分类： politics

After four years of tentative, fragile calm, long-simmering conflict in Yemen has reignited dramatically, with Houthi rebel forces scoring major territorial gains against internationally recognized Yemeni government troops in recent weeks. The insurgents have seized control of the strategic Red Sea port city of Mocha, along with multiple nearby islands, establishing a military foothold just kilometers from the Bab al-Mandeb Strait — a critical global trade artery that connects shipping lanes between Asia and Europe.

This rapid territorial push has sent deep alarm through Saudi Arabia, Yemen’s northern neighbor and the primary backer of the Yemeni government, for three interconnected reasons that cut across regional security and global energy markets. First, the Houthi advance marks a clear military defeat for Riyadh and the fragmented pro-government coalition it has supported with billions of dollars in military aid and financial backing since 2015. The retreat of Saudi-aligned forces along the western coast exposes long-running weaknesses in the coalition’s coordination and combat capacity.

Second, the strategic shift comes at a moment when Saudi Arabia has become far more dependent on the Bab al-Mandeb Strait for its oil exports. Following the 2026 outbreak of open conflict between the United States, Israel and Iran that effectively closed the Strait of Hormuz — the kingdom’s traditional primary export route — Riyadh has redirected nearly all of its energy shipments through Bab al-Mandeb. With Houthi forces now controlling large swathes of Yemen’s western coast adjacent to the strait, the group gains the ability to severely restrict or block Saudi energy exports at will.

Third, the Houthi movement’s long-standing military and political alliance with Iran means Tehran now holds potential influence over two of the world’s most critical maritime chokepoints for global oil trade. As of June 2026, the Bab al-Mandeb Strait carries approximately 7% of the world’s total seaborne oil supplies, placing a large share of global energy flows within reach of Iranian-aligned forces.

To understand how the conflict reached this breaking point, it is necessary to trace decades of instability in Yemen. The Houthi movement first emerged in the 1990s as a grassroots organization defending the interests of Yemen’s large Zaydi Shia Muslim community, and quickly entered into armed conflict with longtime autocratic president Ali Abdullah Saleh. After widespread popular protests forced Saleh to resign in 2012, Yemen descended into prolonged political and security chaos, allowing the Houthis to expand from their northern stronghold and seize control of the capital Sana’a in 2014.

Alarmed by the prospect of an Iranian-aligned movement controlling its southern neighbor, Saudi Arabia launched a full-scale military intervention in March 2015, with the stated goal of restoring the internationally recognized government of Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi, Saleh’s former deputy, to full power. After years of grinding warfare that killed hundreds of thousands of people and created one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises, the conflict settled into a military stalemate by the late 2010s. Though multiple attempts to negotiate a permanent peace deal failed, all warring parties agreed to a ceasefire in April 2022. While the formal truce expired in October that same year, both sides largely avoided large-scale offensive operations, keeping violence at historically low levels for four years.

Hopes for a lasting negotiated settlement rose significantly in March 2023, when China brokered a historic rapprochement that restored diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran, which had been severed in 2016. But Houthi leaders quickly rejected any suggestion that the Iran-Saudi normalization would lead to a peace deal between the group and Riyadh, asserting their independence from Tehran and dashing initial optimism.

Prospects for peace eroded further after the outbreak of the 2023 Israel-Gaza war. Shortly after Hamas’ deadly cross-border attack on southern Israel and the subsequent Israeli military campaign in Gaza, Houthi forces launched missiles and drones targeting Israeli shipping in the Red Sea. The U.S. Navy intercepted Houthi projectiles headed for Israeli territory, marking the first direct American military intervention in the conflict on Israel’s behalf. Tensions escalated again in January 2024, when the Houthis carried out a large-scale coordinated attack on multiple U.S. Navy vessels operating in the Red Sea, prompting retaliatory airstrikes against Houthi targets by the U.S. and United Kingdom. A new U.S.-brokered ceasefire mediated by Oman took hold in May 2025, bringing another period of relative de-escalation.

