分类： politics

The festering rivalry between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates that is now reshaping regional and global politics has roots stretching back to a 1950s border conflict, a power struggle rooted in historical distrust and modern ambitions for regional dominance. Late veteran journalist David Holden first chronicled the 1950s Buraimi dispute in his 1966 work *Farewell Arabia*, recounting how Saudi Arabia attempted to bribe Zayed bin Sultan al-Nahyan—then the “Lord of Buraimi” and later the founding father of the UAE—from the ruling al-Nahyan family to hand over control of the oil-rich Buraimi oasis. When Zayed rejected the bribe, Saudi Arabia launched an invasion that ultimately failed, setting a template for decades of tension between the two Gulf monarchies.

Today, that historical rivalry has reignited between Zayed’s son, current UAE President Mohamed bin Zayed (known widely as MBZ), and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS). The two nations are now at odds across nearly every major sphere of influence in the Middle East and beyond, from the battlefields of North Africa to global energy markets, and analysts widely agree that the outcome of their feud will define the future of the entire region—especially as American engagement in the Gulf faces growing uncertainty amid the Israel-Iran conflict. The spillover of their rift will even reach household budgets in Europe, Asia, and North America, through shifts in global energy pricing.

The most high-profile public split came this month, when Abu Dhabi ended its 60-year membership in the Saudi-led Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), vowing to increase daily oil production by millions of barrels. Energy analysts note that the surface-level disagreement centers on long-term strategy: the UAE prioritizes maximizing immediate profits by ramping up output, while Saudi Arabia prefers managing global supply to sustain higher long-term oil prices.

But this policy rift is merely a symptom of a far deeper power struggle. For decades, OPEC has operated as a bloc of major oil-exporting Muslim-majority nations led by Saudi Arabia, which holds more than twice the UAE’s proven oil reserves, is home to Islam’s two holiest sites (Mecca and Medina), and has a population of 36 million—more than triple the UAE’s total population of 10 million, just one million of whom are native Emirati citizens. “Saudi Arabia wants to project its power through OPEC and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Because of its size and resources, it sees itself as the natural leader of the Gulf,” explained Rob Geist Pinfold, an international security expert at King’s College London. “The UAE is small, but it has undergone a remarkable transformation to become a larger-than-life global brand. The UAE feels deferring to the Saudis prevents it from exercising power on the world stage.”

Historical context reinforces this distrust: the coastal trading communities that formed the modern UAE have long been squeezed between Persian influence to the east and the expansionist Saudi royal family, originating from the central Arabian region of Najd, to the west. Analysts argue that MBZ’s contemporary foreign policy is a modern iteration of this ancient rivalry, supercharged by decades of oil wealth and cutting-edge digital and military technology. “The Emiratis have always viewed the Saudis as a predatory neighbour who want to make them their vassals,” noted Patrick Theros, a former U.S. Ambassador to Qatar who first arrived in the Middle East when the Buraimi dispute was still a raw, unresolved issue. “They have also, traditionally, been wary of the Persians asserting their own zone of influence in the Gulf. MBZ finally decided that it’s possible for a small Gulf country to stand up to the Saudis and the Persians.”

Today, the UAE has emerged as one of the most vocal Gulf supporters of U.S. and Israeli military action against Iran, and has received Israeli air defense systems to fend off Iranian drone and missile attacks. To offset its small size and geographic limitations, the UAE has also built alliances with local factions across strategically important states west of the Arabian Peninsula—a strategy that has repeatedly clashed with Saudi interests.

The two Gulf powers back opposing factions in Sudan’s ongoing civil war: the UAE supports the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) paramilitary, while Saudi Arabia backs the established Sudanese government. Middle East Eye first revealed that Saudi Arabia even lobbied Washington to impose sanctions on the UAE for its RSF support, exposing how deeply bilateral ties have been strained in that theater. In Yemen, just before the 2025 Israel-Iran war escalated, Saudi Arabia launched strikes against UAE-aligned secessionist groups in eastern Yemen, even partnering with Oman to block an Emirati power grab in the region.

For the UAE, control or allied influence in these regions delivers critical strategic depth that its small domestic territory cannot provide. A RSF victory in Sudan would give the UAE an allied partner on the Red Sea coast directly opposite Saudi Arabia, while the UAE-aligned Southern Transitional Council seeks to split from Yemen to control oil-rich territory bordering the strategic Bab el-Mandeb Strait. The UAE has also recognized the breakaway Republic of Somaliland, a move backed by Israel, further expanding its influence along key global shipping lanes. Amid ongoing Iranian threats to close the Strait of Hormuz, the primary chokepoint for Gulf oil exports, control of alternative Red Sea shipping routes has become a critical geopolitical priority for both nations.

