分类： business

A tourist visiting Oslo last February left with one striking impression: electric vehicles have become completely ubiquitous across the Norwegian capital. Every taxi hailed ran on battery power, a visible sign of a decades-long transition that has positioned Norway as the global trailblazer for electric vehicle adoption.

Last year, driven by generous government tax incentives and subsidies, new electric vehicle sales captured 95.9% of Norway’s total new car market, jumping from 88.9% in 2024. While EVs already dominate new purchases, two-thirds of the country’s total passenger vehicle fleet still runs on fossil fuels — a gap Norway is rapidly working to close. In 2025, EVs surpassed diesel-powered vehicles for the first time to become the most common powertrain on Norwegian roads, putting the country on track to meet its goal of a fully fossil-free new car fleet.

Norway’s rapid EV transition is not an isolated trend. Global adoption of electric vehicles has been fueled first by growing urgency around climate change, and more recently by supply chain and price volatility for oil-driven by geopolitical conflicts such as the Iran war, which pushed more nations to prioritize domestic, low-carbon transportation.

Last year, EVs made up 55% of all new car sales in China and 28% in Europe. The International Energy Agency projects that 28% of all new car sales globally will be electric this year, with 50% growth in EV sales across Asia-Pacific markets outside China and 45% growth in Latin America. By 2035, the IEA forecasts that half of all new cars sold worldwide will be electric.

The United States stands out as a stark outlier to this global trend. Last year, EVs accounted for less than 10% of new car sales in the U.S., and sales have declined further this year. The current Trump administration, which has prioritized supporting domestic oil production, has rolled back nearly all pro-EV policies enacted by the previous administration.

Detroit’s Big Three automakers, which had poured tens of billions of dollars into EV development and battery manufacturing, have reversed course after receiving clear signals from the administration. Multiple planned new EV models have been canceled, and billions in EV-related investments have been written off as losses. While the major U.S. automakers still offer EVs and have tentative plans for future models, their enthusiasm and investment in the sector have sharply declined.

For veteran auto journalist Urban Lehner, the author of this analysis and former Detroit bureau chief for The Wall Street Journal, this pattern of complacency in the face of rising global competition feels familiar. In 1984, when Lehner took up his post in Detroit after three years covering the Japanese auto industry in Tokyo, Detroit’s executives showed almost no curiosity about the competitive threat from Japanese manufacturers that would go on to reshape the global industry. Most dismissed the trend, changing the topic to local sports rather than engaging with the shifting market.

Today, the rising competitive threat comes from China, which dominates global EV production. The IEA reports that China manufactured nearly 75% of the world’s EVs last year and controls nearly 80% of global battery cell production. Cutthroat domestic competition has pushed Chinese manufacturers up the learning curve rapidly, with vehicle quality and technology improving steadily year over year. In China, many EVs are already cheaper than comparable gas-powered cars, and as battery technology improves, experts expect they will reach price parity globally without relying on government subsidies. EVs already outperform gas-powered cars in acceleration, noise level, and maintenance costs, with driving range continuing to improve rapidly.

The U.S. currently imposes 100% tariffs on Chinese-made EVs, shielding domestic manufacturers from direct competition in the short term. Still, Ford Executive Chairman recently warned that the U.S. cannot block Chinese EVs from its market forever. Lehner notes that while Detroit’s executives today are far more aware of the Chinese threat than their 1980s predecessors were of Japan, they face structural headwinds: a large domestic market with underdeveloped EV charging infrastructure, and constant policy whiplash from Washington that flips pro- and anti-EV policies every four years with changes in administration.

Lehner argues that U.S. consumers will not remain insulated forever. While Chinese EVs are blocked from the U.S. market today, their growing success in third markets such as Mexico, Canada, Brazil, and Norway will eventually create spillover. If Chinese EVs capture large market share in Mexico and Canada in the coming years, they will inevitably become more visible to American consumers, who may well prefer their lower prices and better performance.

