分类： politics

BEIJING – China’s top national legislative body has slated a four-day standing committee session for late April, with a packed agenda that includes advancing long-gestating legislative drafts and launching first reviews of multiple proposed law revisions, according to official announcements. The upcoming session, set to run April 27 to 30 in Beijing, was formally scheduled during the 65th meeting of the Council of Chairpersons of the 14th National People’s Congress (NPC) Standing Committee, held April 20 at Beijing’s Great Hall of the People. The gathering was chaired by Zhao Leji, Chairman of the NPC Standing Committee.

Per the finalized draft agenda approved at Monday’s chairpersons’ council meeting, the upcoming session will mark the first legislative review of revised drafts for four major laws: the Law on State-Owned Assets of Enterprises, the Agriculture Law, the National Defense Mobilization Law, and the Water Law. This round of initial deliberation opens the door for public feedback and further refinement before the drafts move to subsequent voting stages.

In addition to the new reviews, sitting committee members will continue the deliberation process for three other high-priority draft pieces of legislation: a new law on social assistance, a foundational law on national healthcare security, and a targeted law on farmland protection and quality improvement. All three drafts have already gone through an initial round of review and have been amended based on earlier feedback from lawmakers and stakeholder groups.

Beyond legislative work, the session will also include a series of oversight and procedural business items. Lawmakers will review official reports covering three core areas: national environmental protection efforts, the management of state-owned assets, and the verification of new and outgoing lawmakers’ qualifications. The body will also consider formal proposals for personnel appointments and removals within relevant state institutions.

Monday’s organizational meeting also approved the NPC Standing Committee’s core work priorities for 2026, laying out clear guiding plans for the body’s upcoming legislative drafting, statutory oversight, and engagement with NPC deputies across the country. The framework sets the tone for the legislative body’s work through the rest of the year, aligning its agenda with national development priorities and public policy needs.

In a landmark move marking Japan’s largest post-WWII military export deal, Australia and Japan formalized a $7 billion warship procurement agreement on April 18, 2026, deepening bilateral defense ties and triggering widespread expert warnings over rising risks of bloc division in the Asia-Pacific. The deal, first awarded to Japan over Germany’s competing bid in August 2025, comes 12 years after Japan lifted its post-WWII ban on military exports, and represents a major milestone for Tokyo’s expanding global defense industry presence.

Under the terms of the memorandum signed by Australian Defense Minister Richard Marles and Japanese Defense Minister Shinjiro Koizumi during talks in Tokyo, Japan’s Mitsubishi Heavy Industries will construct the first three of the 11 planned Mogami-class frigates domestically, with the remaining eight vessels to be built at a new shipyard in Western Australia. The first completed frigate is scheduled to be delivered to the Royal Australian Navy in 2029, a development Marles frames as a core component of Australia’s ambitious plan to build a larger, more technologically advanced and lethal surface fleet.

The deal marks a significant comeback for Japan’s defense industry, which lost a high-profile 2016 Australian submarine contract to French defense contractors. For Tokyo, it also represents another step in its accelerating military buildup and expanding defense partnership network beyond its long-standing formal treaty alliance with the United States. Japan now officially labels Australia a “semi-ally”, and Koizumi described the procurement deal as a transformative step that elevates bilateral defense cooperation to an unprecedented new level, noting Japan remains an indispensable partner for Australia under Canberra’s newly updated national defense strategy.

Just days after the deal was signed, Australia unveiled its 2026 National Defense Strategy, which earmarks an extra $38.1 billion in military spending over the next decade. The plan targets lifting Australia’s total defense budget to 3% of GDP by 2033 when calculated using NATO’s inclusive methodology that accounts for military pensions and related defense-associated expenditures. Marles told the National Press Club in Canberra that the strategy includes the most sweeping modernization of Australia’s maritime military capabilities since the end of World War II.

However, the deepening defense alignment between Tokyo and Canberra has drawn sharp concern from both Chinese officials and regional security experts. In an official statement following the deal signing, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun urged Japan to draw clear lessons from its wartime history, honor its international obligations, and remain committed to the path of peaceful development. His comments came amid large-scale public protests in Tokyo against the Japanese government’s ongoing push to revise the country’s pacifist post-WWII constitution. Guo stressed that preventing the resurgence of Japanese militarism is not only a core obligation for Tokyo, but also a shared firm demand of the international community, including China.

Regional security analysts warn that the growing military cooperation between the two nations is far more than a routine arms transaction. Chen Hong, director of the Australian Studies Centre at East China Normal University, explained that the bilateral security relationship has evolved steadily from early dialogues and the Reciprocal Access Agreement to regular joint military exercises, integrated intelligence sharing, and now full defense industrial cooperation. This progression, Chen noted, is building a rapidly institutionalized regional security network, and the warship deal marks a critical turning point toward full integration of the two countries’ military systems. In effect, Chen argues, the partnership has evolved into a de facto “quasi-alliance”: an unofficial but fully functional security arrangement that allows both countries to avoid the political and financial costs of a formal alliance while advancing shared security goals.

