Global Pulse

标签： Asia

亚洲

  • While helping African farmers, China’s not funding food processing

    While helping African farmers, China’s not funding food processing

    Over the past two and a half decades, Chinese institutional lending for African agriculture has grown steadily, but a new academic study reveals critical gaps in how this funding is allocated that hinder long-term agricultural modernization across the continent. Authored by Adrino Mazenda, a senior researcher and associate professor of economic management sciences at the University of Pretoria, the study breaks down the distribution, priorities, and limitations of China’s agricultural development finance in Africa.

    Between 2000 and 2024, the research documents 41 distinct Chinese-funded agricultural loans across Africa, totaling an estimated $2.26 billion. Geographically, Southern African nations including Angola, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Mozambique have received the largest share of these loans, followed by East African countries (Ethiopia, Kenya, and Tanzania), West African markets (Nigeria and Ghana), and Egypt in North Africa.

    When it comes to project priorities, Chinese agricultural funding is heavily concentrated in core production-facing activities. Nearly 36% of total lending goes toward large-scale farm schemes, while fisheries projects account for 29%. Additional major allocations support irrigation systems, agricultural mechanization, and rural infrastructure. By contrast, investment in post-harvest and value-adding infrastructure remains minimal: cold-chain and general storage facilities make up just 3% of total lending, and agro-processing plants receive less than 2% of all committed funds.

    Structurally, the study notes that most large Chinese agricultural loans are channeled through government-affiliated agencies and non-sovereign entities, rather than directly to African national governments. It also emphasizes that agricultural funding makes up only a small fraction of China’s overall development finance portfolio for Africa, where transport, energy, and general infrastructure have consistently received far larger financial commitments.

    The research identifies two key shortcomings in the current lending model. First, the lack of investment in post-harvest processing, storage, connected transport networks, and market systems leaves African agricultural sectors unable to build fully robust, value-adding industries. Even as core production capacity expands, the absence of these critical links prevents smallholder farmers from accessing local and global supply chains, limiting the economic impact of increased output. Second, Chinese lending decisions are driven primarily by the practical viability of individual projects and the credentials of loan applicants, rather than alignment with a broader strategic vision for continent-wide or national agricultural transformation. This approach follows a broader pattern among Chinese lenders, which prioritize deliverable stand-alone projects over systemic sector development.

    This gap comes at a critical moment for African agriculture. Many African nations lack the domestic capital needed to fund the full scope of infrastructure and systems required to modernize their agricultural sectors, making international development finance a critical resource. For agriculture to deliver sustained economic growth and improved food security across the continent, transformation requires more than just increased crop production: it demands integrated investment in market access, agricultural research, extension services, and institutions that connect small producers to regional and global buyers. While China’s current funding has successfully expanded production capacity, it falls short of supporting this full systemic transformation, per the study’s findings.

    Mazenda outlines clear actionable solutions to improve the long-term impact of Chinese agricultural lending. First, he argues that the long-term value of Chinese finance will depend not just on the total volume of investment, but on whether future lending prioritizes integrated value chain development that connects production, processing, storage, and markets. Investing solely in isolated production infrastructure is unlikely to deliver the transformative changes needed to build a more productive and competitive African agricultural sector.

    Second, African national governments have a key role to play in reshaping financing partnerships. They can negotiate for funding packages that align with national long-term agricultural development strategies, rather than accepting disconnected stand-alone projects. Targeted increased investment in storage facilities, agro-processing plants, cold-chain networks, integrated transport, agricultural research, extension services, and market development will strengthen value chains and amplify the long-term benefits of external finance. Governments should also improve interdepartmental coordination between agriculture, finance, and planning agencies to ensure external lending aligns with national priorities, and increase transparency around borrowing and project implementation to boost public accountability.

    Finally, international development partners including Chinese lenders can adjust their financing models to integrate production with post-harvest infrastructure and market access, allowing investment to generate broader, more inclusive economic benefits across African economies. As climate change, rapid population growth, and persistent food insecurity put growing pressure on African food systems, the question of whether development finance is structured to deliver long-term systemic value, rather than short-term project outcomes, has grown increasingly urgent. Building productive, competitive, and resilient agricultural systems will require intentional, integrated investment that addresses the gaps exposed by this new research.

  • Thousands still missing as Nepal-Tibet flood relief and recovery intensifies

    Thousands still missing as Nepal-Tibet flood relief and recovery intensifies

    It has been seven days since a catastrophic glacial-collapse-triggered flash flood tore through the cross-border Himalayan valley along the Nepal-Tibet boundary, leaving a trail of widespread destruction and a massive number of unaccounted-for people as rescue teams race against time to locate any remaining survivors before shifting fully to recovery operations.

