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A rapidly escalating military advance by Yemen’s Houthi movement has triggered a regional security crisis, with Saudi Arabia formally requesting diplomatic and military backing from the United Kingdom and the United States to counter the group’s push toward the strategically critical Bab el-Mandeb Strait. Multiple credible news outlets have confirmed that Riyadh is seeking operational assistance to fend off the Iran-aligned group’s southern offensive along Yemen’s Red Sea coast and repel cross-border strikes on Saudi territory.

Over the past weekend, the Houthi group — formally known as Ansar Allah — seized large stretches of Yemeni coastal territory adjacent to the Bab el-Mandeb, one of the world’s most vital maritime chokepoints for global energy trade. Shortly after securing these positions, Houthi forces launched an attack on the East-West Pipeline, a critical infrastructure link that transports roughly 4% of the world’s total daily oil supply. Damage from the drone assault on the pipeline will take Saudi energy authorities an estimated five to six weeks to fully repair, Reuters reported.

The Houthi advance already sent shockwaves through global energy markets last week, pushing oil prices sharply higher as traders priced in the risk of prolonged disruption to oil shipments through the Bab el-Mandeb. For the UK, the potential full Houthi takeover of the strait carries severe domestic economic consequences: advisors to Prime Minister Andy Burnham have warned that prolonged disruption to international shipping through the waterway would send UK energy prices soaring, exacerbating already existing pressure on household and business energy costs.

Multiple sources indicate that Burnham has already committed to deploying British military advisors to Saudi Arabia to support Riyadh’s counter-offensive, though Downing Street has not yet confirmed any additional military assistance beyond this step. The United States has also not issued any public comment on the Saudi request for aid. British Foreign Secretary Ed Miliband has already signaled London’s clear backing for Riyadh, telling Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan during a Saturday phone call that “The UK stands firmly with Saudi Arabia and the internationally recognised government of Yemen.”

The escalation in fighting has already inflicted civilian casualties on both sides. On Tuesday, Saudi-led coalition air strikes targeting Yemen’s southwestern Taiz province killed three people, including two children, and wounded two more, according to Houthi-affiliated al-Masirah TV. In a reciprocal development, the Saudi-led coalition reported that Houthi strikes targeting three Saudi cities — Khamis Mushait, Abha, and Taif — on Monday left 13 civilians injured.

Two regional powers that recently deepened security ties with Saudi Arabia have not yet moved to provide assistance: Pakistan and Turkey, which signed a joint defense agreement with Riyadh, have refrained from committing support to the kingdom’s current campaign against the Houthis. A senior Turkish official clarified that the delay stems from the fact that the defense agreement has not yet entered into force, leaving no formal obligation for Ankara to deploy support at this stage.

As diplomatic and military maneuvering continues, the crisis remains focused on the fate of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, whose security is critical to stable energy supplies and global economic stability worldwide.

Growing anxiety over a potential global energy crisis has intensified following new details about severe damage inflicted by a drone attack on a critical Saudi Arabian oil pipeline last week. As first reported by The Associated Press on Monday, the kingdom’s East-West Pipeline – a key artery that moves crude oil from production centers to Red Sea export terminals – will remain out of operation for multiple weeks after the strike that occurred last Thursday.

Anonymous regional officials confirmed to the AP that full repairs, which include work on a major pumping facility impacted in the attack, will take between three and five weeks to complete. Saudi authorities have pinned responsibility for the assault on Iran-aligned militias operating from Iraqi territory. Satellite imagery published over the weekend confirmed extensive fire damage to the targeted pumping station, undercutting early attempts to downplay the severity of the incident.

The pipeline had taken on outsized strategic importance in recent months. Saudi Arabia began rerouting most of its oil exports through the East-West Pipeline to the Red Sea after the Strait of Hormuz, the world’s busiest traditional chokepoint for Middle Eastern oil shipments, was effectively closed to most commercial traffic following the outbreak of war between the United States and Iran in February, launched under former U.S. President Donald Trump. This shift made the pipeline the sole viable route for most of Saudi Arabia’s export volumes.

