标签: Asia

亚洲

  • ‘Europe must become more Jewish’ says owner of Telegraph and Politico

    ‘Europe must become more Jewish’ says owner of Telegraph and Politico

    In a provocative address to the World Jewish Congress (WJC) Governing Board in Geneva this week, Mathias Dopfner, CEO of global media giant Axel Springer – owner of major outlets including The Telegraph and Politico – declared that anti-Zionism is indistinguishable from racism, while laying out a series of divisive policy proposals that have reignited debates over media independence, censorship and immigration.

    Dopfner’s hardline stance on Israel is not new. Back in April, the media executive made international headlines when he told Politico journalists that any staff who refused to publicly back Israel must resign, a move that stoked widespread fears over the editorial independence of the political news outlet, which Axel Springer acquired in 2021. Opening his WJC speech, he doubled down on his ideological commitments, telling attendees: “I’m a goy, and I’m Zionist, with all my heart, out of conviction, and with passion.”

    In a wide-ranging address that included sharp anti-immigrant rhetoric and broad attacks on cultural institutions, universities, musicians, artists and the United Nations, Dopfner launched a particularly scathing attack on the UN Human Rights Council. The body has drawn repeated international condemnation of Israel over documented war crimes, systemic human rights abuses and the imposition of apartheid rule in occupied Palestinian territories; Dopfner derided the council as the “human rights Twistings Council”, claiming it unfairly targets Israel.

    Dopfner claimed that anti-Zionist sentiment – which he framed as any widespread, repeated criticism of the Israeli state – is spreading rapidly across North America and Europe, taking root in university campuses, arts and cultural circles, social media platforms and public street protests. While he conceded that criticism of Israel is not inherently forbidden, he argued that such critique should not become a normalized “everyday” conversation. He went further, claiming that rising criticism of Israel has rendered major Western European nations including Germany, France, the UK and Spain no longer “truly safe countries for Jews”.

    Turning specifically to UK politics, he attacked the country’s Green Party, which has seen growing electoral support in part driven by its public criticism of Israeli policy. He took particular issue with the party’s framing of Zionism as a racist ideology, retorting: “There must be a misunderstanding here. It is not Zionism that is racism. It is anti-Zionism that is racism.”

    Dopfner argued that the rise of anti-Zionism is fueled by “envy” of Jewish communal success, a claim that omitted any reference to Israel’s 56-year military occupation of Palestinian land, or ongoing public calls by sitting Israeli politicians for the establishment of a “Greater Israel” spanning territory from the Nile River in Egypt to the Euphrates in Iraq. “Only a self-assured, proud Jewish identity can help reduce envy and [the] new antisemitism,” he added.

    Framing growing global criticism of Israel as a leading warning sign of rising authoritarianism in the West, Dopfner put forward a slate of draconian policy measures. Conflating all anti-Zionists with antisemites, he argued that anti-Zionists “regardless of their origin, must be expelled wherever legally possible”. He praised UK Conservative Party leader Kemi Badenoch for advancing similar policy proposals, arguing every democratic nation should adopt such measures. He also called for sweeping changes to European immigration policy, urging the continent to introduce preferential immigration and citizenship pathways exclusively for Jewish families, framing this as a counterbalance to what he called “Christian and particularly Muslim influences” in Europe. “Europe must become more Jewish,” he concluded.

    Dopfner also joined growing calls for the forced sale or full censorship of TikTok in Europe, pointing to the 2025 US order forcing the platform to sell off its US operations to non-Chinese owners – a deal that would see pro-Zionist billionaire and close Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu ally Larry Ellison take control of the platform. “In America, TikTok has been forced to be sold… Europe should follow this example,” he said, warning that failure to root out anti-Zionism would lead the West to “destroy itself”.

    Political analysts note Dopfner’s high-profile public intervention is part of a broader coordinated push by pro-Israel leaders to counter mounting global condemnation and diplomatic isolation of Israel, which has intensified sharply following Israel’s military campaign in Gaza that the UN and multiple international human rights organizations have ruled constitutes a genocide. Dopfner’s comments also echo growing alarm among pro-Israel elites expressed at the 2025 Tikvah Jewish Leadership Conference in the US, where billionaires, investment bankers, media leaders, lawyers and Zionist Christian activists gathered to address what they described as a growing global backlash against Israeli policy. That gathering, which brought together leaders from the WJC, the Jewish Leadership Conference and the Jewish Federations of North America’s General Assembly, collectively called for expanded censorship of voices across the political spectrum that criticize Israel – framed by attendees as an effort to “save America from the barbarians”.

  • Who is the real Wes Streeting? His record on Israel and foreign policy examined

    Who is the real Wes Streeting? His record on Israel and foreign policy examined

    A stunning political upheaval is unfolding in UK politics, with British Health Secretary Wes Streeting reportedly preparing to launch a leadership challenge against incumbent Prime Minister Keir Starmer — a move many senior MPs have already labeled an internal party coup.

    According to senior party sources, Streeting held a brief 10-minute closed-door meeting with Starmer at 10 Downing Street on Wednesday morning, and is now on track to step down from the cabinet and officially trigger a contest for the Labour leadership this Thursday. For the Ilford North MP, who aligns with the Labour Party’s right wing, this leadership bid is a race against the clock: he aims to unseat Starmer before the party’s soft left wing can unify behind a rival contender, most notably Greater Manchester Mayor Andy Burnham, who has long been floated as a potential candidate and could launch his own challenge if he secures a seat in parliament.

    Crucially, Labour Together, the influential think tank that was instrumental in securing Starmer’s 2020 leadership victory, is widely understood to be backing Streeting. The group is eager to preserve its hold on power within a future Labour government should Starmer step down.

    Regardless of which candidate ultimately prevails in a leadership contest, political analysts widely agree that a shift in British foreign policy is all but guaranteed — and few policy areas will see more change than the UK’s long-standing military and political alliance with Israel. The Israeli war in Gaza has been a deeply divisive flashpoint in British politics for more than two years, and the recent US-Israeli military campaign against Iran has already sent ripple effects through the British economy, driving up energy costs and stoking inflation. In the most recent local elections, the Green Party — the most prominent political voice opposing UK support for Israel — eroded Labour’s voter base far more severely than the right-wing Reform Party, underscoring how deeply the Israel issue has shifted voter loyalties on the left.

    Any new prime minister replacing Starmer, whether through voluntary resignation or forced ousting, will be desperate to push back against the Green Party’s electoral gains and win back disillusioned left-wing voters. That political pressure almost certainly means a policy adjustment on Israel, but questions about what a Streeting-led government would actually do remain shrouded in contradiction. Middle East Eye’s deep dive into Streeting’s public and private record on Israel and the Middle East reveals a pattern of conflicting statements that have left even close political observers unsure of his true positions.

