博客

  • Mamdani to disband special NYPD unit deployed during pro-Palestinian protests

    Mamdani to disband special NYPD unit deployed during pro-Palestinian protests

    New York City Mayor Zohran Mamdani formalized a long-standing campaign pledge on Monday, unveiling a sweeping restructuring of the New York Police Department’s widely criticized Strategic Response Group (SRG) that will fully disband the specialized tactical unit and replace it with a community-centered framework focused on de-escalation and upholding First Amendment rights.

    The SRG, a 500-officer heavily armored tactical squad, has faced years of public backlash over its aggressive crowd control protocols, which drew widespread condemnation for mass arrests and the deployment of batons, tear gas, and pepper spray against demonstrators. The unit came under intensified public and legislative scrutiny during the 2024 wave of pro-Palestine demonstrations across the city, as well as the campus protest movement that originated at Columbia University, where footage of SRG officers clashing with student participants circulated widely across local and national media.

    The New York Civil Liberties Union (NYCLU) has been a leading voice in campaigns to reform NYPD protest policing for more than a decade, and executive director Donna Lieberman hailed the announcement as a landmark shift. “These critical, long-overdue changes will create far safer conditions for peaceful assembly, and remove the barriers that have stopped thousands of New Yorkers from exercising their right to make their voices heard on issues that matter to them,” Lieberman stated in a public reaction.

    The announcement has also exposed a notable rift between the mayor’s administration and NYPD leadership over the scope of the coming reforms. Speaking to local outlet ABC7 shortly after Mamdani’s press conference, Police Commissioner Jessica Tisch insisted that the public would see no meaningful shift in how the department responds to large gatherings. “New Yorkers can expect in crowd control type situations to see the very same response that they are accustomed to. Nothing would change about the way that the NYPD responds to crowd control conditions,” Tisch told reporters.

    That framing stands in direct contrast to the official policy blueprint outlined in the mayor’s formal press release, which frames the overhaul as a fundamental transformation of city protest response protocols. “This overhaul will transform how the City prepares for and responds to protests, placing communication, de-escalation and civilian coordination at the center of our approach, while protecting New Yorkers’ constitutional right to protest,” the mayor’s office statement affirmed.

    Under the new structure, the disbanded SRG will be replaced by the Community Dialogue and De-escalation Division, a unit housed within the mayor’s Office of Safety and Community and led primarily by civilian community stakeholders, rather than ranking NYPD command staff. A core component of this new division will be the First Amendment Support Team, a 30-person cohort of carefully vetted uniformed officers who will complete specialized, extended training in conflict mediation, de-escalation, and First Amendment legal compliance before being deployed to protest events. A separate, smaller Patrol Support Division will also be established, made up of additional rigorously screened officers who will only be authorized to carry out arrests during demonstrations in rare, carefully documented instances where imminent public harm is identified.

    The accompanying regulatory framework formalized as part of the announcement implements sweeping restrictions on previously common NYPD crowd control tactics: it explicitly bans the use of kettling, mass deployment of tear gas and pepper spray during demonstrations, and all long guns at protest events, while capping the maximum volume of long-range acoustic devices used during crowd management operations at 90 decibels. A binding public transparency mandate will also require the NYPD to publish detailed quarterly reports disclosing the full deployment of all protest-related tactical units, the tactics used at each event, and data on arrests and interactions with demonstrators.

    Mamdani also used the Monday announcement to formally endorse the CURB Act — short for Communities United to Reject Police Brutality — the landmark state legislation authored by New York State Assemblyman Chi Osse that is designed to codify stronger state-level protections for demonstrators by restricting the aggressive policing tactics that the former SRG was known for deploying. “New Yorkers exercising their constitutional right to protest should not be met with the same police response as a terrorism threat. We are establishing a new, civilian-led approach that prioritizes dialogue, engagement and de-escalation. These reforms accomplish the key changes called for by Councilmember Chi Ossé’s CURB Act – a bill I am proud to support. Protecting New Yorkers’ rights and keeping our communities safe go hand in hand,” Mamdani stated in his official remarks.

    The policy shift marks one of the most significant overhauls of protest policing in New York City in more than two decades, following years of community organizing against heavy-handed police responses to social justice demonstrations spanning racial justice, climate action, and human rights advocacy.

  • Iran still retains up to 2,500 ballistic missiles: Report

    Iran still retains up to 2,500 ballistic missiles: Report

    A newly surfaced intelligence estimate, first reported by The Wall Street Journal on Sunday, indicates that U.S. national security agencies assess Iran maintains a stockpile of 1,500 to 2,500 operational ballistic missiles, a figure that directly contradicts repeated public claims from the Trump administration that the Islamic Republic’s military capabilities had been effectively decimated. U.S. intelligence officials classified this assessment as low confidence, but the numerical range closely aligns with longstanding Israeli government estimates that put Iran’s active ballistic missile inventory at no fewer than 1,500 units.

    For years, former and sitting U.S. President Donald Trump has publicly framed Iran as a defeated, militarily broken nation, repeatedly touting what he described as a 93 percent military victory over the country and claiming the U.S. had “won” any prior conflict engagement. While large-scale direct war between Washington and Tehran has de-escalated in recent months, tit-for-tat strikes between the two sides have persisted: over the past week, Iran carried out two targeted attacks on U.S. military installations stationed in Bahrain, in retaliation for earlier U.S. strikes that damaged Iranian military infrastructure. On Monday, Iranian officials also confirmed their forces deployed mines in the strategic Strait of Hormuz, striking two commercial vessels and sinking one Very Large Crude Carrier (VLCC) navigating the critical global shipping chokepoint.

