Global Pulse

标签： Asia

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  • US-China space race shifts into a higher lunar gear

    US-China space race shifts into a higher lunar gear

    Following NASA’s landmark successful crewed lunar flyby mission, Artemis II, which wrapped up its 10-day lunar approach and began its return voyage to Earth, China has announced a ramp-up of its own lunar exploration program, reigniting discussion of the growing technological and geopolitical competition in deep space exploration.

    Launched on April 1, Artemis II carried four astronauts into space aboard NASA’s heavy-lift Space Launch System rocket and Orion capsule, marking the first crewed test flight for NASA’s flagship Artemis program, which aims to return humans to the lunar surface for the first time since the Apollo era. The U.S. has set a 2028 target for its first crewed landing via the Artemis III mission, while China has formally committed to landing its own astronauts on the moon by 2030, creating a tight, overlapping timeline that underscores the high stakes of this new space race.

    To advance its crewed landing goals, China is moving forward at an accelerated pace on critical heavy-lift launch infrastructure, most notably the Long March 10A rocket, a reusable next-generation launch vehicle purpose-built to carry crewed spacecraft and lunar landing hardware to orbit. According to chinastarmarket.cn, which cited Lian Jie, deputy chief engineer of the Lijian-2 rocket program, the China Manned Space Agency (CMSA) has formally approved a plan to conduct the first ever launch of the Long March 10A in mid-2026. For this mission, the Long March 10A will serve as the first-stage booster, paired with an upper stage from the commercial Lijian-2 rocket, to deliver navigation satellites into a trans-lunar injection (TLI) bound for cislunar space — the region between Earth and the moon where the two bodies’ gravitational fields interact.

    This 2026 mission will mark a number of key milestones for China’s space program: it is the first test flight of the Long March 10A, and it will also mark the first time a rocket built by a Chinese commercial space enterprise has operated in cislunar space. The Lijian-2 rocket, developed by CAS Space — a commercial spin-off from the Chinese Academy of Sciences — just completed a successful launch on March 30, placing three satellites into their intended orbits. Like SpaceX’s workhorse Falcon 9 rocket, Lijian-2 uses kerosene and liquid oxygen as propellants. Lian added that a second Lijian-2 mission, carrying a carbon-monitoring satellite focused on terrestrial ecosystem research, is scheduled for September 2026, with an upgraded design that will substantially increase the rocket’s payload capacity.

    Prior to this formal announcement, CMSA had only confirmed that the Long March 10A would launch sometime in 2026, without sharing a specific timeline. Progress on the rocket’s development has proceeded steadily in recent months: on February 11, 2026, the Long March 10A first stage completed a successful controlled sea-landing test in Wenchang, Hainan, validating key rocket recovery technologies as well as low-altitude flight performance and maximum dynamic pressure escape capabilities for China’s next-generation crewed spacecraft.

    China has also completed key ground infrastructure to support its lunar ambitions, finishing construction of two dedicated spacecraft and launch vehicle assembly towers at the Wenchang Space Launch Site. These new facilities are designed to enable parallel processing of mission hardware and cut down preparation time between crewed lunar launches.

    Observers of China’s space program note that while progress appears slower to some observers following Artemis II’s successful flight, China is sticking to its own well-defined roadmap. A Sichuan-based space columnist outlined the coming milestones: following the Long March 10A’s maiden flight in mid-2026, tests of the Mengzhou crewed lunar spacecraft are scheduled for the second half of the year, with a combined test of the Long March 10A and Mengzhou expected as early as November. If all these milestones are met, the 2030 landing target remains firmly achievable, with preparations proceeding incrementally ahead of a long-term plan to establish a sustained human presence on the moon. The Long March 10A itself is designed to be reusable, capable of lifting 14 tons to low Earth orbit (LEO), or carrying a crew capsule with up to seven astronauts.

    For the actual 2030 crewed landing mission, China will use a modified Long March 10 configuration, created by adding two additional boosters to the base Long March 10A design. This upgraded rocket will generate a total thrust of 26,250 kN, capable of lifting 70 tons to LEO and 27 tons to trans-lunar injection. For comparison, the Saturn V rocket that carried Apollo 11 to the first historic lunar landing in 1969 delivered between 43.5 and 47 metric tons to TLI.

    China will use a dual-launch architecture for its 2030 landing: one Long March 10 will launch the Mengzhou crew capsule carrying three astronauts, while a second will launch the Lanyue lunar lander. The two craft will rendezvous and dock in lunar orbit; two astronauts will transfer to the lander and descend to the lunar surface, while the third remains in orbit aboard Mengzhou. After completing surface operations, the crew will ascend back to lunar orbit, re-dock with Mengzhou, and return to Earth together.

    On the U.S. side, the Artemis program plans to conduct its first crewed landing with Artemis III in 2028, followed by Artemis IV in 2029, which will begin assembly of the Lunar Gateway orbital space station. Both missions rely on SpaceX’s Starship as the human landing system to transport crews between lunar orbit and the surface. Artemis V, targeted for 2030 or later, will expand sustained lunar operations, using Blue Origin’s Blue Moon lander under a second NASA contract. SpaceX founder Elon Musk has also stated that the company aims to build a permanent human settlement on the moon within the next decade, pairing lunar development with its long-term goal of crewed missions to Mars.

    Many industry analysts point out that as both the U.S. and China ramp up investment in lunar exploration and base development, more capital will flow into lunar infrastructure, creating more immediate commercial opportunities for space equipment suppliers and related private industries than the more distant, long-term goal of Mars exploration.

    Beyond the 2030 crewed landing, China has laid out a clear long-term lunar exploration roadmap. In August 2026, China plans to launch the Chang’e-7 probe to the lunar south pole, a region believed to hold significant deposits of water ice in permanently shadowed craters. Sun Zezhou, a senior researcher at the China Academy of Space Technology, explained that Chang’e-7 will conduct comprehensive surveys of the local polar environment, analyze lunar surface composition, map geological structures, and search for water ice that could be processed into hydrogen and oxygen for rocket fuel and life support. The mission also reflects China’s commitment to international collaboration, carrying six scientific payloads provided by international partners including Italy, Russia, Egypt, Bahrain, Switzerland and Thailand.

