博客

Amid the ongoing military confrontation between the United States and Iran, the Islamic Republic has expanded its retaliatory operations across the Gulf region, targeting U.S. strategic assets while turning its attention to Iranian Kurdish opposition groups based in northern Iraq. The cross-border strikes have deepened regional instability and sparked new debate over the nature of the threat Tehran perceives from these exiled Kurdish factions.

Keywan Faramarzi, international relations representative for the Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan, confirmed to Middle East Eye that recent weeks of attacks on Komala bases and operational hubs in Iraqi Kurdistan have left 10 fighters dead. While no group has formally taken responsibility for the strikes, Faramarzi explicitly pinned the blame on the Iranian government, framing the violence as part of a long-standing state policy to eliminate Iranian Kurdish opposition organizations operating beyond Iran’s official borders.

Komala is not alone in facing this escalation. Multiple other Iranian Kurdish opposition groups have reported similar attacks both in northern Iraq and inside Kurdish-populated regions of Iran itself.

The latest surge in Iranian strikes follows unconfirmed reports from Israeli media claiming Turkey pressured the U.S. to scrap a planned operation that would have deployed Iranian Kurdish fighters across the border to overthrow Tehran’s government. Since the U.S.-Israeli military campaign against Iran launched in February, rumors of a Kurdish incursion into Iran have circulated repeatedly, but this most recent proposal was said to carry greater strategic ambitions – and the Iranian leadership has treated the threat with clear seriousness.

In a public statement released July 19, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi accused the U.S. and Israel of plotting to fragment Iran using Kurdish opposition groups as proxies. “I made clear that if any threat emerges against us from Iraqi Kurdistan, we will respond without question,” he said.

Despite Tehran’s claims, all major Iraqi-based Iranian Kurdish parties have flatly denied any involvement in internal Iranian armed conflict, and reject assertions that former U.S. President Donald Trump ever proposed a cross-border ground operation to them. “We have no knowledge of any such plan, and no verifiable evidence exists to support these allegations,” Faramarzi said. “These reports read as nothing more than media speculation that does not align with on-the-ground realities.”

Hana Yazdanpanah, a representative for the Kurdistan Freedom Party (PAK), echoed that denial. “We hold no such intention,” she told Middle East Eye. Yazdanpanah acknowledged that PAK supported and defended Kurdish communities in Iranian Kurdistan during the January anti-government protests, but dismissed all claims of involvement in a regime-change operation as baseless. “Neither the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, our party PAK, nor any other Iranian Kurdish party have taken part in any such operation, nor have we received any weapons or military supplies from foreign actors,” she added.

Even with these consistent denials, Iran’s unbroken campaign of strikes confirms that Tehran still views the exiled Kurdish factions as a meaningful threat. Middle East Eye reached out to the Iranian Foreign Ministry for additional comment, but received no response prior to publication.

As demographic data cited by Minority Rights Group International shows, Kurds make up roughly 10 percent of Iran’s total population, concentrated primarily in the country’s western provinces of Kurdistan, Kermanshah, West Azerbaijan, and Ilam. For decades, several Iranian Kurdish opposition movements – which Tehran designates as terrorist organizations – have maintained operational bases in the semi-autonomous Kurdistan Region of northern Iraq. These groups include Komala, PAK, the Kurdistan Democratic Party-Iran (PKDI), Khabat, and the Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK), the latter of which holds ties to the Turkey-based Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK).

While the groups hold a range of distinct ideological positions, most are united around two core goals: the self-defense of Kurdish communities inside Iran, and the eventual achievement of self-determination for Iranian Kurdistan. In late February of this year, the major factions announced a new formal coalition, with an explicit stated mission of coordinating efforts “to overthrow the Islamic Republic of Iran.”

In April, former U.S. President Donald Trump claimed his administration had supplied large quantities of firearms to anti-government protesters in Iran, and that Kurdish groups had taken possession of the weapons – a claim the Kurdish parties have repeatedly denied.

“We have formed this alliance to strengthen and escalate our struggle in East Kurdistan [Iranian Kurdistan] and across Iran against the Islamic Republic,” Yazdanpanah said. “In this struggle, we utilize every available method of resistance.” Even so, she emphasized that the coalition has “openly maintained and declared its neutrality” in the ongoing U.S.-Iran conflict.

Estimates of the coalition’s collective military strength put it far below the capacity of Iran’s state security forces. PAK reported roughly 1,000 members in 2019, while PDKI, Komala, and Khabat are believed to have similar troop counts. PJAK officials have claimed as many as 3,000 active fighters. Combined, the entire coalition’s fighting force pales in comparison to Iran’s hundreds of thousands of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) personnel, plus an additional hundreds of thousands of volunteers in the Basij militia network.

