标签: Asia

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  • Chuck Schumer dismisses opposition to his leadership from progressive Democrats

    Chuck Schumer dismisses opposition to his leadership from progressive Democrats

    In the aftermath of the Democratic Party’s decisive midterm election victory this week, a growing internal rift has erupted within Senate Democratic ranks, as progressive advocacy organizations and a cohort of incoming freshman lawmakers openly oppose longtime Senate Democratic leader Chuck Schumer’s bid to assume the Senate majority leader post. Three newly elected senators — Adam Hamilton of Kansas, Troy Jackson of Maine, and Abdul El-Sayed of Michigan — have explicitly pledged to vote against Schumer’s leadership during their respective campaign trails, framing their opposition as a push for generational turnover in the party’s top congressional ranks.

    Leading progressive advocacy group Indivisible amplified this call for leadership refreshment in a public statement this week, arguing that Tuesday’s sweeping electoral mandate from voters was a clear signal that the Democratic base demands a new cohort of young, dynamic progressive standard-bearers to steer the party’s legislative agenda. “Voters made it very clear that they want a new generation of Democratic fighters,” the group noted. “We need a Leader in the Senate who is capable of leading that fight. It’s time for Senate Democrats to choose new leadership.”

    The core flashpoint driving this internal friction is the stark divergence in stances on U.S. policy toward Israel between the 75-year-old Schumer and the new wave of progressive Democratic legislators. A longstanding, vocal advocate for unconditioned U.S. military aid to Israel, Schumer has repeatedly used his legislative influence to block congressional bills that would tie military assistance to Israeli human rights conduct. Back in February 2026, while serving as Senate minority leader, Schumer told a gathering of pro-Israel Jewish leaders that prioritizing unwavering support for Israeli military funding was one of his top official responsibilities. “I have many jobs as leader… and one is to fight for aid to Israel, all the aid that Israel needs,” he stated at the event, going as far as to refer to U.S. taxpayer-funded aid packages for Israel as his personal “baby.” He further pledged that as long as he held a Senate seat, the funding program would continue to expand, and he would block any efforts to roll back or restrict it.

    As a prominent Jewish-American Democratic figure, Schumer has long enjoyed robust backing from the influential American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC). However, newly released polling data commissioned by progressive pro-Israel group J Street and published this week reveals that Schumer’s uncompromising stance on unconditioned Israeli aid is now out of step with the vast majority of Democratic-leaning Jewish voters across the U.S. The survey found that a supermajority of Jewish Americans believe that current Israeli government actions and AIPAC’s advocacy work are contributing to rising levels of antisemitism within the United States.

    This dispute over Schumer’s leadership lays bare a far broader ideological schism that has split the Democratic Party for years on Middle East policy. Incoming senator-elect Abdul El-Sayed represents a fast-growing faction of Democratic elected officials and voters who are demanding an immediate end to unconditioned U.S. support for Israel, citing the ongoing humanitarian crisis and widely documented reports of genocide in Gaza, as well as Israel’s decades-long military occupation of the West Bank. At the opposite end of the caucus spectrum, figures such as Pennsylvania Senator John Fetterman remain staunch, unwavering supporters of Israel’s right to self-defense and full U.S. military partnership.

    Despite the public pushback from progressives, political analysts widely expect Schumer to secure enough votes to retain his position as Senate majority leader, in large part because no senior, long-tenured Senate Democratic colleagues have publicly declared their interest in challenging him for the top role. When asked about the reported internal rift during a Thursday interview with MS Now, Schumer downplayed the tensions, framing his leadership track record as a key driver of the party’s historic midterm wins. “The bottom line is: first… we’ve had a very, very strong finish here, and I have worked really hard to get the results we got. But second, the issue is not me,” he told the outlet. “The issue is unity, fighting together. We still have a big job to do.”

  • An Indian film that nobody would release is finally a hit – 18 awards later

    An Indian film that nobody would release is finally a hit – 18 awards later

    After spending two years trapped in distribution limbo, the poignant 111-minute Uttarakhand-set drama *Pyre* has emerged as a surprise cultural sensation across India, drawing tearful standing ovations from theatergoers and rave endorsements from top Bollywood talent. Helmed by veteran television journalist turned filmmaker Vinod Kapri, the production centers on Bubu and Aama – the local Uttarakhandi terms for grandfather and grandmother – played by first-time, non-professional leads Padam Singh, Kapri’s retired army uncle, and Heera Devi, a widowed village farmer who spent decades raising her children through agricultural labor, grass cutting, and buffalo rearing.

    Set in a remote, roadless, electricity-free Himalayan hamlet, the narrative traces the quiet 65-year companionship of elderly couple Padam Singh and Tulsi, who have spent 28 years waiting for their only son Hariya to return home from Mumbai, where he migrated in search of stable work. Their long period of anticipation surges with new urgency when a letter arrives bearing Hariya’s promised return date, but as the few remaining local families gradually depart for urban opportunities, the couple is left increasingly isolated in the vast, unforgiving mountain landscape. When a departing neighbor warns them they will soon have no one left to carry their bodies down the steep slopes for a proper funeral, Padam Singh builds two adjacent funeral pyres directly outside their small home, to ensure they will never be separated even in death. While the story grapples with heavy, timely themes – including mass outmigration that has turned hundreds of Himalayan settlements into ghost villages, and worsening climate change that has made local weather patterns far harsher and less predictable – the film is laced with gentle, warm humor, framing the couple’s constant playful bickering as their unique, decades-tested love language.

