分类： politics

Weeks after the U.S.-Iran memorandum of understanding fell apart, both Washington and Tehran have been shoring up their strategic positions ahead of any potential resumption of negotiations. The two sides have adopted starkly different posturing: the U.S., led by President Donald Trump, has issued open threats and floated the possibility of expanded bombing strikes against key Iranian infrastructure, while Iran has deliberately cut maritime traffic to a trickle through the strategically critical Strait of Hormuz, the chokepoint that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has repeatedly proven it can close at will.

Official statements from both capitals remain deeply contradictory. Trump has repeatedly claimed Iran is desperate to restart talks, but Iranian officials have consistently denied any active negotiations are underway. Even amid this dissonance, both sides acknowledge that any future agreement will revolve entirely around control and access to the strait, which borders Iran and Oman. The two adjacent countries have floated a series of framework proposals for managing traffic through the waterway, and while no final deal has been reached, it is already clear Iran will hold far more sway over shipping than it did before the U.S. preventive war began in February.

A core sticking point in ongoing discussions over a regional framework is whether Iran will be permitted to charge tolls or fees for commercial vessels passing through the strait. The Trump administration has taken an uncompromising stance against any such arrangement, arguing that it would deliver much-needed new revenue to Tehran and serve as undeniable public proof that its preventive war was a catastrophic strategic error. Secretary of State Marco Rubio reiterated this position in July, warning that allowing a nation-state to unilaterally control an international waterway and charge passage fees would set a dangerous global precedent that could be replicated in other strategic waterways around the world.

Before the outbreak of war, the strait operated as a free, open international shipping route, with 120 to 150 commercial vessels traversing the waterway daily to move energy and goods to global markets. The U.S. has pushed for a full return to this pre-war status quo, but Iran has zero interest in rolling back its new leverage—a reality that reflects the shifting power dynamics created by the war itself. Trump’s decision to launch conflict gave Tehran a unique opportunity to leverage its geographic position, and Iranian leaders moved quickly to capitalize on it.

Initially, Iran’s decision to restrict strait access was designed to raise the cost of the war for the U.S. and push regional U.S. partners to pressure Washington into ending hostilities. Over time, however, control over the strait evolved into a far more valuable strategic asset: a bargaining chip Iran can deploy whenever the U.S. threatens to escalate military operations. Today, reopening the strait to full traffic is a higher priority for the U.S. than containing Iran’s nuclear program, but Washington has yet to find a viable path to achieve that goal.

Trump first turned to military force to break the impasse, betting that heavy U.S. airstrikes would degrade the IRGC’s capacity to target shipping and force Tehran to back down. That strategy failed on two counts: it overestimated the ability of U.S. military power to force a change in Iran’s core strategic calculations, and it drastically underestimated Iran’s capacity to mass-produce and deploy low-cost drones and missiles against shipping. Every U.S. strike only reinforced Tehran’s belief that the war threatened the existence of the Iranian state, and instead of capitulating, Iran escalated: it targeted vessels using the alternative route along Oman’s southern coast and made clear that expanded U.S. bombing would trigger wider attacks on Gulf energy infrastructure.

All U.S. military efforts to restore the pre-war status quo have failed, and there is little reason to expect future attempts to succeed. Foreign policy analyst Daniel R. DePetris argues that if the Trump administration wants to extract itself from an open-ended unwinnable conflict, its best available option is to accept an Iranian toll and fee structure for strait passage.

Admittedly, this would face fierce domestic pushback: Capitol Hill hawks would almost certainly condemn the move, and many of Trump’s own political allies would struggle to justify the concession to voters. But when framed as a choice between accepting passage fees or remaining mired in endless conflict, accepting fees is the far more pragmatic option. The Trump administration’s original decision to launch war created the current crisis, and bad policy choices inevitably generate unforeseen negative outcomes that must be managed.

