分类： politics

During a joint appearance with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Ankara ahead of the NATO summit, former President Donald Trump made a sweeping promise to roll back existing U.S. sanctions on Turkey and revive the stalled sale of American F-35 stealth fighter jets to the NATO ally. “We don’t want to sanction friends. It’s very simple,” Trump stated, adding that a final decision on the F-35 deal – which he described as “the best plane by far” – would be finalized after careful consideration.

Despite Trump’s public confidence, regional and foreign policy experts warn that significant legal and political barriers stand between the proposed policy shift and implementation, with congressional buy-in emerging as the single biggest obstacle.

Geopolitically, Turkey occupies a uniquely important position for the Western alliance today: it boasts NATO’s second-largest standing military, and has gained renewed goodwill across European capitals amid ongoing efforts to counter Russian aggression following the invasion of Ukraine. For many policymakers in Washington, Turkey also serves as a critical counterweight to Iranian regional influence, particularly after Ankara-backed Syrian leader Ahmed al-Sharaa ousted the Iran-aligned Assad government in 2024. For Trump personally, the push for warmer ties is also shaped by a longstanding close personal relationship with Erdogan – so much so that Trump confirmed he attended the NATO summit primarily as a favor to his Turkish counterpart.

But that warmth has not extended to Capitol Hill, where Turkey has faced deep, bipartisan criticism for years. U.S. lawmakers have repeatedly condemned Erdogan’s domestic crackdown on political opposition, while foreign policy disagreements have further strained relations: pro-Kurdish lawmakers have decried Turkish military incursions into northern Syria, pro-Israel legislators have pushed back against Ankara’s support for Palestinians and Erdogan’s description of Hamas as resistance fighters, and supporters of U.S. ally Greece have criticized Turkey’s longstanding territorial disputes in the Aegean Sea.

The most consequential rift, however, dates back to 2019, when Turkey completed its purchase of Russia’s S-400 air defense system, triggering sweeping U.S. punitive measures that derailed the original F-35 partnership. Before the S-400 purchase, Turkey was an integrated partner in the F-35 joint production program, set to manufacture roughly 900 parts for the jet and purchase 100 aircraft for its own air force. Within days of the S-400 delivery, the Trump administration at the time removed Turkey from the program and canceled the sale. In 2020, the Turkish Defense Industry Agency (SSB), the country’s arms procurement body, was formally sanctioned under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), a law initially crafted to respond to Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election.

Experts note that Trump does retain limited flexibility to work around CAATSA sanctions: the administration recently notified Congress of a planned $700 million sale of jet engines to Turkey for its domestic Kaan fifth-generation fighter program, bypassing SSB by structuring the deal directly with Turkish Aerospace Industries. But that small step is far different from reviving full F-35 participation and sales, which face additional legal barriers. A 2020 National Defense Authorization Act amendment explicitly bans F-35 sales to Turkey as long as it retains possession of the S-400, with no provision for a presidential waiver.

This has sparked speculation of a behind-the-scenes compromise between Trump and Erdogan to resolve the S-400 impasse. Notably, Turkey has never activated the S-400 system, with most components still stored in original packaging, a choice experts frame as a deliberate gesture to Washington. Former U.S. Ambassador to Turkey James Jeffrey, now a senior analyst at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, told Middle East Eye that he expects a deal under which Turkey would render the S-400 permanently inoperable. “I suspect Trump and Erdogan are talking behind the scenes on some sort of deal to render the S-400 inoperative,” Jeffrey said.

Aaron Stein, president of the Foreign Policy Research Institute, echoed that assessment, noting that any path forward hinges on redefining what “possession” of the S-400 means for the purposes of U.S. law. “Trump wants to sell stuff, but he is prevented from doing so by pieces of legislation that he has no control over. One option is to lean on Congress to make changes. He can also certify non-possession and get Congress to agree,” Stein explained. Even if the two leaders reach a compromise on the S-400, however, experts warn that congressional opposition remains a major risk. Longstanding procedural rules allow any chair or ranking member of the House or Senate Foreign Affairs Committees to place a hold on proposed arms sales, and the Trump administration already faced pushback over the recent jet engine deal, overriding a hold placed by House Foreign Affairs Committee ranking member Gregory Meeks, who accused the White House of refusing to share details of the transaction.

