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An unreleased 15-point Gaza disarmament framework, obtained exclusively by Middle East Eye (MEE), upends popular public narratives about the proposed agreement by outlining a fully Palestinian-led process that keeps all weapons out of Israeli and international hands, rather than requiring factions to surrender their arms.

The draft agreement came to light after former U.S. President Donald Trump claimed Thursday that the U.S.-backed Board of Peace had secured a binding deal to disarm Hamas and all other armed Palestinian groups in Gaza, framing the announcement as a breakthrough for his 20-point Middle East peace plan and the establishment of a new transitional Palestinian administration. “This is a monumental step toward lasting PEACE and SECURITY,” Trump posted on his social platform Truth Social, adding that Israeli forces would withdraw from occupied areas of Gaza as disarmament was finalized, and that a UN-mandated International Stabilization Force would partner with a new Palestinian police force.

Hamas pushed back on the announcement within 24 hours, issuing a statement that any final deal for the full disarmament of Palestinian factions is contingent on Israel and the United States fulfilling all commitments laid out in the October 2025 ceasefire agreement. Senior Hamas official Ghazi Hamad told Reuters Friday that the group will retain its arms until Israel ends all military attacks, facilitates increased entry of humanitarian aid and commercial goods into Gaza, and completes a full withdrawal of its forces from territory it currently controls, in line with the 2025 truce terms.

Despite Trump’s public framing that the deal requires Hamas to lay down its arms under external pressure, the draft text obtained by MEE paints a drastically different picture. The agreement explicitly states that no weapons will be transferred or surrendered to Israel or any non-Palestinian entity. Instead, all weapons in Gaza will be placed under the oversight of the National Committee, a transitional Palestinian governing body that will hold exclusive authority over weapons registration, licensing, storage, and enforcement by the end of the disarmament process.

The deal frames weapons collection and inventory as an entirely domestic Palestinian process, with all Palestinian factions, clans, and community groups required to cooperate with the National Committee. International actors will only monitor the process, not lead or enforce it, and armed Palestinian factions will participate directly in the work. Notably, the agreement enshrines a phased implementation structure where progress to each next stage depends on the verified completion of the previous stage’s obligations, a structure that explicitly ties all weapons-related steps to a gradual Israeli withdrawal from the areas of Gaza it still occupies.

Three critical preconditions must be met before the disarmament process can even begin: completion of all remaining obligations under the existing Sharm El-Sheikh Protocol, the entry of the National Committee into Gaza, and the full deployment of the International Stabilization Force. As of August 2026, none of these preconditions have been fulfilled. The text requires parties to finalize a full implementation timeline within 14 days of the agreement’s signing, a window that can be extended by the International Verification Committee, a body made up of international guarantor states, the Board of Peace, and the International Stabilization Force.

Contrary to public messaging that positions the International Stabilization Force as the primary security guarantor for the transition period, the draft assigns the force a far more limited mandate. The agreement explicitly bars the international force from carrying out policing duties within Palestinian society, enforcing ceasefires, or training Palestinian police. Its only authorized roles are monitoring compliance from all parties, tracking the flow of humanitarian aid and essential goods into Gaza, and completing non-policing tasks requested by the National Committee. All internal security responsibilities remain fully under the control of the transitional Palestinian body.

One of the most consequential, underreported clauses of the draft rules out the integration of former militia fighters into formal Palestinian security services or police forces, a common practice in post-conflict disarmament processes designed to stabilize demobilized combatants. The agreement states that militia weapons will be logged and stored under the National Committee’s authority, but does not guarantee fighters positions in new state security institutions. Only existing police personnel are granted protections: officers who fail required vetting will be offered alternative civilian roles matching their expertise or retired with full financial benefits per Palestinian law. For militia fighters, the text only offers a vague promise of future “reintegration and social support” that leaves their fate undecided.

Another little-noticed provision places a strict $400 million cap on the National Committee’s total financial obligations to suppliers, contractors, and other third parties, to be implemented gradually over three years per the committee’s priority setting. Any claims or liabilities exceeding that cap will be deferred to a future broader national reconciliation process. Analysts note that the modest cap underscores the severely depleted state of Gaza’s institutional finances ahead of any large-scale reconstruction funding.

Israel has not yet publicly acknowledged the existence of the draft agreement, and an unnamed Israeli political source quoted by Israeli daily Haaretz stated that Israel has no intention of withdrawing from the Yellow Line, a strategic corridor that splits the Gaza Strip in half. The divergent public positions of all key parties leave the future of the proposed framework uncertain, given Israel’s history of failing to uphold previous agreements with Palestinian groups, and Hamas’s firm refusal to move forward without Israeli compliance with existing ceasefire terms.