Critics who warn that an Iranian fee structure would be unprecedented are mistaken. There is already a working model for this kind of arrangement at another critical global trade chokepoint: the Strait of Malacca in Southeast Asia, where shipping companies contribute to a voluntary fund managed by Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore that covers navigational support, maritime safety, environmental protection, and search and rescue operations. A similar voluntary system in the Strait of Hormuz would not break new ground, and in fact, shipping firms and their insurance providers may even view predictable fees as a net benefit, if they reduce the risk of far costlier disruptions or attacks.

It would be disingenuous to ignore the downsides of such a deal: U.S. acceptance of Iranian tolls would be an embarrassing acknowledgment that Tehran is now the primary power broker for the strait, and reports that Iran is demanding fees equal to 7% of a vessel’s cargo value mean Tehran would gain substantial new revenue it did not control before the war. Even so, this scenario is far less catastrophic than many U.S. policymakers claim. Over time, Iran’s new leverage will gradually erode, as Gulf Arab states have already begun adapting to the new status quo by expanding alternative energy export routes that bypass the strait entirely, reducing their vulnerability to Iranian pressure.

Saudi Arabia has ramped up crude exports through its cross-country east-west pipeline, which delivers oil to Red Sea ports for global shipment. While this route remains vulnerable to attacks from the Iran-aligned Houthi movement in Yemen and cannot fully replace the volume of traffic that previously moved through the Strait of Hormuz, it has still allowed Saudi Arabia to avoid a full shutdown of oil production. The United Arab Emirates has followed a similar path, increasing exports through the Fujairah terminal located outside the strait; by July, Fujairah accounted for 66% of all UAE crude exports, up from 51% just one month earlier. Iran’s aggressive actions during the war have only accelerated these diversification efforts, which will over time reduce Tehran’s ability to disrupt global energy flows by holding the strait hostage.

Negotiations over the future of the Strait of Hormuz remain ongoing. If an agreement requiring passage fees becomes unavoidable, DePetris argues U.S. policymakers should set aside political posturing and accept the deal. Ceding ground on the fee question is the most efficient way for the U.S. to exit a foolish, unnecessary conflict at the lowest possible long-term cost.

This analysis is by Daniel R. DePetris, a fellow at Defense Priorities, a Washington D.C.-based think tank that promotes realism and restraint in U.S. foreign policy, and a columnist for multiple major U.S. publications. It was originally published by Responsible Statecraft and republished with permission.

Zhu Rongji, the transformative former premier of China whose bold economic reforms reshaped the nation’s trajectory and cemented its place as a global manufacturing powerhouse, has passed away at the age of 97. Holding China’s second-highest government office from 1998 to 2003, Zhu leaves behind a legacy of sweeping change that laid the groundwork for decades of explosive economic expansion.\n\nBorn in 1928 in central China’s Hunan Province, Zhu earned an electrical engineering degree before entering civil service and joining the Communist Party of China in 1949. His early political career was marked by extraordinary hardship: he was twice purged from the party, first in the 1950s after labeling Mao Zedong’s economic policies “irrational” and being branded a rightist, and again during the 1966–1976 Cultural Revolution. Following Mao’s death, Zhu was rehabilitated and steadily rose through the ranks, becoming vice-premier overseeing economic policy in 1991 before taking the post of premier seven years later.\n\nAs premier, Zhu spearheaded the sweeping structural reforms that remade China’s economy. He led grueling, years-long negotiations that ultimately secured China’s accession to the World Trade Organization in 2001, opening Chinese manufacturing to the global market, unlocking massive inflows of foreign direct investment, and integrating China into the rules-based global trading system. Domestically, he overhauled China’s fiscal system by shifting local taxation authority to the central government, restructured or privatized thousands of underperforming, debt-ridden state-owned enterprises, and rolled out policies that expanded home ownership across the country. His tenure also brought a blunt, unflinching approach to systemic problems: in a 1998 address, he openly acknowledged that China faced “many potential crises that could erupt at any time,” calling out public discontent over official corruption, the widening gap between rich and poor, and the authoritarian behavior of some local officials. Famously, he labeled unethical rogue bankers “half-wits” and famously described shoddily built Yangtze River flood dikes as “flimsy and porous as tofu dregs,” a stark rebuke of corner-cutting infrastructure construction.\n\nUnder Zhu’s leadership, China’s economy achieved sustained double-digit growth, pulled hundreds of millions of people out of poverty, and transitioned from a largely closed, centrally planned system to a global manufacturing hub. Widely remembered by the Chinese public as a tough, pragmatic leader unafraid to speak plainly about systemic problems, Zhu was also a staunch and vocal opponent of official corruption, prioritizing anti-graft efforts during his time in office.\n\nHis reforms were not without controversy, however. The restructuring of state-owned enterprises led to roughly 30 million layoffs over five years, and the rapid economic expansion he spurred exacerbated income inequality, issues that remain persistent challenges for China today.\n\nOfficial Chinese state media has honored Zhu’s legacy in his obituary, describing his life as one of “revolution, struggle and brilliance,” and praising him as “an outstanding member of the Communist Party of China and a loyal Communist fighter, an outstanding leader of the Party and state.”’

