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  • Turkey replaces Russian oil and diesel imports from US as wars reverberate

    Turkey replaces Russian oil and diesel imports from US as wars reverberate

    A major shift in global energy trade flows has emerged in recent months, with new Turkish customs data confirming that Turkey has turned to the United States for crude oil and refined petroleum products after Russian supplies were severely disrupted by intensifying Ukrainian attacks on Russian energy infrastructure.

    In a historic shift that underscores the reshaping of Turkey’s energy import map, the United States surpassed Russia in June 2025 to become Turkey’s largest crude oil supplier. Data shows approximately 570,000 tonnes of US crude arrived at Turkish ports during the month, outstripping the 425,000 tonnes delivered by Russia. This shift lays bare how Ankara has steadily reduced its reliance on Russian crude, a stark reversal from its position as one of Russia’s top crude buyers in the period immediately after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

    Alongside cutting Russian crude imports, Turkey has also ramped up purchases of diesel from both the United States and India. Data from energy analytics firm Kpler shows that since August 2025, Turkey has imported more than 120,000 barrels per day (bpd) of diesel from India and 90,000 bpd from the United States. These volumes mark the highest level of Turkish diesel imports from these two markets since Kpler began tracking this data in 2017.

    Three interconnected factors are driving Turkey’s sweeping adjustment to its energy import portfolio. First, sustained lobbying from the Donald Trump administration pushed Ankara to expand purchases of American energy, with high-level diplomatic pressure intensifying during Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s September 2025 visit to the White House. A former United States official told Middle East Eye on that occasion that Turkey was far more likely to reduce reliance on Russian oil than Russian gas, most of which is delivered through long-term pipeline contracts that Ankara has little incentive to abandon abruptly. As of 2024, 41 percent of Turkey’s total gas imports still come from Russia, with these supplies offering favorable payment terms that help power Turkey’s manufacturing sector and mitigate the impact of persistent double-digit domestic inflation. Just last December, Ankara extended its expiring long-term Russian gas import contract by an additional year, and Turkey has continued to position the TurkStream Pipeline as a critical alternative route for Russian gas to reach European markets amid Western sanctions on Moscow.

    Second, Russia’s domestic energy industry has been thrown into chaos by intensifying Ukrainian drone and missile strikes on key energy infrastructure. Kyiv’s military has repeatedly targeted Russian refining capacity, including strikes on Russia’s largest Siberian oil refinery and key processing facilities in Novgorod and Tatarstan. The damage to production forced Russia to implement a full ban on diesel exports in July 2025, and resulting domestic fuel shortages across Russia have further limited the country’s ability to export crude and refined products to international buyers including Turkey.

    Third, the ongoing US-Israeli military campaign against Iran has disrupted regional oil supply routes that feed into Turkish refineries, cutting off access to crude from major suppliers including Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates.

    This dramatic realignment of Turkey’s energy imports highlights how ongoing geopolitical conflicts continue to reshape global energy trade routes, forcing major consumer nations to rapidly adjust their supply chains to offset unexpected disruptions.

  • Why Nepal floods should worry India

    Why Nepal floods should worry India

    The catastrophic flood disaster that has struck southern Nepal near the Tibet border has already claimed more than 1,000 lives, sending a urgent transboundary warning that stretches far beyond Nepal’s national boundaries. As hydrological and climate experts emphasize, Nepal and India share an interconnected network of Himalayan river systems, and the link between upstream flooding in Nepal and downstream disaster in India is far more complex than the simple narrative of water flowing south across the border.

    Nepal is home to more than 6,000 rivers and streams, the vast majority of which drain southward into India’s Ganges river basin. Four major transboundary systems dominate the region: the Kosi in eastern Nepal, the Gandaki (known as Gandak in India) in central Nepal, the Karnali (called Ghaghara in India) in western Nepal, and the Mahakali (Sharda) that runs along the two countries’ western border. Dozens of smaller rivers, including the Bagmati, Kamala, Rapti, and Babai that originate in Nepal’s Siwalik and Chure hill ranges, are far less well known but pose outsized risk: their small, steep catchment areas produce far faster, more unpredictable flash floods that can catch communities off guard.

    Manish Shrestha, a hydrologist at the International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD), confirms that between 7 to 9 major river systems flow from Nepal into India’s northern plains, and these systems are the primary source of flood hazards across northern India. India’s Central Water Commission formally lists the Kosi, Gandak, Bagmati, and Ghaghara as the highest-risk transboundary watercourses.

    Among Indian states, Bihar is by far the most vulnerable to cross-border floods, with approximately 75% of northern Bihar officially designated as flood-prone territory. Nearly every major river that floods the state originates in Nepal, with the Kosi—long infamously known as the “sorrow of Bihar”—toping the list of high-risk systems, followed by the Gandak, Bagmati, and Kamala. But the hazard extends far beyond Bihar’s borders: eastern Uttar Pradesh is regularly impacted by flooding from the Ghaghara, Rapti, and Gandak rivers, with districts including Gorakhpur, Bahraich, Lakhimpur Kheri, and Shravasti facing repeated disaster. Uttarakhand shares the Mahakali-Sharda river system with Nepal, while North Bengal receives floodwaters from the Mechi and Mahananda. Pradeep Man Dangol, another ICIMOD hydrologist, notes that while Bihar bears the largest scale of flood risk, Uttar Pradesh is the second most affected and its vulnerability is chronically underreported.

    Hydrologists break down transboundary flood risk into a clear three-stage chain of causality. First, the rainfall: flood peaks that reach Indian territory are most often generated not in the high Himalayas, but in the lower elevation Siwalik, Chure, and Terai regions, where intense monsoon downpours fall on steep, small catchments that can channel massive volumes of water downstream very quickly. Second, the river itself: after rushing out of the mountains, Nepal’s rivers hit a sharp break in slope at the mountain front, drop their heavy sediment load, and spread across the plains as wide, braided, constantly shifting channels. Third, when the water crosses into India, the final severity of the disaster depends entirely on local conditions: how much rain has fallen on the Indian side, the existing water level of the Ganges, the condition of embankments and barrages, and how much natural drainage has been blocked by roads, railways, and expanding settlements on the floodplain.

