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  • MEE correspondent Mohammed Amin, refused UK visa, wins One World Media Award

    MEE correspondent Mohammed Amin, refused UK visa, wins One World Media Award

    Award-winning Sudanese journalist Mohammed Amin has been named Journalist of the Year by One World Media, a leading global media organization, for his relentless on-the-ground reporting from conflict-torn Sudan as a freelance correspondent for Middle East Eye (MEE). Though the honor was awarded at a ceremony in London Wednesday night, Amin could not collect the prize in person after the UK Home Office rejected his travel visa application, barring his entry to the country.

    In a pre-recorded video acceptance speech played for the ceremony audience, Amin called out the discriminatory reasoning cited in his visa refusal. UK officials claimed he posed an immigration risk, alleging he would likely overstay his visit to seek asylum in Britain.

    “The Sudanese are not a heavy burden in this world. We are equal partners in humanity,” Amin asserted in his address, pushing back against the implicit bias in the Home Office’s decision.

    Amin’s award-winning work has centered the experiences of Sudanese civilians caught in the ongoing brutal civil war between the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and the Sudanese Armed Forces, a conflict the international community has largely sidelined. He highlighted the story of his home village, al-Tekeina, which successfully mounted a community defense against the RSF — a paramilitary group widely accused of perpetrating genocide against Sudanese civilians.

    “This tells us what people can do when they have the will, and what independent media can do,” he said of the village’s resistance. Describing Sudan as “a very wounded and traumatised country,” Amin reframed the conflict not as a two-sided battle between military factions, but “between fascism and the Sudanese people.” He closed his speech with a call for global solidarity among journalists in the Global South, urging the creation of independently funded, community-centered media platforms to elevate unheard local narratives.

    The Home Office’s visa rejection came despite full sponsorship for Amin’s trip from MEE and a formal invitation from One World Media’s award organizers. UK visa rules offer no right of appeal against immigration refusals for short-term travel. Notably, this is not Amin’s first time traveling to London for a major journalism award: in 2022, when he won the Martin Adler Prize at the Rory Peck Awards for his reporting on Wagner Group massacres and the 2019 Sudanese coup, the then-Conservative UK government approved his visa without issue.

    Barriers for Sudanese applicants have skyrocketed since the outbreak of full-scale civil war in April 2023. Earlier this year, the current Labour government implemented a controversial “visa brake” policy that pauses all new student visa applications from Sudanese citizens applying from outside the UK, along with applicants from Afghanistan, Cameroon and Myanmar. Amin also has personal ties to the UK: he lived in the coastal English city of Plymouth for two years during his childhood.

    Chinwe Kalu-Uma, interim director of One World Media, expressed deep disappointment over the visa refusal in a statement to MEE. “It is deeply disappointing that Mohammed, our Journalist of the Year Award winner, who has at great risk continued to report from inside Sudan so that the world might pay attention, has been denied a visa to travel to London to receive that recognition,” she said. “His absence from our stage is itself a story about the barriers Sudanese people face, not only in their own country, but in being seen and heard beyond it.”

    Amin beat out two other high-profile finalists for the award: Ghada Abdulfattah, nominated for her New York Times reporting from Gaza, and Tony Cheng, recognized for his Al-Jazeera coverage of the aftermath of the 2025 Myanmar earthquake.

    Over the past year, Amin’s reporting has broken ground on undercovered aspects of Sudan’s war: he has investigated the bloody aftermath of the siege of el-Fasher, documented how the illicit drug captagon fuels the conflict, and exposed the targeting of the marginalized Kanabi community by all warring factions. His viral report on al-Tekeina’s resistance, which spread widely across Sudanese social media and was translated into multiple languages, prompted a landmark visit from a Sudanese government delegation led by the prime minister — the first official state visit to the village in more than 60 years — that brought promises of reconstruction aid.

    One World Media’s judging panel praised Amin’s work for filling a critical gap in global coverage. “Mohammed Amin’s work provides rare, essential insight into a conflict the international community has largely ignored. He centres voices from within his own community to reveal the human reality of the conflict, exposing not only what is happening on the ground but why it matters far beyond Sudan’s borders,” the judges wrote in their citation. “His reporting combines clarity, sensitivity, and political relevance, demonstrating the wider implications of the conflict while remaining rooted in lived experience.”

    David Hearst, co-founder and editor-in-chief of MEE, commended Amin’s extraordinary courage and commitment to ethical journalism. “Mohammed Amin has reported from Sudan with courage, precision and an unwavering commitment to the people whose lives have been shattered by this conflict,” Hearst said. “His reporting has documented not only the brutality of the war, but also the resilience of Sudanese civilians. At great personal risk, Mohammed has ensured that Sudan’s story reached a global audience. His work embodies the very best traditions of journalism: bearing witness, holding power to account, and giving voice to those who would otherwise go unheard.”

    When asked for comment on Amin’s visa refusal, a UK Home Office spokesperson only stated that all applications are reviewed on an individual basis in line with published policy, and that it is longstanding government policy not to comment on individual cases.

  • Trump justifies Iran deal as a way to prevent ‘economic catastrophe’

    Trump justifies Iran deal as a way to prevent ‘economic catastrophe’

    Speaking to reporters on the sidelines of the G-7 Summit in Evian, France on Wednesday, former U.S. President Donald Trump laid out contradictory stances on his administration’s newly announced 60-day ceasefire agreement with Iran, blending aggressive military threats against Tehran with key concessions that have already drawn fierce criticism from hardline pro-Israel allies in his own Republican Party.

    The core of the agreement is a temporary memorandum of understanding (MOU) that keeps the strategic Strait of Hormuz, a vital global chokepoint for oil and maritime trade, toll-free for the next two months. Under the terms of the deal, Iran will negotiate the future governance of the strait alongside Oman and other Persian Gulf littoral states in line with international law, leaving open the possibility of navigation fees being imposed after the ceasefire period ends. The White House has framed the ceasefire extension, announced publicly this past Sunday, as a first step toward reaching a permanent end to the ongoing conflict that has roiled global energy markets.

    In unusually candid remarks, Trump acknowledged his biggest political risk tied to the conflict: economic fallout that could sink his presidency, echoing the political fate of Republican President Herbert Hoover, who left office in disgrace after the 1929 stock market crash and the onset of the Great Depression. “The one president I did not want to be was the late, great, Herbert Hoover,” Trump said, noting that stock markets have shifted directly in response to signals about whether the conflict would end or escalate. “The stock market is more brilliant than anybody there is, including the people on this stage, other than me, of course.”