Over the course of mid-2025 to 2026, the Trump administration has rolled out a sweeping set of policy and investment measures designed to reshore and diversify U.S. defense critical mineral supply chains, with the explicit goal of breaking China’s long-held dominance over global production and processing of key industrial and defense materials including scandium, tungsten, and rare earth elements.

The coordinated push kicked off on July 20, when President Donald Trump signed a landmark executive order tightening restrictions on the Department of Defense’s ability to grant waivers for critical materials sourced from countries classified as U.S. adversaries: China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran. The order mandates that all such waivers will expire permanently on January 1, 2027, unless a contractor holds a formally approved plan to phase out materials from the four listed nations, while actively encouraging defense contractors to qualify new mineral suppliers based in the U.S. and allied partner countries.

Ten days later, on July 30, Trump issued a formal presidential determination under Section 101 of the Defense Production Act. This designation classified recoverable critical minerals, including tungsten scrap and spent battery material known as “black mass,” as scarce and essential to U.S. national defense, and directed the Secretary of Commerce to implement new restrictions on the export of these materials to preserve domestic supplies.

The most high-profile step of the initiative came on August 7, during a roundtable meeting with U.S. mining industry leaders. At the event, the administration announced more than $2 billion in new targeted investments to scale up domestic and allied-nation critical mineral production, while the U.S. Treasury formally welcomed the launch of new S&P Global reference prices for six key critical minerals: gallium, germanium, tungsten, antimony, neodymium, and praseodymium. The pricing framework is intended to underpin a broader critical minerals trade agreement with allied partners including Japan, Mexico, and the European Union, which will establish phased, mineral-specific price floors to support diversified, market-aligned supply chains.

Breaking down the $2 billion investment package, the single largest award is a $1.4 billion Department of Defense grant to California-based battery manufacturer Sila Nanotechnologies. The funding will support the expansion of the company’s silicon-carbon anode production capacity, as well as the construction of a new lithium-ion cell facility dedicated to supplying defense sectors, including satellites, drones, and munitions. The second-largest allocation, $400 million, will go to Australia’s Sunrise Energy Metals to develop the world’s first primary scandium mine. The project will secure a stable supply of high-heat aluminum alloys critical for manufacturing fighter jets and spacecraft components. Additional funding includes $150 million for Minnesota-based Niron Magnetics, a firm developing rare earth-free permanent magnets that eliminate reliance on Chinese processed rare earths, and $85 million for Standard Bauxite to produce refractory-grade bauxite for high-temperature defense components. Smaller grants have been allocated to projects focused on graphite, tantalum, niobium, and boron, alongside $180 million earmarked for mining education programs at U.S. academic institutions to build a skilled domestic workforce.

