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  • US air losses over Iran may grimly foreshadow China war risks

    US air losses over Iran may grimly foreshadow China war risks

    Recent steep losses of U.S. military aircraft during joint U.S.-Israeli operations in the Middle East have ignited urgent new debate over whether American air power can endure sustained high attrition in a potential future great-power conflict against China in the Indo-Pacific.

    In May 2026, the nonpartisan U.S. Congressional Research Service (CRS) published a detailed report documenting that at least 42 U.S. aircraft have been lost or damaged beyond field repair since the launch of Operation Epic Fury, the February 2026 U.S.-Israeli military campaign targeting Iranian military and infrastructure assets. The toll cuts across every major segment of U.S. air power: fighter jets, refueling tankers, special operations aircraft, helicopters, and uncrewed surveillance and strike drones, painting a stark picture of the campaign’s high intensity.

    A breakdown of the confirmed losses includes four F-15E Strike Eagle fighters—three destroyed in friendly fire incidents over Kuwait in March, and a fourth shot down over Iranian airspace in April—plus one damaged F-35A stealth fighter, one A-10 Thunderbolt II destroyed by enemy fire, seven KC-135 refueling tankers, one E-3 Sentry AWACS early warning aircraft, two MC-130J special operations transport aircraft, one HH-60W combat rescue helicopter, 24 MQ-9 Reaper strike drones, and one MQ-4C Triton surveillance drone. Several additional aircraft were damaged on the ground at Saudi Arabia’s Prince Sultan Air Base during Iranian missile and drone counterattacks, while the two stranded MC-130Js inside Iranian territory were deliberately destroyed by U.S. forces to prevent capture.

    The CRS notes that the U.S. Department of Defense has not publicly released a full official damage assessment, but Capitol Hill lawmakers are already preparing to investigate the wide-ranging operational, budgetary, and defense industrial base implications of replacing these high-value military aircraft. Analysts have attributed the heavy losses to a mix of overlapping factors: tactical mistakes on the battlefield, surprisingly resilient Iranian air defense networks, long-unaddressed vulnerabilities in U.S. operational doctrine, and improved Iranian strike capabilities backed by technical and intelligence support from China and Russia.

    Writing for Forbes in March 2026, defense analyst Peter Suciu argued that common fog-of-war challenges contributed heavily to avoidable losses. These include ground crew and pilot errors caused by turned-off emitters or transponders during covert operations, widespread communications overload from constant radio traffic, disruptive enemy electronic warfare, rapidly shifting operational plans, failures in data linking and digital command systems, and human factors such as stress, fatigue, and inadequate training for high-intensity combat. Dense multinational operating environments, conflicting radar readings, unrecognized identification friend-or-foe (IFF) system failures, and pilots forgetting critical combat procedures have also amplified avoidable losses, Suciu added.

    Beyond tactical missteps, analysts emphasize that even after months of preliminary strikes, Iran’s integrated air defense network has retained enough operational capacity to impose heavy costs on U.S. air operations. Ahead of Operation Rising Lion—Israel’s June 2025 pre-emptive strikes on Iran’s nuclear program, widely seen as the precursor to February 2026’s Operation Epic Fury—defense journalist Arie Egozi documented that Iran operated a layered, multinational air defense architecture including Russian TOR-M1, SA-5, SA-6, and S-300PMU systems, Chinese-designed HQ-2 and FM-80 batteries, upgraded legacy HAWK missiles, British Rapier systems, and Swedish RBS-70 short-range weapons.

    Per Egozi’s analysis, the Russian-built TOR-M1 is capable of engaging fixed-wing aircraft, helicopters, drones, guided missiles, and precision-guided ordnance even in heavily contested electronic warfare environments, while the S-300PMU forms the backbone of Iran’s long-range defense capability, with advanced multi-missile compatibility, extended range, and improved lethality. Iran has also integrated Chinese-built YJ-14 search radars, modernized air surveillance systems, and a unified command-and-control network to protect key national assets including Tehran, military sites, port facilities, and oil infrastructure.

    While U.S. and Israeli strikes did degrade Iran’s largest fixed-site air defense systems such as the S-300PMU, hundreds of mobile, concealed, and dispersed short-range systems survived pre-emptive attacks and continue to pose a major threat to coalition aircraft. Lower-cost, highly portable systems have proven particularly difficult to suppress. The Robert Lansing Institute (RLI) reported in February 2026 that under a €500 million contract signed in December 2025, Russia agreed to supply Iran with 500 Verba man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS) and 2,500 9M336 missiles for delivery between 2027 and 2029. The RLI notes that Verba MANPADS are optimized to engage low-flying aircraft, helicopters, cruise missiles, and drones, and their widespread deployment across Iran has already significantly complicated U.S. air operations, increased attrition risk for low-altitude airframes, and forced coalition aircraft to alter flight routes, cruising altitudes, and mission timelines. MANPADS deployed around high-value Iranian sites also create localized no-fly zones that hinder intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) operations, combat search and rescue (CSAR) missions, and rapid strike sorties.

    The heavy attrition experienced during Operation Epic Fury has also exposed critical gaps in the U.S. military’s core operating doctrine for high-intensity conflict, the Agile Combat Employment (ACE) framework. As analyst Michael Blaser outlined in a 2024 Proceedings article, ACE is designed to increase aircraft survivability by dispersing airframes across multiple small bases and relocating them frequently to outpace enemy targeting cycles. However, Blaser argues that this strategy relies on two unrealistic assumptions: that adversaries lack the long-range strike capacity to hit dozens of dispersed airfields simultaneously, and that enemy kill chains—the sequential process of identifying, tracking, and attacking targets—will remain slower than the U.S. military’s ability to generate sorties and relocate aircraft.

    The CRS report’s documentation of six U.S. aircraft destroyed on the ground at Prince Sultan Air Base by Iranian counterstrikes—five KC-135 tankers and one E-3 AWACS—directly illustrates this vulnerability. Blaser adds that modern artificial intelligence, machine learning, and persistent space-based surveillance have cut adversary kill chains to less than 24 hours, allowing peer competitors to identify and target dispersed U.S. aircraft faster than U.S. crews can relocate them to new positions.