    Analysts note that the sheer scale of Iran’s verified ballistic missile stockpile is the most likely explanation for the U.S. holding back from launching new large-scale offensive strikes on Iranian territory, despite Trump’s prior triumphalist rhetoric. A Bloomberg report published last week further corroborates the sustainability of Iran’s military production capacity, noting that Tehran can manufacture approximately 50 new ballistic missiles every month, a rate that adds to its already massive existing fleet of less advanced, low-cost attack drones that have been deployed extensively in regional skirmishes.

    This updated picture of Iran’s military strength carries outsized policy weight as Trump openly debates whether to restart full-scale military conflict against the Islamic Republic. During a public interview with prominent conservative radio host Hugh Hewitt last week, Trump went so far as to state that he would consider his presidency a failure if the Iranian government remained in power by the end of his current term in office, responding with a blunt “absolutely” when asked if that outcome would count as a personal defeat.

    The administration’s stance on Iran has shifted dramatically in the weeks following the Democratic Party’s sweeping victory in the November 3 U.S. midterm elections. Immediately after the midterms, Trump struck a notably conciliatory tone, claiming there was positive “momentum” moving toward a negotiated political settlement with Tehran. He has since reversed that position entirely, asserting that no diplomatic resolution is necessary, and that the U.S. can achieve its policy goals through sustained economic warfare and a sweeping maritime and land blockade targeting Iran.

    Trump also revealed last week that key U.S. Gulf Arab allies have pushed back against proposals for direct U.S. strikes on Iranian civilian infrastructure, noting that these nations “prefer a waiting period” due to their own critical military vulnerabilities. He went as far as to describe Saudi Arabia, one of Washington’s closest long-term regional partners, as “disintegrating” amid the ongoing security strains. All Gulf Cooperation Council states would bear the brunt of any large-scale joint U.S.-Israeli offensive against Iran, and their existing stockpiles of U.S.-supplied air defense interceptors have already been severely depleted after months of fending off thousands of incoming Iranian drone and ballistic missile attacks.

    Any renewed full-scale war would quickly devolve into a logistical contest between Iran’s steady, growing output of missiles and drones, and the U.S. military’s ability to resupply its Gulf allies and Israel with enough interceptors to repel incoming attacks. Multiple independent reports have confirmed the U.S. is critically ill-equipped to meet that demand: an Associated Press investigation from August found that U.S. stockpiles of Patriot air defense interceptors are at a “beyond critical” shortage level, stretched thin by competing obligations to supply defensive weapons to Ukraine to counter Russian strikes, as well as backfill dwindling inventories for U.S. regional partners in the Middle East. A separate Reuters report from the same month confirmed that the U.S. has nearly exhausted its entire stockpile of advanced long-range surface-to-surface missiles, including the ATACMS platform and the newer Precision Strike Missile, with two anonymous U.S. defense officials confirming Washington has used “virtually all” of these precision munitions across multiple global conflict theaters.

    This report was originally published by Middle East Eye, an independent news outlet dedicated to unrivaled coverage and analysis of the Middle East, North Africa and adjacent regions.

  • Somali-American Uber driver left in coma after alleged hate crime in Minnesota

    Somali-American Uber driver left in coma after alleged hate crime in Minnesota

    A 2026 late-night violent assault in a Minneapolis suburb has left a beloved Somali-American rideshare driver clinging to life in a medically induced coma, sparking widespread community outcry over rising anti-Muslim and anti-Somali rhetoric across the U.S. state of Minnesota, home to one of the nation’s largest Somali diaspora populations.

    Mohamed Yusuf, a dedicated Uber driver and devoted family breadwinner, was on shift in Hopkins, Minnesota, in the early hours of November 14 when a passenger allegedly initiated a targeted confrontation. After asking for Yusuf’s name, the suspect openly stated he held animosity toward the name “Mohamed” before launching a brutal, unprovoked attack: he strangled Yusuf from behind, wrested control of the driver’s vehicle, and struck him multiple times with the car before leaving him for dead in a roadside ditch nearly a mile from the initial site of the assault. First responders who were dispatched to reports of a suspicious abandoned vehicle at approximately 1:20 a.m. discovered Yusuf suffering from catastrophic, life-threatening injuries: multiple broken ribs, fractured legs, two collapsed lungs, severe spinal damage, and extensive internal bleeding. He remains in critical condition at Hennepin County Medical Center, unconscious and fighting for his life, according to his grieving family.

    Local law enforcement confirmed that a male suspect identified in arrest records as 29-year-old Samit Apurva Patel was taken into custody on November 14 and charged with first-degree assault, though Hopkins police have not yet formally linked Patel to Yusuf’s assault, publicly named the suspect in the ongoing case, or established an official motive for the attack. Investigators have also not yet classified the incident as a hate crime, a gap that has fueled urgent demands from community members for a thorough, transparent probe into potential bias as a driving factor.

    The harrowing incident has ignited widespread outrage across Minnesota’s Somali and Muslim American communities, with advocates, elected officials, and religious leaders uniting to condemn the violence and call for accountability. U.S. Congresswoman Ilhan Omar, a prominent Somali-American representative for Minnesota, issued a forceful statement on X (formerly Twitter) framing the assault as a preventable act of racial violence rooted in sustained dehumanization of marginalized communities. “My heart is with Mohamed and his family. I am praying for his full recovery. This horrific act of racial violence is unacceptable. No one should live in fear because of who they are. The relentless dehumanization of the Somali community has real consequences. We must unequivocally condemn this violence and reject the hatred that divides our communities,” she wrote.

    High-profile Muslim-American scholar Dr. Omar Suleiman also addressed the attack, noting that targeted assaults against Minnesota’s Somali population have spiked in frequency in recent months. “Attacks on our Somali community are more and more frequent. Mohamed Yusuf went to work to provide for his family and is now fighting for his life after a horrific attack. May Allah grant him a full recovery and hold accountable those who spread and act upon such hatred,” he shared in a public social media post.

