BEIJING – After more than seven decades resting far from their homeland, 12 Chinese People’s Volunteers (CPV) martyrs who fell during the 1950–1953 War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea will finally be brought back to Chinese soil this Wednesday, China’s Ministry of Veterans Affairs has announced. This scheduled handover marks the 13th repatriation conducted under a bilateral agreement between China and the Republic of Korea (ROK) that has allowed fallen heroes to return home for burial. Since the first repatriation operation launched in 2014, a total of 1,011 CPV remains have been transferred from the ROK to China, each recovery a quiet act of respect for the sacrifice these service members made more than 70 years ago. The long-running repatriation program reflects the shared commitment of both sides to honoring the war dead and upholding historical memory, giving fallen soldiers the homecoming they deserve decades after the end of the conflict.
标签: Asia
亚洲
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No delegation from Iran visits Islamabad, state television says, as talks speculation grows
DUBAI, United Arab Emirates – As swirling rumors of potential negotiations between Iran and the United States gained traction in regional and international policy circles, Iran’s state-owned television released an official on-screen statement Tuesday clarifying that no Iranian diplomatic delegation has traveled to Islamabad for discussions as of yet. This public correction comes amid a backdrop of rising internal tension within Iran’s theocratic leadership, which is grappling with how to respond to a recent high-seizure of an Iranian container vessel by the U.S. Navy over the weekend. For decades, Iran’s state television has remained under the direct control of hardline factions within the country’s ruling establishment, making its public messaging a key window into internal ideological divides. To date, no senior Iranian official has confirmed plans to dispatch a negotiating team to the Pakistani capital, where Pakistani officials have reportedly maintained preparedness for days in anticipation of the potential talks. U.S. officials have confirmed that Vice President JD Vance is tapped to lead the American delegation if talks move forward, while Iran has yet to announce any representative to head its side. The last time direct talks between the two nations occurred, Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf led Tehran’s delegation. Public discourse around resuming diplomatic talks with the U.S. remains entirely absent from official Iranian media and public government channels, with extreme hardline factions voicing strong public pushback against any renewed negotiations in recent days. This opposition has only hardened following the U.S. seizure of the Iranian container ship, a move that has escalated already heightened tensions between the two nations. Online, a growing campaign has called for Supreme Leader Ayatollah Mojtaba Khamenei to issue an official public statement clarifying his stance on whether the Islamic Republic should move forward with new talks. However, the newly installed supreme leader has not released any public comment, and no verified images of him have been published since the start of the ongoing conflict between Iran, Israel, and the United States. U.S. and Israeli intelligence officials have claimed Khamenei was wounded in an attack carried out earlier in the conflict. The absence of the supreme leader from public view has shifted governing power firmly toward Iran’s paramilitary Revolutionary Guard, the institution that has led much of Iran’s military operations throughout the ongoing conflict. Guard commanders have largely operated with limited oversight from central Tehran authorities when selecting targets and coordinating military actions, a dynamic that has only become more pronounced amid the current leadership vacuum. Iran’s civilian political leadership has remained largely silent on the issue of potential talks, a silence made more notable by a recent public misstatement from Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi. Over the weekend, Araghchi posted online that the Strait of Hormuz, the critical global oil chokepoint connecting the Persian Gulf to international open waters, had been reopened to full traffic – a claim that was immediately retracted and denied by other senior officials in Tehran. Since the U.S. and Israel launched coordinated military strikes against Iran on Feb. 28 that ignited the current open conflict, Tehran has restricted commercial vessel traffic through the strait, a move that has rippled through global energy markets. In response to Iran’s actions and ongoing pressure from hardline domestic factions, the U.S. has implemented a full naval blockade of major Iranian ports, further isolating the country’s economy and escalating the ongoing military standoff.
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PLA warns Japan after Strait transit
On the 131st anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Shimonoseki — the unequal agreement that saw Japan occupy Taiwan following the First Sino-Japanese War — a Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force destroyer completed a highly unusual 14-hour transit through the Taiwan Strait, a move Chinese military authorities and analysts have universally condemned as a premeditated, malicious provocation. China’s People’s Liberation Army has issued a resolute warning, stating it will not hesitate to take firm countermeasures if Tokyo continues its encroachment on Chinese sovereignty.
The vessel in question, the JS Ikazuchi, a older Murasame-class destroyer, made the extremely slow passage through the 370-kilometer strait on April 18, 2026. Military analysts note that a journey of this distance would normally take a fraction of the 14 hours the Japanese ship spent in the waterway, making any claim of “routine innocent passage” indefensible.