    These doctrinal and operational vulnerabilities have been further exacerbated by alleged intelligence and targeting support provided to Iran by China and Russia. The report notes that China has supplied Iran with commercial satellite imagery, access to ground receiving stations, and AI-powered intelligence tools that can process satellite data, flight tracking, and commercial shipping information to identify U.S. deployments. Chinese private firms have also used AI-enabled open-source intelligence (OSINT) to map U.S. force positions and reconstruct coalition flight patterns. Russia, meanwhile, has reportedly provided Iran with its own satellite imagery, real-time targeting data, and ISR support tracking U.S. troops, warships, and aircraft, enabling far more precise Iranian strikes on U.S. radar sites, command infrastructure, and forward positions. Together, this support has helped Iran build a distributed, plausibly deniable intelligence network that underpins its most effective counterstrikes.

    The strategic implications of these losses extend far beyond the Middle East, directly shaping U.S. military planning for a potential future conflict with China in the Pacific. Unlike Iran, China fields a far larger, more capable missile arsenal, has a much deeper defense industrial base, and operates a far denser integrated strike network across the Indo-Pacific.

    A 2023 report from the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) led by analyst Mark Cancian already warned that the U.S. and its regional allies could lose hundreds of aircraft in a conflict over Taiwan, with 90% of those losses occurring on the ground to pre-emptive Chinese missile strikes. The report attributed these projected losses to China’s large, sophisticated arsenal of ballistic and cruise missiles, which can target the small number of fixed air bases available to U.S. forces across the Western Pacific.

    If the heavy attrition seen in Operation Epic Fury is any indication, future conflicts against peer great-power competitors will not be decided by which side fields the most technologically advanced stealth fighters. Instead, victory will likely go to the power that can keep enough of its air fleet dispersed, survivable, and operational through weeks of sustained missile and drone attacks.

  • Saudi Arabia freezes work for western consultants, even as oil revenue rises

    Saudi Arabia freezes work for western consultants, even as oil revenue rises

    Against the backdrop of heightened regional volatility sparked by the US-Israeli war on Iran, Saudi Arabia has implemented a halt on new contracts for Western consultancy firms, with some payments to existing service providers delayed, according to an exclusive report from the Financial Times published Thursday.

    One anonymous senior executive briefed on the policy told the outlet that scheduled payments on outstanding existing invoices have been pushed back to the end of June, the close of Saudi Arabia’s second fiscal quarter. Officials from the Saudi government have denied that any broad suspension of payments is in place.

    While many industry observers have linked the policy shift directly to regional instability stemming from the ongoing war, deeper structural factors underpin Saudi Arabia’s new hesitancy to engage Western consulting firms, according to sector analysts.

    Paradoxically, the conflict has delivered a major financial boost to Riyadh: data from the kingdom’s General Authority for Statistics shows that March oil export revenues hit $24.7 billion, the highest level recorded in more than three years, driven by sharp global price increases for crude and refined oil products spurred by war-related supply chain disruptions. That marked the highest monthly revenue figure for Saudi oil exports since October 2022.

    Unlike most other Gulf oil producers, Saudi Arabia has been able to capitalize on rising prices despite the effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz, the world’s busiest oil chokepoint, due to overlapping US and Iranian blockades. Most regional nations, with the lone exception of the United Arab Emirates which operates a small alternative pipeline through Fujairah and Oman, lack infrastructure to bypass the strait. Saudi Arabia’s domestic East-West Pipeline connects its Persian Gulf production fields directly to the Red Sea export terminal of Yanbu, allowing the kingdom to maintain exports at roughly 70% of pre-war levels, even as the international Brent benchmark trades 50% above pre-war prices.

    Despite this windfall from elevated oil prices, the kingdom still faces a widening fiscal deficit, with government outpacing growing far faster than incoming revenue. Preliminary first-quarter fiscal data shows a $33.5 billion deficit for the first three months of the year, as total public spending jumped 20% year-over-year. Riyadh has attributed the spending increase to broad economic stimulus measures, alongside a 26% jump in military outlays prompted by increased regional threats, including Iranian missile and drone attacks on Saudi territory.

    The pause on new Western consulting contracts also aligns with a broader strategic pivot in Saudi Arabia’s long-term development plans that predates the current conflict. In recent months, the kingdom has dramatically scaled back the massive, high-profile megaprojects that defined the early phase of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s Vision 2030 reform initiative – projects that relied heavily on expertise from top Western consultancy firms. Riyadh has instead shifted its focus toward more targeted investments in logistics, mining, technology and artificial intelligence. Most notably, the kingdom’s flagship $500 billion Neom megaproject was entirely excluded from the 2026 pre-budget policy statement released by the government.

    Western consulting firms have operated in Saudi Arabia since the 1950s, but saw explosive growth in new contracts after Vision 2030 launched in 2016, leading firms such as McKinsey & Company and the Boston Consulting Group to heavily expand their footprint in the kingdom. Western consultants took the lead on planning and developing Neom, a project that envisioned a 170-kilometer car-free linear city called The Line and an artificial snow ski resort in the middle of the Arabian desert.

    However, even before the outbreak of the US-Israeli war on Iran, Riyadh had begun rolling back these ambitious megaprojects, as officials confronted their unsustainable price tags and weaker-than-expected interest from international private investors. As early as July 2025, Saudi officials were already discussing widespread staff cuts at Neom. Addressing this trend in December, Saudi Finance Minister Mohammed al-Jadaan said the kingdom had “no ego” that would stop it from reassessing and refocusing major projects to align with fiscal reality.

    Compounding tensions with Western firms have been reported cultural frictions at high-profile projects like Neom. Multiple reports have documented instances of Western executives at the project making derogatory comments about their Saudi colleagues and local culture. Most notably, Wayne Borg, the former head of Neom’s media division, gained notoriety for aggressive outbursts that included disparaging remarks about Islam, lewd sexual comments, and derogatory statements describing Gulf Arab women as “transvestites”, according to on-the-record accounts from former colleagues.

  • Turkish court rules to remove leadership of main opposition party

    Turkish court rules to remove leadership of main opposition party

    A landmark and deeply controversial court ruling in Turkey has upended the leadership of the country’s main opposition bloc, the Republican People’s Party (CHP), triggering immediate outrage from the party’s current leadership and laying bare escalating tensions between the ruling establishment and Turkey’s oldest political force.