Beyond territorial competition, the two nations hold fundamentally different approaches to post-Arab Spring regional order. After the 2011 uprisings that collapsed multiple long-standing Arab regimes, the UAE has backed secessionist and anti-Islamist factions across conflict zones including Yemen, Libya, and Sudan, while Saudi Arabia has prioritized backing unified national governments and preserving existing state institutions. “Our Saudi approach is based on supporting the nation state: preserving its unity, strengthening its institutions and sovereignty, and contributing to its reconstruction rather than its fragmentation,” explained Hesham Alghannam, a scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “Conversely, the other side’s regional engagement has often been characterised by an obsessive, narrow strategic emphasis on combating Islamists or political rivals. This has weakened state institutions, empowered militias, and created parallel forces that challenge legitimate authority. We clearly support combating extremism and terrorism, but through national institutions operating within the framework of the state and the rule of law. This should not be done through arming non-state actors or entrenching internal divisions.”

It is important to note that the current rift was not inevitable: for a decade after the 2011 Arab Spring, the two monarchies shared common interests that temporarily aligned their policies. The 2012 electoral victory of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt spooked both royal houses, which viewed Islamist political movements as an existential threat to their rule. Both also saw the rise of the Houthi movement in Yemen as an Iranian-aligned threat, and jointly led the three-and-a-half-year blockade of Qatar, accusing Doha of supporting groups hostile to Gulf monarchies. Experts note this cooperation was partially rooted in personal ties: when MBS rose to power in 2015, MBZ mentored the younger crown prince, and was instrumental in convincing MBS to launch the Qatar boycott. “You can absolutely see in those early days when MBS was coming to prominence, the close working relationship. It was basically MBZ that convinced MBS to boycott Qatar,” said Neil Quilliam, a Gulf expert and associate fellow at Chatham House.

But analysts emphasize this period of cooperation was an aberration, not the norm. Long before the Arab Spring, the two nations fell out over plans for deeper Gulf integration. In 2009, the UAE withdrew from the GCC monetary union project, which aimed to create a single shared currency for Gulf states, after Abu Dhabi was angered by the decision to site the union’s headquarters in Riyadh. “It would be like France and Germany having spat over the EU and one withdrawing,” noted Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, a Middle East fellow at Rice University’s Baker Institute. “Before the Arab Spring, it looked like the break was going to be between the UAE and Saudi Arabia, not Qatar. The Arab Spring temporarily brought them together, but if you take a long-term view, pre-2010 and post-2020, they were at loggerheads.”

The two nations have also diverged sharply on reconciliation with Qatar after the 2021 al-Ula agreement that formally ended the blockade. While Saudi Arabia moved quickly to repair ties with Doha, the UAE has maintained a cool, suspicious relationship with Qatar years after the official end of hostilities.

The starkest example of their modern policy divergence comes in their approaches to Israel and the Palestinian conflict. In 2020, the UAE broke ranks with the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative, a plan crafted by Saudi Arabia and endorsed by the entire Arab League that requires the creation of an independent Palestinian state on pre-1967 borders before any Arab state normalizes relations with Israel. While Saudi Arabia had been in talks with the Biden administration to normalize relations with Israel in 2023, Israel’s full-scale military campaign in Gaza ended any prospect of a deal. The UN and multiple independent human rights bodies have classified Israel’s military operation in Gaza as genocide, which has killed more than 72,600 Palestinians to date, and public opinion in Saudi Arabia is overwhelmingly opposed to normalization; a 2023 poll by The Washington Institute for Near East Policy found 96 percent of Saudis support cutting all ties with Israel over the war. MBS has publicly echoed this widespread public sentiment. “Politics in Saudi Arabia is heading back towards the more consensual model that it was based on,” Quilliam explained. “There is a diversity of views on Israel in the UAE, but MBZ feels he doesn’t need to worry about that. MBS came to see some of MBZ’s adventurous positions as a liability and has developed a better understanding of the Arab street.”

The ongoing 2025 war between Israel and Iran has only widened this rift, pushing the two nations to build competing blocs within the U.S. alliance network. While both nations remain deeply dependent on Washington for security and economic cooperation, the UAE has deepened its strategic partnership with Israel, while Saudi Arabia has built a broader coalition with Turkey, Egypt, and Pakistan. “Neither the UAE or Saudi Arabia can give up the U.S. But those new alliances are going to grow,” Theros said. As the rivalry plays out across energy markets, battlefields, and diplomatic circles, its outcome will not only reshape the Middle East but send ripple effects across the global economy and international order.