    Kapri, a Uttarakhand native, first conceived the project in 2018 after encountering an 84-year-old local man in the scenic hill town of Munsiyari, whose deeply lined face and quiet devotion to his elderly wife left a lasting impression. The original plan to film the real-life couple was abandoned after a week of shooting, as the pair could not adapt to performing for a camera. Kapri then approached iconic Bollywood acting couple Naseeruddin Shah and Ratna Pathak Shah for the lead roles, but the pair turned down the part out of respect for the story’s regional authenticity, noting they could not fully embody the lived experiences of Uttarakhand’s rural elderly population. The final casting of two local villagers, who had never faced a camera before, ended up becoming one of the film’s greatest strengths, drawing widespread praise from Indian cinema’s most respected figures, including Naseeruddin Shah and Anupam Kher. When Shah finally watched the finished film, he tearfully embraced lead actor Padam Singh, telling him he could never have delivered such a raw, authentic performance even across seven lifetimes.

    *Pyre* earned 18 international film festival awards throughout 2024, including three best feature honors and 12 audience choice best film prizes, but struggled to secure a theatrical distribution deal for two full years, with major streaming OTT platforms also rejecting the project. It only reached cinemas on October 30 via a modest 70-screen release funded by a supportive producer friend of Kapri’s, but explosive positive word of mouth quickly drove surging ticket demand, prompting theater operators to expand screenings nationwide. Audiences have flooded social media with clips of viewers exiting screenings in tears, noting the story has not moved them this deeply in decades. Many attendees approach the two lead actors at public events to hug them or touch their feet, sharing that the film reminds them of their own elderly parents and grandparents waiting alone in hometowns they left behind for work.

    Both non-professional leads admit they initially feared performing on camera, worrying they would forget lines and face judgment from their families and local communities. Now basking in nationwide acclaim, the pair have used their new platform to call on India’s younger generation not to abandon their rural ancestral lands, and to urge state and federal policymakers to expand local education and employment opportunities in rural Himalayan regions, so families no longer have to separate by migrating thousands of kilometers for work. As Heera Devi observes, the film’s widespread resonance stems from its unflinching realism: “Across villages in India, the elderly are left alone. No one’s children stay home anymore, and all parents wait endlessly for visits from their sons, daughters-in-law and grandchildren. That quiet loneliness is something no one can escape.”

  • Rights groups condemn Bahrain’s largest mass trial of Shia clerics in history

    Rights groups condemn Bahrain’s largest mass trial of Shia clerics in history

    Manama, Bahrain – The Gulf Arab kingdom of Bahrain is on the cusp of convening the largest mass trial targeting Shia religious leaders in its modern history, as human rights organizations raise urgent alarms over systemic due process violations, including claims that judicial authorities have extracted confessions through physical coercion and torture. A local national court is scheduled to issue formal verdicts this Sunday for 69 total defendants, 60 of whom are practicing Shia clerics, who face a sweeping slate of charges: affiliation with a purported terrorist organization, conspiring to overthrow the country’s constitutional ruling system, and disseminating Iran’s official political ideology within Bahraini borders. Documented testimony collected by the Bahrain Institute for Rights and Democracy (BIRD) details a catalogue of severe abuses inflicted on the detained group during pre-trial detention, including being forced to stand for extended hours on end, being kept blindfolded and handcuffed for days at a time, prolonged intentional sleep deprivation, and repeated threats of physical harm, sexual violence directed at both the detainees and their immediate family members. Multiple detainees also reported that interrogators explicitly threatened to revoke their Bahraini citizenship and forcibly deport them if they refused to confess to the alleged charges. One 62-year-old prominent Shia cleric, Sheikh Mohammed Saeed Al-Taitoon, shared with independent investigators that he was held blindfolded and physically restrained for seven consecutive days, forced to remain standing even as he suffered from severe urinary bleeding and painful kidney stones, and was actively denied access to life-saving surgical care for his condition. A second 57-year-old cleric, Sayed Moosa Jawad Alwedaie, stated that interrogators beat him repeatedly, subjected him to electric shock torture, and left him naked and exposed in his cell for extended periods. A coalition of 20 leading global human rights groups, including Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, has issued a joint public appeal to Bahraini governing authorities, demanding the immediate release of all individuals arbitrarily detained in the sweep, the full dismissal of all charges rooted in peaceful, lawful religious practice, and a fully transparent, independent investigation into every verified allegation of mistreatment and torture against the detainees. This upcoming trial is the latest flashpoint in long-running international scrutiny of Bahrain’s ruling Sunni monarchy, which has faced consistent global condemnation for its widespread crackdown on the country’s 2011 Arab Spring-era pro-democracy movement. For more than a decade, the kingdom’s ruling establishment has repeatedly targeted religious leaders from Bahrain’s large Shia majority population, routinely framing them as having secret operational ties to the Islamic Republic of Iran. Recent regional geopolitical tensions, sparked by the outbreak of open conflict between the United States and Israel against Iran, followed by a series of Iranian retaliatory strikes targeting U.S.-aligned Gulf states including Bahrain, have prompted a sharp new wave of domestic repression against individuals suspected of having any ties to Tehran. To date, 69 Bahraini citizens of Iranian heritage have already had their legal citizenship formally revoked as part of this expanded security campaign. Tariq Al Hassan, director of Bahrain’s internal state security agency, defended the government’s actions in a Friday interview with Reuters, stating that the ongoing crackdown is designed to counter “an ideology that demands obedience to Iran’s leadership above Bahrain’s sovereign authority.” Critics of the government’s campaign, however, argue that the high-profile mass trial is a thinly veiled new effort to crush all remaining peaceful political dissent across the kingdom. Sayed Ahmed Alwadaei, advocacy director at BIRD, characterized the upcoming mass trial as a direct “attack on the faith and identity of Bahrain’s Shia community” and one of the “ugliest forms of persecution” the Bahraini state has carried out since the 2011 pro-democracy uprising. “When allegations of torture are brushed aside and defendants are denied a meaningful opportunity to challenge the evidence against them, the judiciary becomes an instrument of persecution,” Alwadaei noted in a public statement. “This mockery of justice must end. It will leave lasting wounds and deepen divisions across the country.”