    The Ankara court’s judgment ordered the temporary removal of sitting CHP Chairman Ozgur Ozel and his entire executive team, installing former party leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu and his political allies to take over their roles in an interim capacity. The ruling, issued by Turkey’s Court of Appeals, stems from claims of electoral fraud that nullified the CHP’s 38th Ordinary Elective Congress held in November 2023, the party meeting where Ozel secured his victory to replace Kilicdaroglu. Under the terms of the ruling, all subsequent party congresses held after the 2023 extraordinary gathering are also legally invalidated.

    Founded by iconic Turkish statesman Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the CHP has secured historic electoral gains against the long-ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) in recent national contests. Most notably, imprisoned CHP presidential candidate Ekrem Imamoglu – the former popular mayor of Istanbul – has consistently led in opinion polling, with results showing he would defeat incumbent President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in a head-to-head general election. It remains uncertain whether the latest court ruling will also invalidate Imamoglu’s 2025 party primary victory, which secured his place as the CHP’s presidential nominee.

    Imamoglu was taken into custody in March 2025 on a sweeping array of charges including corruption, extortion, bribery, money laundering, espionage, and ties to terrorism – all allegations he has forcefully denied. Dozens of CHP local officials and grassroots party workers have also been arrested in what the opposition has decried as a coordinated campaign of political repression. Prior to Imamoglu’s arrest, the CHP had largely escaped the heavy-handed state interference that has targeted smaller left-leaning and pro-Kurdish political parties in Turkey for years, a pattern that shifted dramatically after the party won major gains in 2024 local elections.

    Kilicdaroglu, who led the CHP from 2010 to 2023, was credited with expanding the party’s electoral base and broadening its public appeal, but growing criticism from the party’s younger generation of politicians and his 2023 presidential election loss to Erdogan led to his departure from the leadership role. Following the court ruling, Kilicdaroglu signaled he was prepared to reassume his former post, telling TGRT News: “May this decision be beneficial to Turkey and CHP.”

    The current CHP leadership has rejected the ruling as politically motivated and has pledged to contest it. Per Turkish law, the party has a 14-day window to file an appeal with the country’s Court of Cassation. “All decisions taken by courts acting on instructions [from the government] are null and void as far as we are concerned,” CHP Deputy Chairman Gokan Zeybek stated, according to reports from independent Turkish outlet Medyascope. “Now we are going to Ankara. We are going to stand up for our headquarters, the headquarters entrusted to us by the nation, entrusted to us by the organisation.”

    The ruling marks the most significant escalation in a months-long crackdown on the CHP, deepening political uncertainty in Turkey ahead of upcoming national presidential elections.

  • Labour Party group accused of faking independent candidates in local election

    Labour Party group accused of faking independent candidates in local election

    A growing electoral fraud scandal has shaken UK politics, centered on a local Labour Party faction in Tameside, Greater Manchester, where party members are alleged to have planted non-existent independent candidates to siphon votes away from opposition contenders in May’s local elections. Greater Manchester Police have confirmed that five individuals — four men and one woman, ranging in age from 23 to 47 — were taken into custody on suspicion of conspiracy to defraud, as investigators probe claims of deliberate electoral rule-breaking.

    Local independent outlet the Manchester Mill first broke the story, reporting that fake independents Muhammad Ali and Marie Fairhurst were listed on the St Peter’s Ward ballot paper as part of the alleged scheme. Together, the two fake entries collected 291 votes in the 7 May poll. In a striking confirmation of the fraud allegations, a real local woman named Marie Fairhurst told reporters she had never consented to run for office and had no idea her name appeared on the ward’s ballot.

    In the end, the Labour Party candidate for the ward, Attar Ul-Rasool, secured a narrow victory, beating legitimate independent candidate Ahmed Mehmood by just 177 votes — a margin smaller than the total votes collected by the two alleged fake candidates. This controversy carries national political weight: the Tameside council region overlaps with Ashton-under-Lyne, the parliamentary seat of Angela Rayner, deputy leader of the national UK Labour Party.

    The arrests come at a highly sensitive moment for UK Labour, coming less than four weeks ahead of a critical by-election in the Greater Manchester constituency of Makerfield. Greater Manchester Mayor Andy Burnham is widely expected to win the Makerfield seat, a result that would put him in position to launch a challenge to current Labour Party leader Keir Starmer for the top job. Any proven electoral fraud linked to the party could have major reputational ramifications ahead of the upcoming by-election and the next general UK election.

    Outlining the scope of the investigation in an official statement, a Greater Manchester Police spokesperson said: “This morning, officers in Tameside arrested five people on suspicion of conspiracy to defraud, as part of an investigation into alleged offences committed leading up to the local elections. In the days leading up to and following the election on May 7, we received reports surrounding concerns about candidates within the St Peter’s ward. Following initial enquiries last week, we have launched a full investigation into the allegations.”

    “The work is specifically investigating the process of how candidates were put forward and represented in the ward, and if this adhered to the relevant legislation and electoral procedures,” the spokesperson added. “The five people … were arrested at addresses in Tameside this morning. They remain in custody for questioning. We are working closely with the Electoral Commission and local partners as part of our enquiries. We will provide further updates as we progress our investigation further.”

  • Father of Gaza flotilla activist says UK ignored call for help after son seized by Israel

    Father of Gaza flotilla activist says UK ignored call for help after son seized by Israel

    The tense fallout of an Israeli military raid on a Gaza-bound humanitarian aid flotilla in international waters has left a British family pleading for government intervention, with the father of the detained student activist saying official UK authorities have largely ignored their pleas for help.

    Twenty-four-year-old Hasnain Jafer, a student organizer at King’s College London originally from Birmingham, was taken into custody by the Israeli navy earlier this week when Israeli forces intercepted the Gaza Sumud Flotilla off the coast of Cyprus, in international waters. Jafer was among dozens of international peace and humanitarian activists on board the convoy, which set out to challenge Israel’s years-long naval blockade of the Gaza Strip and deliver badly needed aid to the besieged Palestinian enclave.

    In an emotional interview with Middle East Eye, Jafer’s father Jafer Taasleem described his family’s overwhelming distress, saying they have received no official updates on their son’s condition or whereabouts since the raid, which flotilla organizers have labeled an act of illegal high-seas aggression.

