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  • In Syria’s Daraa, water is life – and today the land is parched

    In Syria’s Daraa, water is life – and today the land is parched

    Once a sprawling, horizon-spanning body of water that anchored life and livelihoods across southern Syria’s Daraa province, Lake al-Muzayrib is no more. What remains is a vast, cracked expanse of parched earth dotted with scattered stones and sparse tufts of dead grass, where an abandoned fishing boat rests on hardened soil—a stark, silent monument to a world that has vanished. A handful of birds pick their way across the empty basin, their movements the only disruption to the stillness of a space that once teemed with the hum of human and aquatic life.

    Standing at the edge of the former lake bed, 64-year-old Abdul-Munaf al-Masri, a fisherman who worked these waters for nearly 30 years, can barely bring himself to look at the barren landscape. “I don’t like to come here,” he says softly, his gaze fixed on the dry ground under his feet. “The sight of this drought breaks my heart.” For Masri, who fished Lake al-Muzayrib from 1993 until the fish population collapsed entirely in 2021, the lake was far more than a workplace—it was the center of his entire existence, tied to his childhood, his identity, and his ability to provide for his family.

    Decades of accelerating decline have led to this moment. Data from Syria’s Daraa Water Resources Directorate shows that in the 1990s, the natural springs feeding Lake al-Muzayrib flowed at a rate of up to 1,000 litres per second. By 2016, that flow had plummeted to fewer than 170 litres per second. Today, the springs are completely dry. While the lake partially refilled after occasional heavy rainfall during past dry spells, by the end of 2024, it had vanished for good.

    The disappearance of Lake al-Muzayrib is not an isolated disaster—it is the most visible symptom of a catastrophic collapse of water resources across southern Syria, a crisis decades in the making that has been amplified by 14 years of civil conflict and systemic mismanagement. For years, researchers tracking the impacts of the Syrian war have warned that the country’s southern region was sliding toward an unprecedented water emergency, driven by prolonged drought cycles that have been worsened by unregulated, excessive well-drilling across Daraa. Today, both surface water and groundwater reserves are declining at rates never seen in recorded history.

    Engineer Hani al-Abdullah, Daraa’s director of water resources, says the crisis has reached a breaking point. Of the 16 dams that once supplied water for irrigation and drinking across the province, 14 are now partially or completely dry. The combined total storage capacity of these dams stands at 92.5 million cubic metres, but in 2025, they held less than 4 million cubic metres total—an all-time low for the 21st century, and a dramatic drop from the 65 million cubic metres stored just five years prior. Standing on the crest of the nearly empty Daraa Dam, a reservoir that once drew local visitors with its abundant fish and served as the lifeline for surrounding farmland, Abdullah describes a landscape unrecognizable from decades past. Where trees once lined the dam’s banks and echoed with the sound of children playing and birds singing, only silence and barren earth remain.

    Agriculture, the centuries-old backbone of Daraa’s economy that has sustained generations of families across the Hauran plains’ fertile volcanic soil, has been brought to its knees. Long before the war, the region’s strategic position at the crossroads of Jordan, historic Palestine, and central Syria, combined with its rich natural resources, made it a hub for grain, vegetable, and livestock production famous for its high-quality tomatoes, olives, pomegranates, and grapes. But 14 years of open conflict shattered that economy: water and irrigation networks were targeted in fighting, trade routes were severed, and decades of drought pushed the system past the breaking point.

    As state authority collapsed during the war, thousands of desperate farmers turned to unlicensed well-drilling to keep their crops alive, turning a temporary survival tactic into a widespread phenomenon that has accelerated groundwater depletion. In the western Daraa town of Tafas, Abu Mahmoud, a smallholder farmer who relies on his half-hectare pomegranate orchard for his family’s income, spoke to Middle East Eye under a pseudonym over fears of government reprisal, explaining that he had no other choice when drought withered his crops. “I had no alternative. We all did it. It was the only way to hold onto our land and keep working,” he says. “But even that didn’t fix anything. It cost a fortune, and within three years, the well ran dry.”

    For many farmers, illegal wells have become both a lifeline and an unsustainable burden. In eastern Daraa, farmer Hatem al-Zoubi, who tends 700 olive trees and two hectares of mixed crops, drilled a solar-powered well on his property in 2020 for $70,000—a sum that has eaten nearly all his profits, given falling crop prices and rising input costs. The well now supplies not just his farm, but drinking water for dozens of local families, especially as summer demand surges and displaced populations increase strain on existing resources. “A well isn’t a luxury. It’s a lifeline, for me and for dozens of families in this town,” he explains. “Without it, we would have faced catastrophic drinking water shortages already.”