Song Zhongping, a retired PLA Rocket Force officer and prominent military affairs commentator, framed the slow transit as a deliberate show of force intended to embolden secessionist “Taiwan independence” forces. “This was by no means normal navigation,” Song explained. “It was an intentional display of military power and a targeted provocation, designed to send dangerous, encouraging signals to Taiwan separatists. By acting this way, Japan is only paving the way for its own consequences.”
Song further emphasized that even relative to the current PLA Navy, the decades-old Ikazuchi is an outdated vessel, noting that the Chinese military already holds overwhelming capability to neutralize any such provocation, and has only exercised maximum restraint to this point. That restraint will not hold indefinitely, however. “If Japan continues to escalate its provocations, or if other U.S. allies persist in similar acts of aggression, the PLA will not rule out taking decisive, resolute measures to end the threat,” Song said. He added that the long-held policy of refraining from firing the first shot is not an unchangeable principle: any incursion on China’s core national interests, sovereignty, and security in itself counts as the other side firing first, and will justify a full counterresponse. “When national interests are violated, firing the first shot becomes a fully legitimate option. Old scores and new wrongs will be settled together if Japan continues on its current path,” Song stressed.
China’s Ministry of National Defense formally confirmed on the same day as the transit that it had already lodged a strong official protest with Tokyo over the incident. Senior Colonel Zhang Xiaogang, the ministry’s spokesperson, said the Japanese warship’s actions sent a clear wrong signal to Taiwan’s secessionist camp, and would only strengthen the Chinese people’s resolve to push back against external interference. “The Chinese military maintains constant high alert, and will take all necessary firm measures to counter any outside meddling in our internal affairs,” Zhang said.
The PLA’s Eastern Theater Command, which is responsible for operations in the East China Sea and Taiwan region, also deployed coordinated naval and air assets to track and monitor the Japanese destroyer for the full duration of its transit, maintaining full operational control of the situation throughout the incident.
The deliberate timing of the transit — coming exactly 131 years after the 1895 signing of the Treaty of Shimonoseki that ceded Taiwan to Japanese colonial rule — sparked widespread public outrage among Chinese internet users. One Weibo user noted that the treaty left a permanent, deep national wound for China, calling the destroyer’s deliberate incursion a calculated test of China’s red lines on core sovereignty issues.
Fellow military analyst Wu Peinci pointed out that the transit aligns with Japan’s broader long-term strategy of pushing for constitutional revision, accelerating military expansion, and advancing its remilitarization, all in an effort to break free from the constraints of the post-WWII international order. “Japan is seeking to gradually establish a renewed military presence in the Taiwan Strait and even position itself to intervene militarily in the Taiwan question, which is an internal matter of China,” Wu said. “China will never compromise on this, will never allow a repeat of the history of Japanese invasion and humiliation, and leaves no room for ambiguity when it comes to blocking Japanese military meddling in the strait.”
In the days following the incident, official PLA media outlets published repeated clear warnings to Japan, cautioning that such provocative actions will carry catastrophic, irreversible consequences. An editorial on the PLA’s official WeChat account noted that Tokyo has already accelerated military deployments on its southern islands adjacent to Taiwan, and is now creating new instability by sending warships through the Taiwan Strait. “This makes clear the dangerous intent of certain Japanese politicians to interfere militarily in the Taiwan question,” the editorial read. “Japan must see the situation clearly, act with prudence, and immediately halt all reckless moves on the Taiwan question. If Tokyo persists in its wrongdoing and refuses to change course, it will only bring ruin upon itself and pay an unbearable price.”
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Legacy of Ping-Pong Diplomacy stands test of time
Half a century after a chance encounter on a team bus reshaped the course of modern international relations, participants and new generations alike are marking 55 years since the groundbreaking Ping-Pong Diplomacy that laid the groundwork for normalized relations between China and the United States.
On April 10, 2026, a commemorative event held in Beijing honored this historic milestone, while also launching a new series of sports exchange programs designed to connect young athletes from both countries. Attendees at the event even had the unique opportunity to test their table tennis skills against an AI-powered robot, blending the 1971 moment of diplomatic breakthrough with cutting-edge modern innovation. The event, first reported by China Daily, gathered veterans of the original exchange alongside rising young athletes to reflect on how far bilateral ties have come — and how the core mission of people-to-people connection remains just as vital.
Liang Geliang, now 75, was one of the youngest members of China’s national table tennis team when he traveled to the 1971 World Table Tennis Championships in Nagoya, Japan, the gathering that set the diplomacy in motion. Speaking with reporters from China Daily, Liang, who lives with tinnitus, asked for a slower pace to recount his first-hand memory of the encounter that would change global history. When 19-year-old American player Glenn Cowan missed his team’s bus after a practice session and boarded the Chinese team’s bus instead, Chinese champion Zhuang Zedong extended a warm public welcome, a small gesture that sent shockwaves through a world where Cold War divides had cut off all official contact between the two nations for more than two decades.