For F-35 sales, opposition is expected to be even fiercer. As Gonul Tol, a senior fellow at the Middle East Institute, put it: “The engine sale is low-hanging fruit. The most challenging element to the sanctions is Turkey becoming part of the F-35 production line again.” In a reflection of the long odds facing the proposal, Stein noted that Trump has no ability to unilaterally override existing law. “This is very messy. Trump can’t wave a magic wand,” he said.

During a bilateral meeting on the sidelines of the NATO summit held in Ankara on Tuesday, U.S. President Donald Trump made a landmark announcement: he intends to remove Turkey from the U.S. sanctions blacklist that he first imposed during his initial presidential term.

Speaking alongside Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Trump told assembled reporters, “We’re going to be taking the sanctions off. Okay? It’s time to do that… We don’t want to sanction friends. It’s very simple.” As his remarks were translated, the typically reserved Erdogan reacted with an uncharacteristic broad smile and a public thumbs-up to the announcement, a visible display of approval for the new U.S. stance.

The sanctions in question stem from the 2017 Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), a federal U.S. law that placed Turkey alongside designated U.S. adversaries North Korea and Iran after Ankara moved forward with a deal to purchase Russia’s advanced S-400 air defense system. In addition to being blacklisted, Turkey was expelled from the multinational F-35 stealth fighter jet program over U.S. fears that sensitive military technology could be compromised by Moscow. Trump also noted Tuesday that he is open to reconsidering Turkey’s participation in the F-35 program, opening the door for Ankara’s potential return to the initiative.

Analysts say the announcement marks a significant symbolic shift in bilateral ties. Alper Coskun, a former Turkish diplomat now based at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, called the news “music to Ankara’s ears” in comments to Middle East Eye. Coskun emphasized that while the announcement aligns with signals the Trump administration has sent for months, it makes clear Trump intends to work with Congress to formalize the policy change. For sanctions to be fully lifted, Coskun noted, Turkey will likely be required to completely abandon its S-400 acquisition from Russia.

Because CAATSA is a congressional statute, legislative approval will be required to fully roll back the blacklisting. That said, Coskun explained that the Trump administration could take an interim step by reinterpreting existing sanctions rules, arguing that the conditions that triggered Turkey’s blacklisting no longer apply. The president also holds the authority to issue a sanctions waiver, though it remains unclear whether he will pursue that unilateral route or seek bipartisan agreement with a Congress currently controlled by his Republican party. Control of both congressional chambers could shift to the Democratic party following the upcoming November midterm elections, adding uncertainty to the legislative path ahead.

The announcement fits into Trump’s broader pattern of sidelining and criticizing other Western NATO allies while prioritizing closer ties with Ankara. Trump has openly lambasted the leaders of major Western European nations including the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Spain, accusing them of weak policies on defense and immigration. He launched a high-profile dispute with Denmark over Greenland’s territorial status, and is currently locked in an open public feud with Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni. Since March, he has repeatedly expressed frustration that these allies have refused to back his hardline policy against Iran.

Trump made his tilt toward Turkey explicit during Tuesday’s press interaction, saying, “I was very disappointed with NATO, and frankly, if [the summit] weren’t held in Turkey, where my friend happens to be a very strong leader, a very strong person, it’s possible that I wouldn’t have attended. I felt I had to attend because of the fact that, you know, I know he’s gone all out…but we weren’t treated well [by western Europe] because we did something in Iran. We don’t need anybody’s help. I didn’t even want their help, but before I asked, they said they wouldn’t be there.”

He went on to frame the bilateral relationship in stark terms, adding, “We have a better relationship with Turkey,” and praising what he described as Turkey’s unique loyalty compared to other NATO allies.