    Official death tolls released by relevant authorities paint a grim picture of the disaster’s impact. Nepal’s national disaster management agency confirms that at least 1,114 people have lost their lives across Nepali territory, with close to 4,000 more still listed as missing. On the Tibetan side of the border, Chinese state media reports 16 confirmed fatalities and more than 500 people unaccounted for, with no survivors reported to date even as search work continues.

    Access to the full scope of damage in Tibet remains limited, as the Chinese government maintains strict travel restrictions for foreign journalists in the region, meaning all public information about the disaster there comes exclusively through official state media outlets. While Beijing has confirmed the devastation along the border, few detailed updates on victim identities or the full impact on local rural communities have been released to the global public. In a positive development for cross-border search efforts, however, Chinese state media reports that round-the-clock work using heavy equipment has succeeded in clearing debris and reopening the key Gyirong border crossing route, a step expected to speed up search operations moving forward.

    In Nepal, one of the most urgent ongoing search priorities focuses on hundreds of workers believed to be trapped inside the tunnels of local hydroelectric power stations, which were inundated when the floodwaters swept through the valley. To date, roughly 12,000 people have been pulled from affected areas and brought to safety, but thousands more remain missing – including hundreds of foreign nationals from countries including India, the United Kingdom, Australia, the United States, and Malaysia, among others. As the first week since the disaster passes, aid officials and communities are increasingly bracing for the confirmed death toll to rise significantly in coming days.

    International and cross-border support has been deployed to assist in the response, with technical and operational experts from both China and India on site helping to construct temporary bridges that will allow rescue teams to reach cut-off remote communities. Drones are also being deployed to conduct aerial scans of hard-to-reach terrain in search of any signs of life from missing people.

    The United Nations’ Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs confirmed this week that the disaster response has now entered a new phase, with national and local authorities ramping up both relief distribution and recovery work. The biggest ongoing challenge facing responders remains access to affected areas: more than 40 bridges along critical transport routes were destroyed by the surging floodwaters, leaving the most isolated communities dependent on army helicopter flights to receive even basic food and supplies. Many villages still face critical shortages of fuel and electricity a week after the flood hit.

    The human displacement crisis stemming from the disaster is also growing in Nepal. Authorities report that nearly 3,500 people have been left homeless by the flood, with most currently housed in 27 emergency displacement sites across the hard-hit Nuwakot and Rasuwa districts. The majority of these sites are repurposed school buildings, which has disrupted access to education for thousands of local children.

    For displaced survivors and affected communities, the United Nations outlines core immediate priorities: access to life-saving humanitarian aid, recovery of remains to allow for proper burials, systematic tracing of missing relatives, reunification of children separated from their families during the flood, and access to specialized psychosocial support to help communities process the trauma of the disaster.

    Aid officials warn of growing secondary health risks in the wake of the flood, particularly as the disaster unfolded in the middle of Nepal’s annual monsoon season. Overcrowded emergency shelters, contaminated drinking water supplies, and damaged local health facilities have combined to create a heightened risk of infectious disease outbreaks among displaced populations.

    Nepali Prime Minister Balendra Shah has reaffirmed the national government’s commitment to prioritizing survivor protection, emergency medical care, and mental health support for those affected by the disaster. In a coordinated response to the crisis, the government of Nepal and the United Nations have jointly launched a four-month emergency humanitarian flash appeal to raise funding for ongoing relief and recovery efforts across the country’s affected districts.

  • Tugboat sinks off South Korea’s southern coast, leaving 1 dead and 6 missing

    Tugboat sinks off South Korea’s southern coast, leaving 1 dead and 6 missing

    A maritime disaster unfolded off the southeastern shore of South Korea on Wednesday, when a 286-ton tugboat overturned and ultimately sank, claiming one life and leaving six crew members unaccounted for, according to official statements from the South Korean Coast Guard.

    The ill-fated vessel set out on Wednesday morning on a routine mission to tow a cargo merchant ship, with a total of eight crew members on board. Its voyage through the waters near Busan, one of South Korea’s busiest port cities, ended in sudden catastrophe when it flipped unexpectedly.