    The president went on to stress that Tehran’s blockade of the Strait of Hormuz had inflicted enough economic damage globally to push his administration to agree to the ceasefire extension. Even so, he adopted a belligerent tone when discussing enforcement of the MOU, repeating multiple times that he would resume large-scale military bombing of Iran if he disapproved of Tehran’s compliance. “It’s a memorandum of understanding. And if I don’t like it, we’ll go back to shooting at them, dropping bombs on their head,” Trump said. “If I don’t like it, if they don’t behave, we’ll go right back to dropping bombs right smack in the middle of their head, OK?”

    The deal has already come under intense fire from Iran hawks and pro-Israel voices in the U.S., who have pushed for a full rollback of Iran’s nuclear program, ballistic missile arsenal, and regional military influence. Trump acknowledged that the terms of the MOU would amplify this criticism: the agreement does not address Iran’s nuclear program in any detail, leaving that critical issue for future negotiations during the 60-day ceasefire period.

    Pushing back against demands that the U.S. seize Iran’s existing enriched uranium stockpiles, Trump argued that the material is buried deep in underground facilities that only the U.S. and China have the technical capacity to access, adding that international cameras are already in place to monitor suspect sites. He also rejected longstanding Israeli demands that Iran be barred from any enrichment activity entirely, noting that neighboring countries in the region maintain their own nuclear energy programs. “It’s a little hard when other people have it, other adjoining states have it, and you’re not letting them have it for purposes of electricity and things like that. You have to use a little common sense,” he said.

    This stance marks a clear shift from Trump’s 2017 decision to unilaterally withdraw from the Obama-era Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the multilateral nuclear agreement that placed strict limits on Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief. Trump has framed his new framework as different from the JCPOA, arguing that the threat of ongoing U.S. military force prevents Iran from ever acquiring a nuclear weapon. “Whoever sells them a nuclear weapon would get nuked themselves,” he claimed, though the JCPOA already explicitly barred Iran from pursuing a nuclear weapons program.

    Trump also dismissed demands from hawks and Israel that Iran be forced to completely eliminate its ballistic missile program, which he previously cited as a core justification for launching U.S. strikes against Iran. Arguing that it is unreasonable to bar Tehran from possessing any missiles when neighboring Gulf states like Saudi Arabia maintain their own arsenals, Trump claimed that U.S. strikes have already destroyed roughly 80 percent of Iran’s existing missile capacity. “Doesn’t work that way,” he said of demands for full disarmament.

    On economic policy, Trump confirmed that the U.S. will not directly invest in Iran to help rebuild the country, which he estimated has sustained around $2 trillion in damages from U.S. and Israeli strikes. He added that Washington will not block neighboring Arab Gulf states from investing in Iran if a final peace deal is reached, a stance that is already fueling speculation that states including the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Qatar will move to normalize economic ties with Tehran in the coming months.

    The president also drew backlash from hawks by confirming that he is open to returning billions of dollars in Iranian assets that have been frozen by Western sanctions, stating that the assets “is not our money” and will eventually need to be returned. The move is certain to please Tehran while hardening opposition from pro-Israel lawmakers in Washington.

    Trump’s remarks swung between sharp criticism of Iran and faint praise for the country’s leadership. He referred to Iran as having a “primitive culture” while also acknowledging that Iran’s leaders “love their country.” He also openly boasted about U.S. strikes on Iranian civilian infrastructure, specifically highlighting the April 1 bombing of the Karaj B1 bridge, which he compared to New York’s George Washington Bridge.

    In a surprising acknowledgment, Trump thanked both Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin for maintaining neutrality during the conflict, noting that both countries could have made the military campaign far more difficult for the U.S. Multiple independent outlets have previously reported that China and Russia provided Iran with arms and intelligence support during the fighting. “I just want to thank them because they made it a lot better,” Trump said. “I want to thank China, President Xi. I was with him, and he stayed neutral, totally neutral, and I appreciate it. And I want to thank Vladimir Putin; he was very neutral. They could have made it much more difficult for us.”

    Trump also confirmed that the United Arab Emirates participated directly in offensive airstrikes against Iran during the conflict, saying he was caught off guard by the scale of the UAE’s military involvement. “He was dropping bombs last week, I said, ‘who the hell’s dropping all those bombs?’ It was the UAE. He’s a good fighter,” Trump said of UAE President Mohamed bin Zayed. The comments were made during a wide-ranging, rambling press conference flanked by top senior administration officials including Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Secretary of Commerce Howard Lutnick and Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent.

  • US‑Iran deal should see oil and LNG begin to flow again – slowly

    US‑Iran deal should see oil and LNG begin to flow again – slowly

    Following the announcement of a ceasefire deal ending the US-Israel-Iran conflict, former US President Donald Trump took to his social media platform to issue a triumphant declaration: “Ships of the World, start your engines. Let the oil flow!” But while the announcement has sparked cautious optimism among energy markets, critical questions remain about just how quickly global oil and gas shipments through the strategically vital Strait of Hormuz can return to pre-conflict levels.

    The deal has already moved global oil benchmarks: Brent crude has fallen to $78.96 per barrel, dipping below the $80 threshold for the first time since early March 2026. This price drop signals broad market confidence that the ceasefire agreement will hold, despite Trump’s history of making unfulfilled claims of peace deals during his tenure. Still, the US Navy has confirmed its existing blockade of Iranian ports will remain in effect until the agreement is formally signed on June 19, leaving a period of uncertainty before any formal changes take effect.

    For all the market optimism, industry analysts and shipping firms warn that a full recovery of Hormuz shipping will take far longer than many observers expect. The strait is one of the world’s most critical energy chokepoints: it handles 25% of global seaborne oil trade, 19% of all refined petroleum products, roughly 20% of global liquefied natural gas (LNG) trade, and a large share of global seaborne chemical shipments, particularly fertilizer. Even under the best-case scenario, analysts project it will take at least six months for crude oil flows through the strait to rebound to pre-conflict levels. For LNG exports, the timeline stretches much longer, following extensive damage Iran inflicted on Qatari energy infrastructure during the conflict.

    Details of the draft ceasefire remain deliberately opaque, with no full published text of the agreement released to the public. Iran’s state-run Mehr News Agency has only confirmed that the strait will reopen within 30 days under “Iranian arrangements,” leaving shipping firms without clear guidance on new operating protocols. The lingering ambiguity has left industry stakeholders deeply cautious, with little change in actual traffic through the strait observed in the days since the ceasefire announcement.

    That caution is well-founded: over the course of the conflict that began in February 2026, 38 commercial vessels transiting the region have been hit by attacks, 24 by Iranian forces, four by US forces, and the remainder by unclaimed actors. Clearing all naval mines laid by Iran in the strait alone is expected to take months. Compounding this uncertainty are conflicting public statements from the two main signatories: Tehran has announced it will charge shipping firms a transit fee for using the strait, while Trump has insisted the waterway will remain toll-free. This core disagreement has yet to be resolved, leaving further uncertainty for global shipping lines.