    Chang’e-8 is scheduled for launch around 2028, and will test key technologies for in-situ resource utilization — the ability to extract and use materials found on the moon — laying the technical groundwork for a future permanent lunar research station. After Chinese astronauts complete the 2030 landing, China plans to begin construction of the initial International Lunar Research Station (ILRS) by around 2035, developed in partnership with a coalition of international partners including Nicaragua, the Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization, and the Arab Union for Astronomy and Space Sciences. The ILRS is designed as a long-term, multi-node research network linking lunar surface facilities, orbital infrastructure, and ground control systems, capable of sustained operation with periodic crewed missions.

  • The Iran war doesn’t immediately jeopardize Taiwan

    The Iran war doesn’t immediately jeopardize Taiwan

    The global ripple effects of the United States and Israel’s joint military campaign against Iran have extended across continents, reaching deep into Asian geopolitics – and nowhere is this indirect influence more consequential than for Taiwan’s security amid ongoing cross-Strait tensions with mainland China. This analysis explores two core, interconnected questions that sit at the center of regional security calculations: first, how the Iran conflict alters perceptions of U.S. willingness to intervene militarily to defend Taiwan, and second, how it shifts Beijing’s calculus of whether to launch an invasion of the island.

    Critics of the U.S. campaign against Iran have raised a host of objections: they argue the operation was unnecessarily aggressive, that Washington skipped over ongoing diplomatic negotiations with Tehran without cause, that Iran posed no immediate threat justifying a large-scale attack, that U.S. leaders failed to consult allies before moving forward, and that they underestimated Iran’s capacity to sustain retaliatory action even after heavy damage to its conventional military forces. But for Taiwan, the central concern runs in the opposite direction: whether the current U.S. administration is bold enough to commit American troops to the island’s defense, rather than stepping back from a cross-Strait conflict.

    For years, many foreign policy observers have framed former President Donald Trump’s approach to global affairs as leaning toward isolationism. Prominent commentators, including Temple University Tokyo campus Professor Robert Dujarric, former U.S. National Security Advisor John Bolton, and The Guardian foreign affairs analyst Simon Tinsdall, have all argued that Trump prioritizes avoiding a major war in Asia over blocking China from annexing Taiwan.

    It is true that China would be a far more formidable opponent than Iran, so willingness to engage in large-scale operations in the Middle East does not automatically translate to willingness to fight a great-power conflict in the Indo-Pacific. Even so, the Iran campaign demonstrates that this U.S. administration is willing to rule out the option of deploying large conventional forces in distant conflicts outside of the Western Hemisphere – a key shift that Beijing cannot ignore.

    Beijing’s longstanding strategic approach to territorial expansion follows a framework of cautious aggression: it first probes for weakness, only advancing further if it encounters minimal resistance. This aligns with the classic strategic guidance often attributed to early Soviet leaders Josef Stalin and Vladimir Lenin: “If you hit mush, keep going; if you hit steel, pull back.” For a Chinese leadership that relies heavily on gray zone tactics to advance its interests without open war, the pattern of bold actions taken by the Trump administration – from the targeted strike that killed Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani during his first term, to the political intervention in Venezuela, the tightening of Cuba’s oil blockade, the large-scale bombardment of Iran, and even public discussions of seizing Greenland – comes as a striking departure from previous expectations of U.S. restraint.

    Given this track record of unilateral, forceful action, it is now effectively impossible for Chinese planners to confidently conclude the U.S. would refuse to militarily intervene to defend Taiwan.

    This uncertainty around U.S. intervention leads to the second critical question: how the Iran conflict changes the likelihood that China will choose to launch an invasion of Taiwan.

    Some analysts have argued that Washington’s adoption of a “might makes right” approach, visible in its actions against Iran and Venezuela, gives Beijing a green light to pursue its own territorial goals by force against Taiwan. But this argument misses key realities of Chinese strategic planning. Beijing does not tie its policy decisions to a normative standard set by the United States. The Chinese government has long maintained it will use force against Taiwan if its leadership deems it necessary, a threat formalized in the 2005 Anti-Succession Law.

    For years, Chinese state propaganda has emphasized the narrative that the U.S. is a declining “paper tiger,” pointing to the 2021 withdrawal from Afghanistan as proof of American weakness. But the U.S. military’s smooth, successful execution of the complex large-scale operation in Iran, thousands of miles from the American homeland, offers a stark counterpoint. Meanwhile, Chinese-supplied military equipment – particularly air defense systems – performed poorly in both Venezuela and Iran, offering Chinese leadership an unvarnished reminder that the U.S. armed forces remain the most capable in the world.

    While Chinese officials and state media publicly condemned the U.S. campaign as illegal and brutal, many independent and state-aligned Chinese analysts openly acknowledged American operational competence. Prominent Chinese foreign affairs scholar Zheng Yongnian concluded the U.S. “still [ranks] number one” in global military power. Analyst Niu Tanqin noted he “cannot but admire” the U.S. military’s performance, and leading international relations scholar Shi Yinhong confirmed that the tactical success of American forces “strongly impressed the leaders [in Beijing].” This clear demonstration of coordinated, advanced military capability carries tangible deterrent weight for Beijing’s Taiwan planning.

    At the same time, Chinese observers have also noted that the Iran campaign has diverted U.S. military focus and depleted stockpiles of key weapons that would be used to counter Chinese expansion in the Indo-Pacific. U.S. officials have insisted the conflict has not delayed pre-planned weapons deliveries to Taiwan that the island has already purchased, noting that munitions used in Iran are drawn from existing U.S. military stockpiles rather than from production lines allocated for foreign sales. Even so, the U.S. has temporarily reallocated significant military capabilities from Asia to the Middle East for the Iran campaign, including Patriot interceptors, THAAD anti-missile systems, the USS Abraham Lincoln carrier strike group, two additional guided-missile destroyers, and two Marine expeditionary units.

    U.S. forces have also expended large stockpiles of high-value precision weapons, most notably Tomahawk cruise missiles – a system that would play a critical role in any Indo-Pacific conflict thanks to its long range, powerful warhead, and newly developed anti-ship variant. To date, the U.S. has fired between 850 and 1,000 Tomahawks in the Iran campaign, and replacing the entire stockpile will take two to three years at a cost of roughly $3.5 million per missile. This has led some analysts to speculate that the diversion of forces and depletion of munitions creates a new window of opportunity for China to attack Taiwan, arguing that U.S. military stockpiles were already stretched thin before the Iran conflict, and China could now count on U.S. forces running out of critical munitions far more quickly in a cross-Strait war.