    To put this simply: while the volume of flood flow arriving at the Indo-Nepal border is determined primarily by rainfall in Nepal, the ultimate severity of flooding depends at least as much on local conditions in India. The 2008 Kosi disaster offers a clear illustration of this dynamic. When the Kosi breached an embankment in Nepal and flooded large swathes of Bihar, killing nearly 400 people, the event was not caused by an unprecedented high-flow event. According to Rajiv Sinha, a professor of earth sciences at the Indian Institute of Technology (IIT) Kanpur, the actual river flow during the 2008 event was only around one-tenth of the channel’s designed carrying capacity. The catastrophe was triggered by a breach in decades-old embankments that had never been properly maintained. “The embankments constructed in the 1950s and 1960s had not been properly maintained. They had become eroded and eventually developed a weak point. The river breached its embankment through these vulnerable points and entered parts of India that had not seen flooding for perhaps 100 years,” Sinha explained. Saswata Sanyal, ICIMOD’s intervention manager for disaster risk reduction, summarizes this failure: “The failure was structural, not hydrological.”

    For routine monsoon floods, India typically receives between 12 hours and two days of advance warning before floodwaters arrive, depending on how quickly water travels downstream. It takes roughly one full day for floodwaters to travel from the Nepal mountain front to the Bihar plains along the Kosi and Gandak, and slightly longer for the Ghaghara. Flash floods from the steep Chure hill rivers can arrive in just a few hours, and surges from landslide dam bursts or debris flows move even faster: during the 2026 Nepal floods, the peak flood surge from Rasuwa reached the Indian border near Triveni in just seven and a half hours.

    Currently, India and Nepal do share real-time rainfall and river level data through a network of monitoring stations, with Nepal’s Department of Hydrology and Meteorology sharing data with India’s Central Water Commission to support flood forecasting. But experts warn that critical gaps remain in the existing cooperation framework. There are far too few real-time monitoring stations in the fast-flowing Chure catchments that produce the most dangerous flash floods. The two countries also do not have a single shared cross-border flood forecasting model, and there is limited routine information sharing on embankment conditions, shifting river channels, and sediment buildup. Even when forecasts are successful, gaps remain in the “last mile” of warning delivery: a notification reaching a district government office does not guarantee that at-risk families in rural floodplains receive the warning in time to evacuate.

    Scientists are also eager to correct a common public misconception: the idea that Nepal intentionally “releases” floodwater into India. Nepal has almost no large-scale reservoirs capable of storing and releasing large volumes of water; the country’s largest storage dam, the Kulekhani, holds less than one-tenth of a cubic kilometre of water, far too little to create a large-scale flood. “So there’s nothing to release,” Sanyal says. In fact, the Kosi and Gandak barrages that regulate flow along the border are operated by India, not Nepal. When floodwater crosses the border, it is almost entirely the result of heavy rainfall upstream, not deliberate gate openings by Nepal.

    That said, the basic fact remains: the majority of floodwater that hits northern Bihar and eastern Uttar Pradesh originates as rain in Nepal, so Nepal’s rainfall patterns set the timing and size of flood peaks that reach India. Overall, Nepal supplies roughly 40% of the Ganges’ average annual flow, and a far larger share during the dry season, making Nepal’s hydrology critical to India’s water security and flood risk. But experts emphasize that blaming Nepal for downstream floods is overly simplistic. “Rain is not a decision,” Sanyal points out. Whether a given flow becomes a disaster depends on conditions in India as much as Nepal: the Ganges’ baseline water level, local rainfall, embankment integrity, drainage infrastructure, and sediment buildup.

    Crucially, the impacts of water management on one side of the border also affect the other: infrastructure like embankments and barrages built for flood protection in India have raised upstream water levels and caused backwater flooding in Nepal’s Terai region, a longstanding concern for Nepali authorities. Since Nepal and India share a single integrated river system, with one country positioned upstream and the other downstream, the solution to growing flood risk is not blame, but expanded cross-border cooperation on data sharing, joint forecasting, and integrated river basin management.

    Experts note that the 2026 Nepal flood disaster carries a broader warning beyond transboundary management: it highlights the growing risk of extreme, debris-laden catastrophic flood events driven by climate change across the entire Himalayan region. Sinha points out that the 2026 Nepal disaster follows a pattern of similar catastrophic events that have struck India in recent years, including the 2021 Chamoli disaster and the 2025 Dharali disaster in Uttarakhand, and the 2026 Nepal event was between five to 10 times larger than those earlier disasters.

    “The fundamental point is that these are not normal hydrological floods,” Sinha explains. Conventional floods are composed almost entirely of water, but these new extreme events mix intense rainfall, melting glacial ice, or sudden glacial lake discharge with massive volumes of rock and sediment, creating a thick, high-energy debris slurry that can destroy almost every structure in its path. This was exactly what happened during the 2021 Chamoli disaster, when a large section of a Himalayan glacier collapsed, sending a debris and water cascade downstream that killed more than 200 people and destroyed major hydropower infrastructure. The same dynamic was seen in the 2025 Dharali disaster, where heavy rain triggered a flash flood that buried large parts of a village under meters of rock and sediment.

    Climate change is amplifying these risks across the board. Experts confirm that extreme rainfall events are intensifying across the Himalayan region, which is warming faster than the global average. A warmer atmosphere holds more moisture, leading the monsoon to deliver more total rain in fewer, more intense downpours. High mountain hazards are also growing: as permafrost degrades, glacial lake outburst events and rock-ice avalanches are projected to become more common, creating faster, debris-heavy floods that are far harder to forecast. More extreme events also trigger more landslides, adding larger volumes of sediment to rivers, which raises riverbeds and reduces channel capacity on both sides of the border. All these hazards are part of a single interconnected Himalayan risk system, and India’s exposure to these events is very significant.

  • Half of Americans think post-9/11 wars were worth it, poll shows

    Half of Americans think post-9/11 wars were worth it, poll shows

    As the United States prepares to mark the 25th anniversary of the devastating September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, a new national poll has laid bare deep partisan divisions over the decades-long legacy of the post-9/11 “war on terror” and the domestic surveillance and security infrastructure it spawned.

    On September 11, 2001, 19 al-Qaeda hijackers seized control of four commercial airliners, launching coordinated attacks that killed nearly 3,000 people. Two planes crashed into the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in New York City, destroying the iconic complex; a third struck the Pentagon outside Washington, D.C.; the fourth crashed into a rural field in Pennsylvania after passengers fought back against the hijackers.