Recalling the days after that iconic bus ride, Liang described an impromptu practice between the young players from both sides. “I was 21 that year, it was my first time competing at the World Table Tennis Championship, and Cowan was right there on our bus to the stadium. After we got off the bus, he used simple English and gestures to ask for a practice round,” Liang said. “The group of us, all young men around the same age, played for more than 10 minutes, and we had such a good time together. We all knew even then that this wasn’t just about hitting a ball back and forth — it was the start of a cross-border friendship.”
That unexpected moment of connection quickly snowballed into a historic opening. Just weeks after the Nagoya encounter, on April 10, 1971, an official United States table tennis delegation arrived in China. This was the first official delegation from the United States to be invited and granted entry into China since the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, breaking a 22-year diplomatic freeze. When the visiting American players competed in friendly exhibition matches against their Chinese counterparts across multiple Chinese cities, including a landmark match at Beijing’s Capital Indoor Stadium, the matches sparked widespread excitement among Chinese audiences, turning ordinary athletes into accidental ambassadors for bilateral friendship.
Five and a half decades later, participants say while the geopolitical landscape and both nations themselves have transformed beyond recognition, the personal connections and core lesson of Ping-Pong Diplomacy — that people-to-people exchange can open doors that official diplomacy cannot — has stood the test of time. The new youth exchange initiative launched at this year’s anniversary event carries that legacy forward, aiming to build new bonds between the next generation of Chinese and Americans through the shared love of sport.
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Japan loosens arms export rules in break from post-WW2 pacifism
Eight decades of post-World War II pacifism that has shaped Japan’s national identity stands at a pivotal turning point, following a landmark policy shift announced by Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s administration in April 2026. In a move that marks the most significant overhaul of Tokyo’s defence trade rules in modern history, the government has scrapped long-standing limitations that restricted Japanese arms exports to just five non-lethal categories: rescue, transport, warning, surveillance, and minesweeping equipment.
The revised framework clears the way for Japan to export fully lethal weaponry to 17 nations with which it has pre-existing defence cooperation agreements, including major Western powers the United States and the United Kingdom. While a general ban on arms sales to countries actively engaged in armed conflict remains in place, officials confirmed the new rules allow for discretionary exceptions in what are defined as “special circumstances”.
Announcing the policy change on social media platform X, Prime Minister Takaichi framed the shift as a necessary response to an increasingly unstable global security landscape. “In an increasingly severe security environment, no single country can now protect its own peace and security alone,” she wrote. Takaichi sought to reassure observers that the core tenets of Japan’s post-war identity remain unchanged, stating: “There is absolutely no change in our commitment to upholding the path and fundamental principles we have followed as a peace-loving nation for over 80 years since the war. Under the new system, we will strategically promote equipment transfers while making even more rigorous and cautious judgments on whether transfers are permissible.”
Chief Cabinet Secretary Minoru Kihara expanded on the government’s rationale during a press briefing, emphasizing that the policy adjustment is “intended to safeguard Japan’s security and further contribute to the peace and stability of the region”.
The announcement coincided with another historic shift in Japan’s defence engagement: for the first time, Japanese Self-Defence Forces personnel are participating as active combat units in the annual joint military exercises hosted by the United States and the Philippines, moving beyond their previous role as non-combat observers. The drills are held in maritime areas of the Philippines close to disputed waters and islands claimed by Beijing, including the vicinity of Taiwan.
China has issued strong pushback against both developments, with the Chinese Foreign Ministry stating it is “seriously concerned” about what it calls Japan’s “reckless militarization”. “China will remain highly vigilant and resolutely opposed [to the move],” the ministry said in a regular media briefing. Beijing has also condemned the joint exercises, arguing they deepen regional divisions. China claims self-ruled Taiwan as an integral part of its territory and has never ruled out the use of force to assert control, and tensions have risen steadily since Takaichi drew Beijing’s anger last year by suggesting Japan could deploy its Self-Defence Forces in the event of a Chinese attack on Taiwan.
Japan’s post-war pacifist framework was enshrined in its 1947 constitution, most notably in Article 9, which formally renounces war as a tool for settling international disputes and prohibits the maintenance of standing offensive military capabilities. For generations, pacifism became a core part of Japan’s national identity, but a gradual shift in defence policy has unfolded over the past 12 years. In 2014, then-Prime Minister Shinzo Abe relaxed a total blanket ban on military sales, opening the door to joint arms development with allied nations and granting Japan’s domestic defence industry access to new global markets and advanced technologies. Then in 2023, former Prime Minister Fumio Kishida went a step further, approving exports of fully finished lethal weapons for the first time since the end of World War II.