    This window-of-opportunity argument holds weight only if one accepts the premise that Chinese leader Xi Jinping has already decided to forcibly annex Taiwan as soon as the odds of success appear favorable. But that premise fails to account for the massive risks and downsides that a full-scale invasion would pose for China’s leadership.

    In any invasion scenario, China would have to plan for a coordinated defensive response from Taiwanese, U.S., and Japanese forces. Even as the U.S. draws down its precision munition stockpiles, Taiwan is on track to assemble what it calls “the world’s highest density of anti-ship missiles” by the end of 2026. Japan has also begun mass production of its new Type 25 anti-ship cruise missile – a system with range covering the entire Taiwan Strait – and began deploying the weapon in March 2026.

    A Chinese victory is far from guaranteed, and even a limited victory would likely be pyrrhic. The U.S. Navy would almost certainly interdict China’s seaborne energy imports, and a full-scale war in the Taiwan Strait would halt commercial shipping along most of China’s eastern coast for weeks or months. The resulting economic turmoil could trigger widespread social and political unrest within mainland China, and Beijing would face a generations-long challenge to pacify and govern a hostile Taiwanese population.

    Beyond these immediate military and economic risks, Beijing has no pressing need to resort to force against Taiwan in the near term. Chinese strategic thinking holds that U.S. comprehensive power is in gradual decline, while China continues to advance in industrial and technological capacity. Over time, this shift improves Beijing’s relative position, increasing the likelihood that Washington will eventually choose to step back from competition for strategic leadership in East Asia on its own.

    Domestically, Xi is still in the midst of a sweeping purge of roughly half of China’s senior military commanders, with a disproportionate share of those removed coming from the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force – the service branch that would play a central role in any invasion of Taiwan. This ongoing leadership reshuffle creates significant internal uncertainty that discourages any high-stakes military gambit in the near term.

    Politically, Beijing also has reason to wait for a more favorable outcome through peaceful means. Taiwan’s main opposition Kuomintang (KMT) accepts Beijing’s core position that Taiwan is part of a single China, and Beijing holds out hope that the KMT will regain control of Taiwan’s presidency in the 2028 election. Recent political developments have bolstered these hopes: KMT Chairwoman Cheng Li-wun’s high-profile visit to mainland China in April 2025 underscored the party’s willingness to engage with Beijing, and the KMT holds a legislative majority in coalition with the Taiwan People’s Party. Incumbent President Lai Ching-te of the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) has struggled with low approval ratings – his ratings were negative for most of 2025 and hover around 50 percent in 2026 – and the KMT successfully defeated a 2025 DPP recall campaign that attempted to remove 31 KMT legislators, with all 31 retaining their seats. While it remains far from certain that the KMT will win the presidency in 2028 and implement a more Beijing-friendly cross-Strait policy, current trends give Beijing ample reason to wait and watch rather than rush to war.

    Diplomatically, Beijing also has incentives to avoid conflict this year. Trump and Xi are scheduled to hold two formal summits in 2026, and Beijing is eager to stabilize bilateral economic relations, which are currently under a temporary truce after a years-long trade war that saw the U.S. impose steep tariffs on Chinese imports and China threaten to restrict rare earth exports to the U.S. A sudden invasion of Taiwan would derail this economic stabilization effort. Additionally, Beijing will have the opportunity during the summits to push for limited U.S. concessions on Washington’s support for Taipei; the U.S. has already agreed to delay the announcement of a major new arms sale to Taiwan until after Trump’s first May 2026 meeting with Xi, creating an opening for Beijing to secure a limited political win without resorting to force.

    Finally, the Iran conflict has drawn new attention to underrecognized vulnerabilities in Taiwan’s energy security: the island relies on seaborne imports for more than 95 percent of its oil and liquid natural gas (LNG), with LNG accounting for roughly half of Taiwan’s electricity generation. Taiwan’s strategic LNG reserve only covers 8 to 11 days of demand, and while its 100-day oil reserve is more robust, the island remains highly exposed to any disruption of maritime supply routes. Addressing these energy vulnerabilities, along with hardening Taiwan’s western coastline with mobile, survivable anti-ship and anti-air missile batteries, should be a top priority for Taipei’s security planners.

    Even with these new challenges highlighted by the Iran conflict, the campaign does not create immediate additional risk of an invasion for Taiwan. Despite the depletion of U.S. precision munitions and the diversion of some regional forces to the Middle East, Beijing faces a host of compelling domestic, political, and strategic incentives to hold off from launching a high-risk invasion attempt for the foreseeable future.

  • Hong Kong firm files arbitration against Maersk, saying it schemed with Panama over port takeover

    Hong Kong firm files arbitration against Maersk, saying it schemed with Panama over port takeover

    In a fresh escalation of the high-stakes conflict over control of strategically critical ports along the Panama Canal, a subsidiary of Hong Kong conglomerate CK Hutchison Holdings has initiated international arbitration proceedings against Danish logistics giant Maersk, accusing the shipping group of colluding with Panama’s government to seize control of its terminal operations.

    Panama Ports Company, the CK Hutchison unit that held long-term concessions for the Balboa and Cristobal ports at the Atlantic and Pacific entrances of the canal, laid out the new legal claim in an official statement released Tuesday. The company alleges that Maersk deliberately undermined its existing operating contract to clear the way for a Maersk-affiliated entity to take over operations of the high-traffic Balboa terminal. The arbitration will be conducted in London, though the firm has not publicly disclosed what financial or legal remedies it is pursuing through the process.

    This latest legal action builds on a series of disputes that stretch back to early 2025. Back in February, Panama’s national government seized full control of both the Balboa and Cristobal ports, shortly after the country’s Supreme Court ruled that CK Hutchison’s original operating concession was unconstitutional. That court ruling and subsequent seizure triggered immediate diplomatic pushback from the Chinese government. Shortly after the takeover, Panama’s administration handed operational control of the two ports to subsidiaries of Maersk and Mediterranean Shipping Company, the two largest container shipping firms in the world.

    Panama Ports Company first launched arbitration proceedings against the Panamanian government itself in February. By late March, the firm expanded its damages claim, stating that total losses related to the seizure now exceed $2 billion. The company emphasized in Tuesday’s statement that the new claim against Maersk is entirely separate from its ongoing legal efforts to hold Panama liable for what it describes as “anti-contract and anti-investor conduct.”

