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  • Polish-Palestinian survivors take Israeli leaders to court over Gaza genocide

    Polish-Palestinian survivors take Israeli leaders to court over Gaza genocide

    Trauma does not easily loosen its grip, even when the bombs have fallen silent thousands of kilometers away. For five-year-old Malik Agha, the echoes of war live in small, daily habits: he still tucks extra bits of food next to his pillow each night, a quiet instinct born of months of hunger in a Gaza displacement camp. His four-year-old sister Razan automatically sets aside a portion of every meal, even when their plate in their new home in southern Poland is full. Malik mixes up the words “tent” and “home,” and both children flinch at the smell of smoke and the flash of red emergency lights, their small bodies bracing instinctively for another incoming strike. More than two years after their family escaped the deadly conflict in Gaza, these deep emotional scars remain.

    On a Monday in Wrocław, the children’s father Amjad Agha stepped into the city’s district prosecutor’s office alongside a second Palestinian-Polish survivor, prominent plastic surgeon Ahmed Elsaftawy, to file a landmark criminal complaint. The document accuses senior Israeli officials of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity committed against Palestinian civilians in the Gaza Strip. Named in the complaint are former Israeli defense minister Yoav Gallant, his current successor Israel Katz, sitting and former Israel Defense Forces chiefs of staff, the Israeli navy commander, Israel’s energy and water minister, and current and former heads of the Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories (Cogat) – the Israeli body that controls all humanitarian access into Gaza and the occupied West Bank.

    This case marks one of the first formal legal actions of its kind in Europe brought by named, dual-citizen survivors of the Gaza conflict. Legal teams backing the complaint say the action is intended to test whether Polish prosecutors will uphold international law by holding alleged perpetrators of crimes against Polish citizens and their family members accountable, in line with legal obligations.

    Agha’s path to this moment traces back decades. Born in Khan Younis in southern Gaza, he moved to Poland to study, earning advanced degrees in food chemistry and management from Lodz University of Technology before returning to Gaza in 2005 to care for his aging parents. He took a role at the Palestinian agriculture ministry, running a laboratory that taught local Gaza farmers how to cultivate oyster mushrooms – an affordable source of protein and a rare small income stream in Gaza’s long-besieged economy. It was there he met Alaa, a microbiologist who would become his wife. The couple married in 2020, settling on the ground floor of a family home in central Khan Younis, with Agha’s brother and his family living upstairs, and a wide network of cousins, friends, and neighbors surrounding them. Their son Malik arrived in 2021, followed by daughter Razan a year later; both children inherited Polish citizenship through their father.

    When Israel launched its military campaign in Gaza in October 2023, Malik was just two years old, and Razan had only just turned one. One week into the conflict, on 14 October, the family was woken before dawn by an Israeli airstrike that hit their apartment building. They had already moved their mattresses into the home’s hallway, the most sheltered spot in the structure – a choice Agha says saved all their lives. Had they stayed in their bedrooms, with the children in their cots, he is certain none would have survived.

    Agha described the chaos that followed: “It was dark and very hot, and dust hung thick in the air. The children were crying desperately.” Shards of glass, chunks of ceiling, and broken concrete rained down around the family. Agha grabbed Malik, who had been sleeping beside him, before his wife screamed out asking where Razan was. Agha’s brother rushed down from the upper floor with a phone flashlight. Agha passed Malik to his uncle, then found Razan buried under debris. Both children were crying at first, but Razan quickly fell silent, terrifying her parents. Agha’s brother carried the two children out to a waiting ambulance, while Agha stayed behind to free Alaa, who was trapped up to her neck in rubble. By the time the ambulance reached the nearest hospital, Razan had stopped breathing. “At that moment, we were convinced that our little girl was already dead, that she was gone,” Agha recalled. It was only after Agha rescued his wife and reached the hospital himself that doctors told the couple Razan had been successfully resuscitated.

    Thirteen members of Agha’s extended family were killed in that single strike. The surviving family members lost every possession they owned, and spent months sheltering in overcrowded displacement tents. “It was cold, the water was contaminated, and there wasn’t enough food, especially for the children,” Agha said. Both children developed chronic diarrhoea and severe dehydration; Razan slipped into life-threatening malnutrition, while Malik developed anaemia. The family was finally able to evacuate Gaza in May 2024, relying on the children’s Polish citizenship to exit the strip. They now live in Wrocław, where Malik and Razan attend local preschool alongside Polish peers. Agha says his son’s first clear words after the strike were about a “broken window”: “His favourite spot was the windowsill, from which he watched the street, children playing with a ball, cars passing by. That space was his world, his point of reference. Suddenly, it was gone. He didn’t know who did it; he just said that they ‘broke it’, that ‘it’s gone’. He was not quite two years old, and those were practically his first words.”

    Elsaftawy, the second complainant, brings his own generations-long history of displacement and grief to the case. A leading plastic surgeon who heads a department at a hospital in Trzebnica, just outside Wrocław, he has lived in Poland for more than 30 years. His own family’s story of displacement began in 1948, during the Nakba – the mass expulsion of Palestinians that accompanied the creation of Israel. His father, then eight years old, was forced out of al-Majdal, the territory that is now the Israeli city of Ashkelon. The family ended up living in refugee tents in Gaza, turned into stateless refugees overnight. Elsaftawy himself was born in Qatar, where his parents moved in the 1960s searching for work. He moved to Poland at 17 to study medicine – a field that was closed to non-citizens in Qatar at the time – and has built his life and career there ever since. After the Oslo Accords in the 1990s, many of his relatives moved back to Gaza. Since October 2023, 34 members of his extended family have been killed in Gaza. The most devastating loss, he says, was his sister, who died from complications of malnutrition after being denied access to urgent medical care. “This tragedy will forever remain a part of my life,” he told Middle East Eye.

    To evacuate his elderly father and his brother’s family from Gaza last year, Elsaftawy traveled to Egypt and paid $27,500 in cash to Hala, the Egyptian private company that controlled access to the Rafah crossing evacuation list for most of 2024. The fee was $5,000 for his father, and $2,500 for each of his brother’s three children. “In a world where freedom is not a right but a commodity, everything has a price,” he noted.

    The legal complaint argues that the ongoing humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza is not an accidental side effect of military operations, but the result of a deliberate, coordinated strategy that meets the international legal definition of genocide. It specifically highlights the use of starvation as a prohibited weapon of war, and the deliberate obstruction of life-saving humanitarian aid to Polish citizens and their family members in Gaza. The complainants are backed by the Hind Rajab Foundation, the Polish-Palestinian justice initiative Kaktus, and Polish activists Nina Ptak and Ewa Jasiewicz from the Global Sumud Flotilla mission.

