分类: world

  • Somali piracy surges as the impact of the US-Iran war ripples outwards

    Somali piracy surges as the impact of the US-Iran war ripples outwards

    A sharp resurgence of piracy off the coast of Somalia has amplified threats to global commercial shipping, a sector already strained by maritime blockades and escalating regional tensions stemming from the ongoing conflict between the United States and Iran. In just four days last week, two separate cargo vessels were seized in the Gulf of Aden, pushing the total number of recorded attacks since the start of 2026 to at least 13. This wave of hijackings marks the most significant escalation of maritime criminal activity in the region in more than a decade, reviving long-dormant fears over security for one of the world’s most critical trade corridors.

    “Piracy is always a crime of opportunity,” explained Omar Mahmood, senior Somalia analyst at the International Crisis Group (ICG). “Right now, the pirates see a clear opening to act.” That opening has been created by cascading insecurity in key waterways further north: the Strait of Hormuz remains a flashpoint for ongoing tensions between Washington and Tehran, while Iran-aligned Houthi forces in Yemen have enforced a targeted blockade of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, the critical gateway to the Red Sea. Though the blockade was originally implemented as part of the Houthi dispute with Saudi Arabia, it has upended security for all international shipping transiting the region.

    Vice-Admiral Ignacio Villanueva Serrano, operations commander for the European Union’s naval mission tasked with protecting shipping off Somalia’s coast, noted that pirates have calculated international security resources are already stretched thin by the northern crises. “They believe that international forces will be focused on managing Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb, rather than prioritizing counter-piracy patrols off Somalia,” he said.

    Two recent high-profile seizures underscore the growing threat. On August 17, the MV Lutuf, a Cameroon-flagged cargo vessel, was hijacked off the coast of Somalia’s semi-autonomous Puntland region. Just four days later, pirates boarded the MT Sibu 1, an Eritrean-flagged oil products tanker, in Gulf of Aden waters near the Yemeni coast.

    The hijacking of the MV Lutuf has triggered unforeseen diplomatic and security fallout. Since August 18, two drone strikes targeting alleged pirate supply networks linked to the vessel have killed 13 men. While no party has officially claimed responsibility for the attacks, local and regional officials have blamed Turkey, claiming the MV Lutuf was carrying a cargo of Turkish weapons bound for Somalia’s capital, Mogadishu.

    The BBC has confirmed that the MV Lutuf is now one of six vessels being held by pirate groups demanding multi-million dollar ransoms. Four of the seized ships are currently anchored near Bander Beyla, a coastal fishing town long recognized as a piracy hotbed. Current activity remains far below the peak of Somali piracy 15 years ago, when attacks cost the global economy billions of dollars annually: in 2011 alone, Somali pirates launched more than 200 attacks and held hundreds of crew members hostage. A coordinated international naval response, paired with the adoption of private security teams on commercial vessels, successfully drove down attacks and contained smaller flare-ups in 2023 and 2024.

    But experts warn that while pirate networks were suppressed for years, they were never dismantled. Root causes including widespread poverty and persistent weak governance and security in Somalia have never been addressed, allowing criminal networks to remain intact. Locally, the current resurgence is fueled by deep-seated anger over unregulated overfishing by foreign trawlers in Somali territorial waters, which has gutted the small-scale fishing industry that sustains coastal communities in Puntland.

    Shifting shipping patterns have also created more targets for pirates. As vessel operators divert their routes south to avoid conflict and blockades further north, more commercial ships are now passing closer to Somalia’s coastline. With global oil prices remaining elevated, hijacking a loaded oil tanker has become a far more lucrative criminal enterprise. Mahmood noted the confluence of factors working in pirates’ favor: “You have that combined effect of less naval patrolling but more commercial shipping in these waters, and that signals an opportunity. And once you’ve had a successful attack, that spurs other criminal groups to carry out copycat incidents.”

    Analysts have also floated the possibility of limited collaboration between Somali pirate networks and Yemeni criminal groups, following multiple seizures near the Yemeni coast. Mahmood, however, says any collaboration is almost certainly between criminal factions, not with Iran-backed Houthi forces—especially since the MT Sibu 1 is reportedly part of Iran’s so-called “shadow fleet” of vessels used to transport oil in violation of U.S. sanctions. “I don’t see something specifically Iran-directed,” he emphasized.

    Turkey’s role in the crisis has emerged as a major point of political tension. Unnamed Puntland security sources and a Somali federal government official have told the BBC that the MV Lutuf was carrying weapons and sensitive satellite equipment bound for a Turkish military training facility in Mogadishu, as well as a new Turkish space station being constructed north of the capital. Turkey has a long-standing defense and economic partnership with Somalia’s federal government, focused in part on strengthening Somalia’s maritime security. The sources also claim that six international warships are currently deployed near the hijacked MV Lutuf: two from Turkey, and one each from Spain, Denmark, the United States, and India. The BBC has not been able to independently verify this deployment.

    The Somali government official, who spoke on condition of anonymity, alleged that Turkey carried out the second deadly drone strike on August 24 that killed nine armed men. “The men who were killed were criminals and I don’t have sympathy for them, but taking it to that level is escalating the situation even more,” he said. Turkey’s defense ministry has confirmed that its forces are providing “necessary support” to Somali authorities within the framework of their existing security agreement, but has not directly addressed accusations it carried out the drone strikes. Somalia’s federal government has only stated publicly that it is aware of counter-piracy operations and will take appropriate steps to manage the situation.

    Puntland authorities have been far more vocal in their opposition. Deputy Puntland Security Minister Abdirahman Yusuf told BBC Somali Service that his administration has evidence linking Turkey to the drone strikes, citing observed Turkish military activity near the MV Lutuf and along the Puntland coast. The BBC has not independently verified these claims. Puntland’s security ministry issued a formal statement opposing “bombings by international warships targeting civilians” that “undermined co-operation in combatting piracy,” and demanded an immediate explanation for the strikes.