    At a press conference held outside Hennepin County Medical Center two days after the attack, Jaylani Hussein, executive director of the Minnesota chapter of the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR-MN), explicitly tied the violence to years of inflammatory political rhetoric targeting Somali immigrants. He cited repeated derogatory public remarks from former President Donald Trump, Minnesota House Majority Whip Tom Emmer – who recently claimed on a conservative podcast that Minnesota had “inherited Somalia’s civil war” – and local far-right agitators as key contributors to a festering climate of bigotry that normalized anti-Somali hostility. “For more than a year and a half, Muslims across this country, and specifically Somali Americans here in Minnesota, have lived in an unwritten climate of fear, hatred, bigotry and dehumanisation,” Hussein told assembled reporters, elected officials including Minneapolis Mayor Jacob Frey, and a crowd of fellow rideshare drivers. “This rhetoric has built an environment that we are living in today, an environment which we believe has created this heinous attack that took place on Saturday night here in Minnesota. This attack did not happen in a vacuum. It was created, festered and driven by sustained campaigns of dehumanization.”

    Family members of Yusuf echoed these concerns in public statements, with one relative posting on X that the passenger explicitly stated he “hated people named Mohamed” during the assault. “I’m angry at our government for feeding that hatred with its anti-Muslim and anti-Somali rhetoric,” the post read, adding that Yusuf was widely known as a gentle, generous man who only ever wanted to work to support his household. Minnesota State Senator Omar Fateh also joined calls for a fully transparent, expeditious investigation, noting that Yusuf “should be home safe with his family, not fighting for his life after an attack fueled by hatred towards his Somali identity.”

    Rideshare platform Uber issued an official statement condemning the assault, noting that the accused passenger has been permanently banned from the platform and that the company will provide full cooperation with ongoing law enforcement investigations. A community-led GoFundMe campaign launched to cover Yusuf’s mounting medical bills and support his family has already raised more than $140,000 as of press time, as hundreds of local residents, fellow drivers, and advocates rally to stand in solidarity with the injured driver and his loved ones.

  • Can soybeans save Taiwan?

    Can soybeans save Taiwan?

    A recently published provocative thesis from a U.S.-based China military specialist has sparked cross-sector discussion, drawing interest not just from national security circles but also global agricultural producers. Writing in the journal Foreign Affairs, Joel Wuthnow, a researcher at Washington’s National Defense University, posits that China’s heavy reliance on imported soybeans could act as an unexpected, underrecognized deterrent against a potential full-scale military assault to seize Taiwan.
    Wuthnow’s core argument centers on the cascading supply chain disruptions that would unfold in the event of a Taiwan Strait armed conflict: U.S. soybean shipments to China would immediately face formal embargoes, while deliveries from major South American soybean exporters could be cut off via naval blockades. Even without formal military blockades, the analyst notes that skyrocketing maritime insurance premiums for commercial vessels operating in the high-tension Taiwan Strait region would almost certainly dissuade most global shipping operators from accepting soybean cargo bound for Chinese ports, effectively severing the vast majority of China’s overseas soybean supply lines.
    The researcher acknowledges that Beijing has spent years building strategic stockpiles of soybeans alongside critical reserves of crude oil and other high-priority imported commodities. But unlike energy resources that can be stored for extended periods without degradation, Wuthnow emphasizes that soybeans are a comparatively fragile agricultural commodity, with hard limits on how long they can be held in storage before spoiling or losing nutritional value. In the scenario of a protracted Taiwan conflict, these soybean stockpiles would be rapidly depleted, forcing Chinese households to revert to a largely grain-based diet that would eliminate the large quantities of meat and cooking oil that have become staples of modern Chinese life, a shift widely viewed as deeply unpopular with the public. Wuthnow concludes that the most effective deterrence strategy for the U.S. and its partners is to clearly communicate to Chinese leadership that domestic food-related crises would emerge far faster than any achievable military victory over Taiwan.
    The subsequent analysis from veteran Asia-based journalist and agricultural publication editor emeritus Urban Lehner puts Wuthnow’s untested thesis under rigorous scrutiny, raising a series of critical, unresolved questions that challenge the core assumptions of the soybean deterrence framework. First, Lehner notes that Wuthnow’s unsubstantiated claim that Chinese soybean stockpiles would only last a few months fails to account for Beijing’s longstanding practice of sourcing extra-dry soybeans for storage, a specification that, paired with modern advanced grain preservation technologies, can extend the usable shelf life of stored soybeans to 12 months or longer. Second, the thesis largely dismisses years of Chinese government policy efforts to diversify global soybean supplier networks, expand domestic soybean cultivation acreage, and develop modified low-soy animal feed formulas, all initiatives that could reduce China’s import dependence far more than Wuthnow has accounted for.
    Lehner further questions whether the threat of a food consumption shift would actually deter Chinese leadership, pointing to widespread nationalist sentiment that Beijing has cultivated over decades, paired with the longstanding framing of Taiwan reunification as a core national priority. Drawing parallels to U.S. civilian food rationing during World War II, where American households accepted limits on meat and other staples as a necessary wartime sacrifice despite widespread grumbling, Lehner notes that it is entirely plausible Chinese citizens would similarly rally around national wartime efforts and tolerate reduced access to meat and cooking oil. The analysis also points to shifting U.S. strategic ambiguity under the second Donald Trump administration: while U.S. arms sales to Taiwan have continued, Trump has publicly framed these sales as potential negotiating chips for favorable trade deals with China, alongside repeated public complaints about the excessive financial costs of U.S. overseas security commitments. These shifts have already led many independent U.S. analysts to question whether Washington would actually deploy military force to defend Taiwan in the event of a cross-strait conflict, a calculation that Chinese leadership is almost certainly making as well.
    Additionally, Lehner argues that Chinese military planners are far more likely to prioritize developing capabilities to deliver a rapid, overwhelming victory in a Taiwan conflict rather than planning for a prolonged drawn-out war, pointing to Beijing’s rapid naval expansion, massive stockpiles of precision-guided missiles, and military assessments that suggest U.S. conventional missile stockpiles would be exhausted within a week of large-scale conflict, a vulnerability exacerbated by recent drawdowns of U.S. munitions to support operations in the Middle East. Finally, the analysis highlights that both sides hold competing strategic vulnerabilities: while China relies on soybean imports, the U.S. and its allied high-tech manufacturing sectors are deeply dependent on Chinese exports of rare earth minerals and other critical industrial components, meaning a prolonged large-scale conflict would likely impose far more crippling industrial damage on Western economies than on China’s domestic food supply chain.
    Lehner acknowledges that Wuthnow correctly identifies China’s soybean import dependence as a largely overlooked strategic vulnerability, but emphasizes that the actual deterrent value of this weakness remains highly unproven and open to fierce debate. The one point of clear consensus in the analysis is Wuthnow’s final policy recommendation: that the U.S., Taiwan, and allied regional governments must move rapidly to expand drone production, rebuild depleted national munitions stockpiles, and launch consistent public diplomatic messaging to make clear to Beijing that any attempt to seize Taiwan by force will inevitably devolve into a costly, extended conflict that cannot be won quickly.