    Even after the strait is cleared for full transit, widespread damage to regional energy infrastructure will delay a full recovery of global energy supplies. International Energy Agency Executive Chairman Fatih Birol noted that more than 80 energy facilities across the Persian Gulf were targeted during the conflict, damaging oil fields, refineries, and export pipelines, meaning a rebound in supplies will be gradual rather than immediate.

    The United Arab Emirates, the world’s third-largest oil exporter shipping through Hormuz, has already confirmed it will not be able to restore full export flows until 2027, even with an immediate end to hostilities. For Iran, the deal brings a key benefit: a US waiver on longstanding oil sanctions that will allow Tehran to resume exports to a broader range of global customers. Still, Israeli strikes on Iran’s critical South Pars gas field and the adjacent Asaluyeh processing hub damaged key infrastructure. While Tehran has restarted production at three offshore platforms in the field, it has not released a timeline for full repairs.

    The longest delay will hit global LNG markets, after Iran targeted Qatar’s Ras Laffan gas complex, the world’s largest LNG processing facility. Before the conflict, the facility produced 77 million tonnes of LNG annually, accounting for nearly 19% of global production. QatarEnergy has confirmed that 12.8 million tonnes of annual production will remain offline for between three and five years as repairs proceed, meaning a full recovery of regional LNG exports could take up to half a decade.

    In the near term, the ceasefire is still expected to deliver a modest boost to global energy supplies. Roughly 60 crude oil tankers have been trapped in the Persian Gulf since the conflict began in February, and these vessels will likely be able to depart for global markets once the strait reopens. Some of these supertankers carry as much as 2 million barrels of crude each, equivalent to two days of Australia’s total oil consumption. Still, maritime traffic data shows that hundreds of additional cargo vessels waiting outside the strait to enter the Persian Gulf for loading will face extended delays as transit capacity ramps up gradually.

    For Australia, which has faced global supply disruptions since the conflict began, the country has thus far weathered the crisis relatively well. Early in the conflict, the IEA warned the Iran conflict represented the largest supply disruption in the history of the global oil market. But Australia proactively boosted imports of record volumes of diesel, the fuel that accounts for more than half of the country’s daily oil consumption and is critical to trucking, mining, and agricultural sectors. As a result, Australia has remained at Level 2 of its National Fuel Security Plan, avoiding mandatory fuel rationing or restrictions for consumers.

    A permanent, fully implemented peace deal would be widely welcomed by energy users across Australia and the globe. But risks remain: if the ceasefire collapses and the strait closes once again, analysts warn oil prices could rebound sharply, reigniting consumer concerns about fuel shortages and price volatility.

  • Analysis: Turkey emerges unscathed from the Iran war

    Analysis: Turkey emerges unscathed from the Iran war

    In late February, when US President Donald Trump ordered military strikes against Iran, Turkish leadership found itself unexpectedly sidelined from major decision-making. Ankara’s repeated diplomatic efforts to head off the conflict fell on deaf ears, with senior Turkish officials concluding that Trump prioritized advice from Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu over their own input. Just three months later, the geopolitical landscape shifted dramatically: Trump publicly named Turkey, alongside Pakistan and Qatar, as one of the key countries that helped broker a breakthrough memorandum of understanding with Iran, while adopting a sharply more confrontational stance toward Israel.

    The 60-day ceasefire agreement reached between Tehran and Washington over the weekend comes with two core provisions: it extends the fragile pause in hostilities between the two nations and reopens the Strait of Hormuz, the critical global energy chokepoint that Iran had blocked after the US-Israeli military campaign began. Speaking to Middle East Eye this week, senior Turkish officials have struck a cautious tone about the deal, emphasizing that the memorandum represents only an initial step toward resolving the long-running US-Iran dispute and does little more than temporarily ease shipping pressure on the strait.

    “The 60-day window to negotiate a final agreement on the nuclear file and other outstanding disputes will be far more complex and challenging than any prior stage of negotiations,” one senior Turkish official said. “This will be the true test of whether this current calm can be sustained.” Many policy experts based in Ankara share concerns that Israel could take provocative action in the coming months to derail the fragile agreement. Even amid these lingering uncertainties, one outcome is already clear: Turkey has emerged from the US-Iran war largely unharmed, and in many respects, strategically strengthened.

    When the conflict first erupted, Ankara harbored deep fears about the stability of the Iranian government and potential spillover that could threaten Turkish national security. To date, none of these worst-case scenarios have materialized. Turkish officials immediately activated pre-planned contingency measures along Turkey’s eastern border with Iran to prepare for a possible mass refugee influx, successfully keeping border crossings calm and avoiding a humanitarian crisis. A second major threat also emerged early on: Israeli officials pushed for a plan to arm Iranian Kurdish groups to lead an insurgency in western Iran.

    Ankara viewed this proposal as a direct threat to its own domestic security, arguing that empowering Kurdish armed groups in western Iran could derail ongoing peace talks with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and drag Turkey into a scenario similar to the Syrian conflict, where Kurdish groups based along the border seized control of territory and posed a persistent security challenge. As US and Israeli strikes on Iranian targets intensified, hardline members of Netanyahu’s cabinet began openly stating that “Turkey is next after Iran,” amplifying Ankara’s fears that a collapse of Iranian state authority would spread chaos directly to its borders.

    Despite these significant risks, Ankara managed to retain political influence and convince the Trump administration that a Kurdish insurgency in western Iran was not in US interests. Several external factors worked in Turkey’s favor: deep internal divisions within Iraqi Kurdistan over how to approach Iranian Kurdish groups, including public rifts between the powerful ruling Barzani and Talabani political dynasties, and the fact that very few Iranian Kurdish fighters had access to the heavy weaponry required to lead a large-scale insurgency. Top Trump administration officials, including CIA Director John Ratcliffe and Secretary of State Marco Rubio, also openly expressed deep skepticism about the feasibility of the Israeli plan.

    One unforeseen crisis that tested Ankara’s crisis management came when Iran fired four ballistic missiles into Turkish territory. The strike was part of a broader barrage targeting Gulf states and regional countries hosting US military forces, and analysts believe the missiles targeted the US-operated Incirlik Air Base and the Kurecik Radar Base, a critical installation used to track Iranian ballistic missile launches. The attack triggered fierce pushback from Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, who held multiple angry conversations with Iranian authorities to make clear that Ankara would not tolerate strikes on its territory, especially any that risked civilian casualties.