    Taasleem last spoke to his son roughly one hour before Israeli commandos boarded the vessel on Monday. Since that conversation, all contact has been cut off. “We’re totally distressed, worried and in extreme emotional and personal pain right now,” Taasleem said. “I just hope he’s well, sound and good and not being hurt in any way physically or mentally. At this present moment, I doubt that hasn’t happened.”

    Taasleem singled out his local member of parliament Shabana Mahmood for failing to offer any assistance to the family, noting that only two UK MPs – veteran pro-Palestine campaigner Jeremy Corbyn and Ayoub Khan – have stepped up to offer support. The father added that while ordinary students at King’s College London have reached out to express solidarity, university leadership has not directly contacted the family to offer information or support. In a brief public statement issued on May 20, the university told student outlet Roar News it was coordinating with the student union and British Consulate to monitor the situation and work to secure Jafer’s well-being, but Taasleem said the institution’s silence has been disappointing. “Hasnain really, deep down from his heart and soul, loves and values King’s,” he said. “The university leadership has to say something, has to do something.”

    The family’s anxiety deepened after far-right Israeli Interior Minister Itamar Ben Gvir published footage and photos online showing detained activists being held in an Israeli facility. The images showed more than 100 activists handcuffed and forced to crouch, while guards manhandled some detainees and waved Israeli flags directly in their faces, in what was widely seen as a taunting display. The provocative post drew formal condemnation from multiple Western governments, including the UK, the U.S., France, Italy and Canada.

    Israeli officials have attempted to frame the flotilla as a provocative operation aligned with Hamas, claiming Gaza already receives an abundance of humanitarian aid despite widespread international reports of critical shortages and a unfolding humanitarian catastrophe in the blockaded territory. In an unusual split within the Israeli government, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu distanced himself from Ben Gvir’s actions, saying the footage was “not in line with Israel’s values” and ordered that all detained activists be deported “as soon as possible.” Current reports indicate the activists are on track to be transferred to Turkey by the end of Thursday.

    Despite this development, Taasleem said he has seen little meaningful action from the UK government to secure the immediate release of his son and other British detainees, even after the incident was raised in the House of Commons earlier this week. The perceived lack of urgency from official authorities, he said, has shaken his long-held trust in the British state, where generations of his family have lived. “It makes me feel like nobody’s doing anything… Is this really my country? Are these people really mine?” he asked. Taasleem has made an urgent plea for the UK government to step in immediately and use diplomatic channels to secure the safe return of his son and all other detained British citizens.

  • Israelis slam Ben Gvir for ‘damaging country’s image’ with flotilla abuse video

    Israelis slam Ben Gvir for ‘damaging country’s image’ with flotilla abuse video

    A leaked video showing Israeli National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir overseeing the mistreatment of detained activists from the Gaza-bound Global Sumud Flotilla has triggered widespread condemnation both inside Israel and across the global community, exposing deep rifts within the country’s political establishment over the incident and its international fallout. The footage, which went public in late May 2026, captures Ben Gvir waving an Israeli flag while confronting detained activists, who are seen being manhandled and forced to kneel face-down on the ground by officers from the Israel Prison Service (IPS).

    The controversy unfolded days after Israeli naval forces intercepted the flotilla—made up of 77 vessels carrying hundreds of activists seeking to break Israel’s long-running blockade of Gaza—while it was still in international waters. More than 30 activists on board were taken into Israeli custody following the raid, with the vast majority deported by Thursday, with only Israeli citizens remaining in detention. According to Israeli public broadcaster Kan 11, Israeli officials had originally planned to process the detainees quietly, deport them via the southern port of Ashdod, and avoid public provocation. Multiple branches of Israel’s security and diplomatic apparatus, including the foreign ministry, top security establishment leaders, and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) spokesperson unit, had even opposed the publication of any official footage from the raid, to align with this low-profile approach.

    Internal planning shows the IDF spokesperson unit had intended to release curated footage showing activists being treated respectfully, to shape global public perception of the operation. But the foreign ministry vetoed that plan, opting instead to hand-select what imagery would be made public. That carefully managed narrative collapsed after Ben Gvir published the video of his presence at the detention facility, a move that senior Israeli security sources have described as causing “enormous damage” to the country’s international standing.

    Already, the incident has drawn sharp condemnation from world leaders, particularly from nations whose citizens were among the detained activists. Activist testimonies collected by Adalah, an Israeli legal center representing Palestinian and minority rights, confirm that detainees faced systemic abuse in custody. Suhad Bishara, Adalah’s legal director, says activists reported severe violence at the hands of Israeli forces, with at least two people hospitalized after being struck by rubber bullets during the raid. Additional allegations from Ynet, an Israeli mainstream news outlet, add that naval forces fired rubber bullets at approaching flotilla vessels and blasted loud, disruptive music through the ships’ communication systems during the interception. Adalah’s account further alleges that detainees endured extreme violence, sexual humiliation, and serious injuries both during the naval raid and after being brought to Ashdod port. An IPS spokesperson defended the operation in a statement to Haaretz, claiming all treatment of detainees followed official standard operating procedures, and noting that any footage showing abuse was captured in areas controlled by the IDF and national police, not the IPS.

    Within Israel, criticism of Ben Gvir has been widespread—even from the minister’s own political allies—though most internal condemnation has focused on the damage the video caused to Israel’s global reputation, rather than the abuse of the activists documented in the footage. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who appointed Ben Gvir to his national security post, acknowledged that the minister’s handling of the confrontation “is not in line with Israel’s values and norms” amid mounting international pressure. Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar went further, saying Ben Gvir’s “disgraceful display” had caused tangible harm to the state, and that the far-right minister “is not the face of Israel.”

    Opposition leaders have gone a step further, placing blame squarely on Netanyahu for allowing Ben Gvir to hold a senior government post. Yesh Atid party leader and opposition head Yair Lapid said Netanyahu bears ultimate responsibility for the damage done to Israel’s international public diplomacy, known locally as hasbara. Yair Golan, leader of the opposition Democrats party, called Ben Gvir “a criminal and a strategic liability” to the state, while fellow Democrat Gilad Kariv added that the minister “does not represent Israel” or Israeli values, calling him “a disgrace to Judaism and Zionism.”