In debates over U.S. military engagement in Iran, a core argument from critics has gained widespread traction: that the ongoing conflict erodes American deterrence in the Indo-Pacific, undermines the confidence of U.S. allies and partners, and drastically increases the risk of a violent confrontation between the United States and China over Taiwan.

There is no question that this premise rests on tangible, observable facts. The U.S. military, particularly its naval branch, is already smaller than strategic analysts argue it needs to meet global defense demands, and a large share of Washington’s available combat power is currently tied down in the Middle East amid the Iran campaign. Currently, no deployable U.S. aircraft carrier is positioned in the Western Pacific, and the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit — the only forward-deployed Marine amphibious task force in the region — has been reallocated to support operations related to Iran.

Equally concerning for defense planners is the pace at which the Iran conflict is depleting U.S. weapons stockpiles, especially long-range precision strike missiles and air defense ordnance. While the full severity of the stockpile shortfall remains unconfirmed, it is widely assessed that the U.S. currently does not maintain the reserve of munitions that defense leaders would deem sufficient for a major conflict with China. U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) Commander Admiral Samuel Paparo recently alluded to this very gap in public remarks, lending official weight to these concerns.

Against this backdrop, a critical question has emerged: does this moment create a tempting window for Chinese leader Xi Jinping to launch aggressive action against Taiwan, or against other U.S. partners in the region including the Philippines and Japan?

On paper, the opportunity seems clear. China has carried out the largest and fastest military expansion since World War II, building a modern, capable force focused heavily on its primary near-term objective: seizing control of Taiwan. For more than 50 years, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has planned and trained for this mission. Today, it has the naval and air power to establish a full blockade around the island, and its combined amphibious and airborne lift capacity is sufficient to move a large invasion force across the Taiwan Strait. Beijing’s massive rocket force can strike key targets across Taiwan, and years of subversion and cognitive warfare have cultivated pro-unification fifth column elements within Taiwan’s population to support an invasion.

For Xi, the math could seem compelling — particularly if he believes any conflict over Taiwan could be contained to the Taiwan Strait and concluded quickly, within a matter of weeks. But a successful seizure of Taiwan is far from a guaranteed outcome, even with U.S. forces tied down in the Middle East, and Xi faces a host of major strategic risks that could give him serious pause.

First, the U.S. retains significant latent military capability in the Indo-Pacific even amid the Iran deployment, and can quickly reinforce regional positions from other global command areas. Beyond force numbers, the U.S. has demonstrated its operational proficiency in recent conflicts in Venezuela and Iran, as well as in ongoing efforts to intercept Houthi missiles and drones in the Red Sea. Notably, Chinese-made air defense systems and missiles supplied to Iranian and other proxies have performed poorly against U.S. and allied systems, a reality that cannot be lost on Chinese military planners.

Another key factor: the PLA has not fought a major conventional conflict in more than 50 years, leaving it untested in large-scale, high-intensity combat against a modern adversary. If the conflict expands beyond a short, contained operation, China has openly acknowledged that its military is not prepared to protect China’s global interests. The PLA lacks the capability to operate far from Chinese shores or project power more than 1,000 miles beyond the mainland, even as its longer-range missiles can hit targets much farther out.

A prolonged conflict would also bring catastrophic economic consequences for Beijing. China’s international trade would almost certainly come to a complete halt, along with its imports of critical energy and food supplies. Chinese manufacturers would be cut off from access to Western components and technology, and finished Chinese goods would lose access to major global markets. Losing export revenue denominated in hard currency, primarily U.S. dollars, and being cut off from the global dollar-based financial system would create an unprecedented economic crisis. While Beijing could attempt to rely on its own currency, the renminbi is not freely convertible, and it is not widely held or desired by global trading partners — making it nearly impossible to purchase critical imports from Australia, the Middle East, and other suppliers that require hard currency payment.

Domestically, a prolonged, costly conflict could also erode Xi’s domestic standing. For years, Xi has urged Chinese citizens to “eat bitterness” and prepare for hardship, but more than 600 million Chinese people live on $5 or less per day. If thousands of young Chinese soldiers are killed in an invasion that becomes bogged down, public anger could build, even after an initial wave of nationalist sentiment. Xi’s existing political opponents would almost certainly capitalize on public discontent to challenge his rule.

