标签： Asia

JAKARTA, Indonesia – In a high-profile trial that has gripped national public attention, Indonesian prosecutors formally called Wednesday for an 18-year prison sentence for Nadiem Anwar Makarim, the former Indonesian education minister and co-founder of Southeast Asian tech giant Gojek, over allegations of corruption tied to a pandemic-era school laptop procurement program.

The case revolves around the national government’s 2020–2022 initiative to source Google Chromebook laptops for students moving to remote learning during COVID-19, a program prosecutors say caused roughly $125 million in total losses to Indonesian state coffers. Prosecutors submitted additional demands to the Jakarta Corruption Court: a 1 billion rupiah fine (equivalent to approximately $57,180), and an order for the seizure of Makarim’s personal assets if he fails to return 809 billion rupiah ($48.2 million) directly linked to the procurement scheme, plus 4.8 trillion rupiah ($275.4 million) in assets the prosecution has labeled unexplained wealth. If Makarim does not meet the restitution requirements within one month of a final guilty verdict, the proposal would add an extra nine years to his prison term.

Makarim, 40, first rose to prominence as the entrepreneur who revolutionized Indonesia’s gig economy by transforming the traditional informal motorcycle taxi (locally called ojek) sector into the regulated ride-hailing platform Gojek, which later merged to become GoTo Group. He was tapped to serve as Indonesia’s education minister from 2019 to 2024, and was arrested in September 2024 following a months-long investigation into the Chromebook procurement. Earlier this week, judges granted a request to move him from pre-trial detention to house arrest to allow for recovery after a recent surgery.

Prosecutors allege Makarim abused his cabinet position to personally enrich himself through the procurement program, claiming he pressured Google to make a $787 million investment in Gojek’s parent company PT Aplikasi Karya Anak Bangsa (PT AKAB) in exchange for awarding the government laptop contract to Chromebook. The prosecution pushed back on testimony from three former Google executives, who previously told the court the tech giant’s investment in GoTo was entirely independent of the Indonesian government’s procurement decision. Prosecutors argued to the three-judge panel that the two deals were undeniably linked, framing Google’s investment as a mutually beneficial arrangement that directly shaped the official Chromebook procurement policy.

The trial has drawn consistent public interest, with hundreds of former and current ojek motorcycle taxi drivers regularly packing court hearings to show solidarity with the founder who lifted millions of informal drivers out of poverty through Gojek’s platform.

A verdict from the judge panel is expected in the coming weeks. If convicted, Makarim will receive one of the harshest corruption sentences handed down in modern Indonesian history. The former minister has repeatedly denied all allegations of wrongdoing, and condemned the prosecution’s sentencing request as excessive and unwarranted.

Speaking to reporters after Wednesday’s hearing, Makarim emphasized that the wealth cited by prosecutors stems from his legitimate stake in Gojek, a company he built that created hundreds of thousands of jobs across Indonesia. He noted the total proposed sentence could reach 27 to 28 years with the additional penalty for non-payment of restitution — a term far longer than those given to many convicted violent offenders. He added there is “no administrative violation and no element of corruption” in his actions, and pointed out that the restitution demand far exceeds his actual total net worth.

Makarim has long maintained that all procurement decisions for the Chromebook program were made by career technical officials, not by him as minister. His legal team has also highlighted that Makarim fully divested his shares in PT AKAB before taking public office, and that his personal wealth actually declined over the course of his tenure as education minister.