    In response to the attacks, then-President George W. Bush launched sweeping changes to U.S. national security architecture that reshaped American life for generations. The administration created the new Department of Homeland Security, established the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) which introduced widespread airport screening protocols still used today, signed the Patriot Act granting law enforcement broad authority to surveil citizen communications, and secured congressional passage of the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF). That open-ended military authorization remains in effect 23 years later, and has been invoked by every subsequent administration to launch military operations across at least seven sovereign nations, including Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Somalia, Pakistan, Libya and Yemen.

    The new YouGov poll, published Wednesday, surveyed 1,098 U.S. adults aged 18 and older between August 20 and 23, with a margin of error of plus or minus 4.1 percentage points. When asked whether post-9/11 counterterrorism measures—including overseas military operations and expanded domestic security and surveillance—have been “worth the cost”, 48 percent of respondents answered yes, 25 percent said no, and 27 percent reported being unsure.

    Partisan affiliation drove starkly different views: 71 percent of Republican respondents said the measures were worth the cost, nearly double the 36 percent of Democrats who agreed with that assessment. That partisan divide extends to perceptions of national safety: just under half of all respondents (49 percent) said the U.S. is safer today than it was before the 9/11 attacks, but that number jumps to 60 percent among Republicans, while only 20 percent of Republicans say the country is less safe now.

    Maha Hilal, author of *Innocent Until Proven Muslim*, a book documenting the human costs of the war on terror, attributed widespread acceptance of the “safer now” narrative to decades of sustained government propaganda and little visible disruption to daily life for most Americans. “It’s pretty easy to convince people that they’re safer now because their ability to maintain the same sort of lifestyle has been relatively unchanged, especially as Americans tend to be quite apathetic anyway,” Hilal told Middle East Eye.

    The poll also found that a narrow majority of Americans—52 percent—recognize that Muslim Americans have faced worse treatment than followers of other faiths in the post-9/11 era. That finding also splits sharply along partisan lines: 71 percent of Democrats agree that Muslim Americans have been mistreated, compared to just 28 percent of Republicans. This gap comes as Muslim community leaders and experts report that current anti-Muslim rhetoric from leading Republican figures is more extreme today than it was in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks.

    When asked which ideological group has carried out the most violent attacks within U.S. borders, 25 percent of respondents correctly identified right-wing extremists, while 19 percent blamed Islamic extremists, 17 percent pointed to unaffiliated lone wolves, and 13 percent named left-wing extremists.

    Hilal noted that the decades-long success of the war on terror narrative has made it difficult even for progressive critics to center the harms of Islamophobia, which is often framed as an accidental side effect of counterterrorism rather than a core, intentional feature of the policy. “It has been to reiterate over and over again how this war has been a success, and how it has stopped numerous acts of terrorism,” Hilal said. “Even among leftists and liberals, it has been difficult to communicate the idea that Islamophobia has been a part and parcel to the war.”

    The ongoing resonance of post-9/11 biases has been highlighted by a recent controversy at CBS News, which faced internal backlash from current and former staffers over its coverage of Abdul El-Sayed, the first Muslim Democratic nominee for U.S. Senate in Michigan, who is running in the 2024 November election. Critics accused the network of overt racism and poor journalism for publishing a pre-anniversary story highlighting old, deleted social media posts from El-Sayed. In the posts, El-Sayed compared the more than 1 million U.S. deaths from COVID-19 to the nearly 3,000 deaths from 9/11, and called for the same level of national mobilization to address poverty and the pandemic that the country deployed after the attacks. He also mourned both the victims of 9/11 and the hundreds of thousands of people killed in the post-9/11 wars that followed.

    New research from Brown University’s Costs of War project has underscored the staggering human toll of those post-9/11 conflicts. A 2023 report from the project estimated that at least 4.5 million people have died as a direct or indirect consequence of post-9/11 wars across the Middle East, North Africa and Asia. Of those fatalities, between 3.6 and 3.7 million are classified as indirect deaths, caused by collapsed economies, widespread food insecurity, destroyed public health infrastructure, environmental contamination, and ongoing intergenerational violence and trauma that follow armed conflict. Even after the U.S. withdrew its formal military presence from Afghanistan in 2021, Afghans continue to suffer and die from war-related causes at higher rates than at any point during the conflict, the report found. Many of these indirect deaths could have been prevented if not for the collapse of basic services brought by war, researchers noted.

    While casualty counts for post-9/11 conflicts remain a topic of heated political debate, independent estimates have consistently pointed to massive death tolls: a 2015 report from Nobel Prize-winning organization Physicians for Social Responsibility estimated that more than 1 million people had been killed in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan alone by that point.

  • Israel vows to retaliate if UK imposes sanctions

    Israel vows to retaliate if UK imposes sanctions

    A sharp diplomatic standoff between Israel and the United Kingdom has intensified in recent days, as top Israeli officials have issued explicit warnings that any new British sanctions targeting illegal Israeli settlements in the occupied West Bank will trigger a swift and proportional retaliation from Jerusalem.

    The public escalation began during an interview with Israeli domestic news outlet Ynet this Tuesday, when Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar laid out Israel’s position amid growing tensions over Israel’s recently announced plan to expand settlement construction in the West Bank’s highly contentious Area E1. Sa’ar levelled criticism directly at the UK’s current Labour government, accusing the administration of pursuing a coordinated agenda against Israel. He noted the government has already restricted Israeli defense imports and imposed punitive measures on senior Israeli ministers, actions that set the stage for the current crisis.

    The Labour government first imposed targeted sanctions in June 2025, when it blacklisted far-right Israeli cabinet members Itamar Ben Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich for their role in inciting settler violence against Palestinian communities during Israel’s ongoing military campaign in Gaza. This Tuesday, UK Foreign Secretary Ed Miliband formalized plans for further action during an address to British Members of Parliament, confirming his government would roll out a “comprehensive” package of sanctions in the coming weeks.

    Miliband emphasized that Israel’s proposed E1 development – which would connect Jerusalem to the existing Ma’ale Adumim settlement and other Israeli built communities east of Jerusalem, effectively splitting the core territory Palestinians have earmarked for their future independent state – poses an existential threat to the prospect of a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. “This government will not acquiesce in the destruction of the two-state solution,” Miliband told lawmakers, confirming that concrete measures would be outlined in the near term.