    Not all Israeli political figures have criticized Ben Gvir, however. Transport Minister Miri Regev, a member of Netanyahu’s ruling Likud party, was also present at the detention facility and published her own footage from the site. She defended the operation in a social media post, writing “This is what should be done to terror supporters who came to break the siege on Gaza,” and falsely claiming the activists had been under the influence of drugs and alcohol. On Channel 14, a pro-Netanyahu Israeli outlet, panelists openly defended Ben Gvir’s actions, with one commentator stating “We want to show the world that we treat these people like cockroaches here.” Even some critics of Ben Gvir’s messaging have defended his core position: Amichai Stein, diplomatic correspondent for i24NEWS, wrote that Ben Gvir had every right to label the activists as anti-Israel terrorists, but argued he should not be in charge of shaping the country’s international messaging.

    Ahmed Tibi, a Palestinian member of the Israeli Knesset, pushed back on claims that Ben Gvir does not represent Israeli values, arguing that the far-right minister’s actions, and the widespread support they have received within the ruling establishment, accurately reflect the current attitudes of Israel’s government and its core political positions. The controversy has already created significant friction between Israeli security and diplomatic institutions, and has reinforced global criticism of Israel’s ongoing blockade of Gaza and treatment of pro-Palestinian activists seeking to challenge it.

  • Exclusive: Sudan’s Burhan open to talks with UAE but ceasefire not imminent

    Exclusive: Sudan’s Burhan open to talks with UAE but ceasefire not imminent

    More than two years into Sudan’s devastating civil conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), diplomatic overtures are stirring tentative movement between the SAF-aligned transitional government and the United Arab Emirates, a major backer of the RSF. In an exclusive interview with Middle East Eye, Burhan laid out clear preconditions for any formal dialogue with Abu Dhabi: the UAE must immediately end its military and logistical backing for the RSF, honor Sudan’s territorial sovereignty, and conduct all negotiations on terms set by Khartoum’s recognized military leadership.

    MEE can exclusively confirm that Burhan’s high-profile visit to Bahrain last week was not a routine diplomatic stop: it formed the core of a deliberate mediation push by Manama, which leverages its long-standing close political ties to Abu Dhabi to act as a trusted intermediary between the Sudanese government and Emirati officials. Multiple sources, including a senior Sudanese intelligence official and four European diplomatic figures with direct knowledge of the talks, confirm that while efforts to open a sustained communication channel remain ongoing, they have yet to yield any tangible breakthrough.

    Burhan’s recent Gulf tour, which also included stops in Oman and Saudi Arabia, comes amid growing cautious optimism among SAF leadership based in Port Sudan that the UAE could eventually be pressured to curb or end its support for the RSF, a force that has faced widespread international accusations of perpetrating genocide in the Darfur region. This tentative optimism has been fueled in large part by a wave of high-profile defections from the RSF in recent months, with every departing senior commander publicly corroborating claims of ongoing Emirati military and financial support for the paramilitary group.

    Even as new mediation efforts get underway, however, veteran regional diplomats warn that there is little sign Abu Dhabi is prepared to alter its core stance in the near term. This comes after Burhan launched a rare public rebuke of both the UAE and Ethiopia in recent weeks over their ongoing backing of the RSF. MEE previously confirmed that the RSF operates from an Ethiopian army base, plunging already fraught relations between Khartoum and Addis Ababa to a new low, with the UAE also implicated in channeling weapons to the RSF through Ethiopian territory.

    Abu Dhabi has repeatedly rejected all accusations of support for the RSF, dismissing claims from the Sudanese government as “unfounded accusations and deliberate propaganda.” In an official statement to MEE, the Emirati foreign ministry claimed the allegations were a deliberate deflection tactic by the SAF, designed to shift blame for the continuation of the war away from military leadership and obstruct genuine peace efforts.

    This is not the first attempt to open direct dialogue between Burhan’s leadership and the UAE. Over the past three years, multiple initiatives have been launched to bridge the divide, with only rare limited successes. The most recent successful contact came in July 2024, when Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed mediated a direct phone call between Burhan and UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan. A separate effort was launched during indirect Quad mechanism talks between the SAF and RSF in Washington last year: the Quad, which includes the United States, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt, arranged a closed-door face-to-face meeting between Sudanese military delegates and senior Emirati officials to de-escalate tensions. But the talks collapsed within minutes, far ahead of the scheduled one-hour timeline.

    According to three sources briefed on the collapsed meeting, the SAF delegation arrived with documented evidence of Emirati military and logistical support for the RSF, a set of accusations Abu Dhabi continues to publicly deny. Led by UAE Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Shakhboot bin Nahyan Al Nahyan, the Emirati delegation cut the discussion short after the Sudanese side focused exclusively on the support allegations. “The atmosphere became tense very quickly,” one participating diplomat recalled. “The Sudanese side focused almost entirely on accusations regarding Emirati support for the RSF, and the Emiratis saw no basis for continuing the discussion.”

    Senior regional figures say the collapse of that meeting reflects a deeper, persistent rift: Abu Dhabi remains deeply distrustful of Burhan’s leadership, clinging to the perception that the SAF is heavily influenced by Islamist political networks and has grown increasingly aligned with Iran, a regional rival of the UAE. Burhan’s recent Gulf tour was in part designed to counter this narrative, with multiple stops in key Gulf Cooperation Council states intended to signal that his administration does not side with Tehran in regional tensions.

    One senior regional diplomat explained that broader geopolitical alignments are the primary driver of the UAE’s intransigence, noting that meaningful change will only come if external powers pressure Abu Dhabi to alter its course. “Without a major change in the approach taken by Washington and Tel Aviv towards the region, there is unlikely to be enough pressure on Abu Dhabi to reconsider its current strategy in Sudan,” the source said. Both the U.S. and Israel maintain close strategic alliances with the UAE, even after a recent public disagreement when Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s office unilaterally revealed a “secret meeting” between Netanyahu and Mohammed bin Zayed weeks after Israel launched its war on Iran.