    As of Wednesday, neither Maersk’s corporate leadership nor Panama’s government has issued an immediate public response to the new arbitration filing.

    The unfolding legal conflict has further complicated a major pre-existing deal that has drawn global geopolitical and business attention. CK Hutchison first announced plans in March 2025 to sell the majority of its 40+ global port assets—including the two Panama Canal ports—to a consortium led by U.S. investment firm BlackRock, in a deal valued at $23 billion. The proposed transaction was welcomed by former U.S. President Donald Trump, who had repeatedly made unsubstantiated claims of Chinese interference in the operations of the vital global shipping lane. However, the deal sparked pushback from Beijing, and China’s antitrust regulator launched a formal review of the transaction last year. Since then, the parties to the sale have explored multiple adjustments to keep the deal on track, including the possibility of adding a Chinese investor to the buying consortium to resolve regulatory concerns.

  • How Pakistan helped secure a fragile ceasefire between the US and Iran

    How Pakistan helped secure a fragile ceasefire between the US and Iran

    Weeks of quiet behind-the-scenes diplomacy led by Pakistan has culminated in a breakthrough agreement for a two-week ceasefire between long-standing adversaries Iran and the United States, a deal that narrowly came together after last-minute escalations nearly derailed the entire process.

    In the hours leading up to the official ceasefire announcement, confidential insights shared with the BBC by an anonymous Pakistani source close to the negotiations highlighted the high-stakes, fast-moving nature of the talks. The source, who was not part of the core negotiating team, confirmed that Pakistan had maintained its role as the primary intermediary between Tehran and Washington, with discussions advancing “at pace” through a tightly controlled, very small circle of Pakistani negotiators. The mood throughout the final stretch, the source added, remained “sombre and serious but still hopeful” that a halt to hostilities could be reached, with only hours left to lock in the framework.

    Pakistan’s long-standing ties to both sides made it a natural broker for the talks: it shares a lengthy border and decades of what it describes as a “brotherly” relationship with Iran, while it maintains close security cooperation with the United States. Former U.S. President Donald Trump has publicly praised Pakistan’s top military commander, Field Marshall Asim Munir, calling him his “favorite” Field Marshall and noting that Munir has unique insight into Iranian politics.

    The path to the ceasefire was far from smooth, however. Just two days before the agreement, unplanned escalations – an Israeli strike on Iranian targets followed by an Iranian attack on Saudi Arabia – threw months of diplomatic work into doubt. Speaking to Pakistan’s parliament on Tuesday, Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar acknowledged that until the attacks, negotiators had been cautiously optimistic about progress. “Until yesterday we were very optimistic that things are moving in a positive direction,” Dar said, adding that Pakistan “was still trying to manage things as much as possible” to salvage the deal.

    Munir, Pakistan’s top military leader, issued unusually blunt criticism of Iran’s move, calling the attack on Saudi Arabia a deliberate setback that “spoils sincere efforts to resolve the conflict through peaceful means.” The rebuke marked one of the strongest public statements Pakistan has made against Iran since the broader conflict began. International analysts noted that the criticism was likely intentional, designed to ramp up external pressure on Tehran to compromise, particularly given Pakistan’s existing mutual defense pact with Saudi Arabia – a pact that has not yet been activated despite repeated attacks on Saudi territory throughout the conflict.

    In the hours after midnight Pakistan local time, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif took to social media platform X to outline the emerging framework, writing that “diplomatic efforts… are progressing steadily, strongly and powerfully with the potential to lead to substantive results in near future.” Sharif called on Trump to extend the existing U.S. deadline for a negotiated outcome by two weeks, and requested that Iran keep the critical Strait of Hormuz open to commercial shipping for the duration of the ceasefire.

    Shortly after Sharif’s post, Iran’s ambassador to Pakistan Reza Amiri Moghadam confirmed the diplomatic progress in his own X post, writing at around 3 a.m. local time that negotiations had moved “a step forward from critical, sensitive stage.” Just two hours later, Sharif made the official announcement: a two-week ceasefire had been formally agreed by both sides. As part of the next step, he invited representatives from Iran and the U.S. to travel to Islamabad on April 10 for direct talks aimed at reaching a permanent, conclusive peace agreement.

    Even with the ceasefire in place, however, observers and insiders remain cautious about long-term prospects. The anonymous Pakistani source emphasized to the BBC that negotiators are “still being very circumspect” given the “continued fragility” of the situation. Decades of mutual hostility have left deep-rooted distrust between Iran and the U.S., with both sides holding strongly entrenched positions on core issues. While Pakistan has succeeded in bringing the two adversaries to the negotiating table in Islamabad, the question of what substantive agreements they can reach to lock in long-term peace remains far from answered.

  • ‘Hard to unseat the king’: Iran’s control of Hormuz may not be end of petrodollar

    ‘Hard to unseat the king’: Iran’s control of Hormuz may not be end of petrodollar

    As tensions escalate around the strategic Strait of Hormuz, energy and currency experts agree that while Iran can easily maintain operational control over this critical global waterway, dislodging the U.S. dollar from its decades-long dominance of the global oil trade will prove far out of Tehran’s reach. The standoff over the strait, through which roughly 20% of the world’s energy supplies flow annually, has become the central flashpoint of ongoing regional conflict, with former U.S. President Donald Trump issuing extreme threats against Iran over its claims to influence over the waterway. Tehran has already implemented a structured toll system for vessels seeking passage, allowing entry to ships from allied nations including Pakistan and China, and its decision to denominate these tolls in Chinese yuan has sparked widespread speculation that the petrodollar system – the longstanding arrangement under which global oil is priced and traded exclusively in U.S. dollars – could be facing a fatal collapse.

    Iran has strong strategic and economic incentives to challenge dollar hegemony, notes Djavad Salehi-Isfahani, an Iranian economy specialist at Virginia Tech. Decades of sweeping U.S. sanctions have left Tehran locked out of the global dollar-denominated financial system, giving Washington effective veto power over nearly all of Iran’s cross-border financial transactions. But even if Iran solidifies its control over Hormuz, leading currency experts argue that key Gulf oil-producing states – including Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, Bahrain, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates – show no willingness to abandon the petrodollar framework.

    “The Strait of Hormuz was a freeway, and it’s going to become a toll road. The Iranians will control it, but king dollar is still king dollar,” explained Steve Hanke, a currency expert and professor at Johns Hopkins University.