Takaichi, who assumed office in October 2025, has long been an outspoken advocate for revising Japan’s pacifist constitution. While she has not released full details of proposed amendments, political analysts broadly expect any reform to focus on modifying or removing Article 9’s war-renouncing provisions.
Supporters of the policy shift argue that Japan’s geostrategic reality demands an update to outdated post-war rules. Located in a neighborhood marked by rising Chinese military assertiveness, Russian regional aggression, and North Korea’s advancing nuclear and missile programs, they argue Tokyo must adjust its defence posture to protect its own sovereignty and contribute to collective deterrence for regional allies.
Critics, however, warn that the cumulative series of policy changes are steadily dismantling Japan’s 80-year commitment to pacifism, transforming the country into a fully war-capable military power that could be drawn into distant armed conflicts against its national interests. The debate over Japan’s defence future is set to intensify in the coming months as the Takaichi administration moves forward with plans to advance constitutional reform.
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Next, an Iran nuclear deal with Chinese characteristics
Recent attacks from former president and current US leader Donald Trump against Pope Leo XIV and Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni have inadvertently revealed a potential path to de-escalation and lasting peace between the United States and Iran. By falsely claiming that the pair’s opposition to his war on Iran equates to supporting Tehran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons – and even a potential nuclear attack on Italy – Trump has publicly reframed the core purpose of the conflict, shifting it away from the original goal of regime change to a singular focus on blocking Iran from developing a nuclear arsenal.
This rhetorical shift, which carries the political risk of alienating the estimated 53 million Catholic voters across the United States, signals that Trump is now seeking to force Iran into accepting new constraints on its nuclear program. A negotiated agreement on this front would allow him to claim a form of political victory and wind down the conflict without a total defeat. While this outcome is feasible, achieving a lasting deal would require Washington to secure backing from two unlikely sources: China, and the political allies and frameworks Trump has spent years condemning – the administration of former US President Barack Obama, and the governments of Germany, France, and the United Kingdom.
As the current US-Iran ceasefire approaches its April 21 expiration, nuclear policy is far from the only sticking point between the two nations. Significant divides remain on a host of critical issues: the long-term governance rules for the strategic Strait of Hormuz, through which a fifth of the world’s oil supplies pass; the sweeping Western sanctions imposed on Iranian exports, sovereign foreign assets, and domestic financial institutions; Iran’s long-standing military and political support for militant groups Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza, and the Houthi movement in Yemen; and the future development of Iran’s ballistic missile program.
Even so, Trump’s recent focus on nuclear non-proliferation as the conflict’s core goal suggests that this issue could serve as the key to unlocking progress on all other sticking points, at least from his perspective.
It is widely agreed across the global community that expanding the circle of nuclear-armed states beyond the current nine – the United States, Russia, China, India, Pakistan, the United Kingdom, France, Israel, and North Korea – poses unacceptable risks to global security. The foundational global framework for managing this risk has been the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which binds nuclear and non-nuclear states alike to blocking the spread of nuclear weapons technology while enabling the peaceful sharing of civilian nuclear energy technology.
In the decades since the NPT entered into force, three new openly nuclear-armed states have emerged: India, Pakistan, and North Korea. Israel has also developed an unacknowledged nuclear arsenal, and experts widely believe that existing nuclear powers provided clandestine support to many of these new programs. While this gradual proliferation is a cause for concern, the doctrine of mutually assured destruction has acted as a powerful deterrent: with the notable exception of North Korea, analysts broadly agree that no nuclear-armed state would ever launch a nuclear attack, as it would immediately prompt devastating retaliation. The greatest existential nuclear risk today, by contrast, is the possibility of nuclear materials or weapons falling into the hands of non-state terrorist groups that cannot be deterred by the threat of reciprocal attack.
For 25 years, since evidence of Iran’s secret advanced uranium enrichment program first emerged, global powers have pursued diplomatic means to ensure Iran’s nuclear program remains exclusively for civilian energy use, not weapons development. After years of multilateral negotiations, this effort culminated in the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), an agreement reached between Iran and the P5+1 group – the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Russia, and China.
The JCPOA placed strict verifiable limits on Iran’s uranium enrichment activities, mandated regular inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and offered phased relief from crippling Western sanctions in exchange for compliance. Though European powers led much of the late-stage diplomatic work, the agreement was widely hailed as one of former President Barack Obama’s most significant foreign policy achievements. Remarkably, even rival major powers Russia and China agreed to back the deal – making it a top target for Trump during his 2016 presidential campaign. Shortly after taking office in 2018, Trump withdrew the United States from the JCPOA and reimposed all US sanctions on Iran.