  • France’s polarised road to 2027: Repression, racism and the rise of the far right

    France’s polarised road to 2027: Repression, racism and the rise of the far right

    On 30 October, the streets of Trappes, a working-class suburban town north of Paris, were flooded with thousands of grieving and furious local residents who gathered to pay tribute to victims of a brutal targeted racist attack that occurred one week prior. The assault claimed the life of 26-year-old Black man Pengo Bossio Wangi, and left seven other people wounded, including a 12-year-old girl.
    The 39-year-old suspected perpetrator, Kevin Tessier, has been placed in pre-trial detention, where he openly confessed to law enforcement that he deliberately targeted individuals he categorized as “Muslim, African or North African.” A search of his residence uncovered a copy of Adolf Hitler’s manifesto Mein Kampf, alongside homemade stickers bearing references to the National Rally (RN), the prominent far-right party led by Marine Le Pen, who is a leading 2027 French presidential candidate.
    Trappes mayor Ali Rabeh emphasized that Tessier’s violent bigotry did not emerge in a vacuum, stating it was cultivated through repeated, dehumanizing rhetoric that framed marginalized ethnic and religious minority groups as legitimate targets for elimination. Rabeh directly held the RN and its current president Jordan Bardella accountable, referencing Bardella’s 2022 public remarks labeling Trappes as “a miniature Islamic republic.” The mayor further criticized mainstream politicians within traditional republican political circles who have sought to appease the far right by adopting its discriminatory language, normalizing its ideological talking points, and even codifying its policy demands into national law.
    Rabeh also singled out the CNews television channel and the far-reaching media empire owned by conservative tycoon Vincent Bollore for their role in amplifying hate speech, and called on independent media outlets to uphold journalistic integrity and stop providing broadcasting airtime to public figures convicted of inciting racial hatred. One such figure is Eric Zemmour, leader of the far-right Reconquete! party and a potential 2027 presidential contender, who has been found guilty multiple times of incitement to hatred and discrimination. Zemmour recently publicly blamed “hordes of Arab and African barbarians” for looting that broke out during nationwide demonstrations focused on poor living standards and inadequate school and university conditions. He was far from alone in pushing such racialized framing: RN representatives, mainstream right-wing presidential hopeful Bruno Retailleau, and even the official government spokesperson all pinned unrest in working-class suburbs on alleged suburban “thugs.” Former Prime Minister Edouard Philippe, another leading 2027 presidential aspirant, went further to claim there was an “overrepresentation of French people from immigrant backgrounds among the rioters.”
    These very same racialized suburban communities, known in France as banlieues, were the explicit targets of Tessier’s violent attack. He told police he carried out the assault to “avenge looted shopkeepers,” and chose Trappes as his target because he shared Bardella’s view of the town as “a stronghold of Islamists.” Dominique Sopo, president of leading anti-racist organization SOS Racisme, confirmed that the sustained discriminatory rhetoric targeting banlieue residents directly explains the motives behind the Trappes racist attack. “The recurring dehumanisation of people perceived as Arab, Black or Muslim, combined with the biased media coverage of the recent demonstrations, plays a direct role in pushing criminals to commit violent acts,” Sopo told Middle East Eye. “Portraying part of the population as ‘thugs’ or an ‘existential threat’ inevitably legitimises violent behaviour in the minds of certain individuals,” he added, warning that further racist attacks are highly likely in the lead-up to the 2027 presidential election.
    Official data confirms the growing toll of far-right violence in France: since 2022, eight people have been murdered by far-right activists solely on the basis of their perceived ethnicity or immigrant background. Recent victims include Djamel Bendjaballah, killed in Dunkirk in 2024 by a member of the ultra-right French Patriotic Brigade (BFP), and Hichem Miraoui, an Arab man murdered in the Var region in 2025 by a neighbor who openly sympathized with the National Rally. Despite repeated demands from SOS Racisme and other civil society groups, the BFP has still not been formally dissolved by French authorities. Since President Emmanuel Macron took office, only roughly 20 far-right identity groups have been banned, even though experts estimate there are approximately 300 such organizations operating across French territory. In recent weeks, these far-right factions have carried out a string of targeted assaults on the sidelines of public demonstrations in multiple French cities, claiming their actions were intended to “defend local businesses.” According to reporting from Le Monde, some of these violent attacks on peaceful demonstrators took place in full view of national riot police, who not only failed to arrest the perpetrators but also reportedly detained the victims of the assaults and allowed the far-right attackers to leave the scene unimpeded.
    In recent days, civil society organizations and independent media outlets have uncovered online communications where far-right individuals openly threaten to ambush racialized delivery workers, poison halal food products in supermarkets, and target Muslim worshippers holding street prayers outside mosques. On 31 October, graffiti promoting the idea of “remigration” — a far-right policy referring to the mass forced deportation of immigrants — was found spray-painted on the storefronts of multiple shops in Paris. French authorities moved that same day to ban a scheduled ultra-right conference focused entirely on promoting the remigration concept. The remigration doctrine is deeply tied to the far-right “Great Replacement” conspiracy theory, and France’s junior minister for combating discrimination Aurore Berge recently sparked widespread public outcry after she refused to classify the conspiracy theory as a racist ideology.
    Abdellali Hajjat, a sociology professor at the Free University of Brussels, noted that such ambiguous, tolerant official positions on extremist ideas directly contribute to the “normalisation of far-right discourse” across French public life. “When members of the government embrace myths – not theories – such as the ‘Great Replacement’, ‘Brotherism’, or ‘Islamo-leftism’, they legitimise an entire racist and conspiratorial worldview,” he told MEE. The term “Brotherism” (or “Entryism”) — a false narrative claiming the Muslim Brotherhood is orchestrating a secret political infiltration campaign across French institutions — was the focus of a proposed Senate bill in May of this year, while the term “Islamo-leftism” — a baseless claim that segments of the political left have aligned with Islamist interests — has been invoked for years by a wide range of political actors including sitting government officials to discredit their political opponents. Hajjat further argued that the current Macron administration is actively “implementing a far-right agenda through the erosion of fundamental rights and freedoms – including the rights to association, protest and expression – and through the brutal repression of political dissent.”