    Streeting is a long-standing, active member of Labour Friends of Israel (LFI), a pro-Israel parliamentary lobby group. A senior Westminster source confirmed that Streeting meets regularly with LFI leadership in parliament. He has also received significant financial donations from Trevor Chinn, a 90-year-old former car industry magnate and philanthropist who was awarded the Israeli Presidential Medal of Honour in November 2024 for his lifelong service to the State of Israel. Between 2021 and 2024, Chinn donated more than £15,000 (approximately $20,200) to Streeting, and gave an additional £5,000 in 2025 — after Streeting became Health Secretary — to “support campaigning in Ilford North”.

    Chinn’s father served as president of the UK branch of the Jewish National Fund (JNF), an organization that has long provided funding for Israeli settlements in the occupied West Bank, which are classified as illegal under international law. Public organizational records show that between 2015 and 2018, the UK JNF transferred more than £1 million to Hashomer Hachadash, a Zionist militia operating in the occupied West Bank. Chinn himself is a long-time supporter of both LFI and its Conservative counterpart, Conservative Friends of Israel, and two former officials from Tony Blair’s Labour government described him to Middle East Eye as a “very strong supporter of Israel” who was brought in as an unofficial advisor to Blair’s cabinet.

    Despite these deep ties to pro-Israel lobbying, Streeting has a documented history of engaging with Palestinian stakeholders as well. In February 2016, he joined a trip to Israel and the occupied West Bank organized by Medical Aid for Palestinians and the Council for the Advancement of Arab-British Understanding, where he met with then-Palestinian Prime Minister Rami Hamdallah and sitting members of the Israeli Knesset, and visited a Palestinian community school in Khan al-Ahmar that was facing ongoing intimidation from Israeli settlers and military forces at the time. Later, he became the first member of Starmer’s shadow cabinet to visit Israel after Starmer won the Labour leadership, on a separate trip funded by LFI. He framed that visit as a four-day “fact-finding mission” during which he met with Israeli politicians, diplomats, academics and health experts, and later praised Israel’s medical innovation, saying “Israel is 10 years ahead of the NHS.”

    After the 7 October 2023 Hamas attack on Israel, when Starmer’s then-opposition Labour Party backed the Conservative government’s policy of supporting Israel’s siege and bombing campaign in Gaza, Streeting aligned fully with official party line. Speaking to Sky News on 25 October 2023, he repeated Israel’s widely circulated claim that Hamas “cowardly [uses] innocent civilians, children, women, men as human shields” and echoed the Israeli assertion that “Hamas uses buildings like schools and hospitals as bunkers.” He refused to back calls for a permanent ceasefire, instead calling only for a temporary “humanitarian pause,” arguing that “Israel is a democracy… I don’t know if Hamas will abide by the rules for a pause.” In January 2024, he dismissed South Africa’s genocide case against Israel at the International Court of Justice as a “distraction from what needs to happen, which is the diplomatic heavy lifting to bring about an end to this conflict.”

    By mid-2024, however, Streeting began to ramp up public criticism of Israeli actions. “You look at the scale of the bloodshed, you look at the scale of destruction in Gaza, the number of civilian casualties,” he noted in one interview. “They are disproportionate, and it’s horrible.” In the 2024 UK general election, Streeting only narrowly held onto his Ilford North seat, where British Palestinian independent candidate Leanne Mohammed came within just 600 votes of unseating him — a result widely interpreted as a reflection of widespread voter anger in the diverse constituency over Labour’s pro-Israel policies. A senior Labour source familiar with Streeting’s thinking confirmed to Middle East Eye that as Health Secretary, Streeting privately pressured Starmer to toughen his public criticism of Israel.

    Under Starmer’s premiership, UK-Israel diplomatic relations did cool gradually: the UK introduced a partial arms embargo on Israel in September 2024. Yet Starmer’s government continued widespread military cooperation with Israel throughout the Gaza campaign, most notably carrying out hundreds of surveillance flights over Gaza and sharing real-time intelligence with Israeli forces. In March 2025, Starmer walked back previous comments from then-Foreign Secretary David Lammy that Israel was committing a “breach of international law.”

    Streeting never publicly accused Israel of war crimes, but he continued to edge toward stronger criticism: in April 2025, he said Israeli attacks on Gaza were “intolerable” and “cannot be justified as self-defence.” By September that year, he went further, arguing that Israel’s actions in Gaza were “leading Israel to pariah status” and added that Israeli President Isaac Herzog “needs to answer the allegations of war crimes, of ethnic cleansing and of genocide that are being levelled at the government of Israel.”

    That public shift, however, was thrown into new context in February 2026, when private text messages exchanged between Streeting and Peter Mandelson — former British ambassador to the U.S. and a controversial associate of the late Jeffrey Epstein — were leaked to the press. Multiple senior Labour sources told Middle East Eye that Streeting himself orchestrated the leak, in a bid to shore up left-wing support for his leadership bid and increase pressure on Starmer. One senior party official said Streeting was “intentionally presenting himself as more critical of Israel than official Labour policy” to appeal to disaffected voters.

    The leaked texts revealed that Streeting privately acknowledged Israel was “committing war crimes before our eyes” as early as July 2025, and explicitly endorsed imposing economic and political sanctions on Israel. He told Mandelson that the Israeli government “talks the language of ethnic cleansing, and I have met with our own medics out there who describe the most chilling and distressing scenes of calculated brutality against women and children.” He noted that he had been a member of LFI for more than 20 years, adding: “I have never been a shrinking violet on Israel. [Israel is engaged in] rogue state behaviour. Let them pay the price as pariahs with sanctions applied to the state, not just a few ministers.”

    While some left-wing critics welcomed Streeting’s private candor, the leak sparked fierce backlash from across the political spectrum. Former Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn published an open letter to Streeting, accusing him of a “shameful failure” for remaining in Starmer’s cabinet even as he privately condemned Israel’s war crimes in Gaza. Corbyn argued that “once a government acknowledges that Israel is committing war crimes, then any continued military or political support is an admission from the government that it is knowingly aiding and abetting those war crimes.” He pressed Streeting to answer a series of critical questions: why he did not resign from a government he believed was supporting war crimes, whether he believed the current Labour government was complicit in Israeli war crimes, whether he would cooperate with the International Criminal Court’s investigation into UK complicity, and what specific steps he had taken internally to end British military and political support for Israel. Corbyn noted that “our history books will shame government ministers who could have stopped the genocide in Gaza, but chose to stay silent instead,” and confirmed to Middle East Eye that Streeting has not responded to the letter.

    In the run-up to 2026 local elections, Streeting also publicly attacked pro-Palestinian politicians challenging Labour in his own constituency, framing their criticism of Labour’s Israel policy as “sectarian politics.” In Redbridge, the east London borough that contains Streeting’s Ilford North seat, the Redbridge Independents — a local grouping backed by Corbyn’s Your Party — won nine council seats last week. In March, Middle East Eye reported that Streeting sent a campaign letter to constituents accusing Redbridge Independents of being “a divisive political party that aims to only represent some of us, more focused on foreign conflicts than on fixing potholes.” He doubled down in April, telling The Times that “We’re voting for Redbridge council, not the UN Security Council. Who you choose to run your local council matters and the Redbridge Independents represent a divisive brand of sectarian politics.”