    Elsaftawy emphasized he is not seeking special treatment, only equal application of the law. “I am demanding only the right to the truth, accountability and the protection of fundamental humanitarian values, which should apply regardless of nationality, religion or origin,” he said. “Poland has a duty to adhere to the principles of international law, the protection of human rights and responsibility for the safety of its citizens.” In a statement, Kaktus framed the case as a critical test for Polish democratic institutions, asking: “Will the law be applied equally to everyone, or selectively, depending on origin?”

  • Iran: ‘shot down Reaper drone’ after US launched new strikes

    Iran: ‘shot down Reaper drone’ after US launched new strikes

    A spiraling cycle of cross-border attacks between U.S. and Iranian forces has thrown fragile ongoing peace negotiations into deep uncertainty, just days after U.S. President Donald Trump claimed progress toward a potential end to the illegal U.S.-Israeli war on Iran. The escalation, which unfolded across roughly 24 hours, has underscored deep divisions between the two sides and cast serious doubt over whether a diplomatic breakthrough can be reached.

    The sequence of hostilities began on Monday, when U.S. Central Command announced it had carried out what it framed as “self-defense strikes” against targets in southern Iran. The military command said the raids targeted Iranian missile launch sites and naval vessels that it accused of planning to deploy mines, framing the action as a necessary measure to protect U.S. troops deployed in the region. The strikes came mere hours after Trump publicly claimed that peace talks with Tehran were moving forward smoothly.

    Early Tuesday, the Iranian military issued a sharp response, confirming that its air defense units had downed a U.S. MQ-9 Reaper drone, and had engaged an RQ-4 surveillance drone and an F-35 fighter jet that had entered Iranian airspace. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which issued the official statement carried by multiple Iranian state news outlets, characterized its actions as legitimate self-defense, and insisted it retains the full right to respond to any violation of sovereign Iranian territory by aggressive U.S. forces.

    Independent experts have laid out a more detailed sequence of events than either side has publicly released, based on Iranian sources. Hamidreza Azizi, a foreign policy researcher and visiting fellow at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, explained that the exchange escalated through multiple sequential rounds. “It reportedly began when U.S. forces attacked two IRGC naval boats, killing four Iranian military personnel,” Azizi said. “Iran responded with anti-ship missiles targeting U.S. vessels. Iranian air defense systems then shot down at least one – some reports say three – U.S. drones operating in the area. After that, the U.S. hit Iranian anti-ship missile positions and air defense sites, prompting a second Iranian response targeting U.S. ships in the Arabian Sea with additional anti-ship missiles.”

    To date, independent verification of casualty counts, damage assessments, and which side initiated the clash remains severely limited. The competing accounts of the incident fit a well-established pattern in the conflict, with both nations framing their own military actions as just responses to the other’s aggression. What is clear, however, is that the multi-round escalation over a single day is far harder to de-escalate than an isolated one-off incident, raising urgent questions about the future of the indirect peace talks currently underway between the two countries.

    Diplomatic efforts have been on shaky ground for days, even before the latest military clash. Trump has publicly claimed that a final peace deal is close at hand, and on Monday evening released a social media post laying out his demand that Iran hand over all its enriched uranium to the U.S. for destruction, or destroy it under international supervision. Tehran has not accepted this proposal, and Iranian officials have pushed back hard on Trump’s claims that an imminent deal is near.

    The Wall Street Journal reported on Monday that negotiators have been working toward a 14-point memorandum of understanding that would implement an immediate ceasefire, open the Strait of Hormuz to global shipping after a U.S. blockade, lift some sanctions on Iran, unfreeze Iranian assets held abroad, and set up a 30-day window for broader negotiations that would later address Iran’s nuclear program. According to anonymous sources cited by the outlet, the U.S. is pushing for upfront commitments from Iran on its nuclear program, while Iranian negotiators are demanding concrete, detailed guarantees of sanctions relief before any final agreement is signed.

    During a press briefing on Monday, Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Esmail Baghaei acknowledged that significant progress has been made on many core issues, but rejected any suggestion that a final deal is imminent. “It is correct to say that we have reached a conclusion on a large portion of the issues under discussion,” Baghaei stated. “But to say that this means the signing of an agreement is imminent – no one can make such a claim.”

    Baghaei emphasized that the top and only priority of current negotiations is ending the war on all fronts, including the ongoing Israeli offensive in Lebanon. Contradicting Trump’s public claims, he confirmed that nuclear program issues and the long-term governance of the Strait of Hormuz are not on the table in this round of talks. “How this region should be managed concerns the littoral states,” Baghaei said, referring to Iran and Oman. “We understand that the security of the Strait of Hormuz is a concern for the entire world.”

    The spokesperson also hit out at shifting U.S. negotiating positions and what Tehran says is consistent Israeli efforts to sabotage the diplomatic process. A major sticking point in the talks, he noted, is Iran’s demand that any ceasefire agreement must include an end to Israeli attacks on Lebanon, which have killed or wounded more than 12,000 people to date. Even after a Pakistan-brokered ceasefire took effect in early April, Israel escalated its strikes, killing and wounding more than 1,400 people in a single 24-hour period. “One should expect nothing from Israel except the sabotage of any process,” Baghaei added.

    Trump later tempered his earlier claims of an imminent deal, posting on his Truth Social platform that “Negotiations with the Islamic Republic of Iran are proceeding nicely! It will only be a Great Deal for all or, no Deal at all – Back to the Battlefront and shooting, but bigger and stronger than ever before – And nobody wants that!” Trump also added a new demand to the negotiations: that all regional mediating countries including Turkey, Pakistan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Jordan be required to join the U.S.-brokered Abraham Accords normalization agreements with Israel, and suggested that Iran itself should also normalize ties with Israel as part of any deal, a proposal Tehran has not engaged with publicly.

    Analysts warn that the latest military escalation has created an extremely high-risk environment for the negotiations. “Fighting and talking at the same time is quite a common thing in a negotiation at the end of a conflict that has been very intense and hasn’t been resolved,” said Samir Puri, a visiting lecturer in war studies at King’s College London. “The key … is to keep talking and to not allow the talks to collapse by these escalations – because these may not be the last escalations. What we don’t know is whether this is the storm before the calm or the calm before the storm. We don’t know whether these negotiations need to be sustained and to absorb these sorts of escalations for days, for weeks, for months. It could be a very long negotiation process still to come.”