Finally, any unprovoked invasion of Taiwan would accelerate a global shift toward balancing against Chinese aggression, uniting more countries in cooperation with the United States to counter Beijing. This shift is already underway, driven by Xi’s increasingly aggressive foreign policy. Japan, which resisted major defense expansion for decades under successive U.S. administrations, has now significantly bolstered its military capabilities in response to Chinese threats. The Philippines, Indonesia, and even New Zealand have grown increasingly alarmed by Beijing’s expansionism and deepened security cooperation with the U.S. In Washington, the U.S. government and military now openly recognize the severity of the Chinese threat, a marked shift from a decade ago when public warnings about China were effectively banned in policy and military circles.

Even Europe, long hesitant to confront China, has begun to recognize the importance of strengthening defense, spurred by Russian aggression in Ukraine and a more tough-minded U.S. approach under the Trump administration. In the Global South, public backlash against Chinese aggression would grow if the PLA launched deadly attacks on Taiwan, and Chinese investment and influence in the region would collapse. Even Russia would likely only offer symbolic pro-Beijing statements rather than concrete support, happy to let China and the U.S. exhaust one another.

If China attacked U.S. military bases in Guam, the Northern Marianas, Hawaii, or anywhere on U.S. territory, it would kill American citizens — uniting even deeply divided U.S. public opinion against Beijing, and eliminating any chance that pro-China leftist groups in the U.S. could soften Washington’s response. Even the traditional pro-engagement business community on Wall Street, which has long prioritized economic ties with Beijing, would likely rethink its support for the People’s Republic of China (PRC) after an invasion.

Ultimately, only Xi Jinping knows what decision he will make. It remains possible that he will judge the current moment, with U.S. forces occupied in Iran, as too good an opportunity to pass. But any decision to launch an invasion of Taiwan would be one of the largest gambles in modern military history. For all their ambitions, Xi and other senior CCP leaders are not suicidal — a fact underscored by their long pattern of moving personal wealth and family members overseas to safety ahead of any potential crisis. Retired U.S. Marine Colonel Grant Newsham, author of *When China Attacks: A Warning to America*, contributed this analysis.

As former U.S. President Donald Trump prepares for a high-stakes upcoming summit with Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing, a pressing humanitarian and geopolitical plea has taken center stage: the family of imprisoned Hong Kong pro-democracy activist Jimmy Lai is urgently calling on Trump to leverage the meeting to secure Lai’s release, warning that the 78-year-old’s declining health leaves little time for delayed action.

Lai, once a prominent media tycoon and vocal critic of Beijing’s governance in Hong Kong, founded the now-shuttered pro-democracy newspaper Apple Daily. The outlet was forced to close during the sweeping crackdown that followed Hong Kong’s 2019 large-scale anti-government protests. Last year, Lai was sentenced to a total of 20 years in prison under the controversial national security law that Beijing imposed on Hong Kong in 2020 — a law that Lai had once hoped a U.S. president would intervene to stop.

In an exclusive interview with the Associated Press, Lai’s 31-year-old son Sebastien Lai, who is based in London, laid out the family’s last-ditch hopes for diplomatic intervention. Sebastien, who has maintained contact with his father through letters during his five years in custody, warned that his father’s pre-existing health conditions — including heart palpitations and diabetes — put his life at grave risk if he remains behind bars. “My father will die in prison if he’s not freed,” Sebastien said, adding that an in-custody death would create a lose-lose outcome for all parties, turning Lai into a martyr and deepening international distrust of Beijing. If released, Sebastien added, his father only desires to live out the rest of his years in quiet seclusion.

Trump has already signaled he plans to raise Lai’s case during the Beijing talks, alongside other core agenda items including trade relations, the ongoing Iran war and cross-strait tensions over Taiwan. Speaking to conservative radio host Hugh Hewitt, Trump noted he holds “a little bitterness” over Lai’s continued detention. This is not the first time the former president has raised the issue: he first brought up Lai’s case during an October 2024 meeting with Xi, and has twice instructed senior administration officials to raise the demand in bilateral talks with Chinese counterparts, according to Mark Clifford, president of the Committee for Freedom in Hong Kong Foundation, which advocates for Lai’s release.