    In the immediate aftermath of the overturn, one Indonesian crew member was pulled from the water by the nearby merchant vessel the tugboat had been heading to assist, and emerged physically unharmed. Rescuers from the coast guard later recovered a second crew member, a South Korean national, who was found unresponsive. The sailor was airlifted to a mainland hospital for urgent treatment, but medical teams were unable to revive him and he was pronounced dead shortly after arrival.

    As search efforts entered their first full day, the South Korean Coast Guard and national Navy have deployed a large-scale search and rescue contingent, including dozens of surface vessels, fixed-wing surveillance aircraft, and diving teams to comb the area where the tugboat sank for the six missing crew. South Korean President Lee Jae Myung has issued explicit orders to relevant response agencies, directing them to mobilize every available resource to speed up search operations and leave no stone unturned in efforts to locate the missing.

    Official records confirm the tugboat slipped beneath the surface around 3:30 p.m. local time, which is 0630 GMT, roughly two hours after the first distress report of the capsizing was received. At this early stage of the investigation, maritime officials have not yet confirmed what triggered the capsizing, and a full probe into the incident is already underway to determine root causes and rule out any safety negligence.

  • UK aid worker says he was mistaken for survivor in Nepal

    UK aid worker says he was mistaken for survivor in Nepal

    In the wake of catastrophic flash floods that swept through Nepal and neighboring Tibet last week, leaving a devastating trail of death and displacement, a British aid volunteer has found himself at the center of an unexpected administrative mix-up that saw him incorrectly identified as a rescued survivor.

    Alastair Chambers, a 45-year-old aid worker hailing from Gloucester, had traveled to Nepal just days after the disaster struck to deliver critical humanitarian support to hard-hit, cut-off communities. His mission brought him to remote settlements near the Trishuli River, where he worked alongside local volunteers to distribute life-saving essentials including sleeping bags, food, and water purification equipment to residents stranded by collapsed bridges and damaged infrastructure.

    After completing an aid distribution mission to the affected region, Chambers flew back to Nepal’s capital Kathmandu aboard a humanitarian relief helicopter and landed at a local army barracks. When a police officer approached to collect his personal information in line with post-disaster check-in protocols, Chambers complied with the request—unaware that officials would incorrectly categorize him as a survivor pulled from the flood zone.

    The mix-up quickly gained official traction, when Nepali authorities announced on Tuesday that 119 people, including one British national, had been rescued via air operations. In the hours that followed, Chambers was flooded with inquiries from nearly 15 journalists reaching out to check on his condition after his supposed rescue, forcing him to clarify the error repeatedly.

    “It’s been a bit of a weird one, really,” Chambers told the Press Association in an interview. “I got dropped off at the army barracks, and when I got dropped off one of the police officers came up to me and asked for my details. Then they presumed that I’d been rescued… I had to say: ‘Well sorry, I haven’t been rescued.’”

    The flash flood disaster has already claimed more than 1,000 lives across Nepal and Tibet, with more than 3,900 people still unaccounted for as of this week. In the UK, the Foreign Office has updated its count of missing British nationals in Nepal, raising the figure from 33 to 36, Under-Secretary of State Lord Wood of Anfield confirmed to the House of Lords this week. The Foreign Office declined to comment further when contacted for this report.

    Chambers, a former local councillor, described the brutal conditions on the ground in affected areas, where landslides and fallen trees block most overland routes. What would normally be a 90-minute road journey from Kathmandu to the flood zone now takes between eight and nine hours to complete by air and ground transport. During his deployment, Chambers and his aid team even had to scramble up a nearby mountainside after a secondary flood scare, though the incoming water surge was smaller than the initial devastating flood. Once the water receded, the team returned to continue their work, which includes locating the remains of flood victims alongside delivering aid.

    “It’s quite dangerous, and we’ve got a lot of landslides, trees across the roads in front of us,” he said. “It’s been quite challenging, but it’s been very rewarding as well.”

    Looking ahead, Chambers plans to return to the UK in the coming days to launch a fundraising campaign for the destroyed villages he has been supporting. Once he has collected enough donations and supplies, he intends to return to Nepal to deliver additional essential goods and install solar-powered lighting systems for communities that have lost access to electricity.

    Separately, UK official diplomatic engagement with Nepal on flood recovery is ramping up this week. Baroness Winterton, Minister for the Indo-Pacific, will travel to Kathmandu for talks Wednesday through Thursday, where she will meet with Nepali government representatives, United Nations officials, UK embassy staff, and members of the UK’s rapid deployment team that is supporting families of affected British nationals. Back in London, Foreign Office minister Stephen Doughty will meet with members of the British-Nepali community on Wednesday to discuss what support is available for those impacted by the disaster.