That fragile peace finally collapsed in July 2026. On July 13, Saudi forces carried out an airstrike on Sana’a International Airport, blocking a plane carrying a Houthi delegation from landing to attend the funeral of Iran’s late supreme leader Ali Khamenei. Riyadh and the Yemeni government justified the attack by claiming the flight violated Yemeni sovereignty. In response, the Houthis launched missile strikes against civilian and military airports in southern Saudi Arabia, declared a full maritime embargo on all Saudi commercial and military vessels, and formally announced an end to the “de-escalation phase” of the conflict via official Telegram channels.

While global attention has focused on the threat Houthi control of the western coast poses to global energy supplies, the recent offensive carries profound implications for Yemen’s own internal dynamics. The territorial gains represent a major, strategic setback for the Saudi-backed Yemeni coalition, a fragmented alliance far more diverse than commonly understood: it includes forces led by Tareq Saleh, nephew of former president Ali Abdullah Saleh, southern separatist groups pushing for regional autonomy, and a loose coalition of tribal and local armed factions.

For the Houthis, the new territorial gains also create significant new challenges. The group now must administer a much larger swathe of territory and population, while facing near-certain attempts by Saudi Arabia and pro-government forces to retake the newly captured areas. This mirrors an earlier phase of the conflict: in 2015, the Houthis seized large southern territories including Aden, Abyan and Lahj, but were quickly pushed back by pro-government forces and forced to relinquish control of the areas within months.

In recent weeks, reports have emerged indicating that Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has requested direct U.S. airstrikes against Houthi positions to reverse the recent rebel gains. Washington has reportedly declined the request so far, but analysts widely agree that this is unlikely to be the final chapter in a conflict that has stretched for more than a decade, with no end in sight to the confrontation between Riyadh and the Houthi movement in Yemen.

This analysis is based on reporting and commentary by Vincent Durac, Associate Professor in the School of Politics & International Relations at University College Dublin, originally republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license.

Fresh diplomatic friction has broken out between long-standing regional rivals India and Pakistan, after a collision between two naval vessels in the Arabian Sea earlier this week prompted both nations to summon each other’s top envoys and trade blame for the incident. The confrontation took place on Tuesday in the contested waters of the Arabian Sea, with each side quick to accuse the other of not only causing the crash but also violating a decades-old bilateral agreement designed to prevent dangerous military misunderstandings.

The collision comes more than 18 months after the two South Asian neighbors launched cross-border military strikes against one another, a escalation that was only de-escalated after the pair reached a new ceasefire agreement to calm tensions along their shared border. This latest incident has once again thrown the fragile regional stability into question.

In an official statement released by India’s Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi lodged a formal strong protest with Pakistan’s Charge d’Affaires based in Delhi, condemning what it called the “unacceptable and unprofessional conduct” of the Pakistani naval unit involved. The Indian ministry instructed the Pakistani diplomat to communicate to Islamabad that all of its military units must exercise proper caution and strictly adhere to the terms of existing bilateral agreements to prevent similar dangerous incidents from happening again. New Delhi confirmed that the collision did not result in any major damage to its vessel, and did not report any casualties among its crew.

Mirroring India’s move hours later, Pakistan summoned India’s Charge d’Affaires to its foreign ministry headquarters in Islamabad, where it delivered its own formal complaint. Islamabad claims its naval vessel was in the middle of its regularly scheduled biennial military exercise, SEASPARK-26, operating within its own exclusive economic zone when the Indian navy ship carried out reckless, aggressive maneuvers in dangerously close proximity to the Pakistani vessel. Unlike India, Pakistan has not issued any clear statement confirming or denying whether its vessel suffered damage in the collision.

