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China and the United States have continued to make consistent, steady progress in cross-border anti-narcotics cooperation, expanding practical collaboration across multiple high-priority areas, a senior Chinese narcotics control official announced Wednesday. The announcement came as China rolls out new strengthened measures for domestic drug governance and chemical regulation, adding 16 extra non-medical narcotic and psychotropic substances to its official controlled substances roster.

Wei Xiaojun, executive deputy director of the Office of China National Narcotics Control Commission and director of the Ministry of Public Security’s narcotics control bureau, outlined that bilateral cooperation between the two countries has deepened across a wide range of critical domains: substance scheduling regulation, precursor chemical control, intelligence sharing, transnational joint investigations, illegal online drug content cleanup, repatriation of drug-related fugitives, anti-money laundering initiatives, and advances in drug testing technology.

Wei confirmed that China has maintained regular, structured communication with relevant U.S. government agencies, including the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy, to share updates on ongoing operations and align collective strategic priorities. Chinese law enforcement bodies have also partnered on joint casework and fugitive repatriation with multiple U.S. law enforcement agencies, including the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, he added.

A recent example of this cooperative work was highlighted: In February 2026, Tianjin police apprehended a drug suspect surnamed Gong using intelligence provided by U.S. law enforcement. Prior to the Chinese arrest, U.S. authorities in Georgia had already taken into custody a U.S. citizen linked to the same transnational drug ring.

Addressing the principles of global anti-drug collaboration, Wei emphasized that cross-border narcotics control is a shared global responsibility that must be rooted in mutual respect and mutual trust between nations. “As long as China and the United States work in tandem, we can effectively tackle shared drug-related challenges, an outcome that will bring tangible benefits to both of our peoples and the entire global community,” he stated. He added that China remains fully committed to preserving the positive, hard-won momentum of Sino-U.S. anti-drug cooperation, which requires continuous, coordinated joint efforts from both sides to sustain.

Wei also noted that China has proactively addressed the growing global threat of unregulated nonscheduled chemicals being diverted into illegal drug manufacturing networks, particularly the diversion routes that feed illicit production in North America.

Coinciding with Wednesday’s announcement, China’s national drug regulatory body confirmed that starting July 1, 2026, the 16 newly added substances will be formally integrated into the country’s official catalogue of controlled nonmedical narcotic and psychotropic substances. Once the update takes effect, China will have regulatory control over 412 types of non-medicinal narcotic and psychotropic substances, along with full category-based controls for all fentanyl-related substances, synthetic cannabinoids, and nitazene-related compounds.

To proactively mitigate emerging regulatory risks ahead of the policy update, China issued two official public compliance warnings in November 2025 and May 2026, urging all industry actors to abide by existing national drug control laws. Chinese customs and postal inspection authorities have also already strengthened export oversight, upgraded risk analysis frameworks, and expanded inspection protocols for high-risk chemical shipments.

Nationwide, Chinese authorities have carried out large-scale crackdowns targeting illegal trafficking of precursor chemicals and new psychoactive substances, while also pushing for stronger industry self-regulation across chemical manufacturing and distribution sectors. Wei noted that strict upstream chemical regulation remains a core, foundational pillar of China’s national anti-drug strategy. In 2025 alone, Chinese law enforcement seized 550.6 metric tons of illicit drug-related precursor chemicals. The country has also published a landmark white paper focused specifically on fentanyl control and has continuously expanded its national regulatory system to close emerging gaps.

While Wei confirmed that China’s overall domestic drug situation remains stable, he warned that evolving trafficking patterns have created new regulatory challenges: modern drug networks are increasingly organized, available substances are more diversified, and the average age of drug users continues to fall. Unregulated gray-area compounds and exploitation of regulatory loopholes, alongside the constant emergence of new addictive synthetic substances, have added significant complexity to national control efforts.

The 2025 China Drug Situation Report, which was also released Wednesday, provided a full overview of last year’s anti-drug work. The data showed that Chinese authorities solved 27,000 drug-related criminal cases and arrested 34,000 suspects in 2025, representing year-on-year drops of 27.6 percent and 33 percent respectively. Total drug seizures reached 33.5 tons, a 25.4 percent increase from 2024, while authorities processed 134,000 drug users for treatment and supervision, a 30.3 percent year-on-year decrease.

The report also highlighted a key emerging trend: a sharp rise in abuse of unregulated nonscheduled addictive substances. In 2025, authorities seized nearly 1.27 million liters of nitrous oxide, an 84 percent year-on-year increase, and 9.3 tons of other unregulated addictive substances, which marked a more than 17-fold increase compared to 2024 figures.