    To understand the dollar’s enduring hold on global oil markets, it is necessary to trace the origins of the petrodollar system back to 1974, when U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger negotiated a landmark agreement with Saudi Arabia. Under the deal, Riyadh agreed to price all of its oil exports in dollars and reinforces its export surpluses into U.S. Treasury assets, a arrangement that rescued the dollar’s status as the world’s primary reserve currency just three years after President Richard Nixon ended the dollar’s gold convertibility, upending the post-WWII Bretton Woods system.

    The 1974 deal produced two transformative outcomes: it sparked the eurodollar boom of the late 1970s, when dollar deposits held in foreign (mostly European) banks became the foundation of global cross-border lending, and cemented the dollar’s global dominance after the 1971 “gold shock” that threatened its status. Following Saudi Arabia’s lead, all other Gulf producers adopted the petrodollar framework, and by the mid-1970s, the region had become the largest single source of new capital for U.S. government borrowing via Treasury bond purchases.

    David M Wight, author of *Oil Money: Middle East Petrodollars and the Transformation of US Empire*, notes that the petrodollar system has proven “remarkably resilient” across five decades of geopolitical upheaval. Contrary to popular narratives that frame the system as U.S. coercion of Gulf states, Wight emphasizes that the arrangement was mutually beneficial, built through negotiation rather than strong-arming. In the wake of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War and the Arab oil embargo that worsened U.S. inflation, Gulf leaders sought U.S. security guarantees in exchange for their commitment to the petrodollar, creating a longstanding geopolitical bargain that endures today.

    That bargain is why many analysts have argued that Iran’s control of Hormuz could upend the entire system, especially amid shifting U.S. policy: Trump has alternated between threatening to destroy Iran’s civilization and suggesting he would withdraw U.S. forces and allow Iran to take full control of the strait, even telling U.S. allies to “go get your own oil” last week. Today, all Gulf states continue to peg their national currencies to the U.S. dollar, unlike the freely floating euro, and collectively held $315 billion in U.S. Treasuries by the end of 2025, with Saudi Arabia alone holding $134 billion in January 2026.

    The geopolitical and economic landscape has shifted substantially since the 1970s, however. The U.S. has grown far more reliant on deficit spending, reducing the relative importance of Gulf investments, while Gulf states have evolved into more mature, diversified investors. In the 1980s, Gulf purchases of Treasuries covered roughly 10% of annual U.S. deficit spending; today, that figure stands at just 2%, according to analysis by former CIA economist Jess Hoversen of Column Bank. U.S. government spending has exploded in recent decades, but a bigger shift comes from Gulf states themselves: many now run domestic budget deficits as they invest heavily in local economic diversification projects, particularly Saudi Arabia’s push to reduce its reliance on oil exports, which led Riyadh to issue $82 billion in sovereign debt in 2025. Gulf states are now net borrowers rather than large net buyers of U.S. government debt, reorienting their surplus capital toward U.S. equities, global alternative assets like European football clubs, and domestic infrastructure.

    “Defining the petrodollar today has changed from decades ago,” noted Brad Setser, a former U.S. Treasury economist now at the Council on Foreign Relations. “The Gulf states are borrowers now and not as big buyers of treasuries.”

    Still, the system’s underlying vulnerabilities have been laid bare by the recent regional conflict. The Financial Time reported that multiple central banks have sold off large holdings of U.S. Treasuries in response to the U.S.-Israeli war on Iran, driving a sharp surge in 10-year Treasury yields from 3.9% pre-war to roughly 4.4% today. Higher yields raise borrowing costs for U.S. consumers and the federal government alike, and mark an unusual break from historic norms: during periods of global crisis, investors typically flock to U.S. Treasuries as a safe-haven asset, pushing yields down rather than up.

    Despite these growing pressures, experts say the deep liquidity of U.S. capital markets – the ability to buy and sell dollar-denominated assets quickly and at scale – remains the core reason Gulf states will not abandon dollar pricing. While Hanke acknowledges that U.S. geopolitical moves including sweeping sanctions, regional wars, and tariffs have eroded the dollar’s standing over the long term and opened space for competing currencies, the unmatched size and liquidity of the U.S. capital market will keep oil priced in dollars for the foreseeable future.

    The dollar’s dominance has already faced incremental challenges at the margins. After Western sanctions imposed following its 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Russia now sells most of its oil and gas to China in yuan, and sanctioned Iran also conducts its oil sales to Beijing in the Chinese currency. This bifurcation of the global oil market means that the dollar and U.S. debt markets are not receiving the typical boost they would see during a period of high oil prices and regional conflict: blocked from exporting through Hormuz, Gulf states are not reaping the windfall from elevated energy prices that would normally flow into dollar assets, while major non-Gulf producers like Russia are not reinvesting their profits in dollars.

    “We have a meaningful rise in the price of oil, but Gulf countries are not benefiting from it. So who are the big beneficiaries? One is Russia, which won’t save in dollars,” Setser said.

    Even as the role of petrodollar surpluses has evolved, Wight argues that the system remains politically and economically critical enough that the U.S. would bring significant pressure to bear on any Gulf state that moved to price oil in an alternative currency like the euro or yuan. “I think there is pressure from the US to keep these transactions in dollars and thus far, the Gulf states have been happy to go along with it,” he said.

    As the global reserve currency for the world’s most traded commodity, the dollar is deeply embedded in global trade networks, creating sustained global demand that keeps its value high relative to other currencies. This dynamic actually benefits major export economies like China and the Eurozone, which gain a competitive trade advantage from a weaker domestic currency, meaning even major potential rivals to the dollar have little incentive to push for an end to the petrodollar system.

    “There are some advantages to being a reserve currency, but also drawbacks, one of which is that it makes it harder for you to promote your own exports,” Wight explained.

    This combination of deep structural inertia, competing geopolitical and economic interests, and the unique liquidity of U.S. dollar markets means that the petrodollar system will remain largely intact despite Iran’s control of the Strait of Hormuz and incremental challenges to dollar hegemony. “There are these challenges at the margins, but it’s hard to unseat the king,” Hanke said.

  • Indonesia extradites Scottish man sought by Spain as crime boss

    Indonesia extradites Scottish man sought by Spain as crime boss

    In a landmark cross-border law enforcement operation, Indonesian authorities have completed the long-awaited extradition of 45-year-old Steven Lyons, an alleged high-ranking Scottish organized crime leader, to Spain on Wednesday. The handover had been pushed back multiple times amid ongoing investigative work by local and international agencies, according to Indonesian official statements.