    Analysts warn that the incident has further complicated long-running political tensions between the semi-autonomous Puntland region and the federal government in Mogadishu, which has long had a close military relationship with Turkey. This political rift already undermines efforts to coordinate a unified counter-piracy response across Somalia.

    While the current wave of hijackings has not yet reached the level of a full-blown piracy resurgence, experts warn that without a de-escalation of the U.S.-Iran conflict and renewed international investment in counter-piracy deterrence, Somali piracy will continue to raise security risks in one of the world’s most economically vital maritime corridors.

  • Transgender former Israeli spy detained by ICE in US

    Transgender former Israeli spy detained by ICE in US

    A transgender Israeli woman with a background in elite Israeli military intelligence is set to be deported from the United States following a conviction on felony kidnapping charges, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) confirmed this week.

    ICE announced in a public statement Thursday that agents took Eliyahu Alon, identified by the agency as a “criminal illegal alien from Israel”, into custody during a targeted enforcement operation in Concord, New Hampshire. ICE referenced Alon by her previous given name, Avishay, a decision that comes amid Alon’s longstanding legal fight over gender recognition during her criminal proceedings.

    According to ICE’s public disclosure, Alon’s criminal record includes three separate felony convictions: making criminal threats with a deadly weapon, kidnapping, and unlawful possession of controlled substances. Before relocating to the United States, Alon served in Unit 81, one of the Israeli Defense Forces’ most sensitive classified divisions, which develops cutting-edge technology for special operations run by Israeli military intelligence. Following her military service, Alon transitioned gender and went on to hold senior engineering positions at major U.S. tech giants Amazon and Microsoft, court records and legal representatives confirmed to The Jerusalem Post.

    Alon’s offense stemmed from a 2024 incident: she was arrested in September that year for abducting a male acquaintance whom she suspected had spiked her water bottle with GHB, the so-called “date rape drug” linked to sexual assault. Court indictment documents show that the plan to abduct and interrogate the man originated with a friend of Alon’s, Brian Levy, who pushed Alon to confront the suspect. When law enforcement arrived at Alon’s Dover, New Hampshire, residence to investigate a report of a suspicious vehicle parked outside, they inadvertently uncovered the kidnapping: officers heard the victim screaming for help from inside the home. At the time of the raid, Alon had two loaded handguns on the property, one of which was fitted with an illegal silencer, and she had pointed one of the weapons at the victim during his detention, the indictment confirms.

    Alon was tried and sentenced as a male despite her public gender identity as a woman, receiving a prison sentence of 2 to 6 years in state custody in early July. Following her sentencing, Alon launched a legal challenge to her placement in a male correctional facility, requesting access to gender-affirming medical care and a transfer to a women’s prison. Instead of ruling on her correctional placement appeal, New Hampshire authorities transferred Alon to federal immigration custody on August 20 to begin deportation proceedings, clearing the way for her removal from the U.S. once her sentence concludes.

  • Colombia captures a suspected Tren de Aragua gang leader as US security ties deepen

    Colombia captures a suspected Tren de Aragua gang leader as US security ties deepen

    In a high-profile joint operation marking a new era of regional security cooperation, Colombian security forces have captured Luis Saúl Pérez Nieto, a suspected top-ranking leader of the transnational Venezuelan criminal gang Tren de Aragua, U.S. Southern Command announced Friday. The arrest, carried out Thursday with participation from the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, stands as the first major milestone in deepened counter-organized crime collaboration between the two neighboring countries following the inauguration of Colombia’s new conservative president Abelardo de la Espriella.

    Pérez Nieto, who operates under the aliases “Páez” and “Nairobi”, is accused by Colombian law enforcement of overseeing the gang’s cross-continental drug and weapons trafficking networks, and leading Tren de Aragua’s expansion into Peru. Originally founded as a prison gang based out of Venezuela’s Tocorón penitentiary, the organization has evolved into a powerful transnational syndicate under the coordination of leaders like Pérez Nieto. In 2023, he escaped from Tocorón prison alongside the gang’s top leader Héctor “Niño Guerrero” Guerrero Flores, who was killed earlier this year in a U.S. military strike conducted under a rare collaborative agreement with the Venezuelan government.

    A self-described admirer of U.S. President Donald Trump, de la Espriella took office earlier this month on a promise to dismantle Colombia’s powerful drug trafficking networks with direct support from Washington. In a sharp policy reversal from his progressive predecessor, his administration has designated Colombia’s second-largest city Medellín as the operational hub for Trump’s new regional anti-cartel alliance, and formally approved joint U.S. military counter-crime operations on Colombian soil.

    “Narco-terrorists have no safe haven in our hemisphere,” U.S. Southern Command stated in its official announcement Friday. “We stand united with our partners to dismantle these criminal networks and protect our homeland.” DEA Administrator Terry Cole extended congratulations to the Colombian government and national police for the successful capture, noting the operation as a major win for regional counter-terror and anti-crime efforts.

    U.S. authorities have formally requested Pérez Nieto’s extradition to face charges of terrorism, money laundering, drug trafficking, and criminal conspiracy, per confirmation from Colombian and Peruvian officials. As of Friday, the Trump administration had not released public details of the U.S. case against the suspect, and the DEA declined to comment further on the specific charges or its operational role.

    The capture comes amid a broader push by the Trump administration to expand coordinated counter-cartel action across South America, aligned with a growing regional shift toward conservative, Trump-aligned leaders who have campaigned on aggressive security crackdowns. Earlier this week, U.S. Southern Command chief General Francis Donovan met with Colombian defense and military leaders in the Pacific port city of Tumaco, before traveling to neighboring Ecuador for security talks centered on the volatile Colombia-Ecuador border, a key transit route long exploited by cartels for drug smuggling, illegal mining, and human trafficking.