According to a Monday report from The Guardian, if repairs are not completed within a matter of days, Saudi Arabia will deplete its available stored crude oil allocated for export, a disruption that could remove up to 4% of total global oil supply from international markets.

Energy analysts warn this disruption could not come at a worse moment for already strained global energy systems. In a Monday market analysis for Bloomberg, senior energy correspondent Alex Longley noted that global markets have already faced persistent volatility for months, driven by the ongoing U.S.-Iran conflict and the continuing Russia-Ukraine war that has scrambled European and global energy flows. “Whatever happens, the oil market will need a quick fix,” Longley wrote. “It’s currently screaming for barrels.”

Even a rapid repair of the pipeline would not immediately ease sky-high energy prices, analysts caution. Multiple overlapping disruptions continue to block alternative supply routes: the Strait of Hormuz remains closed, Houthi forces in Yemen have significantly escalated attacks on commercial oil shipping moving through the Red Sea, and the U.S. has shown no willingness to pursue a diplomatic resolution with Iran that could reopen Hormuz to traffic.

The Houthi movement gained additional leverage over Red Sea shipping last Thursday, when it seized the key Yemeni port city of Mocha from Saudi-backed government forces. The capture of the port strengthens the group’s ability to launch attacks on vessels transiting the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, another critical chokepoint for Red Sea energy trade.

News of the pipeline’s prolonged shutdown immediately roiled global energy markets on Monday. During intraday trading, international benchmark Brent crude spiked above $109 per barrel in response to the revelations. The price surge has already translated to heavier cost burdens for consumers, particularly in the United States. New data released Monday by the American Automobile Association (AAA) shows the average U.S. retail gasoline price now stands at $4.32 per gallon, while diesel prices – a key driver of broader logistics and food costs – hit a new record high of $6.23 per gallon.

Mali’s years-long internal conflict has entered a new phase of shifting alliances and diplomatic outreach, with the Tuareg separatist Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) confirming it has held direct, tactical communications with Russia’s Africa Corps and publicly calling for open dialogue with Turkey to facilitate a negotiated political settlement to the country’s deepening crisis. The revelations came in an exclusive interview with Middle East Eye from FLA spokesperson Mohamed Elmaouloud Ramadane, who detailed the complex web of battlefield coordination and competing political goals shaping the current conflict.

Today, the FLA is fighting alongside Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), an al-Qaeda-aligned armed coalition, against Mali’s military-led government. The two factions have coordinated a series of successful offensives in recent months, capturing multiple urban centers and military outposts, blockading the capital Bamako, and even killing senior government military leadership including Defense Minister Sadio Camara. Despite this operational alignment, Ramadane emphasized that the two groups hold fundamentally divergent end goals: the FLA seeks to establish an autonomous independent state of Azawad in Mali’s resource-rich northeast, while JNIM’s core objective is to overthrow the Bamako government entirely.

The current military landscape in Mali is a dramatic reversal of just a decade ago, when French and Western coalition troops were deployed to prop up the Malian state against JNIM and its predecessor extremist groups. Today, the Malian junta relies on military support from Moscow, which first deployed Wagner Group mercenaries to the country in 2022. Following the short-lived Wagner mutiny against the Kremlin in 2023, the group’s Malian operations were reorganized into the official Russia Africa Corps.

A major FLA-JNIM offensive in April exposed critical weaknesses in Russia’s military deployment in northern Mali, with Africa Corps personnel withdrawing from the strategic northern city of Kidal shortly before FLA fighters seized full control of the area. By July, as fighting intensified around Anefis, a town located roughly 100 kilometers southeast of Kidal, unconfirmed reports began to circulate of informal arrangements between the FLA and Africa Corps.

Ramadane confirmed for the first time that direct contacts between the separatist group and Russia’s Africa Corps have indeed taken place, but stressed these communications are strictly tactical in nature and do not amount to formal political negotiations or a strategic shift toward rapprochement. “I can confirm that there were direct contacts in certain contexts, notably around questions related to movements, withdrawals and the situation in certain areas,” Ramadane told Middle East Eye. “In a conflict, there are sometimes channels of communication with the adversary to avoid incidents, manage certain situations or facilitate occasional arrangements. This does not mean that the political objectives of the parties have become compatible.”