    The French Human Rights League (LDH) has repeatedly described new laws and legislative proposals that expand police powers, extend mass surveillance authorities, restrict the right to public protest, and target marginalized minority groups and civil society organizations as “liberty-restricting.” One such measure, the law on the presumption of self-defence passed by the National Assembly in July, has been nicknamed the “licence to kill law” by the LDH, as it significantly loosens the legal conditions under which law enforcement officers can successfully claim self-defence to avoid prosecution for use of force. The LDH has also consistently criticized the 2021 so-called anti-separatism law, which it argues fosters a pervasive climate of state suspicion and targeting directed at the country’s Muslim community. Meanwhile, Amnesty International has issued public warnings about the violent policing tactics used against recent nationwide demonstrations, including the deployment of less-lethal weapons that have the capacity to cause permanent, life-altering injuries. Since the wave of protests began in September, thousands of people across France have been arrested on charges ranging from minor public-order offences to destruction of public and private property, with 85% of all individuals taken into custody being minors.
    In the immediate aftermath of violent incidents that broke out during the 17 October demonstrations, French Justice Minister Gerald Darmanin called for the implementation of exceptional legal measures, including reclassifying certain protest-related acts as organized crime offences and applying legal tools that are normally reserved exclusively for counter-terrorism operations. Darmanin specifically claimed that members of the “ultra left” and the “far left” were the primary instigators of protest-related violence and looting. He went on to assert that 2027 presidential candidate Jean-Luc Melenchon and his left-wing party France Unbowed (LFI), which was formally categorized as a far-left organization in a February ministerial circular, bore partial responsibility for the unrest surrounding the demonstrations. Prime Minister Sebastien Lecornu similarly accused LFI of “fuelling anger” across the country. These accusations have drawn broad support from Macron’s centrist governing coalition, the traditional mainstream right, and the far-right National Rally. Even Socialist Party presidential candidate Raphael Glucksmann — who has been criticized by large segments of the left for being disconnected from working-class communities and acting as an obstacle to left-wing electoral unity — publicly accused Melenchon of “brutalising public debate.”
    However, official French intelligence service assessments confirm that traditional left-wing parties including LFI and the Communist Party, while present as participants at the demonstrations, had no involvement whatsoever in any of the violent incidents. An independent investigation by French investigative outlet Mediapart further revealed that internal intelligence reports directly contradict the government’s official political narrative, with some law enforcement officers reporting they were placed under explicit pressure to falsely blame LFI for acts of violence that the party had no role in instigating during the 17 October protests. LFI leaders have accused the government of deliberate political manipulation, stating these leaked revelations are proof of a coordinated broader campaign to demonize their party.
    Jeremy Younes, a researcher at French media watchdog group Acrimed, supports the view that Melenchon’s party — which current polling projects could advance to the second round of the 2027 presidential election to face Marine Le Pen — is the target of a coordinated delegitimization campaign orchestrated by both mainstream media outlets and the country’s established political establishment. “Since its creation in 2016, LFI has faced hostility from journalists and commentators largely because it broke with the neoliberal consensus and adopted anti-racist positions that have led to it being labelled ‘Islamo-leftist’,” he told MEE. In France, nearly all major private media outlets are owned by a small cohort of billionaire owners and large industrial or financial groups that are ideologically opposed to core components of LFI’s policy platform, including proposals for sweeping wealth redistribution and the dismantling of private media monopolies to expand media pluralism. Younes describes mainstream media coverage of LFI as a relentless barrage of unsubstantiated attacks, denouncing what he characterizes as a systematic effort to exclude the movement from legitimate republican political discourse through manufactured, bad-faith controversies rather than evidence-based, substantive debate over policy proposals and factual realities. “Claiming that LFI raises issues such as racism and support for the Palestinian people merely to court Muslim voters is part of this broader effort to discredit the party,” he said. “The conditions under which the left can express itself are being undermined everywhere.”
    The CNews channel has emerged as the most prominent outlet leading what critics have called widespread “LFI-bashing” coverage. Classified by press freedom group Reporters Without Borders as a far-right opinion channel, the rolling news station is currently the subject of a public petition calling for its broadcasting licence to be revoked. The petition has already collected nearly one million signatures, a threshold under French constitutional law that triggers a formal mandatory parliamentary review of the matter. A separate grassroots online campaign is also encouraging French social media users to actively reduce the algorithmic visibility of content that promotes far-right ideological narratives. Sopo of SOS Racisme notes that these citizen-led initiatives “can play a useful role,” and argues that “a civic awakening committed to building a society based on coexistence is necessary” to push back against rising hate. He added a note of caution, however: “Today, society is so polarised that it is difficult for an anti-racist movement to build broad public support.”
    Professor Hajjat warns that if Marine Le Pen’s National Rally wins the 2027 presidential election, the party will already have all the pre-existing legislation it needs to fully implement its openly racist, sexist, homophobic and anti-social policy agenda. The academic argues that the ongoing normalization of far-right ideas, and their incremental incorporation into formal law by the current Macron administration, are actively clearing a path for Le Pen’s electoral victory, as she remains the clear frontrunner in all current public voting-intention polls. In the event of a Le Pen presidential win, Hajjat warned, “foreign nationals and French citizens of immigrant origin would be the first targets of legal discrimination in areas including housing, employment and education among others.”