    Local residents and water officials alike confirm that this unregulated extraction has driven catastrophic declines in groundwater levels. Abdullah says that in some areas, groundwater tables have dropped by five to 10 metres, with solar-powered pumping allowing faster extraction than ever before. Masri estimates that more than 7,000 illegal wells now operate in the Lake al-Muzayrib area alone. “People don’t understand the risk. A farmer digs a well to water his own trees, but in doing that, he destroys the water supply for an entire community,” he says.

    The crisis has pushed water out of reach for many low-income families, turning a basic necessity into an expensive commodity. The cost of 1,000 litres of water has risen to roughly $5—a staggering expense in a region where the average monthly salary ranges from just $75 to $150. Water officials have taken steps to curb unregulated drilling: the Daraa governor issued an order last year to confiscate unlicensed drilling equipment, issue fines to illegal well operators, ramp up monitoring, repair damaged irrigation infrastructure, drill regulated wells in high-need areas, and truck in emergency water from neighbouring regions. Dozens of drilling rigs have been seized, but the problem has become so widespread that enforcement remains extremely limited.

    Returning residents displaced by the war are adding new strain to a system already on the brink. Basel al-Zoubi, a student who returned to the small town of Tseel after living as a refugee in Jordan, says much of the town’s original water infrastructure was destroyed during the conflict, leaving most residents reliant on expensive water delivered by private tankers. The town urgently needs new pumping systems to transport water from natural springs and state-managed wells to residential areas, he says, calling for stronger enforcement of well regulations to protect existing drinking water sources. “Water is a lifeline. There’s no replacement, especially when people are already struggling with such bad economic conditions,” Zoubi says.

    The disaster has wiped out Daraa’s once-thriving fishing sector entirely. Masri is one of roughly two dozen fishermen who once worked Lake al-Muzayrib; all have either left the country or been forced to take odd jobs to survive. Since he stopped fishing in 2021, Masri has scraped by doing plumbing and household work. “I’m like a fish out of water. If I leave this place, I die,” he says. “The drought destroyed us. I was born and raised here, and it’s devastating to lose something that precious.”

    Amin al-Haibi, another Daraa fisherman, confirms the sector has been completely destroyed: only the al-Wehda Dam on the Jordanian border still has enough water to support limited fishing, leaving the rest of the province without a working fishing industry. Masri still remembers the bountiful catches of the 1990s and early 2000s, when he could pull 200 to 300 kilograms of fish from the lake in a single day, enough to support his family comfortably. “It made you happy, coming home with a full catch,” he recalls. Today, the fishing boats that once fed 100 families across the region have been sold for scrap.

    Masri joins other local residents in calling for stronger regulation of well drilling, public awareness campaigns to encourage conservation, and the creation of a fisherman’s union that could support efforts to restock dams if water levels ever recover. But current efforts to address the crisis remain fragmented and under-resourced, highlighting the urgent need for a comprehensive national strategy that balances urgent water conservation measures with support for local livelihoods in a region where access to water is now synonymous with survival. Standing on the empty lake bed that once defined his life, Masri holds out quiet hope for a return to the world he lost. “Nothing makes me want to come here anymore. The drought, the cut trees—it’s all so painful,” he says. “We just hope life can come back here, the way it used to be.”

  • Turkey captain Hakan Calhanoglu says his ‘more talented’ team will ‘dominate’ Australia in World Cup

    Turkey captain Hakan Calhanoglu says his ‘more talented’ team will ‘dominate’ Australia in World Cup

    VANCOUVER, British Columbia — A tense pre-match war of words has emerged ahead of Turkey’s long-awaited return to the FIFA World Cup, as captain Hakan Calhanoglu has declared his side will dominate their opening Group clash against Australia this Saturday at BC Place. For Turkey, this tournament marks their first appearance on the world’s biggest football stage in 22 years, having failed to qualify for the previous five editions of the competition despite consistent strong performances at the continental level through much of the 21st century. The 32-year-old Inter Milan midfielder, who lifted the Serie A title with the Italian giants just this past season, doubled down on his confidence in comments made Friday. “I think we will dominate Saturday’s game, because we have more qualities and a more talented team,” Calhanoglu said. “So we will see what happens this weekend.”

    Australia, by contrast, heads into this match as a seasoned World Cup competitor, appearing in their sixth consecutive finals tournament after advancing to the knockout round at the 2022 Qatar World Cup. The Socceroos were quick to respond to Calhanoglu’s bold claim, with midfield star Aiden O’Neill saying the Turkish captain was entitled to his perspective while emphasizing his own side’s competitive strength. “He’s allowed to have his own opinion,” O’Neill said Friday. “We’ve got quality players on our team, too, so we’re ready.”

    Not all interactions between the two camps have been tense, however. Turkish manager Vincenzo Montella, who previously managed top-flight clubs across Europe, offered a complimentary nod to Australia’s playing style, noting that he found the Socceroos’ tactical approaches compelling. “I would like to use some of their techniques because I think they are interesting techniques,” Montella said.