In an exclusive sit-down interview with the BBC’s Tokyo correspondent from his Tokyo office, Japanese Defence Minister Shinjiro Koizumi has laid out the most dramatic reorientation of Japan’s national security posture since the end of World War II, arguing that the country must fundamentally strengthen its defence capabilities and re-examine the pacifist framework that has guided its foreign and military policy for 80 years.

Koizumi framed the sweeping policy changes as a core component of building multi-layered deterrence to prevent new conflict in the Indo-Pacific, a goal that relies on three interconnected pillars: boosting domestic defence capacity, reinforcing the long-standing security alliance with the United States, and expanding defence cooperation with other like-minded nations across the globe.

One of the most significant recent shifts has been the relaxation of Japan’s 50-year-old restrictions on arms exports, a change that opens new doors for Japanese defence manufacturers to sell and transfer defence equipment and lethal weaponry to 17 nations that have signed formal partnership agreements with Tokyo, including the United States and the United Kingdom. Koizumi detailed the early progress of this new policy, noting that Australia has already selected Japanese-built warships, active negotiations are ongoing with the Philippines to transfer used destroyers from Japan’s Maritime Self-Defence Force, deep discussions are underway with Indonesia, and New Zealand has formally expressed interest in acquiring Japanese destroyers. “This vision of trading equipment and assets throughout the Indo-Pacific is something we have never seen before,” Koizumi told the BBC.

Defence policy has jumped to the top of the policy agenda for Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s current administration, which took office in October 2025 and has already pushed through historic increases in defence spending, framing the reforms as an urgent response to growing instability across the region. Takaichi, a long-time advocate for stronger defence alliances and a hawkish approach to regional security, has made revising Japan’s iconic Article 9 a core policy priority. Enshrined in Japan’s post-WWII constitution, Article 9 formally renounces war as a sovereign right of the nation, bans the use of force as a tool to resolve international disputes, and prohibits the maintenance of formal land, sea, and air military forces.

Speaking as a member of parliament rather than in his official cabinet role, Koizumi confirmed his full support for amending Article 9, arguing that the dramatic shifts in the regional security environment over the past eight decades demand an update to the country’s founding legal framework. “Japan has not amended its Constitution even once since World War Two. Given how dramatically the security environment has changed, we need to adapt to those changes if Japan is to remain peaceful,” he said.

Koizumi identified Beijing as Japan’s most significant strategic challenge, with China’s claims over self-governing Taiwan representing the latest flashpoint in a long-fraught bilateral relationship. The uninhabited Senkaku Islands, known as Diaoyu in China and claimed by both nations, sit in a strategically critical location along the First Island Chain, a geographic formation long described as a key strategic barrier between China’s coastal waters and the wider Pacific Ocean. Over the past year, Chinese aircraft carriers have conducted intermittent operational activities beyond the islands, a shift that has raised alarm in Tokyo. Japan’s Defence Ministry formally labeled China’s military activity the “greatest strategic challenge” in its most recent cabinet-submitted white paper, and is expected to reaffirm this assessment in its upcoming annual government report.

Last month, Koizumi pushed back against Beijing’s criticism that Japan’s defence shifts amount to a return of “new militarism”, arguing instead that China’s massive expanded weapons arsenal is the source of widespread global concern. Despite the rising tensions, Koizumi stressed that Japan remains committed to maintaining open lines of communication with Beijing. He noted that he met with his Chinese counterpart last November, and conveyed a clear desire to maintain ongoing dialogue despite the deep disagreements between the two nations. “Unfortunately, there have not been many opportunities for direct communication recently. However, as I stated at the Shangri-La Dialogue, Japan is always open to dialogue. We will continue sending that message and hope that opportunities for dialogue can be created whenever necessary,” he said.

Efforts to revise Japan’s post-war security framework are not new: Nobusuke Kishi first pushed for a more normalized military posture in the 1950s, Koizumi’s own father Junichiro Koizumi, who served as prime minister in the early 2000s, also backed constitutional revision including reforms to Article 9, and the late Shinzo Abe, Kishi’s grandson, made amending the pacifist clause a central priority during his time in office. But the pace of change has accelerated sharply under the Takaichi administration, a shift that has sparked some of the largest anti-war protests Japan has seen in decades.

Koizumi also emphasized the need to formalize the legal status of Japan’s Self-Defence Forces (SDF). While the SDF operates as a functional military in practice, Japanese law and political convention have long avoided labeling it as an official military force. “The SDF should be able to carry out its mission with pride and honour, and Japan must possess defence capabilities that remain steadfast even in today’s challenging security environment,” he added.

