分类： politics

A long-running pro-Israel lobbying group embedded within the UK Labour Party has ignited fierce internal and international debate after releasing a new policy report that argues against a national import ban on goods produced in Israeli settlements located in occupied Palestinian territory, a move that directly contradicts overwhelming grassroots support for such a ban within the party.

Labour Friends of Israel (LFI), an influential lobby group that counts more than 70 sitting UK members of Parliament among its affiliate members (though it has not published a public roster of supporters for some time), published the 15-page policy briefing late last week under the title *Settlements and Solutions: A Guide to the Issues*. The document was reviewed in full by Middle East Eye ahead of its circulation to Labour lawmakers and senior party figures.

Under international law, all Israeli settlements constructed in the West Bank and East Jerusalem – territories captured by Israel during the 1967 Six-Day War – are classified as illegal. This position was further cemented earlier this year when the United Nations’ highest judicial body, the International Court of Justice, issued an advisory opinion ruling that Israel’s ongoing occupation of Palestinian territory is unlawful as a whole, and required all UN member states to take active measures to end the occupation.

Against this global legal consensus, LFI’s report takes a nuanced but controversial stance, acknowledging that most of the international community rejects Israel’s claim that settlements are legal under international law while pushing for a tiered approach to the issue. The document openly criticizes unauthorised Israeli settlement outposts – small, often rogue encampments built without formal approval from the Israeli government – and calls on the UK to pressure any future Israeli government to dismantle these outposts, halt all new settlement expansion outside of existing large, established settlement blocs, increase Palestinian access to construction permits in Area C (the 60 percent of the West Bank under full Israeli civil and military control), and expand territorially for Palestinian autonomous zones.

This framework makes clear that LFI opposes any British objection to the large, established settlement blocs that house the vast majority of Israeli settlers in the West Bank. The report goes further, arguing that a full national ban on all settlement goods is unfeasible on both practical and political grounds. It claims a comprehensive boycott would not only impact Israeli businesses operating within settlement blocs, East Jerusalem and Jerusalem’s Old City, but would also inadvertently harm Israeli citizens living within Israel’s pre-1967 borders, effectively becoming a de facto boycott of the entire state of Israel.

Such a move, the report argues, would be perceived by the UK’s Jewish community as evidence that the Labour government is disproportionately targeting Israel for punitive action, deepening existing divides within the country over the government’s Middle East policy.

The LFI briefing comes at a critical juncture for UK Prime Minister Andy Burnham’s new Labour government, which widespread Whitehall sources confirm is actively considering implementing an import ban on settlement goods once Parliament reconvenes following its current recess. Burnham has publicly stated he is reviewing “further measures to deter unacceptable violence” in the occupied West Bank, where extremist settler attacks on Palestinian communities have spiked dramatically over the past two years.

Multiple senior figures within Burnham’s cabinet have documented ties to LFI. Current Defence Secretary Wes Streeting, who has previously stated he has been a supporter of LFI for more than 20 years in leaked text messages to former disgraced UK ambassador to the US Peter Mandelson, has nevertheless broken with the lobby group’s latest position, endorsing sanctions on Israel and publicly accusing the country of committing war crimes in Gaza. Business and Trade Secretary Jonathan Reynolds, another senior Labour figure, previously served as a vice-chair of LFI.

It is worth noting that when Labour was the official opposition, the party publicly called for a ban on settlement goods. In June 2020, then-shadow foreign secretary Lisa Nandy argued that implementing such a ban would require political courage that sitting Conservative ministers had so far refused to demonstrate.

The push for import restrictions on settlement goods is gaining traction across Europe. France and Sweden recently tabled a joint proposal calling on the European Union to implement strict new import controls on goods produced in Israeli settlements, while the Netherlands officially implemented a national ban on trade in these goods just last month.

Domestically, LFI’s position puts it sharply at odds with the vast majority of the Labour Party’s own grassroots membership. Polling conducted earlier this year found that 87 percent of registered Labour members support a national ban on trade with Israeli settlements, with just 6 percent opposing the measure.

In its report, LFI does condemn the current Israeli administration led by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, which took office in January 2023 and has dramatically accelerated settlement expansion beyond the established blocs while failing to crack down on violent extremist settlers. The group also argues that there is a long-standing international consensus, previously accepted by both Israeli and Palestinian negotiating teams, that the major settlement blocs will remain under Israeli control as part of any final two-state peace agreement, via a land swap arrangement that would exchange Israeli territory for the occupied land held by the blocs.