Diplomatic friction between Israel and Jordan has escalated in recent weeks after Israel declined to renew a bilateral water supply agreement that supplements the core terms of the countries’ 1994 peace treaty, multiple Israeli media outlets have confirmed. In reports published Monday, Israel’s public broadcaster Kan 11 and leading news site Ynet outlined that the Netanyahu administration has so far refused to sign off on an extension of the 2021 deal, which added an extra 50 million cubic meters of annual water to the 50 million cubic meters Israel is obligated to supply under the original peace accord, leaving water-dependent Jordan facing growing pressure amid a persistent regional water crisis.

Jordanian officials have privately raised alarm over the holdup, telling Kan 11 that water access is not only a critical national priority for the kingdom but also a binding component of the 1994 peace treaty. The official also warned that Amman would be forced to respond to the ongoing Israeli delay, with widespread speculation that the Israeli government is leveraging water access as a diplomatic bargaining chip amid severely strained relations that have deteriorated since the outbreak of Israel’s military campaign in Gaza in 2023. Back in March, Kan 11 previously reported that Jordan’s King Abdullah II made any meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu conditional on resolving outstanding water disputes alongside progress on Palestinian issues, setting the stage for the current standoff.

As tensions mount, the United Arab Emirates has stepped in to mediate, proposing a trilateral summit in Abu Dhabi that would bring together energy ministers from the UAE, Israel, and Jordan to negotiate a path forward. According to Ynet’s reporting, the proposed talks would address the water agreement renewal as well as revive a UAE-backed initiative to build a joint Israeli-Jordanian desalination plant that would expand the kingdom’s long-term water access. The diplomatic push from Abu Dhabi comes as regional actors work to defuse rising tensions between Jordan and Israel, which have hit their lowest point in decades following the outbreak of the Gaza conflict.

Israeli officials have pushed back against suggestions that the country is violating the terms of the original peace treaty, noting that Israel continues to deliver the 50 million cubic meters of water required by the 1994 accord. In comments to Ynet, an anonymous Israeli official clarified that the government has no legal obligation to provide the extra 50 million cubic meters added in the 2021 temporary deal, arguing that additional supply is contingent on goodwill between the two neighboring states. The official added that Israel’s decision to hold off on a long-term extension is also rooted in a historic drought that is the most severe the country has faced in a century, with the government prioritizing replenishing its own reservoirs to support domestic agricultural needs. The official also framed the potential trilateral summit in Abu Dhabi as an opportunity to advance broader normalization, resolve water issues, and rebuild bilateral ties, noting that “when you help your neighbours, you expect warmer relations.”

To understand the scope of the current dispute, it is necessary to look back at the long history of water cooperation between the two states. Since the 1994 Israel-Jordan peace treaty, water management and supply have been among the most sensitive and consequential issues in bilateral relations, as Jordan faces chronic, worsening water scarcity that has left the kingdom heavily reliant on imported water from Israel. The original 1994 treaty codified an annual supply of 50 million cubic meters from Israel to Jordan, with both sides committing to collaborate on regional water security through developing new sources, curbing pollution, and reducing waste. In 2021, Israel agreed to a three-year temporary deal doubling annual supply to 100 million cubic meters. When that deal expired in 2024, the Netanyahu administration only approved a six-month short-term extension, rejecting Jordan’s request for a five-year renewal. After signing the short-term extension in May 2024, Israeli Energy Minister Eli Cohen stated that Israel would “continue to use our natural resources to strengthen Israel’s standing in the region.”

Jordan has already prepared contingency plans to secure its water independence amid the ongoing political standoff. In February, Jordanian state broadcaster Al-Mamlaka TV reported that the kingdom had finalized emergency measures to guarantee national water security regardless of external political pressure or regional instability. To date, the Jordanian government has not issued any public comment on the current dispute, leaving negotiations unfolding behind closed doors.

The current water clash comes against a backdrop of severely deteriorated bilateral relations since the start of Israel’s military campaign in Gaza. Jordan formally recalled its ambassador to Israel, Ghassan Majali, in November 2023 in protest of the campaign, and last week King Abdullah issued a royal decree officially ending Majali’s posting with no replacement planned. This development aligns with broader reporting that Israel is increasingly using water access as a diplomatic tool across the region, including in Gaza, where Israel has been widely accused of restricting water access as a weapon of war. Notably, Jordan has cooperated with regional partners to intercept Iranian drone and missile attacks targeting Israel in recent conflicts, a step that has not softened Israel’s current stance on water negotiations.