    At the time, Ankara insiders widely expected that if the missiles had hit a populated area and caused civilian deaths, Turkey would have been forced to launch retaliatory strikes, creating a dangerous cycle of escalation that could have dragged the country directly into the war. By limiting the strikes to military installations hosting US assets and avoiding civilian casualties, Iran avoided a full rupture of bilateral ties with Ankara. Ironically, the missile attacks ultimately strengthened Turkey’s position within the NATO alliance: the US, Germany, and Italy all quickly deployed additional anti-ballistic missile systems to Turkey to support an ally under threat, warming previously strained ties between Ankara and these major Western powers.

    Beyond strategic gains, Turkey has capitalized on the conflict to expand its economic and commercial influence across the Middle East. In the wake of Iranian long-range drone and missile strikes on Gulf states, many regional governments began seeking large-scale purchases of air defense systems, allowing Ankara to step in as a reliable new supplier. Turkey has already signed hundreds of millions of dollars worth of arms contracts with Gulf states including Qatar, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia, establishing itself as a growing player in the global arms market. While Turkey still lacks domestic long-range anti-ballistic interceptor technology, it has an active domestic development program and has proposed joint investment partnerships that have drawn increasing interest from Gulf capitals.

    At the same time that Turkey expanded arms sales to Gulf allies, it managed to preserve its longstanding diplomatic and economic ties with Iran, a relationship that proved critical during ceasefire negotiations. The Iranian missile strikes also shattered long-held assumptions that Gulf monarchies and their major financial centers were immune to regional attack, creating an opening for Ankara to position itself as an alternative regional investment hub for global businesses looking to de-risk their exposure. The project remains a long and difficult bet, requiring extensive domestic legal reforms and large-scale infrastructure investment, but the conflict has already helped boost Turkey’s reputation as a stable safe haven outside the range of direct Iranian strikes.

    Of course, the conflict has not come without costs for Turkey. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz disrupted global shipping and pushed up global energy prices, exacerbating Turkey’s long-running battle with high inflation. A leading energy research think tank estimates that higher energy costs stemming from the strait closure will add nearly $14 billion to Turkey’s annual national energy bill. Inflationary pressures were already visible in April and May economic data, though the Turkish government has so far managed to mitigate the worst economic impacts of the price shock.

    Even amid these economic headwinds, Ankara has turned the energy crisis into an opportunity to advance its long-term goal of becoming a central Eurasian energy and connectivity hub. Turkish officials have proposed a slate of new infrastructure projects that leverage the country’s unique geographic position, including reviving the historic Hejaz Railway, expanding the existing Iraq-Turkey oil pipeline to reach the southern Iraqi port of Basra, and building a new direct natural gas pipeline linking Qatar to Turkey.

    Finally, domestic political analysis shows the conflict has produced a clear “rally-around-the-flag” effect for Turkish leadership. Recent independent polls reviewed by Middle East Eye indicate that President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s domestic popularity has risen during the conflict, even after his government launched a widespread crackdown on the country’s main opposition party. “Turks are now experts on turning regional crisis into opportunities for themselves,” one senior European diplomat summed up the outcome.

  • Sudanese victims ask ICC to investigate Emiratis over RSF atrocities in el-Fasher

    Sudanese victims ask ICC to investigate Emiratis over RSF atrocities in el-Fasher

    Seven Sudanese survivors of the devastating atrocities in Darfur have taken a landmark step toward accountability, filing a formal communication with the International Criminal Court (ICC) asking prosecutors to open an investigation into senior United Arab Emirates (UAE) government officials and business leaders for their alleged role in enabling war crimes and genocide committed by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF).

    Submitted to the ICC Office of the Prosecutor on Tuesday under Article 15 of the Rome Statute — the legal mechanism that allows any individual or group to submit evidence to prompt a formal inquiry — the filing names UAE Vice President Mansour bin Zayed Al Nahyan among those accused of maintaining close ties to the RSF, and facilitating the group’s operations through critical financing and logistical backing. The submission specifically requests prosecutors examine the potential criminal liability of third-party actors under Articles 25(3)(c) and 25(3)(d) of the Rome Statute, which cover individuals who aid, abet, or knowingly contribute to crimes carried out by a group acting with a shared criminal purpose.

    The UAE has repeatedly and publicly denied allegations that it has provided weapons, funding, or any other form of support to the RSF. However, a growing body of independent investigations published since mid-2023 has consistently linked the UAE to sustained arms and materiel flows to the RSF. Multiple inquiries have confirmed that weapons have reached the RSF via a secret airbridge operating out of Amdjarass, Chad, with the UAE named as the primary suspected supplier. In January 2024, Middle East Eye (MEE) exposed a sprawling cross-border network through which the UAE funnelled weapons to the RSF, with supply routes stretching across Libya, Chad, Uganda, and breakaway regions of Somalia. More recently, an April 2024 MEE investigation uncovered covert RSF support operations operating out of an Ethiopian military base in Asosa, Benishangul-Gumuz region, with identical military vehicles documented at the Port of Berbera in Somaliland — where the UAE maintains a permanent military base. A 2024 New York Times investigation, which is cited in the new ICC filing, further found that the UAE smuggled weapons to the RSF concealed within shipments labelled as humanitarian aid. In May 2024, Human Rights Watch reported that Colombian mercenaries hired by a UAE-based company transited through Emirati military bases before deploying to Sudan to support the RSF.

    The survivors — all now sheltering in a 26,000-person displacement camp in Sudan’s Northern State, many of whom walked more than 745 miles to escape violence — are not only seeking accountability for the RSF fighters who directly carried out atrocities. They are calling for the court to trace responsibility up the entire chain of support, investigating every individual and entity that funded, armed, or facilitated the RSF’s campaign of violence.

    The ICC already holds clear jurisdiction over crimes committed in Darfur, stemming from a 2005 United Nations Security Council referral that grants the court authority to prosecute individuals of any nationality for crimes committed in the region. Legal scholars consulted by MEE note that this jurisdiction could theoretically extend to Emirati nationals accused of aiding RSF crimes, though significant practical barriers remain. The UAE has not ratified the Rome Statute, and gathering admissible evidence and securing state cooperation would present major challenges for ICC investigators.

    The communication was brought to the court by Elise Le Gall, a Paris-based ICC counsel acting on behalf of the seven survivors. “International crimes cannot be committed without support networks,” Le Gall said in a statement accompanying the filing. She called on ICC prosecutors to closely examine private and public sector actors who may have enabled the RSF’s atrocities “through the provision of funding, logistical support, equipment, or personnel.”

    The filing centers on the catastrophic fall of El-Fasher, the capital of North Darfur, which was captured by the RSF on October 26, 2025, after a 500-day siege that trapped more than 250,000 civilians without access to food, clean water, or life-saving medicine. The United Nations Human Rights Office has confirmed that more than 6,000 civilians were killed in the first three days of the RSF’s final assault on the city. Prior to the fall of El-Fasher, satellite analysis from Yale University’s Humanitarian Research Lab identified a ring of earthen fortifications built by the RSF around the city as a deliberate “kill box” designed to block civilian escape and enable mass killing.