After months of intensive, good-faith negotiations, Hamas has formally signed off on a detailed, U.S.-mediated framework to advance further phases of a Gaza ceasefire, a move billed as a historic breakthrough toward ending nearly a year of catastrophic Israeli military operations in the blockaded Palestinian enclave. The plan, developed in coordination with U.S. President Donald Trump’s Board of Peace, aligns with Trump’s broader comprehensive peace vision and United Nations Security Council Resolution 2803, outlining a phased roadmap toward security, new governance, humanitarian relief, and long-term reconstruction in Gaza.

The announcement comes amid a staggering humanitarian crisis that has left Gaza in ruins. Since the start of Israel’s military campaign, more than 73,000 people in Gaza have been killed, with thousands more still missing and presumed dead. Roughly 90% of Gaza’s 2 million residents have been displaced from their homes, now sheltering in overcrowded, unsanitary tent camps with no access to basic services. Middle East Eye, which obtained the full Arabic draft of the agreement Hamas approved, has published the complete English translation of the text publicly.

The core framework of the agreement anchors all future progress in verified compliance from both parties, with each phase of implementation proceeding only after the International Verification Committee confirms all prior obligations have been met. That oversight body, established by the Board of Peace, includes representatives from guarantor states, the Board of Peace, and the International Stabilisation Force. Key initial obligations require both Israel and Hamas to immediately end all military operations in line with the existing Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum, with detailed timelines and mechanisms for Phase Two of the agreement set to be finalized within 14 days of the deal’s signing (a deadline that can be extended by the verification committee if needed). Once those logistics are confirmed, the newly established National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG) will enter the territory to take up its governing duties.

Under the terms of the deal, Hamas and all other Palestinian armed factions will transfer full civil and security governing authority for Gaza to the independent NCAG during the transitional period, with factions agreeing to refrain from any interference in the committee’s work. The NCAG will be tasked with maintaining continuity of public services, ensuring fair treatment for all civil servants, conducting a full administrative and financial audit of Gaza’s public resources, and addressing outstanding financial commitments capped at $400 million over a three-year implementation period.

A core security pillar of the agreement establishes the guiding principle of “one authority, one law, one weapon” for Gaza. All police personnel will undergo mandatory vetting, with unqualified officers offered alternative civilian roles or retirement benefits protected under Palestinian law, and no penalties imposed based solely on political affiliation. All police weapons will be transferred to NCAG control immediately upon the committee’s entry into Gaza. A full inventory and secured storage process for heavy weapons, military infrastructure, weapons depots, and militant tunnels will begin after the Sharm el-Sheikh obligations are met, NCAG is deployed, and the International Stabilisation Force enters the territory. No weapons will be surrendered to Israel or any non-Palestinian entity, and once the process is complete, the NCAG will be the sole body authorized to control weapons in the enclave. Personal weapons will be regulated under existing Palestinian law, with the NCAG holding exclusive authority for registration, licensing, and enforcement.

Militia personnel will not be integrated into Gaza’s new security or police forces, and all militia weapons will be collected and stored under NCAG control per the agreed timeline, with compliance verified by the International Verification Committee. The deal also requires all factions to sign a social peace agreement committing to an end to internal Palestinian violence, and banning acts of revenge, shows of force, military parades, and armed demonstrations.

To separate Israeli forces from NCAG-controlled areas, an interim International Stabilisation Force will be deployed to Gaza. The force will not carry out domestic policing, ceasefire enforcement, or police training, instead focusing on monitoring compliance with the deal and facilitating the flow of humanitarian and essential supplies into the territory, along with other non-policing tasks requested by the NCAG. Israel will complete a phased withdrawal from all of Gaza in line with the agreed timeline, with a formal commitment not to force any Gaza residents to leave the enclave. All internal security incidents will be handled exclusively by the NCAG.

Long-term reconstruction of Gaza, which has seen most of its built infrastructure destroyed, will be overseen jointly by the Board of Peace and the NCAG, which will develop a detailed implementation plan and timeline aligned with international standards and Palestinian law. The overarching goal of the entire process, the agreement notes, is to end the cycle of violence and destruction in Gaza, secure full Israeli withdrawal, restore normal life for Palestinian residents, and open a credible political path to Palestinian self-determination and the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state.