  • Why do US troops have history with this Thai city?

    Why do US troops have history with this Thai city?

    Nestled along Thailand’s eastern Gulf coast, the sun-drenched resort city of Pattaya is globally known today for its bustling, often raucous nightlife and booming tourism industry. But few first-time visitors recognize that the city’s modern identity was fundamentally shaped by the presence of U.S. military personnel decades ago, a historical link that continues to echo through the city’s social and economic landscape today. In a recent retrospective analysis, BBC Southeast Asia correspondent Jonathan Head has traced the deep roots of this unexpected connection between American troops and the Thai coastal community.

    The story of this relationship dates back to the Vietnam War era, when conflict raged across Indochina and thousands of U.S. service members were granted rest and relaxation (R&R) leave away from frontline combat zones. With its tropical climate, affordable amenities, and proximity to Vietnam, Pattaya emerged as one of the most popular destinations for these troops looking to decompress after months of combat duty. Between the 1960s and early 1970s, tens of thousands of American GIs passed through the city’s quiet fishing villages and small local businesses, transforming the sleepy coastal settlement almost overnight.

    Before the arrival of U.S. troops, Pattaya was little more than a remote fishing outpost with a small local population. The sudden influx of American service members created immediate demand for accommodation, food, entertainment, and other services. Local entrepreneurs quickly pivoted from fishing and small-scale agriculture to catering to the needs and wants of visiting troops, laying the foundation for the massive tourism industry that drives Pattaya’s economy today.

    Head notes that the legacy of this era is complicated. On one hand, it created the economic spark that turned a little-known coastal spot into one of Thailand’s top tourist destinations, a status it retains more than half a century later. On the other hand, the concentration of troops seeking entertainment also shaped the city’s reputation for adult-oriented nightlife that still defines its public image for many travelers today. As modern Pattaya works to rebrand itself as a family-friendly destination and diversify its tourism offerings, the historical echoes of the U.S. troop era remain visible everywhere, from the bars along Walking Street to the enduring cross-cultural connections forged decades ago.

  • War has shifted how power works in Iran

    War has shifted how power works in Iran

    On August 19, the United States announced what it framed as an economic “D-Day” for Iran: a new round of sweeping financial restrictions tightened around Iranian ports, designed to deliver decisive pressure that would force Tehran to bend to Washington’s demands. But inside Iran, the move was interpreted through a very different lens: it served as definitive proof that the U.S. continues to prioritize coercive pressure over any lasting negotiated settlement that it would actually uphold.

    Across Iran’s deeply fragmented political landscape, where consensus on almost any major issue is rare, this reading of Washington’s latest move was strikingly uniform. Economic advisors working to stabilize Iran’s economy under President Masoud Pezeshkian viewed the new sanctions as a clear breach of prior implicit agreements by the U.S. For commanders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) led by Major General Ahmad Vahidi, the escalation vindicated their long-standing warnings that Washington cannot be trusted to keep its word.

    This latest action has eroded whatever fragile faith remained in Iran that the U.S. is genuinely willing to strike a viable deal, and that collapsing trust is now reshaping every red line Tehran is willing to accept in any future talks. It is critical to recognize that Iran’s political leadership is currently debating existential questions about the core survival strategy of the Islamic Republic, a debate that no longer fits the outdated framing of reformists versus principlists, or moderates against hardliners. Instead, the real contest pits two loyal, competing camps against one another: one that argues the regime can best survive by converting its wartime leverage into tangible economic and diplomatic gains, and another that insists long-term survival depends on maintaining permanent confrontation with the West. This shared loyalty to the state, paired with deeply divergent views on survival, makes the internal debate far more intractable than conventional framing suggests.

    Compounding this complexity is the decentralized structure of modern Iranian power, which today functions best as a network state rather than the rigid vertical hierarchy associated with former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. While Khamenei’s son Mojtaba Khamenei occupies the formal top position and shapes outcomes primarily through key appointments – having installed founding IRGC member Mohsen Rezaee as his representative on the Supreme National Security Council, and rebuilding the Supreme Leader’s office (the Bayt, long the true center of Iranian power) around loyalists such as chief of staff Mahdi Khamoushi – he rules as a balance-keeper rather than an ultimate decider. He intentionally avoids allowing any single power center to dominate the system, leaving authority spread across multiple nodes of the security and political establishment. Rezaee coordinates national strategy from the security council, Vahidi controls the regime’s military muscle ranging from ballistic missile forces to naval operations in the Strait of Hormuz, Parliamentary Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf mediates between legislative bodies and security institutions, Pezeshkian’s civilian administration manages the struggling economy, and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghhi handles diplomatic outreach abroad. No single leader holds consolidated control over all these domains.