  • Leaked UN report ‘establishes conclusively’ that UAE hired Colombian mercenaries for Sudan’s RSF

    Leaked UN report ‘establishes conclusively’ that UAE hired Colombian mercenaries for Sudan’s RSF

    A strictly confidential quarterly update from the UN Panel of Experts on Sudan, submitted to the UN Security Council last week and obtained exclusively by Middle East Eye (MEE), delivers irrefutable, conclusive evidence that the United Arab Emirates orchestrated the deployment of Colombian mercenary fighters to back Sudan’s abusive Rapid Support Forces (RSF).
    The investigation traces the elaborate recruitment, training and transit network managed by GSSG, a UAE-headquartered security firm with documented direct ties to Emirati state institutions, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Presidential Affairs. The mercenaries were first trained at facilities across the UAE in Abu Dhabi, Ghayathi and al-Wathba, as well as at the UAE-subsidized Puntland Maritime Police Force (PMPF) base in Bosaso, Somalia – a semi-autonomous territory where Emirati proxies hold de facto control. The fighters were then ferried into Sudan via a multi-stop route spanning Libya, Somalia and Chad, all regions where Emirati-aligned armed groups hold large swathes of territory. Additional arms and logistical supplies for the RSF moved overland through Haftar-controlled eastern Libya, Ethiopia, and the UAE-linked breakaway Somali regions of Puntland and Somaliland.
    The report confirms the Colombian mercenaries played a pivotal operational role in RSF’s 500-day siege and subsequent capture of el-Fasher, the capital of North Darfur, in October 2024, providing critical drone operation support, artillery expertise and frontline infantry backing. Multiple eyewitness and victim accounts collected by MEE confirm that during the el-Fasher offensive, RSF forces carried out widespread atrocities including mass rape, summary executions, civilian extortion and even forced blood extraction from detained people. Both the UN and United States have previously formally designated the RSF as responsible for perpetrating genocide in Sudan’s Darfur region.
    All implicated parties, including the UAE, have publicly denied any wrongdoing. In an official letter included in the leaked confidential report, the UAE formally stated it rejects all allegations of misconduct related to the Sudan conflict and claims it takes reports of mercenary activity very seriously, though it did not respond to MEE’s formal request for comment on the new conclusive evidence. Unlike prior partial disclosures of Emirati involvement, this fully documented, fourth quarterly panel report is far more difficult for Abu Dhabi to dismiss.
    The emergence of this damning verified evidence of Emirati interference in Sudan’s 19-month civil war lands directly in the middle of the high-stakes race to replace outgoing UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, as the UAE’s former long-serving female permanent UN representative Lana Nusseibeh is actively campaigning for the top global diplomatic post. Sudan’s ambassador to the UK, Babiker al-Siddig al-Amin, warned MEE that Nusseibeh’s candidacy must not be used to whitewash Abu Dhabi’s documented support for the genocidal RSF, stating that actors with Sudanese civilian blood on their hands should not lead global governance institutions, and that her election would represent a catastrophic blow to the UN’s institutional credibility.
    A highly decorated Emirati diplomat with close ties to the UAE ruling elite, Nusseibeh is a Cambridge and SOAS University of London graduate who previously served as UN General Assembly vice president, head of the UN Women executive board, and twice as Security Council president. She was a key architect of the UAE’s 2020 normalization of diplomatic relations with Israel. For years, she has rejected press reports detailing Emirati involvement in the Sudan war, and when pressed recently on her ability to remain impartial on Sudan-related issues if elected secretary-general, she stopped short of directly addressing Emirati support for the RSF, only stating that she would back full accountability for RSF atrocities and support all UN fact-finding mechanisms.
    While Nusseibeh currently trails Costa Rica’s Rebeca Grynspan in informal straw polling for the position, her candidacy has gained significant momentum due to the UAE’s extensive economic and diplomatic leverage over the UN Security Council’s five veto-wielding P5 members. Abu Dhabi has pledged $1.4 trillion in long-term investments to the United States, billions of euros in economic commitments to France alongside hosting a permanent French military base and a Louvre museum branch, and poured tens of billions of pounds into the United Kingdom’s economy, including major stakes in the city of Manchester and ownership of the iconic Manchester City Football Club by Emirati Vice President Mansour bin Zayed Al Nahyan. China is the UAE’s largest global trading partner, while Russia has relied heavily on Dubai and Abu Dhabi networks to circumvent Western sanctions imposed after its 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Multiple diplomatic sources confirmed to MEE that the US, UK, France and Russia are all leaning toward backing Nusseibeh’s bid, with only China remaining opposed. Unconfirmed prior claims that International Rescue Committee head David Miliband had lobbied his brother, UK Foreign Secretary Ed Miliband, to support Nusseibeh’s candidacy were formally denied by the IRC, while the UK Foreign Office stated it would only evaluate all candidates on merit and would not publicly comment on individual hopefuls. Prior tensions between the UK and UAE over Sudan-related diplomatic stances came to light last year, when Abu Dhabi cancelled scheduled meetings with British ministers and forced a mid-flight turnaround of a visiting UK government aircraft after London declined to defend the UAE at a UN Security Council session on the Sudan war.
    This latest confidential UN report follows a prior panel document earlier this year that also outlined UAE links to RSF mercenary deployments, which was blocked from public release for months by Bahrain, a close Emirati ally and non-permanent Security Council member. Investigations by AI safety firm Anthropic also confirmed with high confidence last September that the UAE ran a coordinated influence operation targeting UN Sudan experts and independent critics of its role in the conflict. The New York Times also recently revealed that GSSG, the security firm that deployed the Colombian mercenaries, was founded by a senior official in the Emirati presidential office.