In early July, Turkish Vice President Cevdet Yilmaz traveled to Tehran to participate in the funeral of Iran’s late Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, where he was greeted warmly by senior Iranian government officials and later hosted for formal talks by newly elected Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian. Behind the public diplomatic courtesy, a critical behind-the-scenes security collaboration between the two regional powers was revealed to independent news outlet Middle East Eye by multiple anonymous sources familiar with the closed-door discussions. \n\nAccording to the sources, Pezeshkian expressed explicit gratitude to the Turkish delegation for its role in derailing a covert Israeli plan led by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to incite an armed uprising by Kurdish opposition groups in western Iran. Senior Turkish officials had launched intensive diplomatic outreach to their U.S. counterparts to argue that the Israeli proposal was not only unworkable but also posed a direct threat to Turkey’s core national security interests. Multiple sources familiar with the exchanges note that former U.S. President Donald Trump had previously hinted on multiple occasions that Ankara was even prepared to take military action to stop the creation of a new Kurdish separatist entity along its southern border, a response shaped by Turkey’s past security experiences stemming from the civil war in neighboring Syria. \n\nBeyond blocking the Israeli initiative, Turkey also delivered a clear diplomatic message to Iranian leadership during the talks: avoid sustained large-scale military operations against Kurdish groups positioned in the cross-border regions of Iran and northern Iraq. Turkish policymakers warn that if Iran continues its crackdown after the failure of the Israeli-backed insurgency plot, displaced and embattled Kurdish factions will have little choice but to deepen alliances with Israel and Western powers, a outcome that runs directly counter to Ankara’s current security priorities. \n\nCrucially, Turkey is currently navigating a fragile peace process with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a group designated as a terrorist organization by Ankara, the EU, and the United States. The Turkish government is set to introduce landmark draft legislation to parliament this coming Monday that would create a legal pathway for former PKK militants to return to Turkey within a six-month window. The proposed partial pardon would open a path to social reintegration for non-violent PKK cadres, making regional stability a non-negotiable requirement for the peace process to move forward. Any escalation of Iranian military action in northern Iraq, where the PKK maintains long-standing rear bases, risks unraveling the delicate negotiating track. \n\nTurkish diplomatic lobbying of Washington proved surprisingly effective, sources confirm, because senior Trump administration officials were already deeply skeptical of Netanyahu’s regime-change gambit, particularly the claim that Kurdish forces could successfully execute a ground incursion into central Iran. Multiple U.S. officials privately dismissed the plan as deeply flawed: the CIA director reportedly described Netanyahu’s regime-change scenarios as “farcical”, a characterization that Secretary of State Marco Rubio echoed in blunter terms to aides, calling it “bullshit”. \n\nEarlier this year, when U.S. officials working with Israeli intelligence agency Mossad and the CIA approached Iraqi Kurdish leaders to invite them to join the proposed anti-Tehran uprising, the proposal left Kurdish leadership caught between competing interests. The plan called for the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (PDKI), the Iranian affiliate of Iraq’s ruling Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), to lead the insurgency, and also demanded that Peshmerga forces from Iraq’s semi-autonomous Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) join the campaign, as U.S. officials doubted the PDKI had the military capacity to pull off the operation on its own. But Erbil rejected the proposal. \n\nThe reluctance of Iraqi Kurdish leaders to sign on stemmed from lingering distrust of Washington, after the U.S. abandoned Kurdish militias in northern Syria earlier this year in a policy shift to accommodate the new Damascus government. With no guarantee of sustained U.S. support, Kurdish leaders had little incentive to take up arms against Iran. \n\nMehmet Alaca, a leading Turkish scholar focused on Iraqi politics and security, explained that escalating Iranian military pressure on Kurdish opposition groups would backfire for all regional actors. “Increased Iranian military pressure could inadvertently push Iranian Kurdish opposition groups, such as the PDKI, Komala and the Kurdistan Freedom Party (PAK), closer to the West, particularly Israel,” Alaca told Middle East Eye. “The Kurdistan Region of Iraq, which has hosted these groups for many years, would bear the greatest cost of such a development. Besides risking the transformation of the region into a new front in the Iran-Israel rivalry, this scenario could make the balance between the KDP and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) [in Iraq], the party led by the Talabani family, even more fragile. It could also provide Tehran with a justification for further expanding its influence in the region on security grounds.” \n\nIran has launched repeated airstrikes against PDKI bases in northern Iraq since escalating operations against Kurdish opposition groups in late February. To mitigate the risk of escalating instability, Alaca notes that Turkey has actively pursued diplomatic outreach to the PUK, a traditionally Iran-aligned Iraqi Kurdish party that normalized official relations with Ankara during a high-level visit to Turkey earlier this month. Currently, both the KDP and PUK – despite their long-standing internal rivalry – have agreed on a shared position that Iranian Kurdish opposition groups should not be drawn into the broader conflict between Iran and Israel. \n\nFor Turkey, Alaca emphasized, the entire dynamic revolves around its long-term domestic and regional security goals. “For Turkey, the most critical dimension is the peace process and the new security architecture it is seeking to build for the post-PKK era. The extension of the Iran-Israel rivalry into Iraqi Kurdistan and the re-emergence of the Kurdish card at the centre of the regional power struggle would directly undermine Turkey’s long-term security calculations.”’