    Even this decentralized balance is shifting, however. Sustained confrontation with Washington has pulled power toward centralization even in a system built to spread it. The longer the standoff with the U.S. drags on, the more the IRGC has evolved from simply the most powerful single node in the network into the de facto effective decision-maker for the state. While the IRGC still lacks the capacity to singlehandedly run the economy, manage diplomacy, and maintain clerical legitimacy – forcing it to govern through a cross-factional coalition rather than seizing direct control – prolonged conflict steadily erodes that arrangement. Over time, nearly all major policy decisions become tied to the confrontation, shifting more authority to the security establishment.

    Iran’s current approach to a potential negotiated exit from the crisis is defined by a spectrum of factional positions, rather than a binary hardline-moderate split. At one end of the spectrum are the economic stabilizers surrounding Pezeshkian and Araghchi, who argue that the current prolonged stalemate is unsustainable and prioritize securing sanctions relief, unfreezing blocked Iranian assets, and ending the port blockade. Next are the pragmatic sovereigntists led by Ghalibaf and Rezaei, long-time regime insiders who agree that diplomacy is the only viable exit from the crisis, but reject any deal that would force Iran to give up its strategic autonomy. This camp will only enter negotiations from a position of strength, and insists that Iran’s ballistic missile program and its regional network of allied proxies remain completely off the negotiating table.

    Further along the spectrum are the security-first coercionists centered on Vahidi and the IRGC leadership, who view diplomacy as a tactical tool that must always remain subordinate to military leverage. At the far end of the spectrum are the ideological rejectionists of the Paydari Front and Saeed Jalili’s political network, who see any agreement with Washington as outright surrender. This faction functions primarily as a spoiler, able to drastically raise the political cost for any other faction that pursues a deal.

    Contrary to common external misperceptions, this internal disagreement is not a sign of Iranian state dysfunction. It is a deliberate debate over existential questions of statecraft, and what is most notable is not the depth of division between factions, but the broad consensus that has emerged on core fundamentals. Without any formal public announcement, most factions across the spectrum have agreed that some form of negotiation is the only viable path out of the current crisis. The economic stabilizers want a deal to rescue Iran’s collapsing economy; the pragmatic sovereigntists want a deal to lock in the strategic gains Iran has made through years of regional confrontation; even the IRGC has signaled it wants its own channel for talks, as confirmed by recent reports that the Trump administration has relayed messages directly to IRGC leadership via Iraqi Kurdistan.

    The debate is therefore no longer over whether to negotiate at all. Instead, it centers on the terms and conditions Iran will demand, and how the regime can strengthen its position before committing to any irreversible agreement.

    For Washington, the key takeaway is clear: every new round of sanctions escalation – every new economic “D-Day” – plays directly into the hands of the ideological rejectionists, who argue that permanent confrontation with the U.S. and Israel is unavoidable. At the same time, it weakens the very factions that have worked against steep odds to push the Iranian system toward the negotiating table.

    By opening direct talks with the IRGC, former President (and current U.S. presidential candidate) Donald Trump has recognized that there is a unique opportunity to extract the U.S. from a self-created diplomatic quagmire. But for that opportunity to succeed, he must not allow personal political or diplomatic ego to undermine the painstaking work of mediators working to build a path to talks.

  • Trump warns Iran of ‘biggest attack of them all’

    Trump warns Iran of ‘biggest attack of them all’

    On a Tuesday marked by escalating Middle Eastern tensions, former President Donald Trump delivered a stark, unprecedented threat to Iran just hours after the United States military restarted offensive bombing operations targeting positions linked to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) within Iranian territory.

    In a public post shared to his Truth Social platform, Trump preemptively warned the Iranian government against any retaliatory action for the U.S. airstrikes. “If the failed Nation of Iran retaliates for this very justified attack, they will be hit again at a much harder and higher level,” the post read. Trump went on to amplify the threat, adding, “it will not be the biggest attack of them all, that is waiting in the wings and, when it is over, there will be very little left of the Islamic Republic of Iran!”

    Contrary to Trump’s attempt at intimidation, Iran did not back down from responding. The Associated Press confirmed on the same Tuesday that Iran launched a coordinated counter-strike of missiles and drones against U.S. assets immediately following the American bombing campaign.