    Domestic political opposition to a potential deal has emerged on both sides of the conflict, as well as from Israel. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said Sunday that he supports U.S. diplomatic efforts, but insisted that any final deal must eliminate what he calls Iran’s nuclear threat – a position that contradicts long-standing assessments from both U.S. and Israeli intelligence, which confirm Iran halted its nuclear weapons program in the early 2000s and has not resumed it. Israeli opposition leader Yair Lapid joined pro-war Republican U.S. lawmakers in criticizing the emerging framework, calling the proposed deal “bad for Israel, bad for the region, bad for the citizens of Iran.”

    Some U.S. Congressional Democrats have also raised objections to the terms of the potential deal, even as they support an immediate end to the conflict. The war has already killed or wounded more than 30,000 Iranians, most of them civilians, according to the Iranian Ministry of Health. “If this deal with Iran is real, I will welcome it because every day this insane war goes on, America gets weaker,” Sen. Chris Murphy, a Connecticut Democrat, said Sunday. “The priority is to end the war – now. But make no mistake: These are Iran’s terms. Our nation emerges humiliated.”

    Murphy, a long-time opponent of the war, noted that Trump, who withdrew the U.S. from the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) nuclear deal during his first term, has failed to achieve any of his stated war goals. “A hardline regime is still in charge. Iran still has its ballistic missile and drone program. They still have a navy that can close the strait,” Murphy said. “And now that we are dropping sanctions, we have less leverage to get them to give more in future negotiations. Of course, none of those things could be accomplished by an air campaign – which is why so many of us opposed this war. And now the new regime is emboldened. They took our best shot and beat us. Iran emerges more powerful.”

    Iranian military leaders have reaffirmed that their forces are fully prepared to resume and escalate hostilities if negotiations collapse. “Look, Americans talk too much and keep changing their story by the minute,” Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters Commander Ali Abdollahi Aliabadi said Monday. “We’ve said it many times before: On the battlefield, we’ll show what we’re capable of.”

  • African nations seek security ties with Turkey through ‘Somalia model’

    African nations seek security ties with Turkey through ‘Somalia model’

    Over the weekend, Turkish Defense Minister Yasar Guler confirmed a growing trend across the African continent: a rising number of African states are pushing to adopt the long-developed ‘Somali model’ partnership that Ankara and Mogadishu have built over more than a decade, aiming to secure Turkish security and economic support to strengthen their own national capacity. Speaking on the sidelines of the Efes military exercises held in western Turkey, Guler emphasized that Turkey continues to deliver specialized military training and technical assistance to armed forces across African nations in response to their formal requests, supporting steady progress in local defense capacity building. ‘In this context, several other countries are requesting the same comprehensive model we implemented in Somalia,’ Guler noted, adding that Turkish officials are currently reviewing each incoming request.

  • Atrocities in Sudan backed by Colombian mercenaries trained at UAE bases, says report

    Atrocities in Sudan backed by Colombian mercenaries trained at UAE bases, says report

    A groundbreaking new investigation from Human Rights Watch (HRW) has uncovered damning evidence linking the United Arab Emirates to the deployment of hundreds of Colombian mercenaries in Sudan, where the foreign fighters have supported the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) — a paramilitary group accused of large-scale war crimes and genocide in the country’s ongoing civil conflict.

    According to the 38-page report, Abu Dhabi-based private security firm Global Security Services Group (GSSG) has actively recruited hundreds of Colombian special operations contractors since the start of 2024, deploying them directly to Sudan to fight alongside the RSF against the official Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). HRW investigators confirmed that the contractors passed through UAE-operated military bases on Sudanese territory before joining frontline RSF units, a trail of evidence that the human rights organization says proves direct UAE complicity in widespread violence committed by the paramilitary.

    The RSF has faced mounting international accusations of genocide, systematic mass sexual violence, ethnic cleansing, and multiple other violations of international humanitarian law since Sudan’s civil conflict reignited in April 2023. HRW’s findings add new weight to global calls for punitive action against the UAE, which has long faced allegations of covertly backing the RSF despite consistent official denials.

    “The recruitment of Colombian private military contractors adds to a growing body of evidence that the UAE provides military support to the Rapid Support Forces, which have repeatedly carried out heinous atrocities in Sudan,” said Mausi Segun, executive director of HRW’s Africa Division. “Governments should publicly demand that the UAE stop supplying weapons, equipment, personnel, and other military support to the Rapid Support Forces.”

    HRW’s findings align with earlier independent investigations into RSF atrocities. In March 2024, Yale University’s Humanitarian Research Lab (HRL) corroborated United Nations claims of genocide in Sudan’s Darfur region, documenting that RSF forces had waged a deliberate campaign of starvation against the strategic city of el-Fasher. The lab’s report confirmed that RSF fighters razed dozens of rural farming villages, destroyed critical crop infrastructure, and systematically targeted civilian populations after seizing control of the city. Extensive on-the-ground interviews conducted by independent outlet Middle East Eye (MEE), alongside subsequent UN and HRL investigations, have documented widespread extrajudicial executions, mass rape, and extortion of el-Fasher’s civilian population by RSF fighters.

    The presence of Colombian mercenaries in Sudan first entered public view in November 2024, when a SAF-aligned armed group released social media videos showing an intercepted convoy of Colombian fighters that had crossed into Sudan from neighboring Libya. While the UAE has repeatedly rejected all accusations of supporting the RSF, MEE has published years of investigative work backed by satellite imagery, flight tracking logs, weapons serial numbers, and multiple anonymous insider sources confirming the UAE’s ongoing military backing for the paramilitary.

    Joey Shea, a lead HRW researcher on the investigation, told MEE that Colombian contractors transited through sensitive UAE military and government facilities prior to their deployment to RSF frontlines. She added that investigators have directly linked the foreign contractors to grave human rights abuses on the ground.

    “One contractor who I spoke to told me that he helped to support the training of child soldiers, boys as young as 13-14 years old,” Shea explained.

    The investigation also revealed that the military relationship between the UAE and Colombian private military contractors stretches back more than a decade. As early as 2011, The New York Times reported that UAE leader Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan was building a foreign legion of up to 800 Colombian contractors to serve officially within the UAE armed forces. One retired Colombian contractor interviewed by HRW confirmed he took part in that 2011 recruitment drive, noting that the operation was entirely public, with all participants receiving formal work contracts for their service in the UAE.

    This report is based on independent reporting from Middle East Eye, a media outlet specializing in original, unfiltered coverage of the Middle East, North Africa, and global affairs.

  • Halal food at the wedding? Hard-right Restore leader’s son marries daughter of Libyan academic

    Halal food at the wedding? Hard-right Restore leader’s son marries daughter of Libyan academic

    A growing far-right nativist British political party that has drawn high-profile backing from X owner Elon Musk is facing internal backlash and public scrutiny just weeks ahead of a critical by-election that could reshape the country’s political landscape. Led by former Reform UK MP Rupert Lowe, Restore Britain has risen rapidly in prominence over recent months, galvanized by viral mobilization on the social media platform X, where Lowe and party-aligned accounts collectively boast hundreds of thousands of followers.