Beyond the bilateral diplomatic standoff, the dispute underscores a growing global crisis of water insecurity that is particularly acute in the arid Middle East. Climate change has amplified drought conditions and water scarcity across the region, with a recent United Nations report warning that the world has entered an era of “Global Water Bankruptcy,” with nearly three-quarters of the global population living in countries classified as either water-insecure or critically water-insecure. Interestingly, Israel has emerged as a global leader in desalination technology, with 70 to 80 percent of domestic household water coming from domestic desalination plants that currently produce 804 million cubic meters of potable water annually. Last month, the Israeli government approved an ambitious expansion plan that will boost the country’s desalination production capacity to 2 billion cubic meters per year by 2050, cementing its status as a regional water power.

On the morning of June 28, a coordinated large-scale pre-dawn operation carried out by elite Iraqi security forces inside Baghdad’s highly fortified Green Zone marked one of the most striking anti-corruption crackdowns Iraq has seen in recent years. However, widespread scepticism persists among ordinary Iraqis and analysts alike that the country’s most powerful, deeply entrenched corrupt figures will ever be held accountable for years of siphoning public funds.

Backed by tanks and armoured vehicles, counter-terrorism units swept into the Baghdad Residence neighbourhood, a residential and official enclave located just steps from the U.S. Embassy, following a months-long probe launched by Iraq’s new administration into misappropriated funds linked to irregular public infrastructure and development contracts. By the end of the operation, at least 47 people had been taken into custody, including sitting members of parliament, senior political appointees and other high-ranking government officials. Security forces raided dozens of private homes and official offices, seizing millions of dollars in undeclared cash, gold bullion, and even luxury gold-plated women’s lingerie, items that quickly became a lightning rod for public anger.

Footage of the operation spread across Iraqi television stations and social media platforms within hours, with many viewers comparing the dramatic show of force to blockbuster Hollywood action sequences. For generations of Iraqis who have watched their political elite line their own pockets while basic public services from electricity to clean water remain consistently out of reach, the crackdown represented an unprecedented public challenge to a ruling class long accused of systemic graft.

“It’s really shocking seeing millions of dollars hidden in the gardens of politicians, finding gold bars and gold-made women’s lingerie that they use to please themselves with our money,” said Mohammed Basheer, a 24-year-old resident of Basra, in an interview with Middle East Eye. While Basheer welcomed the operation, he warned that its credibility would stand or fall on whether the government ultimately moves against Iraq’s most powerful political leaders. “I am looking forward to seeing if Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi will touch the big heads. If he does not, then it would be unfortunate – just like a TV show,” he added. “As previous prime ministers did almost the same campaigns, I need to see where this will end, and how serious it is when it comes to holding big officials accountable.”
That scepticism is shared by many long-time Baghdad residents. Jassim Mohammed, 52, argued that the operation would only prove meaningful if it leads to sustained systemic change. “Let’s wait and see how serious this campaign is. If so, that would be great; if not, then it is just a bubble,” he said. “Taking corrupt politicians to jail would be a good lesson to others to avoid following their path in stealing the people’s money. However, after this campaign, the prime minister should offer good services, better infrastructure, and, most importantly, kick out the Iran-backed allies.”

The timing of the raids, carried out just weeks before al-Zaidi is scheduled to travel to Washington for high-level talks, has fuelled political speculation about the operation’s dual motivations. The al-Zaidi administration is already facing growing pressure from the U.S. to curb the influence of Iran-backed armed factions and demonstrate greater institutional control over Iraqi state affairs. Analysts say the crackdown is designed both to appease Iraqi voters fed up with decades of endemic corruption and to signal to U.S. officials that Baghdad is serious about targeting officials linked to Iranian-aligned Shia political parties. According to Iranian opposition outlet Iran International, multiple of the arrested officials have documented ties to Shia parties close to Tehran. The outlet also confirmed the raids came shortly after a closed-door meeting between U.S. Special Envoy Tom Barrack and Prime Minister al-Zaidi.