Last week’s unprecedented joint military operation by the United States and Saudi Arabia against Iran-aligned militias based in Iraq has done far more than stoke fears of imminent retaliation. It has laid bare the deep fragility of Baghdad’s years-long balancing act, which has sought to nurture warmer ties with both Riyadh and Washington while keeping powerful Tehran-aligned armed factions in check — a delicate compromise that may now force Iraq to make hard choices its leaders have long evaded.

According to Iraqi and Iranian media reports, the strikes hit multiple bases belonging to Iraq’s Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) on July 29, leaving at least 20 PMF fighters dead alongside four military advisers from Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The operation marks the first time Saudi Arabia has openly participated in coordinated military strikes alongside the U.S., and was framed as retaliation for recent drone attacks on Saudi oil infrastructure that were launched from Iraqi territory.

What is most notable, however, is that neither Riyadh nor the targeted Iran-linked militias appear to be seeking a prolonged, large-scale military confrontation at this stage. The Saudi foreign ministry characterized the joint action as an act of legitimate self-defense, while noting that further strikes would only occur if additional attacks against Saudi territory are carried out. For Riyadh, the priority remains addressing ongoing Houthi threats to its oil facilities and maritime trade routes from Yemen, and the kingdom has little interest in opening a new active front against Iran-aligned groups in Iraq.

Regional analysts broadly agree that the primary goal of the strikes was to reestablish deterrence against Tehran and its Iraqi proxies, rather than spark a full-blown conflict. “The strikes were targeted at specific militia sites linked directly to drone attacks on Saudi oil facilities, to deter these groups,” explained Dr. Hesham Alghannam, a Riyadh-based scholar with the Carnegie Middle East program, in an interview with Middle East Eye. “But killing Iranian military advisers alongside militia fighters was not accidental. This was a message to Tehran that Saudi Arabia holds Iran responsible for what its personnel direct from Iraqi soil, regardless of which formation pulls the trigger.”

A similar restrained posture can be seen on the side of the Iran-aligned militias. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI), an umbrella coalition that includes the PMF, has publicly vowed retaliation for the strikes, but its rhetoric toward Saudi Arabia has been far more tempered than its sharp hostility toward the United States. In a July 29 statement posted to its official Telegram channel, the group emphasized that its “response to the American enemy is inevitable,” while only noting that it may target Saudi Arabia “if circumstances require.”

The IRI has given Iraq’s central government an August 7 deadline to respond to the joint strikes, but analysts argue this timeline and accompanying threats are aimed more at influencing Baghdad’s domestic policy than setting the stage for immediate military escalation. Multiple IRI-affiliated factions, including Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba and Saraya Awliya al-Dam, have already called on Baghdad to cut diplomatic ties with Saudi Arabia, indicating the pressure is intended to shape Iraq’s broader regional alignment rather than trigger immediate conflict.

Mustafa Alsaray, research director at the Al-Bayan Centre for Research and Planning, pointed out that armed factions in Iraq rarely publicize deadlines for retaliation, instead relying on surprise attacks. “When they set such deadlines, they intend to send a message and achieve something, perhaps politically or in terms of security,” he told Middle East Eye. A second possibility, he added, is that the militias are holding off on any retaliation to coordinate their response with Tehran, amid shifting currents in ongoing U.S.-Iran tensions.

In recent days, U.S.-Iran relations have shown tentative signs of de-escalation: former U.S. President Donald Trump confirmed that direct negotiations with Tehran are ongoing, though he also warned the latest talks represent Iran’s “last chance” to reach a new nuclear and security deal. A renewed breakdown in those talks could prompt Iran-aligned militias to launch new attacks against Saudi Arabia, and potentially even Jordan or other Gulf Arab states, observers warn.

Beyond regional tensions, the strikes come at an extraordinarily sensitive juncture for Iraq’s domestic politics and security agenda. Baghdad is currently working to bring all weapons held by non-state armed groups under formal state control, advance integration of the PMF (which is technically part of Iraq’s official security apparatus but hosts highly autonomous Iran-aligned factions), and implement a national disarmament plan with a September 30 compliance deadline for all armed groups.

