Global Pulse

标签： Asia

亚洲

  • Hong Kong booksellers are reportedly arrested over alleged sales of seditious publications

    Hong Kong booksellers are reportedly arrested over alleged sales of seditious publications

    HONG KONG – In the latest crackdown on independent bookselling in the semi-autonomous city, Hong Kong police have carried out coordinated raids on two independent bookstores and arrested five people on charges of violating the 2024 national security law through the alleged sale of seditious publications. The operation, confirmed by police in an official statement Wednesday, marks the third round of arrests targeting independent booksellers since March this year, deepening concerns over shrinking press and publication freedoms in the former British colony.

    Visual evidence from multiple local and international media outlets documents the raid on Have A Nice Stay, a bookstore founded by a group of former journalists, located in the busy Mong Kok district. Footage shows uniformed officers removing sealed boxes of materials from the store’s building and leading one bookseller into custody. Just a short distance away, a second raid unfolded at Greenfield Book Store, with video from online news platform The Collective showing law enforcement also seizing boxes of inventory from that location.

    In their public statement, police confirmed the two Mong Kok locations were searched and that two men and three women were taken into custody on suspicion of violating the national security law. Investigators found the five suspects allegedly displayed and sold publications intended to stir up public hatred against Hong Kong’s executive government, judiciary and law enforcement institutions, the statement said. The case was originally referred to police by Hong Kong Customs, which discovered the allegedly seditious titles in a shipment arriving from overseas; police have not released the names of the publications in question.

    Both targeted stores remained shuttered during their regular operating hours Wednesday, and attempts to reach ownership of Greenfield Book Store and the founder of Have A Nice Stay went unanswered. Notably, Have A Nice Stay had already publicly announced plans to permanently close its doors on August 30, citing unmanageable financial strain and the uncertainty of unwritten regulatory “red lines” that make operating an independent bookstore untenable in today’s Hong Kong.

    For decades, Hong Kong built a global reputation as a haven for free expression and open publication, drawing Chinese mainland readers who crossed the border to access books and materials considered too politically sensitive for distribution across the mainland. High-profile cases targeting independent booksellers stretch back nearly a decade: Lam Wing-kee, owner of the iconic Causeway Bay Books, died earlier this month after making global headlines in 2016 when he revealed he had been detained by Chinese mainland authorities during a trip to Shenzhen in 2015. Four other people connected to Causeway Bay Books also disappeared in late 2015, a case that sent shockwaves through Hong Kong’s publishing community and raised urgent questions about the future of the civil liberties Beijing pledged to protect for 50 years after the 1997 handover.

    Since the large-scale anti-government protests that roiled the city in 2019, independent bookstores have faced increasingly difficult operating conditions, with multiple crackdowns under the national security framework. Hong Kong authorities maintain that the national security legislation is critical to upholding long-term stability and public order in the city. Secretary for Security Chris Tang has previously stated the government will not publish an official list of banned books, arguing such a list would be unworkable in practice.

    This week’s operation is the third targeted action against independent booksellers this year. In March, police arrested the owner and multiple staff members of Book Punch, another independent Hong Kong bookstore, on identical suspicion of selling seditious publications. Among the materials seized in that raid was a biography of jailed former pro-democracy media mogul Jimmy Lai, who was sentenced to 20 years in prison in a separate national security case. A second round of arrests came in June, when two more booksellers were taken into custody on suspicion of selling seditious materials and receiving funding from foreign political organizations; all five people arrested in the March and June operations were later released on bail.

  • Why Iran shut Hormuz after decades of holding back

    Why Iran shut Hormuz after decades of holding back

    Over three consecutive nights of air operations, United States military forces have launched strikes against hundreds of Iranian targets, including sites in the southern strategic port city of Bandar Abbas. The campaign was launched by sitting US President Donald Trump in an effort to reassert American control over the critically important Strait of Hormuz, the world’s most vital chokepoint for global oil and natural gas trade.

    Trump has positioned the United States as the self-declared “guardian” of the waterway, revived a naval blockade of Iranian commercial ports, and made a fleeting demand for a 20 percent toll on all cargo transiting the strait – a proposal that his own Secretary of State Marco Rubio had publicly ruled out just two weeks prior to the announcement.

    In response to the US strikes, Iran has escalated hostilities in turn: the country has carried out attacks on two commercial tankers operating in the strait, which left one crew member dead, and launched retaliatory strikes against US military bases located across the Persian Gulf. Tehran’s open decision to target commercial shipping in the strait, a move that directly threatens the stability of the global economy, lays bare the significant strategic leverage Iran holds in the escalating conflict.

    Yet amid this spiraling cycle of tit-for-tat violence, a critical question has emerged: why has Iran chosen to carry out its long-dormant threat to disrupt traffic through the strait now, when it has held the military capacity to do so for nearly 40 years?