Renad Mansour, director of the Iraq Initiative at London-based think tank Chatham House, argues the crackdown is as much a political performance for international audiences as it is a domestic anti-corruption measure. “Al-Zaidi is looking to sell his administration – not just to the Iraqi public – but to the US and its allies in the region,” Mansour told Middle East Eye. “In particular because of the threat that the US is posing to Iraq with sanctions, and because Iraq is stuck in the middle of this ongoing regional standoff between Israel, the US, and Iran.”

Mansour noted that while the operation has generated blanket media coverage and uncovered massive amounts of stolen assets, it has so far carefully avoided confronting the top figures who control Iraq’s patronage-driven political system. “The ongoing anti-corruption campaign has been effective only insofar as he has managed to go after some middle-ranking officials and, through those arrests, uncover a lot of cash and gold bars. So, the theatrics are certainly there. Because of that, the prime minister is pursuing this anti-corruption campaign. The drive is very much going after those who are easier to catch: the middle-ranking officials, not the tops, not the heads of the system who sit above it, as it is impossible to go after them.”

This limited scope means the campaign cannot address the root structural causes of corruption that have crippled Iraqi governance for decades, Mansour argued. “Insofar as that is the case, this isn’t changing how the political system is largely fuelled by corruption. It is just changing the configuration of what that corruption looks like and who is part of it. While this might bring some cash infusion, it is not going after the whole system and it is not structurally fixing it. The system is really facing massive challenges with the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and the ongoing conflict in the region. Therefore, it is hard to see this cosmetic display as a structural fix for the corruption that stops Iraqis from having basic services, electricity, and a functioning economy.”

Baghdad-based political analyst Raad Hashim echoed that assessment, agreeing that the campaign’s long-term credibility depends on whether al-Zaidi expands the crackdown beyond mid-level officials to target Iraq’s most powerful political actors. “In this campaign, the small fish have been caught, while everyone is waiting for the moment when the big fish – the major targets among the corrupt – are netted,” Hashim said. While he described the mass arrests as unprecedented by Iraqi standards, he noted that such operations would be considered routine anti-corruption work in most other countries. “Comparing al-Zaidi’s campaign with global anti-corruption efforts, his campaign is merely a drop in the ocean, because what al-Zaidi has done is routine work. However, only in Iraq does everyone view it as a major campaign, simply because we are not accustomed to seeing such actions.”

Hashim added that it is still too early to write off the operation entirely, leaving open the possibility that it could be a first step toward a broader crackdown. “That is, unless this is a preliminary campaign paving the way for a broader one – then we would have a different tone of talk,” he said. Still, he questioned why the operation had not targeted wealthy militia leaders and other influential figures linked to Iraqi armed factions. “Failure to target the big heads, including the influential figures who have become wealthy among the militia leaders, means that avoiding them constitutes a blow to the entire campaign, its seriousness, and its credibility.”

Sarkawt Shamsulddin, a former Iraqi member of parliament, said the campaign aligns with long-standing anti-corruption rhetoric from the Sadrist movement and could help build political momentum ahead of next year’s scheduled parliamentary elections. Regardless of the mixed motivations behind the operation, Shamsulddin noted that al-Zaidi is taking a political risk few Iraqi leaders have been willing to take in recent decades. “I applaud his efforts and all who have been arrested are samples of a larger group who have been suffocating public coffers without consequences. This campaign is a warning. Is there a foreign push? Maybe, but it takes someone in the prime minister’s position who is ready to take the risk and limit the bleeding in public resources being plundered with impunity.”

Even so, Shamsulddin cautioned against overstating the immediate impact of the raids. “But that is just a scratch on the surface. Will he continue? Maybe this is a very sensitive issue and requires serious consideration of domestic politics.”

As of July 4, Iraq’s Federal Integrity Commission confirmed that officials have recovered at least 98 billion Iraqi dinars ($74 million) in stolen assets alongside $11 million in untraceable cash. One commission official told Middle East Eye that security teams required heavy excavation equipment to dig up cash stashed four meters underground in private gardens and remote plots of land owned by arrested officials.