Critics of the proposed changes, however, argue that formal recognition and expansion of the SDF undermines the core pacifist principles of Article 9, and that the existing constitutional framework is already sufficient to meet Japan’s current defensive needs. “We don’t need to amend Article 9 for defensive operations against China. So it’s more a political agenda than something based on military rationality,” explained Hirohito Ogi, a senior research fellow at the Institute of Geoeconomics specializing in military strategy and defence policy. Ogi noted that even in the event of a threat to Japanese-controlled southern islands claimed by Beijing, or an attack on U.S. military bases located in Okinawa or Kyushu, the current constitution can already be interpreted to recognize such an attack as a direct act of aggression against Japan, justifying a full defensive response.

Koizumi acknowledged that while the ruling Liberal Democratic Party supports constitutional revision, the final decision will rest with the Japanese people. Under Japanese law, constitutional amendments require approval via national referendum, and Koizumi noted that “the timing and circumstances under which the public is asked to make that decision involve major political judgements.”

The evolving defence posture also requires Japan to balance its stance toward China while upholding its core alliance with the United States, which remains the cornerstone of Tokyo’s security policy. Established in the post-WWII era, the alliance hosts roughly 50,000 U.S. troops in Japan, the largest overseas U.S. military deployment in the world. In recent years, however, U.S. leaders – particularly President Donald Trump in his second term – have pushed for greater alliance burden-sharing, demanding that U.S. allies increase their own domestic defence spending. “The era of the United States subsidising the defence of wealthy nations is over,” U.S. Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth declared last month during his keynote address at the Shangri-La Dialogue.

In response to this pressure, and driven by its own security priorities, the Takaichi administration has raised Japan’s defence spending to 2% of GDP, double the long-standing post-war benchmark. The expanded budget is earmarked for the development and deployment of new surface-to-ship missiles and unmanned drone systems for both land and underwater operations.

Defence analysts are divided on the implications of this shift: some argue that Japanese defence-related industries, including shipbuilding and advanced electronic systems, are well-positioned to become increasingly competitive in the global defence export market. The Center for Strategic and International Studies has noted that the emergence of dedicated, full-scale Japanese defence firms focused primarily on the sector will be critical to the success of this new export strategy. Other analysts argue that larger budgets and updated deterrence frameworks are not enough to address the challenge from China, and that Japan needs bolder structural reforms to make its military forces more nimble and adaptable to modern security threats.

Aligning with U.S. regional strategy, Koizumi argued that Japan is ready to take on a more prominent independent role in maintaining Indo-Pacific security, beyond its existing partnership with Washington. “Japan can make contributions to the region that are uniquely Japanese – not solely through our relationship with the US, but also in our own independent role,” he said. “It’s our country. We need to protect it.”

In late February, when US President Donald Trump ordered military strikes against Iran, Turkish leadership found itself unexpectedly sidelined from major decision-making. Ankara’s repeated diplomatic efforts to head off the conflict fell on deaf ears, with senior Turkish officials concluding that Trump prioritized advice from Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu over their own input. Just three months later, the geopolitical landscape shifted dramatically: Trump publicly named Turkey, alongside Pakistan and Qatar, as one of the key countries that helped broker a breakthrough memorandum of understanding with Iran, while adopting a sharply more confrontational stance toward Israel.

The 60-day ceasefire agreement reached between Tehran and Washington over the weekend comes with two core provisions: it extends the fragile pause in hostilities between the two nations and reopens the Strait of Hormuz, the critical global energy chokepoint that Iran had blocked after the US-Israeli military campaign began. Speaking to Middle East Eye this week, senior Turkish officials have struck a cautious tone about the deal, emphasizing that the memorandum represents only an initial step toward resolving the long-running US-Iran dispute and does little more than temporarily ease shipping pressure on the strait.

“The 60-day window to negotiate a final agreement on the nuclear file and other outstanding disputes will be far more complex and challenging than any prior stage of negotiations,” one senior Turkish official said. “This will be the true test of whether this current calm can be sustained.” Many policy experts based in Ankara share concerns that Israel could take provocative action in the coming months to derail the fragile agreement. Even amid these lingering uncertainties, one outcome is already clear: Turkey has emerged from the US-Iran war largely unharmed, and in many respects, strategically strengthened.

When the conflict first erupted, Ankara harbored deep fears about the stability of the Iranian government and potential spillover that could threaten Turkish national security. To date, none of these worst-case scenarios have materialized. Turkish officials immediately activated pre-planned contingency measures along Turkey’s eastern border with Iran to prepare for a possible mass refugee influx, successfully keeping border crossings calm and avoiding a humanitarian crisis. A second major threat also emerged early on: Israeli officials pushed for a plan to arm Iranian Kurdish groups to lead an insurgency in western Iran.