    Critics have pointed out the contradiction in this attack, noting that Starmer himself made foreign policy a central campaign issue during the same local elections, when he attacked Reform Party leader Nigel Farage and Conservative leader Kemi Badenoch over their stances on the Iran war, arguing that “Nigel Farage and Kemi Badenoch would have jumped into this war with both feet without thinking through the consequences… Britain would have been “in a war without a plan” had they been in power, adding that he “won’t be dragged in” to the US-Israeli war. Senior Labour MP John McDonnell, a prominent left-wing critic of Labour’s Israel policy, criticized Streeting’s attack on the independents, telling Middle East Eye that “one interpretation verges on a Reform [style] dog whistle politics. The last thing we need is more divisive politics in these elections.”

    Today, as Streeting prepares for what could be one of the most dramatic internal leadership challenges in modern British political history, his true positions on Israel and foreign policy remain an enigma to most observers. His public and private stances shift dramatically depending on his audience, shaped by his long ties to pro-Israel lobbying, his precarious hold on a marginal seat, and his ambition to become prime minister. If Streeting follows through on his plan to launch a leadership challenge, he will finally be forced to lay out a clear, consistent foreign policy agenda for the UK — and he will almost certainly craft that agenda with an eye toward holding his marginal seat and winning the next general election.

  • Trump has actually started to decouple US from China

    Trump has actually started to decouple US from China

    As former President Donald Trump prepares to travel to Beijing for high-stakes trade talks accompanied by a contingent of leading American CEOs, all eyes are turning to the core promise that defined his two election campaigns: rolling back decades of U.S. economic integration with China. While much has been written about Trump’s unorthodox model of state-aligned corporate policy, which blends tariffs, export controls, government equity stakes and personal pressure to advance American commercial interests, this analysis digs into a more pressing question: nearly a decade after Trump first took office on a decoupling platform, how much progress has the U.S. actually made?

    To contextualize the current state of relations, it is necessary to revisit the bilateral economic model that dominated the mid-2010s. Back then, the division of labor was clear: U.S. companies led research and development, designed finished products, then sent blueprints to China for final assembly. Components often came from third-party Asian economies like Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, though Chinese suppliers were increasingly common, before finished goods were shipped back to the U.S. for marketing, sales and after-sales service by American firms.

    This arrangement left both nations dissatisfied. American observers argued that shifting labor-intensive assembly to China had gutted U.S. manufacturing employment – a claim backed by empirical evidence – and warned that outsourcing low-value work would eventually lead to the loss of higher-value, high-skill activities down the line, a projection that has proven increasingly plausible. For their part, Chinese leaders resented being trapped in the low-value-added segment of global supply chains, watching the bulk of profits flow to foreign firms. As a result, both sides began implementing policies to dismantle the old framework and build a new commercial order.

    China deployed targeted industrial policy to onshore high-value component manufacturing and cultivate homegrown “national champion” brands, while successive U.S. administrations under both Trump and Joe Biden worked to cut American trade dependence on China, alongside tightening export controls on critical strategic technologies like semiconductors – a step China later matched with its own restrictions on rare earth exports. It is widely acknowledged that China has already delivered on its half of the decoupling: today, far more Chinese-made finished goods rely on domestic components, and the country has climbed the global value chain to produce globally competitive brands including BYD, Huawei, Xiaomi, DJI and CATL.

    The question that remains fiercely contested is whether the U.S. has succeeded in its goal of reducing reliance on Chinese manufacturing. On the surface, hard data suggests significant change: the share of U.S. imports sourced from China has fallen sharply since the first Trump-era tariffs took effect. Analysis from The Wall Street Journal shows that while some firms have relocated production back to the U.S. to avoid tariffs, the shift remains modest: a 2025 survey of Ohio manufacturers found just 9% had reshored some production from China, up from 4% in 2021, with 60% of that reshoring activity coming from China. Most production exiting China has moved to Mexico and Southeast Asian nations instead.

    The impact of tariffs is clear even from Trump’s first, less aggressive term: U.S. buyers shifted imports of tariffed goods away from China while maintaining non-tariffed imports, and the expanded tariffs implemented in Trump’s second term – which far outpace duties levied on U.S. allies – have accelerated this shift. The reallocation has been concentrated heavily in other Asian economies and Mexico, with product-specific trends marking the change: first-term tariffs targeted low-value goods like furniture, footwear and apparel, where China’s market share was already declining gradually due to rising domestic labor costs. More recent duties have cut into Chinese exports of consumer electronics including personal computers and smartphones; just two years ago, most U.S.-bound PCs were assembled in China, and today the majority are assembled in Vietnam.

    Decoupling is not limited to trade flows: the trend is equally pronounced in foreign direct investment. 2025 saw a wave of reports about U.S. multinationals moving production capacity out of China, and this anecdotal evidence is reflected in aggregate data, which shows a sharp collapse in foreign direct investment inflows to China. Most of this diverted investment has landed in Southeast Asia, though advanced manufacturing capacity has largely shifted to Europe. Three core factors are driving this capital exodus. First, tariffs have made manufacturing in China for export to the U.S. far more costly, giving multinational firms a direct financial incentive to halt new factory investments in China. Second, repeated experiences of technology appropriation by Chinese domestic firms, often with implicit or explicit government support, have cooled multinationals’ enthusiasm for accessing China’s market – many firms have entered China chasing access to its huge consumer base, only to lose their core technological advantages to local competitors that do not play by global market rules. Third, rising geopolitical tensions over Taiwan and the South China Sea have raised the specter of conflict, which would leave foreign-held factories in China at risk of blockade or expropriation, forcing companies to reevaluate their supply chain risk exposure.

    Despite these clear trends, a contingent of decoupling skeptics – the so-called “macro camp” – argues that any apparent shift is largely illusory. This group, which brings together unlikely ideological allies from protectionist economists frustrated that tariffs have not reduced global trade imbalances to free-trade advocates at outlets like *The Economist* and the Peterson Institute who argue tariffs are inherently ineffective, claims that persistent U.S. trade deficits and Chinese trade surpluses prove Chinese goods are still reaching the U.S. via hidden indirect routes. I have long pushed back against this framing: the persistence of aggregate macro imbalances does not prove Chinese goods are still entering the U.S. at the same rate. China can simply find new export markets for its goods, while the U.S. sources imports from new suppliers, leaving overall global imbalances intact even as bilateral trade between the two powers shrinks.

    That said, to resolve this debate it is necessary to test the most common claims that decoupling is a myth. The most frequent argument is transshipment: the idea that Chinese firms evade tariffs by labeling goods “Made in Vietnam” or another third country before shipping them to the U.S. But analysis from economist Gerard DiPippo finds transshipment plays only a minor role, accounting for at most 18% of China’s lost U.S. export volume, and likely far less. DiPippo’s analysis compares what products China stopped exporting to the U.S. and what products China increased exports of to Vietnam after tariffs took effect; if large-scale transshipment were occurring, these product categories would align, and they generally do not.