    During the visit, Donovan announced that U.S., Colombian, and Ecuadorian officials had agreed to a new coordinated strategy to “hunt cartel leadership, shatter their logistics and permanently deny them safe haven.” “The border between Colombia and Ecuador is a geographic chokepoint that violent cartels have long exploited,” Donovan said. “Today, we are changing the game.” Colombia and Ecuador are among the handful of South American governments that have approved joint U.S. military counter-crime operations on their territory, a core part of the Trump administration’s plan to expand its lethal campaign against drug smuggling from maritime routes to inland criminal networks.

    On the same day Pérez Nieto’s capture was announced, Chilean officials celebrated their own major security victory against Tren de Aragua, with the extradition of two suspected gang leaders from the U.S. and Colombia to face charges connected to the 2024 abduction and murder of former Venezuelan army Lieutenant Ronald Ojeda, a dissident who had been granted political asylum in Chile. Ojeda’s body was discovered buried in a cement-lined pit inside a suitcase in the Chilean capital Santiago.

    Chilean President José Antonio Kast, another Trump-aligned conservative leader who took office on promises of sweeping crime reduction and mass deportations, has faced widespread criticism for failing to deliver on his security pledges. The extraditions mark a high-profile win for his administration. Chilean authorities have charged Rafael Enrique Gámez Salas, alleged head of Tren de Aragua’s primary Chilean branch Los Piratas, with kidnapping, extortion, and criminal association. The second suspect, Alfredo Camilo Carrillo Ortiz, alias “El Gocho”, was extradited from Colombia, with prosecutors accusing him of helping plan and execute Ojeda’s killing and managing the informal settlement where the dissident was buried.

    Chile’s Undersecretary for Public Security María del Pilar Giannini called the extraditions “a concrete demonstration” of the Kast government’s commitment to rooting out transnational organized crime, adding “We are going to pursue them to the very end.” U.S. officials also praised the extradition of Gámez, who was transferred from a U.S. federal prison in California where he was serving a sentence for illegal reentry. U.S. Attorney General Todd Blanche called the transfer “evidence of the strong cooperation with our Chilean partners to combat transnational crime, dismantle foreign terrorist organizations like Tren de Aragua and hold members accountable for their heinous criminal acts.”

    The Trump administration designated Tren de Aragua as a formal foreign terrorist organization last year, part of a policy shift to treat Latin American cartels as U.S. national security threats rather than ordinary criminal groups. However, independent reporting from The Associated Press has previously documented that Trump has at times overstated the gang’s transnational connections to justify expanded deportation policies targeting Venezuelan migrants.

  • Sudanese in Kordofan’s Bara the latest civilians to be forced into battle

    Sudanese in Kordofan’s Bara the latest civilians to be forced into battle

    Two and a half years into Sudan’s brutal civil conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), civilian communities across the country have been left with no choice but to take up arms to defend their homes, families and lives. As fighting shifts to the resource-rich Kordofan region south of Darfur, this pattern of civilian mobilisation has repeated – drawing in pro-democracy activists, former regime opponents, and ordinary people united by the shared threat of RSF violence, even as political divisions over the movement persist.

    This wave of civilian self-defence is not a new development. From the earliest months of the war, which broke out in April 2023, communities have risen up to repel RSF incursions when central military defences failed. In summer 2023, Masalit fighters in Darfur’s al-Geneina launched a counteroffensive against advancing RSF and allied militias that were rampaging through the city. Villages in al-Jazira state, south of Khartoum, fought off invading RSF fighters even as surrounding neighbourhoods and towns fell. Most infamously, residents of el-Fasher – the besieged capital of North Darfur – helped hold RSF forces at bay for more than 550 days, until defensive lines collapsed in October 2025, leading to a massacre that killed an estimated 60,000 people.

    Today, the epicentre of the conflict has moved south to Kordofan, and civilians here too have joined the fight. Most have aligned with Popular Resistance units, organised to fight alongside the SAF. The Popular Resistance was formally established by SAF chief General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan in June 2023, with the military providing tens of thousands of civilian volunteers with weapons and basic combat training. Its ranks include a diverse cross-section of Sudanese society, even counting pro-democracy revolutionaries who once opposed Burhan and his military government.

    But the movement has not escaped political controversy. Sumood, a bloc of civilian political parties led by former Sudanese prime minister Abdalla Hamdok, argues that the Popular Resistance is dominated by religious conservatives who seek to use the movement as a vehicle to restore political figures from the authoritarian regime of former president Omar al-Bashir to power.

    For civilians on the frontlines in North Kordofan, however, politics have been set aside in the face of existential violence. Mustafa Karam al-Din, a pharmacist from the strategic city of Bara, joined the Popular Resistance under SAF command after RSF fighters killed his brother and ransacked his family home in 2024. “They raided our house, killing my brother and others in my neighbourhood, so I had no option other than taking up weapons to protect myself and my family and neighbours,” Karam al-Din explained in an interview with Middle East Eye in el-Obeid, capital of North Kordofan. “The RSF was very brutal with everybody when they entered the city. That wasn’t just against armed people but against all citizens, including the civilians.”

    According to Karam al-Din, the RSF launched a campaign of collective revenge when it recaptured Bara in 2024, after the SAF briefly seized control of the city and residents celebrated the RSF’s expulsion. “They had videos and lists of some people, including the agents of the Popular Resistance,” he said. For civilian communities across Bara and wider Kordofan, this brutality made clear that self-defence was a necessity. “They entered police stations and weapons stores and took up weapons. They also got others from the SAF. Then the Popular Resistance was organised, including in Bara, el-Obeid and other areas in Kordofan,” Karam al-Din added.