  • Incoming Texas governor to reverse terror designation for Muslim civil liberties group

    Incoming Texas governor to reverse terror designation for Muslim civil liberties group

    In a landmark policy shift following a historic Democratic sweep of Texas’ top state offices in this month’s midterm elections, governor-elect Gina Hinojosa has confirmed plans to immediately rescind a sweeping executive order from outgoing three-term Republican Governor Greg Abbott that labeled the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) a foreign terrorist organization. The announcement, shared exclusively with The Washington Post in a Saturday interview, marks a pivotal reversal of a policy that civil liberties advocates have decried as a politically motivated assault on Muslim civic participation. Hinojosa, who made history as the first Hispanic woman elected to the Texas governorship, will take the oath of office in January 2025. She emphasized in her remarks that state public safety resources must be deployed exclusively for legitimate, evidence-based community protection, not targeted ideological campaigns. The sweeping blue wave that flipped Texas’ long-held deep red governing structure also unseated staunch Trump-endorsed Republican Attorney General Ken Paxton, who lost his U.S. Senate bid to Democratic challenger James Talarico earlier this month. Every statewide top office, from lieutenant governor to a majority in both chambers of the state legislature, now rests in Democratic hands, leaving only high-profile Republican Senator Ted Cruz as the remaining GOP officeholder with statewide jurisdiction. Cruz has spent years amplifying narratives framing the Muslim Brotherhood, a transnational Islamist movement with deep roots in Egypt that combines religious observance, grassroots social welfare programming and political advocacy, as a core national security threat to the U.S. The movement, whose popular support remains strong across large swathes of the Arab world, no longer operates under the centralized Egyptian leadership structure it maintained for most of the 20th century. Cruz’s repeated framing of the group as a domestic danger often points to Hamas, the U.S.-designated terrorist faction that governs Gaza, as an alleged direct offshoot, though analysts note Hamas operates exclusively within the occupied Palestinian territories and Israel, with no documented operational presence on U.S. soil. Abbott’s original executive order, issued almost exactly one year prior to Hinojosa’s announcement, designated both the Muslim Brotherhood and CAIR as both foreign terrorist organizations and transnational criminal enterprises. The order imposed sweeping restrictions that barred both groups from purchasing or acquiring any real estate in the state, and granted Attorney General Paxton broad discretionary authority to file civil and criminal lawsuits against the organizations. Abbott’s order specifically cited 15-year-old public remarks from CAIR national executive director Nihad Awad, in which Awad referenced the group’s long-term goal of training 50,000 American Muslim community organizers to run for public office and shape public narratives to counter anti-Islamic bias, claiming the comments constituted proof Awad sought to impose Sharia law across the U.S. CAIR has consistently rejected all unsubstantiated links to the Muslim Brotherhood, noting that nearly 100% of its operating budget comes from grassroots public donations from Muslim and non-Muslim American supporters. At the time of Abbott’s designation, the group released a statement asserting it has repeatedly condemned all acts of terrorism and antisemitism, and that Abbott’s action was a deliberate tactic to suppress advocacy critical of Israeli government policies. Civil rights leaders across Texas have already hailed Hinojosa’s planned repeal. Sam Robles, executive director of the Texas Nonprofit Protection Network, noted in a public statement that Abbott weaponized his executive authority to stoke anti-Muslim hostility and intimidate community defense organizations, framing the terrorist designation as the latest escalation in a years-long campaign to paint Muslim civic engagement as a public safety threat. The positive news for CAIR in Texas comes on the heels of a devastating legal loss in neighboring Florida, where a federal judge last week refused to roll back a similar state-level terrorist designation that forced the organization to cease all in-state operations after more than 20 years of service to Florida’s Muslim community. U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida Chief Judge Allen C. Winsor acknowledged that Florida’s new law allowing the state to designate nonprofits as terrorist entities without standard due process safeguards was “novel — and perhaps unprecedented,” but ruled that CAIR’s emergency motion failed to meet the legal threshold to prove the group was facing immediate unconstitutional criminal punishment. Winsor did, however, issue a partial ruling barring Florida state officials from denying CAIR access to legal representation, and state authorities have pledged they will not prosecute the group’s board members, staff, or third-party partners. CAIR’s national deputy director Edward Ahmed Mitchell noted that the shutdown in Florida has left local Muslim residents without access to critical support for reporting hate crimes at mosques, workplace discrimination, anti-Muslim school bullying, and other documented acts of bigotry. The organization has already confirmed it will file an immediate appeal of the Florida court ruling.