    Husnan Handano, a spokesperson for Bali’s regional immigration office, confirmed that Lyons was flown out of Indonesia to Amsterdam in the early hours of Wednesday. From the Dutch transit point, he will be transferred onward to Madrid to face a series of serious criminal charges, including drug trafficking and money laundering. Lyons was first taken into custody back in March at Bali’s Ngurah Rai International Airport, moments after he landed on the island from Singapore. Indonesia’s border security system flagged his identity via an Interpol Red Notice – a global arrest alert for extradition purposes – that had been filed at the request of Spanish authorities.

    Law enforcement agencies across three continents have long identified Lyons as the top leader of the so-called Lyons crime family, a transnational syndicate that has been targeted by investigators in both Spain and the United Kingdom for years. He has appeared on Spain’s most-wanted roster for roughly two years, linked to a 2024 homicide on Spanish soil. Bali Police Chief Daniel Adityajaya noted that Lyons’ March arrest was the culmination of a months-long joint probe coordinated by Indonesian, Spanish, and Scottish law enforcement groups.

    Indonesian investigators allege that Lyons’ network, which is based primarily in Scotland, controlled key drug trafficking routes connecting Spain and the United Kingdom. The syndicate is also suspected of laundering billions of dollars in illegal proceeds through a web of dummy companies spread across Europe and the Middle East, with registered entities in Spain, Scotland, England, Dubai, Qatar, Bahrain and Turkey, according to local police allegations.

    Months before Lyons’ arrest in Bali, law enforcement teams in Scotland and Spain launched coordinated raids targeting the network’s infrastructure, which led to multiple arrests of suspected syndicate members. Additional co-conspirators were taken into custody in Turkey, the Netherlands and the United Arab Emirates as the investigation expanded across borders.

    Bali immigration head Bugie Kurniawan revealed a key detail that emerged after Lyons’ arrest: the alleged crime boss arrived in Bali accompanied by two other people, despite telling Indonesian officials he was traveling alone. Spanish Interpol has formally identified both companions as members of Lyons’ criminal cartel, though no active arrest warrants or Red Notices have been issued for them, so they remain at large on the island as of Wednesday. Bali Police spokesperson Ari Sandy declined to offer additional comment on the ongoing investigation when contacted by reporters.

    Scottish media outlets have pieced together a long public history of Lyons’ alleged ties to organized crime. Reports show he survived a 2006 shooting in Glasgow that killed his cousin, and he later relocated to Spain before eventually moving to Dubai. Just last year, Lyons’ brother and a close associate were gunned down in a suspected gangland slaying at a beachfront bar in Fuengirola, a coastal town in southern Spain.

  • Decorated Australian veteran remains behind bars on Afghan war crime charges

    Decorated Australian veteran remains behind bars on Afghan war crime charges

    In a landmark development that has rocked Australia’s military and legal communities, Australia’s most highly decorated living veteran Ben Roberts-Smith has declined to apply for bail after being formally charged with war-related homicide during a Sydney court hearing Wednesday.

    Roberts-Smith, 47, earned Australia’s two highest military honors — the Victoria Cross and Medal of Gallantry — for his combat service in Afghanistan, making his prosecution one of the most high-profile war crime cases in the nation’s modern history. He is only the second Afghanistan veteran from Australia to face war crime charges, following former SAS soldier Oliver Schulz, who has maintained a not guilty plea to a 2012 war crime murder charge, with his trial not expected to begin before 2027.

    The charges against Roberts-Smith stem from the alleged unlawful deaths of five Afghan civilians between 2009 and 2012, when he served as an elite corporal in Australia’s Special Air Service (SAS). Australian law defines war crime murder as the intentional killing of non-active combatants — including civilians, prisoners of war, and wounded service members — during armed conflict. Authorities allege Roberts-Smith either personally shot the five victims or directly ordered a subordinate to carry out the killings. He was arrested Tuesday morning at Sydney Airport, charged with five counts initially, and appeared on the court docket Wednesday with two formal charges of war crime murder and three additional counts of aiding and abetting war crime murder; every charge carries a maximum sentence of life imprisonment if convicted.

    The veteran spent Tuesday night in custody after his arrest, and did not appear for Wednesday’s hearing in either person or via video link. His legal team did not enter a plea on his behalf, nor did they file a request for bail. The case has been adjourned for preliminary proceedings until June 4.

    This criminal prosecution follows years of investigations and prior civil legal action. The charges originate from a 2020 independent Australian military report which uncovered conclusive evidence that elite SAS and commando troops unlawfully killed 39 unarmed Afghan people, including prisoners and local farmers, between 2001 and 2021 — the 20-year period when Australia deployed roughly 40,000 military personnel to Afghanistan, with 41 Australian service members killed in the campaign.

    In 2018, major Australian newspapers published public allegations of widespread war crimes committed by Roberts-Smith. He responded by filing a civil defamation lawsuit against the publications. In 2023, a federal judge ruled against Roberts-Smith, finding that the core of the allegations — that he unlawfully killed four unarmed Afghan noncombatants in 2009 and 2012 — were proven on the civil standard of a balance of probabilities. Unlike civil court, criminal charges require a higher burden of proof: prosecutors must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt to secure a conviction.

  • Asian benchmarks jump after oil prices sink in response to the Iran ceasefire

    Asian benchmarks jump after oil prices sink in response to the Iran ceasefire

    Global financial markets reacted dramatically early Wednesday, with Asian equities jumping to multi-session highs and crude oil prices tumbling double-digit dollars per barrel, following a last-minute breakthrough: the United States and Iran have reached an agreement for a 14-day ceasefire that will reopen the strategically critical Strait of Hormuz for global shipping.

    In early morning trading across Asia, major benchmark indices posted double-digit percentage gains in some cases, a sharp turnaround from weeks of volatility stoked by geopolitical tensions. Japan’s Nikkei 225, the region’s most closely watched benchmark, climbed 5% to hit 56,106.18 minutes after opening. Australia’s S&P/ASX 200 notched a 2.6% rise to 8,952.30, while South Korea’s Kospi outperformed most peers with a 5.9% surge to 5,819.97. In Greater China markets, Hong Kong’s Hang Seng Index gained 2.6% to 25,767.42, and mainland China’s Shanghai Composite added a solid 1.7% to close in on the 4,000 point threshold at 3,957.55.