    Bara has been one of the hardest-hit areas in the latest phase of the war, changing hands between the SAF and RSF multiple times over the past three years due to its position along Kordofan’s critical Export Road. Since July 2025, the city has been held by the SAF. “Since October last year we have been fighting with the SAF against the RSF until we liberated our city, and I’m very proud of that,” Karam al-Din said.

    Karam al-Din frames the conflict not just as a domestic civil war, but as a fight against foreign intervention: the RSF has been widely backed by the United Arab Emirates, which has continued to supply the paramilitary with weapons and foreign mercenaries despite global condemnation and widespread accusations of RSF war crimes, including genocide in Darfur – a charge already formally leveled by the U.S. government and multiple leading human rights organisations. “This conflict has become a war against the UAE’s foreign invasion, which is using the RSF as a tool,” said Karam al-Din, who now mans frontline checkpoints. He added that SAF forces recovering Bara found evidence of UAE-origin weapons and supplies in captured RSF positions, and that resistance fighters have arrested foreign mercenaries from Colombia, South Sudan and other countries fighting alongside the RSF in towns including Um Syala and Gabrat al-Shiekh.

    Godat Abdul Hadi, a senior Popular Resistance leader, told MEE that the organisation now runs military training programs for hundreds of young people displaced from Bara to el-Obeid. “The Popular Resistance in el-Obeid, Bara and other areas began at the start of the war and even before the SAF officially declared and expanded it under SAF command,” he explained. “The number was initially small, but it has hugely increased in response to the RSF invasion of the majority of North and West Kordofan and with the widespread atrocities it committed.”

    Not all civilian activists in Kordofan have embraced armed resistance alongside the SAF, however. Mohammed Adam, a pro-democracy activist and member of the Resistance Committees network that led the 2019 revolution that ousted Bashir, long questioned whether aligning with the military was the right response to RSF aggression. When the RSF overran Bara in October 2024, Adam was sheltering a group of armed young resistance fighters in his home, and faced immediate danger when the paramilitary advanced.

    “I can never forget that day. Some of the armed youths were with me in my house, and they were unable to join their units because of intensive RSF fire. So, we lay under beds for hours, and when the crossfire stopped, we realised the SAF had been defeated and RSF fighters were starting to attack civilians,” Adam recalled. The group quickly hid all weapons and military uniforms, and Adam provided civilian clothes for the fighters before they attempted to flee. Even after RSF fighters entered the home, accused the group of being associates of the former “deep state” and searched the property, they did not discover the hidden arms, allowing Adam and the fighters to escape that night to el-Obeid.

    Looking back on the chaos, Adam described scenes of widespread carnage: dozens of civilian bodies left in the streets, with wounded and displaced residents relying on help from nearby village communities for basic food, water and emergency medical care. He recalled a particularly brutal incident that turned even hesitant residents in Bara completely against the RSF: paramilitary fighters killed a local neighbour, then opened fire on his funeral the same day, killing dozens more unarmed civilians for no reason.

    Critics within Kordofan’s pro-democracy movement share the concern that the Popular Resistance has been co-opted by allies of the old Bashir regime. One anonymous Resistance Committees activist from Bara told MEE that former regime associates are leading the Popular Resistance in the region to pave the way for an authoritarian comeback. “Former regime associates are leading the so-called Popular Resistance in Bara and other places in order to pave the way for the old regime to exploit the war and return to power,” the activist said. “This war has to be stopped by all means and concessions. It destroyed the country and enabled the old regime to come back through the SAF.”

    Even Adam, who has reservations about aligning with Burhan’s military, acknowledges that ordinary civilians have no other viable option to protect themselves from RSF brutality. “The RSF has attacked everybody: civilians or military, young or old, men or women. They take revenge on everybody in Bara,” he said. “Those who took up weapons in self-defence were our brothers, cousins and neighbours. Any previous political disagreements are not an issue at the moment. Let me tell you: I prefer not to carry weapons under the SAF, but I can’t tell those who have been attacked and humiliated by the RSF not to defend themselves by all means.”

  • Footage of Tibet floods isn’t being shown in China – and we know little about victims there

    Footage of Tibet floods isn’t being shown in China – and we know little about victims there

    Dramatic surveillance footage capturing a catastrophic flash flood tearing through Gyirong Port, a key border crossing between Nepal and Tibet Autonomous Region of China, has circulated widely across global social media and international news outlets—yet it remains almost entirely inaccessible to audiences inside China, according to a new Reuters report.

    The torrential flood, which struck earlier this week, has already claimed hundreds of lives, with hundreds more still unaccounted for as of Friday. But inside China’s strictly censored online ecosystem, searches for information about the disaster and related user-generated content are heavily restricted. As of Thursday, China’s national state-run flagship news bulletin had only aired a single still image of the event, with minimal additional context.

    While Beijing has launched a large-scale search and rescue operation deploying hundreds of emergency responders, and President Xi Jinping personally chaired an emergency coordination meeting to direct response efforts, the stark contrast between global access to on-the-ground footage and the controlled information environment inside China has thrown the country’s online censorship framework into sharp relief.

    China’s administration of Tibet has long been marked by strict information controls. Beijing asserts full sovereignty over the region, which it annexed in the 1950s, and has repeatedly cracked down on anti-government protests, while facing widespread international accusations of severe human rights violations against the Tibetan Buddhist population. Chinese authorities have designated the exiled Tibetan spiritual leader the Dalai Lama as a separatist, and the region’s name itself is a heavily monitored term for Chinese online censors. These long-standing sensitivities have shaped the government’s response to the disaster, observers say.