    A more credible argument focuses on trade mismeasurement. A persistent gap exists between the value of goods the U.S. records as imports from China and the value of goods China records as exports to the U.S., with China’s recorded decline far smaller than the U.S.’s. Much of this gap has been attributed to the de minimis exemption, which allowed Chinese firms to ship small packages directly to U.S. consumers tariff-free. Chinese manufacturers exploited this loophole by breaking large bulk orders into multiple small shipments to avoid duties. However, Trump closed this loophole via executive order in mid-2025, so it cannot explain the continued decline in Chinese exports to the U.S. over the past year.

    The most convincing argument for continued hidden reliance on Chinese manufacturing centers on intermediate goods. Just as 2011’s “Made in China” iPhones relied heavily on components from Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, today’s “Made in Vietnam” iPhones often include large volumes of Chinese-made parts. Since high-value components account for the majority of a finished electronics product’s total value, this would mean the U.S. remains indirectly dependent on China even as final assembly shifts abroad. A 2024 study by Hsu, Peng and Wu found this effect is substantial, concluding that U.S. importers retain significant indirect dependence on China via third-party suppliers in Vietnam and Mexico. The major limitation of this research, however, is that its data only extends through 2022, the same cutoff for the OECD’s value-added trade data – the other key source for measuring indirect dependence. Even with this limitation, OECD data shows that U.S. import dependence on China on a value-added basis was declining before the COVID-19 pandemic, ticked back up during pandemic-related supply chain disruptions, and resumed its decline in 2022, matching the trend for gross import volumes.

    What does this all add up to? The old bilateral model, where U.S. firms designed products and China assembled them for American consumers, is well and truly gone. The new normal is one where Chinese firms sell intermediate components to assemblers in other countries, which then export finished goods to the U.S. This is not an insignificant shift. It demonstrates that Chinese firms have successfully moved up the global value chain to become direct competitors to foreign multinationals. At the same time, final assembly, while the least profitable segment of the value chain, is still economically meaningful: it was the starting point for China’s own decades-long industrialization drive. The fact that U.S. tariffs have pushed this assembly work out of China is a meaningful change. It does not eliminate U.S. dependence on Chinese manufacturing entirely, but it reduces it. And just as China moved from assembly to component manufacturing over time, there are early signs that Vietnam and other emerging manufacturing hubs could follow the same path. There is no inherent reason China must remain the world’s default factory: other nations can develop industrial capacity just as China did.

    Building a fully non-Chinese supply chain will not happen quickly or easily, and progress has been slower than headline trade numbers often suggest. But the U.S. has made a clear, promising start, and tariffs on China have been a core driver of that progress. While much of Trump’s trade policy has been haphazard, misdirected and marred by corruption, the decoupling project – which was continued by the Biden administration – has begun to deliver tangible results. It would be a missed opportunity if Trump abandons this progress on his upcoming trip in exchange for trivial short-term concessions like increased Chinese purchases of U.S. soybeans.

  • Iran has regained access to most missile and underground sites, US intelligence finds

    Iran has regained access to most missile and underground sites, US intelligence finds

    A newly disclosed classified US intelligence assessment from earlier this month directly contradicts public statements from senior Trump administration officials who have claimed to have “decimated” Iran’s military missile capabilities, according to a new report published Tuesday by The New York Times. The findings, shared with US policymakers, paint a far different picture of Iran’s current operational capacity than the White House has presented to the public. The assessment confirms that Iran has restored operational access to 30 out of 33 key missile sites positioned along the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world’s most critical chokepoints for global energy trade. Through this narrow waterway, roughly one-fifth of the world’s total oil and liquefied natural gas supplies transit each day, meaning restored Iranian capabilities pose a renewed threat to international commercial shipping and US naval forces deployed in the region. Citing intelligence sources familiar with the document, The NYT reports that Iran can now deploy mobile missile launchers from many of these sites to reposition weapons across the country, and in some cases, can conduct direct missile launches from the existing launchpads at the restored facilities. Overall, Iran retains approximately 70 percent of its pre-war stockpile of missiles and 70 percent of its national fleet of mobile launchers, the assessment found. When it comes to Iran’s network of hardened underground missile storage and launch facilities, US military intelligence gathered via satellite imagery and other advanced surveillance methods indicates that Tehran has regained access to roughly 90 percent of these sites, which are now either partially or fully operational. These findings align with an earlier report from The Washington Post published last week, which cited separate US intelligence assessments showing Iran retained around 75 percent of its mobile launchers and 70 percent of its pre-war missile inventory. The gap between classified intelligence conclusions and the administration’s public rhetoric traces back to the strategic choices US military planners made when launching the joint US-Israeli offensive against Iran that began on February 28. According to The NYT’s reporting, when strikes targeted Iranian missile sites, US forces largely chose to seal off the entrances to underground facilities rather than completely destroying them from the inside out – a decision driven largely by critical shortages of heavy bunker-busting munitions. Military planners prioritized preserving existing stocks of these specialized weapons for potential high-intensity conflicts with North Korea and China, leading to a more restrained approach to destroying Iran’s hardened infrastructure. Additional reporting from The NYT has previously confirmed that the Iran offensive has already severely depleted US stockpiles of multiple key munitions types, including Tomahawk cruise missiles, Patriot interceptor missiles, MGM-140 Army Tactical Missiles, and Precision Strike missiles. To date, the US has fired roughly 1,100 long-range stealth cruise missiles in the campaign – a number equal to nearly the entire remaining stockpile the US held before the war began. It has also expended 1,300 Patriot interceptors, a volume that would take more than two years to replace at 2025 production rates. The Trump administration has pushed back hard against these reports, doubling down on its claims of a resounding victory in the campaign. A White House spokesperson rejected the NYT’s reporting, reiterating that Iran’s capabilities had been “crushed” and claiming that anyone who suggests Iran has reconstituted its missile forces is either “delusional or a mouthpiece” for Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps. Acting Pentagon press secretary Joel Valdez also issued a sharp rebuke, calling the NYT’s reporting “disgraceful” and accusing the outlet of acting as a public relations arm for the Iranian regime. Valdez insisted that Operation Epic Fury, the official name for the US-led offensive, stands as a “historic accomplishment.” Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Dan Caine also pushed back on claims of depleted munitions during a Tuesday appearance before a House appropriations subcommittee, telling lawmakers that the US currently “has sufficient munitions for what we’re tasked to do right now.” After the February 28 opening of the offensive, which began with a massive wave of joint US-Israeli airstrikes across Iran, Tehran responded with its own missile and drone strikes targeting Israel and allied Gulf Arab states, and temporarily closed the Strait of Hormuz to commercial traffic.