    Crude oil markets, which had seen prices spike sharply after the conflict closed the strait to commercial shipping, saw an immediate and steep correction. Benchmark U.S. crude plummeted $16.84 to settle at $96.11 per barrel in early trading, while international benchmark Brent crude fell $14.51 to $94.76 a barrel. The sharp drop comes as no surprise to market analysts: nearly 20% of the world’s daily oil supply transits through the Strait of Hormuz, making the waterway one of the most critical energy chokepoints on the planet. For resource-import dependent economies like Japan, the reopening of the strait removes a major near-term threat to energy security.

    The breakthrough followed a flurry of diplomatic activity through Tuesday evening. After Pakistan’s prime minister publicly urged U.S. leadership to extend its original deadline for reopening the strait and pressed Iranian officials to resume commercial navigation, U.S. former President Donald Trump announced late Tuesday he would pause planned strikes against Iranian civilian infrastructure, including bridges and power plants, that had been threatened in recent days. Iran’s foreign minister confirmed that the strait would remain open for all commercial shipping for the 14-day period, under supervision by the Iranian military.

    Even as markets rallied, analysts struck a cautious tone. Tim Waterer, chief market analyst at KCM Trade, noted that the current market momentum is rooted in cautious optimism rather than unbridled celebration. “The ceasefire is only two weeks long, and markets will be watching closely to see whether shipping through the Strait of Hormuz normalizes as promised and whether the fragile truce can pave the way for a more durable peace agreement,” Waterer said.

    The ceasefire announcement ended weeks of sustained market volatility that began when the conflict broke out in late February. On Tuesday, U.S. equities already began pricing in the potential for a diplomatic breakthrough, with the S&P 500 erasing all earlier losses to close 0.1% higher. The Dow Jones Industrial Average edged down 0.2% (a drop of 85 points), while the Nasdaq Composite also closed 0.1% higher.

    Other asset classes also reflected easing geopolitical risk. In U.S. bond markets, the yield on 10-year Treasury notes eased to 4.24%, down from 4.30% earlier Tuesday as investors moved back to safe-haven assets following the news. In foreign exchange markets, the U.S. dollar softened against major peers, falling to 158.54 Japanese yen from 159.52 yen earlier in the week, while the euro rose to $1.1671 from $1.1597.

    This report was contributed to by AP Business Writer Stan Choe in New York, with reporting from Yuri Kageyama based in Tokyo.

  • Top Australian soldier to remain in jail over alleged war crimes

    Top Australian soldier to remain in jail over alleged war crimes

    One of Australia’s most decorated living military veterans, Ben Roberts-Smith, is now being held in police custody after his arrest earlier this week on war crime charges, after his legal team opted not to pursue bail ahead of upcoming court proceedings.

    The 47-year-old former soldier was taken into custody by law enforcement officers at Sydney Airport on Tuesday, and was immediately slapped with five counts of murder under Australian war crime law. He was then transferred to a holding cell to await his first court appearance, held the following day.

    On Wednesday, when the matter was brought before a Sydney local court, legal representatives for Roberts-Smith — who received the Victoria Cross, Australia’s highest award for battlefield bravery, in 2011 for his service in Afghanistan — did not submit an application for release on bail. Through his legal team, Roberts-Smith has repeatedly denied all allegations against him, describing the charges as egregious, malicious acts driven by spite.

    Tuesday’s arrest and subsequent criminal charges cap years of scrutiny of Roberts-Smith’s conduct during his deployments to Afghanistan between 2009 and 2012, when he served as a corporal in Australia’s elite Special Air Service Regiment (SAS). The proceedings come after a landmark 2023 civil defamation ruling, which followed years of legal battles. The defamation case was initiated by Roberts-Smith himself after major Australian newspapers published reports detailing his alleged war crimes, marking the first time any Australian court had formally considered allegations of unlawful killings by Australian military personnel deployed overseas.

    In that civil trial, the judge ruled that on the balance of probabilities — the lower standard of proof required in civil legal proceedings — most of the war crime allegations against Roberts-Smith were substantially true, finding he had unlawfully killed multiple unarmed Afghan civilians during his tour. Throughout the defamation case, Roberts-Smith’s legal team argued that any killings attributed to their client were lawful acts of combat, or that the deaths never occurred at all.

    In the new criminal case, Roberts-Smith faces a mix of charges: one count of war crime murder, one count of participating in a joint murder, and three counts of aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring murder. If convicted on any of the charges, he faces a maximum sentence of life imprisonment.

    Australian Federal Police (AFP) Commissioner Krissy Barrett confirmed that the charges are the result of a years-long, complex and exhaustive investigation into the allegations. “It will be alleged the victims were shot by the accused or shot by subordinate members of the ADF [Australian Defence Force] in the presence of, and acting on the orders of, the accused,” Barrett told reporters Tuesday.

    Barrett also emphasized that the alleged misconduct is limited to a very small group of Australian military personnel, noting that the vast majority of Australian Defence Force members serve with honor and bring credit to the nation.

    Following Wednesday’s initial court hearing, the presiding judge scheduled the next hearing in the case for June 4, and ordered that Roberts-Smith appear at the proceeding via video link. Roberts-Smith’s legal team has already stated they intend to file a request to move the next hearing to an earlier date.

  • US lawmakers call to remove Trump after ‘civilization will die’ threat against Iran

    US lawmakers call to remove Trump after ‘civilization will die’ threat against Iran

    A growing coalition of Democratic U.S. lawmakers is demanding President Donald Trump be stripped of executive authority through the 25th Amendment, a little-used constitutional mechanism that allows the vice president and cabinet to remove a sitting president deemed unfit to fulfill their official duties. The unprecedented call comes amid an escalating war in the Middle East that has now entered its seventh week, driven by Trump’s increasingly extreme rhetoric targeting Iran that critics have labeled a threat of genocide and war crimes.

    In a social media post Tuesday, Trump issued an ultimatum to Iran’s leadership: by 8 p.m. Washington local time, Tehran must agree to Washington’s demands to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, halt all nuclear enrichment activities, and end its domestic missile production program. If his conditions are not met, Trump vowed to “obliterate” Iran’s critical civilian infrastructure—including energy grids, communications networks, and public water systems that millions of Iranian civilians depend on for survival. In his most alarming remark, he warned that “a whole civilization will die tonight” if the Islamic Republic refuses to comply.