    State media has published incremental updates confirming the rising death toll, ongoing rescue work, and risks posed by a newly formed barrier lake at risk of catastrophic overflow. But beyond official statements highlighting rescue operations, little additional information has been released. No firsthand survivor accounts from the affected areas in Tibet have been made public, and no user-posted footage of the disaster or its aftermath has been allowed to remain online. Anxious families of missing people inside the region have also not spoken publicly, and contacting residents in the area remains extraordinarily difficult even in non-disaster times. One veteran foreign correspondent with experience covering North Korea noted that reaching interview subjects in Pyongyang is often easier than connecting to people in Lhasa, Tibet’s capital.

    The information gap was thrown into stark relief Thursday evening, when China’s main state broadcaster led its flagship evening news segment not with the Himalayan flood disaster, but with the launch of a new collection of President Xi Jinping’s political writings. Foreign journalists are barred from traveling to Tibet without prior official approval, leaving international reporters with a narrow window to gather information before content is scrubbed from online platforms and local voices are silenced. Most external reporting has therefore had to rely exclusively on official state media dispatches, which have focused heavily on the dramatic efforts of rescue teams scaling cliffs and crossing raging rivers to reach hard-hit communities, with no details on the number of people saved or the full extent of damage.

    Analysts emphasize that Beijing is not indifferent to the disaster: Premier Li Qiang, China’s second-highest ranking leader, was rapidly dispatched to the region to oversee debris removal and response efforts, an unusually quick visit for a top official following a major crisis. Instead, the muted, controlled public narrative is rooted in the Chinese Communist Party’s overriding priority of maintaining social stability, the report notes.

    Party leadership fears that a large-scale, unregulated public discussion of the disaster could stoke public discontent over the response or perceived lack of pre-disaster mitigation, observers say. There are also additional concerns that the tragedy could become a organizing point for dissent, particularly in a region where Buddhist religious identity remains a core part of community life. While large-scale public protests have not occurred in Tibet for years, Tibetan exile groups have repeatedly raised alarms over expanding Beijing control, including new education policies that critics say erode the influence of monasteries and Buddhist cultural practice.

    Within hours of the flood striking, local party authorities issued an internal notice calling on grassroots party members to lead relief efforts, provide psychological support to affected residents, and prioritize maintaining social order and public confidence in disaster zones. The notice explicitly states that members who perform well will receive rewards, while those who fail to meet expectations will face disciplinary action. Rights activists report that Tibetan residents can face detention or arrest for speaking to foreign journalists or posting online content that deviates from the official government narrative, a restriction that has left ethnic Tibetans living outside the region unable to confirm the safety of family members trapped in the disaster zone.

    The International Campaign for Tibet, an advocacy group, has acknowledged the critical work of on-the-ground first responders, but has accused Beijing of systematically removing user-generated videos and firsthand accounts of the disaster from domestic social platforms. The organization has called on Chinese authorities to release full, verifiable information about the scale of casualties and damage.

    Beijing has long rejected accusations of human rights violations in Tibet, pointing to massive infrastructure and economic investments that have grown the region’s tourism sector and integrated it more closely with China’s national economy. Even so, most Chinese citizens residing outside Tibet currently have little access to accurate, detailed information about the flood disaster unfolding in the Himalayan border region.

  • 97-year-old woman rescued after Nepali floods looked like ‘a warrior’

    97-year-old woman rescued after Nepali floods looked like ‘a warrior’

    In the wake of devastating flash floods that swept through Nepal, a remarkable story of survival has captured public attention: 97-year-old Guna Maya Bohara emerged alive after being trapped by the rushing floodwaters, and was successfully pulled to safety in an extraordinary rescue operation that relied on heavy construction equipment.

    Local rescue teams responding to the flood disaster faced challenging terrain and fast-moving water that complicated evacuation efforts for trapped residents. When crews located Bohara, who had been cut off by the sudden surge of floodwater, they made the unconventional call to use an excavator to reach her isolated position. The heavy machinery allowed rescuers to navigate the waterlogged, debris-strewn landscape and extract the elderly woman without serious injury.

    Witnesses and first responders described the elderly survivor as displaying remarkable grit throughout the ordeal, with many noting she bore the quiet steadfastness of a warrior in the face of life-threatening disaster. Her survival against the odds has become a symbol of resilience for communities reeling from the damage caused by the sudden flash floods, which have become an increasingly frequent extreme weather event in the Himalayan nation in recent years.

  • Pakistan’s new mediation push revives hopes for US-Iran climbdown

    Pakistan’s new mediation push revives hopes for US-Iran climbdown

    For weeks, long-simmering tensions between the United States and Iran have raised the risk of full-scale escalation, leaving regional powers scrambling to keep diplomatic channels open. Among these actors, Pakistan’s sustained diplomatic outreach has reignited a long-debated question: is Islamabad merely a passive messenger carrying demands between Washington and Tehran, or has it emerged as an independent, credible mediator with the access and standing to de-escalate tensions? Field Marshal Syed Asim Munir’s August 24 visit to Tehran, the latest step in a months-long cross-branch diplomatic effort led by Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar, Interior Minister Mohsin Naqvi and Pakistan’s top military command, offers strong evidence for the latter.

    Islamabad has maintained open, formal channels with both capitals throughout the conflict, with a core mandate to narrow ideological gaps, prevent violent escalation, and preserve a viable pathway to a negotiated ceasefire and long-term settlement. Prior to Munir’s Tehran trip, Reuters reported that former US President Donald Trump spoke with the Pakistani military chief and asked Islamabad to leverage its close ties with Iran to encourage Tehran to return to the negotiating table. But framing the visit as nothing more than a mission carried out on Washington’s behalf overlooks the broader strategic context of Pakistan’s months-long engagement. Pakistan’s Foreign Office has explicitly rejected labeling Munir as a US envoy, framing the trip as a natural continuation of Islamabad’s independent mediatory efforts.