The FLA spokesperson also stressed that the northeastern Azawad region must not be allowed to devolve into a proxy battleground for competing foreign powers, even as the group pursues new diplomatic overtures to Turkey. Over the past decade, Ankara has steadily expanded its diplomatic, economic, and military footprint in Mali, emerging as a key external partner for the Bamako junta. Since 2023, Turkey has supplied armed drones and other military hardware to the Malian government, and bilateral trade between the two countries has tripled since 2014. According to reporting from Le Monde, arms and ammunition made up 20 percent of all Turkish exports to Mali in 2024, making it Ankara’s top export category to the country ahead of electronics, industrial machinery, and cereals.

Ramadane acknowledged Turkey’s deepening ties to the Malian junta, noting that Turkish-supplied drones have allegedly been used in strikes that have caused civilian casualties in Azawad. “We note that Turkey has considerably developed its relations with the criminal junta in Bamako, particularly in the sale of drones,” he said. However, he argued that Ankara’s growing influence positions it uniquely to facilitate dialogue, and the FLA is not calling for Turkey to cut its ties with the Bamako government. “We do not ask Turkey to break its relations with the military junta. We ask it to look at the Malian reality in all its complexity and not to consider the question of Azawad solely through the prism of the authorities in Bamako,” Ramadane explained.

The FLA is seeking to open direct channels of dialogue with the Turkish government and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, rather than limiting engagement to only military channels, Ramadane added. He emphasized that the outreach is not an attempt to recruit a new foreign military patron. “We do not ask Turkey to take a military side with the FLA. We ask it first to listen and understand,” he said. “Turkey’s influence in Africa and the Muslim world, combined with its close relationship with Bamako, gave it a particular responsibility. We do not ask Turkey to choose between Mali and Azawad. We ask it to contribute to ensuring that peace is not imposed on Azawad but negotiated with it. Our essential message is this: we are not seeking foreign patrons for our cause, we are seeking partners capable of contributing to a just, lasting political solution consistent with the aspirations of the populations concerned.”

A senior Turkish official familiar with African affairs responded to the FLA’s outreach, confirming that Ankara is open to engaging with a broad range of actors in Mali. “Ankara was open to dialogue with a range of actors and that channels could be found if the FLA wanted to engage with the Turkish government,” the official told Middle East Eye. “However, it doesn’t mean that we will take their side and be part of the internal conflict of a foreign state. But we would listen to them.”

Alongside its diplomatic overtures to Russia and Turkey, the FLA once again clarified the nature of its current cooperation with JNIM, stressing that operational coordination on the battlefield does not constitute a formal political alliance. Ramadane acknowledged that the two groups have grown closer operationally out of a shared opposition to the Malian junta and Russian military presence, but their core political projects remain distinct. “It is first necessary to distinguish two things that are often deliberately confused: operational convergence on the ground and political alliance,” he said.

Following coordinated April offensives across northern and central Mali, the two groups launched a second wave of coordinated attacks in July, including heavy clashes around Anefis and targeted strikes on military positions in Gao and Aguelhok. Ramadane argued that the ad-hoc cooperation is a pragmatic response to current battlefield conditions, not a merging of political goals. Any lasting peace agreement, he emphasized, must explicitly address the longstanding political demands for Azawad’s self-determination. “The FLA remains an Azawadian political and military organisation whose project responds to the aspirations of the people of Azawad,” he said. “That being said, lasting peace in Mali and Azawad will necessarily have to take into account the realities on the ground.”

Ramadane also argued that JNIM, which now draws the vast majority of its membership from Malian citizens, cannot be sidelined in any future peace process. “It is impossible to make peace in Mali or speak of stability without including JNIM,” he said, adding that the group has increasingly begun to articulate a political platform focused on local grievances, rather than only a transnational extremist agenda.