Chen added that while deeper ties with Japan give Australia a new regional military foothold and supports its existing policy narratives around supply chain and energy security, this comes at the cost of gradual erosion of Canberra’s long-standing strategic autonomy.

Liu Shuliang, an associate researcher at the Tianjin Academy of Social Sciences, noted that Japan’s closer military ties with Australia are clearly aligned with Washington’s broader Indo-Pacific strategy, and fit into existing US-led security frameworks including the trilateral AUKUS partnership between Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States. Both Japan and Australia, as key US allies, have increasingly leveraged exclusive “small bloc” arrangements to deepen military cooperation aligned with US strategic priorities, Liu explained.

This trend, experts warn, carries severe risks for the broader Asia-Pacific security architecture. Rooted in an outdated Cold War zero-sum mentality, Liu argued, this exclusive security framework weakens the central role of inclusive multilateralism in maintaining regional peace, limits space for broad multilateral cooperation, and erodes the effectiveness of existing collective security mechanisms. Beyond that, the alignment risks escalating tensions around existing regional flashpoints, accelerating destabilizing shifts in the regional military balance, fueling a new regional arms race, and deepening the widespread regional security dilemma. Chen Hong added that the development of this exclusive quasi-alliance framework will ultimately intensify regional tensions and deepen the security challenges that both Japan and Australia themselves face.

Court documents obtained by the Associated Press on Tuesday have revealed new details of a major asset forfeiture action launched by the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region government against jailed former media entrepreneur Jimmy Lai. Authorities are moving to seize more than 127 million Hong Kong dollars, equal to roughly 16 million U.S. dollars, in cash held in personal and corporate bank accounts, corporate shares, and other funds linked to what officials describe as national security crimes tied to Lai. While the government first announced its plan to pursue asset forfeiture in early April, it had not publicly disclosed the full value of the assets in question until the release of the court filing, which also does not detail the specific connection between the targeted properties and Lai’s convicted offenses.

Jimmy Lai, founder of the now-shuttered pro-democracy newspaper Apple Daily and a long-standing vocal critic of China’s ruling Communist Party, was found guilty in December last year on two counts under the Beijing-imposed Hong Kong National Security Law: conspiracy to collude with foreign forces and conspiracy to publish seditious content. In February, he was handed a 20-year prison sentence, the harshest penalty issued to date under the 2020 national security legislation.

The court filing outlines the full scope of assets Hong Kong’s Department of Justice is seeking to have forfeited to the government. The list includes 15 personal bank accounts held under Lai’s name, funds held in accounts tied to multiple companies he is associated with, and corporate shares controlled by Lai and other connected parties. Among the targeted shares are Lai’s stake in Next Digital, the parent holding company of Apple Daily, and holdings in Dico Consultants, a firm tied to an earlier fraud conviction against Lai that was ultimately quashed by the courts. The requested seizure also includes 2 million Hong Kong dollar (US$255,440) fine from Lai’s 2022 fraud conviction, which was set to be refunded to him after that conviction was overturned in February, as well as bail funds deposited with the Hong Kong judiciary.

In its April 2 statement announcing the forfeiture application, the Hong Kong government cited provisions of the national security law, which allow for the confiscation of any assets used, or intended for use, in committing a national security offense, as well as any proceeds generated through those offenses. Officials argue that the forfeiture order is a necessary step to protect national security, preventing Lai, his allies, and his representatives from using crime-connected assets to carry out further activities that threaten the stability and security of Hong Kong and China. A court hearing on the government’s application is scheduled to be held in July.

The case has sparked ongoing international and domestic debate over the scope of the national security law and its impact on civil liberties in Hong Kong, which returned to Chinese rule in 1997 after more than 150 years of British colonial administration. Critics of Lai’s conviction argue that it represents a dramatic erosion of press freedom and other core civil liberties that were guaranteed to Hong Kong under the 1997 handover framework. Conversely, the Hong Kong government has repeatedly emphasized that the prosecution is not an attack on free press, maintaining that Lai and other co-defendants used journalistic activity as a cover to carry out acts that undermined national security over a period of years.

In a move that has drawn both domestic pushback and international scrutiny, the Japanese government moved forward with a controversial revision of its defense equipment export regulations on Tuesday, April 21, 2026, removing long-standing restrictions that barred most shipments of lethal weapons to overseas buyers, according to a Kyodo News report. Just four days before the government formalized the policy change, hundreds of Japanese citizens gathered outside the prime minister’s official residence in central Tokyo on the evening of April 16 to stage a public protest. Holding placards and voicing clear opposition, demonstrators condemned the administration’s decision to scrap the decades-old arms export constraints, warning that the policy shift risks dragging Japan into greater global military entanglement and fueling regional arms proliferation. This revision marks a major break from Japan’s post-World War II pacifist stance, which for generations has imposed strict limits on the development and international trade of offensive military capabilities. Beyond domestic backlash, the policy change has already drawn attention from neighboring countries that have previously called on Japan to uphold historical reflection and guard against the resurgence of Japanese militarism. In prior statements, Chinese officials have emphasized that Japan bears a fundamental obligation to prevent the reemergence of aggressive militarism in the region, a point that has taken on new urgency following the arms rule revision.