This military imbalance has led most independent analysts to conclude the Kurdish coalition lacks the raw power to overthrow Iran’s government on its own. The repeated claims of foreign-backed regime change have also sparked growing frustration among the Kurdish parties themselves.

Winthrop Rodgers, an associate fellow at the London-based Chatham House think tank, noted that the Kurdish parties have approached the ongoing U.S.-Iran war with significant caution, a choice that reflects their own clear assessment of their limited capabilities and the current strategic context. “This caution likely disappointed the expectations of some reckless U.S. and Israeli planners, who failed to grasp the complex dynamics at play on the ground,” Rodgers explained.

Even so, Iran’s continued targeting of Kurdish positions in northern Iraq makes clear that the opposition groups remain a persistent concern for Tehran, even if they do not pose an immediate existential threat. Faramarzi argued that Komala’s core work focuses on building political power, not large-scale conventional military invasion. “Our main role is organizing, supporting, and strengthening civil society and protest movements across Iran – and that is what the government fears,” he said. “Through these attacks, the Islamic Republic is trying to erode our political and organizational capacity, while also sending a warning to all opposition forces across the country.”

On Thursday, Lebanese President Joseph Aoun will travel to Ankara for a high-stakes one-day meeting with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, a diplomatic mission focused on bringing long-overdue clarity to a relationship that has remained formally intact but strategically undefined amid sweeping shifts in Middle Eastern geopolitics. Unlike traditional state visits packed with cabinet delegations and formal treaty signings, Aoun will be accompanied only by a small group of senior presidential advisors, with no binding bilateral agreements scheduled to be finalized during the talks.

Multiple Lebanese and Turkish sources confirmed to Middle East Eye that the discussions will center on mapping out the broader strategic contours of the relationship between Beirut and Ankara. Key topics on the agenda include Turkey’s long-held concerns about Lebanon’s regional alignment, as well as new opportunities to expand bilateral military and diplomatic cooperation. A senior Lebanese insider described the meeting as a critical starting point for a more transparent bilateral dialogue, noting that Lebanon’s fragile domestic politics and exposed geographic position require it to balance relationships across competing regional blocs without alienating any major power.

While diplomatic ties between the two countries have never been severed, both sides have acknowledged a persistent gap in clear communication around their respective core political priorities. The senior Lebanese source emphasized that this lack of regular open dialogue has not risen to the level of public Turkish discontent with Lebanon’s policy direction, but the upcoming meeting is designed to address that gap head-on. “This will be a full, open and honest exchange between the two heads of state,” the source added.

Far from a reconciliation effort to repair broken relations, the visit is an attempt to add explicit political definition to a partnership that has already operated through quiet diplomatic, economic and security channels, but has never been anchored by a shared strategic framework. For Lebanon, the meeting comes as the country walks a careful diplomatic tightrope, managing relationships with Turkey, Gulf Cooperation Council states, the United States, Europe and other regional actors while avoiding any permanent, exclusive alignment with a single bloc.

For Turkey, the summit offers a rare opportunity to lay out its clear expectations for Lebanon’s positioning in a region increasingly defined by cutthroat competition over energy transit routes, maritime boundary claims, defense pacts and relationships with Israel. Ahead of his departure, Aoun told Turkey’s state-owned Anadolu Agency that Lebanon welcomes a meaningful Turkish role in any future international governance arrangement for southern Lebanon, particularly as global powers negotiate the future mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). Turkey has a long history of contributing to UNIFIL’s maritime task force and has maintained steady military and security cooperation with the Lebanese state for decades, and Aoun’s remarks were crafted to signal that Beirut views Ankara as a contributor to Lebanese stability, not just an outside power pursuing its own regional interests.

Aoun is also expected to use the meeting to update Turkey on efforts to implement existing agreements governing southern Lebanon, including calls for a full Israeli withdrawal from contested territory and continued international backing for the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF). However, Turkish officials plan to use the summit to press Aoun for clear answers on the future direction of Lebanese foreign policy, sparked by Beirut’s 2023 unilateral maritime border agreement with Cyprus.

A senior Turkish official told Middle East Eye that Ankara was caught off guard by Lebanon’s decision to move forward with the deal without any prior consultation with Turkey. The concern extends far beyond Ankara’s exclusion from negotiations: Turkish policymakers argue the agreement carries sweeping regional implications because of Cyprus’s close strategic and energy ties to Greece and Israel. The eastern Mediterranean has emerged as one of the most contested regions in the Middle East, with two competing blocs vying for control of energy and trade infrastructure. One bloc, linking Israel, Cyprus and Greece, is developing cross-border gas infrastructure, electricity interconnectors and shipping routes designed to connect the eastern Mediterranean directly to European markets. Turkey, by contrast, has championed alternative energy and trade corridors that position it as the central hub connecting Asia, the Middle East and European markets.