  • Customers report service outages at major US banks

    Customers report service outages at major US banks

    A widespread service disruption struck some of the United States’ largest financial institutions on Monday, leaving thousands of retail and small business customers facing delays and access hurdles to routine banking operations. Customers of JPMorgan Chase, Wells Fargo, and Bank of America were among the first to flag issues ranging from extended transaction processing times to intermittent access to mobile and online banking portals starting in the early afternoon, according to crowdsourced outage tracking data from Downdetector, which recorded nearly 5,000 separate reports of Chase service failures at the peak of the incident.
    Chase, the U.S.’s biggest banking network that serves over 86 million individual customers, 7.4 million small business clients, and ranks as the nation’s leading credit card issuer, moved quickly to reassure users that the disruption was rooted in an isolated, temporary software bug embedded in its on-premise hardware systems, emphasizing that the glitch was not systemic in nature and bore no connection to any cyberattack or malicious activity. The institution also noted that the ripple effects of its internal technical fault may have spilled over to partner banking networks, rather than originating as separate independent failures across multiple providers.
    While Chase confirmed all customers retained full access to their account holdings and funds, many users reported extended wait times for pending transactions to post, and users of U.S. Bank’s digital payment tool Zelle encountered error messages blocking peer-to-peer payment sends. Zelle’s operating team clarified that its own core platform was functioning normally, and the payment errors stemmed from processing bottlenecks at connected member banks. Representatives for Truist, PNC, and Capital One all told the BBC that their internal systems remained fully operational, dismissing circulating social media reports of widespread outages on their respective networks.
    By 6 p.m. Eastern Time (2300 GMT), outage reports across all affected major banks had declined sharply, with most customers regaining full access to standard banking services. The incident arrives on the heels of a chaotic string of unrelated national technical disruptions in the preceding week, including a global mass IT outage tied to a Microsoft platform update, a major telecommunications network failure, and a widespread systems glitch that temporarily grounded all domestic U.S. commercial flights. Chase has not yet disclosed full technical details of the specific software bug that triggered the disruption, and the BBC remains in ongoing communication with the institution to request further clarity on root causes and preventive measures for future incidents.

  • The paper trail that leads from the UAE to a dead boy in Sudan

    The paper trail that leads from the UAE to a dead boy in Sudan

    The author opens with a searing personal memory: 12-year-old Osama, his younger brother’s closest childhood friend, was killed by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) during a 2023 attack on a town in Sudan’s al-Jazira state. The pair had spent their days sharing a single bicycle, one pedaling while the other ran alongside holding the seat, until Osama’s life was abruptly erased by the paramilitary’s violence.

    Years earlier, in the aftermath of the 2019 Khartoum sit-in crackdown, the author — a member of Sudan’s nationwide grassroots resistance committees — joined a small group of local activists tending to a pile of discarded sheep wool left after Eid celebrations. Neighborhood families had noted the main road’s streetlights had been broken for months: children tripped in the rain, and elderly residents stopped walking to the mosque after dark for fear of unseen hazards. Instead of selling the wool for pennies in small batches, the group pooled the proceeds to repair the streetlights, documenting every pound collected and spent in a cheap blue-covered notebook. No one set out to create an archive, but it became one: the only official, unfiltered record that their street was lit again, a fact no state history would ever acknowledge. This moment taught the author there are two distinct types of paperwork that answer to no shared authority: one rooted in mutual accountability for the local community, and the other the formal, sanitized documentation of governments designed to persuade other global powers that plunder and violence are legitimate, ordinary business, often framed as “purely humanitarian.”

    The author traces how this second, deceptive ledger paved the way for Sudan’s 2023 war. In December 2022, Sudan’s military and civilian political bloc signed a Framework Agreement promising to integrate the RSF — a 2013 paramilitary successor to the Janjaweed militias responsible for hundreds of thousands of deaths in Darfur — into the official Sudanese Armed Forces. Just three weeks later, Chad inaugurated a 3km paved runway in Amdjarass, a town 50km from Sudan’s border, a project 93% complete long before any global actor formally recognized the impending Sudan conflict. No public records name the United Arab Emirates as the runway’s builder, but the strip was purpose-built to accommodate heavy cargo flights departing from Abu Dhabi’s Al Dhafra airbase. Throughout 2022 alone, the UAE extracted nearly 40 tonnes of Sudanese gold worth over $2 billion, none of which passed through any civilian-vetted Sudanese national budget. Weeks before fighting erupted in Khartoum on April 15, 2023, Sudan’s central bank deposited $50 million into RSF-controlled Alkhaleej Bank, a fact later confirmed by the U.S. Treasury. By the first shots of the war, the RSF already held exclusive access to the cross-border Amdjarass airstrip, a fully funded financial institution, a years-long supply chain for military vehicles, and a gold trade larger than the combined budgets of most Sudanese federal ministries. As the author notes, flags and formal government ministries are not real power: power lies in unregulated funds, weapons, and the infrastructure that moves them, all of which had already shifted to RSF control by the end of 2022.