    Restore Britain built its support base on a hardline anti-immigration, anti-Muslim platform, promising to roll back what it labels the “Islamisation of Britain”, ban kosher and halal animal slaughter, and achieve net-negative migration through mass deportations. The party’s explicitly nativist ideology sets it apart from even the right-wing Reform UK: in February, party spokesperson Charlie Downes made clear that while Reform UK holds that any person from any background can become British, Restore Britain defines British national identity as tied to indigenous ancestry and the Christian faith. The party has also called for the British armed forces to prioritize recruitment from the “native majority” rather than recruiting from minority communities, and Lowe has repeatedly made inflammatory public comments targeting immigrant groups from Muslim-majority nations, claiming foreign men from these backgrounds harass women and disrupt public order.

    The party has shaken up the race for the upcoming Makerfield by-election, where popular Greater Manchester Mayor Andy Burnham is running as the Labour Party candidate. A Labour win would put Burnham in position to mount a leadership challenge to Prime Minister Keir Starmer. A late Survation poll the previous week placed Labour at 43% support, Reform UK close behind at 40%, and Restore Britain at 7% in third place. Multiple campaign sources, however, have told reporters that on-the-ground canvassing data shows Restore Britain outperforming this polling number significantly. Elon Musk’s public endorsement of the party – including a recent post declaring “Only Restore Britain can save Britain” – has supercharged its growth, and the party now claims more than 123,000 registered members. Reform UK leader Nigel Farage has accused Musk of deliberately splitting the right-wing vote to tip the race to Labour, saying “Quite what he’s trying to achieve, I have no idea.” With the right-wing vote split between Reform and Restore, polling and political analysts agree that the split is helping Burnham maintain his lead in the constituency, which is largely working-class and majority-white, where right-wing parties draw higher overall support than Labour.

    The party’s momentum has hit a major crisis following the wedding of Lowe’s son Angus over the previous weekend, after Lowe posted a wedding photo of the couple to X that drew immediate outrage from his own far-right base. The bride, Yasmin Mezran, is the daughter of Karim Mezran, a prominent Libyan-Italian academic who currently serves as director of the North Africa Initiative and resident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for Middle East Programs. Mezran, a well-known expert on political Islam and Mediterranean geopolitics, has a decades-long track record of advocating for Muslim integration and religious pluralism in Europe, and has publicly criticized anti-Muslim nationalist policies from far-right European governments. Outrage among Restore Britain supporters intensified after it was confirmed that a halal meal option was available for Muslim guests at the wedding reception – a direct contradiction of the party’s official policy to ban halal slaughter nationwide. Mezran himself reposted a social media note highlighting the contradiction between the wedding’s arrangements and Restore’s official platform.

    Mezran’s long career of academic and policy work stands in stark ideological opposition to Lowe and Restore Britain’s core mission. In 2013, he published a major paper arguing that Muslim communities in Italy needed a formal agreement with the Italian state to guarantee their equal rights, noting that previous attempts at such an agreement had been blocked by widespread prejudice among the Italian public and a lack of political courage from state institutions. He has repeatedly advocated for pluralistic integration that aligns with the democratic values of constitutional tolerance, and in 2022 warned the Italian government of Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni that its anti-Muslim nationalist rhetoric would damage Italy’s diplomatic relations with Middle Eastern nations. Following Pope Francis’ death in 2025, Mezran praised the late pope for his public advocacy for Palestinian rights during the war in Gaza. He has also pushed back against stereotypes of Islamist political groups, arguing in 2012 that Libya’s elected Muslim Brotherhood did not fit common negative tropes, and called for cross-ideological cooperation between liberal and religious conservative politicians in the country. In a 2023 analysis, he framed Algeria as a critical pillar of regional stability for Italy and the European Union, arguing that closer Italian-Algerian ties would strengthen Mediterranean security.

    Lowe, a millionaire former businessman, farmer, and ex-chairman of Southampton FC, was suspended from Reform UK in March 2024 after he publicly criticized Nigel Farage and called Reform a “protest party led by the Messiah”, prompting his split to form Restore Britain. He is no stranger to public controversy: last year he drew widespread condemnation after revealing he had asked his gamekeeper to shoot his 17-year-old pet dog in the head after the dog lost the use of its hind legs, a decision he defended as humane. Advocacy group Hope Not Hate CEO Nick Lowles noted that Restore Britain’s aggressive on-the-ground campaign in Makerfield is being heavily amplified by far-right vloggers and Musk’s platform, and that Reform UK’s focus on attacking Restore Britain is inadvertently boosting its appeal to racist voters across the country. Middle East Eye has reached out to Karim Mezran for additional comment on the ongoing controversy.

  • Osaka sparkles in golden French Open outfit

    Osaka sparkles in golden French Open outfit

    Four-time Grand Slam champion Naomi Osaka has once again blended high fashion and elite tennis, turning heads at the 2026 French Open with a dramatic two-layered outfit inspired by the sparkling night sky over Paris’ iconic Eiffel Tower — and backing up the viral entrance with a straight-set first-round win.

    The 28-year-old Japanese star, who has built a reputation for show-stopping custom looks at major tournaments, made her entrance onto Court Suzanne Lenglen in a dramatic outer ensemble: a structured black corset paired with a flowing pleated skirt that swept across the red clay. Beneath this moody, elegant outer layer, Osaka hid a showstopping custom gold tennis dress covered in light-catching sequins that glinted under the bright Parisian sun. In a post-match interview, Osaka shared that the outfit’s design was directly inspired by the twinkling evening light display that makes the Eiffel Tower one of the most visited landmarks in the world. “When I first saw it, I felt like I look like the Eiffel Tower at night time when it’s bright,” she explained.

    The layered look was a collaborative design: the sustainable black outer pieces came from London-based fashion designer Kevin Germanier, while the glittering gold base dress was custom-created by Osaka’s long-time apparel partner Nike. Osaka admitted that she had one major concern ahead of her opening match: the intense reflection from the sequins when hit by direct sunlight. She revealed she brought two plain backup dresses to the court, worried tournament umpires would ask her to change over distraction concerns. “I was a little scared the umpire was going to kick me off the court,” she joked. “Thankfully I didn’t have to wear them.”

    Osaka’s fashion-forward entrance won praise from across the tennis world, including from women’s top seed Aryna Sabalenka, who watched the entrance live on broadcast. “This is sparkling. I love it. I love that she is expressing herself and feels confident,” Sabalenka said. “That’s the beauty of the fashion world, there’s space for anything and I love that she’s bringing it on court.”