A core point of contention in the dispute is a 1991 bilateral agreement officially titled the Advance Notice on Military Exercises, Manoeuvres and Troops Movements, which both nations signed specifically to prevent dangerous crisis situations from emerging from accidental misinterpretation of each other’s military intentions. Both sides have accused the other of breaking the terms of this agreement. India specifically says Pakistan violated Article 10 of the 1991 deal, which mandates that naval vessels and submarines from both countries must maintain a minimum distance of three nautical miles from one another when operating in international waters, a rule put in place explicitly to prevent accidental collisions.

Pakistan went a step further in its statement, calling on the global international community to intervene and pressure India to halt what it described as irresponsible actions that threaten to further destabilize the entire South Asian region. “The region cannot afford to be held hostage to India’s reckless pursuit of conflict and instability,” Pakistan’s foreign ministry said in its official release.

For nearly four years, India — one of the world’s largest net oil importers — has capitalized on the upheaval Russia’s invasion of Ukraine triggered in global energy markets. After Western nations cut most purchases of Russian crude following the 2022 full-scale invasion, vast volumes of discounted Russian oil redirected away from Atlantic markets to South Asia, flooding Indian refineries with a low-cost, abundant supply. This arrangement drastically cut India’s total import bill, keeping domestic fuel prices stable and boosting margins for the country’s refining sector. Today, that once-lucrative bargain has emerged as a major source of geopolitical risk.

On Wednesday, the U.S. House of Representatives approved new legislation that grants President Donald Trump sweeping authority to impose additional sanctions on Russia and levy tariffs as high as 100% on imports from any country that continues purchasing Russian oil and natural gas. The bill now heads to Trump’s desk to be signed into law. Among nations vulnerable to the new measures, India and China stand at the top of the list, as both have become the largest buyers of Russian crude in recent years.

Analysis from the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA), an independent energy think tank, shows that between December 2022 and August 2026, China absorbed 50% of Russia’s total crude exports, while India took 37%, with Turkey and the European Union each accounting for 5%. Data from the Delhi-based Global Trade Research Initiative (GTRI) puts Russia’s share of India’s total crude imports at 30.3% for the 2026 fiscal year, worth $40.8 billion of India’s total $134.7 billion crude import bill. As of July 2026, that share rose to more than 50% — exceeding the combined volume supplied by India’s next six largest providers: the UAE (10.8%), Saudi Arabia (9.6%), Venezuela (6.3%), Brazil (5.5%), Oman (5.3%), and the United States (2.9%).

Ajay Srivastava, a former Indian trade official who leads GTRI, framed the new U.S. legislation as a heavy-handed tactic to force India into accepting a lopsided bilateral trade agreement. “India buys Russian oil to secure affordable energy for 1.4 billion people, not to finance war, and these purchases have helped stabilise global supplies and prices,” he explained. While the economic appeal of Russian crude has softened in recent months — steep early-war discounts have largely disappeared, competition for shipments has grown, and costs for shipping, insurance and risk mitigation have risen — the supply remains an important pillar of India’s energy security.

Democratic Senator Richard Blumenthal made clear the target of the new law shortly after its passage, telling reporters: “China and India, you better buy your oil and gas somewhere else.” Under the terms of the bill, affected nations typically have 180 days to phase out Russian energy imports or negotiate a compromise with Washington, but the president holds authority to shorten that window dramatically. In an official statement, India confirmed it is “monitoring further developments on this matter” and reaffirmed its “firmly commitment to ensuring energy security” for its population. Officials added that the issue has been raised at the highest levels of diplomacy with U.S. counterparts, and New Delhi has clearly communicated the potential fallout for both bilateral ties and global energy markets.

While India could technically replace Russian crude with supplies from other producers, scaling that shift would carry a steep economic cost. Analysis from S&P Global notes that alternative supplies would come with higher per-barrel costs, increased freight and insurance premiums, and longer shipping routes that add further expense. Crucially, the proposed tariffs would not only apply to Russian crude entering India: they would hit Indian exports bound for the U.S. market directly, rippling through Indian exporters, the value of the rupee, domestic refinery margins, and India’s overall trade balance.