Against a backdrop of shifting global geopolitics and regional development ambitions, the recent official visit of Vietnam’s highest leader To Lam to China has cemented the longstanding centrality of China-Vietnam relations in Hanoi’s foreign policy agenda, regional analysts agree. To Lam, who serves concurrently as General Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam Central Committee and President of Vietnam, carried out his four-day state visit to China from April 14 to 17, 2026. This trip marks his first official overseas visit since his recent election as Vietnamese president, and comes exactly one year after Chinese President Xi Jinping’s 2025 state visit to Vietnam, creating a critical rhythm of high-level diplomatic exchange between the two neighboring nations.

Regional policy experts note that the itinerary of the visit carries far more than symbolic weight. After meetings in Beijing, To Lam traveled via high-speed rail for roughly 10 hours to Nanning, the capital of China’s Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, which shares a long land border with Vietnam. During the stop in Nanning, the Vietnamese leader visited the China-ASEAN Countries Artificial Intelligence Application Cooperation Center, a tangible marker of expanding technological collaboration between the two sides.

Le Hong Hiep, senior fellow and Vietnam Studies Programme coordinator at Singapore’s ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, explained that the visit underscores the consistent priority Hanoi has long placed on its bilateral ties with Beijing. “This visit confirms that China remains a cornerstone of Vietnam’s foreign policy,” Hiep told China Daily. He added that the trip also reflects To Lam’s interest in adapting successful elements of China’s governance and development models to support Vietnam’s own domestic goals: the Southeast Asian nation has set a target to reach high-income economy status by 2045, with a focus on replicating China’s progress in infrastructure development and technological innovation.

The visit aligns with key domestic milestones for both countries: it comes as Vietnam enters a new development cycle following its 14th National Party Congress, while China has just kicked off implementation of its 15th Five-Year Plan spanning 2026 to 2030.

Ian Seow Cheng Wei, senior analyst at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore, emphasized that the Guangxi leg of the journey stands out as a particularly meaningful highlight. Beyond highlighting the shared revolutionary roots between the Communist Party of China and the Communist Party of Vietnam, the stop draws attention to Guangxi’s outsize role in bilateral economic exchange: the autonomous region ranks among China’s largest provincial-level trading partners with Vietnam.

This economic and strategic importance is reflected in the new cooperation agreements signed during the visit, which cover growing collaboration in artificial intelligence, semiconductor development, and cross-border transport connectivity. In a joint statement released during the visit, the two sides committed to accelerating cross-border infrastructure integration. They praised the early completion of the feasibility study for the Lao Cai-Hanoi-Haiphong railway, whose first phase of construction launched in December 2025 to connect Vietnam to China’s Yunnan Province. The two sides also welcomed the signing of implementation agreements for two additional standard-gauge railway projects linking Guangxi to northern Vietnam: the Dong Dang-Hanoi line and the Mong Cai-Ha Long-Haiphong line.

Khang Vu, a visiting scholar in the Political Science Department at Boston College in the United States, noted that while Vietnam maintains multiple comprehensive strategic partnerships globally, the timing and framing of To Lam’s visit makes clear that China holds a unique “first among equals” status in Hanoi’s foreign relations. Khang added that expanded railway infrastructure cooperation delivers mutual benefits to both nations: it strengthens China’s connectivity with Vietnam and the broader Southeast Asian region, while also cutting transport costs for Vietnamese exports bound for European markets via transcontinental rail links.

Against the backdrop of recent global energy market volatility sparked by the Iran war, which has exposed risks tied to Vietnam’s current energy import dependency, Khang pointed out that Hanoi can also draw lessons from China’s decades of experience in expanding electric vehicle production and scaling clean energy infrastructure. Moving forward, he noted, infrastructure connectivity and clean energy development are set to become the core pillars of deepening bilateral cooperation.

Amid widespread global geopolitical turbulence, Hiep noted that both China and Vietnam used the visit to reaffirm their shared commitment to stabilizing bilateral relations and advancing the vision of a China-Vietnam community with a shared future. This approach aligns directly with Vietnam’s core goal of maintaining a peaceful, stable external environment to support its long-term domestic development ambitions. “The visit further underscores China’s indispensable role as a neighbor and a development partner of Vietnam,” Hiep said.

BEIJING – After more than seven decades resting far from their homeland, 12 Chinese People’s Volunteers (CPV) martyrs who fell during the 1950–1953 War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea will finally be brought back to Chinese soil this Wednesday, China’s Ministry of Veterans Affairs has announced. This scheduled handover marks the 13th repatriation conducted under a bilateral agreement between China and the Republic of Korea (ROK) that has allowed fallen heroes to return home for burial. Since the first repatriation operation launched in 2014, a total of 1,011 CPV remains have been transferred from the ROK to China, each recovery a quiet act of respect for the sacrifice these service members made more than 70 years ago. The long-running repatriation program reflects the shared commitment of both sides to honoring the war dead and upholding historical memory, giving fallen soldiers the homecoming they deserve decades after the end of the conflict.