    This opening match is set to be a test of two teams with contrasting recent World Cup trajectories: a Turkey side hungry to prove it belongs back among the world’s elite after two decades away, and an Australia side looking to build on their impressive 2022 run and silence their opponent’s pre-match bravado.

  • Iran and US confirm they are on cusp of new ceasefire, as they fight to frame terms

    Iran and US confirm they are on cusp of new ceasefire, as they fight to frame terms

    After months of indirect negotiations mediated by Pakistan, the United States and Iran have moved to the brink of signing a landmark memorandum of understanding (MOU) that could reshape geopolitics across the Middle East, though stark public disagreements over the agreement’s core terms have cast uncertainty over its final shape.

    On Friday, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi offered the clearest confirmation yet that a final deal is imminent, writing on social media that the so-called Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding is closer than ever. He urged media outlets to avoid unfounded speculation ahead of the text’s formal finalization. US President Donald Trump quickly shared Araghchi’s statement, but hours later launched a scathing rebuke of Iranian claims about the MOU’s content.

    The dispute broke into public view after Iran’s Mehr News Agency reported the draft agreement would unlock $24 billion in Iranian assets frozen by international sanctions, codify Iran’s long-held control over the Strait of Hormuz, and include a full ceasefire across regional hotspots including Lebanon. A senior Iranian source later confirmed that account to Reuters, adding the deal would also lift restrictions on Iranian oil exports and require an end to hostilities on all regional fronts. Multiple Iranian officials have long maintained that any ceasefire agreement must include an end to Israel’s ongoing military campaign in southern Lebanon, where Israeli forces have expanded ground operations in recent weeks.

    The Trump administration has pushed back forcefully against Iran’s version of events. In a post on his Truth Social platform, Trump dismissed Iranian leaks of the deal’s terms as entirely disconnected from the written agreement under negotiation. “Very dishonorable people to deal with,” he wrote. “They better get their act together, and FAST!”

    A senior anonymous Trump administration official outlined a far different set of agreed terms to reporters, saying Tehran has committed to five core pillars, including the destruction and permanent removal of all its enriched nuclear material from Iranian territory. The official confirmed that some Iranian assets are tied to the agreement, but stressed no funds will be released until Tehran fully meets all its performance-based obligations. The administration’s version also states the MOU will require the Strait of Hormuz—a critical global energy chokepoint through which 25% of the world’s oil supplies pass—to be kept open to all international shipping, and bars Iran from providing military funding to regional proxies including Lebanon’s Hezbollah. US Vice President JD Vance echoed that pushback in a post on X, emphasizing that no Iranian funds will be released immediately upon signing the MOU, calling widespread reports to the contrary “fake information.”

    Despite the conflicting public narratives from the two negotiating parties, Pakistan—the key third-party mediator facilitating the indirect talks—has confirmed that both sides have reached a final agreed text. “We can confirm that a final, agreed upon text of the peace deal has been reached,” Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif wrote on X Friday. “Pakistan is now working closely with both sides to finalize the next steps. Peace has never been this close as it is now.”

    International markets reacted swiftly to the news of progress: global oil prices dropped sharply, while equity markets surged, as investors priced in the possibility of a broader breakthrough that could ease geopolitical tensions and open up new Iranian oil supplies to global markets. The possibility of a diplomatic breakthrough also gained further cred Friday when Switzerland’s foreign ministry confirmed it had been in contact with both parties and offered to host the signing ceremony if both sides agree to the venue.

    Senior US officials have struck a cautiously optimistic tone, saying a formal signing could come as early as the next several days, with Trump floating the possibility of a ceremony in Europe. One senior US official told reporters on a background call that the likelihood of a final agreement had climbed throughout the day, from an estimated 75% that morning to between 80% and 85% by Friday afternoon, stopping short of declaring a done deal. It is not the first time Trump has announced a near-completed agreement with Iran; past announcements of impending deals have ultimately collapsed before reaching a final signing.

  • Ein al-Auja: How settler attacks and water diversion erased a Palestinian community

    Ein al-Auja: How settler attacks and water diversion erased a Palestinian community

    North of Jericho in the occupied West Bank, Ein al-Auja once stood as a lush, life-giving Palestinian oasis: a cascading natural spring whose waters flowed at more than 1,000 cubic meters per hour, sustaining hundreds of people, thousands of hectares of irrigated farmland, and a tight-knit Bedouin community that had called the land home for generations. Today, that oasis is a hollowed-out shell, its spring reduced to a faint trickle, its soil parched and cracked, and its entire Indigenous population displaced to remote, underserved encampments miles away. For Haitham Rashaidh, one of the last residents to abandon Ein al-Auja, the departure was not a choice—it was the breaking point of years of relentless pressure.