Michael Kugelman, senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, told the BBC that the new bill could bring significant disruptive impacts at the worst possible moment, as the two nations navigate sensitive final-stage trade talks and already strained broader relations. “India has built some insulation to fend off the shocks of US tariffs through new trade deals with key markets in the EU and elsewhere, and through bolstering an already strong trade partnership with China. But [up to]100% tariffs from a critical export destination is real bad news, no matter how you slice it and even with successful hedging tactics,” Kugelman explained.

The scale of India’s exposure to U.S. tariffs is substantial. According to the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, the U.S. imported $104 billion worth of goods from India in 2025, and total two-way trade in goods and services hit roughly $240 billion. India’s top exports to the U.S. include electronics, pharmaceuticals, industrial machinery, jewelry, chemicals, textiles, and refined petroleum products. In 2025, electrical and electronic goods alone made up $25.8 billion of Indian exports to the U.S., followed by pharmaceuticals at $9.7 billion and machinery at $7.2 billion. This new tariff threat comes on the heels of earlier Trump administration tariffs on Indian goods that peaked at 50% in 2025 before being partially rolled back.

The new landscape leaves New Delhi with a difficult calculus: how much economic benefit does Russia oil still provide, and when do the risks to its critical U.S. export market outweigh those savings? There is no straightforward answer, as the outcome will depend on multiple shifting variables: the size of any remaining Russian crude discount, global benchmark prices, logistics costs, the final tariff level Trump approves, and whether Washington grants exemptions to India or negotiates a broader compromise.

The situation grows more complex when accounting for India’s role as a refiner, not just an importer. After a series of Ukrainian drone strikes damaged Russian domestic refineries, Russia — once the world’s largest exporter of refined petroleum products — has become a net importer of fuel. CREA data shows Russian fuel imports hit a record 172,000 tonnes in August 2026, more than seven times the previous monthly high. Of that volume, India supplied roughly 120,000 tonnes — about 70% — most of which was petrol refined from Russian crude at a Gujarat refinery, totaling approximately €78 million in value.

While China purchases more Russian crude than India, Kugelman notes Beijing holds far more economic leverage in its relationship with Washington, due to its central role in global supply chains and the sheer scale of bilateral trade. “China has massive leverage over the global economy, particularly through its dominance of critical supply chains. India, despite being one of the world’s biggest economies, does not have the same leverage. The Trump administration appears to believe that its economic interests are more exposed if China retaliates than if India does,” he explained.

For India, the core challenge extends beyond just adjusting import volumes: it depends on how resilient alternative supply sources truly are. India relies on imports for more than 88% of its total crude demand, according to the Council on Energy, Environment and Water (CEEW), an Indian energy think tank. More than 85% of India’s crude comes from just six countries, many located in geopolitically unstable regions, and most domestic refineries lack the infrastructure to quickly switch between different grades of crude. This vulnerability is not limited to crude: India imports more than 60% of its LPG, the primary cooking fuel for more than 330 million Indian households. Its strategic petroleum reserves only cover 9 to 10 days of net imports, far less than Japan’s roughly 200 days and South Korea’s 207 days, though refinery operational stocks add an additional 64 days of coverage.

Since shifting purchases toward Russia after 2022, CEEW estimates India has saved roughly $12.6 billion on crude imports, turning discounted Russian oil into a key buffer for domestic energy security. Now, the looming U.S. tariff threat risks turning that buffer into a major liability, forcing New Delhi to weigh the savings from continued Russian oil purchases against the economic costs of U.S. tariffs.

GTRI’s Srivastava projects that Washington will use the tariff threat as a negotiating tool: threatening the full 100% levy, then offering to lower rates in exchange for Indian cuts to Russian oil purchases and concessions in the bilateral trade deal. “India should not allow US tariff threats to determine its energy policy,” he said. “It should continue buying Russian oil as long as it remains commercially competitive and negotiate firmly with Washington without granting unilateral trade concessions.”