    For four decades, the threat to close the Strait of Hormuz remained a rhetorical weapon that Iran never chose to fire. Even at the peak of the brutal Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s, which saw more than 400 commercial and military vessels attacked across the Gulf, Tehran exercised deliberate and notable restraint. Iran never attempted to fully seal off the strait, not even after the USS Vincennes, a US Navy warship, mistakenly shot down an Iranian civilian passenger airliner in 1988, killing all 290 people on board.

    At that time, Tehran’s strategic logic was clear: closing the strait would cripple Iran’s own critical oil export revenue and guarantee devastating retaliation from Western powers. As political scientist Caitlin Talmadge observed in 2008, closing the strait would have been “the military equivalent of cutting off its nose to spite its [enemies] face.” For decades, the strait functioned solely as an instrument of Iranian coercive diplomacy: Tehran leveraged the threat of closure as a deterrent and bargaining chip, but never followed through on the warning.

    This pattern held through decades of escalating tensions. In 2011, then-Iranian Vice President Mohammad Reza Rahimi threatened that “not a drop of oil will pass through the Strait of Hormuz” if Western sanctions on Iran’s petroleum exports were implemented. Yet in the end, Tehran backed down, allowing the embargo to take effect without disrupting strait traffic. This pattern of rhetorical bluffing held through every round of escalation before 2026, making Iran’s current decision to act on its threats a significant departure from decades of strategic behavior.

    Scholars argue this dramatic policy shift stems not from a change in material military capacity, but from a fundamental shift in how Iran’s leadership perceives risk. Behavioral economics’ prospect theory offers a compelling framework to explain this reversal: the theory holds that decision-makers do not evaluate risk in a consistent, rational way. When leaders operate within a context of perceived gains, they overwhelmingly prefer the certainty of what they already hold over risky gambles that could cost them their current advantages. But when leaders frame their situation as one of accumulating losses, this logic flips: they become far more willing to take extreme risks to recover what they have lost.

    The clearest evidence of this shift comes from the first public statement by Iran’s new Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei, issued March 12, two weeks after the assassination of his predecessor Ali Khamenei. In the address, he declared: “The revenge we have in mind is not just because of the martyrdom of the illustrious leader of the revolution. Every member of the nation martyred by the enemy is a separate case that demands we seek revenge … the leverage of closing the Strait of Hormuz must definitely continue to be utilised.”

    The statement reframed every Iranian death from conflict not as a tragic cost of war, but as a sacred debt that the United States and Israel owed in retribution – and the Strait of Hormuz was positioned as the tool to collect that debt. Khamenei’s insistence that the strait’s leverage “must definitely continue to be utilised” transformed the waterway into a mechanism through which Iran could recover its accumulated perceived losses.

    This framing has spread widely across Iranian society. In a mid-April address delivered directly at the shore overlooking the strait, Iranian cleric Hojjat al-Islam Jafar Rastakhiz argued that “for 47 years the criminal America has sanctioned us” and now “the Strait of Hormuz, because of the atrocities of America, has been closed.” Ali Khamenei’s recent state funeral, which drew mass processions across Iran, turned the regime’s collective losses into a public national ritual, with mourners chanting in unison: “Our word is one! Revenge! Revenge!”

    This public rhetoric lays bare how the Iranian regime now narrates its geopolitical position: it has framed Iran as a state burdened by decades of accumulated military, political, and symbolic losses that demand recovery. In doing so, it has created the exact conditions under which extreme risk-taking becomes politically and strategically acceptable to Iran’s leadership.

    This shift carries uncomfortable implications for US strategy. Trump’s decision to launch repeated strikes on Iran, while framing the action as protecting commercial shipping in the strait, may actually be reinforcing the very psychological conditions that drive Tehran’s risky behavior. Conventional effective deterrence relies on the assumption that an adversary will calculate what it stands to lose from escalation. But against a regime that believes it has already suffered irrecoverable losses, every additional US strike simply deepens the perceived deficit that Iran’s leaders are gambling to reverse. Today, the conflict is being fought on terms entirely defined by Tehran.

  • US-China moon race could turn into a lunar land grab

    US-China moon race could turn into a lunar land grab

    Six decades after the iconic US-Soviet race to the moon that ended with American astronauts planting their flag on lunar soil, a new chapter of lunar exploration competition is unfolding – and this time, it bears little resemblance to the mid-20th century contest. Where the original 1960s race focused on Cold War prestige and short-term exploratory milestones, with no long-term plan for sustained human presence, the 21st-century lunar contest, led by the United States on one side and a China-Russia partnership on the other, centers on securing access to critical natural resources and establishing permanent outposts.

    The focal point of all modern lunar efforts is the moon’s south pole, a region that holds vast, unevenly distributed deposits of water ice. This resource is far more than a scientific curiosity: it can be processed for drinking water and breathable air to sustain long-term human habitation, and split into hydrogen and oxygen to produce rocket fuel, turning the moon into a potential refueling hub for deep space missions. With only a limited number of geologically stable, ice-rich sites suitable for building outposts, competition to claim the most valuable locations has raised questions of whether this new race will devolve into a scramble for lunar territory.