Israel has never supported the JCPOA, arguing that Iran’s long history of secret nuclear activities means it cannot be trusted to uphold its non-proliferation commitments, especially given Iran’s ongoing support for groups that regularly target Israeli territory. While other powers argue that any Iranian nuclear weapon would be deterred by the threat of massive retaliation from Israel or the US, Israeli leaders have refused to test this proposition.
The great irony of the current moment, however, is that any new negotiations between US and Iranian negotiators will almost certainly center on an updated version of the 2015 JCPOA – the very agreement Trump shredded seven years ago.
Following US and Israeli airstrikes on Iranian nuclear infrastructure in June 2025, Iran’s uranium enrichment capacity has been drastically reduced, a key change from the 2015 baseline. A new outstanding issue that will need resolution is Iran’s current stockpile of roughly 400 kilograms of enriched uranium, much of which is buried under rubble from the bombings. While partially damaged, the stockpile remains militarily potent, so a new framework will need to establish a clear plan to secure and dispose of this material.
Negotiators face two core structural challenges: Iran will never agree to renounce its sovereign right to civilian uranium enrichment, and Israel will never fully accept that Iran has permanently abandoned any ambition to build a nuclear weapon. If Trump is serious about securing a nuclear deal to end the conflict and withdraw US naval forces from the Middle East, he will need to find creative diplomatic solutions to bridge these gaps.
Both China and the original JCPOA framework offer clear paths forward. As an original signatory to the 2015 deal and a country with deep existing economic, military, and political ties to Iran, China could lead a multinational consortium to manage Iran’s existing enriched uranium stockpile and oversee the operation of its civilian nuclear program. Beijing has no strategic interest in seeing Iran become a nuclear-armed state, a position that could allow it to win trust from Washington, European capitals, and even Jerusalem. Reports already indicate that China has been working behind the scenes to encourage a negotiated peace, and the upcoming summit between Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing on May 14-15 creates a unique opportunity for the two major powers to broker a breakthrough agreement.
European governments, which already hold decades of experience negotiating and implementing the original JCPOA, can contribute their institutional knowledge to the new talks, while the IAEA stands ready to resume its independent verification role.
Most analysts believe Iran would accept such a framework, particularly if it leads to phased relief from crippling Western sanctions and deeper economically beneficial trade and investment ties with China. The biggest unanswered question remains whether Trump will be willing to accept a deal that revives the core framework of the Obama-era agreement he once condemned, and walk away from the conflict with a limited political victory rather than pushing for total regime change.
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Pakistan delivers weapons to Libya’s Haftar as part of Saudi-financed deal, sources say
New unreported arms shipments from Pakistan to the eastern Libyan administration led by military strongman Khalifa Haftar have been carried out earlier this year, with financing and facilitation from Saudi Arabia, multiple Western and Arab officials with direct knowledge of the matter have confirmed to Middle East Eye.
One official who was present at Benghazi’s main airport during the offloading process confirmed that at least five Pakistani cargo jets carrying military hardware arrived and were unloaded in March. A second senior official verified the shipments occurred, but declined to share details on the specific types of weapons transferred. This delivery marks the first confirmed execution of a massive $4 billion arms framework between Pakistan and Haftar’s government, a deal that was first reported by Reuters after a December visit to Benghazi by Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff, Field Marshal Asim Munir.
Haftar, 82, accompanied by his son Saddam Haftar — widely viewed as his likely political successor — made a rare official trip to Islamabad in early February, where the pair held meetings with Munir and Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif. The Arab official confirmed that the full terms of the March weapons shipments were finalized during this high-level visit.
This delivery comes at a moment of growing uncertainty for Pakistan’s broader arms export agenda across Africa, just after another major Pakistani arms deal with Sudan’s transitional government collapsed earlier this month when Saudi Arabia withdrew its pledged financing for the purchase.
According to regional and Western diplomatic sources, the new deal is part of a deliberate Saudi push to expand its influence in eastern Libya and displace the long-standing dominance the United Arab Emirates has held over Haftar and his political bloc. One senior Arab official called the deal an explicit outreach strategy, stating: “This deal was done to pull Haftar away from the UAE. Saudi Arabia is using honey, and saying ‘we can sponsor you’.” A Libyan source familiar with Haftar’s inner circle expressed skepticism about the success of this gambit, noting that the Haftar family retains extensive business holdings and assets in the Emirates.