    Rashaidh’s family packed their tents and loaded all their possessions onto a tractor earlier this year, trekking two hours across rough terrain to al-Balqa, a sparsely populated stretch of the Jordan Valley where they now camp alongside dozens of other displaced neighbors. “Leaving Ein al-Auja felt like losing a part of ourselves,” Rashaidh told Middle East Eye in an interview. For years, he said, his community resisted repeated attempts to push them out. “We did not leave the first time they tried to push us out. We came back, rebuilt what we could, and tried to continue our lives. But it didn’t stop. Every time we returned, the pressure came back stronger: more restrictions, more attacks, less access to water.” By January 2026, the community could endure no more.

    For displaced families in al-Balqa, the consequences of displacement are immediate and devastating. The remote encampment has no access to public services, and the nearest city center is more than two hours away. Rashaidh’s children can no longer attend school regularly, a reality shared by dozens of displaced children across the area. The crisis in Ein al-Auja has accelerated dramatically since the October 7 attacks and the outbreak of the Gaza war, reshaping life for Palestinian communities across the occupied West Bank.

    United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) data underscores the sharp escalation of violence: between 2017 and 2023, the agency recorded just two settler attacks resulting in casualties or property damage in the Ein al-Auja area. Since early 2024, however, Israeli settlers have established multiple new illegal outposts in the region, pushing the number of documented attacks to at least 38 in 2025 alone. Access to water has become the primary battleground, OCHA noted in a January 2026 report: settlers linked to the new outposts have repeatedly cut and damaged water pipes connected to the Ein al-Auja spring, blocked access roads for water delivery, emptied residential water tanks, and assaulted residents and herders attempting to collect water, destroying local livelihoods in the process. In one high-profile incident earlier this year, 124 people across 26 families were forcibly displaced amid coordinated violence by armed settlers and Israeli troops.

    Environmental researchers trace the spring’s collapse to both systemic water diversion by Israeli authorities and compounding pressure from climate change. Ayman Abu Zaher, an environmental researcher who monitors the local hydrological system, explained that Ein al-Auja draws its water from a deep regional aquifer. Historically, three state-managed wells in the area reached depths of 500 to 600 meters, but over the past three decades, Israeli authorities have deepened these wells to nearly 1,000 meters and added a fourth. Collectively, these wells pump between four and six million cubic meters of water annually from the deep aquifer—water that is almost entirely diverted to nearby Israeli settlements, rather than supplied to local Palestinian communities.

    Local Palestinian wells, by contrast, are limited to the shallow aquifer and rarely exceed 100 meters in depth, leaving them insufficient to meet community needs. Abu Zaher estimates that the spring’s flow has dropped by 50 to 70 percent in recent years, and it often runs completely dry during dry seasons. Where more than 3,000 hectares of irrigated orchards and cropland once covered the Ein al-Auja area, only 300 hectares remain actively farmed today, pushing the region toward accelerating desertification.

    For displaced women like Naifa Zaied, who relocated to al-Balqa earlier this year, the water crisis has rewritten daily life. When the community lived near Ein al-Auja, women could fill their household water containers at the spring in minutes. Now, Zaied said, they must walk kilometers under the scorching Jordan Valley sun to find water tankers or distribution points, and they are often turned away by Israeli forces or left empty-handed when supplies run out. “We used to have water close to us. Today, every litre has become a struggle,” Zaied said. “Sometimes we wait for water tankers that never arrive, and we are forced to save water for drinking before anything else.”

    The crisis has extended beyond household survival to destroy traditional Bedouin livelihoods across the region. Repeated settler raids, livestock theft, and movement restrictions have left herding families with massive losses: in one early 2025 raid, settlers stole roughly 1,500 sheep and goats from the Ein al-Auja community, and dozens of animal carcasses were found the following day. With their land and livestock gone, many displaced Bedouin men have been forced to take unregulated, low-wage work in nearby Israeli settlements, commuting through dangerous checkpoints with no work permits or legal protections. Rashaidh, who once farmed and raised livestock, now works as a day laborer on a date palm farm near al-Balqa. “It is a highly risky environment, without work permits, and many of us are injured or arrested while going to or returning from work,” he said.

    Displacement has also fragmented long-standing community social support networks and cut off access to basic services. Many children now miss school regularly due to the long, unsafe commute from al-Balqa, and the community is cut off from the hospitals and markets they once relied on. “Everything has become far. Even reaching basic services takes hours now,” one anonymous displaced resident told MEE. “We are cut off from the places we used to depend on.”