    Today’s lunar exploration landscape also looks dramatically different from the closed, two-superpower system of the Cold War era. Three decades ago, human spaceflight was almost exclusively the domain of the US and the Soviet Union (later Russia), with other major space entities like the European Space Agency focusing on robotic science missions and commercial satellite launches. Today, space activity has globalized dramatically: roughly 20 countries now possess independent orbital launch capabilities, and privately funded robotic lunar missions, backed by government partnerships, have become commonplace. Even so, human spaceflight remains a uniquely high-barrier achievement, with only three countries – the US, Russia, and China – currently capable of launching crewed missions on their own rockets. The unforgiving nature of space leaves no room for error; human crews require constant life support, and backup rescue options are extremely limited, requiring exhaustive testing of every system.

    Despite entering the human spaceflight sector decades later than the US and Russia, China has rapidly closed the gap in technological and exploratory achievements. Since 2021, China has operated Tiangong, a modular permanently crewed space station that leaves significant room for future expansion. Its landmark Chang’e lunar program has achieved multiple historic firsts, including returning samples from the moon’s far side, deploying communications relay satellites, and conducting extensive terrain surveys with robotic rovers. These successes have positioned China and its partner Russia as the primary competitors to the US-led Artemis program in the new lunar race. China is currently testing its Mengzhou crew capsule and Lanyue lunar lander, targeting its first crewed lunar landing around 2030, with construction of the joint International Lunar Research Station at the south pole slated to begin by 2035.

    On the US side, the Artemis program has already marked a major milestone with the Artemis II mission, the first crewed lunar flyby in more than 50 years. NASA’s medium-term goal is to establish a permanent crewed outpost at the lunar south pole, modeled after the rotating-crew structure of the International Space Station and Antarctic research bases. Unlike the original Apollo program, which focused on short sorties, Artemis is built for long-term habitation. NASA uses the Orion capsule to transport crews from Earth to lunar orbit, but is relying on private sector partners Blue Origin and SpaceX to develop the specialized lunar landers required to descend to the surface. A key docking test for the Artemis III mission is scheduled for next year in low Earth orbit. In the coming years, a fleet of robotic craft, many led by private companies, will scout landing sites, deliver cargo, and deploy preliminary science experiments.

    Operating outposts at the lunar south pole presents unique engineering challenges that teams are working to address. The most ice-rich deposits sit in permanently shadowed crater floors, where temperatures drop below -200°C. While nearby polar mountaintops enjoy nearly constant line-of-sight to Earth, communications blackouts require dedicated relay satellites in lunar orbit. The sun sits barely above the horizon for most of the year, with extended periods of total darkness eliminating consistent solar power generation, requiring alternative energy sources such as nuclear fission to keep life support and equipment operational. Between 2029 and 2032, NASA plans to lay core infrastructure including power and communications systems, conduct exploratory drilling, and deploy a sophisticated pressurized rover developed jointly with Japan that will allow astronauts to work without bulky space suits. From 2032 onward, the program aims to expand the modular base, enable year-round habitation, and begin in-situ resource processing to produce water, oxygen, and building materials from lunar resources.

    Beyond establishing a permanent human foothold, modern lunar exploration opens a host of groundbreaking scientific opportunities. Researchers hope to use permanent lunar bases to answer longstanding questions about the moon’s formation and geologic history, as well as conduct novel medical and materials research that cannot be done on Earth. Building radio telescopes on the moon’s far side, which is shielded from Earth’s dense radio interference, would allow astronomers to detect faint cosmic signals that are invisible to ground-based observatories. The moon’s low gravity also makes it an ideal staging ground for deep space missions: assembling large spacecraft in lunar orbit instead of launching fully assembled vehicles from Earth would reduce launch costs and enable far more ambitious crewed missions to Mars and other destinations across the solar system.

    Economically, a sustained lunar presence also creates new commercial opportunities, from private sector development of landers, rovers, and infrastructure to cargo transport services for science experiments and commercial payloads. In-situ production of rocket fuel would drastically cut the cost of deep space exploration by eliminating the need to launch all required fuel from Earth, and could even enable refueling services for satellites in Earth orbit.

    Despite these promising opportunities, questions remain about the governance of lunar resources. The 1979 United Nations Moon Agreement enshrines the principle that no nation can claim sovereignty over the moon and requires all actors to use its resources responsibly. However, nearly all major countries involved in the Artemis program, including the United States, have not ratified the agreement. As exploration efforts move forward, space scientists and policy experts hold out hope that competition will not devolve into an unregulated scramble for the most valuable lunar territory.

  • Air India crash report ‘expected to be ready’ in October

    Air India crash report ‘expected to be ready’ in October

    One year to the day after the deadliest aviation crash in recent Indian history killed 260 people, India’s official accident investigation body has confirmed that a draft final report on the June 2025 Air India AI171 disaster is on track to be completed by October.