    The proposed E1 project has been a flashpoint for international criticism for decades, as its implementation would permanently cut off the geographic contiguity of the West Bank, making a sovereign, viable Palestinian state functionally impossible. Sa’ar rejected Miliband’s announcement outright, framing the planned sanctions as an unjust attack on Israeli interests. “If Britain acts against Israel, Israel will act against Britain,” Sa’ar told Ynet. “They will be making a big mistake. Israel will not be a passive victim of this policy, and we will defend our rights, our interests and our people.” Sa’ar added that Israeli authorities are already making preparations for potential sanctions and finalizing their retaliatory response.

    This public exchange is the latest high-profile clash between the two countries’ top diplomats: just last month, Sa’ar and Miliband traded critical remarks over the E1 settlement expansion plan, opening the rift that has now widened into a full diplomatic crisis.

    According to a Monday report from Israeli right-wing newspaper Ma’ariv, Israeli officials have already privately warned London that any new sanctions on settlements will be met with a “substantial” response. The report noted that Israeli leadership has not yet finalized the form of retaliation, with multiple options on the table including diplomatic and economic measures. One option reportedly under active consideration is the expulsion of British representatives from the US-led International Gaza Support Centre (IGSC), the multinational body established to monitor the ongoing Israel-Hamas ceasefire in Gaza.

    This would not be an unprecedented step for Jerusalem: just last week, Israel expelled Dutch officials from the IGSC in response to the Netherlands’ recent ban on imports of goods produced in illegal Israeli settlements. Earlier this year, Israel similarly removed Spanish representatives from the body, accusing the Spanish government of “obsessive anti-Israel bias.”

    Still, Ma’ariv reported that Israeli leadership is weighing the potential long-term risks of a harsh retaliation against the UK, noting that future British governments led by the Conservative Party or a Reform UK-aligned administration are widely expected to adopt a far more pro-Israel stance. The report also confirmed that the United States administration has been working behind the scenes as an intermediary between the two governments, actively pressuring London to abandon its planned sanctions package.

  • How China’s censoring coverage of the Tibet flood disaster

    How China’s censoring coverage of the Tibet flood disaster

    In the wake of catastrophic flash floods and landslides that have devastated cross-border regions of Nepal and Tibet’s Xizang Autonomous Region, ongoing rescue operations have been overshadowed by a heated social media dispute over media coverage and information control of the disaster.

    The controversy ignited after a report from Laura Bicker, the BBC’s China correspondent, claimed that Chinese authorities had scrubbed viral footage of a massive flood and mudslide surge that swept through Gyirong Port, a key border trading hub on the Tibet-Nepal border. Bicker argued the removal was rooted in Beijing’s concerns over potential social unrest in the politically sensitive Xizang region.

    Critics of the BBC’s reporting quickly pushed back, with social media users sharing screenshots proving the same footage cited by Bicker had already been broadcast by multiple domestic Chinese outlets. One Chinese journalist publicly accused the outlet of spreading blatant misinformation, while other online observers noted nuanced, middle-ground perspectives are often erased in polarized debates over Chinese media censorship.

    Long-standing tensions frame this conflict: Beijing has repeatedly condemned what it frames as systemic bias in Western media reporting on Xizang, and pro-government social media users have amplified this narrative this week, centering their criticism on the BBC. At the same time, domestic and overseas Chinese social media users have long documented widespread state control over information in China, a pattern that has reemerged in the aftermath of the floods.

    As Bicker outlined in her report, the most tangible evidence of content restrictions is the removal of user-shared footage showing the flood wave swallowing Gyirong Port. While the clips initially spread across domestic platforms WeChat and RedNote, they were later made inaccessible to users. Beyond content removal, independent and foreign journalists are systematically barred from accessing the disaster zone. Allyson Horn, a correspondent with the Australian Broadcasting Corporation, confirmed she had submitted multiple requests to visit the affected area and was rejected each time, with other international reporters facing identical blocks.

    This blanket access restriction makes independent verification of official Chinese accounts of the disaster impossible for outside outlets. The combination of removed social media content and barred independent reporting has left Chinese state media with full control over the public narrative of the floods.

    State media coverage of the disaster has followed China’s long-standing crisis reporting playbook, which prioritizes content that avoids public panic or perceived threats to social stability. Coverage has centered almost exclusively on People’s Liberation Army rescue missions, President Xi Jinping’s oversight of the response, and Premier Li Qiang’s official visit to the affected region. Reporting has also included updates on road repair efforts and the delivery of relief supplies to impacted communities, but as The Guardian has observed, there has been a stark lack of coverage detailing the disaster’s impact on local residents, their destroyed homes and damaged communities. This stands in sharp contrast to the Nepali side of the border, where international reporters have been allowed to interview survivors without restrictions.

    Critics also accuse Beijing of concealing the true casualty toll from the disaster, but the restricted access to the region means no outside observers can confirm or refute competing claims about the number of fatalities.

    To contextualize current information controls, it is worth examining shifts in Chinese emergency reporting over recent decades. In some historical cases, Beijing has allowed far more open coverage of large-scale disasters: the 2008 Wenchuan earthquake, which killed over 70,000 people and left millions homeless in Sichuan province, saw Chinese state media launch extensive live coverage within hours of the quake, a practice that continued for weeks. China Central Television published regular updates to the death toll and covered rescue efforts in depth. While foreign reporters raised questions about the collapse of poorly constructed school buildings and calls for accountability for victim families, domestic Chinese outlets even covered some of these controversies, including debates over whether local officials had conducted proper construction quality inspections. This early coverage was widely hailed by international observers as an unprecedented breakthrough in open Chinese disaster reporting, with many noting the extraordinary level of transparency on display. Within weeks, however, the government cracked down on discussions of the collapsed schools over fears the issue would fuel anti-government sentiment.

    Over time, the standard approach for state media during crises has solidified: outlets are mandated to focus exclusively on “positive reporting,” while online censors remove any content that criticizes the government’s response or suggests official culpability. The 2011 Wenzhou high-speed train crash, which killed dozens of people, serves as a clear example of this model. Academic research shows that unlike the relatively open early coverage of the 2008 earthquake, the government enforced strict controls on permissible coverage of the crash. Officials ordered outlets not to deploy reporters to the scene, limited how often outlets could cover the incident, and barred any coverage that linked the crash to broader national high-speed rail expansion. Journalists were also forbidden from investigating the root causes and human impact of the crash, or sharing personal commentary on the incident on social media. Instead, they were instructed to prioritize heartwarming stories of bravery and collective action, such as local residents donating blood for victims, to encourage feelings of national unity and compassion rather than criticism.