As the world rapidly shifts toward mass EV adoption, the U.S. remains an outlier — but how long can that last? For Detroit, repeating the 1980s pattern of complacency in the face of rising global competition would mean playing catch-up in an industry that will define the 21st century automotive market.

NEW YORK – Early optimism that China had successfully pulled out of a deflationary slump has been sharply undermined by new government inflation data released this week.

China’s headline consumer price index rose just 0.5% year-over-year in July, down from 1% in June, marking the slowest pace of consumer price growth in six months and the third consecutive month of deceleration. This cooling comes even amid global energy price spikes driven by shipping disruptions through the Strait of Hormuz, a key global oil chokepoint. Producer price growth also slowed, dipping to 3.5% year-over-year from 4.1% in the prior month.

Few economic analysts are caught off guard by this slowdown, however. Yale University senior economist Stephen Roach has long warned that deflationary pressures in China are far more persistent than many optimistic forecasts suggest. “However 2026 plays out, hopes that Xi Jinping’s administration has successfully tamed China’s deflation could be in for a rude awakening,” Roach argues. “Japan’s decades-long battle with deflation demonstrates that even when top-line inflation data appears to show reflation taking hold, the entrenched deflationary mindset among households and businesses is extremely difficult to reverse.”

Roach’s core argument is that deflationary pressures can linger for years after headline inflation turns positive, gradually eroding consumer and business confidence. This dynamic is why global financial markets are increasingly pricing in the possibility of monetary easing from the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) in the coming months. A looser monetary policy stance would likely weaken the yuan, in turn widening China’s already large trade surplus.

That trade surplus is the unspoken undercurrent of the current policy debate, according to Brad Setser, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. “Of course, no official explicitly says they would welcome a larger trade surplus,” Setser notes. “But if the standard policy prescription for China is monetary easing to fight deflation, paired with fiscal consolidation to address off-balance-sheet debt risks and greater exchange rate flexibility, that framework effectively amounts to advocating for China to export its way out of its domestic economic troubles.”

Yet Beijing has so far resisted allowing the yuan to depreciate significantly. A stable or slowly appreciating yuan serves three core strategic goals for Chinese policymakers: it reduces the risk of offshore default among heavily indebted Chinese property developers; it supports the long-term push for yuan internationalization, which aims to establish the currency as a major global reserve asset; and it helps manage trade tensions with the United States, where the current administration remains highly sensitive to any signs of competitive currency devaluation. A stronger yuan also currently helps China avoid importing additional global inflation from elevated global commodity prices.

The harder, more intractable challenge, Roach warns, is psychological – and Japan’s 30-year struggle proves just how persistent that deflationary psychology can be. Recent inflation data confirms “stalling reflationary momentum,” according to Carlos Casanova, senior economist at Union Bancaire Privée.

In the short term, Casanova notes, the data reveals clear signs of broad weakening in domestic demand: retail sales remain in contractionary territory, and commodity cost pressures have faded for the time being. Casanova adds that the PBOC itself has acknowledged growing structural divergence across the Chinese economy, with AI-related sectors outperforming sharply while broader consumer spending remains sluggish. Subdued credit demand has also weakened the transmission of monetary policy, leaving room for the PBOC to cut the reverse repo ratio by 25 basis points to stimulate lending.

Setser is skeptical that currency policy alone has meaningful impact on China’s deflation trajectory one way or the other. “There is no evidence that the nominal yuan depreciation in 2022-2023 materially slowed deflation in China, and there is also zero evidence that the modest nominal appreciation over the last year accelerated deflation,” he argues. “If anything, the pace of deflation has moderated, though I fully accept that higher global oil prices have played a role in that shift.”

Even so, many analysts worry the PBOC is moving too slowly to address mounting deflationary pressures. Société Générale economist Michelle Lam notes that “China’s growth likely cooled notably in the second quarter to 4.4%, as weak consumption and sluggish property activity offset resilient export growth and a modest end-of-quarter industrial rebound.” She adds that while producer-led reflation has supported nominal GDP growth, any future policy easing will likely be incremental rather than a precursor to large-scale stimulus.