A month after completing what stands as the highest-profile diplomatic tour of Libya by the US’s top regional envoy since he assumed his role, Massad Boulos’ push for Libyan institutional unification remains mired in ambiguity, leaving regional observers and local factions questioning Washington’s core goals in the fractured North African nation.

Boulos, who serves as senior advisor to former President Donald Trump on Arab and Middle Eastern affairs, kicked off his multi-stop tour in early July with widespread expectations that he would unveil a concrete framework to resolve Libya’s decade-long political split. The itinerary kicked off with preliminary closed-door talks with factional representatives in Malta on July 6, followed by back-to-back face-to-face negotiations the next two days: first with Tripoli-based Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibah, who leads the UN-backed western Libyan government, on July 7, and then with eastern Libyan strongman Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar in Benghazi a day later.

In a notable break from standard diplomatic itineraries, Boulos also carved out time to meet with a range of influential independent players unaffiliated with either of the country’s rival ruling blocs. These included Naji Issa, governor of Libya’s Central Bank, and leading representatives from the Council of Elders of Misrata, the economically powerful western Libyan city that played a key role in defeating Haftar’s 2019–2020 offensive on western Libya.

Despite weeks of follow-up talks after the tour, no clear public roadmap has materialized for what Boulos framed during his visit as national unification efforts, a framework that has become widely known as the “Boulos initiative.”

This diplomatic push is not a new endeavor. As far back as September 2024, Boulos publicly committed that Washington would actively facilitate the reunification of Libya’s governing institutions, which have split along eastern-western lines since the outbreak of the country’s second civil war in 2014. That division came three years after a NATO-backed intervention toppled longtime Libyan ruler Muammar Gaddafi, leaving a power vacuum that has stoked ongoing instability.

Today, the country’s political landscape remains split: Haftar and his allied factions control eastern Libya, while Dbeibah’s UN-supported administration governs the west from Tripoli. The UN Support Mission in Libya has led formal peace negotiations since large-scale fighting ended in 2020, but the country has yet to achieve full institutional unification, with no national elections held to resolve competing claims to power.

After nearly 12 months of regular negotiations and meetings with Libyan officials from all sides, Boulos’ only confirmed major breakthrough has been the brokering of a unified national budget for both rival governments, agreed in April 2025. No additional concrete progress has been recorded in the months since. As of July 19, Aguilah Saleh, speaker of the Tobruk-based House of Representatives aligned with Haftar, confirmed that the legislative body had not received any official draft proposal for the Boulos initiative as of yet.

Slow progress on the initiative has been fueled in large part by mounting criticism from multiple major Libyan factions, whose opposition coalesced after a June 2025 Financial Times report cited anonymous sources familiar with the matter claiming that Washington was pushing a power-sharing deal that would install Saddam Haftar, Khalifa Haftar’s son and widely anticipated successor to the 82-year-old field marshal, as head of Libya’s highest executive body, the Presidential Council. The role is currently held by Mohamed Menfi, a relatively neutral political figure.

When Boulos arrived in Misrata on July 7 to begin his tour of western Libya, dozens of protesters gathered at the city’s airport to demonstrate against his visit and denounce what they called a “suspicious deal” to advance the Haftar family’s political power. Misrata, Libya’s commercial heartland, and its business and military leadership have a long history of fierce opposition to the Haftars; the city’s militias led the resistance that repelled Haftar’s 2019–2020 offensive to seize control of western Libya.

“The criminal Haftar is responsible for everything happening today, this is reason enough to reject a solution [involving his family],” Younes al-Salabi, spokesman for the Misrata Military Council, one of Libya’s largest armed factions, told Middle East Eye in an interview.

Misrata is not the only bloc opposing the initiative. In southern Libya’s desert region, rebel leader Mohamed Wardago, whose armed movement has waged an insurgency against Haftar’s forces since January 2025, echoed the opposition. “Nobody can accept that Haftar and his sons should hold key sovereign positions within the Libyan state,” Wardago said, confirming that his group had also seen reports of the US plan to install Saddam Haftar as Presidential Council head.