    The Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau (AAIB) outlined its investigation progress in a formal affidavit submitted to India’s Supreme Court this Tuesday, noting that the probe is currently in its evidence analysis phase, a stage expected to wrap up in approximately six weeks. The filing did not include any preliminary findings on the root cause of the crash, nor did it confirm a timeline for the full report to be released to the public.

    The tragedy unfolded on 12 June 2025, when a Boeing 787 Dreamliner operating Air India’s flight from Ahmedabad, a major city in western India, to London crashed just seconds after lifting off from Ahmedabad’s airport. The aircraft crashed roughly 6 kilometers from the airport runway, slamming into a doctor’s residential building on the campus of a local medical college and triggering a massive explosion on impact.

    Of the 241 passengers and crew on board, only one passenger—Viswashkumar Ramesh, a resident of Leicester, U.K.—survived the impact. Nineteen people on the ground also died in the crash and subsequent explosion, bringing the total confirmed death toll to 260.

    Investigators launched a full probe within hours of the crash, and released an initial preliminary report just one month later, in July 2025. On the first anniversary of the disaster last month, the AAIB released a brief update confirming that it had made “significant progress” in evidence analysis, but shared no additional details about the probe’s direction.

    In this week’s court filing, the AAIB reported that it has completed 49 of the 66 required procedural steps mandated for major aircraft accident investigations. Completed work includes a full forensic examination of the crash site and aircraft wreckage, recovery and analysis of both flight data and cockpit voice recorders, and a full review of all relevant documentation, including the flight crew’s medical history and training records.

    The affidavit also confirmed that investigators have completed a full review of Air India’s organizational culture, human factors protocols, and industry safety practices, and have received the final report from an aviation psychologist who conducted a psychological autopsy as part of the human factors probe. This process typically involves a detailed assessment of crew members’ psychological profiles to rule out pre-existing mental health factors that could have contributed to the accident. Investigators have also completed a full transcript of the cockpit voice recorder recording, though no details from that transcript have been released to the public.

    The preliminary report released last year already revealed a critical, unexplained anomaly in the moments after takeoff: the aircraft’s fuel-control switches suddenly moved to the “cut-off” position, cutting all fuel flow to both engines and causing a total loss of power seconds after the plane left the runway. Cockpit audio captured one pilot asking the other why they had moved the switches, to which the other pilot replied that he had not done so. The preliminary report did not identify which pilot made each statement, leaving a critical ambiguity that sparked widespread public and media speculation.

    Some international media reports later claimed that investigators were shifting focus to senior captain Sumeet Sabharwal, suggesting the captain may have been responsible for the accidental or intentional movement of the switches. These claims sparked immediate public pushback from Sabharwal’s father, Indian national pilots’ associations, and the AAIB itself, which criticized the unsubstantiated reporting.

    The current affidavit was filed in response to a public interest lawsuit brought by Sabharwal’s father, who is demanding an independent, external investigation into the crash. In the filing, the AAIB acknowledged that unregulated media speculation placing blame on the flight crew has had a negative impact on the probe, noting that “media speculation and narrative attributing blameworthiness to the pilots have, regrettably, caused some witnesses to become restrictive and non-responsive.”

    As the investigation enters its final analysis phase, families of the victims and the global aviation industry remain waiting for the final report to answer the lingering questions that have remained unresolved for a full year after the crash.

  • Committee hears final arguments in probe of Hong Kong’s deadliest fire in decades

    Committee hears final arguments in probe of Hong Kong’s deadliest fire in decades

    HONG KONG – After months of public hearings and evidence gathering, an independent statutory inquiry into Hong Kong’s worst residential fire in more than 50 years entered its final stage Wednesday, as legal teams for all parties prepared to lay out their closing arguments ahead of the panel’s upcoming final report. The deadly blaze broke out in November last year at Wang Fuk Court, a dense suburban residential complex in Tai Po, where the fire rapidly spread across seven interlinked apartment buildings. The disaster left 168 people dead and displaced hundreds of residents, destroying a tight-knit community that had anchored the neighborhood for generations.

    Within a month of the fire, the Hong Kong government established the three-member independent inquiry committee, tasked with pinpointing the root causes of the blaze and the high death toll, examining systemic gaps in building fire safety regulation, and delivering actionable policy recommendations. The panel is led by High Court Judge David Lok, with non-judicial members including Executive Council member Chan Kin-por and Hospital Authority Board director Rex Auyeung. From the start, the inquiry was scheduled to conclude its work within nine months, leaving bereaved families and displaced survivors waiting for long-awaited answers.

    Over the course of hearings that launched in March, lead inquiry counsel Victor Dawes laid out preliminary findings showing multiple overlapping failures directly contributed to the scale of the disaster. Key contributing issues included disabled fire alarms and non-functional fire hose systems, non-fire-retardant scaffolding netting used in ongoing renovation works at the complex, and unauthorized foam board window installations that accelerated the spread of flames and toxic smoke.