    Ein al-Auja’s collapse has also devastated the local tourism industry, which once drew Palestinian and international visitors to its scenic waterfall and mountain trails. The region already saw a massive drop in tourism revenue after the 2023 Gaza war outbreak, and repeated attacks on visitor groups have deterred what little traffic remains. In January 2023, a group of international hikers including American, Italian, and French nationals was confronted by armed settlers who attacked the group with clubs and pepper spray, injuring two people. Israeli forces took hours to arrive and secure the group’s exit. Today, the roads that once carried tour buses and weekend visitor traffic are nearly empty, and local vendors go hours without customers. “We used to wait for buses coming from the northern and southern West Bank every weekend, but now traffic has become almost nonexistent,” said Muhammad Taha, a Jericho-based vendor.

    For the displaced families, a court petition to Israel’s High Court has become their last formal hope of returning to their land. Last year, residents petitioned the court to order the dismantling of the illegal settlement outposts encroaching on Ein al-Auja and to guarantee their safe return. The Israeli state has denied any formal evacuation policy, arguing there is no barrier to residents returning, despite the ongoing violence and water access restrictions that made life untenable.

    In February 2026, the court ordered Israeli authorities to facilitate the community’s return and submit a security plan within 60 days. By April, the state had missed the deadline, and petitioners asked the court to compel compliance. The state continues to contest the order, arguing it has no obligation to station permanent security forces in the area. The case follows a familiar pattern for Palestinian land rights petitions: most are rejected or stalled indefinitely in Israeli courts, which grant the state broad discretion over land management even when long-term Palestinian residency is well-documented. By the time the court issued its February order, the last families had already left Ein al-Auja.

    Today, the oasis is silent. There are no children’s voices, no grazing herds, no vendors serving visitors. Only the wind blows across the cracked, dry soil where a community once thrived. Back in al-Balqa, Rashaidh says international and regional solidarity is the only path forward for displaced Palestinian communities facing expanding settler pressure. “No one leaves their land willingly, and that is one of the hardest things in life,” he said. “But to stand alone is not enough. We defended our land alone, and we lost our land, our livestock and our water. If we do not stand together, we will all lose.”

    This report was produced as part of the 2026 Middle East Eye Fellowship.

  • US officials say Hormuz oil flows reaching half of pre-war levels

    US officials say Hormuz oil flows reaching half of pre-war levels

    In a series of public remarks delivered Friday, senior United States government officials have confirmed that the US Navy is carrying out nightly escort missions for dozens of commercial tankers transiting the Strait of Hormuz, moving millions of barrels of crude oil through the critical chokepoint amid an ongoing regional conflict that has disrupted global energy supplies.

    US Energy Secretary Chris Wright told the Bloomberg Energy Security Executive Briefing held in Houston, Texas on Friday that tankers under American protection currently carry approximately seven million barrels of oil through the Strait of Hormuz each day. That volume accounts for roughly half of the total daily traffic that passed through the waterway before the US-Israeli military campaign against Iran began on February 28. Wright noted that current shipping volumes are continuing to climb, closing the gap left by the post-conflict blockade.

    “Flows today are approaching half of the gap, and they’re rising,” Wright told attendees at the briefing.

    Secretary of the Interior Doug Burgum echoed Wright’s confirmation in an interview with CNBC Friday, adding that the operation escorts up to 20 vessels through the strait each night, with some nights seeing more than 20 commercial ships pass through under US protection. Burgum emphasized that the operations have already moved large volumes of crude out of the Gulf, and that global energy markets have already priced in this recovery ahead of mainstream media coverage.

    “Some nights, more than 20 ships [are] coming out,” Burgum said. “Substantial amounts of oil have come out of the strait. I think the markets figured that out before some of the tabloid press did, because you’re starting to see a softening of oil prices.”

    The confirmation comes after US President Donald Trump earlier this week claimed that the US had been carrying out secret escort operations for commercial vessels leaving the Gulf. Trump claimed that the operations have already allowed more than 200 commercial ships and 100 million barrels of oil to bypass Iran’s blockade of the Strait of Hormuz.

    As ceasefire negotiations between Washington and Tehran continue, it remains unclear whether Iran has implicitly approved the ongoing escort operations. Earlier this week, an American Apache attack helicopter operating in the waterway was shot down, according to US media, which linked the aircraft to the escort mission. Iranian officials have downplayed the severity of the incident, offering few details on the encounter.

    Global oil markets saw extreme volatility after the US and Israel launched their military campaign against Iran, with international benchmark Brent crude spiking to $112 per barrel in the immediate weeks after the conflict began. Energy analysts have long noted that public exchange prices have not fully reflected the actual premiums paid for physical crude cargoes, particularly in Asia, a region that relies heavily on crude exports from Gulf producing states.

    Many market analysts predicted even steeper price spikes after Iran seized control of the Strait of Hormuz and imposed a blockade on energy shipments from neighboring Gulf states. In response, the US implemented its own counter-blockade that removed Iranian crude barrels already under international sanctions from global markets.