Beyond shifting influence dynamics in Libya, the deal also ties to Saudi regional priorities in the ongoing Sudan conflict. Western and Arab officials confirm Riyadh is pressing Haftar to block illegal cross-border weapons flows from southeastern Libya to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), the paramilitary group fighting Sudan’s military government. The deal is also structured to buy Haftar’s cooperation with ongoing efforts to integrate his eastern military forces with the military wing of the internationally recognized Tripoli-based government under Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh. In March, forces from both sides participated in joint training exercises during the U.S.-led Flintlock military drill, and a joint military coordination committee has already been established to advance integration. As one Western official put it: “There is a sense that Saudi Arabia is buying Haftar’s cooperation with new supplies. The integration of Libya’s military is against the UAE’s interest vis-a-vis Sudan.”
The Saudi-UAE rift that underpins this new initiative has deepened rapidly over the past year, despite the two countries’ long history as Gulf allies. Both nations joined forces to intervene in Yemen’s civil war and backed Haftar’s failed 2019 offensive to seize full control of Tripoli, but their alignment collapsed after the outbreak of Sudan’s 2023 civil war. Tensions flared after Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman lobbied former U.S. President Donald Trump to oppose the UAE’s open support for the RSF. Rifts escalated further in December, when Saudi Arabia launched airstrikes against UAE-aligned militia groups in Yemen.
While the two sides have attempted to contain open conflict, with bin Salman sending a February letter to UAE National Security Advisor Tahnoon bin Zayed that outlined Riyadh’s grievances and called for mediation, recent regional shifts have only deepened divisions. The outbreak of the ongoing Israel-Iran conflict sparked speculation that Gulf powers would put aside differences to present a unified front, but the war has instead widened the gap between the two: Saudi Arabia has sought to balance U.S. requests for military access with public calls for a negotiated end to tensions, while the UAE has taken a hardline hawkish stance against Iran and has publicly expressed frustration with U.S.-led direct talks with Tehran — talks that Pakistan has helped facilitate.
Libya has remained split into two competing administrative blocs since 2014, and a United Nations arms embargo imposed on the country has been routinely violated by outside powers seeking to advance their own regional interests. Middle East Eye reached out to the Saudi and Pakistani embassies in Washington D.C. for official comment on the arms shipment, but received no response prior to publication.
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Iran top diplomat says country may rejoin Islamabad peace talks
As a fragile two-week ceasefire between Iran and the U.S. enters its final 48 hours ahead of a Wednesday evening expiration, Tehran remains undecided on whether to participate in a new round of peace negotiations scheduled this week in Islamabad, with top Iranian officials slamming the Trump administration for untrustworthy behavior and maximalist negotiating demands that derailed the previous talks.
Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Esmail Baghaei clarified Monday during a regular press briefing that no final decision has been reached on Iranian attendance at the proposed new talks. The earlier round of negotiations held in the Pakistani capital ended without any breakthrough to de-escalate the conflict that the Trump administration and its Israeli ally launched in late February.
Baghaei highlighted a stark contradiction between Washington’s public claims of diplomatic readiness and its recent aggressive actions, pointing specifically to a U.S. military operation over the weekend that seized an Iranian-flagged cargo vessel in the Gulf of Oman. Such moves, he argued, offer no indication of the U.S. being serious about pursuing a constructive diplomatic path.
Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian echoed these criticisms in a social media post published Monday, calling out what he framed as contradictory and unconstructive signals coming from U.S. officials. Pezeshkian emphasized that upholding commitments is the foundational requirement for any meaningful dialogue, noting that Iran holds deep, history-rooted mistrust of the U.S. government stemming from decades of past aggression against the country. “They seek Iran’s surrender,” Pezeshkian wrote of Trump administration officials. “Iranians do not submit to force.”
Pezeshkian’s remarks came as U.S. President Donald Trump issued stark new threats to resume large-scale bombing operations if no peace deal is reached before the ceasefire expires. The ongoing conflict has already killed more than 3,300 Iranians and displaced millions of civilians. When asked what would happen if talks fail, Trump told PBS News: “Lots of bombs start going off.”
This threat followed an even more extreme warning from Trump: that if Iranian leaders reject his administration’s terms for ending the war, the U.S. will destroy every power plant and bridge across Iran. Legal experts have widely condemned these threats as violations of international law, which explicitly protects civilian infrastructure from intentional attack, noting that the threats themselves qualify as war crimes regardless of whether they are carried out.
Beyond the military standoff, the conflict has sparked growing internal friction within the Trump administration over skyrocketing U.S. gasoline prices. On Monday, Trump publicly contradicted his own Energy Secretary Chris Wright, a former fracking industry executive, who suggested over the weekend that U.S. gas prices might not drop below $3 per gallon until 2027.