  • ‘Is this a joke?’: Centcom podcast mocked as Iran war drags on

    ‘Is this a joke?’: Centcom podcast mocked as Iran war drags on

    As the U.S.-led military campaign against Iran stretches into its ninth month, with cumulative costs for American taxpayers mounting steeply to a Pentagon-estimated $47.1 billion and an additional $153 billion in excess fuel expenses for U.S. consumers per Brown University calculations, U.S. Central Command (Centcom) rolled out its first official audio production, titled *Inside Centcom*, on a Thursday in early November 2026. The 12-minute debut episode, hosted on YouTube, pairs Admiral Brad Cooper, the top U.S. commander overseeing the Iran war theater, with Fleet Master Chief Lateef Compton, leaning into a laid-back, casual conversational style that mirrors popular independent Gen Z-focused podcast formats. The pair spends significant airtime on light, trivial banter, including Cooper joking about stealing French fries from Compton’s lunch, while offering only passing, vague references to the ongoing, deeply unpopular conflict: Compton opens the episode with a throwaway line noting “it’s been a busy year,” and Cooper makes no explicit mention of the February 28, 2026 U.S. airstrike on the Shajareh Tayyebeh primary school in Minab, southern Iran, the very first day of the war. That strike, per Amnesty International, killed 156 people including 120 children, with the human rights group concluding the U.S. violated international humanitarian law by failing to take all feasible precautions to shield civilian populations. UN human rights experts further stated in September 2026 that there are “reasonable grounds” to believe U.S. forces committed war crimes during the Iran campaign. The episode’s release appears to be a deliberate outreach effort targeting young American men who may be eligible for future military service in U.S.-led Middle East operations, though Centcom opted to disable public comment functions on its YouTube upload of the production. The public reception on social media platform X has been overwhelmingly scathing: the clip has amassed more than 2 million views, with users deriding the production as a “shitshow,” mocking the military for abandoning somber professional conduct for trendy podcast tropes, and sarcastically suggesting future episodes could feature celebrity guests ranging from influencer Jake Paul to pop star Nicki Minaj and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. High-profile figures across policy, journalism and veteran military circles have also condemned the move. Veteran journalist Murtaza Hussain called the production “completely undignified,” noting Cooper avoided addressing the Minab school attack that killed dozens of children and school staff. Former U.S. deputy assistant secretary of defense for intelligence Christopher K. Mellon argued the American public has no interest in learning the personal quirks of Centcom’s top leadership, and instead expects commanders to execute their duties “somberly, professionally, and excellently.” U.S. Democratic congresswoman-elect Elaine Luria echoed the criticism, stating Cooper’s core responsibility is “to win wars, not record podcasts” and urging Centcom to “read the room.” Prominent U.S.-based Iran expert Trita Parsi quipped sarcastically that he would fully support Centcom abandoning its decades-long track record of launching needless Middle East wars to pivot entirely to full-time podcast production.

  • Fake Iranian accounts ‘campaigned for Netanyahu’ ahead of Israeli election

    Fake Iranian accounts ‘campaigned for Netanyahu’ ahead of Israeli election

    A sprawling coordinated network of 1,653 X (formerly Twitter) accounts masquerading as Iranian citizens, based both inside Iran and in diaspora communities, ran a targeted disinformation push to boost Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s re-election bid in the run-up to last week’s national vote, a joint investigation by Israeli outlet Haaretz and social media monitoring firm Expose confirmed on Friday. The fake profiles, which framed their advocacy as coming directly from the Iranian people, published content almost exclusively in Hebrew urging Israeli voters to cast their ballots for Netanyahu and his ruling Likud party, claiming a Netanyahu government would shield Israel from the Iranian Islamic Republic and its allied Axis of Resistance. The network’s activity followed highly regimented, synchronized patterns that ruled out organic, independent user behavior: Expose’s data showed two of the accounts shared 109 identical posts, a figure exponentially higher than the four overlapping posts that would be statistically expected from unconnected users. The coordinated accounts also responded to 232 separate posts from 53 different unrelated profiles within a five-minute window of one another, with activity spiking dramatically on official election day. Examples of their tightly choreographed output include two accounts posting the same Hebrew call to “support Benjamin Netanyahu to finish the job” paired with the #IsraeliElections2026 hashtag roughly an hour apart on election morning, a 10pm eve-of-election comment urging followers to “vote only for the Likud party” under a Netanyahu post, and two separate identical posts telling users to “Vote for Benjamin Netanyahu” published within two minutes of each other just after midnight. A dual-language Hebrew and English post circulated at 2am that week explicitly tied support for Netanyahu to protection from Iranian state forces. The vast majority of the accounts – roughly 1,600 of the 1,653 profiles – had been flagged as part of a previously documented 2024 influence operation that promoted Reza Pahlavi, the exiled son of Iran’s overthrown 1979 shah, as a viable alternative to the current Iranian government. As Israel’s general election campaign ramped up in July 2025, 185 of these existing accounts pivoted their activity to engage directly with Netanyahu’s official X profile, sharing content that attacked his political rivals and amplifying his campaign messaging. Once last week’s election wrapped up, the full network reverted to its original core focus of promoting Pahlavi’s political agenda. The findings were first submitted as expert evidence in October, when the Brandeis Institute and watchdog group FakeReporter filed a formal petition with Israel’s Central Elections Committee targeting Netanyahu, the Likud party, and the Prime Minister’s Office over suspected illegal unreported election advertising. Committee chairman Judge Noam Solberg rejected the petition on the eve of the election, noting that while the network’s activity appeared on its face to violate mandatory election ad transparency rules, the panel could not issue a final enforceable ruling because the identities of the accounts’ operators remained completely unknown. Solberg ordered all collected evidence to be forwarded to Israeli law enforcement for further criminal investigation. Both the Prime Minister’s Office and the Likud party have repeatedly issued formal denials of any connection, coordination, or financial support linked to the fake Iranian account network.

