Eight months into the ongoing military confrontation between the United States and Iran, a growing consensus among regional stakeholders and policy analysts across the Middle East holds that no lasting diplomatic settlement is feasible while Donald Trump remains in the White House. The Trump administration has failed to break Tehran’s resolve to stand firm against U.S. pressure, nor has it mapped out a clear exit strategy from the prolonged conflict, with the president himself openly acknowledging to *Time* magazine that he no longer believes a peace deal with Iran is attainable — a remarkable admission for a leader who was widely expected to pursue negotiated de-escalation at the start of his term.
For its part, Tehran has laid out non-negotiable preconditions for any return to talks that it knows the current U.S. administration cannot accept: full rollback of all punitive U.S. sanctions and threats against Iran, alongside a guarantee that no quantity of the country’s enriched uranium stockpile will be removed from its territory. Neither side is actively negotiating toward a compromise; instead, both are holding out for a shift in the domestic political landscape of their opponent to gain a strategic upper hand.
However, the political ground is shifting first under Trump’s feet, as the November 3 U.S. midterm elections draw near. The president’s public approval rating hovers at just 39%, while global crude oil prices have climbed above $110 per barrel, driving steep increases in domestic gasoline costs that have become a top voter grievance. The U.S. House of Representatives has already passed three separate bills to curtail Trump’s unauthorised war powers related to the Iran conflict, and dozens of Republican candidates running in competitive swing districts are now centering their campaigns on ending the war to bring down fuel prices for constituents.
Facing a high risk of losing his party’s narrow congressional majority after the midterms, Trump has publicly pledged not to order new military strikes against Iran before polling day, even as U.S. Central Command has reportedly received classified instructions to prepare for a resumption of large-scale combat operations. Many analysts warn that a pre-election strike on Iranian targets remains a distinct possibility, and a Republican midterm defeat would only amplify this incentive: a lame-duck president with no remaining re-election stakes would face far fewer political costs for military escalation. Yet such a move would do little to shore up voter support, as a recent Politico survey found 46% of registered voters stated that ending the war before Election Day would not change their voting behavior at all.
Iran, meanwhile, has heavily fortified its nuclear facilities and issued explicit public warnings that any new U.S. attack would prompt retaliatory strikes on regional energy infrastructure, a move that would send global oil prices surging even higher. Trump’s own inner circle is already positioning themselves for the unpredictable aftermath of the ongoing impasse: Vice President JD Vance, who was privately skeptical of the Iran conflict from its launch, has distanced himself from the administration’s Iran policy in recent weeks, notably declining to endorse Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu ahead of Israel’s October 27 national election. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, widely seen as a top 2028 Republican presidential contender, spent the same week on an official trip to India focused almost entirely on bilateral trade, with little public discussion of the Iran conflict. By contrast, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth made a surprise unannounced visit to Israel just one day after Trump formally endorsed Netanyahu, cementing his public association with the administration’s hawkish Iran stance — a move that multiple political commentators first suggested as early as April was designed to position Hegseth as the potential scapegoat if the war ends in a catastrophic failure, an impression his recent high-profile visibility has only reinforced.
Gulf Arab states have also reached the same conclusion that U.S. policy toward Iran lacks long-term reliability, and are actively hedging their strategic bets. The United Arab Emirates, which joined the U.S.-led military campaign against Iran back in February, has recently opened quiet backchannel diplomatic talks with Iranian officials, after concluding that direct bilateral engagement is far more dependable than relying on inconsistent U.S. security guarantees. Working in coordination with Saudi Arabia to de-escalate tensions related to the Yemen conflict, the UAE is pushing for a negotiated diplomatic path to reduce regional hostilities — a striking policy reversal in less than eight months, coming after Abu Dhabi absorbed thousands of Iranian missile and drone attacks on its territory, as it moves to secure its own separate security arrangements before the next U.S. political shift unfolds. The U.S. has twice rejected Saudi requests to launch airstrikes against Houthi targets in Yemen, stating it will not carry out new kinetic operations in the country for the time being; instead, the UAE has reportedly agreed to resume funding for anti-Houthi armed groups operating in southern Yemen, a arrangement that lets Washington avoid direct involvement while a regional partner executes its security goals on its behalf.
Iran’s entire strategy is rooted in deliberate patience, with its leadership expressing confidence that it can withstand roughly another year of U.S. economic and military pressure before the political tide in Washington turns against Trump. Its recent outreach to Saudi Arabia reflects this long-game approach: even after Houthi attacks linked to Iran’s Revolutionary Guard killed at least 19 people at Saudi civilian airports, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi placed a direct call to Riyadh days after the deadliest strike to offer to mediate between the kingdom and the Houthis, arguing that the Yemeni crisis has no viable military solution. Tehran’s explicit goal is not to destroy Saudi critical infrastructure, but to convince Riyadh that U.S. security guarantees are untrustworthy, and that any formal normalization of ties with Israel will carry steep, unavoidable costs. Riyadh has already begun to adjust its calculations accordingly, but regional pressures will not ease while Trump remains in office, as Tehran sees no reason to make concessions to reach a settlement under the current U.S. administration.
The remaining major variable is Israel’s policy trajectory, both during the rest of Netanyahu’s term and under his potential successor. Trump has openly endorsed Netanyahu to help “finish the job” of countering Iran, and Israeli officials have reportedly requested that any new U.S. strikes on Iranian targets be delayed until after Israel’s October 27 national vote. Current Israeli election polls show Netanyahu’s ruling coalition is on track to win fewer than 50 of the 61 parliamentary seats required to form a stable government, leaving him potentially leading a weakened caretaker government with every political incentive to keep the Iran conflict as a central national security issue. A future Israeli government led by former defense chief Gadi Eisenkot would not soften Israel’s hardline stance on Iran’s nuclear program, but it would likely be far less willing to tie Israel’s core national security strategy to the volatile political fortunes of the sitting U.S. president. If Israel chooses to launch unilateral strikes on Iran after the U.S. disengages from the conflict, Gulf states will accelerate their efforts to hedge against U.S. unreliability, and any prospects for Saudi-Israeli normalization will recede even further out of reach. For now, both Tehran and the Gulf Arab states have completed their strategic assessments, and are waiting for a new occupant to move into the Oval Office to reset the entire framework of regional relations.