    Former British top-ranked player Annabel Croft noted that pulling off a high-profile custom outfit on a Grand Slam stage takes a unique level of confidence that few players can match. “If you out there in an extraordinary outfit, you’ve got to live up to that and have the confidence to play in it and give the crowd the tennis as well as the outfit,” Croft told BBC Radio 5 Sports Extra. “Naomi can handle it. She really loves it and she’s not fazed by it.”

    Osaka delivered on both fronts: after the viral entrance, she played solid, consistent tennis to defeat Germany’s Laura Siegemund 6-3, 7-6 (7-3) to secure her spot in the tournament’s second round. She will next face Croatia’s Donna Vekic for a place in the third round.

    This French Open look continues Osaka’s recent tradition of memorable Grand Slam entrance outfits. At the 2026 Australian Open earlier this year, she stepped onto court in a jellyfish-inspired look that she dedicated to her two-year-old daughter Shai, and previous majors have seen her debut bold designs ranging from bow-accented lime green ensembles to tie-dye statement pieces. Osaka says these pre-match entrances are the one part of her job where she gets to embrace the performative side of professional sports. “Sometimes people say athletes are in show business or entertainers or whatever,” she said. “For me, Grand Slam walk-ons are the only time that I possibly feel like I’m an entertainer.”

    Osaka is no stranger to pushing fashion boundaries in tennis, a trend that can be traced back decades through trailblazing players like Serena and Venus Williams. The image gallery accompanying this event highlights iconic boundary-pushing tennis fashion moments: Serena Williams’ all-black studded ensemble at the 2004 US Open, her 2018 French Open black catsuit (which she said made her feel like a “superhero”), Venus Williams’ black-and-red corset lace dress at the 2010 French Open, and Maria Sharapova’s tuxedo-inspired twist on Wimbledon’s all-white dress code in 2008, placing Osaka’s latest design firmly in a legacy of athletes using fashion to express creativity on court.

    Since returning to the tour following the birth of her daughter in 2023, Osaka has mounted a remarkable career comeback, climbing back into the world’s top 20 rankings and reaching the semi-finals of the 2025 US Open.

  • The world may or may not be entering ‘Beijing time’

    The world may or may not be entering ‘Beijing time’

    In recent weeks, consecutive back-to-back state visits to Beijing by Russian President Vladimir Putin and former U.S. President Donald Trump have thrust China’s role in global diplomacy into the center of international discussion. Many international analysts have framed this flurry of high-level summits as proof of China’s emerging status as a stabilizing global actor: a capable broker capable of hosting two competing major powers within days, and a core pillar of global order. Other observers go further, arguing that the wave of visits cements China’s position as an indispensable global power, and its leader as a central global figure that must be engaged and courted by the international community.

    Chinese analysts add broader context to this trend, noting that Putin and Trump’s visits are not isolated events. Over the past six months, Beijing has welcomed heads of state from across the globe, including France, the United Kingdom, Canada, South Korea and Germany. Notably, many of these trips marked long-awaited returns to Beijing for top leaders: it was the first UK prime ministerial visit in eight years, and the first such trip in nine years for leaders from Canada, South Korea and the United States. Chinese state media has embraced this narrative, describing Beijing as a global “living room” that offers much-needed stability amid global turbulence, with one headline declaring the world has entered “Beijing time.”

    But while the string of summits has undeniably elevated China’s global profile, these celebratory interpretations overlook three critical, underreported factors that change the picture of Beijing’s growing diplomatic centrality.

    First, the true motivation behind many leaders’ trips to Beijing remains unclear. While many frame the visits as a victory for proactive Chinese diplomacy, a large share of these trips are instead driven by foreign leaders’ desire to gain greater leverage in their own tense dealings with the second Trump administration. For example, when Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney traveled to Beijing in January, widespread analysis framed the trip as a direct response to Canada’s deep structural economic dependence on the United States, paired with growing policy volatility under the second Trump administration. Many international outlets noted Carney was effectively playing the “China card” to strengthen his hand in upcoming trade negotiations with Washington.

    Second, access to Beijing’s diplomatic “living room” comes with a high tangible price, and many visits have been tied to significant policy concessions from visiting leaders. During his 2025 Beijing trip, for instance, Trump reversed earlier campaign and policy proposals that would have blocked Chinese nationals from purchasing U.S. farmland and imposed strict caps on Chinese university students studying in the United States. Chinese state media itself was quick to highlight the fierce backlash these concessions drew from Trump’s own MAGA base and rival Republican lawmakers in Washington.

    Similarly, Carney’s trip yielded a major trade concession for Beijing: a new bilateral deal that cut Canadian tariffs on Chinese-made electric vehicles to 6.1% for the first 49,000 imported vehicles annually. This marked a sharp reversal from late 2024, when Canada imposed a 100% tariff on Chinese EV imports, and even clashed with Carney’s own 2025 election campaign rhetoric, where he called China the “biggest geopolitical threat” to the West. The tariff reversal drew sharp criticism from Canadian opposition politicians, who warned it would open the door to a flood of low-cost Chinese EV imports without securing any binding guarantees for reciprocal Chinese investment in Canada’s domestic economy.

    Third, the string of high-profile visits has not produced any measurable shift in China’s long-held core foreign policy positions, despite repeated appeals from visiting leaders. European leaders’ diplomatic outreach, for example, has not altered Beijing’s ongoing material support for Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, nor has it reduced China’s persistent large bilateral trade surplus with the European Union. Similarly, Beijing refused to commit to supporting the Trump administration’s policy goals around Iran, even after Trump publicly praised Xi Jinping’s leadership and paused a controversial planned arms sale to Taiwan that Beijing had strongly opposed. Even Vladimir Putin, a close strategic partner of Beijing, left his Beijing visit without resolving longstanding disagreements over the Power of Siberia 2 natural gas pipeline, a project Putin has prioritized for years. If completed, the pipeline would carry 50 billion cubic meters of Russian gas to China annually — equal to roughly 12% of China’s total domestic gas consumption in 2025.

    So what does this wave of visits actually signal, if not a rise in China’s effective global leadership? The surge in top-level trips to Beijing is more a reflection of growing systemic uncertainty across the existing global order, argues author Czeslaw Tubilewicz, a senior lecturer in the Department of Politics and International Relations at Adelaide University. The sharp, unpredictable shifts in U.S. foreign policy under the second Trump administration have sparked deep anxiety among Washington’s long-standing traditional allies, creating a vacuum that China has been quick to fill by positioning itself as a reliable, stable alternative partner after years of more confrontational “wolf-warrior diplomacy.”