    Iranian leaders have flatly rejected Trump’s non-negotiable preconditions, countering with demands for a complete end to all U.S. and Israeli military hostilities across the region and full financial compensation for damage already inflicted by ongoing conflict.

    As of Tuesday afternoon in Washington, D.C., at least 30 sitting members of Congress have publicly and explicitly called for Trump’s immediate removal through the 25th Amendment process. California Congressman Ro Khanna laid out the urgency of the demand in a video posted to X Tuesday, arguing that Trump’s public statements cross fundamental moral and legal lines.

    “If the United States Congress has any life left in it, every member of the House and Senate must be calling for Trump’s removal today, based on the 25th amendment,” Khanna said. “He is threatening the entire destruction of a civilisation. He is calling Iranians ‘animals’. He is showing a total disregard for the humanity of people in Iran, in Gaza, in Cuba. This is a moral crime. It is a war crime. We need to be demanding that Congress convene today, and we need to be invoking the 25th amendment.”

    When questioned by reporters Monday about whether targeting Iran’s civilian infrastructure could constitute a war crime given its direct impact on civilian survival, Trump dismissed all concerns out of hand.

    Colorado Congresswoman Diana DeGette added that if Trump’s cabinet refuses to act to remove the president, Congress should immediately launch new impeachment proceedings. “Donald Trump is openly threatening war crimes against the entirety of Iranian civilization. 25th Amendment proceedings must begin immediately, but if the Cabinet is too cowardly, the House should begin the impeachment process,” she wrote on X.

    Illinois Congresswoman Delia Ramirez echoed DeGette’s position, accusing Trump of deliberately escalating the conflict to advance his own political and financial interests. “He is a warmonger, escalating the conflict for his own profit and consolidation of power,” Ramirez added.

    Congress has already seen one impeachment effort against Trump launched earlier this year, on December 10 by Texas Congressman Al Green. The measure currently has only two co-sponsors and has failed to gain momentum, largely because both chambers of Congress are held by Republican majorities—any impeachment trial in the Senate would almost certainly result in acquittal. If November’s midterm elections flip congressional control to Democrats, however, a third impeachment (following 2018 and 2021 efforts) becomes a distinct possibility.

    Arizona Congresswoman Yassamin Ansari, who is of Iranian descent, went a step further Monday, announcing she will introduce articles of impeachment against Secretary of War Pete Hegseth, one of the most prominent public advocates for expanding the war into Iran. “Trump is escalating a devastating, illegal war, threatening massive war crimes and targeting civilian infrastructure in Iran…the rhetoric has crossed every line. Pete Hegseth is complicit,” Ansari wrote. “It’s clear he’s unfit to be president.”

    Michigan Congressman Shri Thanedar called out Republican lawmakers for their silence, writing on X: “If Vance, Rubio & the others continue to be spineless cowards, Congress must do everything possible to stop Trump & this war.” Fellow Michigan Congresswoman Rashida Tlaib called Trump a “maniac” who “should be removed from office,” adding: “After bombing a school and massacring young girls, the war criminal in the White House is threatening genocide. It’s time to invoke the 25th Amendment.”

    Minnesota Congresswoman Ilhan Omar, who has been repeatedly targeted by Trump’s anti-Somali rhetoric, called Trump an “unhinged lunatic” and issued a two-word demand: “Impeach. Remove.” Wisconsin Congressman Mark Pocan warned that Trump poses an immediate existential risk: “He is too unhinged, dangerous, and deranged to have the nuclear codes!” California Congresswoman Sydney Kamlager-Dove labeled Trump’s rhetoric “pure evil,” urging Republicans to break with the president. “Republicans, if there were ever a time to stand up, it’s now,” she wrote. “I’m sick to my stomach. Trump’s genocidal language and indiscriminate warfare cannot be normalized or accepted.”

    Multiple other Democratic lawmakers have echoed these condemnations, with Massachusetts Congressman Seth Moulton arguing that the threat cannot be dismissed as typical Trump behavior. “This is not just ‘Trump being Trump’. This is an insane man who is unfit for office,” Moulton said. Delaware Congresswoman Sarah McBride noted that Trump’s threat crosses an unprecedented red line even for a presidency defined by controversial rhetoric. “In a political career defined by grotesque statements, this president’s horrifying, illegal, and genocidal threat this morning is among the most dangerous and appalling,” she wrote Tuesday. “You can’t shout ‘fire’ in a crowded theater and a president cannot be allowed to threaten genocide with the United States military.”

    Massachusetts Senator Ed Markey went even further, urging active-duty U.S. troops to refuse to carry out any orders that qualify as war crimes, noting that the current conflict was never authorized by Congress. “To the members of our military: remember, you do not have to follow illegal orders,” Markey wrote.

    No sitting Republican lawmakers have publicly expressed support for removing Trump, but one high-profile former Republican member of Congress, Marjorie Taylor-Greene of Georgia, broke with party lines to back the 25th Amendment push. “25TH AMENDMENT!!! Not a single bomb has dropped on America. We cannot kill an entire civilization. This is evil and madness,” she wrote on X.

    The 25th Amendment, ratified in 1967, outlines the formal constitutional process for transferring executive power in the event a sitting president is deemed unable to carry out their duties. The mechanism has never before been used to permanently remove a sitting president; past uses have only involved temporary transfers of power while presidents underwent medical procedures requiring general anesthesia.

    To initiate the process to remove Trump, Vice President JD Vance and a majority of Trump’s cabinet (or an alternate congressional body created for this purpose) must first formally agree that the president is unfit to serve due to mental or physical incapacity. That declaration must be submitted in writing to the Speaker of the House and the Senate President Pro Tempore, the second-highest ranking Senate leader who presides over votes when the vice president is absent. Immediately upon submission, Vance would assume the powers of the acting presidency.

    Trump would then have the right to submit his own declaration to Congress asserting he is capable of resuming his duties, which would allow him to retake power immediately. Vance and the cabinet would then have four days to submit an appeal to Congress, at which point lawmakers would convene to vote on the question of removal. A two-thirds majority vote in both the House and Senate is required to formalize the president’s removal, after which the vice president would serve as acting president until the next scheduled presidential election. Without that two-thirds majority, Trump would remain in office.