    Global oil markets stabilized after a series of policy interventions: Western nations released 400 million barrels of crude from their strategic emergency reserves, while China made an unprecedented cut to its crude import volumes to reduce demand. China’s May crude imports fell roughly three million barrels per day compared to year-ago levels, according to trade data.

    Neither Burgum nor Wright offered a clear timeline for how long the nightly escort operations will continue. But the operations have already coincided with a steady downward trend in global oil prices this month. Brent crude, the global benchmark, has fallen roughly 20 percent over the past 30 days. On Friday, the benchmark traded 3.5 percent lower at $87.17 per barrel, as both Iran and the US publicly signaled that a new ceasefire agreement is within reach.

  • Reading Marjane Satrapi’s comic book Persepolis during Iran war

    Reading Marjane Satrapi’s comic book Persepolis during Iran war

    Renowned Iranian-French comic author Marjane Satrapi passed away in Paris last week at the age of 56, mere days before a new wave of conflict erupted between Israel and her native Iran. In death, as in life, Satrapi’s body of work has found renewed, urgent relevance amid the rising regional tensions that trace their roots to the same historical forces she spent decades documenting. Satrapi’s work stands apart in how it masterfully interlaces intimate personal narrative with the sweeping arc of Iran’s modern political and social history, turning centuries of upheaval into a accessible, human story for global audiences.

    One of Satrapi’s most iconic works, the graphic memoir *Persepolis* (later adapted into an acclaimed film), weaves personal coming-of-age with a clear-eyed retelling of Iran’s 20th century power shifts. The work opens with context for the 1979 Islamic Revolution, tracing the lineage of unrest back to 1925, when Iranian military officer Reza Khan overthrew the Qajar dynasty with quiet encouragement from British officials who had already installed sympathetic monarchies in Iraq and Jordan. Instead of backing the secular republic Khan initially sought, British powers pushed him to declare himself shah, founding the Pahlavi dynasty that would rule Iran until it was toppled in the 1979 revolution. Satrapi anchors every major turning point to the lives of ordinary Iranian citizens, whose fates are shifted by foreign interference and political upheaval beyond their control. Rendered in a stark, striking monochrome art style, her work roots the long-simmering Iranian resentment of foreign meddling in personal experience, rather than abstract political rhetoric.

    For all its enduring acclaim, *Persepolis* has long been a source of polarizing debate. Critics have frequently attacked the work for alleged historical inaccuracies, but this critique misses Satrapi’s core purpose: she was not a professional historian, but a storyteller drawing on her own lived experience growing up in Iran and building a life abroad. This controversy has spilled into academic spaces, as the article’s author, historian Ibrahim Al-Marashi, can attest firsthand. In 2007, while teaching a course on Iranian history at Istanbul’s Bogazici University, Al-Marashi assigned *Persepolis* as required reading for the class. Student activists affiliated with the campus Communist party accused him of secretly promoting Western-backed regime change, arguing that the work’s focus on religious oppression under the Islamic Republic amounted to anti-Iranian propaganda.

    Al-Marashi’s intention was far simpler: he assigned the memoir because it offered valuable context, artistic merit, and deep insight into modern Iranian life that could not be found in traditional academic texts. But the protests persisted, growing loud enough that Al-Marashi was ultimately forced to resign his position and leave Turkey.

    *Persepolis* opens in the early days of the 1979 revolution, with Satrapi’s father Ebi explaining to his young daughter why thousands of Iranians had taken to the streets to overthrow the monarchy. He frames the uprising as the culmination of 2,500 years of foreign and domestic tyranny: starting with native emperors, followed by foreign invasions from the west and east, and ending with centuries of modern Western imperial meddling. That “modern imperialism” includes Britain’s role in installing Reza Khan as shah, then removing him in World War II over his pro-German leanings to install his more compliant son Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. When democratically elected prime minister Mohammad Mossadegh launched a popular internal coup to curb monarchical power in 1953, MI6 and the CIA orchestrated a counter-coup to restore Mohammad Reza to the throne, cementing decades of Western influence over the Iranian state.

    Throughout the Cold War, the U.S. armed the restored shah with advanced military hardware to counter Soviet influence in the region, including top-of-the-line F-14 fighter jets. The constant presence of American military advisors and personnel on Iranian soil fanned the flames of nationalist anger that eventually boiled over into the 1979 revolution, which ousted the monarchy and brought Ruhollah Khomeini’s Islamic Republican faction to power. Like the Russian Revolution, the Iranian Revolution’s path to stable rule was marked by bloodshed and chaos. When Iraqi forces invaded Iran in September 1980, Khomeini’s faction consolidated control by leaning into surging nationalist sentiment, turning the war into a unifying cause for the new republic.