    Since Xi Jinping took office in 2012, concerns over potential threats to party rule have led to even stricter controls on both traditional media and social platforms across China. The restricted, positive-only coverage of the Tibet floods aligns fully with this tightened policy framework.

    The ongoing dispute has also been amplified by growing geopolitical distrust between China and Western nations, which has deepened perceptions of biased coverage on both sides. Logistical barriers to accessing the disaster zone and first-hand sources have only further muddied the information landscape. China’s access restrictions leave Western journalists unable to independently confirm details on the ground, creating an information gap that fuels suspicion of censorship in the West and criticism of Chinese state media narratives. In turn, this criticism reinforces Beijing’s long-held claim that all Western reporting on Tibet is inherently biased, creating a feedback loop that justifies further information restrictions.

  • The 49ers set to embark on the NFL’s longest road trip for the season opener in Australia

    The 49ers set to embark on the NFL’s longest road trip for the season opener in Australia

    In what will go down as the longest road journey in National Football League history, the San Francisco 49ers are set to depart their Bay Area home base late Wednesday for Melbourne, Australia, where they will face off against the Los Angeles Rams in the 2025 NFL season opener on September 11. The unprecedented trip requires a massive logistical overhaul and careful preparation, as the 16-hour, 8,000-mile flight crosses the international dateline, turning a Wednesday departure from California into a Friday arrival in Australia.

    Team officials and medical staff have outlined detailed guidance for players covering everything from in-flight nutrition and hydration to post-arrival routines and sleep scheduling to combat the harsh effects of severe jet lag. Players have adopted a wide range of personal strategies to adjust to the 14-hour time difference.

    Second-year defensive lineman Keion White, an experienced world traveler who has already competed in NFL regular-season games in Germany and London, is approaching the trip with casual enthusiasm, unlike some of his teammates and head coach Kyle Shanahan who have openly expressed frustration over the taxing opener schedule. White’s unconventional game plan for beating jet lag relies heavily on sleep aid melatonin. “I don’t know if you can OD on melatonin, but I’m going to try,” he explained. “Take five melatonins, go to sleep on the plane. As soon as I wake up, I’m taking five more. Just keep rolling like that.”

    Once he lands, White plans to spend his first free day after mandatory team meetings exploring Melbourne. He intends to browse TikTok for activity ideas, navigate the city’s public transit system, and spend the entire day awake to reset his circadian rhythm as quickly as possible. “I’m an experience guy,” he said. “If I’m up, walking around, just going to do stuff, I’ll be up. Just go explore.”

    While both the 49ers and the Rams worked extensively with sports scientists and logistics teams during the offseason to develop their jet lag mitigation strategies — even sending advance staff to Australia to study time zone adjustment firsthand — the two franchises landed on completely opposite approaches. The 49ers opted for an early arrival strategy: landing two full days before the game to give players time to gradually adapt. Their schedule calls for a light practice on Saturday, a rest day on Sunday, three full regular practices from Monday through Wednesday, and kickoff on Friday morning. Immediately after the game ends, the team will fly back to California, landing in the Bay Area that same Friday afternoon, allowing them the entire weekend to rest before their Week 2 home game against the Miami Dolphins on September 20.

    Shanahan noted that he initially had reservations about the early arrival plan, but aligned with the recommendation from sports scientists and his players, ultimately agreeing the approach makes sense. “It’s a big adjustment on the body,” Shanahan said. “So, the recommendation for everybody has been to tell us when to go, and it’s made a lot of sense. I know how our players feel also. I was a little bit on the fence. Science wasn’t and what I was reported on and our players weren’t at all. So that helped me get off the fence.”

    In contrast, the Rams are taking the opposite tack: they will complete nearly all of their pre-game preparation at their California facility and only arrive in Melbourne roughly 24 hours before kickoff, betting that a shorter stay will minimize jet lag disruption. It remains to be seen which strategy will deliver better on-field results, with the answer only set to emerge after the opening whistle.

    The rushed lead-up to departure has created a whirlwind of behind-the-scenes work for the 49ers front office. Following the team’s final preseason exhibition game in Las Vegas on August 28, players got the Labor Day weekend off, returning to practice on Monday, just one day after the NFL’s mandatory deadline to cut rosters down to 53 active players. General manager John Lynch’s staff had to finalize roster cuts, build the 16-player practice squad, confirm injury statuses for all active players, and handle a host of unforeseen logistics hurdles before departure.

    “There’s a lot behind the scenes,” Lynch said. “Our logistics folks, our folks that work in the cafe, have just gone to tremendous lengths, our health and performance team, to make sure that we’re giving our players the best opportunity to feel right when they play down there in Australia. Everything from getting visas, which much more complicated than I ever knew, and they’ve been outstanding. … Hats off to those guys for pulling off a monumental task, and it’s not done yet.”

    Lynch recalled that securing valid passports for all players created last-minute scrambles, including one practice squad signee who required his parents to overnight his passport to the team facility. The chaos was even more pronounced for recently acquired offensive lineman Jarrett Patterson, who was traded from the Houston Texans to the 49ers just three days before departure. “They were like, hey, do you have a passport? We’re leaving for Australia in three days,” Patterson said. “I was like, ‘Whoa!’ It’s obviously a quick turnaround getting here a couple hours after I found out and now getting ready for Australia.”

    Despite the logistical headaches and physical toll of the cross-hemisphere trip, most 49ers players have embraced the unique opportunity. Cornerback Deommodore Lenoir said he would be willing to travel 30 hours straight just for the chance to play in an NFL regular-season game. For rookie cornerback De’Zhaun Stribling, the trip even comes with a bucket-list item he plans to check off before his first NFL regular season appearance: “I kind of want to see a kangaroo, just because,” he said. “To see how big they are.”

  • Israel Katz says Palestinians will leave Gaza

    Israel Katz says Palestinians will leave Gaza

    In a public conference appearance this week hosted by Israeli media outlet Ynet and the Israel Democracy Institute, Israeli Defence Minister Israel Katz made an explicit public case for relocating the entire Palestinian population out of the Gaza Strip, framing mass emigration as the only viable long-term resolution to the ongoing conflict in the coastal enclave.