Ankara viewed this proposal as a direct threat to its own domestic security, arguing that empowering Kurdish armed groups in western Iran could derail ongoing peace talks with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and drag Turkey into a scenario similar to the Syrian conflict, where Kurdish groups based along the border seized control of territory and posed a persistent security challenge. As US and Israeli strikes on Iranian targets intensified, hardline members of Netanyahu’s cabinet began openly stating that “Turkey is next after Iran,” amplifying Ankara’s fears that a collapse of Iranian state authority would spread chaos directly to its borders.

Despite these significant risks, Ankara managed to retain political influence and convince the Trump administration that a Kurdish insurgency in western Iran was not in US interests. Several external factors worked in Turkey’s favor: deep internal divisions within Iraqi Kurdistan over how to approach Iranian Kurdish groups, including public rifts between the powerful ruling Barzani and Talabani political dynasties, and the fact that very few Iranian Kurdish fighters had access to the heavy weaponry required to lead a large-scale insurgency. Top Trump administration officials, including CIA Director John Ratcliffe and Secretary of State Marco Rubio, also openly expressed deep skepticism about the feasibility of the Israeli plan.

One unforeseen crisis that tested Ankara’s crisis management came when Iran fired four ballistic missiles into Turkish territory. The strike was part of a broader barrage targeting Gulf states and regional countries hosting US military forces, and analysts believe the missiles targeted the US-operated Incirlik Air Base and the Kurecik Radar Base, a critical installation used to track Iranian ballistic missile launches. The attack triggered fierce pushback from Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, who held multiple angry conversations with Iranian authorities to make clear that Ankara would not tolerate strikes on its territory, especially any that risked civilian casualties.

At the time, Ankara insiders widely expected that if the missiles had hit a populated area and caused civilian deaths, Turkey would have been forced to launch retaliatory strikes, creating a dangerous cycle of escalation that could have dragged the country directly into the war. By limiting the strikes to military installations hosting US assets and avoiding civilian casualties, Iran avoided a full rupture of bilateral ties with Ankara. Ironically, the missile attacks ultimately strengthened Turkey’s position within the NATO alliance: the US, Germany, and Italy all quickly deployed additional anti-ballistic missile systems to Turkey to support an ally under threat, warming previously strained ties between Ankara and these major Western powers.

Beyond strategic gains, Turkey has capitalized on the conflict to expand its economic and commercial influence across the Middle East. In the wake of Iranian long-range drone and missile strikes on Gulf states, many regional governments began seeking large-scale purchases of air defense systems, allowing Ankara to step in as a reliable new supplier. Turkey has already signed hundreds of millions of dollars worth of arms contracts with Gulf states including Qatar, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia, establishing itself as a growing player in the global arms market. While Turkey still lacks domestic long-range anti-ballistic interceptor technology, it has an active domestic development program and has proposed joint investment partnerships that have drawn increasing interest from Gulf capitals.

At the same time that Turkey expanded arms sales to Gulf allies, it managed to preserve its longstanding diplomatic and economic ties with Iran, a relationship that proved critical during ceasefire negotiations. The Iranian missile strikes also shattered long-held assumptions that Gulf monarchies and their major financial centers were immune to regional attack, creating an opening for Ankara to position itself as an alternative regional investment hub for global businesses looking to de-risk their exposure. The project remains a long and difficult bet, requiring extensive domestic legal reforms and large-scale infrastructure investment, but the conflict has already helped boost Turkey’s reputation as a stable safe haven outside the range of direct Iranian strikes.

Of course, the conflict has not come without costs for Turkey. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz disrupted global shipping and pushed up global energy prices, exacerbating Turkey’s long-running battle with high inflation. A leading energy research think tank estimates that higher energy costs stemming from the strait closure will add nearly $14 billion to Turkey’s annual national energy bill. Inflationary pressures were already visible in April and May economic data, though the Turkish government has so far managed to mitigate the worst economic impacts of the price shock.

Even amid these economic headwinds, Ankara has turned the energy crisis into an opportunity to advance its long-term goal of becoming a central Eurasian energy and connectivity hub. Turkish officials have proposed a slate of new infrastructure projects that leverage the country’s unique geographic position, including reviving the historic Hejaz Railway, expanding the existing Iraq-Turkey oil pipeline to reach the southern Iraqi port of Basra, and building a new direct natural gas pipeline linking Qatar to Turkey.

Finally, domestic political analysis shows the conflict has produced a clear “rally-around-the-flag” effect for Turkish leadership. Recent independent polls reviewed by Middle East Eye indicate that President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s domestic popularity has risen during the conflict, even after his government launched a widespread crackdown on the country’s main opposition party. “Turks are now experts on turning regional crisis into opportunities for themselves,” one senior European diplomat summed up the outcome.