    Yet this growing diplomatic visibility does not equate to more effective Chinese diplomacy. Domestic economic pressures and competing conflicting international priorities still severely limit the tangible concessions and outcomes Beijing can deliver to global partners. To prevent widespread factory closures and hit official annual economic growth targets, for example, Beijing provides massive state subsidies to key domestic manufacturing sectors, generating massive surplus output that is exported to global markets (including the EU) at artificially low prices. Beijing cannot afford to rein in these exports, even as it fuels trade tensions with Western economies that are critical to China’s own long-term economic growth.

    At the same time, China has continued to provide diplomatic and material support to Russia and Iran as they challenge U.S. and European security order, even as this ongoing support creates lasting rifts with Western economies that are central to China’s economic development. The end result is that high-profile summits in Beijing deliver heavy ceremony and global visibility, but very few tangible, lasting policy outcomes.

    In sum, the recent visits by Putin, Trump and a stream of other world leaders have certainly made China appear far more central to global diplomatic affairs. But this newfound visibility does not automatically translate into effective, influential global leadership.

  • Former ICC prosecutor says Mossad chief pressured her to stop investigating Israel war crimes

    Former ICC prosecutor says Mossad chief pressured her to stop investigating Israel war crimes

    In a bombshell new interview with Al Jazeera published Sunday, former International Criminal Court chief prosecutor Fatou Bensouda has lifted the veil on coordinated political pressure, intimidation tactics and punitive sanctions designed to force her to abandon a landmark investigation into alleged war crimes committed in occupied Palestine. Bensouda, who led the ICC’s prosecution division from 2012 until 2021, laid out a years-long campaign of harassment that began just months after she opened a preliminary examination into the Palestinian situation in 2015.

    The first incident came when two unidentified men showed up unannounced at Bensouda’s private residence in The Hague, where the ICC is headquartered. The men left her an envelope holding $500, claiming the cash was a thank-you gift from a party she had previously assisted. But Bensouda told the outlet she quickly recognized the encounter for what it was: a deliberate threat designed to prove that her opponents could track her down to her home. She immediately reported the break-in visit to ICC security and Dutch law enforcement, which later traced phone numbers linked to the two men back to Israel. No further action was ever taken in the case, according to Bensouda, leaving her feeling abandoned and unprotected by the institutions she served.

    Beyond the surprise home visit, Bensouda detailed repeated, high-level pressure meetings with Yossi Cohen, who led Israel’s Mossad intelligence agency during her tenure. One of the most notable encounters took place in a New York City hotel during the annual United Nations General Assembly, where Cohen made his organization’s position explicitly clear. According to Bensouda, the meetings opened with superficial friendly overtures and attempts to coerce her through persuasion, before quickly shifting to direct, uncompromising demands that she end the Palestine investigation. When asked to confirm a prior Guardian report that Cohen explicitly warned her proceeding with the probe would put her personal safety and her family’s security at risk, and that Israel could “take care” of her if she complied, Bensouda answered plainly: “He did. He did.” The former prosecutor said she had no doubt that the messages amounted to direct threats against her and her loved ones, all aimed at killing the investigation.

    Bensouda went on to link these Israeli intimidation efforts to the sweeping sanctions imposed against her by the first Donald Trump administration in September 2020. The punitive measures were implemented after the ICC moved forward with investigations into alleged war crimes by both U.S. forces in Afghanistan and Israeli troops in occupied Palestine. The sanctions froze her global assets and imposed broad travel restrictions, upending both her professional and personal life in ways the public rarely sees, she explained.

    Beyond barring her from entering the United States, the sanctions triggered cascading financial disruptions that affected nearly every part of her daily life. Her long-held account with the UN Federal Credit Union, opened decades earlier during her work at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, was shut down immediately. Basic routine transactions from booking hotel rooms to sending money to ICC member states became impossible. Even Dutch banks, which fall under the scope of U.S. financial regulations, were forced to cut ties: the bank that held her mortgage closed her account entirely. It took coordinated intervention from the ICC registrar and Dutch authorities to arrange for her salary to be deposited at a bank that already worked with the court, and eventually for a second Dutch bank to take over her basic transactions, even with strict limits on her activity. Even after that workaround, transfers to family members regularly failed when intermediary correspondent banks refused to process the payments out of fear of U.S. penalties. Her own son, a resident of The Gambia, had his personal bank account blocked as a result of the sanctions.

    Bensouda also confirmed that her husband was targeted for surveillance in the lead-up to the 2020 sanctions designation, with efforts to collect intelligence through photographs and audio recordings. The U.S. only lifted the punitive sanctions against Bensouda in early 2021, shortly after Joe Biden took office. Since that time, the politicization of the ICC has only escalated. After returning to the U.S. presidency, Donald Trump reimposed broad sanctions targeting ICC personnel in an executive order signed in February 2024. The order authorizes economic and travel restrictions for any individual working on ICC investigations into U.S. citizens or U.S. allies including Israel. To date, current ICC chief prosecutor Karim Khan, who succeeded Bensouda in 2021, both of his deputy prosecutors, and eight sitting ICC judges have been added to the sanctions list. Khan has since narrowed the scope of the Afghanistan investigation to focus exclusively on atrocities committed by the Taliban and the Islamic State, effectively dropping the probe into alleged U.S. war crimes.

    In addition to detailing the pressure campaign, Bensouda pushed back against longstanding criticisms that the ICC disproportionately targets African nations for investigation. She noted that the vast majority of the court’s African investigations were launched at the formal request of African governments themselves, rather than being imposed by the court unilaterally. “People always forget that ICC did not go to Africa to start investigating. It was Africa that came to the ICC,” she said.

    Despite the growing bipartisan and international political attacks on the court’s authority, Bensouda reaffirmed her unwavering support for the ICC’s core mandate of advancing international justice. “There will be attempts to make the court disintegrate and fade away. But I know that there are still people, institutions and countries that want justice,” she said.

    Bensouda spoke out publicly ahead of her keynote address at last week’s Hague Rights Forum, where she urged the European Union to take concrete action to shield the ICC and its personnel from extraterritorial sanctions imposed by outside powers. She called on the EU to activate its blocking statute, a regulation designed to protect European companies and individuals from the extrajurisdictional impact of third-country sanctions, and to share technological resources from the bloc’s autonomy initiatives with the court to strengthen its resilience.

  • UAE and Bahrain fail to join GCC condemnation of Somaliland opening embassy in Jerusalem

    UAE and Bahrain fail to join GCC condemnation of Somaliland opening embassy in Jerusalem

    A growing diplomatic rift has emerged across the Middle East and broader Muslim world over a controversial plan by the self-declared independent region of Somaliland to open an embassy in occupied East Jerusalem, with two Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members notably declining to join a widespread collective condemnation of the move.