Clifford, citing sources briefed on previous diplomatic engagements, said Chinese officials have acknowledged U.S. calls for Lai’s release without aggressive pushback in private discussions, a shift he calls a positive sign that the door for negotiation remains open. The U.S. Treasury Department declined to comment on the diplomatic outreach, while the White House has not responded to questions about how aggressively it will press for Lai’s release during the upcoming summit. More than 100 bipartisan U.S. lawmakers have already signed a public letter urging the Trump administration to prioritize Lai’s release at the Beijing talks.

Publicly, however, Beijing has maintained a firm stance that Lai’s case falls entirely under China’s internal affairs, barring any foreign interference. Chinese foreign ministry officials have labeled Lai the mastermind of the 2019 Hong Kong riots, while the Hong Kong government has rejected claims that his conviction threatens press freedom, emphasizing that Lai received a fair and open public trial. Authorities are also currently moving to seize all of Lai’s assets on national security grounds, a step Sebastien calls a continued retaliatory attack against his father. Lai, a British citizen whom Beijing insists is Chinese, has chosen not to appeal his conviction and sentence.

Analysts and activists are divided over the likelihood of a diplomatic breakthrough, amid shifting patterns in Sino-U.S. prisoner exchanges. While Washington secured the release of U.S. pastor David Lin and other detainees in a 2024 diplomatic swap, rights advocates note Beijing has grown far less willing to release high-profile political detainees under President Xi Jinping than it was under previous leaders. Human rights lawyer Jared Genser, who represented late Nobel Peace Prize laureate Liu Xiaobo, who died in Chinese custody in 2017 despite international calls for his medical release, said Xi’s administration prioritizes framing its actions as resistance to foreign interference over protecting its international reputation. Unlike under Hu Jintao’s leadership, when China was more open to concessions to maintain smooth economic relations, Genser said, “China knows that most countries will only raise these cases privately, and that self-censorship makes it far harder to secure the release of political prisoners today.”

John Kamm, founder of the Dui Hua Foundation which advocates for political prisoners, noted that China has historically made concessions on detainee cases when it seeks specific diplomatic or economic gains — such as when it agreed to goodwill gestures ahead of hosting the Olympic Games. But Kamm argued that the Trump administration has shown little sustained focus on political prisoners in China, with Trump’s priorities for the summit firmly fixed on trade, investment and the Iran war. Still, other analysts see room for a mutually beneficial deal. Thomas Kellogg, executive director of the Georgetown Center for Asian Law, said releasing Lai could serve both sides: it would allow Beijing to signal it is ready to move past the post-2019 crackdown era in Hong Kong, while delivering a much-needed diplomatic win for the Trump administration after a string of recent political challenges. A deal on Lai would even earn Trump praise from his domestic critics, Kellogg added.

Wilson Chan, co-founder of the Pagoda Institute think tank, offered a more pessimistic outlook, arguing that the chances of a diplomatic solution are slim. Chan noted that Beijing has deliberately chosen to use Lai’s case to send a message to both domestic and international audiences, and continued international pressure on the issue only reinforces Beijing’s view that Lai remains a persistent national security threat. Without sustained, high-profile public pressure, Chan added, Beijing faces no incentive to compromise. For Sebastien Lai and his family, however, there is no alternative to pushing for diplomatic action: with every passing month, the clock ticks closer to what they fear is an inevitable, tragic outcome if intervention does not come soon.

For decades, Washington’s unwavering support for Israel amid ongoing conflicts in the Middle East, including the current war in Gaza and escalations against Iran, has been shaped by a mix of strategic geopolitical interests and a powerful ideological undercurrent: Christian Zionism. This unique fusion of religious belief and political advocacy has quietly shaped U.S. foreign policy for more than a century, and remains a dominant force in contemporary Republican politics even as it faces growing criticism for its ties to extremism and underlying antisemitic undertones.

At its core, Christian Zionism is a political-religious ideology that centers on the belief that Jewish resettlement in the Holy Land – an area encompassing modern-day Israel, Israeli-occupied Palestinian territories, and parts of neighboring Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan – is a required step to fulfill biblical prophecies. Adherents argue that this mass return will pave the way for the Second Coming of Jesus Christ, the Rapture, and the End Times, when all faithful Christian believers will be taken to heaven. While most Christian Zionists back the existence of the State of Israel, many go further to openly endorse Israeli occupation and settlement expansion in the West Bank and Gaza. A central, deeply controversial tenet of the ideology holds that once Jews have returned to the Holy Land, they must convert to Christianity – a requirement that many Jewish communities and leaders have labeled inherently antisemitic.