  • Mohammed Hijab suggests UK counter-terror police tried to recruit him as informant

    Mohammed Hijab suggests UK counter-terror police tried to recruit him as informant

    One of the UK’s most high-profile religious and political content creators, Mohammed Hijab, has come forward with formal public allegations against British counter-terrorism authorities, claiming officers sought to recruit him as a confidential informant following a prolonged seizure of his personal electronic devices. Operating under the public moniker Mohammed Hijab, the creator — whose legal name is Mohamed Hegab — identifies as a religious philosopher currently pursuing a doctoral degree in the subject at the University of Birmingham. Boasting a YouTube subscriber base of over 1 million, he has built a widespread public profile for his rigorous, often high-stakes public debates spanning religious theology, global geopolitics, and Middle East policy, including recent high-profile appearances on Piers Morgan’s broadcast programs where he faced off against former Israeli military international spokesperson Jonathan Conricus. In a public, on-the-record post to his X (formerly Twitter) account dated November 4, 2026, Hijab laid out a timeline of the alleged encounter: on May 12, 2025, he was stopped at Gatwick Airport by officers operating under Schedule 7 of the 2000 Terrorism Act, a legislative provision that grants border and counter-terror teams broad authority to detain, question, and search individuals at ports of entry without requiring pre-existing reasonable suspicion of terrorist activity. During the stop, officers seized all of his personal electronic devices, which Hijab states were used to access and review more than 10,000 of his private messages. The devices were not returned to him until nearly four months later, on September 11, with no follow-up questions or formal charges filed against him. Following a formal subject access request for records related to the stop, Hijab received heavily redacted documentation from Counter Terrorism Policing (CTP). One unredacted handwritten line in the examining officer’s case notes explicitly reads “Doesn’t want to be an informant”, a detail he shared alongside a screenshot of the partially redacted CTP document, which bears the official agency watermark. He also published a second screenshot of an official letter dated May 18, 2025, from the Gatwick Borders Team under Counter Terrorism Policing South East, which formally notified him of a legal adjustment to the authority used to retain his seized property, with two full paragraphs of the correspondence redacted. The letter explicitly notes that the retention of his property does not confirm he is currently the subject of a criminal investigation, and pledged to return his belongings at the earliest possible opportunity, though no timeline was specified. Hijab has since elaborated on the incident in a YouTube address, disclosing that he was summoned for a voluntary police interview under caution as part of an ongoing active criminal investigation, which he asserts is largely focused on his pro-Palestinian, anti-Israeli public activism. He went on to claim, without providing accompanying corroborating evidence, that the state of Israel was actively interfering with his work to curtail his public advocacy. At the time of publication, Middle East Eye (MEE) reached out to CTP London for an official statement addressing Hijab’s allegations, but no response had been received to the media outlet’s inquiry. It remains unclear whether the extensive redactions on the documents Hijab shared were applied by Counter Terrorism Policing prior to releasing the records to him, or if Hijab redacted the remaining content himself to protect the privacy of third parties and sensitive operational details.

  • A deadly raid tests a revolutionary town’s faith in Syria’s new government

    A deadly raid tests a revolutionary town’s faith in Syria’s new government

    Traveling north from the Syrian capital of Damascus toward the Lebanese border, the route winds through desolate, untended apple and cherry orchards before climbing steeply into the rugged Qalamoun mountain range. It is here that the historic rebel stronghold of Rankous sits, where 33-year-old Abu Jad, a former Free Syrian Army (FSA) fighter who took up arms against longtime dictator Bashar al-Assad, waited on the main thoroughfare to greet the visiting reporter. Abu Jad, who lost full function of his right arm to a 2014 bullet wound, waved from behind the tinted window of his SUV with a tight, weary smile, and welcomed the visitor to what he called “the revolutionary capital of the Qalamoun region.”

    That hard-won peace the town had cherished in the months following Assad’s ouster was shattered in the pre-dawn hours of 22 October, when Syrian internal security forces launched sweeping raids across Rankous, storming private homes and local businesses, detaining 45 residents and killing five young local men. The Syrian Ministry of Interior released an official statement framing the operation as a counterterrorism action, claiming the five deceased men held ties to the Islamic State, espoused extremist ideology, and had formally denounced the Syrian state as un-Islamic. But local residents paint a drastically different picture: three of the victims were completely unarmed at the time of the incursion, while the other two opened fire only after security forces breached private property, killing two members of the security detail in the exchange. Many families told reporters they initially mistook the raiding party for members of the Lebanese Hezbollah militia, which had occupied large swathes of Rankous during the civil war, explaining the split-second decision to resist.

    In the days after the raid, hundreds of Rankous residents flooded the central town square — a space that had been scheduled to host a collective mass wedding for 12 local couples in less than two weeks’ time — to hold a multi-day funeral for the five slain young men. Instead of celebrating new life and the long-awaited end of 14 years of brutal war, the community was gathered to mourn sons who had spent their entire childhood and adolescence under bombardment, siege and regime persecution, only to be gunned down months after Assad’s government collapsed.