The joint U.S.-Saudi strikes, and Baghdad’s widespread public perception as unable or unwilling to prevent the attacks on PMF bases, have already hardened resistance to the disarmament push among hardline factions. Abu Hussein al-Hamidawi, secretary general of Kataeb Hezbollah, confirmed that the attacks have “reinforced the group’s commitment to retaining and developing its weapons.” To build popular support for their position, the IRI has explicitly tied the strikes to Baghdad’s disarmament initiative, challenging the government that has “called for the Resistance’s disarmament” to prove it can defend Iraqi territory.

As resistance to disarmament grows, the economic stakes of Iraq’s stalled security reforms are becoming impossible to ignore. During Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi’s official visit to Washington in mid-July, his government signed 48 new trade and investment partnerships with U.S. companies. But U.S. officials have made clear that deeper economic cooperation and larger investments will depend on Baghdad’s ability to rein in or disarm militias that have carried out dozens of attacks on U.S. military and diplomatic targets in recent months, a string of assaults the IRI claimed responsibility for during the U.S.-Israel conflict with Iran.

Saudi Arabia is expected to adopt a similar posture on investment in Iraq. Zaidi has repeatedly framed closer economic partnership with Riyadh as a core priority for his government, but failure to control Iran-aligned militias could derail those plans completely. “September 30 is the real test. If the disarmament process fails – on the same day U.S. forces are set to withdraw from Iraq – Riyadh and even Abu Dhabi will quietly conclude that Baghdad cannot deliver, and their willingness to invest in Iraq will be reconsidered accordingly,” Alghannam noted.

For Iraq, the aftermath of the joint strikes has turned a long-simmering internal tension into an unavoidable test: can Baghdad deliver on its security reforms, preserve its fledgling ties with Gulf Arab states, and avoid being dragged into a wider regional conflict that its war-weary population can ill afford?

In a groundbreaking move that makes it the first Arab and African nation to join the deployment, Morocco formalized its participation in the controversial International Stabilisation Force (ISF) for Palestine in mid-July, tying its involvement to former U.S. President Donald Trump’s divisive Gaza peace plan and the equally disputed Board of Peace (BoP) created to oversee the initiative.

The signing ceremony was held in Rabat on July 15, with top Moroccan and international figures in attendance: Moroccan Foreign Minister Nasser Bourita, BoP Director General Nickolay Mladenov, senior Royal Armed Forces defense officials, and ISF Commander Jasper Jeffers. The deployment follows a direct order from King Mohammed VI, who serves as the Supreme Commander and Chief of General Staff of the Royal Armed Forces, as well as chairman of the Al-Quds Committee. Initial plans called for 500 Moroccan military personnel to be stationed at a refugee camp in Rafah, the southern Gaza city, but that number has since been cut to 200 troops according to Al Jazeera reporting. The force is set to operate in direct collaboration with the Israeli military.

Shortly after Morocco signed the participation agreement, Hamas unveiled a conditional disarmament proposal aligned with Trump’s Gaza framework. However, Israel has failed to uphold its end of the broader agreement, showing no indication of withdrawing from the Palestinian territories it has occupied illegally for decades. Instead of committing to a withdrawal timeline, far-right Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich has pushed forward a proposal to expand illegal Israeli settlements into the Gaza Strip.

In an official statement from Morocco’s National Defence Administration, the kingdom framed its contribution as a demonstration of unwavering commitment to cross-border peace, global cooperation, and regional stability. The statement added that the move is consistent with Morocco’s status as a founding member of the BoP.

Said Saddiki, an international relations professor at Sidi Mohamed Ben Abdellah University in Fez, explained the strategic benefits Rabat stands to gain from the deployment. He noted that joining the ISF gives Morocco a chance to reclaim a high-profile diplomatic role in the Palestinian issue, complementing the decades-long work it has carried out through the Al-Quds Committee and the Bayt Mal Al-Quds Agency. While independent analysis from the Council on Foreign Relations confirms the ISF is intended to act as Gaza’s primary security force, eventually replacing the Israeli military, Moroccan officials have heavily centered public narrative around a planned field hospital the kingdom will establish as part of its ISF mission.

That field hospital framing is nothing more than political spin, according to Saadia, a leading Moroccan member of the Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions (BDS) movement and an organizer for the most recent Global Sumud flotilla. Speaking to Middle East Eye, Saadia argued that while Morocco may claim to support Palestinian interests, its involvement ultimately benefits Israel far more — pointing to the kingdom’s existing role in arms shipments to the Zionist entity as evidence. Saddiki pushed back on that criticism, framing the field hospital as first and foremost a humanitarian undertaking rather than a military one. He acknowledged that Morocco maintains warm diplomatic relations with both Palestinian and Israeli leadership, but emphasized that the current tense regional climate leaves little room for any Arab state to serve as an effective mediator. As such, he said, Morocco is far more likely to contribute through humanitarian aid and diplomatic outreach than through active negotiation. To date, Morocco’s Ministry of Defence has not released any detailed public breakdown of the specific role its troops will fill as part of the ISF deployment.