The origins of Christian Zionism stretch back to 16th-century Europe in the wake of the Protestant Reformation, when Protestant theologians in England and Scotland began framing Jewish people as essential to the fulfillment of end-times prophecies outlined in the Book of Revelation, including the arrival of a thousand-year Messianic Age. When Puritan groups migrated to North America in the 17th century, they carried these ideological beliefs with them, planting the roots of Christian Zionism in what would become the United States.

The movement gained significant momentum in the 19th century through the Dispensationalist movement, led by Anglo-Irish minister John Nelson Darby, which promoted a literal interpretation of the Bible and divided human history into distinct divine eras called “dispensations”, including the Rapture and a period of apocalyptic Tribulation. Influential political and religious figures across the United Kingdom and United States soon adopted the ideology: British reformer Lord Shaftesbury publicly pushed for Jewish resettlement in Israel, while American Evangelical pastor William Blackstone’s 1878 bestseller *Jesus is Coming* cemented Christian Zionism as a mainstream belief among U.S. evangelicals. Eventually, these ideas aligned with the growing Jewish Zionist movement, particularly the work of secular founder Theodor Herzl, who popularized Zionist goals on the global stage. In 1917, UK Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour, a sympathetic Christian Zionist, issued the landmark Balfour Declaration, which pledged British support for a Jewish national home in Palestine.

Today, Christian Zionism’s strongest base of support is among Evangelical Christians, a broad umbrella of Christian denominations that prioritize evangelizing to non-believers and hold a literal, fact-based interpretation of the Bible as the ultimate source of moral guidance. Estimates place the global Evangelical population between 300 million and 600 million of the world’s 2 billion Christians. According to 2024 Pew Research Center polling, roughly 73 million U.S. adults identify as Evangelical Protestants, accounting for 21% of the national population – compared to just 5.8 million Jewish Americans recorded in Pew’s 2020 survey. More than half of U.S. Evangelicals reside in the Southern states and southern Midwest, a region known as the Bible Belt that forms a core voting bloc for the socially conservative Republican Party, which has dominated the area since the 1960s and carried every Bible Belt state in Donald Trump’s 2024 presidential election victory.

Christian Zionism has shaped U.S. Middle East policy for more than a century. In the 1940s, Evangelical activists formed a core part of the American Christian Palestine Committee, which lobbied heavily for the creation of the State of Israel. In the 1980s, President Ronald Reagan, a self-identified “born-again” Protestant, courted Evangelical voters by regularly referencing Armageddon end-times theology. Today, the ideology holds prominent sway in the second Trump administration: key officials including Secretary of War Pete Hegseth, U.S. Ambassador to Israel Mike Huckabee, and House Speaker Mike Johnson are all Evangelical Christian Zionists, as was former Vice President Mike Pence during Trump’s first term. Televangelist Paula White-Cain, Trump’s personal spiritual advisor, explicitly framed unwavering support for Israel as a biblical mandate in a 2024 statement, writing, “In this pivotal moment in human history, we are called to STAND with ISRAEL! This isn’t about politics; this is about living in harmony with the WORD of God!”

The most powerful Christian Zionist lobbying group in the U.S. is Christians United for Israel (CUFI), led by prominent televangelist John Hagee. With more than 10 million members, CUFI is twice the size of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), the leading Jewish pro-Israel lobby. The group claims credit for key policy shifts including the 2018 Trump administration decision to move the U.S. Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. In a 2019 interview with the *Jerusalem Post*, Hagee recalled discussing the embassy move with Trump months before it was announced, and praised Trump as “the most pro-Israel president” in U.S. history. Trump himself acknowledged the movement’s outsized role in the decision, telling a 2020 Wisconsin rally that the move was “for the Evangelicals” and noting, “the Evangelicals are more excited by that than Jewish people, it’s incredible!”

Harvard Kennedy School international affairs professor Stephen Walt, co-author of the landmark 2003 study *The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy*, told Middle East Eye that Christian Zionism has expanded pro-Israel advocacy far beyond the American Jewish community, reinforcing the work of AIPAC and shaping the views of key policymakers like Huckabee. But Walt also noted that support for the ideology and for unwavering pro-Israel policy has declined among U.S. Evangelicals in recent years. “I believe it is less influential than it once was, in part because Evangelicals have focused on other issues and because some parts of the Evangelical community have been disturbed by Israel’s behaviour, which has caused its support to plummet within the US population,” he explained. Recent Pew polling backs this assessment, finding that support for Israel has waned across all segments of the U.S. population, including Evangelicals, amid Israel’s ongoing military campaign in Gaza.