    When international scrutiny fell on Amdjarass, the UAE simply rerouted its supply network, using Libya’s Kufra airbase and Ethiopia’s Asosa and Bahir Dar military sites as new nodes in a decentralized, untraceable system to arm the RSF. Emirati officials have repeatedly denied all allegations of interference: former UAE UN ambassador Lana Nusseibeh published a public letter in 2024 claiming her country had supplied no weapons to the RSF, and later lobbied European Parliament members in Strasbourg to remove all references to the UAE from a formal Sudan war resolution. Evidence of the UAE’s involvement continued to mount: in March 2026, Sudanese air defenses recovered a downed Emirati-manufactured drone in North Kordofan, with flight logs tracing its origin to a hangar at Ethiopia’s Bahir Dar airbase. Investigations also uncovered a global private recruitment network run by UAE-linked firm Global Security Services Group (GSSG), directly tied to the office of the UAE’s Presidential Court, which first recruited Sudanese civilians for deceptive “security jobs” in 2020, then expanded to hire Colombian mercenaries five years later, using layered offshore shell companies to obscure payment trails and avoid accountability.

    The author contrasts this opaque, dehumanizing global system with the small, tangible acts of local solidarity that once defined their community: the Khartoum tea seller who extended interest-free credit to anyone who could not pay for her drink, a simple, transparent arrangement that relied on mutual trust. The author writes late at night from their current home in Cairo, grappling with the weight of unrecorded deaths and forgotten stories, drawing a direct line between the UK’s historic remote governance of Darfur as an extractive “laboratory” and the modern UAE-led cross-border supply chain that treats Sudan as a disposable site for profit and proxy conflict. Osama, the 12-year-old boy killed by the RSF, never received an official death file, only a 40-second frantic phone call from a neighborhood resident announcing the paramilitary’s arrival. This account, the author says, is Osama’s official record: a deliberate act of refusal to let powerful global actors erase the victims of the unacknowledged war, prioritizing the small, community-led archive of the blue wool notebook over all the sanitized, deceptive state paperwork that frames mass atrocity as legitimate business.

  • Head of Arab list appointed temporary deputy speaker of Israel’s parliament

    Head of Arab list appointed temporary deputy speaker of Israel’s parliament

    In a landmark move following last month’s Israeli legislative elections, veteran Palestinian-Israeli lawmaker Ahmad Tibi was formally named one of nine temporary deputy speakers of the Knesset, Israel’s 120-seat parliament, on a Monday vote. The appointment came on the heels of unprecedented electoral gains for political blocs representing Palestinian citizens of Israel, who now hold a combined 19 parliamentary seats, up from previous cycles, after the October 27 national poll.

    The Knesset’s influential Arrangements Committee greenlit the full roster of temporary deputy speakers via a narrow 13-9 vote, following a fiery, hours-long debate that exposed deep partisan rifts across the legislature. The full approved list of temporary deputies spans nearly every major political faction: alongside Tibi, who leads the pan-Arab Joint List alliance and the Ta’al party, the group includes United Arab List (Ra’am) MP Walid Taha, B’Yachad MP Eitan Ginzburg, Democrats MP Yair Fink, Yisrael Beytenu MP Oded Forer, United Torah Judaism MP Yitzhak Pindrus, Likud MP Yaakov Bardugo, far-right Otzma Yehudit MP Limor Son Har-Melech, and Shas MP Michael Malkieli. These temporary officeholders will retain their posts until a formal, permanent slate of deputy speakers is confirmed by the full Knesset in subsequent votes.

    The debate leading up to the committee vote was marked by sharp, hostile pushback from hardline members of former prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s right-wing bloc. Likud lawmaker Ofir Katz took to the floor to denounce the appointment process, claiming the body was “normalising terror supporters” by advancing Tibi’s placement in a senior parliamentary role, while Otzma Yehudit MP Yitzhak Kroizer framed the decision as a dangerous “Rubicon that must not be crossed” for the Israeli legislature.

    Moments after the vote was finalised, Tibi spoke to Al Jazeera to frame the appointment as a hard-won, legitimate victory for his Joint List alliance, which secured 11 seats in the October election. He went on to note that Netanyahu’s Likud party and far-right National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir had waged a fierce campaign of reckless incitement to block his appointment, but had ultimately failed to derail the outcome. “The Joint List will be represented across all Knesset committees, as is our democratic right,” Tibi confirmed, outlining his faction’s upcoming parliamentary priorities.

    The appointment drama unfolds against a backdrop of explosive pre-election misconduct allegations targeting Netanyahu and his inner circle, which Tibi had called for a full criminal investigation into just one day prior, on Sunday. The call followed an investigative exposé from Israel’s Channel 12, which alleged that Netanyahu’s chief of staff Ido Norden reached out directly to the Israeli police commissioner’s office in the lead-up to polling day, claiming three Ra’am activists operating in southern Israel were in possession of large caches of cash and voter incentive vouchers intended to sway electoral outcomes. Police subsequently raided the activists’ residences and took them into custody, with the report noting the operation relied on intelligence from a source who was a former employee of the prime minister’s own office. The Channel 12 investigation further alleged that Shin Bet chief David Zini had sought formal approval to wiretap the personal phones of five Arab-Israeli lawmakers on election day itself, a request that Israel’s attorney general ultimately rejected out of hand. Tibi posted on social media platform X on Sunday to emphasise that “No one is above the law, not even Netanyahu,” while Netanyahu’s Likud party has issued a full, categorical denial of all the misconduct claims levelled against the prime minister and his staff.

    This is far from Tibi’s first tenure in the deputy speaker role: first elected to the Knesset in 1999, he previously served as deputy speaker continuously from 2006 through 2022, and follows a long line of Palestinian and Arab-Israeli lawmakers to hold the senior post, including Ra’am party leader Mansour Abbas, who occupied the position between 2020 and 2022.