    Sudan’s April 2023 outbreak of conflict has long since evolved from an internal power struggle into a proxy battleground, with competing regional powers including Gulf states, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and Turkey backing rival factions to advance their own strategic interests. Despite repeated public denials from Abu Dhabi, a growing body of open-source evidence – including testimony from defected RSF commanders, satellite imagery, flight tracking data, weapons serial numbers, and on-the-battlefield evidence – confirms ongoing Emirati support for the RSF. Emirati academic Abdulkhaleq Abdulla, who has close ties to Abu Dhabi’s leadership, has pushed back on international criticism, arguing that the RSF receives support from multiple regional states including Uganda, Ethiopia, and Chad, and that the UAE is being unfairly singled out.

    The four diplomatic sources interviewed by MEE uniformly agree that there is currently no unified consensus among international and regional actors on a path to end the war, with deep divisions emerging within the Quad mediation framework that have left each member pursuing its own separate interests inside Sudan. “The problem is that everyone officially wants peace, but they all imagine a different Sudan after the war,” one European diplomat explained. “That makes coordinated pressure almost impossible.”

    Another senior diplomatic source assessed the current fragmented diplomatic landscape as unlikely to produce any major breakthrough before the final quarter of 2025, an assessment that aligns with recent comments from U.S. Special Envoy for Africa and Arab countries Massad Boulos, who openly acknowledged the severe challenges of bringing Sudan’s warring factions to the negotiating table.

    Parallel to Bahrain’s mediation efforts, Saudi Arabia has recently ramped up its own diplomatic engagement in Sudan, seeking to counter growing Emirati influence over both civilian and military actors in the country. According to a senior regional diplomat and a Sudanese political figure with direct knowledge of Riyadh’s recent outreach, Saudi officials have quietly expanded contacts with Sudanese civilian political groups over the past several months, hosting a series of closed-door meetings since Ramadan that included members of the Sumoud civilian coalition led by former Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok (currently based in the UAE) and delegates from the Democratic Bloc.

    These meetings are part of a broader Saudi strategy to build political leverage inside Sudan comparable to the extensive influence the UAE has cultivated across sections of Sudan’s civilian political sphere since the war began. Riyadh is also working to build a broad civilian political coalition aligned with Burhan’s SAF-aligned administration. One Sudanese political figure familiar with the discussions said Saudi officials have privately expressed regret over their approach to Sudan following the 2019 popular uprising that toppled long-time ruler Omar Hassan al-Bashir, acknowledging that Riyadh and other Gulf states overrelied on Emirati guidance when backing the country’s post-revolution transitional military leadership.

    “The Saudis increasingly believe that their previous approach helped deepen instability rather than contain it,” the source said. Today, Saudi officials are prioritizing the formation of a civilian-led governing structure, a position that came to the fore during recent debates over Burhan’s appointment of a new civilian prime minister. Multiple sources confirm that Riyadh pushed Burhan aggressively to appoint a civilian premier before he ultimately named Kamil Idris to the role. That push created public tensions with Cairo, which favors a slower, more deliberate transition process and is cautious about rapid restructuring of Sudan’s wartime government. “The Egyptians opposed the idea,” one diplomat confirmed. “But the Saudis pushed hard for Burhan to move ahead with appointing a civilian prime minister.”

    The competing approaches taken by Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt underscore the growing zero-sum competition among regional powers for influence over Sudan’s war and its uncertain post-conflict future. While all Gulf states continue to publicly voice support for diplomatic initiatives to end the conflict, diplomats privately acknowledge that competing strategic interests are the primary driver of their engagement with Sudan’s military and civilian factions.

    For the immediate future, diplomats broadly agree that Bahrain’s indirect mediation is unlikely to produce a quick breakthrough between the SAF and the UAE. Even so, the resumption of backchannel contacts signals that despite high-profile public hostility between the two sides, lines of communication remain open behind closed doors, as regional powers continue to jockey for position in a conflict that has killed hundreds of thousands of people and displaced millions more across Sudan.

  • Israel revokes permits for dozens of Al-Aqsa Mosque staff

    Israel revokes permits for dozens of Al-Aqsa Mosque staff

    A controversial new decision by Israeli authorities to cancel entry permits for dozens of senior administrative and religious staff at Jerusalem’s Al-Aqsa Mosque has escalated long-running tensions over control of one of the world’s most contested religious sites, multiple sources familiar with the policy confirmed to Middle East Eye.

    The revocation, set to take effect in June 2026, will impact approximately 30 long-tenured employees of the Jerusalem-based Islamic Waqf, the Jordanian-appointed body tasked with administering the holy site under decades-old international governance agreements. The affected staff include high-ranking Waqf officials such as senior treasurer Ayyash Abu Ayyash, as well as mosque-based teachers who are administratively affiliated with the Palestinian Ministry of Education. The move will bar these employees from accessing the site they have managed for years.

    Palestinian religious and political leaders have condemned the decision as the latest step in a systematic campaign to consolidate Israeli control over Al-Aqsa, reduce Palestinian and Islamic institutional influence at the site, and dismantle the long-standing status quo arrangement that has governed the compound for generations.

    Ekrima Sabri, imam of Al-Aqsa Mosque and head of the Higher Islamic Council, framed the permit revocation as part of a sharp escalation of “unprecedented actions” by Israeli authorities in recent months. “Every action taken by the occupation authorities is intended to change the status quo and pave the way for imposing Israeli sovereignty over the mosque, while stripping the Islamic Waqf of its authority,” Sabri told Middle East Eye. “In the past, we used to say Al-Aqsa was in danger, but now we say Al-Aqsa faces multiple dangers, not just one,” he added.

    Omar Rajoub, director of the media office for the Jerusalem Governorate, traced the recent wave of restrictions to the outbreak of US-Israeli military operations against Iran in February. During that conflict, Israeli forces implemented an unprecedented 40-day full closure of Al-Aqsa, one of the holiest sites in Islam. While the mosque reopened following a ceasefire in April, Rajoub said many of the emergency restrictions imposed during the closure have been made permanent.

    These ongoing restrictions include a ban on Waqf staff carrying out routine maintenance work across the mosque’s courtyards, from pruning overgrown trees to clearing vegetation. The permit revocations announced this month are not an isolated measure, Rajoub emphasized: already this year, at least 30 other Waqf employees, plus six additional sheikhs and imams, have been denied entry or had their permit applications rejected. Israeli authorities have also expanded restrictions on general worshippers, barring more than 600 Palestinian worshippers from accessing the compound in 2025 alone, he said. “The entire status quo at Al-Aqsa Mosque is rapidly deteriorating in favour of Israeli violations,” Rajoub added.