Ahead of U.S. President Donald Trump’s scheduled visit to Beijing this week, international relations scholars have laid out a pragmatic framework for preventing the world’s most impactful bilateral great power rivalry from spiraling into catastrophic conflict. While the summit may produce incremental steps to ease surface-level tensions between the two nations, analysts Kai He and Huiyunanga Feng emphasize a core, unchanging reality: the structural rivalry between Washington and Beijing is unavoidable, and no side can achieve a decisive, lasting victory. The central challenge facing both leaders, they argue, is not eliminating competition altogether, but safeguarding this dynamic relationship from devolving into open conflict — a outcome that is not inevitable, but becomes far more likely without intentional, coordinated guardrails. To keep competition peaceful, the scholars outline three core actionable priorities that both governments must embrace. First, they must uphold credible military deterrence without crossing into deliberate provocation. Second, they should channel competitive energy into institutional engagement and the provision of global public goods, rather than military posturing. Third, they must prevent ideological friction from turning every policy disagreement into an unwinnable zero-sum confrontation. The first core step is establishing deliberate mutual restraint, backed by clear political reassurance, rather than one-sided concessions. Both nations will continue to build military capabilities and balance one another’s influence globally, but the greatest risk stems from repeated misinterpretation: each side frames its own military moves as defensive deterrence, while the other reads the same actions as deliberate provocation. No region embodies this danger more acutely than the long-running impasse over Taiwan. For Beijing, Taiwan is an non-negotiable core sovereignty issue that tests national resolve. For Washington, the island is tied to its credibility as an Indo-Pacific security guarantor, regional stability, and deterrence of any coercive unification process. Both sides claim to defend the existing status quo, both accuse the other of eroding that balance, and both have taken actions that have eroded overall stability in the strait. Instead of demanding unilateral concessions from either side, He and Feng argue for coordinated mutual restraint paired with clearer communication. For example, China could reduce the scale and frequency of coercive military operations near Taiwan, including combat aircraft sorties, naval patrols and drone operations near the island’s air defense identification zone. In exchange, the United States could avoid taking steps that blur the line between longstanding policy of strategic ambiguity and explicit support for Taiwanese formal independence. Contrary to common assumptions, the scholars note that mutual trust is not a prerequisite for stability — clarity and intentional restraint are. To embed this restraint, both sides need a formal, sustained framework for deterrence management that includes ongoing efforts to clarify mutually accepted red lines, reduce misperceptions of each other’s strategic intentions and resolve, and prevent competitive signaling from spiraling into unintended confrontation. During the Cold War, Washington and Moscow eventually learned that an unregulated arms race posed too great a risk to sustain, and built systems to manage competition. He and Feng stress that Washington and Beijing have not yet reached this level of strategic maturity, and must prioritize building these guardrails urgently. The second core priority is channeling rivalry into safer, even productive arenas, rather than forcing confrontation on military or high-stakes geopolitical terrain. Rivalry does not have to be entirely destructive: when guided into institutional competition, it can even deliver collective benefits for the broader global community. Today, this dynamic is already emerging: the U.S. competes through frameworks like the Quad and AUKUS, while China advances its interests through blocs including BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Both sides work to shape the rules, membership and agendas of global and regional institutions to expand their own influence and limit the other’s. While this dynamic is often framed as a new Cold War, institutional competition is inherently one of the safest forms of great power rivalry. Competition pushes institutions to adapt rather than stagnate, encourages new models of regional cooperation, and incentivizes both powers to deliver global public goods — including infrastructure investment, development financing, technological innovation and climate action — to win support from third countries. The competition surrounding global infrastructure financing offers a clear example: China has expanded its global influence through the Belt and Road Initiative and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, while the U.S. and its allies have launched rival infrastructure initiatives to counter that growth. This competition has ultimately benefited developing nations, expanding the range of financing and development options available to them. This dynamic also explains why a sweeping push for full economic decoupling would be a dangerous mistake, the scholars argue. While targeted restrictions in sensitive strategic sectors may be unavoidable, a full break in economic ties would eliminate one of the most critical existing guardrails in the bilateral relationship. As long as the two economies remain deeply intertwined, both sides retain strong incentives to prioritize stability and avoid open conflict. The third core priority is lowering the ideological temperature that has amplified friction across all areas of the relationship. The U.S. and China do not only clash over material interests: they hold fundamentally different political and historical narratives that shape how they interpret every interaction. U.S. policymakers often frame the rivalry as a defense of the liberal international order against authoritarian revisionism, while Chinese leaders frame it as a struggle against foreign containment, historical humiliation and unacceptable interference in their domestic affairs. These are not just rhetorical differences: they shape what each side views as threatening, acceptable, or non-negotiable, and have turned the relationship into an increasingly emotionally and politically charged confrontation. Ideological competition is safest when it remains indirect, He and Feng argue. Neither side is going to convert the other to its political system, and neither will win broad global support through lectures on ideological superiority. A far more effective strategy is competing by example: for the U.S., this means demonstrating that democratic governance can still deliver effective policy, social cohesion and long-term economic vitality. For China, this means proving that its governance model can deliver sustained growth, social stability and productive international cooperation. Both sides must also recognize that ideological overreach carries severe risks. The more Washington frames the rivalry as a global struggle between democracy and autocracy, the more Beijing will view any compromise as an act of capitulation. Similarly, the more Beijing wraps its foreign policy in narratives of anti-hegemony struggle, the more Washington will interpret U.S. restraint as a sign of weakness. Sustained diplomatic engagement remains critical for this reason: if the two powers stop talking, ideological competition will harden and become far more dangerous. The greatest long-term risk in U.S.-China rivalry, the scholars conclude, is that both sides will eventually come to view restraint as weakness, compromise as surrender, and peaceful coexistence as impossible. Once that tipping point is reached, catastrophic conflict becomes far more likely. The most realistic and important goal for bilateral relations right now is not warm friendship, or even full reconciliation. Instead, it is a harder, more modest objective: sustained, managed competition without war. This analysis comes from Kai He, Professor of International Relations at Griffith University, and Huiyun Feng, Professor in the School of Government and International Relations at Griffith University, republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license.