    The submission details systematic allegations of mass murder, torture, sexual violence, forced displacement, and deliberate attacks on hospitals and medical infrastructure. It documents a repeated pattern of violence in which RSF fighters pursued fleeing civilian populations and deliberately ran them over with armed vehicles. Mohamed Ismail Abdelrahman Hassan, a doctor from El-Fasher who treated injured civilians throughout the entire siege, stated in the filing that heavy weapons supplied to the RSF “devastated infrastructure, besieged civilian populations, and killed civilians indiscriminately.”

    The survivors’ filing draws substantial support from the findings of the UN Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for Sudan, which concluded in February 2025 that the RSF’s conduct in El-Fasher bears all the legal hallmarks of genocide, in addition to widespread crimes against humanity and war crimes. Mona Rishmawi, a member of the fact-finding mission, told MEE earlier this year that the targeted killing of El-Fasher’s Zaghawa and Fur communities left “only one reasonable inference”: that the RSF acted with explicit genocidal intent. Rishmawi called on all governments to immediately halt arms flows to the RSF, warning that any state providing backing to either side in the Sudan conflict risked being held legally complicit in acts that meet the legal threshold of genocide. The mission has already shared confidential evidentiary materials with the ICC, Rishmawi confirmed, though the court’s constrained operational capacity, weakened by long-standing United States sanctions, makes swift investigative action far more difficult.

    Earlier this year, ICC Deputy Prosecutor confirmed that the court’s office is already conducting an active investigation into the atrocities committed in El-Fasher. While the ICC has been probing alleged RSF atrocities since 2023, prosecutors have not yet requested arrest warrants for any Sudanese nationals linked to the violence.

  • Trump has nothing but praise for Modi at G7 after tensions over US military strike, trade

    Trump has nothing but praise for Modi at G7 after tensions over US military strike, trade

    EVIAN-LES-BAINS, France — On the sidelines of the 2025 G7 Summit hosted by French President Emmanuel Macron, U.S. President Donald Trump moved swiftly Wednesday to project unbroken unity with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, lavishing public praise on the Indian leader as a “loyal friend” even as a cascade of thorny disputes — from trade frictions to oil sanctions, and most recently, the tragic death of three Indian mariners in a U.S. military strike — have put their long-warm bilateral relationship to the test.

    The high-stakes meeting came exactly one week after three Indian sailors lost their lives in a strike targeting a tanker in the Gulf of Oman, carried out amid a U.S. blockade intended to disrupt unauthorized oil shipments moving through the strategic Strait of Hormuz. India’s Foreign Ministry had already registered a formal diplomatic protest over the deadly incident ahead of the leaders’ sit-down, putting the fatal strike front and center on the bilateral agenda.

    Modi joined the G7 gathering as one of several guest invitees extended by Macron, marking a key opportunity for behind-the-scenes talks between the two leaders amid growing global geopolitical shifts. From the opening moments of the meeting, Trump pushed back firmly against any speculation of a rift between Washington and New Delhi, launching into a sustained series of compliments for Modi that acknowledged his shrewd negotiating style while framing their personal rapport as the foundation of a rock-solid bilateral relationship.

    “We have the best relationship. We cannot be closer than we are. Would you say that, sir? I don’t think we can be any closer,” Trump stated as he clasped Modi’s hand in a public show of unity. “Both him and I, and our nations. But it really starts with the two of us.”

    For his part, Modi did not shy away from addressing the deadly strike directly, raising the critical issue of maritime safety for the hundreds of thousands of Indian seafarers working on commercial vessels across the globe, including regular transits through the always tense Strait of Hormuz. “Their safety is of utmost importance to us,” Modi affirmed, before thanking Trump for his recent diplomatic efforts to broker a ceasefire agreement ending the war with Iran.

    “You made tremendous efforts towards reaching this understanding and this agreement, and I’m confident that the issue of seafarers will receive the highest priority during the implementation of this agreement,” he added.

    When pressed by reporters to offer words of condolence to the families of the deceased Indian mariners, Trump acknowledged the danger of the maritime profession and reaffirmed shared commitment to supporting global seafarers. “It’s a tough profession. There’s no question about it. And we work together on it,” he said. “We love all of those people. They’re great people.”

    The personal bond between Trump and Modi has been a defining feature of U.S.-India relations throughout Trump’s first term in office, marked by high-profile public displays of camaraderie. During a 2020 state visit to India, Modi drew global attention by organizing a massive welcoming rally for Trump at a packed cricket stadium, an event that left a lasting positive impression on the U.S. president. Just months before that trip, the two leaders shared the stage at the “Howdy Modi” rally in Houston, Texas, which drew a crowd of tens of thousands of Indian diaspora members to show their support for the Indian prime minister.

    But in recent months, that once smooth relationship has grown increasingly complicated by new geopolitical frictions. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has created a difficult diplomatic balancing act for New Delhi, which has maintained longstanding defense and energy ties with Moscow even as the U.S. has pressed allies to cut ties with the Kremlin. That rift spilled over into trade policy last year, when the Trump administration imposed steep new tariffs on a wide range of Indian exports, with the move explicitly tied to New Delhi’s decision to continue purchasing discounted crude oil from Russia.

    While the two economic powers eventually negotiated a limited interim trade agreement to de-escalate tensions, talks on a far more comprehensive broader trade pact remain ongoing, with no final deal yet reached. Speaking on Wednesday, Trump struck an optimistic note about the state of those negotiations, saying a new full agreement was “very close” even as he joked about Modi’s formidable negotiating skills.

    “He’s the most beautiful looking man. He looks so nice. He’s like an angel. But actually, he’s as tough as — he’s a killer,” Trump said of Modi.

  • Equatorial Guinea government resigns after missing targets, vice president says

    Equatorial Guinea government resigns after missing targets, vice president says

    In a sudden political shakeup in the Central African oil-rich nation of Equatorial Guinea, the full national cabinet has stepped down after an internal review found the administration delivered only 10 percent of its stated policy and development targets, Vice President Teodoro Nguema Obiang Mangue has confirmed.

    Obiang Mangue, the son of long-ruling President Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, announced Tuesday that Prime Minister Manuel Osa Nsue Nsuga formally tendered the collective resignation of all cabinet ministers after the government fell drastically short of pre-agreed performance benchmarks. In an official statement published to the social platform X, the vice president noted that the administration’s delivery rate fell dramatically short of public expectations and the official commitments the government made when it took office. He did not, however, provide details on how the 10 percent achievement metric was calculated.