While Lebanon’s agreement with Cyprus does not formally bring Beirut into an alliance with Israel, Ankara fears the deal could gradually draw Lebanon into the regional framework built around Cyprus, Greece and Israel – a shift that would directly undermine Turkey’s own core strategic ambitions in the region. A senior diplomatic source confirmed that Erdogan will raise the maritime agreement directly with Aoun during their talks, making clear that Turkey cannot accept Lebanon aligning with Israel, a path that some figures close to the Lebanese presidency are rumored to favor. “At a minimum, Ankara expects Lebanon to maintain strict neutrality in regional geopolitical conflicts,” the source stated.

Turkey’s concerns do not stem from a belief that Lebanon has already joined an Israeli-led bloc, but rather from deep uncertainty about how Beirut will position itself as new maritime, energy and security arrangements take shape across the eastern Mediterranean. The summit will give Aoun a platform to reassure Erdogan that Lebanon’s expanding engagement with Cyprus and other regional actors is not intended to counter or isolate Turkey. Aoun will also explain that Lebanon’s negotiations with Israel are focused on securing an Israeli withdrawal from contested territory, strengthening Lebanese state sovereignty and ending cross-border hostilities, not forging a strategic alliance with Israel.

In exchange for greater clarity on Lebanon’s regional posture, Ankara is prepared to expand its security and military support to the Lebanese state, with a particular focus on bolstering the Lebanese Armed Forces. The senior diplomatic source revealed that Ankara plans to invite the LAF commander to tour Turkish defense manufacturing and industry facilities, and Ankara is ready to provide significant military hardware to the LAF if Lebanon formally outlines its equipment requirements and expresses interest in a partnership. Turkey’s domestic defense industry produces a wide range of military technology, including combat drones, armored vehicles, communications systems, and naval platforms, and Ankara has increasingly used defense cooperation as a key tool of regional diplomacy in recent years.

The source also pushed back against any interpretation of Turkey’s engagement with Lebanon through the lens of the Ottoman Empire’s historical rule over the territory, noting “Turkey is a NATO member and approaches Lebanon from a modern strategic perspective, rather than through any Ottoman historical framework.” For Lebanon, additional Turkish military assistance would offer a much-needed supplementary source of support for the LAF, which has taken on expanded security responsibilities across the country and along its volatile borders. But Beirut will need to manage any expanded cooperation carefully to avoid creating the perception that it is moving away from its longstanding military partnerships with the United States, France and other Western powers.

The true significance of Aoun’s visit lies not in the prospect of immediate, headline-grabbing agreements, but in the effort to finally map out the clear political boundaries of the Lebanon-Turkey relationship. The two countries already maintain active diplomatic ties, steady commercial trade and ongoing security cooperation, and Turkey holds meaningful political, cultural and humanitarian influence in multiple parts of Lebanon. But the relationship has remained strategically ambiguous for years, as neither side has fully articulated its expectations of the other amid rapid regional change.

Aoun’s one-day trip is not expected to resolve all outstanding questions in a single meeting. But it is likely to establish a new, direct communication channel between the two presidents, reducing the risk that future Lebanese policy decisions will be misinterpreted in Ankara without prior consultation. As the senior Lebanese source put it: the visit will not mark the start of a new relationship between the two countries, but rather the start of a far more candid conversation about where that relationship is headed in an increasingly divided region.

Deep in the cramped, overcrowded space beneath a school staircase in Khan Younis, southern Gaza, 33-year-old Palestinian university professor Kholoud Abu Sahmoud waits helplessly as her late-stage liver cancer progresses out of control. Nine months after her diagnosis, what should have been a treatable condition has become a death sentence, cut short by a catastrophic shortage of life-saving medicine and a months-long bureaucratic blockade that has kept her trapped in the war-ravaged enclave.

Abu Sahmoud received her devastating diagnosis just days after giving birth to her second child nine months ago. She completed 15 rounds of chemotherapy using the limited drugs available inside Gaza, but her condition has only continued to worsen. Unlike the targeted therapies she needs, the available medications have failed to shrink her tumor, only leaving her grappling with brutal side effects. “The chemotherapy never treated my cancer. It only caused my hair and nails to fall out,” she told reporters from Middle East Eye. “Almost every day, parts of my nails come off.”