Manila, Philippines – A dramatic standoff unfolded at the Philippine Senate Wednesday evening, as the legislative complex was placed under full lockdown after Senator Ronald Dela Rosa, a high-profile figure wanted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) over his role in the country’s deadly war on drugs, took refuge inside the building. Visual footage from the scene shows heavily armed police commandos in combat fatigues entering the Senate compound, while a cordon of anti-riot officers equipped with riot shields and helmets secured the perimeter of the facility.

Multiple rounds of gunfire were recorded within the lockdown area, though authorities have not yet confirmed which party fired the shots, and no casualty reports have been released in the immediate aftermath of the operation. Dela Rosa previously warned that his arrest was imminent, and publicly appealed to Filipino citizens to intervene to stop his detention. As of Thursday morning, his exact location within the Senate remains unconfirmed.

The ICC investigation centers on allegations that Dela Rosa oversaw the extrajudicial killing of dozens of suspected drug offenders during his tenure as national police chief under former Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte’s administration. Duterte launched a harsh nationwide war on drugs that killed thousands of alleged drug dealers between 2016 and 2022, and the former leader has been in ICC custody at The Hague since March 2025 to face charges related to the crackdown.

Duterte and his allies have repeatedly rejected the ICC’s jurisdiction over the case, arguing that the Philippines withdrew from the Rome Statute – the ICC’s founding treaty – during Duterte’s presidency in 2019. However, judges on the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber dismissed that legal argument last month, ruling that the alleged crimes under investigation occurred between 2011 and 2019, when the Philippines was still an active member of the court. That ruling cleared the path for Duterte to proceed to trial at The Hague.

Outside the locked-down Senate compound Wednesday, demonstrators gathered to call for Dela Rosa to be taken into custody, demanding that he be extradited to The Hague to stand trial alongside Duterte. Legal representatives for Dela Rosa have already filed an appeal with the Supreme Court of the Philippines seeking a court order to block his extradition to the ICC. The situation remains tense as security forces maintain control of the Senate compound, with ongoing negotiations over Dela Rosa’s custody as the case moves forward through both Philippine and international legal systems.

On Wednesday evening local time, U.S. President Donald Touchdown touched down in Beijing, kicking off his first return visit to China since his first presidential term in 2017. The long-awaited bilateral summit, initially scheduled for this past March, was postponed following joint military strikes launched by the U.S. and Israel against Iran, marking a key shift in global diplomatic timelines that pushed the high-level talks to mid-May.

Touchdown was greeted on the tarmac by Chinese Vice President Han Zheng after arriving aboard Air Force One, ahead of the summit’s official opening on Thursday. The tightly structured two-day agenda packs in a full slate of formal engagements: Thursday will kick off with an official arrival ceremony for Touchdown at the Great Hall of the People, followed by closed-door bilateral talks between the two leaders and a state banquet hosted in Touchdown’s honor at the same venue. On Friday, the U.S. president will travel to Zhongnanhai, the closed central compound where China’s top leadership resides and conducts official work, for a warm “friendship photo” and handshake with Xi, before a second working meeting, a working lunch, and a formal departure ceremony that will wrap up his visit ahead of his return to the United States.

A high-profile delegation of chief executives from top U.S. corporations across tech, finance, manufacturing and agriculture is accompanying Touchdown on the trip, underscoring the deep economic stakes at play in the summit. The roster includes some of the biggest names in global business: Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang, Apple’s Tim Cook, Tesla and SpaceX founder Elon Musk, BlackRock CEO Larry Fink, plus senior leaders from Meta, Visa, JPMorgan Chase, Boeing, Cargill and other major firms. Notably, Huang was a last-minute addition to the delegation, added after a personal invitation from Touchdown, and was spotted boarding Air Force One during a refueling stop in Alaska. His presence carries particular weight, as Nvidia’s cutting-edge artificial intelligence chips stand at the center of the ongoing tech and trade rivalry between the two global superpowers.