    The escalatory exchange comes one day after a Oval Office press interaction, when a reporter asked Trump whether he would entertain the use of nuclear weapons against Iran. At that time, Trump appeared to explicitly rule out such a drastic step, calling the question itself foolish. “There’s no reason for it,” Trump told reporters. “What a stupid question that is, actually. Here they are, they’re totally defeated militarily, so now I defeat them and now I should use a nuclear weapon on top of them?”

    This is not the first time Trump has issued extreme threats against the Iranian government. Back in April, Trump issued an similarly drastic ultimatum, warning that “a whole civilization will die tonight, never to be brought back again” unless Iran unconditionally surrendered to U.S. demands. In a notable reversal, Trump backed away from that threat within hours, agreeing to a temporary ceasefire deal that has since expired.

    Despite Trump’s past pattern of walking back aggressive rhetoric, one risk analyst is warning that the latest threats should not be dismissed out of hand. Brett Erickson, managing partner at Obsidian Risk Advisors, noted in his own Tuesday social media post that the current situation carries new risks. “Throughout this entire war, I have been incredibly skeptical of any claims that President Trump is so much as DISCUSSING the use of nuclear weapons,” Erickson wrote. “This reads to me clear as day that they are on the table now.”

  • South Korea jails disabled care home head for sexually assaulting residents

    South Korea jails disabled care home head for sexually assaulting residents

    A high-profile sexual abuse case at a South Korean disabled care home has sent shockwaves across the country, resulting in a 15-year prison sentence for the facility’s former director and triggering urgent nationwide reviews of residential care services for people with disabilities. The convicted individual, identified only by his surname Kim, was found guilty of sexually assaulting three residents of the Saekdongwon care facility, located in Incheon City, approximately 30 kilometers west of the national capital Seoul. The investigation into Kim’s actions was only launched after one of his victims, a woman living with a severe intellectual disability, stepped forward to report the abuse in February of last year. In the wake of Kim’s conviction, a deeper investigation commissioned by local Ganghwa County authorities uncovered disturbing new findings: as many as 20 current and former female residents of the facility may have been targeted for sexual abuse over the course of Kim’s tenure. The revelation has sparked intense public outrage and widespread questioning across South Korea, particularly given the country strengthened legal protections for people with disabilities against sexual violence back in 2011. Many members of the public and advocacy groups have raised critical questions about systemic failures that allowed Kim’s harmful actions to remain hidden from authorities for years. In response to the scandal, local regulators have taken swift administrative action: Ganghwa County has ordered Saekdongwon to permanently cease operations, while Incheon City officials have revoked the operating license of the non-profit foundation that ran the facility. To protect the well-being of the facility’s current residents, the closure has been delayed until all residents can be safely relocated to appropriate alternative care arrangements and supported transition to independent living, where applicable. The affected foundation has pushed back against the regulatory action, however, filing an administrative lawsuit to challenge the revocation of its operating license. Following the outbreak of the scandal, the South Korean national government launched an urgent inspection of all 1,507 residential disabled care facilities operating across the country. Preliminary results from that sweeping review uncovered 33 separate suspected cases of abuse across the nation’s care system, pointing to broader systemic issues that require policy intervention. South Korean Prime Minister Kim Min-seok has called the abuse at Saekdongwon an unprecedented moral failure, describing the incident as “a grave matter that calls into question the very reason for the state’s existence”, underscoring the severity with which national authorities view the scandal.

  • Some missing tourists make contact as Nepal flood death toll tops 1,100

    Some missing tourists make contact as Nepal flood death toll tops 1,100

    It has been seven full days since a catastrophic glacial outburst flood tore through cross-border regions of Nepal and southern Tibet, leaving a devastating trail of destruction that has claimed at least 1,118 lives and left thousands more unaccounted for. As rescue teams continue to navigate debris-choked terrain to reach cut-off disaster zones, officials confirmed Wednesday that several previously missing foreign tourists have reconnected with authorities, offering a sliver of good news amid widespread tragedy.

    The disaster unfolded on August 26, when a glacial collapse in the Himalayan mountain range sent a massive surge of ice, rock, and glacial meltwater roaring into downstream river valleys. The powerful flood surge coursed through river systems spanning Tibet Autonomous Region in China and Nepal, triggering rapid, extreme river rises that swept away entire settlements, roads, bridges, and critical infrastructure, leaving mud and boulders in their wake. As of Sunday, Chinese authorities had recorded 16 fatalities and 546 people missing from the disaster on their side of the border, while Nepali officials have confirmed 1,118 deaths and more than 3,900 people still unaccounted for across Nepali territory.