Critics have also accused leading Christian Zionist figures of using biblical prophecy to justify escalated conflict, including the recent U.S.-backed war on Iran. Hours after the start of hostilities in March, Hagee claimed in a sermon that “prophetically, we’re right on cue”, and prayed that God would destroy the enemies of Zion and the United States. Hegseth has repeatedly cited biblical verses (including a fictional verse featured in the film *Pulp Fiction*) in public statements during the conflict, and called for “overwhelming violence of action against those who deserve no mercy” during a Pentagon prayer service early in the war. Even U.S. military commanders have faced accusations of framing the conflict as part of a divine End Times plan: an anonymous U.S. officer told the Military Religious Freedom Foundation in March that his commander ordered troops to be told the war was “all part of God’s divine plan”, and repeatedly cited passages from the Book of Revelation referencing Armageddon and the imminent return of Jesus Christ.

While Christian Zionism holds far less sway in Europe, where Evangelicals make up only an estimated 3% of the population, the movement is growing in other regions. It has expanded across parts of sub-Saharan Africa and South Korea, where Evangelicals account for roughly 20% of the population. In Brazil, Christian Zionism was a core ideological influence during far-right Evangelical President Jair Bolsonaro’s 2019-2023 tenure; Bolsonaro campaigned on moving Brazil’s embassy to Jerusalem in 2018, a promise he never fulfilled, and his son Flavio, a 2026 presidential candidate, repeated the same pledge earlier this year.

Beyond its policy impact, Christian Zionism has faced sustained criticism for its inherent antisemitism. University of Nottingham Professor Emeritus of Historical Theology Thomas O’Loughlin explained to MEE that “Christian Zionism does not see any purpose in Judaism, which it views as only a passing phenomenon. It sees Christians as having superseded Judaism. Christian Zionism only supports the return of the Jews to the Holy Land because [it believes] the Jews must be gathered back so that when the whole scattering of Israel is reversed, they can then be given a chance to convert to Christianity.” This core tenet, he argued, makes the ideology “ultimately antisemitic”.

Multiple prominent Christian Zionist leaders have a documented history of antisemitic and anti-religious remarks. In a 2010 interview, Trump advisor and televangelist Robert Jeffress, who led the opening prayer at the 2018 U.S. Embassy dedication in Jerusalem, stated, “Judaism – you can’t be saved being a Jew. You know who said that, by the way? The three greatest Jews in the New Testament: Peter, Paul and Jesus Christ. They all said Judaism won’t do it.” He also labeled Islam and Mormonism “heresy from the pit of hell”. In the late 1990s, Hagee claimed the Holocaust was allowed by God to push Jews to return to Israel, saying, “How did it happen? Because God allowed it to happen. Because God said my top priority for the Jewish people is to get them to come back to the land of Israel.”

Interestingly, Israeli leaders have actively cultivated close ties to leading Christian Zionists despite the ideology’s antisemitic core. In December 2025, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu told a gathering of Evangelical leaders in Palm Beach, Florida that “You are representatives of the Christian Zionists who made Jewish Zionism possible. It’s hard for me to conceive the emergence of the Jewish state, the re-emergence of the Jewish state, without the support of Christian Zionists in the United States, also in Britain, but the main thrust was in the United States in the 19th century.”

Even so, the ideology is broadly rejected by most mainstream Christian denominations outside of Evangelicalism. Non-Evangelical Protestant traditions including Lutheranism and Anglicanism reject Christian Zionist beliefs, as do Eastern Orthodox churches and the Catholic Church, which only established formal diplomatic relations with Israel in 1993 and publicly supports a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In January 2026, the heads of Orthodox, Catholic, and Protestant churches in Jerusalem issued a joint statement condemning Christian Zionism amid ongoing Israeli violations of the Status Quo agreement for shared holy sites. The statement called Christian Zionism a “damaging ideology” that “misleads the public, sow confusion, and harm the unity of our flock.” O’Loughlin noted that mainstream Christian theologians widely dismiss the ideology’s core claims, with Orthodox thinkers particularly labeling it a fundamental misreading of Christian theology.

As conflicts across the Middle East escalate and Christian Zionism remains a powerful force in U.S. politics, the debate over its ideological roots, political impact, and ethical standing continues to shape global conversations about the future of the region.

West Bengal, one of India’s most politically charged states, is poised to enter an unprecedented new era this weekend, as one of its most controversial and battle-tested politicians prepares to take the highest office. Suvendu Adhikari, leader of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and once the closest confidant of outgoing Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee, will be sworn in as the state’s new chief minister on Saturday, capping a decades-long political climb that has upended the region’s power dynamics.