    Closing arguments are set to wrap up by Friday, with legal representation for survivors, the Hong Kong government, the inquiry panel, and multiple involved contractors set to present their final positions. Crucially, the inquiry committee does not have the mandate to rule on civil or criminal legal liability – that process is already being pursued independently by local law enforcement and the courts.

    Testimony throughout the hearings has revealed a web of missteps and miscommunication between contractors and property managers. Martin Ho, counsel for ISS EastPoint Properties, the complex’s property management firm, told the inquiry that the company’s in-house electrician accidentally disabled the fire alarm system while carrying out routine maintenance on water tanks. While Ho called the error regrettable, he argued the mistake could have been prevented if a representative from the complex’s fire safety installation contractor had been on-site during the work, as required. He added that when a second contractor later identified the disabled alarm, the firm failed to follow up on the issue – noting that one senior director of the contracting firm admitted the wider industry has a widespread culture of refusing to correct other companies’ errors, a practice Ho described as “baffling.”

    Aaron Chan, representing a director of one of the involved fire safety contractors, pushed back on shifting full blame to his client, acknowledging that a functional fire alarm system would have reduced casualties but asking the panel to also consider the limited window residents had to escape the rapidly spreading fire and other contextual factors. The exchange led Judge Lok to interject, reminding Chan not to imply fire alarms were ineffective, a suggestion Chan quickly denied, reiterating he only sought to have the panel consider multiple contributing factors.

    For survivors who packed the inquiry gallery Wednesday, the closing arguments have reinforced a growing sense that involved parties are working to deflect blame rather than accept accountability. Betty Ho, a former Wang Fuk Court resident who lost family in the fire, told reporters outside the hearing she is uncertain the inquiry will uncover the full truth, but still holds out hope the panel will secure justice for the 168 victims. “I don’t think we’ll get what we hoped for in the end,” she said.

    Another displaced resident, Patrick Liu, said he has little expectation of a clear accountability finding. “Basically, everyone is just shirking responsibility. There’s no need to even think about it,” Liu said, adding that he would wait for the inquiry’s final report and upcoming criminal trial to learn who bore ultimate responsibility for the disaster.

    Beyond identifying the direct causes of the blaze, the committee is also investigating deep-rooted systemic problems in Hong Kong’s building maintenance and renovation sector, including widespread bid-rigging that has been linked to lowered safety standards and unqualified contractors. On Wednesday, a representative from Hong Kong’s Competition Commission told the inquiry that bid-rigging cartels operate across the city’s construction sector, with some groups tied to criminal triad organizations. To date, the inquiry has heard evidence from former residents, government regulators, fire safety experts, and industry insiders, and has admitted CCTV footage, corporate records, and personal text messages as evidence. The committee’s final report will include a full analysis of the fire’s causes, assessment of systemic risks, and recommendations to update existing fire safety regulations and penalty frameworks to prevent similar disasters.

    Separate from the inquiry, Hong Kong law enforcement has already pursued criminal charges over the fire. In June, authorities filed charges against seven individuals and two companies involved in the Wang Fuk Court renovation project, including the lead contractor Prestige Construction & Engineering Co. and architectural consultancy Will Power Architects Company. Charges include manslaughter, conspiracy to defraud, and professional negligence. Prosecutors allege the firms and their leaders committed gross negligence in overseeing construction materials and work procedures, and conspired to defraud apartment owners by hiding prior litigation records against Prestige and inflating the firm’s score in the tender evaluation process to win the renovation contract.

  • Mahmoud Khalil sues Trump administration officials and pro-Israel groups for ‘conspiracy’

    Mahmoud Khalil sues Trump administration officials and pro-Israel groups for ‘conspiracy’

    Palestinian American activist Mahmoud Khalil has launched a landmark civil lawsuit against a coalition of high-ranking Trump administration officials and right-wing advocacy organizations, accusing them of an unlawful conspiracy to intimidate and silence pro-Palestinian speech. He made the announcement official during a public press conference held Tuesday.

    The legal action is being spearheaded by the Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR) alongside legal representation from the firm Beldock Levine & Hoffman. The suit alleges that the named parties deliberately targeted Khalil and other non-citizen Palestinian rights activists to send a punitive message, with the explicit goal of weakening the rapidly expanding global movement in solidarity with the Palestinian people.

    In a rare legal maneuver targeting coordinated public-private repression, the lawsuit is filed under the Enforcement Act of 1871, more widely known as the Ku Klux Klan Act— a Reconstruction-era law designed to combat conspiracies by private groups and state actors that violate civil rights.

    Court documents argue that the campaign against Khalil was rooted in explicit anti-Palestinian prejudice, with private anti-Palestinian groups coordinating directly with senior executive branch officials to target and persecute Khalil and other advocates for Palestinian rights.

