When Chinese electric vehicle giant BYD paused plans to construct a manufacturing plant in Turkey back in June, shifting its production priorities to existing European facilities, the decision sent ripples through bilateral relations between Ankara and Beijing. What made the reversal particularly awkward for Turkey’s ruling government was the suite of generous tax breaks Ankara had already granted to BYD for domestic vehicle sales, long before any ground was broken on the promised facility.
The early incentives have already paid major dividends for BYD: the automaker’s Turkish sales skyrocketed to more than 45,000 units in 2025, and industry experts estimate the tax advantages have netted the firm between $500 million and $1 billion in extra profits from the Turkish market to date. The collapse of the plant deal left Beijing’s reputation in Turkey on shaky ground, prompting a sweeping public relations push to reverse the growing negative sentiment, according to a Turkish government consultant who spoke to Middle East Eye.
Ankara, the consultant added, has grown increasingly frustrated with what it views as a pattern of Chinese negotiating behavior: creating the perception that a final binding agreement has been reached, only to return to the table later with an expanded list of new demands. For observers who track China’s activities in Turkey closely, the accelerated PR campaign has been impossible to miss.
China’s embassy in Ankara has begun placing unsigned, pro-Beijing opinion pieces in pro-government Turkish media, emphasizing the strategic importance of high-level ties between the Chinese Communist Party and Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP). The embassy has also pushed widespread coverage of the launch of *Volume Five of Xi Jinping: The Governance of China* across government-aligned Turkish media outlets.
Nurettin Akcay, a Turkish academic who specializes in Chinese affairs, confirms that the BYD collapse has undeniably amplified anti-China sentiment among the Turkish public. He notes, however, that the expansion of China’s public diplomacy work in Turkey is not an entirely new development—Beijing has long cultivated ties with Turkish journalists and opinion leaders, regularly organizing all-expenses-paid visits to China long before the BYD deal fell through.
Turkey and China have navigated a fraught bilateral relationship for more than a decade, with the status of the Uyghur people serving as the most persistent and divisive sticking point. Until 2020, Ankara worked to limit critical Turkish media coverage of human rights abuses against Uyghurs in Xinjiang, holding out hope that the gesture would clear the way for large-scale Chinese investment. In a high-profile step to improve ties at Beijing’s request, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan visited the Uyghur-majority Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in June 2024, a trip billed as resolving one of the core barriers to closer economic cooperation. Yet despite months of negotiations in the wake of Fidan’s visit, the promised electric vehicle plant investments from both BYD and fellow Chinese automaker Chery have yet to move forward.
Akcay, who earned his PhD from Shanghai University, has faced personal repercussions for his public tracking of Chinese lobbying efforts in Turkey. He recently revealed via social media platform X that Shanghai University sent him an official email notifying him that the institution had received dozens of complaints over his critical reporting on China. As a result, the university asked him to stop publicly referencing his PhD degree earned at the school, and Akcay says he now expects he will be permanently barred from re-entering China.
Akcay explains that Beijing’s current outreach strategy in Turkey centers on what he terms “elite engagement”: a curated form of showcase diplomacy that invites prominent Turkish figures to visit carefully selected sites across China to project a sanitized, positive image of the country to the Turkish public. Last month, for example, the China-Turkey Friendship Foundation—a Chinese state-funded organization—organized an eight-day press tour to Xinjiang for journalists from leading Turkish opposition and independent outlets, including T24, Halk TV, Cumhuriyet and Haberturk TV.
None of the participating journalists published coverage echoing international allegations of systemic mistreatment of Uyghurs in Xinjiang; instead, their reports focused on what they described as terrorist threats from radical groups in the region and China’s economic integration policies. Multiple outlets used nearly identical phrasing in their coverage, highlighting Xinjiang’s central role to China’s industrial growth and the Belt and Road Initiative, while framing tourism as a core driver of the region’s development.
This curated narrative directly contradicts findings from global human rights organizations. Human Rights Watch’s 2026 World Report documented that Chinese authorities have tightened ideological controls across Xinjiang and Tibet over the past year, while continuing a harsh campaign of forced assimilation against Uyghur and Tibetan communities. The organization notes that there has never been accountability for crimes against humanity in Xinjiang, where hundreds of thousands of Uyghurs remain arbitrarily detained. Since 2017, the Chinese government has detained hundreds of thousands of Uyghurs in extrajudicial “re-education camps,” demolished thousands of mosques and Islamic cemeteries, and banned religious education for Uyghur communities across Xinjiang.
“Everything is planned, and China gets precisely what it wants because visitors are shown only what they are intended to see,” Akcay said. “Consequently, journalists who visit China encounter a positive picture without fully understanding the broader context of human rights abuses in the region.”
Beyond outreach to journalists and ruling party allies, China’s recent influence campaign in Turkey has expanded to include direct engagement with Turkey’s opposition parties, including the conservative Islamist New Welfare Party and the nationalist Victory Party. A New Welfare Party delegation traveled to China in June, and Chinese Ambassador to Turkey Jiang Xuebin met the party’s chairman Fatih Erbakan just last month. Akcay says Beijing has worked to build positive ties with nearly all of Turkey’s opposition factions, regardless of size, with the Uyghur issue once again serving as the core motivating factor.
Right-wing opposition parties in Turkey can speak relatively openly about the Uyghur issue because it resonates strongly with their conservative, nationalist voter bases, Akcay explains. By cultivating ties across the entire political spectrum, Beijing aims to blunt rising domestic criticism of China within Turkey, and prevent that criticism from escalating into large-scale grassroots campaigns against Chinese investment or policy. While Akcay does not believe the campaign has completely reshaped Turkish public opinion of China, he assesses that the strategy has been partially successful in preventing the emergence of a coordinated, radical counter-movement.
“China is seeking to minimise domestic criticism within Turkey by pursuing a broad engagement strategy,” he noted, adding: “It may not completely transform public perceptions, but it is pursuing an effective strategy to prevent the emergence of a radical counter-campaign.”