Wright made the projection during a CNN interview Sunday, when asked when consumers could expect significant price relief after the national average jumped above $4 per gallon following the outbreak of the war. Responding to Wright’s comments in a Monday interview with The Hill, Trump called the energy secretary’s projection “totally wrong” and insisted gas prices would plummet immediately as soon as the conflict ends.
However, independent energy and economic analysts, as well as major reporting from The New York Times, contradict Trump’s optimistic claim. The Times reported Monday that the global economic impact of Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz — which has cut off roughly 20 percent of the world’s global oil supply — is only just beginning to hit global markets, and disruptions will persist for months or even years even if a peace deal is reached quickly.
East Asia is currently bearing the brunt of supply shortages caused by the strait’s closure, but the ripple effects are expected to spread across every major global economy if the waterway remains blocked. Even if a peace deal is signed immediately, the Times reports that the global economy will face months of canceled air travel, soaring food prices, paused factory production, delayed supply chains, and empty shelves for a wide range of consumer and critical goods, from plastic products and instant noodles to microchips, vaccines, medical equipment, and cosmetics. The outlet added that even if the Strait of Hormuz reopens fully tomorrow, it could take years for oil and gas production and shipping to rebound to pre-conflict levels.
Bob McNally, founder and president of energy consulting firm Rapidan Energy Group, confirmed this assessment in comments to Newsweek published Monday. “It is likely we will feel the effects of energy disruptions through the end of the year,” McNally explained. “Even if the conflict and disruptions were to end today, the ripple effects would be felt for many months. Just restarting Gulf production and flows would take three to four months. Repairing damage to facilities could take longer.”
Mark Zandi, chief economist at Moody’s Analytics, also warned that U.S. consumers face continued financial strain in the coming months. In a Sunday social media post, Zandi wrote: “It doesn’t look like gasoline prices will return to pre-war levels anytime soon. That’s even if the war ends soon, which looks iffy, to say the least. And this abstracts from what Americans will need to shell out for higher prices on everything from groceries to airfares in the coming weeks and months. The financial pain caused by the war and its fallout on consumer spending and the economy is set to intensify.”
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South Korean police seek to arrest K-pop mogul behind BTS
In a major development that has sent shockwaves through the global K-pop industry, South Korean law enforcement announced Tuesday it is moving to arrest Bang Si-Hyuk, the legendary music mogul and chairman of HYBE, the entertainment agency behind global supergroup BTS. The push for arrest comes as investigators expand a probe into claims that Bang unlawfully amassed more than $100 million through a fraudulent investor scheme.
The Seoul Metropolitan Police Agency has formally confirmed it has asked prosecutors to seek a court-issued arrest warrant for Bang. As of Tuesday afternoon, representatives for HYBE had not issued any immediate response to media requests for comment on the case.
Bang has been the subject of an ongoing investigation since last November, centered on allegations dating back to 2019. Prosecutors and police claim Bang intentionally misled early investors in HYBE, falsely telling stakeholders the company had no intention of launching an initial public offering (IPO). This misrepresentation allegedly induced investors to sell their stakes to a private equity firm at a discounted rate, just months before HYBE went public in one of the biggest stock debuts in South Korea’s history.
Investigators believe the private equity fund struck an undisclosed side deal with Bang, granting him an estimated 200 billion won (equal to roughly $136 million) in exchange for the manipulated share transfer. The agreement also reportedly guaranteed Bang 30% of all profits generated from post-IPO stock sales by the fund.
Beyond his connection to BTS, Bang holds unparalleled influence across the K-pop ecosystem. He founded HYBE in 2005 under its original name Big Hit Entertainment, building the label from a small startup into a global entertainment giant that manages some of the industry’s biggest modern acts, including Seventeen, Le Sserafim, and newcomer Katseye. He is widely credited with driving K-pop’s mainstream global breakthrough over the past decade, thanks largely to BTS’s unprecedented international success.
The legal controversy comes at a critical juncture for HYBE and BTS, creating a significant public relations challenge for the company. BTS, which went on a nearly four-year hiatus to allow all members to complete South Korea’s mandatory military service, just launched a highly anticipated global comeback tour. Last month, the group drew tens of thousands of fans from across the world to a free opening comeback concert in Seoul, followed by sold-out shows in Goyang, South Korea and Tokyo, Japan. The tour is set to expand to North America later this month, kicking off with a scheduled performance in Tampa, Florida.