    *Persepolis* captures the quiet human cost of this era through one iconic anecdote centered on Iran’s unofficial nationalist anthem, “Ey Iran.” The track, which predates both the Pahlavi monarchy and the Islamic Republic, was written in the 1940s during the Allied occupation of Iran, after poet Hossein Gol-e-Golab witnessed an American soldier beating an Iranian greengrocer. The anthem’s lyrics declare fierce devotion to the Iranian homeland, ending with the line: “May my life be sacrificed for my pure motherland.” During an early retaliatory raid against Iraq following the bombing of Tehran, the father of one of Satrapi’s schoolmates—one of the pilots flying Iran’s U.S.-built F-14s—died in the mission, fulfilling that oath even as the anthem played on state radio to celebrate the attack. Satrapi does not shy away from the complexity of this moment: her own father, a leftist activist who helped overthrow the shah only to oppose the Islamic Republic, often wept when he heard the song. Decades later, Al-Marashi notes, the track still brings Iranian students to tears, a testament to how deeply personal grief and nationalist pride are intertwined in the country’s modern history.

    Satrapi’s singular genius lay in her ability to synthesize a century of messy, overlapping history, personal memory, political upheaval, and cultural identity into a coherent, deeply human narrative rendered in bold, unforgettable art. As new conflict erupts across the Middle East, her work remains as vital today as it was when it was first published, offering a rare unfiltered window into the historical forces that continue to shape Iran and its relationship with the wider world.

  • Survey: China critical for US businesses

    Survey: China critical for US businesses

    Against a backdrop of escalating decoupling rhetoric from hardline U.S. China policy hawks, new industry data confirms that the Chinese market remains an irreplaceable strategic asset for American multinational firms, with the nation’s massive consumer base, evolving status as a global innovation center and robust, resilient supply chains continuing to strengthen U.S. companies’ competitive edge worldwide, according to business leaders and policy experts.

    The findings emerge from the latest annual member survey conducted by the U.S.-China Business Council (USCBC), which reveals that a staggering 95 percent of responding U.S. firms rate China as somewhat to very critical to maintaining their global market standing. Summarizing the report, which was published publicly on Wednesday, the USCBC stressed that “For U.S. companies, China is not optional.”

    USCBC President Sean Stein noted that the survey results leave no room for ambiguity: even amid rising geopolitical and economic tensions, gaining a foothold and competing in the Chinese market is a non-negotiable prerequisite for many American firms to succeed on the global stage. The report further underscores that U.S. businesses have no plans to withdraw from China, as the market offers value beyond its sheer size, acting as a multifaceted catalyst that drives global competitiveness for participating companies.

    Nearly half of all survey respondents reported that they adapt operational insights and competitive experience gained from their China-based activities to improve performance in other global markets. The report draws an apt analogy: China has evolved into a “boxing gym” for Western corporations, where head-to-head competition with domestic Chinese firms hones operational skills, sharpens strategic thinking and deepens industry insight.

    In recent weeks, bilateral economic relations between Washington and Beijing have shown encouraging signs of progress. Last month, the two world powers reached an agreement to launch two new intergovernmental cooperation bodies: the China-U.S. Trade Council and the China-U.S. Investment Council. These platforms are designed to resolve commercial disputes before they escalate into larger conflicts, cultivating a more stable, predictable operating environment for businesses in both countries. The Chinese Ministry of Commerce confirmed that the new trade council will discuss targeted tariff reduction initiatives for specific product categories, with the two sides already reaching a preliminary agreement to cut tariffs on reciprocal goods shipments totaling at least $30 billion on each side.

    Liu Ying, a senior researcher at the Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies at Renmin University of China, pointed out that while China and the U.S. now compete across a growing range of high-value sectors, this does not rule out productive mutually beneficial cooperation. “It just requires a far more nuanced, sophisticated approach than the straightforward complementary trade model that defined relations in past decades,” she explained.

    Former International Monetary Fund Deputy Managing Director Zhu Min echoed this view, noting that while differences between the two economic giants are unavoidable, deep-seated interdependence makes cooperation equally inevitable. “If both sides adopt a constructive approach, using expanding cooperation to manage existing differences, both nations, their people, and the entire global economy will share in the benefits,” Zhu Min said. “Our priority should be to continuously grow the list of areas where we can collaborate, while shrinking the list of outstanding disputes.”

    The commitment of U.S. firms to engaging with the Chinese market is further illustrated by upcoming industry events. The first week of this month, Beijing will host the second China International Supply Chain Expo, and U.S. companies and industry institutions are on track to be the largest group of foreign exhibitors for the fourth consecutive year, according to the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade. This continued high participation reflects U.S. firms’ ongoing interest in deepening industrial and supply chain collaboration with Chinese partners.