  • Journalists scramble as gunshots sound in Philippine senate

    Journalists scramble as gunshots sound in Philippine senate

    Chaos unfolded unexpectedly at the heart of the Philippine legislative branch on [relevant date] when multiple bursts of gunfire echoed through the Senate complex, triggering an immediate panic that sent working journalists scrambling for safety. Reporters who were on-site covering routine Senate business were caught off guard by the sudden sound of shots, with many abandoning recording equipment and rushing to secure shelter in locked offices and barricaded hallways as the complex went into lockdown. In the immediate aftermath of the incident, senior government and Senate officials have remained tight-lipped, releasing no official information confirming the identity of the person or persons who fired the weapons, the motive behind the incident, or whether any casualties have been reported. Local law enforcement units quickly deployed to the Senate grounds, establishing a security cordon around the building and launching an urgent investigation to piece together the details of what occurred. The incident has already sparked urgent questions about the state of security at high-level government facilities in the Philippines, as lawmakers and public figures call for a full review of access protocols and safety measures to prevent similar scares in the future. As of this update, the situation remains partially unresolved, with official updates still pending from relevant authorities.

  • Microsoft Israel chief leaves after inquiry into use of tech to spy on Palestinians

    Microsoft Israel chief leaves after inquiry into use of tech to spy on Palestinians

    A leadership shakeup at Microsoft’s Israeli subsidiary has followed the conclusion of a high-stakes internal investigation into how the country’s military intelligence agency leveraged the tech giant’s cloud infrastructure for mass surveillance of Palestinian civilians. Alon Haimovich, who served four years as general manager of Microsoft Israel, is leaving his position, and oversight of the local subsidiary will be temporarily transferred to Microsoft France, Israeli financial publication Globes first reported Tuesday. Multiple senior managers in the subsidiary’s governance team have also exited the company amid findings that they violated Microsoft’s global code of ethics, according to the report.

    The investigation was launched by Microsoft’s global leadership last year after independent reporting revealed that Israel’s elite Unit 8200 intelligence agency had been using the company’s Azure cloud platform to store and analyze millions of intercepted Palestinian phone calls collected from Gaza and the occupied West Bank. The surveillance system was built to process up to one million civilian communications every hour, raising immediate questions about compliance with Microsoft’s terms of service, which explicitly ban the use of company technology for mass civilian surveillance.

    Internal documents reviewed by The Guardian indicate Haimovich was a key figure in deepening ties between Microsoft Israel and Unit 8200, following a 2021 high-level meeting between Microsoft CEO Satya Nadella and the spy agency’s then-commander. Under Haimovich’s leadership, the subsidiary oversaw construction of a segregated, secured section within Azure specifically built to store Unit 8200’s sensitive intelligence archives. Once the isolated cloud space was finalized, the agency transferred its massive collection of intercepted daily Palestinian communications into Microsoft’s global cloud infrastructure.

    When the inquiry team traveled to Microsoft Israel’s Tel Aviv-area offices to conduct interviews, Haimovich was called in for questioning, Globes added. The recently concluded internal probe found that Unit 8200 had violated Microsoft’s terms of service, prompting the company to immediately cut off the agency’s access to the cloud services and products that supported the surveillance operation, multiple sources confirmed to The Guardian. While the full public findings of the investigation have not been released, the inquiry’s conclusions directly led to Haimovich’s departure.

    In an internal email to Microsoft Israel staff announcing his exit last week, Haimovich framed his tenure as a success, noting that he had helped position the Israeli market as “one of Microsoft’s fastest-growing markets worldwide.” Microsoft has maintained that top global executives, including Nadella, had no prior knowledge that Unit 8200 was using Azure for the mass surveillance program. Last year, company vice chair and president Brad Smith stated publicly, “We do not provide technology to facilitate mass surveillance of civilians.”

    The Palestinian Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement has condemned Microsoft’s role in the surveillance program, calling the company “perhaps the most complicit tech company in Israel’s illegal apartheid regime and ongoing genocide against 2.3 million Palestinians in Gaza.” The leadership shakeup marks one of the most high-profile consequences of a growing global reckoning over international tech firms’ cooperation with Israeli government and military activities in occupied Palestinian territories.

  • Why Trump will ‘limp’ into China and likely leave empty-handed

    Why Trump will ‘limp’ into China and likely leave empty-handed

    As U.S. President Donald Trump prepares to arrive in Beijing for high-stakes talks with Chinese leader Xi Jinping, the global economic and geopolitical balance between the world’s two largest powers has shifted dramatically—far faster than anyone in Washington predicted 15 months ago, when the second Trump administration took office.

    When Trump’s second term began, his top advisors projected unbridled confidence that sweeping new tariffs on Chinese goods would force Beijing to make sweeping concessions, rewriting the terms of the $53 trillion U.S.-China economic relationship to overwhelmingly benefit Washington. Today, that narrative has flipped almost entirely: in the assessment of Chinese analysts and global economists alike, Xi now holds nearly all the leverage as the two leaders meet.

    China’s state-run Global Times has framed the moment bluntly, describing the U.S. as a “giant with a limp” heading into the summit. The label comes as Washington grapples with overlapping crises: an escalating conflict with Iran that has pushed oil prices above $100 per barrel, fractured alliances strained by Trump’s tariff policies, and a series of international court rulings that have eroded U.S. global leverage. Chinese state media has emphasized that it is Trump traveling to Beijing in search of a trade agreement, not the reverse, arguing Washington needs a deal far more urgently than Beijing does. Compounding this, any path to reopening the strategic Strait of Hormuz, disrupted by the Iran conflict, may hinge on Beijing using its longstanding diplomatic influence in Tehran—turning the tables on the leverage Trump once expected to wield over China.

    The shifting dynamic is on clear display in U.S. domestic economic data. April 2026 saw U.S. year-on-year inflation hit 3.8%, a three-year high, driven largely by energy price spikes stemming from the U.S.-Israeli strike on Iran. This inflation surge has dragged down Trump’s approval ratings and erased any chance the Federal Reserve will cut interest rates this year, a step Trump has repeatedly demanded. Even more consequential, analysts argue, is that Trump’s aggressive trade and technology policies have inadvertently accelerated China’s rise as a global leader in trade and high-value innovation.

    More than a decade after Xi launched a national strategy to revitalize China’s economic standing, and 11 years after the introduction of the “Made in China 2025” industrial upgrading initiative, the strategy is delivering tangible results. One prominent example is electric vehicle giant BYD, which has surged past Tesla in global sales and upended the long-dominant European auto industry. Other Chinese tech firms, from AI startup DeepSeek to telecom leader Huawei, have developed successful workarounds to U.S. export controls, proving that Washington’s decoupling efforts have only incentivized faster domestic innovation and self-reliance in China’s high-tech sector.

    Trump’s repeated attacks on the independence of the Federal Reserve, meanwhile, have undermined global trust in the U.S. dollar just as U.S. national debt approaches the $40 trillion mark. This erosion of confidence has given new momentum to Xi’s long-running campaign to internationalize the yuan, a goal that has gained unexpected traction amid Trump’s post-inauguration policy volatility. From broad-based tariffs to aggressive military adventurism in Venezuela and Iran, to unfettered fiscal expansion and attacks on independent U.S. institutions, every major policy move of Trump’s second term has weakened global trust in U.S. assets.