    The ruling Democratic Party of Equatorial Guinea (PDGE) has pinpointed the core issues that prompted the mass resignation: entrenched corruption across government agencies, persistent delays in key public development projects, and a years-long failure to advance economic diversification away from the country’s overwhelming dependence on oil exports. The party added that President Obiang Nguema Mbasogo himself expressed deep dissatisfaction with the sitting government’s overall performance.

    A new full cabinet is expected to be named and sworn in within the coming days, but political analysts widely note the reshuffle is unlikely to shift the country’s long-standing balance of power. President Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, who has held the presidency since 1979, is the longest-serving sitting head of state on the African continent, and maintains near-total control over the national political system, holding the sole authority to appoint all members of government.

    Dissent is effectively nonexistent in Equatorial Guinea, according to international human rights monitors. Rights advocacy organizations and the U.S. State Department have repeatedly accused the country’s ruling establishment of arbitrary detention, torture, and extrajudicial killing of political opponents and activists who challenge government policy. The country is also one of 10 African nations that entered into widely criticized deportation agreements with the former Trump U.S. administration, under which it accepts third-country asylum seekers deported from the United States.

  • What’s in the US-Iran agreement?

    What’s in the US-Iran agreement?

    Nearly four months after open hostilities broke out between the United States and Iran, senior American officials have publicly released the full text of a landmark bilateral memorandum of understanding (MoU) designed to cement a lasting ceasefire, reopen the critical Strait of Hormuz, and ultimately end the ongoing conflict between the two nations.

    The Trump administration has framed the 14-clause agreement as strictly performance-based, meaning Iran will only access the concessions laid out in the text after it fulfills all of its binding commitments under the deal. Speaking from the G7 summit hosted in Evian-les-Bains, France, former President Donald Trump told reporters that the formal signing of the agreement would take place “shortly”, with an indicative target date as early as June 18.

    The opening clause of the MoU requires the US, Iran, and their respective allied partners to declare an immediate and permanent end to all military operations across every active front, including the ongoing conflict in Lebanon. From the Trump administration’s perspective, growing anxiety has mounted in recent days that expanded Israeli military operations against the Iran-aligned Hezbollah movement could derail the fragile agreement with Tehran. For its part, Iranian officials have long maintained that any ceasefire must explicitly include Lebanon, with a Foreign Ministry spokesperson warning Wednesday that any continued Israeli military activity in the country would count as a clear violation of the understanding, prompting unspecified “necessary measures” in response. The agreement codifies that neither side will launch offensive military action or issue threats of force against the other moving forward, while committing both parties to upholding the full territorial integrity and sovereign authority of the Lebanese state. The end goal of the agreement is a full, permanent end to the bilateral conflict, though the reaction of Israeli leadership to this core requirement remains unconfirmed as of Wednesday.

    A second core clause reaffirms that both nations will respect each other’s full sovereignty and territorial integrity, and commit to refraining from any interference in each other’s internal domestic affairs. Analysts note this provision is likely to draw pushback from Iranian dissident groups, who have previously received public support from Trump, who promised “help is on the way” to anti-government protesters that demonstrated across major Iranian cities earlier this year.

    Under the third provision, the US and Iran have agreed to work toward a comprehensive final peace deal within a maximum 60-day window, a timeline that can be extended if both sides consent to an extension. The countdown will officially begin once leaders from the two countries sign the MoU during a planned ceremony in Geneva scheduled for later this week. Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baqaei confirmed Wednesday that “so far, our plans for the Geneva meeting have not changed”, adding that a proposal to have the two national presidents sign the agreement is currently under active review. The Iranian foreign ministry has also formally confirmed its commitment to reaching a final understanding within the 60-day timeline.

    The fourth clause outlines a phased rollback of American maritime restrictions: once the MoU enters into force, the US will begin lifting its naval blockade and all other disruptions or impediments on Iranian commercial ports, with full completion of the blockade removal scheduled for 30 days. During this transition period, the number of vessels the US permits to access Iranian ports will be calibrated to match the rate of traffic restoration Iran achieves in the Strait of Hormuz. Once a comprehensive final deal is signed, the US has committed to withdrawing all American military forces from areas in proximity to Iran within 30 days, returning the US military posture and asset positioning to the status it held before hostilities began on February 28.

    Parallel to the American blockade rollback, the MoU requires Iran to deploy its best efforts to organize immediate, unrestricted free passage for all commercial vessels through the Strait of Hormuz, with no transit fees charged for crossing. This has been a top priority for the US since the outbreak of war, when the closure of the strategic chokepoint triggered a sharp spike in global oil prices. The agreement requires commercial traffic to resume immediately once the MoU is signed, with technical, military obstacles and existing mines to be cleared as a priority. American officials repeatedly emphasized during an off-camera briefing Wednesday that all vessels will be guaranteed free, toll-free access to the strait under the terms of the deal. Long-term, Iran will cooperate with Oman and other Gulf Cooperation Council states to negotiate a broader multilateral framework for managing navigation access and security in the Strait of Hormuz. A senior US official noted that while Washington expects Iran to push aggressively to assert its sovereign rights over the waterway, Gulf states would never accept a permanent tolling system for transit.

    A sixth key provision commits the US and its regional partners to develop a definitive, mutually approved reconstruction and economic development plan for Iran valued at a minimum of $300 billion. The formal funding and implementation mechanism will be finalized within 60 days of a comprehensive final deal, with all necessary US licenses, waivers and regulatory approvals to be granted. Notably, the agreement does not require direct American financial contribution to the fund: a senior administration official stressed that the US is not required to pay “a cent of money” to Iran. To illustrate, the official offered a hypothetical example: if Iran complies fully with its commitments, Emirati authorities could move forward with constructing a new power plant in Iran with American diplomatic approval, no US public funds required. Trump and other senior officials have gone out of their way to stress to the American public that no direct US taxpayer funds will go to Iran, a stark contrast the administration says to the 2015 Iran Nuclear Deal negotiated by the Obama administration.

    Under the agreement’s seventh clause, the US will terminate all existing economic sanctions on Iran, including those imposed via UN Security Council resolutions and unilateral American sanctions. The exact timeline for sanctions removal remains to be negotiated as part of the final deal, though both sides have confirmed their shared intention to address the issue immediately once the MoU takes effect. Iran’s economy has already suffered severe damage from years of crippling sanctions, exacerbated by the recent American campaign, Operation Economic Fury, which has sought to cut Tehran off entirely from the global financial system.