    “The goal was never to win an argument. The goal was always to manufacture fear, to convince people that the cost of speaking out would be too high. When those campaigns were not enough, they brought in the power of the state,” Khalil told reporters during the press conference.

    Khalil, a green card holder married to a U.S. citizen, first became a target of the Trump administration starting in 2024 for his role in organizing anti-Gaza war protest encampments on the Columbia University campus. In 2025, he was taken into immigration detention, where he remained locked up for 104 days. The detention forced him to miss the birth of his first child, a devastating personal consequence he says the defendants are responsible for.

    Despite the years of retaliation for his advocacy, Khalil said the campaign to silence him has failed. He declared, “We cannot let fear become the price of consciousness. To those who built this machinery to silence us, hear me clearly: it did not work. You detained me, and I’m standing here. You tried to make me a warning, and instead, you made me a plaintiff.”

    The lawsuit names a slate of top Trump administration officials: senior presidential advisor Stephen Miller, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Secretary of Homeland Security Markwayne Mullin, acting attorney general Todd Blanche, former Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem, and John Armstrong, an official with the State Department’s Bureau of Consular Affairs.

    Alongside government officials, the suit names three private organizations: Canary Mission, Betar US, and the Heritage Foundation. Canary Mission is a controversial website that maintains a public blacklist of students, activists, and academics who express pro-Palestinian views or criticize Israeli government policy. The outlet routinely conflates pro-Palestinian advocacy and anti-Zionism with antisemitism and support for terrorism, framing its work as documenting anti-American, anti-Israel, and anti-Jewish activity on North American college campuses. Israeli authorities also use Canary Mission’s blacklist to bar pro-Palestinian advocates, including both Palestinian and Jewish critics of Israel, from entering the country.

    Betar US, the U.S. affiliate of the international far-right Zionist movement Betar, is also named as a defendant. The group describes its mission as empowering Jewish people to embrace their identity and defend their heritage, calling itself one of the most impactful Zionist movements in history. It has previously publicly admitted to collecting personal information on participants in pro-Palestinian events and sharing that data directly with the Trump administration. An investigation from New York Attorney General Letitia James found that Betar US repeatedly targeted individuals based on their faith and ethnic background, specifically targeting Muslim, Arab, Palestinian, and Jewish residents of New York. The group was ordered to cease all operations in New York state as a result of the findings.

    The conservative think tank Heritage Foundation, the third private defendant named in the suit, is best known for developing Project 2025, a 900-page comprehensive policy blueprint that has guided the Trump administration’s second-term policy agenda. Project 2025 includes explicit commitments to maintain unwavering U.S. support for Israel regardless of Palestinian civilian harm.

    Khalil currently has two outstanding legal cases pending in the U.S. court system. One is an immigration removal proceeding, where an immigration judge ruled he could be deported; Khalil has appealed that ruling to the U.S. Board of Immigration Appeals. The second is a federal constitutional challenge, where his legal team argues that his detention and attempted deportation violated his First Amendment right to free speech and Fifth Amendment right to due process.

    Khalil closed his press conference by vowing to see the legal fight through to the end. “I will not stop fighting until everyone who willingly contributed to my missing the birth of my son, and to taking 104 days of my life from me, answers for what they’ve done,” he said.

  • Death toll from Bangkok bar fire rises to 32 as 2 more die in hospital

    Death toll from Bangkok bar fire rises to 32 as 2 more die in hospital

    Three days after a devastating fire swept through a popular Bangkok beer bar, leaving at least 32 dead and dozens more fighting for their lives, survivors and grieving relatives gathered at a local police station on Wednesday to give official witness statements, recover left-behind personal belongings, and push for long-overdue financial compensation. The inferno broke out late Sunday night at the Rong Beer Na Ladprao venue, a crowded nightlife spot in the Thai capital, according to updates from the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration. Officials confirm that 70+ people were injured in the blaze, with 24 still clinging to life in critical condition in local hospitals, while the official investigation into the exact cause of the fire remains ongoing.

    Thai police have revealed that most victims were found trapped in windowless bathrooms, spaces many fled to in a desperate bid to escape the spreading flames and toxic smoke. Wiroon Supasingsiripreecha, head of the country’s Institute of Forensic Medicine, told reporters Wednesday that the vast majority of fatalities were caused by smoke inhalation, with only a small number of deaths resulting directly from severe burn injuries.

    For 26-year-old Natthaphong Lakhorn, the horror of that night remains vivid. He was at the venue with four companions, seated near the main stage, when the first signs of the blaze emerged. He told reporters he initially spotted thick white smoke billowing from the stage area, and mistakenly assumed it was just a planned dry ice effect for an upcoming performance — before quickly realizing the venue was engulfed in an uncontrolled fire. “When the fire broke, I just ran, and then all power went out,” Natthaphong recalled, speaking from the Phahonyothin Police Station where he was giving his formal statement. He shared that one of his companions, a close relative, did not escape the blaze. “It was so hectic.” Natthaphong, who suffered burns to his ears and forehead that were still covered in bandages during his Wednesday visit, said he plans to file for compensation to cover his ongoing medical costs.