    Katz’s remarks marked one of the most high-profile endorsements of a long-simmering Israeli policy that has drawn fierce international condemnation over fears it amounts to forced displacement of Gaza’s residents. “There is no real solution for Gaza in the end without migration,” Katz told journalist Moran Azoulay during the on-the-record discussion. He went on to lay out a timeline for advancing the plan, saying momentum for relocation would pick up after Hamas fails to meet its commitments under existing agreements, clearing the way for Israel to escalate military and territorial action to facilitate the population movement.

    To back up his claim that relocation enjoys broad support among Gaza’s population, Katz asserted that consistent public opinion surveys show roughly 80 percent of Gazans want to leave the enclave. That figure aligns with a May survey conducted by the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT), a unit that falls directly under Katz’s own defence ministry. The COGAT survey found that nearly 80 percent of respondents expressed interest in learning more about processes to resettle in third countries via the Rafah and Kerem Shalom border crossings.

    Katz acknowledged that the plan has so far been held up by two key barriers: Hamas blocks Gaza residents from leaving for resettlement, and no foreign nations have stepped forward to accept the displaced population. “We are fully prepared to move them out if it becomes possible — by sea, by air, by every way possible,” the minister said, adding that Egypt has already ruled out allowing relocation through its territory. He also noted that potential host countries are waiting for formal backing from the United States before agreeing to take in Gazans, explaining that former President Donald Trump froze the initiative rather than cancelling it entirely, amid heavy pressure from Arab nations opposing the plan.

    The controversy over Israel’s relocation plan has already forced the government to rebrand the initiative in an effort to blunt international criticism. At the end of June, Israeli officials confirmed that the plan would drop its original label of “voluntary migration” in favor of the rebranded “Freedom of Movement Plan.” Israel’s Channel 13 reported that Israeli security agencies including the Mossad were ordered to stop using the original terminology, which had sparked global backlash over allegations it masked a policy of forced ethnic cleansing. Reporting from Israeli newspaper Haaretz around the same time revealed that Shmuel Ben Ezra, head of Israel’s National Security Council, called an urgent meeting to discuss efforts to advance resettlement, with Mossad officials openly admitting they had yet to identify a single country willing to accept large numbers of displaced Gazans.

    Beyond his comments on Gaza relocation, Katz also addressed rising regional tensions during the conference, confirming that Israel is actively preparing for a potential large-scale attack from Iran during the upcoming Jewish holiday of Rosh Hashanah, which falls between September 11 and 13 this year. The defence minister stressed that Israeli security forces are fully prepared to respond with overwhelming force if Iran or its proxy groups launch an attack on Israeli territory during the holiday period.

  • Al-Khair Foundation strongly denies UK Lawyers for Israel allegation of Hamas links

    Al-Khair Foundation strongly denies UK Lawyers for Israel allegation of Hamas links

    A prominent UK-based international aid organization is at the center of a high-stakes regulatory investigation after a pro-Israel advocacy group formally accused it of ties to the proscribed militant group Hamas, prompting firm denials from the charity and renewed scrutiny of partisan efforts targeting Palestine solidarity work in Britain.

    The Al-Khair Foundation, which delivers critical humanitarian aid to vulnerable populations in Gaza, is now the subject of parallel probes by the Charity Commission for England and Wales and the UK Department for Education. The investigation was launched following a formal complaint submitted by UK Lawyers for Israel (UKLFI), an advocacy group that has long targeted organizations and individuals critical of Israeli government policy.

    The chain of events that led to the probes began in July, when Mohammad Yousef Hasna was arrested in the UK at the request of American federal law enforcement. US prosecutors have charged Hasna with providing material support to Hamas, which is listed as a banned terrorist organization by both the US and UK governments. Al-Khair Foundation has clarified that Hasna was never a direct employee of the organization, noting he worked for a separate partner charity that carries out humanitarian relief work in Gaza. No charges have been filed against Al-Khair itself in relation to the case.

    Within hours of learning of Hasna’s arrest on suspicion of terrorism-linked offenses, Al-Khair proactively submitted a mandatory serious incident report to the Charity Commission — a step the organization took before the regulator opened its formal inquiry. In an official statement released this week, the charity forcefully pushed back against all allegations of connections to Hamas or any other proscribed group.

    “We unreservedly condemn violence and extremism of all kinds,” the statement read. “Al-Khair Foundation as an organisation categorically denies any allegation of channelling support to, supporting or assisting Hamas or any proscribed entity in Gaza or elsewhere.” To address the inquiry fully, the charity has appointed an independent consultant to conduct a full factual review, with findings to be shared alongside all required legal and operational documentation for the investigation.

    The Department for Education’s parallel investigation centers on four schools operated by Al-Khair Foundation: three based in London and one in Oldbury, West Midlands. The charity emphasized that the school network operates completely independently from its international humanitarian aid programs, and has no connection whatsoever to Hasna. “The schools recognise the need for questions from the Department for Education and are responding to all of them,” the organization added.

    This investigation is not an isolated incident: for years, the Israeli government has repeatedly leveled unsubstantiated accusations of Hamas links against international charities that deliver aid to Gaza, where a decades-long blockade and escalating humanitarian crisis have left more than two million residents dependent on outside assistance. Al-Khair reaffirmed its commitment to serving vulnerable communities in the territory, noting its programs have reduced food insecurity and sustained life-saving support for thousands of families amid extremely challenging operating conditions. “We hope the inquiry process will allow us to present evidence that will establish the facts of the work of AKF, and the realities of our humanitarian operations in Gaza,” the charity said.

    Behind the complaint lies a long pattern of advocacy by UKLFI, which was founded in 2011 and has become a leading actor in pressuring UK-based organizations and individuals that express support for Palestinian rights or criticism of Israeli government policy. The European Legal Support Centre’s Britain Index of Repression, which documents systemic efforts to suppress Palestine solidarity activism across the UK, lists UKLFI 128 times. The centre’s research shows that UKLFI frequently acts as an initiating or escalating actor in campaigns against Palestinian solidarity activity, using formal complaints, legal threats, and public pressure to push schools, universities, employers, and public bodies to launch disciplinary proceedings or cancel planned events. This pattern of activity, the centre argues, has created a “chilling environment” where even lawful Palestine-related organizing is often abandoned out of fear of costly legal action and professional reputational harm.