Jalel Harchaoui, a leading North Africa-based political analyst, confirmed that placing Saddam Haftar in the top executive role is the core component of the proposed deal. While the constitutional framework that defines the Presidential Council head’s powers remains vague, Harchaoui noted that Saddam Haftar already commands his own military units, so his appointment would expand the office’s influence and fundamentally reshape its role in Libyan politics.

The proposed deal does not only elevate the Haftar family: multiple reports, including the June Financial Times investigation, indicate the framework would allow Dbeibah to remain in his post as prime minister in Tripoli. Though Washington has long-standing ties to Khalifa Haftar, who holds US citizenship, the State Department has also maintained regular direct diplomatic contacts with Dbeibah; Boulos described a July 26 phone call between the two sides as “productive.”

Dbeibah, who was appointed to his post by the UN-backed Libyan Political Dialogue Forum in 2021 rather than elected through a popular vote, has faced growing public backlash in recent months. Since May 2025, repeated street protests have called for his resignation. Tensions flared again at the end of July, when protests sparked by widespread power cuts in western Libya shifted focus to Dbeibah, with demonstrators attempting to storm his Tripoli office. In recent days, protesters have closed five ministry offices and the national anti-corruption authority to protest collapsing public services, the ongoing electricity crisis, and plummeting living standards across the country.

Against this backdrop, a US-brokered deal that allows Dbeibah to retain power is deeply controversial among the Libyan public, even as it offers the embattled prime minister a critical political lifeline. “Dbeibah would gain recognition across the country and would, for the first time, be able to travel to Benghazi,” Harchaoui explained. “Both Saddam and Dbeibah would acquire national legitimacy, with the possibility of remaining in power without elections for at least a year, probably longer.”

While holding national elections remains an official priority for the United Nations, with the UN Security Council reaffirming its call for polls last month, elections have barely been mentioned as a core goal of Boulos’ initiative and do not appear to be part of his proposed framework. Misrata’s leadership says it supports a resolution centered on “the organisation of a constitutional referendum and elections,” while July protesters in Tripoli repeatedly called for “the fall of all political institutions, without exception,” to be replaced through a free electoral process.

In recent weeks, Boulos, a fluent Arabic speaker, has given a series of interviews to Arab regional media to defend and promote Washington’s efforts in Libya. In a July 27 interview with Saudi outlet Asharq Al-Awsat, Boulos argued that “unity is the basis for legitimacy and democratic elections,” meaning his framework prioritizes reaching a unification deal first before holding any national polls.

Analysts say this sequencing aligns with the White House’s core priorities in Libya: securing stable, pro-US partners rather than advancing rapid democratic transition. Since January 2025, when Libya announced its first oil licensing round in nearly 20 years, the US has actively encouraged American energy firms to invest in Libya’s oil sector, which holds the largest proven oil reserves on the African continent. A second core US priority is expanding security cooperation with Libya’s fragmented military, particularly Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA), to counter Russian influence in the region.

Russia has provided direct military support to the LNA since the second Libyan civil war, with Russian paramilitary groups deploying thousands of fighters to back Haftar’s forces. In exchange, Moscow has gained access to key airfields and ports in eastern and southern Libya, which the LNA controls, allowing Russia to expand its military operations across the African continent.

Harchaoui noted that “The Pentagon believes that unifying the military commands would make it harder for Russia to maintain its presence” in Libya. So far, one of the only tangible US successes in this area has been the Flintlock 2026 joint military exercise held in April 2025, which marked the first time LNA units and Tripoli-based armed forces trained together on Libyan soil.

During his July tour, Boulos also prioritized meetings with top Libyan security officials, meeting not just the Haftar family in Benghazi but also Interior Minister Emad Trabelsi and Deputy Defence Minister Abdul Salam al-Zoubi in Tripoli, both of whom command powerful western Libyan armed groups. Still, even after months of high-level diplomacy, Boulos has failed to outline clear specifics for his initiative, including how military reunification would be implemented.

A recent UN Panel of Experts on Libya report has also added to skepticism, reiterating longstanding allegations of widespread human rights abuses and systemic corruption involving armed groups and factions aligned with both the Haftar and Dbeibah families. Khalifa Haftar in particular has been accused of war crimes by global watchdog groups including Human Rights Watch, and a US court has previously ruled that he is legally liable for torture and extrajudicial executions carried out by his forces.

Ultimately, the lack of clarity surrounding Boulos’ plan has fueled growing skepticism across Libya, even as a broad majority of Libyans from all factions support the ultimate goal of unifying the country’s fractured institutions.