    The proposal comes on the heels of a historic step last year: Israel became the first country in the world to formally recognize Somaliland as a sovereign state, a breakaway territory that declared independence from Somalia in 1991 but has not secured widespread international recognition. In comments delivered Tuesday, Mohamed Hagi, Somaliland’s ambassador to Israel, confirmed the reciprocal diplomatic arrangement, noting that Israel will also open its own embassy in Hargeisa, Somaliland’s administrative capital. Hagi framed the exchange of diplomatic missions as a reflection of deepening friendship, mutual respect, and expanding strategic cooperation between the two entities.

    Under longstanding international law, East Jerusalem is universally classified as occupied Palestinian territory. Israel seized control of the area from Jordan during the 1967 Six-Day War, and despite Israel’s annexation of the territory, the overwhelming majority of the global community has declined to recognize Jerusalem as Israel’s sovereign capital.

    The planned embassy opening has drawn sharp condemnation from a broad coalition of regional and international states. Foreign ministers from four of the six GCC member states—Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia—joined more than a dozen other nations including Egypt, Jordan, Turkey, Pakistan, Indonesia, Djibouti, Somalia, Palestine, Sudan, Yemen, Lebanon, Mauritania, Algeria, Bangladesh, and Morocco to denounce what they called the “illegal and unacceptable step taken by the so-called Somaliland region in opening its purported embassy in occupied Jerusalem.” Even GCC Secretary-General Jasem Mohamed Albudaiwi joined the rebuke, stating that the diplomatic move violates international law and United Nations resolutions.

    Notably absent from the collective condemnation were the UAE and Bahrain, the two GCC states that have already normalized formal diplomatic relations with Israel as part of the 2020 Abraham Accords. Requests for comment from Middle East Eye to clarify the two countries’ positions on the Somaliland embassy plan went unanswered as of the publication of the original reporting.

    Beyond the diplomatic controversy over Jerusalem, the recognition of Somaliland by Israel has opened the door to discussions of deeper security cooperation. Multiple sources have confirmed that Somaliland officials have held talks with Israeli counterparts about constructing a permanent Israeli military base in the territory, a proposal that reverses earlier denials of such plans by Hargeisa’s foreign ministry. For Israel, a military foothold in Somaliland would place its forces within short striking distance of Yemen’s Houthi movement, which has launched repeated attacks on commercial shipping in the Red Sea since late 2023, actions the group says are in retaliation for Israel’s military campaign in Gaza.

    The status of Somaliland itself remains a contentious global issue. While the region has operated as a de facto independent state since 1991, the United Nations, African Union, and nearly all sovereign governments still recognize it as an integral part of Somalia. The UAE has maintained close diplomatic and security ties with Somaliland since 2017, when Hargeisa granted Abu Dhabi permission to establish its own military base in the region, a partnership Somaliland has leveraged to build international support for its independence bid.

    This close alliance has already sparked regional friction in recent months. In January, Saudi Arabia publicly accused the UAE of secretly evacuating Yemeni separatist leader Aidarous al-Zubaidi—who faced treason charges in Yemen—from Yemen to Somaliland, before he traveled onward to Abu Dhabi. Somalia reacted furiously to the incident, canceling all of the UAE’s commercial and military agreements related to Somaliland, even though Mogadishu holds little effective control over the territory. Unlike Saudi Arabia, which centers its diplomatic engagement on Somalia’s recognized central government in Mogadishu, the UAE’s approach to the Horn of Africa has long been structured around its separate ties to both Somaliland and the semi-autonomous Somali region of Puntland.

  • Mali’s new turmoil tests Algerian bid to reclaim mediator role in the Sahel

    Mali’s new turmoil tests Algerian bid to reclaim mediator role in the Sahel

    The recent surge of large-scale armed attacks in northern Mali that has significantly weakened the ruling junta has reignited a long-standing debate across the Sahel: will Algeria, once the preeminent diplomatic mediator for the region, be able to reclaim its influential role – a possibility that many actors in Bamako openly question today.

    On April 25, a coordinated alliance of two powerful groups launched a surprise offensive against Malian military and government installations. The coalition brings together the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA), a Tuareg separatist movement fighting for independence for Mali’s northern Azawad region, and Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), an al-Qaeda-affiliated militant coalition. By the end of the assault, the alliance had seized strategic population centers including the key northern town of Kidal, captured multiple major army bases, imposed a de facto blockade on national capital Bamako, and killed Malian Defense Minister Sadio Camara. The attack marks the most severe threat to the junta that seized power in a 2020 coup since it took control of the country.

    Across the border in neighboring Algeria, the rapid upheaval in Mali has sparked a mix of urgent concern and cautious strategic expectation. For years, Algeria’s diplomatic clout in Mali has steadily eroded, but the new crisis has opened a window for Algiers to reassert its long-held role as a regional crisis manager.

    Algeria’s diplomatic legacy in Mali stretches back decades, with its most landmark achievement being the brokering of the 2015 Algiers Peace Agreement, a deal designed to address the long-simmering political and social grievances that fuel conflict in northern Mali. However, bilateral relations between Algiers and Bamako collapsed dramatically after the August 2020 military coup that ousted Mali’s democratically elected civilian government led by President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita. In 2024, Mali’s junta formally withdrew from the 2015 peace accord, and has repeatedly levied accusations that Algeria maintains improper clandestine ties with northern separatist and militant rebel groups.

    Algeria has consistently rejected these claims, arguing that its open contacts with a full range of Malian stakeholders are intended solely to keep diplomatic communication channels open and prevent further violent escalation of the conflict. For Algiers, reclaiming influence in Mali is not just a matter of regional diplomatic prestige – it is a critical national security priority. The two countries share a 1,370-kilometer undefended border, and Algiers views sustained stability in Mali as central to protecting its own territory from cross-border threats including militant insurgency, arms trafficking, and irregular migration. Algerian policymakers have long warned that any further collapse of control in northern Mali could spill over to destabilize Algeria’s own restive southern regions.

    Toufik Gouider, an Algerian international relations researcher and writer, explained to Middle East Eye that Algeria’s policy is rooted in a core strategic premise: “Mali’s security and stability are part of Algeria’s own security and stability.” Gouider added that Algeria considers preserving Mali’s territorial integrity to be a non-negotiable strategic interest, as fragmentation in the north would almost certainly create instability that spreads across the border.