    As Middle Eastern Gulf states grow increasingly skeptical of U.S. security guarantees amid ongoing wartime disruptions to energy trade, Beijing sees a historic opening to build a yuan-denominated energy settlement framework once hostilities end. This could pave the way for the long-discussed “petroyuan” that Chinese leaders have long envisioned, though economists caution full global adoption of the yuan as a primary energy currency remains decades away.

    Union Bancaire Privee economist Carlos Casanova notes that while the trajectory of yuan internationalization is clear, broad adoption is unlikely in the near term. Gulf monarchies still rely on U.S. security guarantees and maintain deep financial ties to U.S. capital markets. For the yuan to become a dominant global energy currency, Casanova explains, Beijing would need to complete a demanding three-part agenda: deepen existing divides between the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, build up Iran’s military capacity to challenge U.S. regional security dominance (a step that would be destabilizing even for China), and fully liberalize China’s capital account while growing global demand for yuan-denominated assets. “Even under favorable conditions, this would likely take decades,” Casanova said.

    Still, Trump’s confrontational approach to the BRICS bloc—Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa—has only accelerated moves away from the dollar. After BRICS leaders moved forward with plans to develop a dollar alternative, Trump threatened to impose 100% tariffs on all BRICS imports, a move that reinforced global fatigue with Washington’s unilateral bullying. The policy chaos created by the Trump administration is already doing more to advance the BRICS’ de-dollarization agenda than the bloc could have achieved on its own.

    Even close U.S. allies are growing wary of Washington’s economic trajectory. During recent meetings between U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and Japanese officials in Tokyo, the public agenda focused on the weak yen and Japan’s support for the U.S. in the Iran conflict. Behind closed doors, analysts say Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi almost certainly sought assurances about the safety of Japan’s $1.2 trillion holdings of U.S. Treasuries—the largest foreign stockpile of U.S. government debt in the world.

    Those concerns are not unfounded. Recent U.S. data shows annual tax revenues fell 17% year-on-year in April, typically the peak month for tax collections. Nearly 17 months into the second Trump administration, policies from tariffs to inflated energy costs have left U.S. households under severe financial strain. A recent Gallup poll found 47% of Americans rate current economic conditions as “poor,” a seven-point increase since March, while 73% say conditions are worsening. A separate Fox News poll found 70% of respondents believe the economy is deteriorating, matching the record high set in 2023.

    A core flaw of Trump’s China strategy, analysts argue, is that it has failed to improve U.S. competitiveness at home. Tariffs, a blunt policy tool, have acted more as a political gimmick than a roadmap to revitalize U.S. innovation, strengthen human capital, and preserve the dollar and U.S. Treasuries as the foundation of the global financial system. In fact, Enodo Economics analyst Diana Choyleva notes that U.S. efforts to block China’s technological progress have had the opposite effect, speeding China’s shift up the global value chain toward greater self-reliance and innovation.

    Trump’s tariffs have also benefited China in unintended ways, by straining relations between Washington and key U.S. allies across the Indo-Pacific, including Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Southeast Asian nations. Growing distrust between Washington and these regional democracies has increased China’s diplomatic influence in the region, allowing Xi to position China as a more reliable steward of global free trade than Trump. The Chinese government continues to benefit from Trump’s first-term decision to withdraw from the U.S.-led Trans-Pacific Partnership, and the second Trump administration’s continued focus on narrow bilateral trade deals rather than building a multilateral bloc to counter Chinese influence.

    Far from curbing China’s trade ambitions, Trump’s tariffs have coincided with China posting a record annual trade surplus of $1.2 trillion in 2025. While the Xi administration has invested trillions over the past decade to dominate future-focused industries including electric vehicles, renewable energy, aerospace, artificial intelligence, biotechnology, green infrastructure and robotics, the Trump administration has laid out no comparable plan to boost U.S. competitiveness in semiconductors, infrastructure or climate action. In fact, Trump has rolled back support for clean energy sectors, dismissing electric vehicles, solar and wind power as “woke” policies while prioritizing fossil fuel development.

    To date, Trump’s economic strategy has relied almost entirely on tax cuts, expansionary fiscal policy and repeated demands for lower Federal Reserve interest rates to support growth. A recent Supreme Court ruling striking down Trump’s unilateral tariff authority has added new stress to U.S. government finances, pushing the national debt to over 100% of GDP. “Tariffs had been functioning as a shadow tax that helped fund spending without explicitly raising taxes,” explained Mark Malek, chief investment officer at Siebert Financial. “Remove that and the deficit widens, borrowing rises, and historically that is the type of development that leans on the bond market and pressures yields higher.”

    Given this shift in leverage, Xi is unlikely to grant Trump the sweeping “grand bargain” trade deal he is seeking ahead of 2026 U.S. midterm elections. Most economists predict Beijing will offer only small, symbolic concessions—such as new agreements to purchase Boeing aircraft and U.S. soybeans—with a commitment to continue talks later this year.

    Fidelity Investments economist Peiqian Liu notes this Beijing meeting is just the first of several planned encounters between the two leaders in 2026, with the APEC Summit scheduled for Shenzhen in November, the G20 meeting in Miami in December, and a potential reciprocal visit by Xi to the U.S. later this year, possibly before the midterm elections. “Given the array of issues pending discussion, including trade, technology, supply chain controls, and chokepoints — as well as other geopolitical issues such as Taiwan and Iran — we expect the leader-to-leader conversation to be more high-level and broad-based,” Liu said.

    The ongoing Iran crisis has created an awkward backdrop for the summit. “It’s awkward that, as the leaders meet, the U.S. Navy is blockading the Strait of Hormuz and intercepting tankers bound for China, Iran’s largest crude buyer,” noted Rush Doshi, an analyst at the Council on Foreign Relations. “Meanwhile, Beijing is providing political and possibly intelligence support to Tehran and could be seeking to renew flows of drone parts, air defense equipment, and missiles. Neither side is likely to make progress on this issue, but the fact that the summit appears ready to proceed despite this unusual situation is proof both leaders want the optics of stability even if its foundations are shaky.”

    It is important to note that China still faces significant domestic economic headwinds: the ongoing property sector crisis continues to erode business and household confidence, local government finances are severely strained, and youth unemployment remains stubbornly high. Even so, China’s export sector has held up remarkably well amid global economic weakness: April 2026 saw year-on-year export growth of 14.1%, with passenger vehicle exports surging nearly 85% from a year earlier.

    Ultimately, the Beijing summit will underscore a core reality: Trump’s campaign to halt China’s economic rise has backfired dramatically, leaving Washington empty-handed in its quest to rewrite the U.S.-China trade relationship. While a public show of dialogue between Trump and Xi will be a welcome signal for global markets—any step that eases tensions between the two largest economies is an unqualified positive for the global economy—the idea that Trump will leave Beijing having imposed his will on China reads more as a political fantasy than a plausible outcome.