    The Al-Aqsa Mosque compound, located in Israeli-occupied East Jerusalem, sits on a plateau that is revered as the Temple Mount, the holiest site in Judaism. For decades, the site has operated under an internationally recognized “status quo” agreement that designates Al-Aqsa as an exclusively Islamic holy site, with exclusive responsibility for access, worship rights, maintenance and daily management held by the Islamic Waqf.

    In recent years, however, Israeli authorities have systematically eroded this arrangement and the Waqf’s governing authority. Most notably, Israeli police have allowed near-daily incursions into the compound by ultranationalist Jewish groups, who conduct Jewish prayer and religious rituals under armed police protection, a direct violation of the status quo agreement.

    The permit revocation announcement comes amid a string of escalating provocative actions targeting the site in recent weeks. Earlier this week, Israeli cabinet ministers advanced a plan to seize privately owned Palestinian land near the Chain Gate (Bab al-Sila), one of the main entry points to the Al-Aqsa compound, to advance long-standing plans to Judaising the area around the site. Just days before that vote, dozens of Israeli ministers and members of parliament led a mass incursion into the Al-Aqsa compound, during which Israeli flags were raised, Jewish religious rituals were conducted, and one far-right lawmaker publicly called for the mosque to be demolished and replaced with a Jewish temple.

    International law does not recognize Israel’s claim of sovereignty over occupied East Jerusalem, and the Fourth Geneva Convention explicitly prohibits occupying powers from making permanent territorial changes or asserting sovereignty over territory captured in conflict.

  • Legal groups file complaint against barristers over role in UK Lawyers for Israel

    Legal groups file complaint against barristers over role in UK Lawyers for Israel

    Two London-based legal advocacy organizations have launched a formal complaint with Britain’s top legal regulator, accusing three of the country’s most high-profile King’s Counsel barristers of abusing their professional seniority to silence pro-Palestine advocacy. The complaint, submitted Thursday by the European Legal Support Centre (ELSC) and the Public Interest Law Centre (PILC), names Lord David Pannick, Lord Anthony Grabiner, and Stephen Hockman, all three of whom serve as patrons for UK Lawyers for Israel (UKLFI), a pro-Israel advocacy group.

    At the core of the complaint is the allegation that UKLFI routinely highlights the elite legal standing of its patrons in formal correspondence sent to individuals and groups engaged in lawful Palestine solidarity work. The complainants argue that prominently displaying the barristers’ senior titles and reputations intentionally inflates the perceived threat of legal action, creating disproportionate pressure on recipients who often lack the resources or access to legal representation to push back against complex legal claims.

    Founded in 2011, UKLFI frames its core mission as countering efforts to “delegitimize Israel” and opposing the global Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement targeting Israel over its policies toward Palestinians. Structured as a guarantee-limited company with an affiliated registered charitable trust, UKLFI is not regulated by the Solicitors’ Regulation Authority (SRA), meaning its activities do not face the same strict oversight required of licensed law firms. The group has a well-documented history of sending legal warnings and formal complaints to individuals and institutions that organize or participate in pro-Palestine activity, and has publicly described its patrons as “some of the most distinguished members of the legal profession in the United Kingdom.”

    Under UKLFI’s standard practice, the names of its high-profile patrons, including the three barristers named in the complaint, are listed at the bottom of every legal threat sent to groups suspected of violating equality or terror legislation. The complainants argue that this practice leads pro-Palestine campaigners, teachers, healthcare workers, students, and artists to overestimate the severity and credibility of the legal threats they receive, because the barristers’ senior standing lends unearned authority to the correspondence.

    The complaint was filed on behalf of a broad coalition of individuals and organizations working across education, healthcare, migrant advocacy, trade unions, and the arts, many of whom provided formal impact statements detailing how receiving UKLFI’s correspondence disrupted or chilled their Palestine-related work. ELSC data shows UKLFI appears 128 times in its Britain Index of Repression, a database tracking what the organization calls systematic efforts to suppress Palestine solidarity activism across the United Kingdom. The cumulative impact of these tactics, the complainants argue, has created a “chilling environment” that pushes groups and individuals to abandon or alter completely lawful pro-Palestine activity out of fear of costly, drawn-out legal action.

    ELSC and PILC are calling on the Bar Standards Board (BSB), the independent regulator for barristers practicing in England and Wales, to open a full investigation into whether the three barristers’ conduct violates the BSB’s Code of Conduct, specifically provisions requiring barristers to uphold integrity, maintain professional independence, and preserve public trust in the legal profession. Beyond a formal investigation and compliance assessment, the groups are also pushing the BSB to issue new formal guidance governing how senior legal titles can be used in communications directed at non-lawyers and civil society organizations.

    An ELSC spokesperson emphasized that the complaint exposes a clear pattern of weaponizing professional legal status to intimidate people engaged in protected, lawful advocacy. “The effect is a chilling environment that deters lawful public support for Palestine, particularly amid a mass global movement in response to the situation in Gaza,” the spokesperson said. “As our report On All Fronts sets out, these mechanisms are deliberate attempts to erase Palestine from public consciousness. This narrows democratic space, threatens freedom of expression, and must be examined by the regulator to protect public confidence in the legal profession.”

    A PILC spokesperson echoed that sentiment, noting that the prestige associated with senior barrister titles should never be deployed to silence legitimate public debate. “For small charities and grassroots campaign groups showing solidarity with Palestine, receiving legal correspondence that appears to carry the backing of some of the most senior figures at the Bar can be deeply intimidating,” the spokesperson said. “At the heart of this complaint is the public interest – protecting democratic participation, safeguarding freedom of expression, and ensuring that people are not discouraged from speaking out or organising lawfully because of the fear of legal intimidation.”

    This is not the first time the two advocacy groups have taken legal action against UKLFI. Last year, ELSC and PILC filed a separate complaint with the SRA against Caroline Turner, a UKLFI director, accusing her of violating the SRA’s professional conduct rules through the use of strategic lawsuits against public participation, commonly known as SLAPPs—legal tactics designed explicitly to deter and silence free speech on matters of public interest. The groups claim that between January 2022 and May 2025, UKLFI sent at least eight threatening legal letters to pro-Palestine groups and individuals, a pattern of “vexatious and legally baseless” correspondence aimed at silencing campaigners, academics, and civil society organizations.