  • Tunisia steps up civil society crackdown as anger mounts over power and water shortages

    Tunisia steps up civil society crackdown as anger mounts over power and water shortages

    As record-shattering summer heat pushes Tunisia into a dual crisis of widespread infrastructure collapse and growing public fury, President Kais Saied’s administration has intensified a sweeping, systematic crackdown on the country’s already beleaguered civil society sector, a new Human Rights Watch (HRW) investigation has found. In a 49-page report published Wednesday, the global rights watchdog warns that the escalating targeting of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) is not isolated harassment, but a deliberate campaign to eliminate independent civil society from the North African nation entirely.

    The report lays out a detailed timeline of repression that began between May and December 2024, when authorities arrested 14 staff members from two types of groups in particular: organizations that provide support to asylum seekers, and anti-racism advocacy groups. From 2025 through the first half of 2026, at least 47 individuals linked to targeted NGOs have gone through prosecution in Tunisian courts, the investigation found. At least 10 of those people have been held in pre-trial detention for periods longer than the 14-month maximum allowed under Tunisian national law, a clear violation of domestic legal standards.

    One of the highest-profile cases highlighted in the report is that of Saadia Mosbah, a leading Tunisian human rights defender. In March 2026, Mosbah was sentenced to eight years in prison and ordered to pay a substantial fine on what HRW calls “abusive charges of financial crimes” that are widely seen as politically motivated. Five additional employees of asylum support organizations have also been convicted on similar fabricated charges tied directly to their professional work assisting vulnerable populations, the report confirms. All targeted organizations have been forced to cease operations entirely, leaving critical gaps in services for marginalized communities across Tunisia.

    Saied’s government has also weaponized existing counterterrorism and anti-money laundering laws to criminalize even basic assistance to foreigners living in Tunisia with irregular immigration status, turning humanitarian work into a criminal act.

    The government’s crackdown on dissent has done little to quell growing public anger, which has boiled over into mass street protests in recent weeks amid an unfolding climate and infrastructure emergency. This summer, temperatures in Tunisia have repeatedly climbed close to 50 degrees Celsius, driving unprecedented demand for electricity for cooling and increased strain on water supplies. To cope with constrained generation capacity, the Tunisian Company of Electricity and Gas rolled out rolling, rotating power cuts across multiple regions of the country.

    Those outages have triggered a cascading crisis that has hit the country’s water distribution network, which depends on electric-powered pumping stations to deliver supplies to homes and businesses. The outages have added extra pressure to a water system already severely weakened by years of persistent drought. Compounding the crisis, power cuts and shortages of raw plastic have disrupted production of bottled water, leaving communities without reliable access to safe drinking water during the record heat wave.

    The public health system has been pushed to breaking point as a result. Emergency departments across the country are already overwhelmed treating heat-related illnesses, and on August 29, the Tunisian Organisation of Young Doctors issued a statement warning of an “unprecedented” spike in heat-related deaths, and calling on the Saied administration to declare an official national health emergency.

    Facing growing public outrage over the failures of basic services, Saied has responded by blaming unspecified actors for sabotage, a familiar pattern of conspiratorial rhetoric from the president. He has claimed the outages and shortages are “premeditated acts aimed at inflaming the situation by any means necessary, spreading lies and rumours to sow confusion” and “mistreating citizens even in the most basic services” — but has failed to produce any public evidence to back up these claims.

    The current crackdown on civil society is part of a broader erosion of democratic norms that began shortly after Saied’s July 2021 power grab, when he dissolved the sitting parliament, seized executive authority, and moved to consolidate power under his personal control. Since that time, Tunisian civil liberties have deteriorated to what multiple local and international rights groups describe as an “alarming” state, with widespread condemnation of what they call Saied’s “authoritarian drift” and the sharp, systemic erosion of fundamental rights across the country. Dozens of journalists, opposition politicians, and human rights defenders have been arrested, with many handed lengthy, heavy prison sentences in recent years.

  • Exclusive: Blair asked PA to remove ‘Palestine’ from textbooks, former UK envoy says

    Exclusive: Blair asked PA to remove ‘Palestine’ from textbooks, former UK envoy says

    In a bombshell revelation shared during the David Hearst Podcast, former British Permanent Representative to the United Nations Jeremy Greenstock has pulled back the curtain on a controversial diplomatic demand tied to Donald Trump’s Board of Peace, the U.S.-established body tasked with overseeing post-war Gaza reconstruction. According to Greenstock, the board tapped former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair to pressure the Palestinian Authority (PA) to strip all references to the word ‘Palestine’ from its national school curricula, replacing the term with ‘Samaria’ – the Jewish historical designation for the region. Greenstock, who served as Blair’s senior diplomatic envoy during his time in Downing Street, confirmed the condition was explicit: only if the PA complied with the erasure would the Board of Peace recognize it as a legitimate negotiating partner for a final peace deal with Israel to end the ongoing Gaza conflict.

    The demand was immediately and unequivocally rejected by PA President Mahmoud Abbas, Greenstock confirmed. This revelation has sparked fierce debate over the underlying principles guiding the U.S.-backed peace body, with Greenstock questioning the board’s commitment to basic concepts of justice, historical fairness, and longstanding diplomatic norms in the Middle East.

    Blair’s own policy institute, the Institute for Global Change, has issued a flat denial that the former prime minister made the request. Still, the disclosure lines up with a growing, coordinated global campaign led by Israel and its supporters to eliminate references to ‘Palestine’ and Palestinian identity from educational materials and public cultural institutions, multiple recent investigations and on-the-ground actions confirm.

    Greenstock, speaking from his decades of firsthand experience in Middle East diplomacy, also pulled no punches in his assessment of Blair’s current role heading postwar Gaza planning for the Board of Peace, noting the former prime minister has already encountered significant headwinds in the position. ‘Because of his record on Iraq and on Palestine since he left government, he will be seen as prejudiced. So I think he will have, and is having, difficulties,’ Greenstock explained. He went further, dismissing the entire Board of Peace as an ‘abstract and arbitrary committee’ structurally incapable of shouldering the weight of the high-stakes decisions required to resolve the future status of the Palestinian territories. ‘I don’t think the Board of Peace is a strong enough construct to bear the weight of the difficult decisions that are going to have to be made,’ he emphasized.