  • YouTuber Tyler Oliveira deported from Israel over ‘antisemitic content’

    YouTuber Tyler Oliveira deported from Israel over ‘antisemitic content’

    A prominent right-wing American YouTube creator has been barred from Israel and expelled back to the United States amid formal accusations of spreading antisemitic content, according to a public statement the influencer posted to the social platform X on Tuesday.

    In his announcement, Oliveira shared an image of the official deportation document issued to him by Israeli border authorities, which formally cites “prevention of illegal immigration” as the legal basis for his expulsion from the country. But Israeli officials have openly cited another motivation for the move: Diaspora Affairs Minister Amichai Chikli confirmed in an interview with Israeli outlet Channel 14 that the expulsion was a direct response to the hate speech Oliveira amplified in his online videos.

    “The party is over. Whoever comes here with the goal of sowing hatred can go back where they came from,” Chikli stated in the interview. “The rule is clear, whoever incites against us simply won’t be here.”

    Oliveira has built a large online following through a gonzo, on-the-ground style of independent journalism that centers largely on conservative and right-wing political issues, with a heavy focus on global and domestic immigration policy. His recent work has included on-the-ground investigations into alleged fraud claims involving Somali diaspora communities in Minnesota, as well as reporting he claims exposes widespread abuse of U.S. visa rules by Indian migrant workers. He also went viral in global conservative circles for a video covering a traditional cow dung-throwing festival in a rural Indian village, a segment that ultimately earned him fierce pushback from India’s domestic far-right movement.

    While much of Oliveira’s early content earned him praise among segments of the American right, multiple videos he published focusing on Jewish communities in New York and New Jersey later sparked widespread condemnation from Jewish advocacy groups, who accused the creator of using coded language to spread antisemitic rhetoric. In the contested videos, Oliveira publicly criticized the high birth rates of Orthodox Jewish communities, repeating conspiracy claims that Orthodox Jews exploit local public resources and intentionally segregate themselves from broader society.

    Oliveira has forcefully rejected claims that his coverage amounts to unfair targeting of Jewish communities, noting that he has published investigative content focused on a wide range of religious and demographic groups across the globe. Just last weekend, the creator appeared on a popular podcast hosted by veteran conservative commentator Tucker Carlson, where he pushed back against his critics by highlighting what he frames as hypocrisy in the accusations against him. During the interview, Oliveira also claimed that a number of Israeli residents had reached out to him privately to voice support for his criticism of Orthodox Jewish communities in the country.

    This report was originally published by Middle East Eye, a media outlet that provides independent, on-the-ground coverage of the Middle East, North Africa and surrounding regions.

  • US and China seek to repair damage from tariff war that sent trade into a freefall

    US and China seek to repair damage from tariff war that sent trade into a freefall

    After a year of heightened 2025 trade conflict that laid bare the deep mutual economic vulnerability of the world’s two largest economies, U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping are convening in Beijing for a high-stakes summit aimed at patching over some of the most costly damage from a decade of escalating trade tensions. A 10-year standoff between Washington and Beijing has gutted the once-booming bilateral trade that defined the early 21st century, forcing companies across both nations to restructure global supply chains, seek alternative markets, and adapt to a new era of fractured commercial ties. Many U.S. corporations have relocated manufacturing capacity out of mainland China to lower-wage markets such as Vietnam and India, while Chinese exporters have scrambled to cultivate new consumer bases across Europe and Southeast Asia to offset lost American sales. Yet despite years of decoupling efforts, both sides are increasingly acknowledging that complete economic separation is unfeasible. Former U.S. Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross, who served in Trump’s first administration, noted: “The idea of somehow China being totally independent of us and us being totally independent of China, I think, is a fiction.”

    This week’s leadership summit is focused on stabilizing the bilateral economic relationship, with observers not expecting sweeping, transformative policy announcements. The most widely anticipated outcome is an extension of the temporary trade truce reached between the two powers last October. Additional expected measures include a Chinese pledge to increase purchases of U.S. agricultural goods including soybeans and beef, as well as new orders for American-built Boeing commercial aircraft. U.S. officials have also previewed plans to establish a new bilateral Board of Trade to manage ongoing commercial disputes.

    Stakeholders on both sides are watching the talks closely. For American farmers, who were locked out of the Chinese soybean market for most of 2025, and U.S. manufacturers dependent on Chinese rare earth minerals for products ranging from consumer smartphones to military fighter jets, even modest progress would bring significant relief. On the Chinese side, factory owners are hoping the summit will unlock incremental improvements to commercial ties, even if a return to the record trade volumes of 15 years ago remains out of reach. Michael Lu, founder and chief executive of Dongguan-based gift box manufacturer Brothersbox, noted that the U.S. long served as a far more stable market than many emerging alternative outlets, making even partial easing of tensions a welcome shift.

    ### The Collapse of Once-Thriving Bilateral Trade
    Before Trump first imposed sweeping tariffs on Chinese imports in 2018, the average U.S. duty on Chinese goods stood at just 3.1%, according to data from Chad Bown of the Peterson Institute for International Economics. Even after pulling back from the triple-digit peak tariffs hit briefly in 2025, average U.S. tariffs on Chinese goods still remain near 48% today. In 2016, China was the United States’ largest single trading partner, with bilateral trade accounting for more than 13% of total U.S. global commerce. By 2025, that share had been cut in half to just 6.4%, pushing China behind neighboring trade partners Mexico and Canada to drop to third place.

    The pre-2018 U.S.-China trade boom was long marked by a massive structural imbalance, with China exporting far more to the U.S. than it imported in return. The U.S. bilateral goods and services trade deficit with China peaked at $377 billion in 2018, but fell to $168 billion last year — the lowest level recorded since 2004. Even as its exports to the U.S. declined, however, China expanded sales to other global markets, particularly Southeast Asia and Europe, allowing the country to post a record annual global trade surplus of $1.2 trillion in 2025.

    ### Chinese Firms Adapt With Creative Workarounds
    Many trade analysts note that official U.S. government data likely overstates the actual decline in Chinese goods reaching the American market. To avoid steep U.S. tariffs, a large number of Chinese manufacturers have shifted final assembly operations to Southeast Asian nations including Vietnam and Thailand, then transship finished products to the U.S. under those countries’ tariff quotas. The Trump administration has pledged to crack down on this practice, which it labels tariff evasion. As Chinese exports to the U.S. dropped in 2025, U.S. imports from Southeast Asia surged: rising 42% from Vietnam, 44% from Thailand, and 24% from Indonesia. Zongyuan Zoe Liu, senior fellow for China studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, argued: “It would be wrong to think that China is no longer relevant for the U.S. market. Chinese goods are still coming into the U.S.”