    His account of the escape also contradicts an earlier police claim that the venue’s back door was not used by evacuees: Natthaphong said he escaped through that exact exit, located near the bathrooms, where a security guard was already on site using a flashlight to guide panicked guests to safety.

    The police station walls were lined with photos of personal items — mobile phones, bags, wallets and other belongings — left behind by guests during the chaotic evacuation, as relatives came to claim the possessions of their lost loved ones. For 25-year-old Kanticha Singkhon, Wednesday’s trip was to collect her mother’s handbag and other effects; her mother was among those killed in the fire. With her mother’s passing, Kanticha is now the sole guardian for her younger brother, and she has criticized bar owners for failing to proactively reach out to grieving families to support them through the aftermath.

    “Most of the victim’s families are from out of town, many would have already had to travel back to their hometowns to arrange funeral services,” Kanticha explained. “I want bar owners to be the ones to reach out to families, rather than forcing us to come all the way here to the police station on our own.” A lawyer representing the bar owners has told local Thai media that an initial one-off compensation payment of 10,000 Thai baht — equal to roughly 300 U.S. dollars — will be offered to all affected families and survivors. But Kanticha says that sum falls far short of what is needed, and that she has yet to receive any communication or financial support from the venue’s owners. “That amount isn’t even enough to cover a funeral,” she said. “I had to take out a loan just to arrange my mom’s burial, and I haven’t heard anything from anyone at the bar.”

  • Some Gulf states signal they aren’t opposed to paying fees in Hormuz, sources say

    Some Gulf states signal they aren’t opposed to paying fees in Hormuz, sources say

    Behind closed diplomatic doors, several Arab Gulf states have privately communicated to U.S. and European leaders that they do not oppose the idea of charging navigation fees for the Strait of Hormuz — a critical global energy chokepoint — but will not accept Tehran holding sway over the waterway, multiple senior U.S. and regional officials have confirmed in exclusive comments to Middle East Eye.

    According to officials briefed on these confidential diplomatic exchanges, the distinction between accepting a fee structure and rejecting Iranian sovereignty over the strait is a subtle but strategically critical one, emerging at a moment of escalating bilateral tension between the U.S. and Iran that has sent shockwaves through regional energy markets.

    Former U.S. President Donald Trump has repeatedly pushed for economic compensation in exchange for U.S. military security guarantees in the strait, a position that aligns with the quiet signals sent by Gulf Arab leaders. On a Monday earlier this year, Trump first publicly proposed a 20 percent fee on all transit, framing the U.S. as the primary guardian of the waterway and arguing that Gulf partners including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, and Kuwait should cover the cost of security provision.

    Trump’s initial announcement immediately sparked internal division within U.S. political circles: on the same day, senior U.S. official Marco Rubio publicly contradicted the president, stating clearly that no nation has the authority to unilaterally charge tolls or fees in international waterways. Publicly, Gulf state officials including UAE representatives have joined Western powers in rejecting Iran’s attempts to impose unilateral transit fees on the strait.

    By the following day, Trump walked back his original fee proposal, announcing on his social media platform Truth Social that he would replace the 20 percent reimbursement fee with trade and investment deals that Gulf states would make in the U.S. “Based on highly productive conversations with Middle East leadership, I have decided to replace the 20 percent United States Reimbursement Fee with Trade and Investment Deals that the various Gulf States will be making into the United States,” he wrote.

    Even with this policy shift, the core demand for U.S. economic compensation in exchange for Strait of Hormuz security remains unchanged. Notably, Trump did not call for additional investments from Asian economies that rely heavily on Gulf energy imports, or from Greek shipping firms that control a large share of global energy transit through the waterway. He emphasized that Gulf leaders have already expressed enthusiasm for expanding their U.S. investments to record levels, a framework he frames as a reasonable alternative to an explicit fee.

    “I spoke to all of them, and they would love to invest more money in the United States at record amounts, and that would be very acceptable,” Trump told reporters during a White House meeting with Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi. “This way, there’s no fee. I don’t like the concept of a fee, but at the same time, it’s not fair that we’re protecting this strait for the entire world, for China and everyone. I don’t mind protecting it for China. I don’t mind protecting it for anybody. But it’s unfair that we’re not, in some way, compensated.”

    Trump’s public comments align with the anonymous assessments shared by officials, who note that for Gulf states, the financial cost of any fee or investment commitment is a small price to pay for the regional stability that guarantees unimpeded energy exports. “For some Gulf states, a toll doesn’t really matter. Financially, it is negligible to their bottom line. They want stability,” one senior U.S. official explained. “What the Gulf doesn’t want is Iran to have veto power over who can exit and enter the strait. They don’t want Iran to be able to flip a switch. The toll or payment is insignificant,” a separate senior regional official added.