In a dramatic Tuesday press conference broadcast live from central London, senior British right-wing political figure Nigel Farage announced his immediate resignation as the Member of Parliament for Clacton — and immediately confirmed he would run in the resulting by-election, casting the move as a stand against what he calls a coordinated smear campaign by the UK political establishment and national media.

Farage’s resignation comes on the heels of two successive damaging revelations published by *The Sunday Times*, which have opened new ethical and regulatory probes into the Reform UK leader’s financial ties. First, the outlet reported earlier this month that British-Thai crypto billionaire Christopher Harborne donated £5 million to Farage personally in early 2024, just months before Farage won the Clacton seat in a general election. Now, a second follow-up investigation revealed that 32-year-old convicted aristocrat George Cottrell — who the paper describes as Farage’s closest personal advisor for more than a decade — covered the cost of Farage’s personal security and social media team in the 12 months leading up to Farage’s election to the House of Commons.

Cottrell, a self-described crypto gambler nicknamed “Posh George,” has a criminal record: he previously faced up to 20 years in a U.S. prison after pleading guilty to 21 charges including money laundering, fraud, blackmail and extortion. He has accompanied Farage on official trips around the UK and across Westminster, the *Sunday Times* confirmed. He is also linked to Harborne through Tether.bet, an online casino and bookmaker that issues its own digital token, in which Harborne holds a partial ownership stake.

The Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards is already conducting an official inquiry into whether Farage violated parliamentary rules of conduct by failing to properly declare Harborne’s £5 million donation. Farage confirmed Tuesday that a second separate investigation into the Cottrell payments has now been launched in response to the latest *Sunday Times* reporting. Under House of Commons procedural rules, an ongoing standards investigation is paused if a sitting MP resigns — but the inquiry can be immediately reactivated if the MP wins re-election.

In fiery remarks from the press conference podium, Farage denied any wrongdoing, framing the revelations as an unfair attack by his political and media opponents. “The establishment has decided they can’t beat us fairly. They’ve chosen to use foul means,” Farage told reporters. “I’ve done nothing wrong. I’ve not broken the law in any way. I’ve not misused public money. My personal MP expenses are zero.”

A former commodities trader who left the finance sector decades ago to lead the Brexit campaign, Farage pushed back against criticism of his outside income, arguing that political leaders should not be barred from earning money outside of parliament. “Britain’s political and media class seem to fundamentally object to any MP who has outside income,” he said. “Making money is not a crime. I gave up my former job in finance at a huge cost to fight for Brexit, and came out of that decades-long fight with very little money. Since then, I have earned income through work as a broadcaster and social media influencer, and that is entirely legitimate.” He described Harborne’s £5 million donation as a “large personal gift” and a “lottery win,” asking reporters, “Do we want leaders that know how to make money?”

Farage cited the recent publication of details of his multi-million pound property portfolio — including a home owned by his daughter that was featured in an article in *The Times* — as the “final straw” that pushed him to resign. “I’ve never been angrier in my life,” he said of the coordinated coverage from *The Times*, *Sunday Times* and Sky News. Notably, both *The Times* and *Sunday Times* are owned by News Corp, the media company controlled by the Murdoch family. Farage has previously praised 95-year-old Rupert Murdoch as a “remarkable bloke” and “very good man,” and the pair were photographed celebrating together at a garden party shortly after the 2016 Brexit referendum, where both were reported to be in an ecstatic mood.

Farage also claimed he has been the target of repeated threats, recalling one recent incident where he was forced to flee his local pub by a hostile crowd that later damaged his car. Critics of the Reform UK leader have previously linked his inflammatory rhetoric to a rise in violent far-right protests across the UK and Northern Ireland, where far-right demonstrators have targeted care workers and migrant communities in violent attacks.

Rupert Lowe, a former Reform UK MP who now leads the rival right-wing party Restore, rejected Farage’s framing of the controversy, saying the MP was clearly aware he was required to declare Harborne’s donation to parliamentary authorities. “He should have declared that five million pounds. He knows it. We all know it,” Lowe told reporters. “Now he is going to weaponise a by-election to distract from that… Will Farage fund it out of his own pocket? Because he bloody well should.”