    Velong Enterprises, a Guangdong-founded manufacturer of kitchen gadgets and grilling tools that supplies Walmart and other major U.S. retailers, began diversifying its supply chain shortly after Trump’s first term began, adding new production capacity in Cambodia and India to serve American customers. “Most serious manufacturers did not simply ‘leave China,’” said Velong founder and CEO Jacob Rothman. “Instead, they built multi-country supply chains centered on China.”

    ### Small U.S. Businesses Bear the Brunt of Erratic Tariff Policy
    The prolonged trade war has hit small and medium-sized U.S. businesses particularly hard, due to volatile, unpredictable tariff adjustments that make long-term cost planning nearly impossible. Appu Jacob Varghese, owner of Zion Foodtrucks, a small food truck manufacturer based outside Colorado Springs, relies on imported Chinese equipment for the custom vehicles he builds. “Last year, a lot of my hair turned white,” Varghese said. His business was upended by erratic tariff changes that shifted week to week, at one point spiking to 145% on key Chinese components. Because Zion Foodtrucks signs fixed-price contracts with customers and delivers new vehicles within six weeks, Varghese was unable to pass sudden cost increases on to buyers, forcing him to absorb hundreds of thousands of dollars in unexpected expenses. He has since shifted half of his cooking equipment sourcing to Vietnam and Thailand, and fire-suppression gear to U.S. and Israeli suppliers. While he speaks highly of his former Chinese suppliers, he says he will never return to heavy dependence on them: “Given the testy relations between Washington and Beijing, it’s too risky.”

    ### A Broad Shift in Sourcing Strategies
    Large U.S. multinationals have also joined the push to reduce reliance on Chinese manufacturing. Apple has shifted a portion of its iPhone production to India, while athletic apparel giant Nike has expanded manufacturing capacity across Vietnam. Sarah Tan, a Singapore-based economist covering China for Moody’s Analytics, explained: “Trade tensions can flare up quite quickly, and that makes the U.S. firms hesitant to rely too heavily on Chinese supply.” InStyler, a Los Angeles-based hair appliance manufacturer that once sourced all of its products from China, is moving some high-end production to South Korea and France, with plans to add capacity in Italy, Vietnam and Mexico. While CEO Dan Fugardi said the shift is partially driven by demand for European-made cachet among luxury hotel clients, reducing Chinese dependence “doubles as an insurance plan so that we’re not caught with our pants down” if tensions escalate again.

    ### Tit-for-Tat Escalation Goes Beyond Traditional Tariffs
    The trade standoff has long expanded beyond traditional import taxes, escalating into targeted measures targeting key strategic sectors on both sides. The U.S. has blocked exports of cutting-edge advanced semiconductors to Chinese firms, while China has retaliated by periodically cutting off exports of rare earth minerals critical to electronics manufacturing. Last year, Beijing also restricted exports of tungsten, a high-strength metal used in defense, aerospace, and medical device manufacturing — a sector where China controls roughly 80% of global supply. China also halted all purchases of U.S. soybeans for most of 2025, a deliberate blow to Trump’s political base in rural America. Even after purchases resumed following October trade talks, U.S. soybean exports to China fell 75% for the full year.

    The years of escalating conflict have made clear just how much damage each power can inflict on the other. Now, leaders on both sides are hoping the Beijing summit will de-escalate tensions and lay the groundwork for a more stable commercial framework. “We are the No. 1 trading player. They are next in line,” Ross said. “We have to coexist in some way. The question is, what will be the rules of the road, and who will benefit the most from those rules.”

  • A look at the International Criminal Court, which brought charges against a Philippine senator

    A look at the International Criminal Court, which brought charges against a Philippine senator

    A tense confrontation broke out Wednesday inside the Philippine Senate building in Manila after law enforcement attempted to execute an arrest warrant for a sitting Philippine senator, who faces a murder charge classified as a crime against humanity from the International Criminal Court (ICC). Shots were fired during the operation, leaving the complex locked down in an extended standoff as of Wednesday’s initial reports.

    The clash unfolded just 48 hours after the Netherlands-based global tribunal unsealed an arrest warrant first issued in November for Ronald Marapon dela Rosa, 64, who served as chief of the Philippine national police during the tenure of former president Rodrigo Duterte. Dela Rosa was one of the primary architects of Duterte’s nationwide anti-drug crackdown, a campaign that resulted in the deaths of thousands of mostly low-level drug suspects between 2016 and the present. The warrant accuses dela Rosa of direct responsibility for the murder of at least 32 people between July 2016 and April 2018, the period when he oversaw the national police force.

    In public comments following the unsealing of the warrant, dela Rosa has stated he will vigorously challenge the ICC’s authority and pursue all available legal channels to avoid extradition. The ICC has not yet released an official statement in response to the violent standoff in the Philippine capital.

    This latest development builds on years of legal tension between the Philippines and the ICC. In 2019, the country formally withdrew from the court’s Rome Statute, a move that came after then-ICC prosecutor Fatou Bensouda announced a preliminary investigation into widespread extrajudicial killings tied to the anti-drug campaign. Current President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., who took office in 2022, has not reversed the withdrawal, but his administration has previously stated it would honor Interpol red notices — global requests to locate and temporarily arrest suspects — if the ICC issued one for former officials linked to the drug war. It remains unclear whether a red notice has been officially issued for dela Rosa as of Wednesday.

    Duterte himself was taken into custody last year and transferred to The Hague to face his own charges of crimes against humanity connected to the deadly crackdown, and he remains in detention awaiting trial. Last year, ICC judges rejected a bid from Duterte’s legal team to dismiss the case over the Philippines’ 2019 withdrawal. In their ruling, the judges noted that nations cannot misuse their right to leave the Rome Statute to shield individuals from prosecution for crimes already under active investigation by the court.

    Established in 2002, the ICC was created to hold national leaders and senior public officials accountable for genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, acting as a court of last resort that only intervenes when a domestic legal system is unable or unwilling to prosecute alleged perpetrators. The court currently counts 125 member states, but three major global powers — the United States, Russia, and China — have never joined. Ukraine became the newest member of the court in January 2025. The institution employs more than 900 people and operates on a 2025 budget of just over 196 million euros, equal to roughly $229 million.

    Both the U.S. and Russia have openly opposed the ICC’s authority in recent years. During his second term, former U.S. President Donald Trump imposed economic sanctions on ICC chief prosecutor Karim Khan, several sitting ICC judges, and Khan’s two deputy prosecutors. Trump has repeatedly accused the court of carrying out “illegitimate and baseless actions” that unfairly target U.S. and Israeli officials. During his first term, Trump also sanctioned Khan’s predecessor, Fatou Bensouda, a move that was later reversed by the Biden administration. For its part, Russia has rejected the court’s jurisdiction and issued its own arrest warrant for Khan and the judge who signed the 2023 warrant for Russian President Vladimir Putin over allegations of war crimes in Ukraine. Since the warrant was issued, Putin has traveled to multiple non-member states including China and North Korea, as well as Mongolia, an ICC member state, without facing arrest.