    At the time of that earlier complaint, a UKLFI spokesperson denied all allegations, stating that the group “seeks to promote respect for the law in matters relating to Israel and the Jewish people by drawing attention to conduct which is or may be illegal and explaining the relevant facts and law. This sometimes upsets people who are not complying with the law and their supporters. They may seek to disrupt our work by making misinformed complaints to various bodies.”

    The spokesperson added that UKLFI is a non-profit membership organization, not a law firm, and is not required to register or be authorized under UK law for the activities it conducts. “Nevertheless, its work is carried out to the highest professional standards. Many of its members and supporters are practising lawyers who are regulated by the applicable professional regulators. UKLFI has not conducted any activity that can be described as a SLAPP,” they said.

    As of press time, neither the BSB nor UKLFI had issued a public response to the new complaint, and Middle East Eye had not received a reply to its requests for comment from either organization.

  • Top Democrats decry Trump ‘taxpayer shakedown’ and ‘super-pardon’

    Top Democrats decry Trump ‘taxpayer shakedown’ and ‘super-pardon’

    Leading Democratic lawmakers on two key U.S. House of Representatives committees have launched a new push to force senior leaders from the Department of Justice and Treasury Department to explain the controversial settlement of President Donald Trump’s $10 billion civil suit against the Internal Revenue Service, a deal Democrats deride as an orchestrated “sham” designed for political self-dealing.

    In a formal letter sent Wednesday to acting Attorney General Todd Blanche, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, and IRS CEO Frank Bisignano, the top Democratic members of the House Judiciary Committee and Ways and Means Committee—Jamie Raskin of Maryland and Richard Neal of Massachusetts, respectively—leveled harsh condemnation against the agreement, calling it “one of the most brazen acts of public corruption and self-dealing in American history.”

    The lawmakers argue that the current leadership at the DOJ and IRS chose to capitulate rather than protect public funds from what they call a clear grab for private political gain. Central to their criticism is the establishment of a $1.776 billion “Anti-Weaponization Fund” created as part of the settlement, which Raskin and Neal label a taxpayer shakedown meant to direct public money to the president’s political allies—including the pro-Trump rioters who stormed the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021.

    The pair added that the massive, unaccountable fund will be overseen by a handpicked commission made up entirely of Trump’s political cronies, and the terms of the original settlement block both Congress and the general public from ever learning which individuals receive payments from the pool of public money. According to prior reporting from CNN, the first known claim to the fund was already filed this week by Michael Caputo, a long-time Trump advisor and former White House official. Caputo describes his family as “survivors of the illegal Russiagate investigations” and is seeking $2.7 million in compensation from the fund.

    House Democrats emphasized that the U.S. Constitution grants Congress alone the power of the purse through its appropriations clause, and congressional leaders never approved or allocated taxpayer funds for the $1.776 billion political fund. “This settlement is a transparent attempt to circumvent the separation of powers and use the judgment fund for a scam Congress never contemplated: rewarding the president’s political allies at the expense of American taxpayers,” the letter reads.

    Beyond the creation of the controversial fund, the settlement permanently bars the IRS from pursuing any further legal or administrative action against Trump and his immediate family members. Lawmakers say the deal effectively grants a sweeping, unofficial “super-pardon” to the president, his family, and all connected business entities. This immunity releases them from any potential accountability for unpaid taxes, as well as from other ongoing federal civil and criminal probes into allegations including insider trading, antitrust violations, false statements, and sexual harassment.

    Raskin and Neal have ordered the federal agencies to preserve all records tied to the settlement and fund creation, including both physical documents and electronically stored information—covering communications sent via private emails, text messages, encrypted apps like Signal, and all other non-official communication channels. They have also given agency leaders a deadline of next week to turn over the IRS internal memorandum on the settlement, all related supporting records, and formal responses to a list of probing questions. The deadline comes ahead of Bessent’s scheduled public appearance before the Ways and Means Committee.

    The controversy has already drawn scrutiny on Capitol Hill from both chambers. Blanche appeared before the Senate on Tuesday to testify on the DOJ’s annual budget request, where he faced a wave of questions from Democratic lawmakers pushing back on the deal. He attempted to push back against the framing put forward by Senate Appropriations Committee Vice Chair Patty Murray of Washington, who has argued the fund amounts to Trump using tax dollars to enrich his own political circle. Democratic Sen. Chris Coons of Delaware questioned Blanche about requirements for public disclosure of payouts and safeguards to prevent Trump family members from accessing the fund, while Sen. Chris Van Hollen of Maryland raised questions about whether January 6 rioters—including those who attacked Capitol police and even those convicted of child sex crimes—would qualify for payments.

    Hours after the House Democrats released their letter on Wednesday morning, two Capitol Police officers who defended the building during the 2021 attack filed a separate federal lawsuit seeking to dissolve the fund entirely. Their legal argument argues that no federal statute authorizes the fund’s creation, the underlying settlement is a corrupt sham, and the fund’s design violates both the U.S. Constitution and federal law.

    Separately, Raskin introduced new standalone legislation Wednesday, the No Taxpayer-Funded Settlement Slush Funds Act of 2026, designed to explicitly block Trump’s fund from operating. He also submitted a motion to issue formal subpoenas for Blanche, Bisignano, Bessent, and two other officials directly involved in the deal: Associate Attorney General Stanley Woodward and Treasury Department General Counsel Brian Morrissey. Morrissey notably resigned from his post as the deal was publicly announced.

    “Mr. Blanche orchestrated this outrageous slush fund as part of the settlement with Donald Trump, which was also signed by Mr. Woodward, and Mr. Bessent will oversee the payout of these funds,” Raskin said in a public statement. “Mr. Bisignano signed off on this settlement for the IRS, and Brian Morrissey remarkably resigned as this deal was being announced. These individuals all possess critical insights into Trump’s self-dealing scheme with his own agencies to create this fund and reward his supporters and friends.”

    The Republican-controlled House Judiciary Committee voted to reject the proposed subpoenas along a strict party-line vote, ending the immediate push for congressional testimony from the involved officials.