    Iran’s own plans to impose a unilateral service fee on strait transit have been significantly undermined in recent weeks by Oman’s decision to allow vessels to transit its territorial waters without coordinating with Tehran. Multiple U.S. and regional officials confirm that Muscat has faced intense international diplomatic pressure to break with Iran’s fee scheme, a move that strips Tehran of any potential legal justification for charging transit costs.

    Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, coastal nations may claim territorial sovereignty over up to 12 nautical miles of offshore waters. At its narrowest point, the Strait of Hormuz is just 21 nautical miles wide, with only Iran and Oman as littoral states. Legal experts interviewed by MEE note that if the two nations cooperated, they could build a legal case for charging reasonable “piloting fees” or “navigation service fees” for transit. But Oman’s decision to open its territorial waters to free transit eliminates that shared legal foundation.

    In response to Oman’s move and regional opposition to its control ambitions, Iran has escalated maritime aggression, targeting commercial vessels linked to Qatar, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia that were transiting Omani territorial waters. This escalation has further raised tensions in the strategic waterway, through which roughly a fifth of global oil consumption passes each day.

  • China economic growth falls sharply, missing target

    China economic growth falls sharply, missing target

    Against a backdrop of shifting global geopolitics and uneven domestic momentum, China’s economic expansion slowed significantly in the second quarter of 2026, according to official government data released this week. The world’s second-largest economy recorded a 4.3% year-on-year GDP growth between April and June, a step down from the 5% expansion posted in the first quarter and falling short of Beijing’s full-year growth target.

    This latest GDP reading marks the first full quarterly economic report since the outbreak of the Iran war in late February, a conflict that has sent global crude oil prices swinging higher and created new inflationary and supply chain pressures for energy-importing economies like China. The softer growth outcome comes just one day after Beijing released surprisingly strong trade data that showed Chinese exports surged 27% year-on-year in June, defying many analysts’ expectations of a global trade slowdown.

    Earlier this year, in March, Chinese policymakers adjusted the country’s annual economic growth target to a range of 4.5% to 5%, the lowest official growth goal set since 1991. Many economic analysts have framed this downward adjustment as a deliberate policy choice, designed to give Beijing more room to maneuver while navigating overlapping domestic and global economic headwinds, rather than a sign of unplanned weakness.

    Beyond external pressures from oil market volatility, separate economic data released Wednesday laid bare the persistent domestic challenges weighing on China’s growth trajectory. The country’s multi-year property market downturn continued in June, with average new home prices contracting for another month. While the 0.1% monthly decline represented a slight easing in the pace of contraction compared to May, the property sector remains a major drag on household wealth and broader economic activity.

    Consumer spending, another key pillar of domestic demand, also remained muted in June. Retail sales posted a modest 1% year-on-year rise, a small improvement from the 0.6% contraction recorded in May but still far below the pre-pandemic levels of consumption growth that supported steady economic expansion.

    Despite the softness in domestic demand, the June trade data revealed bright spots in China’s export sector that are driving unexpected gains. Global demand for advanced semiconductors, which power the rapidly expanding network of artificial intelligence data centers around the world, has pushed up the value of China’s high-tech exports significantly. Additionally, booming international appetite for Chinese-made electric vehicles helped drive a new export milestone: monthly car shipments topped one million units for the first time in China’s history, cementing the country’s position as the world’s largest exporter of automobiles.

  • China’s economy slows to 4.3% annual pace of growth in April-June

    China’s economy slows to 4.3% annual pace of growth in April-June

    HONG KONG – New official data released Wednesday reveals that China’s economic expansion decelerated in the second quarter of 2026, with the country posting an annualized growth rate of 4.3%. This slowdown marks a noticeable pullback from the 5% growth rate achieved in the first three months of the year, even as the country’s export sector has delivered surprisingly strong performance driven in part by the global AI boom and soaring international demand for Chinese-made electric vehicles.

    Against a backdrop of geopolitical volatility stemming from the Iran war, China’s economy has remained largely insulated from broader regional spillover effects, according to trade analysts. Official customs data underscores this resilience: total exports for the first half of 2026 jumped 17.6% compared to the same period last year, outpacing most forecasters’ expectations.

    However, this robust export momentum has not been enough to offset ongoing softness in key domestic segments of the economy. Domestic consumer spending and fixed asset investment have both lagged projections, dragging down overall quarterly growth and highlighting lingering imbalances between China’s external and internal demand.

    Looking ahead, Chinese national leaders have set a full-year 2026 growth target of between 4.5% and 5%, a slightly lower bar than the 5% growth the economy recorded in 2025. Meanwhile, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) recently adjusted its own 2026 growth projection for China upward by 0.2 percentage points to 4.6%, but the organization struck a more cautious tone for the medium term, forecasting that growth will cool further to 4.1% in 2027.