    The high-stakes appointment comes at a critical juncture for Israeli government formation, as neither Netanyahu’s right-wing bloc nor the centrist alliance led by former IDF chief of staff Gadi Eisenkot managed to cross the 61-seat threshold required to secure a governing majority after the October vote. President Isaac Herzog formally tasked Eisenkot with forming the next governing coalition earlier this month, and the Joint List has already announced its formal backing for Eisenkot’s efforts, meaning the 19 combined seats held by the two Arab-led factions now hold decisive leverage over the weeks of coalition negotiations ahead.

  • Turkey says Hezbollah won’t disarm while Israel occupies Lebanese territory

    Turkey says Hezbollah won’t disarm while Israel occupies Lebanese territory

    Top Turkish diplomatic officials have laid out a clear precondition for any viable path toward Hezbollah’s disarmament in Lebanon, stating exclusively to Middle East Eye that no such process can move forward until Israel fully ends its decades-long and expanding occupation of sovereign Lebanese land. The remarks come as Ankara ramps up high-stakes diplomatic engagement across the Levant, following the seismic political shift that brought a new governing administration to power in Damascus late last year. Over recent months, Turkey has hosted a series of senior Lebanese state representatives, capped by an official state visit from Lebanese President Joseph Aoun in July. Just last week, Bilal Erdogan, son of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, completed a three-day diplomatic mission to Beirut, where he met with a cross-section of Lebanese stakeholders including senior government officials, community dignitaries, and leaders from the country’s diverse religious and political blocs. Multiple Ankara insiders confirmed to MEE that Turkey’s intensified regional outreach is rooted in a strategic assessment that stability across Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon is inextricably interconnected, forming a contiguous security belt that shapes the safety of the entire Eastern Mediterranean and broader Middle East. Turkish policymakers argue that no sustainable peace can take hold in Syria unless Lebanon is also stabilized, a framing that has guided Ankara’s quiet mediation efforts to restart constructive dialogue between Beirut and Damascus. That push yielded a landmark visit from Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani to Beirut in July, a trip widely hailed as the official opening of a new chapter in bilateral relations between the two long-intertwined nations. A senior Turkish official speaking on condition of anonymity explained the regional vision: “We view the Iraq-Syria-Lebanon corridor as a single strategic unit whose collective security directly impacts every corner of this wider region. Our goal is to foster targeted, practical cooperation between the three governments to de-escalate long-simmering cross-border tensions.” Lebanese regional affairs researcher Sohaib Jawhar noted that Ankara’s policy calculus has evolved to frame Lebanon as a core component of Syria’s immediate strategic landscape, with particular emphasis on stability in northern Lebanon as a prerequisite for Syria’s post-conflict reconstruction and planned regional economic integration. Jawhar also highlighted a key motivating factor behind Turkey’s expanded engagement in Lebanon: growing concern that recent trilateral energy and security pacts signed between Israel, Cyprus, and Greece in the Eastern Mediterranean risk cementing a new regional order that deliberately sidelined Ankara from critical decision-making processes. Erdogan’s recent trip to Beirut was explicitly designed to expand Turkey’s traditional network of partnerships in Lebanon beyond its longstanding ties with Sunni Arab political factions, to build working relationships with representatives of the country’s Christian, Druze, and Alawite communities. Though widely shared social media footage of his enthusiastic public reception in the majority-Sunni Tripoli stronghold sparked unsubstantiated rumors that Ankara was seeking to unify Lebanon’s disparate Sunni political blocs, a source directly familiar with the visit’s closed-door discussions confirmed to MEE that no such conversations took place, and the trip’s sole mandate was to deepen formal intergovernmental ties between Turkey and Lebanon. The question of Hezbollah’s future status as an armed non-state actor remains the most intractable unresolved political issue in Lebanon. Even after a sustained campaign of targeted assassinations and armed assaults that have weakened the group’s leadership and rank-and-file over recent months, the movement has repeatedly demonstrated its capacity to regroup and maintain its armed resistance against Israeli military incursions. The senior Turkish official criticized Israel for actively creating new military facts on the ground rather than upholding its previously signed international commitments, noting that while Hezbollah fully withdrew its fighters north of the Litani River in line with existing UN resolutions, Israel has repeatedly violated its own pledges to refrain from establishing new military outposts on Lebanese sovereign territory. “You cannot reasonably demand Hezbollah disarm at a moment when Israeli occupation of Lebanese land is actively expanding,” the official emphasized. “That is a fundamentally contradictory, impossible equation that must be discarded entirely for any progress to occur.” The current wave of cross-border hostilities escalated in March 2025, when Israel launched a full-scale ground invasion of Lebanon after Hezbollah resumed rocket fire in response to the joint U.S.-Israeli military campaign against Iran that began on February 28 of that year. Subsequent U.S.-brokered bilateral negotiations between Israel and the Lebanese government produced a tentative framework that envisioned phased Israeli military withdrawal matched by the deployment of the Lebanese Armed Forces across all southern border regions and the gradual disarmament of Hezbollah. The arrangement was initially rolled out in small pilot zones across southern Lebanon, but implementation has completely stalled over the past several months. Turkish diplomatic representatives have explicitly communicated to their U.S. counterparts that the U.S.-backed framework will never succeed unless Washington takes concrete steps to halt ongoing Israeli land grabs and military expansions. Ankara has also rejected a proposal floated by U.S. President Donald Trump that newly installed Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa intervene directly in Lebanon to force Hezbollah’s disarmament, a plan that Damascus has already publicly rejected. Turkish officials warn that such an externally imposed intervention would almost certainly fail and carry a catastrophic risk of reigniting a full-scale civil war in Lebanon. The Turkish official went on to accuse Israel of deliberately entrenching its occupation by constructing dozens of new temporary military outposts across southern Lebanon, and systematically converting many of these positions into permanent fortified installations. Jawhar echoed this analysis, noting that Ankara does not view Hezbollah’s disarmament as an issue that can be resolved in isolation from the broader political and security context that led to the group’s founding. “Israel’s ongoing occupation of Lebanese territory and continuous cross-border attacks provide Hezbollah with its most foundational justification for retaining its independent military capabilities, paired with more recent framing from the group that cites what it views as a new existential threat emerging from post-transition Syria,” Jawhar explained. He also clarified that Turkey’s current stance does not equal unqualified support for Hezbollah operating as an independent armed force outside of state control, pointing to Ankara’s prior successful mediation work in Iraq to support the central government’s efforts to bring all non-state armed groups and weapons under formal state authority. Earlier this year, Israeli and Syrian negotiators held a series of preliminary talks focused on updating a bilateral security agreement rooted in their 1974 Golan Heights disengagement accord. The Turkish official revealed that Ankara spent more than 12 months facilitating backchannel talks between Israeli and Syrian officials to broker a mutually acceptable security arrangement for southern Syria, but that Israeli negotiators flatly rejected Turkey’s proposed updated framework. “As we anticipated, the Israelis refused to sign any binding agreement, and they have no intention of halting their territorial expansions regardless of diplomatic pressure,” the official said. Turkish policymakers argue that this deliberate Israeli unwillingness to sign formal peace accords explains why Israel regularly puts forward diplomatic proposals that it already knows Lebanon and Syria will reject out of hand. A senior Israeli official pushed back against this characterization in September, telling local media that Damascus lost its motivation to finalize a security deal after international sanctions on Syria were lifted following the collapse of the Assad government in December 2024. The Israeli official added that Jerusalem would never accept any agreement that required it to withdraw from the newly established buffer zone it seized after Assad’s fall, describing the territory as an irreplaceable national security asset. Even so, Turkish officials hold out cautious optimism that a potential new Israeli governing coalition could adopt a more pragmatic diplomatic posture that would unlock rapid progress toward a broader regional settlement for Lebanon. “But as long as Israel continues its expansionist campaigns into Syrian and Lebanese territory, alongside its ongoing operations in Gaza and the West Bank, these cycles of violence will only continue to claim more lives and generate even deeper instability across the entire region,” the Turkish official warned. Jawhar concluded that Turkey is uniquely positioned to broker a viable long-term settlement, given its longstanding diplomatic ties to Iran, its established communication channels with every major Lebanese political and religious faction, and its working relationship with the current U.S. administration. A Turkish-mediated framework could link a full Israeli withdrawal and permanent end to cross-border attacks with a multi-year program to strengthen the Lebanese Armed Forces and facilitate inclusive national dialogue aimed at gradually transferring all weapons in the country under the exclusive control of the Lebanese state. Even so, Jawhar acknowledged that Ankara’s direct ability to shape Hezbollah’s internal decision-making remains limited, and any final settlement will require buy-in from all regional stakeholders.