The BJP’s landslide victory in the 2026 West Bengal assembly election, which saw the party claim 207 of the chamber’s 294 seats, brought an end to 15 years of rule by Banerjee’s All India Trinamool Congress (TMC). It also marks the first time the Hindu nationalist BJP has secured power in the state, a political milestone long sought by Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s national government.

Adhikari’s path to the chief minister’s office did not start with the BJP. Born in 1970 into one of coastal West Bengal’s most influential political clans in Purba Medinipur district, he cut his political teeth with the Indian National Congress before switching to the TMC in the party’s early years as an opposition bloc challenging the long-dominant Left Front. Building on the political network established by his father, veteran Member of Parliament Sisir Adhikari, Adhikari rose through the TMC ranks on the back of grassroots organizing and a reputation for unflinching political combat.

His breakout moment came during the 2007 Nandigram land acquisition protests, a mass movement against the Left Front government’s plan to seize farmland for industrial development. Violent clashes during the agitation fatally weakened the Left regime and cleared the way for Banerjee’s TMC to win power in 2011, and Adhikari—who led much of the on-the-ground organizing—emerged as the TMC’s most effective young operator. For more than a decade after that, he was viewed as Banerjee’s heir apparent, her most trusted lieutenant across the state.

The relationship between the two leaders began to fray in 2016, when Adhikari was caught up in a high-profile sting operation controversy. Secret videos released ahead of that year’s state election appeared to show Adhikari accepting cash from a fake investor in his office, allegations he forcefully denied, questioning both the authenticity and context of the leaked footage. Tensions continued to mount in the years that followed, until Adhikari made his dramatic break: defecting to the BJP in 2020, just months ahead of the 2021 state election.

The 2021 vote proved to be a turning point for Adhikari’s national profile. Contesting the Nandigram seat against his former mentor Banerjee, he pulled off a shocking upset that defeated the sitting chief minister in her own backyard. Though the BJP lost the overall election that year, Adhikari’s win cemented his status as Banerjee’s primary rival and elevated him to the top of the state BJP’s leadership.

Five years later, Adhikari has led the party to an even more historic upset. In the 2026 election, he not only retained his Nandigram seat, but also defeated Banerjee in her decades-long stronghold of Bhabanipur, helping the BJP secure a commanding majority across the state. The win marks a stunning reversal for the BJP, which was once a marginal political force in West Bengal.

But Adhikari’s ascent has never been without controversy. Critics have long painted him as a polarizing figure who has deployed inflammatory, communal rhetoric to deepen political divisions in the state. In 2021, the Election Commission of India issued a formal notice to Adhikari after a campaign speech where he allegedly referred to Banerjee as “Begum” and claimed voting for her was equivalent to supporting a “mini-Pakistan.” Last year, he sparked national outrage when he declared that a BJP government would “physically throw Muslim MLAs out of the assembly” after winning the 2026 election. The remarks drew widespread accusations of hate speech from the TMC, led to a privilege motion against him, and resulted in his suspension from the state assembly. He has also faced intense condemnation for unsubstantiated claims that medicines distributed at TMC-run medical camps were designed to reduce the state’s Hindu population through birth control.

Even as Adhikari prepares to take office, the state has already been roiled by post-election unrest. Earlier this week, a close personal aide to Adhikari was shot and killed by unidentified assailants near his home, in what BJP leaders have called a targeted political assassination. The killing has amplified long-running concerns about political violence in the state, which has surged amid the bitter rivalry between the BJP and TMC.

Beyond security concerns, Adhikari inherits a state facing deep structural economic challenges. For decades, West Bengal has lagged behind other major Indian states in attracting large-scale private investment, and youth unemployment remains a persistent, pressing issue that the BJP centered its 2026 campaign around. He also takes control of a state deeply divided by years of partisan conflict, with frequent outbreaks of election-related violence and allegations of political intimidation on both sides.

To his supporters, however, Adhikari is a leader cut from a different cloth than India’s elite, Delhi-based political class: a grassroots organizer deeply rooted in local communities, with a relentless drive to deliver on the BJP’s campaign promises. They celebrate his combative campaigning style as a much-needed change from the status quo that defined TMC’s 15-year rule. Now, as he prepares to take the oath of office, Adhikari faces his greatest test yet: transitioning from a firebrand opposition leader to a chief executive capable of uniting a divided state, attracting investment, creating jobs, and governing one of India’s most politically volatile regions.