Saadia offered a far more skeptical take on the kingdom’s unstated goals. Beyond the humanitarian framing, she suggested Morocco’s role could include disarming Hamas resistance factions and even overseeing a new wave of American and Israeli colonization of the Gaza Strip. Saddiki countered that Morocco’s participation does not represent a strategic alliance against any party, nor does it come at the cost of the Palestinian cause. He added that domestically, the Moroccan government has worked to balance its foreign policy choices with widespread public support for Palestine, while noting that pro-Palestinian and anti-normalization movements have remained steadily active across the country since October 2023.

Even as the Moroccan state has openly deepened ties with Israel, many ordinary citizens have warned that any normalization agreement with the country amounts to complicity in the ongoing genocide of Palestinian people in Gaza and the occupied West Bank. Younes, a key leader of Morocco’s pro-Palestinian protest movement and a veteran organizer of the past two Global Sumud flotillas, told Middle East Eye that joining the ISF amounts to full complicity in genocide. The activist added that entering Gaza alongside Israeli forces to impose a one-sided peace and force Palestinians to surrender and disarm is a grave injustice that the Moroccan public will never accept.

Both Trump’s peace plan and the BoP have been widely condemned by grassroots activists and sovereign nations alike for violating core principles of international law. Younes argued that no genuine peace initiative can come from negotiations with Israel, noting that the country has long operated with impunity to expand its control over Palestinian land. Shams, a Rabat-based activist who requested to use a pseudonym, described Morocco’s involvement as deeply disheartening and disappointing, though she added that the decision did not come as a surprise. Shams noted that widespread opposition to normalization runs deep, particularly among younger Moroccans: “I cannot speak for all Gen Z Moroccans, but I would say that most are opposed to the Moroccan military support joining the ISF.”

Data from the 2025 Arab Index, published earlier this year by the Arab Center Washington DC, backs up that claim: the survey found that 89 percent of Moroccans oppose recognizing Israel, with just 6 percent in favor of normalization.

A Moroccan journalist who requested anonymity explained that the Moroccan state frames normalization as a strategic tool: the kingdom supports a two-state solution and cooperates with Israel in exchange for diplomatic and political backing from the United States. But the journalist added that public trust in the government’s approach is eroding fast, as the gap between official rhetoric and on-the-ground reality widens. With Israel continuing to expand illegal settlements on occupied Palestinian land, the prospect of a two-state solution grows more distant by the day.

For Shams, the addition of Moroccan military forces to the ISF will not bring peace to Gaza. “I don’t think military intervention is going to facilitate peace when the oppressor has been destroying and bombing and blockading and [committing] genocide for decades on end,” she said. She added that the U.S. and Israel will only continue to destabilize Gaza, kill Palestinian civilians, and destroy the lives of millions.

Morocco is the only North African and Arab nation contributing military troops to the ISF, joining a small coalition that includes Kosovo, Albania, Kazakhstan, Indonesia, and most recently Uganda. Neighboring Egypt has limited its involvement to training and logistical support, choosing not to deploy frontline forces. This unique position has triggered intense anger among Moroccan pro-Palestinian activists, with Younes expressing frustration over the rapid pace of normalization across the country’s public and private sectors. “Zionists in Morocco successfully penetrated every single sector within a short period,” he explained. “What we gather as voluntary efforts and popular mobilisation to face this cancer during the past years isn’t enough.” Acknowledging the gravity of his assessment, he added that Moroccan authorities have continued to push forward with normalization even as grassroots opposition grows, meaning activists must adapt their strategies and pursue new approaches to challenge the trend.

Despite growing pressure from state authorities, Morocco’s pro-Palestinian movement remains defiant. Saadia argued that governments joining the ISF are operating under a dangerous delusion, wrongly believing that alignment with the American-Israeli axis will bring them greater security and protection. Pointing to the recent escalation of conflict between the U.S.-Israeli bloc and Iran, she noted that the U.S. only prioritizes Israel’s security, with no regard for the interests of other partner nations.

(Names of interviewees have been changed to protect them from retaliation)