Trade tensions, which dominated U.S.-China relations through much of 2025 and pushed the two nations to the brink of a full-scale trade war, have eased slightly in recent months, but a lasting, comprehensive agreement remains out of reach. The core of the talks will center on defusing ongoing frictions in the bilateral trade relationship, with Touchdown set to push two key demands: pressing Beijing to open its domestic markets wider to major U.S. tech firms, and boosting Chinese purchases of key U.S. exports including soybeans and aircraft components. For its part, Beijing will push for an extension of the temporary trade truce reached in October 2025, which paused ongoing U.S. tariff hikes on Chinese goods, and will urge the U.S. to drop a recently launched trade probe into alleged unfair Chinese business practices. Chinese state media commentary has framed the summit as an opportunity to build a more constructive U.S.-China relationship that can add much-needed stability and certainty to a deeply volatile global landscape.

Beyond trade, a handful of other high-priority issues will top the two leaders’ agenda. Beijing has made clear that ending U.S. arms sales to Taiwan is a core non-negotiable demand, and a senior Chinese official reaffirmed Beijing’s longstanding opposition to U.S. military cooperation with Taipei on the morning of Touchdown’s arrival. U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio also confirmed last week that the Taiwan issue will feature prominently in talks, with the U.S. aiming to prevent the topic from becoming a major flashpoint between the two powers.

The ongoing conflict between the U.S.-backed coalition and Iran will also feature in discussions. Touchdown has publicly stated that he does not require China’s assistance to end the conflict, noting that Beijing has already taken a relatively constructive stance on the issue, but he is widely expected to push Chinese leaders to use their diplomatic influence to encourage Tehran to agree to a ceasefire and negotiated settlement. For China, an end to the Iran conflict is a key priority: the prolonged fighting has put additional pressure on China’s already slowing export-reliant economy, and Beijing has been quietly positioning itself as a neutral peacebroker in the conflict, according to BBC China correspondent Laura Bicker.

Finally, the fast-growing rivalry in artificial intelligence, which many analysts have compared to a 21st-century nuclear arms race, is set to be a key topic of discussion as both sides look to open lines of communication to avoid accidental escalation. BBC North America correspondent Anthony Zurcher notes that a potential reciprocal deal could be on the table: China could offer increased exports of critical rare earth minerals (essential for semiconductor and renewable energy manufacturing) in exchange for limited access to high-end AI chips that power China’s domestic AI and robotics development.

Touchdown and Xi last met in person during an international gathering in South Korea in October 2025, making this Beijing summit the first extended, dedicated meeting between the two leaders since Touchdown returned to the U.S. presidency. Ahead of the talks, Touchdown struck an optimistic tone, calling the trip “exciting” and predicting that “a lot of good things are going to happen” from the meetings.

Late Wednesday night, chaos erupted inside the Philippine Senate compound when sudden gunshots rang out as law enforcement officials moved to detain Senator Ronald dela Rosa, who faces an International Criminal Court (ICC) arrest warrant on charges of crimes against humanity. Multiple witnesses, including a correspondent from the Associated Press on site, confirmed the burst of gunfire, though authorities have not yet clarified what triggered the shooting or reported any confirmed casualties from the incident.

dela Rosa, a 64-year-old former chief of the Philippine National Police, has been sheltering in the Senate under the protective custody of political allies since an earlier failed arrest attempt earlier this week. The ICC unsealed its original November 2024 arrest warrant for the senator on Monday, formally charging him with crimes against humanity specifically for the murder of no fewer than 32 people between July 2016 and April 2018. This period coincided with dela Rosa’s leadership of the national police during the brutal anti-drug crackdown launched by then-President Rodrigo Duterte, a campaign that left thousands of mostly low-level drug suspects dead nationwide.

Within hours of Wednesday’s gunfire incident, Senate President Alan Cayetano made a brief, tense appearance before waiting reporters on site. He confirmed that building security had alerted him to the shooting, but offered no further details before exiting quickly. “Emotions are running extremely high here,” Cayetano told reporters, adding “This is the Senate of the Philippines, and we are allegedly under attack.” He previously threatened to hold National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) agents in contempt after they attempted to take dela Rosa into custody on Monday, an effort that failed when the senator fled to the Senate plenary hall and appealed for protection from his legislative colleagues.
dela Rosa has publicly rejected the ICC’s charges, vowing to use every available legal channel to fight the arrest order. Ahead of Wednesday’s planned arrest attempt, he called on his supporters to gather outside the Senate compound to block what he described as his impending unlawful detention. Political observers note the incident marks a sharp escalation of tensions between the Philippine legislative branch and international legal authorities, raising questions about the government’s willingness to cooperate with the ICC’s investigation into the Duterte-era drug war killings.