Nearly 10 months after a ceasefire halted large-scale active fighting in October 2025, Israeli authorities continue to enforce tight restrictions on the entry of all essential medical supplies into Gaza, including specialized oncology drugs, chemotherapy agents, antibiotics, anesthetics, diagnostic tools and surgical equipment. UN data from earlier this year shows that by March, 46 percent of all essential medications and 66 percent of critical medical consumables across the enclave were completely out of stock.

This month, Gaza’s Palestinian Ministry of Health announced that most chemotherapy programs for common high-mortality cancers—including breast, colorectal, gastrointestinal, head and neck tumors, and sarcomas—have already been forced to stop entirely, as stockpiles of specialized cancer drugs dropped to critically low levels. Out of Gaza’s nearly 11,000 registered cancer patients, at least 4,000 have received formal medical referrals for urgent treatment outside the enclave, but remain stuck waiting for exit approval from Israeli or Egyptian authorities.

Dr. Muhammed Abu Nada, director of the Gaza Centre for Cancer, told Middle East Eye that the current shortage is the most severe Gaza has seen in decades. “We have been forced to use some medicines that had already expired because of the severe shortages. Now even those have run out,” he said. “This is clearly increasing the mortality rate.” For existing patients, remaining stockpiles barely cover ongoing care, leaving no options for newly diagnosed cases. Facing empty drug cabinets, doctors have been forced to abandon evidence-based combination treatment protocols in favor of less effective single-drug regimens. “This obviously reduces the effectiveness of treatment, worsens outcomes and can lead to further complications,” Abu Nada explained. “We are also facing shortages of immunotherapy drugs, which further increases the risks for our patients.”

Abu Sahmoud’s case is far from unique. Her medical referral for treatment abroad was approved just after her diagnosis, as clinicians confirmed the therapy she needs is not available anywhere inside Gaza. Doctors recommended she travel to Jordan or Turkey for targeted care, but nine months later, she remains trapped in Gaza, her health declining with each passing day. “Doctors told me the treatment I need is available in Jordan or Turkey, and there was no way to improve my condition here,” she said. “I’ve been waiting for urgent medical evacuation for nine months. My health deteriorates every day with this endless waiting.”

Under longstanding regional medical protocols, Gazan patients who require specialized care unavailable locally receive referrals funded by the Palestinian Authority’s Ministry of Health, but final permission to exit through border crossings controlled by Israel or Egypt remains a mandatory prerequisite. Since the start of large-scale military operations in Gaza in October 2023, Israel has drastically limited the number of medical evacuations allowed out of the territory, leaving thousands of critically ill patients stranded without access to care that could save their lives.

Four months after the October 2025 ceasefire, Israel partially reopened the Rafah crossing with Egypt for medical evacuations under a strict, tightly controlled system that caps the number of patients allowed to exit at just 50 per day, all subject to Israeli approval. As of June 30, only 1,655 patients have been evacuated since Rafah reopened in February, while more than 20,000 people—including 4,000 children—remain on the waiting list for urgent exit. Since October 2023, more than 1,570 critically ill patients have died while waiting for permission to leave Gaza for treatment.

For Abu Sahmoud, the waiting game has already left her bedridden, unable to carry out even the most basic daily activities or care for her two young children, a five-year-old son and her nine-month-old daughter. She has lost 20 kilograms as fluid buildup in her abdomen leaves her unable to eat for days at a time, and she has not been able to hold her newborn daughter since she gave birth. “I cannot fulfil any of my responsibilities towards my children. Because of my illness, I have become bedridden,” she said. “I am dying slowly.”

Like most Gazans, Abu Sahmoud has been forcibly displaced dozens of times since the war began, after her home was destroyed in Israeli attacks. She most recently lived in a makeshift tent in Mawasi al-Qarara, but the unsanitary, harsh conditions caused her health to decline even faster. She moved in with her displaced sister, who already occupies the cramped space under the staircase at Ahmed bin Abdul Aziz School, bringing the total number of people sharing the tiny space to 10. “The environment is completely unsuitable for someone in my condition. Even a healthy person would struggle to live here, let alone a cancer patient,” she said.

Next to the thin mattress where Abu Sahmoud spends her days sits a small box of medication, carefully positioned out of reach of the rats that frequent the shelter. Beside it rests a cloth bag holding nearly 50 academic certificates, testaments to a career and academic journey cut short by war and illness. A self-described lifelong bookworm, Abu Sahmoud made history at the Islamic University of Gaza as the first student to complete a two-year master’s degree program in just 16 months, before going on to pursue a PhD and take a position as an assistant professor specializing in curriculum and instruction. “I love learning. My whole life has been devoted to education,” she said. “My dream was to become a professor and continue my academic journey beyond my PhD. I never wanted to stop learning. But the illness has taken all of that away from me. The hardest part is waiting for treatment, with no end in sight.”