    On the nuclear issue, the eighth clause codifies Iran’s commitment to not pursue or acquire a nuclear weapon, and both sides have agreed to implement a framework to manage the existing stockpile of enriched uranium held by Iran. The specific mechanism for managing the material has not been finalized, with the agreement noting that details will be settled in subsequent negotiations. At a minimum, the existing enriched uranium will be downblended domestically under continuous supervision by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). A senior US official called this baseline requirement a “major win” for American negotiating positions, with Trump previously stating that preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon accounted for 99% of his objectives when he launched Operation Epic Fitry earlier this year. As the deal is structured to be performance-based, all sanctions relief laid out in the seventh clause is directly tied to Iran fulfilling its nuclear commitments under clause eight.

    The ninth and tenth clauses establish a nuclear status quo during the transition period before the enriched uranium stockpile is fully addressed, freezing the current state of Iran’s nuclear program until a final deal is reached. In practical terms, this means the US will not impose new additional sanctions on Iran during the transition, and will issue temporary waivers for exports of Iranian crude oil, petroleum products, and associated services including international banking transactions and commercial transportation.

    The eleventh clause addresses the longstanding sticking point of Iranian frozen assets, a core demand for Tehran that has represented a major obstacle to progress in negotiations for months. Under the agreement, the US commits to making all frozen and restricted Iranian funds fully available once the MoU is signed, with specific release procedures to be negotiated during the transition talks. A senior US official confirmed Wednesday that assets will be released incrementally as Iran complies with specific commitments during the post-MoU negotiations, such as beginning the process of downblending its highly enriched uranium stockpile, as an incentive for continued adherence to the deal.

    The final three clauses lay out the procedural and governance framework for the agreement. First, the US and Iran will establish a joint monitoring mechanism to oversee MoU implementation and compliance with any future final deal, though the exact structure and authority of this body remains undetermined. Once the MoU is signed and implementation begins, formal negotiations for a comprehensive final deal will launch immediately. Finally, the agreement requires that any final bilateral deal will receive formal endorsement via a binding UN Security Council resolution to cement its international legitimacy.

  • Ex-Nigeria oil minister cleared in UK bribery trial

    Ex-Nigeria oil minister cleared in UK bribery trial

    After a high-profile 13-year investigation and a months-long trial at London’s Southwark Crown Court, a jury has delivered a stunning acquittal for Diezani Alison-Madueke, the 65-year-old former Nigerian oil minister and the first woman to lead OPEC, clearing all bribery and conspiracy charges against her. The verdict marks a major setback for the UK’s National Crime Agency (NCA), which spent more than a decade building its case against one of Africa’s most recognizable former political leaders.

    Alison-Madueke, who served as Nigeria’s oil minister from 2010 to 2015 and assumed the OPEC presidency in 2014, faced five counts of accepting bribes and one count of conspiracy to commit bribery. Prosecutors alleged that she allowed powerful oil executives holding lucrative Nigerian government contracts to fund her extravagant lifestyle, including luxury accommodations and high-end shopping sprees in the UK. Six oil tycoons were named in the indictment, but none have been charged to date. Crucially, however, prosecutors failed to prove that Alison-Madueke awarded any contracts to these individuals in exchange for improper gifts or payments.

    Two other co-defendants were also fully acquitted: Doye Agama, 69, Alison-Madueke’s older brother and a Pentecostal archbishop based in Manchester, was cleared of conspiracy to commit bribery, while 54-year-old Nigerian-British oil executive Olatimbo Ayinde was found not guilty of bribery and bribing a foreign public official. Ayinde’s case drew particular attention, as she had been working as an informant for Nigerian anti-corruption authorities when she was charged. An EFCC investigator confirmed to the court that Ayinde provided “vital information that assisted the investigation,” leading her legal team to condemn her inclusion in the prosecution as a profound injustice.

    From the opening of the trial in January, Alison-Madueke’s defense team mounted a vigorous attack on the fairness and credibility of the prosecution’s case. They argued that key documents proving their client’s innocence had disappeared during investigations in Nigeria, and that the 13-year delay in bringing the case to trial was inherently unjust, describing the prolonged process as evidence of a “broken criminal justice system” in Britain. Defense barrister Jonathan Laidlaw KC emphasized that Alison-Madueke had effectively been confined to the UK for nearly 11 years, barred from working or traveling freely, while the NCA never took steps to extradite the six uncharged oil executives alleged to have paid the bribes. The jury was never given an explanation for why those men were never prosecuted.

    Alison-Madueke said in court that she had been targeted because of her gender in Nigeria’s deeply patriarchal society, noting that her rise to the country’s second-most senior political role and the top position at OPEC made her a target for male political opponents. She framed herself as a lifelong anti-corruption advocate, so committed to procedural rigor that she earned the nickname “Madam due process,” and pointed to her trailblazing history as the first woman to sit on the board of Shell’s Nigerian operations in 2006.

    Addressing the allegations of improperly funded luxury stays and purchases, Alison-Madueke told the court that under Nigerian rules, ministers were prohibited from holding foreign bank accounts for official overseas work, and her department’s London office was so disorganized that she had to rely on advances from wealthy business contacts for living expenses. She insisted all advances were fully reimbursed in Nigeria, and that the critical evidence proving reimbursement was seized from her Abuja home in 2015 but never turned over to the court. Former Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan, who appointed Alison-Madueke to the oil ministry post, submitted a statement confirming that it was standard practice for third parties to cover travel, accommodation and other expenses for Nigerian ministers on official overseas business.

    The investigation was ultimately undermined by unresolved inconsistencies and gaps in evidence, the defense argued. The NCA was denied direct access to the 2015 search of Alison-Madueke’s Abuja home, forcing it to rely entirely on evidence collection by Nigeria’s Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC). Yet the prosecution asked the jury to trust EFCC evidence against Alison-Madueke while simultaneously urging them to dismiss the commission’s exculpatory evidence for co-defendant Ayinde, a contradiction the defense highlighted heavily during the trial.

    Following the delivery of the verdict, Alison-Madueke called the ruling the end of a decade-long nightmare. “For 11 long, gruelling years this case has hung over my head and has tormented me and my family,” she said in a post-verdict statement. “But today, the past decade of relentless and unjust vilification, condemnation and scrutiny has finally come to an end.”

  • In Belfast, ancient grudges and new furies leave a city burned

    In Belfast, ancient grudges and new furies leave a city burned

    In the residential streets branching off east Belfast’s Newtownards Road, the aftermath of last week’s brutal sectarian-tinged riots hangs heavy. Charred, boarded-up house facades line the road, burned-out car shells sit abandoned at curbsides, and the acrid scent of ash still lingers in the air. What began with the stabbing of local man Stephen Ogilvie quickly exploded into coordinated violence targeting migrant and immigrant communities, leaving dozens of families displaced and a city already grappling with historic divisions confronting a fresh wave of racial hatred.