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US will provide dollar loan to UAE if economy is jolted by war on Iran, US official says
Amid ongoing financial volatility spurred by the US-Israeli war on Iran, a top White House economic advisor has confirmed that Washington stands ready to offer financial support to the United Arab Emirates should the Gulf ally require economic stabilization. National Economic Council Director Kevin Hassett made the commitment in comments to CNBC on Monday, noting that the UAE has served as a critical partner in the regional military campaign.”The UAE has been an incredibly valuable ally throughout this effort, and I’m sure the treasury secretary will make every effort to help them out, should that be necessary,” Hassett stated. He also added that former President Donald Trump had characterized diplomatic efforts to end the conflict as moving forward at a promising pace.Hassett’s comments came in direct response to a Wall Street Journal report revealing that UAE Central Bank Governor Khaled Mohamed Balama privately raised the prospect of a US dollar currency-swap line with Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and Federal Reserve officials during a closed-door meeting the prior week. While Hassett noted that a currency-swap arrangement would likely not be necessary to stabilize the Emirati economy, he reaffirmed Washington’s willingness to extend support if conditions worsen.To contextualize the proposal, currency swaps are bilateral agreements between central banks that allow participating institutions to access foreign currency at more favorable rates during periods of market stress. For global central banks, access to US dollars via swaps is particularly critical, as the greenback remains the world’s primary reserve currency, used widely for international debt repayment and import purchases. The Emirati dirham has long been pegged to the US dollar at a fixed exchange rate, making stable access to greenbacks a core priority for Emirati monetary policy. Per the WSJ’s reporting, the UAE’s inquiry was framed as preliminary and precautionary, not an immediate request for aid.The remarks have already stirred internal backlash within pro-Trump conservative circles, with prominent right-wing commentator Steve Bannon lambasting the potential aid during an episode of his *War Room* podcast Monday. Bannon launched an angry tirade against the proposal, framing it as an unfair burden on working-class American citizens while wealthy Emirati elites and global influencers benefit from the arrangement. “What are you doing you stupid working American? Paying for it,” Bannon said. “You’re not in that club. You’re just a working stiff out there to defend these scum.”Behind the precautionary request lies a subtle signal from Abu Dhabi: if the US fails to buffer the UAE from the economic fallout of the war, the Gulf state could shift oil trading and other key international transactions away from the US dollar to the Chinese yuan or other alternative currencies. For decades, the UAE and other major Gulf oil producers have priced their crude exports exclusively in US dollars, creating the global petrodollar system that generates consistent demand for greenbacks and supports the dollar’s status as the world’s dominant reserve currency. Petrodollar revenues are routinely reinvested into US Treasury bonds, domestic stocks, and other dollar-denominated assets, cementing the currency’s global position.Some geopolitical analysts have warned that the war on Iran could accelerate a global shift away from the petrodollar system, as Gulf states increasingly distance themselves from Washington’s regional policy and Iran already encourages energy trade settled in yuan. Yet experts who spoke with Middle East Eye note that the US dollar will almost certainly remain the dominant currency for Gulf oil exports for the foreseeable future, even amid the instability caused by the ongoing conflict.The US has deployed currency swap lines as emergency economic lifelines multiple times in recent decades, most notably during the 2008 global financial crisis and the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic, when the Federal Reserve extended access to the program to central banks across Europe, Latin America, and other regions. Even so, the UAE’s inquiry has caught many independent analysts off guard: the country is one of the wealthiest nations in the Middle East, with massive sovereign reserves anchored by its consistent oil export revenues. The Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, the UAE’s largest sovereign wealth fund, holds approximately $1 trillion in global assets, while the country’s central bank holds an estimated $270 billion in foreign currency reserves.Brad Setser, a former US Treasury economist and current fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, called the UAE’s request “slightly strange” given the country’s substantial existing financial buffers. Setser added that the Trump administration is unlikely to approve the swap line request, arguing that it runs counter to the administration’s signature “America First” policy framework. “There isn’t anything obviously ‘America first’ about a financial lifeline to one of the richest oil sheikdoms (if not the richest) just so it doesn’t have to borrow in the market [or] sell assets,” Setser explained. At the same time, he acknowledged that the request highlights a core tension: “[it is] clear that parts of the UAE aren’t happy about being asked to absorb the full financial costs of Trump’s bombing campaign.”As the closest Gulf ally to Israel, the UAE has faced sustained retaliation from Iran, including thousands of ballistic missile and drone attacks targeting Emirati infrastructure. The ongoing conflict has severely damaged Dubai’s core luxury tourism sector, once one of the emirate’s largest economic drivers, and slowed critical oil export volumes to a fraction of pre-war levels.While some neighboring Gulf states have pushed for diplomatic negotiation to de-escalate tensions with Iran, the UAE has taken a firmly hawkish stance, publicly supporting the continuation of US military action. Analysts attribute this position to the UAE’s heavy dependence on the Strait of Hormuz, the strategic chokepoint through which nearly a fifth of global oil supplies pass each day, as well as elite opposition to allowing Iran to expand its regional influence across the Gulf.