    According to Nepal’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 324 foreign nationals have been evacuated and rescued from affected areas so far. But roughly 590 people from 39 different countries remain missing, one week on from the flood disaster.

    Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese, who was attending a regional leaders’ summit in Palau on Wednesday, confirmed that five additional Australian citizens had been confirmed safe overnight, bringing the number of missing Australians down from 43 to 38. “Amidst all of this tragedy, we are seeing some positive news. Today, another five Australians have been confirmed safe,” Albanese told reporters. “We hope, of course, for positive news further, and we’re doing everything we can to work with [Nepali] authorities,” he added.

    Sunil Sharma, spokesperson for the Nepal Tourism Board, noted that at least five other foreign tourists previously listed as missing have also made contact with local authorities via email or phone in recent days.

    On the Chinese side of the Nepal-China border, rescue teams have made critical progress clearing access to the disaster site at Gyirong Port, which was completely washed away when the flood surge hit. China’s state broadcaster CCTV reported Wednesday that crews have finished constructing a makeshift access road to the crossing, allowing heavy search and rescue machinery to move into the area. The original road leading to the border crossing was destroyed and buried under a layer of flood-borne water, mud, and rock debris, cutting off the site for days after the disaster.

    As search efforts continue, hundreds of displaced survivors have fled the flood zone to find temporary shelter in Nepal’s capital city of Kathmandu. Roughly 400 people, most hailing from Timure, a town located approximately 110 kilometers west of the capital, are currently being housed at the Yellow Gumba monastery. There, survivors grieve for lost family members and destroyed homes, supporting one another as they wait for long-term relief. The shelter operation is organized by local residents and family members of survivors, with food and emergency supplies donated by individual givers and local charitable organizations.

    Among the survivors sheltering at the monastery is 21-year-old Riya Tamang, who fled her home with her 10-month-old child as floodwaters approached her community. Tamang, who lost both of her grandparents to the flood, shared that her husband, who works as a cook in Gyirong town on the Chinese side of the border, survived the disaster. The couple now stays connected through daily video calls as they navigate the aftermath of the disaster together. “I was the last one to leave the house. It was so difficult to escape,” Tamang said.

    This report included contributions from Associated Press journalists Rod McGuirk in Melbourne, Australia and Huizhong Wu in Bangkok, Thailand.

  • German companies under pressure to adapt as China challenges them at their own game

    German companies under pressure to adapt as China challenges them at their own game

    For decades, Germany’s economic identity has been built on a reliable growth model: manufacturing and exporting high-value, complex industrial goods — from passenger cars and locomotives to factory equipment, aircraft and construction machinery — that power global commerce. Today, that foundational model is facing unprecedented pressure from a new, formidable competitor: China, whose finished manufactured goods now match or near German quality levels while hitting the market at far lower price points.

    This shift, widely dubbed the “China shock” by economic analysts, has emerged as a core driver of the chronic stagnation that has gripped Europe’s largest economy since the COVID-19 pandemic. The prolonged slowdown has dragged down approval ratings for Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s governing coalition, just days ahead of a pivotal regional election in Germany’s eastern state of Saxony-Anhalt, where the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) stands its best chance ever to claim its first state governorship.

    Not long ago, German industrial giants reaped substantial profits from sales into China’s vast growing market. But the tide has turned dramatically. Beijing’s industrial policy strategically targets and supports domestic manufacturing in exactly the sectors where German firms have long dominated. With domestic demand stuck in a prolonged slump in China, surplus Chinese goods are flooding foreign markets, including the European Union.

    Germany’s economy has now gone years without meaningful expansion: it contracted in both 2023 and 2024, posting just 0.2% overall growth over the last year. While the country’s 4% unemployment rate remains lower than the European Union average, the public mood has soured sharply amid a wave of high-profile layoffs at iconic domestic manufacturers that have defined Germany’s industrial legacy for decades. Automotive giant Volkswagen is cutting 50,000 positions, with local media reporting more cuts are planned; BMW is offering 8,000 voluntary buyouts by the end of next year; and leading auto tech supplier Bosch is eliminating 13,000 roles by 2030. Post-pandemic inflation has also outpaced wage growth for years, with real wages only just returning to 2019 levels in 2024.

    Volkswagen CFO Arno Antlitz summed up the pressure facing manufacturers, noting costs must be cut “in an environment where the Chinese total market is down by 20%, and Chinese competitors are increasing exports and thereby competitive pressure in Europe.”