    This framing is supported by the two-way nature of Pakistan’s diplomatic work. Diplomatic sources based in Washington confirm that Islamabad does not only deliver US proposals to Iranian leadership; it also relays Tehran’s counterproposals back to Washington, paired with independent, contextual assessments from Pakistani diplomats. This level of proactive analysis and engagement goes far beyond basic message delivery, indicating a deliberate effort to bridge gaps and find common ground between the two adversarial parties.

    Pakistan’s role as a mediator in the conflict predates Munir’s most recent diplomatic mission by months. The most tangible outcome of this sustained engagement came in June, when the United States and Iran signed the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding, with Pakistan serving as the official mediator and signing witness to the deal. The agreement established a temporary cessation of military operations, guaranteed unimpeded commercial passage through the Strait of Hormuz, and laid out a formal framework for future negotiations on a broader, permanent settlement. Shortly after the MoU was signed, follow-up talks were held in Switzerland with delegates from Iran, the US, and co-mediators Pakistan and Qatar in attendance.

    While the original agreement later frayed amid overlapping disputes over sanctions implementation, compliance with ceasefire terms, and navigation rules in the Strait of Hormuz, it remains the only formal negotiated framework produced since the latest round of conflict erupted. This existing diplomatic foundation gives Pakistan far more credibility than a casual informal messenger: it provides a pre-built architecture that can be revived to restart stalled talks.

    Against this backdrop, Pakistan’s current diplomatic push is less about building a new negotiating process from scratch, and more about shoring up and revitalizing the existing framework established by the Islamabad MoU. Munir’s visit to Tehran fits squarely into this strategy. Accompanied by Interior Minister Mohsin Naqvi, Munir held meetings with senior political and security leaders across Iran’s government. Discussions centered on de-escalation, resuming formal negotiations, stabilizing navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, and building a path toward a permanent end to hostilities.

    Iran’s presidential office described the talks as highly productive, noting that the visit delivered significant diplomatic breakthroughs whose outcomes will be made public in the coming weeks. Iranian officials have also publicly acknowledged Pakistan’s constructive efforts to facilitate dialogue and reduce tensions. This mutual recognition is critical: effective mediation requires that the mediator is seen as legitimate and unbiased by both adversarial sides, a bar Islamabad has been able to clear so far.

    To be clear, Pakistan’s recent outreach has not yet delivered a comprehensive, final settlement to the US-Iran conflict, and no major breakthrough has been announced. But Tehran’s positive assessment of Pakistan’s engagement, alongside its continued willingness to treat the Islamabad MoU as a viable foundation for renewed diplomacy, has strengthened Islamabad’s position as a trusted bridge between the two sides. Tehran’s willingness to restart talks remains conditional: Iranian officials insist that Washington must address what Tehran characterizes as violations of the original June agreement before the framework can be fully restored. Even so, the ongoing relevance of the MoU confirms that Pakistan began its mediatory work long before Washington’s most recent request for assistance, and its efforts are rooted in independent strategic priorities.

    Munir’s unique access to Iran’s top security establishment further underscores Pakistan’s unique value as a mediator. One of his key meetings during the Tehran visit was with General Mohsen Rezaei, the Supreme Leader’s representative on Iran’s Supreme National Security Council. This level of access to Iran’s core security decision-makers gives Islamabad a rare ability to assess whether both Iran’s civilian leadership and security establishment are prepared to support renewed diplomatic talks.

    Pakistan also has clear, self-interested strategic reasons to prevent a prolonged full-scale conflict between the US and Iran. Instability around the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world’s most critical energy chokepoints, threatens global energy markets and Pakistani maritime commerce. Open conflict along Iran’s border with Pakistan would create severe domestic security pressures for Islamabad, while a sustained US-Iran confrontation would complicate Pakistan’s diplomatic and economic relationships across the Gulf region. For Pakistan, mediation is therefore not just a goodwill gesture: it is a direct investment in its own national security and economic stability. While Washington clearly benefits from Pakistan’s access to Tehran, passing proposals between two adversarial parties that lack direct diplomatic ties is a core function of any legitimate mediation. The more important test of Pakistan’s credibility is whether it maintains independent access to both sides and helps shape a negotiating process, rather than simply parroting one party’s demands. Islamabad’s recent diplomatic track record indicates that it is meeting this test.

    The Strait of Hormuz offers the clearest immediate opportunity to test whether renewed diplomacy can deliver tangible results. Any disruption to shipping through the strait impacts Gulf oil producers, major Asian energy importers, and the entire global economy. Even if the broader political dispute between the US and Iran remains unresolved, progress on stabilizing commercial navigation through the waterway could serve as a critical early confidence-building measure to reset relations.

    Recent diplomatic efforts by Oman have already yielded incremental progress on this file. Omani Foreign Minister Badr Al-Busaidi’s recent visit to Tehran produced an agreement on a phased approach to de-escalation, including a temporary safe navigation corridor, mine clearance operations, real-time information sharing between parties, and improved maritime traffic management, with ongoing technical talks working toward a permanent arrangement. Omani and Pakistani diplomatic initiatives are not competing tracks for negotiation: Oman can lead work on practical on-the-ground arrangements for Hormuz navigation, while Pakistan’s unique access to both Washington and Tehran can support the broader political agreements needed to make those practical arrangements permanent. A localized maritime agreement can reduce an immediate source of military confrontation, while a revived Islamabad framework can address broader sticking points including sanctions relief, mutual military restraint, and reciprocal compliance with deal terms. Together, these parallel tracks offer a viable path away from military pressure and toward incremental, sustainable de-escalation.

    Fundamental disagreements between the US and Iran remain unresolved. Tehran has not publicly committed to making unilateral concessions to restart talks, while Washington continues to rely on harsh economic sanctions and military posturing as leverage against the Iranian government. Unconfirmed reports of a potential US proposal offering limited sanctions relief in exchange for Iranian concessions on Hormuz navigation and regional security have not yet resulted in a publicly confirmed agreement, meaning incremental progress should not be misinterpreted as a final breakthrough.