    The April 2025 offensive has laid bare the persistent fragility of Mali’s security situation, even after more than a decade of sustained military operations against separatist and militant groups. Mali’s ongoing crisis first erupted in 2012, when a Tuareg separatist rebellion in the north was rapidly co-opted by al-Qaeda and Islamic State-linked militant groups to expand their influence, spiraling into a persistent civil war that has ebbed and flowed for 13 years.

    Since taking power in 2020, Mali’s junta has prioritized a purely military strategy to reassert full state control over the entire country. The recent successful rebel offensive has demonstrated that the core threat to state authority remains far from eliminated. “The latest events have reinforced the belief that military solutions alone are insufficient, and that lasting stability cannot be achieved without an inclusive political dialogue that takes into account local specificities and social balances in the region,” Algerian political analyst Sadek Amin told Middle East Eye.

    Amin added that abandoning the 2015 Algiers Agreement marked a retreat from the only existing political framework that, for all its flaws and implementation delays, offered a realistic path to preserving Mali’s territorial unity and stabilizing the broader Sahel region. The 2015 accord, signed in Algiers under United Nations oversight, remains Algeria’s most consequential diplomatic achievement in the Sahel. It established a framework for greater political decentralization in northern Mali, and the integration of former rebel fighters into national state institutions, in exchange for armed groups laying down their weapons. While full implementation of the deal stalled for years due to political disagreements on both sides, most diplomats and regional analysts continued to view it as the most comprehensive framework for addressing the root causes of Mali’s conflict.

    “The Algiers Agreement was the only framework that brought the Malian parties to the same table,” Malian journalist Omar al-Ansari told MEE, noting that Mali’s current junta deliberately undermined the accord by prioritizing a military-only approach to ending the conflict. Mali’s military authorities formally exited the agreement in January 2024, justifying the move by claiming the accord no longer aligned with the country’s modern sovereignty and security priorities.

    Bilateral tensions between the two neighbors escalated even further in early 2025, when Algerian air defense forces shot down a Malian military drone near the shared border. Algiers stated the drone had violated Algerian airspace, while Bamako called the incident a deliberate and serious act of escalation. In the wake of the incident, anti-Algeria protests erupted outside the Algerian embassy in Bamako, with demonstrators holding signs accusing Algeria of supporting terrorism.

    Following the April 2025 rebel offensive, Algerian Foreign Minister Ahmed Attaf reaffirmed his country’s long-held position, stating that Algeria remains “committed to the territorial integrity of Mali, the unity of its people and its institutions”, while restating Algiers’s “categorical rejection of all forms and manifestations of terrorism”. Despite this official public stance, Malian government officials and independent commentators continue to accuse Algeria of practicing a double standard: publicly endorsing Mali’s territorial unity while maintaining close ties to separatist and armed political actors in the north, including leaders of groups that have previously waged armed rebellion against the Bamako central government.

    Bamako argues that these covert contacts allow Algeria to gain unfair leverage over Malian domestic affairs, directly undermining any claim Algeria might have to being a neutral, trusted mediator. A senior Malian official, who spoke to MEE on condition of anonymity, said Algeria has “largely lost its credibility” with Mali’s current ruling authorities. The source added that Bamako views Algeria’s continued contacts with rebel groups and opposition figures as an attempt to preserve its own regional influence, rather than a good-faith neutral mediation effort, and acknowledged that Algiers’s policy is also driven by its own goal of securing its southern border.

    Malian journalist Ibrahim Toure confirmed that widespread anti-Algeria sentiment has taken hold among both officials and the public in Bamako, noting that the junta also believes several individuals wanted by Malian authorities on terrorism charges are residing openly in Algeria. “Algeria currently enjoys no credibility as a mediator, neither with the government nor with a large segment of Malian public opinion,” Toure told MEE.

    Algerian analysts have uniformly rejected allegations that Algiers is covertly aiding armed groups against the Malian junta. “These ties are not evidence of double standards, but rather a natural extension of cross-border social, cultural and historical links,” Amin explained, pointing in particular to the transnational Tuareg community, whose traditional lands span multiple countries across the Sahara. He added that maintaining open contacts with all local actors is “a necessity linked to protecting border stability and preventing the spread of chaos and extremist groups”. Gouider echoed this position, emphasizing that Algeria “supports Mali’s unity wholeheartedly”, and that its advocacy for greater representation of northern communities is aimed at securing their full political and institutional inclusion in the Malian state.

    Since the 2020 coup, Mali has completely overhauled its international security partnerships, ending long-standing military cooperation with former colonial ruler France and United Nations peacekeeping forces, while rapidly deepening security ties with Russia, which has become the junta’s primary external military backer. Russia’s presence in Mali is led by the Africa Corps, a state-run paramilitary organization that replaced the Wagner Group after the death of its leader Yevgeny Prigozhin.

    Agence France-Presse reported last month that Algeria may already have played a quiet, off-the-record mediating role during the recent fighting around Kidal, helping to negotiate a safe corridor that allowed Russian forces to withdraw from the embattled town. According to Gouider, Mali’s deepening strategic partnership with Moscow has narrowed Algeria’s room for diplomatic maneuver, but it has not erased the country’s long-standing traditional role as a regional crisis manager, thanks to Algiers’s decades of on-the-ground experience addressing conflict in the Sahel.

    Gouider added that Algeria has taken active diplomatic steps in recent months to counter regional alignments that Algiers views as attempts to marginalize its influence in the Sahel. Most notably, he pointed to the Alliance of Sahel States, a bloc formed in September 2023 by Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso to coordinate political and security policy outside of traditional West African regional frameworks. Gouider said Algeria has launched diplomatic outreach to reopen communication channels with multiple regional capitals, to prevent this new bloc from evolving into a political axis hostile to Algeria’s interests or one that would exclude Algeria from its historic role managing Sahel crises. These efforts, Gouider argued, have allowed Algeria to preserve its status as a key regional actor despite ongoing high tensions with Bamako.

    Even amid widespread distrust in Mali, many regional observers acknowledge that Algiers still retains significant diplomatic and historical capital in the Malian conflict, thanks to its long-standing ties with all armed and political stakeholders across the Sahel. Ansari, the Malian journalist, argued that Algeria “remains the regional actor best placed to play a mediating role in Mali”, citing Algiers’s unmatched depth of understanding of local political and social dynamics.

    At its core, however, the question facing Algeria and the Sahel today is no longer whether Algeria can retain influence in Mali – it is whether the ruling junta in Bamako is willing to accept Algerian influence and mediation once again. The anonymous senior Malian official told MEE that for Algeria to resume any meaningful mediating role, Algiers must first adapt to the new political reality in Bamako and work to rebuild shattered bilateral trust. “Any meaningful mediating role will depend on Algiers’s ability to adapt to the new realities in Bamako and rebuild trust,” the official said.