    Among the world’s major advanced economies, Germany has borne the brunt of this shift. Unlike the U.S., which uses tariffs to block many categories of Chinese goods, most notably automobiles, Germany’s economy is heavily geared toward exports of the very manufactured goods China now prioritizes for growth. Peer major European economies including France, Italy and the U.K. have far smaller manufacturing export sectors, leaving them less exposed.

    Today, Germany imports more from China than it exports in every sector where German firms once claimed global leadership: passenger and commercial vehicles, rail rolling stock, aircraft, industrial machinery, and medical devices. “China has already eaten much of German industry’s lunch and is preparing to start on dinner,” economists Brad Setser and Sander Tordoir wrote in a recent analysis.

    Some German firms have chosen the pragmatic approach: if you can’t beat Chinese competitors, partner with them. Moosburg-based Jungheinrich AG, one of the world’s top three manufacturers of forklifts and warehouse logistics vehicles, has launched a joint venture with Chinese manufacturer EP Equipment to produce a new line of entry-level forklifts branded AntOn, designed to match Chinese rivals on price. The partnership combines EP’s large-scale, low-cost Chinese production with Jungheinrich’s global distribution network and trusted brand reputation.

    The AntOn lineup forgoes some premium features found in Jungheinrich’s exclusively German-made high-end models — it uses basic lever controls instead of modern joysticks, lacks built-in storage for personal electronics and wallets, and comes with an uncushioned seat — but meets core performance needs for customers that do not operate equipment 24/7, and retails for half the price of comparable premium machinery. To differentiate the new line, AntOn units are painted a distinctive bright purple, standing out from Jungheinrich’s signature yellow premium equipment.

    “The challenge is, there comes a massive wave with Chinese products and Chinese offerings into Europe, but also into the international markets. And the key question is, how do you react?” said Nadine Despineaux, Jungheinrich’s Chief Sales Officer, during an interview at the company’s Moosburg facility near Munich. Despineaux frames the growing demand for affordable mid-tech industrial equipment as an untapped opportunity, noting “AntOn is a good combination of German engineering, market access and customer proximity, which we bring to the table, and highly efficient production sites, which we use in China.”

    Volkswagen has taken a different approach, adopting an “in China, for China” strategy that includes opening a dedicated vehicle development center in Hefei to design models tailored specifically to Chinese consumer preferences.

    German policymakers, for their part, are keen to avoid repeating the collapse of the country’s domestic solar industry. Germany was an early pioneer of solar panel manufacturing and adoption in the early 2000s, but lower-cost Chinese imports drove most domestic producers into bankruptcy, and today nearly all solar panels used in Germany are imported from China.

    Critics point out that Chinese industrial policy provides targeted advantages to key domestic sectors, including low-cost access to credit, cheap raw materials, subsidized land, and local content requirements in some cases. Chinese manufacturing labor also costs far less than European labor, and many economists argue China maintains its currency at an artificially low exchange rate to keep export prices competitive.

    But China’s export strength is not solely a product of government support. Domestic Chinese companies face cutthroat price competition amid the country’s own ongoing domestic slowdown, forcing constant efficiency gains and rapid adoption of new manufacturing technology to stay afloat.

    Beijing rejects criticism from Western trading partners over its trade practices. A recent white paper from China’s Ministry of Commerce, titled “China’s Position on the So-Called Excess Capacity Issue,” argues that framing China’s industrial growth as a “China shock” falsely misrepresents the country’s development as a threat to Western economies.

    The German federal government has attempted to jumpstart growth with a €500 billion ($579 billion) infrastructure fund targeting upgrades to roads, bridges and rail networks. A July economic proposal also includes income tax cuts for middle- and low-income households, alongside broad measures to cut bureaucratic red tape for businesses.

    Yet leading analysts argue the solution to Germany’s China challenge may not rest with Berlin or German industry alone, but with EU trade policy overseen by the European Commission in Brussels. The Commission has already imposed targeted tariffs on specific Chinese imports, including electric vehicles and construction aerial work platforms. Setser, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, says trade data confirms the China shock is the single dominant driver of Germany’s current economic malaise, and calls for a more assertive EU trade approach.

    “We do think that Europe needs a tougher trade policy, that it needs to insulate its market from some of the spillovers from China’s own industrial policies,” Setser said. “There has to be a bit more symmetry … that the rest of the world will not remain open to a China that itself is not open to new imports.”