    The violence unfolded almost exclusively in loyalist Protestant working-class areas, where pro-British paramilitary groups that first formed during Northern Ireland’s 30-year Troubles have maintained a persistent, though altered, presence decades after the 1998 Good Friday Agreement ended large-scale conflict. Investigations and local testimonies reveal the riot was not a spontaneous outburst, but a coordinated action: rioters were instructed to wear black, cover their faces, disable doorbell surveillance, and avoid carrying personal phones that could identify them. Migrants’ home addresses were circulated across social media platforms and encrypted WhatsApp groups, forcing many minority families to send their children to stay with white neighbors for safety.

    Among those who lost their homes to arson were a Ukrainian woman who fled Russia’s full-scale invasion of her country, a Polish family, and a Romanian family. The Sudanese man charged with the attempted murder of Ogilvie has been identified as Hadi Alodid, but a subsequent Belfast Telegraph investigation has exposed a stark hypocrisy at the heart of the rioters’ justification: Ogilvie himself was a longtime target of loyalist paramilitaries linked to the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and the notorious Shankill Butchers unit, who had tortured him repeatedly and forced him out of Northern Ireland years before the stabbing. Ogilvie’s family has publicly expressed disgust that his attack was exploited to justify racist violence.

    While the stabbing served as the immediate trigger, campaigners, academics and local residents who spoke to Middle East Eye say this wave of violence was the predictable outcome of years of growing far-right extremism, anti-immigrant disinformation, and the merging of historic paramilitary networks with modern far-right ideology. Unlike the Troubles, when intercommunal violence targeted Catholic communities, this new wave of violence has reoriented old sectarian hatred toward foreign-born residents.

    Multiple actors have been linked to enabling and emboldening the unrest, mirroring a pattern seen in recent racist riots across mainland Britain from Southampton to Southport. Far-right agitator Tommy Robinson, whose legal bills are currently covered by X owner Elon Musk, shared details of planned demonstrations within days of the stabbing, framing the incident as “yet another invader attack on our people.” Musk, the world’s first trillionaire, reposted the call to action on his own platform with the caption: “Only by protesting REPEATEDLY and LOUDLY will there be any change!” The post came just weeks after Robinson met Musk’s father in a luxury Moscow hotel.

    Mainstream far-right political figures have also amplified rhetoric that local activists say laid the groundwork for violence. Traditional Unionist Voice MP Jim Allister decried what he called “an importation of an alien culture that thinks it is appropriate to behead someone within the United Kingdom,” while Reform UK leader Nigel Farage warned that “if there is no urgent action taken to remove discriminatory and dangerous anti-White policies, we will see another Belfast.” Critics point out that this rhetoric of collective blame stands in stark contrast to the silence from these same figures when 30 women were violently killed across Northern Ireland over four years ending in 2024 – a case where the vast majority of attackers were white.

    Data underscores how unfounded many of the anti-immigrant claims circulating in Belfast are. Northern Ireland is over 96 percent white, a higher proportion than England, Wales or Scotland, and hosts just one percent of all asylum seekers housed in UK hotels. Still, systemic failures have created a vacuum that disinformation has rushed to fill. Luqman Saeed, a Pakistan-born lecturer at Ulster University, notes that most working-class loyalist residents have little daily interaction with immigrants, so their perceptions are shaped almost entirely by skewed media coverage that only highlights immigrants in the context of crime or asylum claims. Few are aware that temporary migrants pay a mandatory health surcharge to access the NHS, or that many work in critical frontline health and social care roles across the region.

    For Saeed, who has lived in Belfast since 2022 and raises children born there who attend local schools, the rise in racism has been tangible and worrying. “Things are definitely worse now,” he says. “That sense of security has faded away. It’s hard to know how to re-establish it. There is a co-ordinated, systematic campaign in the media to demonise immigrants.”

    Official bodies have previously warned of the link between persistent paramilitary structures and rising racist violence. In December 2025, the Independent Reporting Commission – a joint UK-Irish body created to monitor post-Good Friday Agreement disarmament – found that “the intimidation, coercive control, and threats linked to paramilitary groups persist, and the structures of paramilitary groups that continue intact can be used to facilitate organised crime and other forms of violence.” The commission specifically noted that “a particularly serious manifestation of that reality over the last two years has been the link between paramilitarism and racist violence connected to the issue of immigration.”

    Amnesty UK’s head of nations and regions Patrick Corrigan says paramilitary involvement is the unique factor that distinguishes Belfast’s current unrest from far-right violence elsewhere in the UK. “Paramilitaries are the element that exists here but nowhere else. It is clear they have been involved in racist violence,” Corrigan says. Local residents also note that paramilitary-linked organised crime groups stand to profit from the unrest, exploiting social division for their own gain.

    Not all local loyalist leaders agree that paramilitary groups centrally controlled the riots. Mervyn Gibson, grand secretary of the Protestant Orange Order and a Presbyterian minister who has negotiated with paramilitaries for decades, acknowledges that individual members took part, but argues the violence was not formally directed by paramilitary leadership. He describes much of the unrest as “recreational rioting” where teenagers and young men were drawn to the chaos for an adrenaline rush, directed by older men with ties to fringe fascist groups as much as traditional paramilitarism.

    Gibson also points to long-simmering grievances in working-class loyalist communities that have created fertile ground for division. He notes that the UK government often places migrant and asylum-seeking families in working-class neighbourhoods without any advance consultation or explanation to existing residents, leaving a information gap that disinformation fills. Systemic housing failures also exacerbate tension: Northern Ireland has more than 20,000 vacant homes, but more than 50,000 people remain on social housing waiting lists. Local residents report that private landlords routinely rent properties to migrant families because the government pays a premium rate, feeding a perception that existing residents’ housing needs are being sidelined.

    Community organiser Conol Matthews says these economic and social grievances are deliberately diverted toward immigrants instead of the political leadership that created the housing crisis. His approach when working with local residents is to redirect anger toward “the boys in suits” in government who have failed working-class communities on all sides of the historic divide. Still, he acknowledges the weight of Belfast’s violent history, noting: “Realistically, what this place is always teetering on the edge of is war.”

    Kashif Akram, an executive committee member at the Belfast Islamic Centre, echoes calls for systemic change to reverse rising hatred. “The government needs to educate them. The importance of migrants needs to be understood. Why are people not being educated about this?” he asks. He notes that for paramilitaries, little has changed except the target of their violence: “it looks like the same individuals and same leaders. The target has changed but the ideology is the same. The violence is directed not at Catholics but people of colour.”

    Despite the wave of violence, many Belfast residents remain optimistic that unity can push back against hatred. Over the weekend following the riots, thousands of people from across all communities took to the streets of central Belfast for an anti-racism march. Akram, a lifelong Belfast resident, puts it simply: “There’s more decent people than racists. We can stop it, but all communities need to come together.”