The big open question is just how incremental policy action can afford to be. Japan’s decades-long deflation battle offers a clear cautionary lesson: even when consumer and producer prices start rising again, Japanese households still lack the confidence to increase spending enough to drive sustained economic growth or lift long-term business confidence.

For Xi Jinping’s administration, the most urgent structural reforms are resolving China’s chronic housing market crisis – which increasingly resembles Japan’s 1990s bad loan spiral – and building a robust national social safety net that gives 1.4 billion Chinese citizens the confidence to spend rather than hoard savings. These two priorities are deeply connected: roughly 70% of Chinese household wealth is tied to real estate, so stabilizing property markets across China’s 70 largest cities is a prerequisite for reviving consumer spending and hitting the government’s 4.5% to 5% annual growth target.

The longer Beijing allows deflationary pressures to fester without decisive action, the more deeply a deflationary mindset becomes entrenched – and the harder it is to reverse. Japan’s experience bears this out: even as the Bank of Japan recently lifted short-term rates to 1%, the highest level in more than three decades, deflationary undercurrents still persist across the economy, most notably in wage growth, which continues to lag far behind inflation. The result has been a slow-burn stagflation, and Tokyo has yet to implement the structural reforms needed to close the gap between rising prices and stagnant household incomes.

Toshihiro Nagahama, an economist at the Dai-ichi Life Research Institute, argues that for Japan to fully break free of its decades-long deflationary mindset, “it is imperative for the government and the central bank to align their policy frameworks, clearly articulate their risk assessments, maintain honest and transparent dialogue with financial markets, and resolutely execute bold, long-term growth investments.”

Nagahama echoes a widespread view that today’s global economy is being rapidly reshaped by the war in Ukraine, Middle East tensions, and a series of historic shifts in global central bank policy, all against a backdrop of persistent global inflation and a strong U.S. dollar. Amid this widespread uncertainty, governments cannot anchor their strategies to best-case scenarios – they must plan for worst-case risks, including the possibility of multi-year shipping disruptions through the Strait of Hormuz that would upend global energy flows and inflation dynamics.

“While these shifts present a formidable trial for Japan, they also represent a historic opportunity,” Nagahama notes. “As the country sheds its decades-long deflationary mindset and restores nominal growth, these external shocks serve as a critical test for fully escaping the paradigm of contracting equilibrium.”

Back in China, the gap between accelerating producer price growth and muted consumer price expansion is now the widest it has been since June 2022. This divergence indicates that Chinese manufacturers are struggling to pass higher input costs on to end consumers, putting increasing pressure on corporate profit margins. If this margin squeeze persists, it could lead to slower wage growth across the world’s second-largest $21 trillion economy, undermining household spending and complicating Beijing’s reflation goals.

This risk of China getting stuck in a “deflation trap” worries geopolitical analysts such as Ian Bremmer, CEO of risk consulting firm Eurasia Group. Bremmer’s concern is that Xi’s administration continues to “prioritize political control and technological supremacy over the consumption stimulus and structural reforms that could break the deflationary cycle. Beijing has the financial resources to prevent a full-blown economic crisis, but living standards will deteriorate, the economic fallout will spread to other countries, and the world’s second-largest economy will remain stuck in a trap of its own making.”

Bremmer warns that the steady decline in Chinese home prices since 2020 has already erased household wealth on a scale comparable to the 2008 U.S. housing crash, and the decline is still accelerating. Consumer confidence, business investment, and domestic demand have all plummeted alongside falling property values. “Beijing bet big that high-tech manufacturing would fill the economic gap left by a shrinking property sector,” Bremmer adds. “Instead, state-driven investment has created massive overcapacity, and weak domestic demand means there are not enough buyers to absorb that excess production.”

The one bright spot is that Beijing is working to restructure its $28 trillion domestic stock and bond markets to better fund its semiconductor rivalry with the United States. This shift marks a move away from blanket state subsidies and backing toward a model that aligns more closely with Xi’s pledge to let market forces play a “decisive role” in economic decision-making.