The U.S. push for supply chain independence comes in the wake of steadily tightening Chinese export controls on critical minerals over the past 18 months. After China first banned gallium, germanium, and antimony exports to the U.S. in December 2024, it expanded broader rare earth export restrictions throughout 2025, before extending dual-use technology controls to Japan in early 2026. Trade data shows the impact of these measures has been significant: in the first half of 2026, Chinese rare earth exports to Japan plummeted 51% year-on-year, with an 81% drop in June alone, and shipments of key heavy rare earths including dysprosium and terbium fell to zero. Over the same period, Chinese rare earth exports to the U.S. declined 28% year-on-year.

Chinese analysts and state-affiliated commentators have widely pushed back on the Trump administration’s timeline, arguing that the goal of fully decoupling U.S. defense supply chains from Chinese critical minerals by 2027 is unfeasible in the near term. In a commentary published by Guancha.cn, analysts noted that U.S. mining and processing firms have not yet built out sufficient capacity to replace Chinese supplies, pointing out that it is impossible for U.S. defense contractors to eliminate purchases of rare earths, tungsten, molybdenum, and tantalum from adversary nations in the lead-up to the 2027 deadline. The commentary added that the complexity of mineral refining has slowed progress on U.S. projects, leaving the foundations of Washington’s effort to challenge China’s rare earth supply chain dominance still underdeveloped, citing examples including a scaling challenge for rare earth refining startup ReElement Technologies and ongoing intellectual property litigation between two major U.S. rare earth firms, USA Rare Earth and MP Materials.

Tianjin-based political commentator Zui Qingfeng expanded on this criticism, noting that China built its dominant position in critical mineral processing over more than two decades, and the U.S. cannot replicate that entire industrial system in just a few years. China currently controls roughly 90% of global rare earth refining capacity, a position built on decades of investment in industrial infrastructure, and the U.S. has outsourced the polluting, long-cycle smelting and processing segment of the supply chain over the past 30 years, leaving gaps in technology, industrial capacity, and skilled labor. Zui Qingfeng estimated that rebuilding a complete, stable domestic supply chain would take the U.S. at least five years, and that American firms cannot avoid relying on Chinese rare earth supplies in the short term.

In recent weeks, China has also implemented new border control measures to protect its critical mineral technical expertise, with new exit and entry rules set to take effect on September 15 that will restrict travel for Chinese rare earth technicians with access to core technical knowledge, to prevent intellectual property leakage to foreign firms. Chinese commentator Big Octopus documented multiple past cases of foreign actors attempting to recruit Chinese rare earth experts to obtain restricted technical information, including a case where a Singaporean-linked headhunter offered a senior Ganzhou-based rare earth engineer a $300,000 annual salary and family green cards to elicit confidential production details, a 2025 incident where a Cayman Islands-registered firm attempted to obtain the restricted chemical mixing ratio for a common rare earth extraction agent from Inner Mongolian technical staff, and a cracked case involving a U.S.-funded Shenzhen headhunting firm that built a database of more than 1,000 Chinese rare earth and solar engineers to screen for potential recruitment.

Current U.S. Geological Survey data shows that while the U.S. remains heavily import-reliant for many critical minerals, its dependence on China is often overstated for key materials. For example, only 19% of U.S. gallium consumption comes from China, with the remainder sourced from Japan and other allied partners; 30% of U.S. yttrium imports come from non-Chinese suppliers including Germany, Austria, and South Korea; and most U.S. germanium imports are sourced from Belgium and Canada. Only heavy rare earths such as dysprosium and terbium remain overwhelmingly dominated by Chinese processing, a gap the U.S. already targeted with a $400 million investment in MP Materials in 2025. Overall, while the U.S. imports 80% of its rare earth supplies, only 56% of those imports come from China, meaning most can already be sourced from allied nations if needed. A March 2026 report from the U.S. National Association of Manufacturers underscored the scope of the challenge, finding that the U.S. is at least 50% import-reliant for 33 of the 58 minerals classified as critical to domestic manufacturing, with 13 of those minerals entirely supplied by foreign sources. The report called for a combined strategy of domestic capacity building and allied supply chain diversification to protect U.S. economic and national security.