    Pakistan cannot force Washington or Tehran to accept a deal, nor can Munir resolve the deep structural disagreements that have kept the two countries in conflict for decades. The ultimate success of any mediation effort depends on both sides concluding that a negotiated settlement delivers greater benefits than continued military and economic coercion. Instead, Pakistan’s unique diplomatic value lies in its ability to keep communication lines open when direct engagement between the two parties becomes impossible due to mutual distrust. Islamabad remained engaged in quiet diplomacy even after the original June MoU fell apart, and has maintained consistent contacts with both sides as tensions escalated over recent months.

    That consistent, sustained engagement is what makes Munir’s latest Tehran visit so significant. Far from being a one-off mission carried out on Washington’s behalf, it is part of a broader, independent Pakistani strategy to preserve open communication, revive the Islamabad framework, reduce tensions around the Strait of Hormuz, and create the conditions for a lasting negotiated settlement. In doing so, Pakistan has preserved a strategically critical asset: a functioning, trusted communication channel between two adversaries whose deep mutual distrust repeatedly pushes them toward open conflict.

    If the latest round of talks delivers tangible progress toward de-escalation, Pakistan’s legacy will not be that it sided with either Washington or Tehran. Instead, it will have proven that it can speak credibly to both, and help turn early signs of willingness to compromise into a sustainable, long-term diplomatic process that delivers regional stability.

  • Virginia family with 4 relatives missing in the Nepal-China floods pleads for more rescue help

    Virginia family with 4 relatives missing in the Nepal-China floods pleads for more rescue help

    Days after catastrophic flash floods tore through the Nepal-China Himalayan border region, dozens of North American relatives of missing trekkers join thousands of grieving families worldwide clinging to fragile hope that their loved ones could still be found alive.

    Among those waiting for answers is 27-year-old Mukti Patel, who has gathered with close friends and remaining family at her parents’ home in Richmond, Virginia, since learning the devastating news. Five members of her extended family are among the missing: her 56-year-old father Umesh Kumar, her 32-year-old sister Akanksha Patel, Akanksha’s 32-year-old husband Ishan, and Ishan’s 59-year-old mother Shilpa. The four had joined a 14-day organized trek run by Himalayan Glacier Adventure and Travel Company, a firm with a U.S. office in Baltimore. The entire group of 40 guests and 7 tour guides on the excursion has been unaccounted for since the flood hit.

    Patel recounted that the final contact the family had with the trekking group came on Wednesday, the day the flood struck, when the domestic team called to wish Ishan a happy 32nd birthday. The group was staying in a local hotel near the flood zone that was completely swept away by the surging waters, but Patel refuses to give up on their survival. “I shouldn’t talk in past tense yet,” she said Friday while sharing memories of her loved ones. “We don’t know anything.”

    She described her sister Akanksha, a psychiatrist who dedicated her career to dismantling stigma around mental illness, as a kind and guiding force in her life. “Everything I’ve done in life has been off the blueprint of my sister. There’s no ounce of meanness in her.” Her father Umesh, a long-time adventure enthusiast who had dreamed of making the Himalayan trek for decades, is known for his generous spirit and volunteered to support COVID-19 pandemic victims during the public health crisis. Ishan, an orthopedic surgeon, brought constant joy to his wife’s life, Patel added. The four missing relatives hold dual citizenship between North American nations: Umesh and Akanksha are Canadian citizens, while Ishan and Shilpa hold both Canadian and U.S. passports.

    As of the latest update, more than 2,000 people remain listed as missing following the disaster, which has already confirmed hundreds of fatalities. The U.S. State Department reports that approximately 90 American citizens are among those unaccounted for. Rescuers are still working to extract survivors from layers of mud and debris left by the flood, but progress has been slow and difficult in the hard-hit mountainous region.

    Sanket Pandey, managing director of the tour company organizing the trek, told reporters that during a recent Zoom call with family members of the missing trekkers, many asked if they could travel to the disaster site to support search efforts, and questioned whether any of their loved ones could be trapped in surviving air pockets in collapsed structures. “It’s really difficult to have nothing,” Pandey said of the ongoing uncertainty for waiting families.

    Patel has issued a call for greater international support to speed up rescue and recovery operations in the affected region, as waiting families continue to hold out hope, however thin, that their loved ones will be brought home safely. “I want my family to come home,” she said.

  • Reports split over whether forced contraception of Greenlandic women and girls constituted genocide

    Reports split over whether forced contraception of Greenlandic women and girls constituted genocide

    NUUK, Greenland — A decades-long dark chapter of colonial-era medical abuse against Indigenous Inuit women in Greenland is back in the global spotlight, after two commissioned investigative reports released Friday delivered conflicting conclusions on whether the systematic forced contraception program carried out by Danish health authorities qualifies as an act of genocide under international law.

    The inquiry, commissioned by the self-governing Greenlandic government, was tasked with evaluating the program against the United Nations’ 1948 Genocide Convention, which explicitly classifies imposing measures designed to prevent births within a protected group as an act of genocide. Over the decades of the program running from the 1960s through the early 1990s, an estimated 4,000 Greenlandic women and girls — half of all fertile women on the Arctic island at the time — were fitted with non-consensual intrauterine devices (IUDs), or given unwanted hormonal birth control injections. Survivors who testified to investigators, more than 350 in total, include girls as young as 12 years old, many of whom had no information about the procedure before it was performed and never gave legal or informed consent.

    Public exposure of the abuse, dubbed the “spiral case” after the coiled shape of common IUDs, has triggered widespread outrage in both Denmark and Greenland over the past several years. The program was openly designed to curb rapid population growth among Greenland’s Indigenous population at the time, when improvements to living conditions and basic healthcare led to a natural population increase. Greenland did not take control of its own healthcare system from Denmark until January 1, 1992, when the program officially ended.