    The timeline of diplomatic activity confirms Blair travelled to Israel in mid-August alongside Jared Kushner, Trump’s son-in-law and senior political advisor, and Nickolay Mladenov, the board’s high representative for Gaza. The trio held closed-door, high-stakes talks with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who has already rejected the board’s proposed postwar roadmap for Gaza. Following the Israel meetings, the delegation travelled to Cairo to meet with a proposed Palestinian technocratic interim government that would take control of Gaza post-conflict, as well as representatives of Hamas.

    Greenstock’s criticism extends far beyond the Board of Peace and Blair’s role. In a sharp rebuke to Britain’s new Prime Minister Andy Burnham, the former envoy urged the UK government to stand firm on principle in its Middle East policy, questioning the contradiction of British support for Ukraine in the face of illegal Russian invasion, while failing to hold Israel accountable for its actions in occupied Palestinian territories. ‘How can Andy Burnham go to Kyiv and support President Zelensky because the Russians invaded Ukraine illegally against United Nations principles, to be condemned around the world for going against the United Nations Charter, and not stand up for justice in the Middle East in the Arab-Israel question?’ Greenstock asked.

    He called for a full review of British arms sales to Israel, and argued that under international law, the UK is obligated to arrest both Netanyahu and former Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant if they enter British territory, as both men face active arrest warrants from the International Criminal Court. ‘We’re under an obligation through our treaty position in the UN and through our support for the statute of the ICC. I think as far as the ICC is concerned, and if anybody who had been indicted by the judges of the ICC, they should be arrested,’ he stated.

    Greenstock also outlined his analysis of Netanyahu’s long-term strategic goals, arguing the Israeli prime minister is acting to fulfill a promise to his late father, historian Benzion Netanyahu, to annex the entire West Bank (referred to by Israelis as Judea and Samaria) and bring it under permanent Israeli sovereignty. He said Netanyahu saw the October 7, 2023 attacks as a unique opportunity to advance that goal.

    Turning to broader trends in global power and the ongoing regional conflict, Greenstock warned Israeli citizens that their country is rapidly losing soft power influence across the globe, a shift that will have long-term consequences for Israeli security. He emphasized that lasting peace can only come through compromise with regional actors, noting that military solutions to long-standing political disputes have repeatedly failed in the modern era. ‘If I was an Israeli citizen, I would worry that my country was losing soft power appeal around the world. It matters in the long term, and it matters for peace and security in the Middle East that there should be some sense of compromise,’ he said.

    Greenstock, who served as a senior coalition official in Iraq immediately after the 2003 invasion, reflected on his firsthand experience with U.S. foreign policy, arguing that America’s overreliance on hard power has led to repeated military failures across the Middle East over the past two decades. He noted that since the 1999 Kosovo conflict, neither the U.S. nor the UK has achieved a decisive, lasting victory in any military intervention, a trend he attributes to a fundamental misunderstanding of modern power dynamics. ‘We are in a world now where power has been diffused in all sorts of ways. And soft power has become more important. The capacity to persuade rather than compel has become extremely important… The legitimacy of using weaponry to force your will has become diminished in world opinion,’ he explained.

    On the recent U.S.-Israeli strikes on Iran, Greenstock argued the Trump administration failed to adequately plan for the consequences of the attack, miscalculating Iran’s asymmetric military capabilities, including its ability to disrupt global oil trade through the Strait of Hormuz. He also suggested the timing of the strike was not accidental, noting it aligned with growing domestic political pressure on Trump over the Jeffrey Epstein files and multiple legal challenges facing his administration. ‘It’s not an accident that the timing of that attack on Iran might have been affected by things that were happening domestically,’ he said.

    Greenstock also addressed the recent Mecca Agreement signed by Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan, framing the pact as a clear response to growing Arab and Muslim distrust of U.S. leadership in the region. He explained that two key factors have eroded confidence in U.S. leadership: the repeated failure of U.S. hard power to deliver stable political outcomes in the Middle East, and the Trump administration’s explicit prioritization of ‘Make America Great Again’ domestic interests over the needs and priorities of U.S. allies in the region.

    Looking at the broader shift in global diplomacy, Greenstock noted that the core moral and legal principles enshrined in the UN Charter are increasingly being set aside in favor of unilateral pursuit of narrow national interest, a shift that has reshaped Middle Eastern politics more than any other region. Today, he argued, there is no shared framework of principles guiding regional negotiation, unlike the cooperative security model developed in Europe after the Cold War.

    Contextualizing the reported textbook demand, recent weeks have seen multiple high-profile actions advancing the erasure of ‘Palestine’ from public life. Just days before Greenstock’s interview, Israeli authorities began imposing their national curriculum on more than 45,000 Palestinian students in state-run East Jerusalem schools, part of a broader crackdown on Palestinian education in the occupied city. Earlier this year, UNRWA Lebanon, the UN agency for Palestinian refugees that Israel has banned from operating, faced intense pressure that forced it to replace the word ‘Palestine’ with ‘West Bank’ and ‘Gaza Strip’ on sixth-grade geography maps, a move that sparked widespread protests and strikes across Palestinian communities. That pressure came even after an independent review led by former French Foreign Minister Catherine Colonna found no evidence to support Israeli claims that UNRWA staff participate in terrorist organizations.

    In the United Kingdom, a cross-party group of members of Parliament has recently called for a formal investigation into the British Museum’s decision to remove references to ‘Palestine’, ‘Palestinian’ and ‘Israelite occupation’ from its public displays. An investigation by Middle East Eye confirmed the museum’s decision came directly in response to targeted lobbying by pro-Israel activists between October and December 2024.

    Since the October 2024 ceasefire brokered by the U.S. that established the Board of Peace, violence has continued unabated in Gaza. Israel has carried out repeated air and drone strikes across the enclave, killing at least 1,300 Palestinians and wounding more than 4,000. Just this week, at least seven rapid air strikes hit an area west of Gaza City, followed by drone attacks on any moving person in the area, local reports confirm. While Hamas and other Palestinian factions have agreed to a disarmament plan as part of the ceasefire framework, Israel has refused to withdraw its forces from Gaza until the disarmament process is fully completed.