The core worry remains that deep vulnerabilities in China’s “old economy” and underlying financial system will limit the growth of the new, technology-focused economy that Xi aims to build. Roach argues that Xi’s focus on a growth model centered on “new quality productive forces” driven by innovation and new technology relies on unsustainable support, and that Beijing is only paying lip service to boosting consumer spending while refusing to implement the large-scale reforms needed to shift to a consumer-led growth model.

As Japan demonstrated to the world, Roach says, “the problem was not so much its technological successes but the long-term sustainability of its growth model. The same lesson might be very much applicable to China” at a moment when the country’s growth model is “showing unmistakable signs of sputtering.”

For now, Beijing’s immediate priority is halting capital outflows from mainland Chinese stock markets. In recent weeks, the government reactivated the so-called “national team” of state-owned investment funds that is mobilized to support sagging equity markets. But analysts broadly agree that what is really needed to turn the tide is bold, long-term action to revive economic confidence – a policy response that remains in short supply as of mid-2026.

One of India’s most iconic industrial conglomerates, Tata Group, is facing unprecedented uncertainty after its chairman N Chandrasekaran announced he will step down when his current term concludes in February, ending months of speculation over behind-the-scenes boardroom tensions.

The 63-year-old industry leader, who has spent nearly four decades with Tata Group, revealed that his decision to exit stems from an ongoing deadlock on the Tata Sons board over a proposed five-year extension of his leadership. The proposal, which was first raised months ago, has failed to earn the unanimous approval required to move forward. Chandrasekaran noted that when the extension was initially tabled in February, at least one board member withheld support. When no consensus had emerged half a year later, he opted to step down rather than leave a leadership vacuum.

“Tata Sons is a very large institution and there are many strategic projects that are under critical stages of execution,” Chandrasekaran said in his official statement. “It is not only necessary to have a leader in place to lead the Group beyond Feb 2027, but also clarity on leadership is important for employees, investors, partners and other stakeholders.”

The news of Chandrasekaran’s impending exit sent share prices of all publicly traded Tata Group subsidiaries plummeting, as investors reacted to the sudden wave of uncertainty over the future of the $300 billion salt-to-steel conglomerate, whose holdings range from the national carrier Air India to global automaker Jaguar Land Rover and steel giant Tata Steel.

Chandrasekaran’s announcement, coming just days before Tata Sons’ annual general meeting, brings long-simmering internal tensions into the public eye. A bitter boardroom power struggle has played out between trustees for months, centered on a range of contentious issues including future board nominations, large-scale funding approvals, and the long-debated question of whether to take Tata Sons, the group’s parent holding company, public.

Tata Group’s unique corporate structure sets it apart from most global conglomerates: Tata Trusts, the group’s charitable arm, holds a 66% controlling stake in Tata Sons. This structure gives Tata significant tax and regulatory benefits, and allows the group to direct a large share of its profits toward wide-ranging philanthropic initiatives across India. However, governance experts have long warned that the overlapping of non-profit charitable objectives and large-scale commercial operations creates inherent structural frictions that can lead to governance gridlock. Currently, Tata Trusts holds three seats on the Tata Sons board, giving it outsized influence over group leadership decisions. The conglomerate has not issued any formal public comment confirming the internal discord reported in local media.

This is not the first time Tata Group has been rocked by public leadership upheaval. Chandrasekaran was appointed chairman in 2017, replacing Cyrus Mistry, whose abrupt removal from the post triggered a years-long bitter legal battle that dominated headlines across India’s corporate sector. Before taking the top job, Chandrasekaran built his four-decade Tata career at Tata Consultancy Services, the group’s world-leading IT services arm, where he rose to the roles of chief executive officer and managing director. A 2017 press release announcing his appointment described him as a “Tata lifer,” highlighting his deep institutional ties to the group.

The leadership chaos comes at a particularly challenging time for Tata Group, which is already navigating significant business headwinds across multiple divisions. Most notably, the group is still in the early stages of turning around Air India, the loss-making national carrier it purchased from the Indian government in a 2022 privatization deal.