    In recent years, Danish officials have taken formal steps toward accountability: last year, Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen issued a formal national apology to survivors, and this week the Danish government approved a 300,000 Danish kroner (approximately $46,500) compensation payout to every confirmed victim of the program. Greenlandic Prime Minister Jens-Frederik Nielsen announced Friday that a national reconciliation commission will be established to continue addressing the harm of the program, a move Frederiksen publicly endorsed.

    The four-person investigative panel split into two factions months before the public release, producing two separate reports with opposing core findings. The Greenlandic government only accepted one of the two reports Friday, noting that the second report — which issued a definitive finding that no genocide occurred — failed to meet established international scientific and investigative standards. The rejected report, led by a former director of the Danish Institute for Human Rights, argued that there was no empirical evidence proving any Danish or Greenlandic authority or medical professional intended to destroy the Greenlandic population as a group, and thus concluded “there was no genocide.”

    In contrast, the accepted report declined to issue a definitive ruling on genocide. Its authors wrote that they were unable to confirm genocidal intent based solely on an investigation of the forced contraception program, and called for further inquiry that would also examine other harmful Danish colonial policies targeting Greenlandic children and families during the same era. Unlike the opposing faction, the accepted report did not rule out the finding of genocide, noting: “It is difficult to imagine circumstances in which an attempt to substantially reduce the population of a single ethnic group could not constitute an intent to destroy, in part, that ethnicity.”

    In its public announcement of the split findings, the Greenlandic government cited “professional disagreements amongst the members and, to some extent, concerns about the geopolitical situation” as the core causes of the panel’s division. The government did not elaborate on what specific geopolitical concerns the dissenting authors referenced. The release of the conflicting reports comes amid a fresh period of geopolitical attention on the Arctic island, after former U.S. President Donald Trump publicly pushed to acquire full U.S. control over Greenland, a self-governing territory within the Kingdom of Denmark. Both Greenlandic and Danish leaders rejected the proposal, affirming that only the people of Greenland can determine their own political future.

  • Satellite images reveal scale of flood devastation in Nepal villages

    Satellite images reveal scale of flood devastation in Nepal villages

    A catastrophic glacial collapse in the transboundary Nepal-Tibet region has unleashed a deadly flash flood along Nepal’s Trishuli River, leaving hundreds dead and hundreds more unaccounted for, new satellite and on-the-ground imagery has confirmed. The disaster, which struck on a Wednesday, has carved a 45-kilometer trail of destruction through river valleys, wiping entire villages, critical infrastructure and agricultural land off the map.

    New before-and-after satellite analysis from two leading private space firms has laid bare the full scope of the devastation, which stretched from the glacial collapse site at the border all the way downstream to lowland Nepalese communities. Verified drone footage captured the exact moment a massive ice chunk broke free from the glacier, leaving a jagged, debris-strewn scar across the mountainside. Planet Labs imagery shows that vegetation and trees were stripped clean from the rock face up to 300 meters above the original riverbed, highlighting the sheer force of the ice and subsequent flood surge.

    The destructive floodwaters carved a path west from the collapse site before turning south along the Trishuli, leaving widespread ruin in every community in its path. At the Nepal-Tibet border crossing, one of the disaster’s hardest-hit locations, imagery from U.S.-based intelligence firm Vantor — released through the company’s open disaster data program — shows the crossing has been almost completely washed away by the rushing water. Shocking CCTV footage from the site captures the moment the churning, debris-laden deluge overwhelms border structures as people scramble to escape to higher ground.

    Visible damage extends more than 2.5 kilometers upstream from the border, with floodwaters and mud reaching 100 meters above the original impact zone. Just a few miles south of the crossing, the small mountain village of Timure has largely vanished from satellite views. Most homes perched along the valley’s steep 50-meter slopes have been either swept away entirely or buried under thick layers of mud and rock. Ten kilometers further downstream in Syapru Besi, the entire settlement is now blanketed by debris, with homes, bridges and a major hydroelectric power plant all destroyed by the surge.

    Further downstream, 45 kilometers from the original collapse site, lies the larger town of Trishuli, which bore the full force of the flood. Verified on-the-ground footage from Trishuli captured dramatic scenes of chaos and destruction: a major road bridge crumples and collapses into the surging river, while passengers trapped on a passing bus scream and scramble for safety as floodwaters rush past. Other videos show survivors huddling on a residential balcony, watching helplessly as the torrent carries large metal debris and a full-sized vehicle toward their home — which, miraculously, remained standing through the disaster. After the waters receded, survivors can be seen emerging from the intact structure to survey a landscape completely covered in thick mud.

    In the wake of the initial collapse, a barrier lake formed at the base of the landslide above the flood path, creating a new secondary hazard that has complicated ongoing rescue and recovery efforts. Chinese authorities have warned that the unstable natural dam poses a major risk of a second catastrophic flood if it fails. Glaciologist Dr. Argha Banerjee, of the Indian Institute of Science Education and Research, told BBC Verify that current satellite imagery is not sufficient to confirm the barrier’s long-term stability or the risk of sudden drainage. However, he noted that the lake’s surface area did not expand significantly between the first two days after the disaster, even as water continued to flow into the basin. A visible natural drainage channel is already allowing some water to escape downstream, and the lake’s current volume is “not alarmingly large” and appears to have stabilized, Banerjee added.

    As of the latest update, Nepalese officials have confirmed more than 550 fatalities, with hundreds of people still reported missing. The extent of damage on the Tibetan side of the border remains unclear, due to strict media access restrictions in the region. BBC Verify has not yet been able to obtain independently verifiable footage or casualty data from the Tibetan side of the border. The open-source satellite imagery released by Vantor is intended to help disaster response authorities prioritize search, rescue and recovery operations, by providing clear geospatial data on the locations of the most severe damage.