  • Home Office pressured council to cancel event featuring pro-Palestine activist, disclosures suggest

    Home Office pressured council to cancel event featuring pro-Palestine activist, disclosures suggest

    Recently released Freedom of Information and Subject Access Request documents obtained by socialist magazine Tribune have laid bare a controversial sequence of actions from the UK Home Office, in which the central government body allegedly attempted to coerce Hackney Council into scrapping a scheduled public speaking event, even after its own internal analysis concluded the gathering posed no risk of public disruption. The event in question, hosted by Tribune on November 4, was set to feature two high-profile speakers: Swedish climate scholar Andreas Malm, who had been formally barred from entering the UK by the Home Office in October, and Huda Ammori, co-founder of pro-Palestine advocacy group Palestine Action. Malm had planned to deliver his remarks remotely via video link, while Ammori was at the time actively engaged in a Supreme Court legal challenge against the UK government’s widely criticized official ban on Palestine Action. Internal Home Office assessments completed ahead of the event explicitly stated the gathering was “unlikely to meet the threshold for disruption”, according to the newly disclosed records. Despite this internal finding, the Home Office’s extremism disruptions team reached out directly to Hackney Council’s Prevent and Hate Crime coordinator, flagging the two speakers as “individuals of concern” and sharing classified intelligence materials that had formed the basis of Malm’s entry ban. Those materials accused Malm of “legitimising and encouraging attacks on energy infrastructure and terrorism”, while an October 12 email from the team alleged the academic had repeatedly made public statements endorsing terrorist groups and direct action tactics linked to both Palestine advocacy and climate activism. Just 24 hours before the event was scheduled to begin, Home Office officials followed up to confirm whether their concerns had been relayed to the management of the council-owned venue where the gathering was set to take place. The pressure prompted Hackney Council administrative staff to notify venue managers, who subsequently informed Tribune editor Oliver Eagleton that the event would be forced to cancel. In the aftermath, a Home Office spokesperson issued a formal statement denying all allegations of coercion, claiming “it is categorically untrue that the Home Office pushed to cancel the event” and maintaining that the final call to scrap the gathering rested entirely with Hackney Council, with the central government only providing supplementary contextual information. The decision to cancel the event was swiftly overturned, however, by Hackney’s Green Party mayor Zoe Garbett, who published an open letter addressed to Home Secretary Shabana Mahmood rejecting the pressure from central government. “Encouraging the cancellation of lawful public events represents an assault on the right to free speech, and under no circumstance will I be complicit in it,” Garbett wrote, adding that she was “shocked” by the Home Office’s conduct. She went on to demand a formal explanation for why central government officials had sought to pressure local council officers to veto invited speakers, questioning how such actions aligned with local authorities’ legal statutory duties to protect the public’s right to free expression and peaceful assembly. Garbett further criticized the national Labour government in a Monday op-ed published by The Guardian, arguing that the administration had become “fixated on petty authoritarianism” in its approach to public gatherings and dissenting voices.