Independent market analyst Ambareesh Baliga noted that the negative market reaction to Chandrasekaran’s departure was inevitable given his decades of experience and standing in the industry. However, he added that the group still has a six-month window to identify and confirm a successor, and most industry observers expect the new leader will be promoted from within Tata’s existing executive ranks.

As stakeholders across the globe wait for clarity on the next chapter of one of Asia’s largest industrial empires, the leadership deadlock has cast a spotlight on the long-term governance challenges embedded in Tata Group’s one-of-a-kind corporate structure.

TOKYO – Toyota Motor Corporation announced Wednesday the passing of Hiroshi Okuda, the former chief executive who guided the Japanese automaker through an era of unprecedented global growth. Okuda was 93 years old, and details on the date and specific cause of his death have not been released to the public as of the announcement.

Okuda’s 45-year tenure at Toyota spanned transformative roles, including 11 years as the company’s president and chairman from 1995 to 2006. He leaves a lasting legacy centered on two landmark contributions to the global auto industry: the development of the world’s first mass-produced gas-electric hybrid vehicle, the Prius, launched in 1997, and the aggressive, strategic expansion of Toyota’s manufacturing and sales footprint across North America and Europe.

At the time of its launch, the Prius represented a groundbreaking leap in fuel-efficient automotive technology, emerging at a moment of already rising global gasoline prices. The model quickly became an international symbol of the auto industry’s shift toward more sustainable, green mobility, and cemented Toyota’s decades-long reputation as a leader in fuel efficiency — a standing the brand extended across its lineup, including top-selling models like the Camry.

Born in central Japan, the same region that hosts Toyota’s global headquarters, Okuda graduated from Tokyo’s prestigious Hitotsubashi University in 1955 with a degree in business. What made his rise to the top of Toyota unusual was that he was not a member of the founding Toyoda family, a break from the traditional leadership structure that had long defined the automaker. Known for his frank speaking style and approachable sense of humor, Okuda held a black belt in judo and was ahead of his time in Japanese corporate culture when it came to advocating for leadership turnover and empowering younger executives.

Long before the current wave of generational corporate shift, Okuda pushed for handing leadership reins to executives in their 50s rather than keeping power concentrated among leaders in their 60s, a rare priority for Japan’s traditional business sector in his era. He summarized his philosophy of adaptive change in a 2005 press conference, stating: “A company must change when things are going well. There’s no point in trying to change after things start going bad.” This commitment to organizational agility aligned perfectly with Toyota’s founding “kaizen” principle of continuous improvement, which paired with the company’s just-in-time production system that minimizes excess inventory to drive operational efficiency.

As Toyota grew to challenge the dominance of Detroit’s “Big Three” U.S. automakers — General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler — Okuda openly warned of potential political and public backlash against the Japanese brand’s rising market share. He consistently emphasized that the auto industry was an interconnected global sector, often using the term “harmony” to frame his vision of cross-border collaboration. By the 1990s and early 2000s, Toyota and other major Japanese automakers were posting record profits while U.S. automakers struggled with deep losses, stoking “Japan-bashing” sentiments that had first emerged in the 1980s. Critics at the time also argued that a weak yen gave Japanese automakers an unfair trade advantage, as it increases the yen value of overseas earnings when converted back to the domestic currency. Okuda remained a key strategic adviser to Toyota’s board after stepping down as chairman, and was part of the organization when it added its first American board member, Jim Press, in 2007.

Outside of his work at Toyota, Okuda was one of the most respected figures in Japan’s broader business community. He served as the head of multiple influential Japanese business groups, including the Japan Business Federation (Keidanren), the Japan Automobile Manufacturers Association, the Japan Federation of Employers’ Associations, and sat on Japan’s Prime Minister’s Economic Strategy Council.

Toyota has not released details about Okuda’s surviving family. According to the company, funeral arrangements are being handled privately by Okuda’s family, and a public memorial ceremony may be announced at a later date.