    For Rankous, a town that lost more than 600 residents to the war, either killed in combat, detained, or disappeared into the notorious Saydnaya prison 15 minutes away, the October raid has deepened a pervasive sense of unmet justice and marginalization in the new post-Assad political order. Once a core hub of anti-regime resistance, where local rebel commander Firas al-Bitar rallied hundreds of residents to drive Assad’s forces out of the town in late 2012 and later fought off a full-scale Hezbollah incursion in 2014, Rankous’s fighters returned triumphantly alongside rebel forces from Idlib on 8 December 2024, only to find themselves systematically sidelined in the new national security architecture. As historic rivals of the now-dissolved Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) faction that leads the new transitional government, FSA-affiliated fighters including Bitar’s Sham Liberation Brigade have been largely locked out of recruitment for the new national Syrian army, leaving thousands of former combatants unemployed and excluded from state support.

    In interviews with grieving family members, almost all rejected the government’s claims that their sons held ties to IS. Ahmad al-Khattib, whose 21-year-old son Youssef was killed in his own living room after returning from dawn prayers, described a gentle young man who practiced taekwondo, danced at local weddings, and never even reprimanded his father for smoking, a behavior he noted would be unthinkable for a strict IS affiliate. Youssef had previously worked as an informant for HTS during the war, and briefly joined the new national army after Assad’s fall, but left after just a few months due to extremely low salaries and a deployment hundreds of miles away from his family. For 25-year-old victim Majd Suleiman, who was gunned down at the small local supermarket where he worked, his father recalled he had attended anti-regime protests from the age of 10, spent years in hiding to avoid Assad’s mandatory military conscription, and had never been accepted into the new army due to a lack of open positions. His long-planned wedding, scheduled for mid-November, was supposed to take place in the exact town square where his funeral was now held.

    Local leaders say the transitional government has provided almost no resources for reconstruction in Rankous, forcing the community’s newly formed local development committee to fund all basic repairs for roads, street lighting, schools and mosques using only private resident donations. The World Bank has estimated total national reconstruction costs for Syria will reach $216 billion, a sum the transitional government has no current capacity to fund. Nihad al-Shahin, head of the Rankous local development committee, has called for a full, transparent public investigation into the raid, noting that even if authorities could produce verifiable evidence of alleged extremist ties, the heavy-handed, unannounced violent incursion was completely unjustified, and reflected the same oppressive security state mindset that defined the Assad era. As Syria approaches the second anniversary of Assad’s ouster, widespread unaddressed grievances among war-scarred former rebel communities across the country are creating vulnerable conditions that extremist groups like the Islamic State are actively seeking to exploit to rebuild their support networks.

  • Turkey moves closer to Saudi troop deployment as parliament approves Mecca defence pact

    Turkey moves closer to Saudi troop deployment as parliament approves Mecca defence pact

    In an early Friday legislative session, Turkey’s national parliament formally adopted the landmark Mecca defence pact, crossing the final major domestic legal threshold required for the country to formalize its membership in the trilateral security framework alongside Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. The historic bill secured 279 votes in favour, with 119 lawmakers casting opposing ballots. Unusually broad cross-chamber backing underpinned the passage: the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) and its nationalist coalition ally the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) formed the core of the pro-treaty bloc, while even the nominally leading opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) opted to support the measure, a shift widely attributed to internal upheaval within the party after a court-ordered removal of its former leader that split its caucus into two factions, leaving the new CHP leadership increasingly aligned with the Erdogan administration’s foreign policy priorities. The ratification process now moves to the desk of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who is slated to sign the legislation for publication in Turkey’s Official Gazette before the end of the week, at which point the accord will enter into legal force for Ankara. Originally signed by the three regional heavyweights during a high-level gathering in Mecca last August, the text of the 16-article, no-expiry defence pact enshrines a collective security clause stipulating that any armed aggression targeting the independence, sovereign status, or territorial integrity of one signatory will be deemed an attack against all three parties, with no specific nation or geographic bloc explicitly named as a pre-defined threat. The pact’s withdrawal provisions are unusually rigid: no member state may exit the alliance until a full 10 years have elapsed from the agreement’s official entry into force, and any party seeking to withdraw must provide a minimum of three months’ formal written advance notice to the other two signatories. Multiple diplomatic sources with direct knowledge of the negotiations confirmed to Middle East Eye that all three nations had previously committed to completing their domestic ratification procedures ahead of a scheduled trilateral summit later this month, with Islamabad and Riyadh both announcing their own full ratification last month, leaving Ankara’s parliamentary vote as the final outstanding step. Senior Turkish government officials have confirmed that the next immediate policy priority following the pact’s entry into force will be to secure separate parliamentary authorization to deploy Turkish military personnel to Saudi Arabia, a move framed as a defensive solidarity measure to support Riyadh in countering cross-border Houthi attacks originating from Yemeni territory. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan emphasized last week that any Turkish troop deployment on Saudi soil will be strictly defensive in scope, with no operational mandate for Turkish forces to conduct missions inside Yemeni national territory. A separate diplomatic source also revealed to MEE that Ankara must still negotiate and ratify a dedicated Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with its two new alliance partners to resolve a full range of practical legal details, including delineating civil and criminal jurisdiction over deployed military personnel, setting entry and exit protocols for troops and equipment, establishing customs and taxation rules for military assets, outlining vehicle registration requirements, and formalizing day-to-day legal protections for deployed service members. As of press time, no public confirmation has been issued regarding whether negotiations for this accompanying SOFA have been finalized.