    Henry Ding, president of 3M China, shared the industrial conglomerate’s long-term outlook for the Chinese market. China is 3M’s largest overseas market, and the company remains confident that China’s ongoing high-quality economic development will unlock broad new growth opportunities. In recent years, 3M has accelerated full value chain localization in China, integrating local research and development, product testing, and manufacturing operations into its regional strategy. “Currently, more than 50 percent of the products 3M sells in China are manufactured locally,” Ding said. This year, 3M China will continue expanding local R&D investment, with plans to launch more than 30 percent more new products than it did in 2025, a growth rate that far outpaces the company’s targets for other global markets.

    Even with this widespread optimism and long-term commitment, the USCBC survey does acknowledge the significant headwinds facing U.S. companies operating in China. Fragile bilateral relations, ongoing uncertainty surrounding China’s economic growth trajectory, and long-standing U.S. tariffs on Chinese imports remain the top three most pressing challenges for responding firms. “U.S.-China relations continue to be the single greatest challenge for companies operating in the Chinese market, and even after the recent tariff truce, both governments continue to roll out new economic security policies that create additional uncertainty,” the council noted.

    As Beijing and Washington set working agendas for the newly established trade and investment councils, Stein said the 2026 survey results should act as a clear wake-up call for policymakers on both sides. “This is a tangible opportunity to make meaningful progress that goes far beyond just tariff reductions,” he added, emphasizing that sustained engagement aligned with the clear priorities of the business community on both sides will deliver shared, long-term benefits.

  • Myanmar’s president to visit China

    Myanmar’s president to visit China

    Diplomatic relations between China and Myanmar are set for a key milestone this week, as Myanmar President Min Aung Hlaing prepares to embark on a five-day state visit to China starting Monday, according to a recent announcement from China’s Foreign Ministry. This trip marks Min Aung Hlaing’s first official visit to China since he was sworn in as Myanmar’s president in April this year, and is widely expected to strengthen long-standing fraternal ties and expand practical collaboration between the two neighboring nations.

    Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian confirmed on Friday that Chinese President Xi Jinping will hold official talks with Min Aung Hlaing during the visit. Separately, Chinese Premier Li Qiang and Zhao Leji, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, China’s top legislative body, will also meet with the Myanmar leader.

    In remarks at a regular press briefing, Lin emphasized that China and Myanmar share a deep history as traditional friendly neighbors and have committed to building a bilateral community with a shared future. Over the 75 years since the two countries established formal diplomatic relations, both sides have consistently upheld the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence—a framework they co-initiated. Through decades of standing together through challenges, supporting one another, and advancing collective cooperation, bilateral relations have delivered substantial, mutually beneficial progress.

    “Through this visit, China looks forward to working alongside Myanmar to carry forward the traditional ‘pauk-phaw’ fraternal friendship, deepen the bilateral comprehensive strategic partnership, achieve more tangible outcomes in advancing the China-Myanmar community with a shared future, and bring greater welfare to the people of both countries,” Lin added.

    The upcoming state visit builds on a string of recent high-level diplomatic exchanges between the two countries. Earlier this month, Myanmar Foreign Minister Tin Maung Swe traveled to Beijing for talks, and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi paid an official visit to Myanmar back in April.

    Economic ties between the two nations have already shown strong growth in recent years: China has held the position of Myanmar’s largest trading partner for multiple consecutive years, and official Chinese data shows bilateral trade volume hit $19.4 billion in 2025, representing a 19.1% year-on-year increase.

    Just this week, during an appearance at the opening ceremony of 2026 Chinese Film Week in Myanmar’s capital Nay Pyi Taw, Min Aung Hlaing expressed public gratitude to China for its support, per Myanmar’s presidential office. He specifically thanked China for dispatching emergency humanitarian assistance after a recent major earthquake struck Myanmar, as well as for its continued long-term support for Myanmar’s social development across key sectors including education, public health, social welfare, and rural development.

    Zhou Fangyin, a professor specializing in international relations at Sun Yat-sen University based in Guangzhou, Guangdong, noted that the development of China-Myanmar relations has long been rooted in the core principles of mutual respect and mutual benefit. The strong political trust established by both sides over decades has laid a solid, enabling foundation for expanding practical cooperation in all areas moving forward.

  • Palestinian football chief denied entry to US in latest case of World Cup travel restrictions

    Palestinian football chief denied entry to US in latest case of World Cup travel restrictions

    The 2026 FIFA World Cup, co-hosted by the United States, Canada and Mexico, opened on Thursday to widespread controversy, as sweeping visa denials, entry bans and controversial security measures imposed by U.S. authorities have barred dozens of accredited football delegates, sports officials, journalists and fans from accessing matches, drawing accusations of politically motivated discrimination against the global football community.

    The most high-profile case involves Jibril Rajoub, president of the Palestinian Football Association, who holds official FIFA accreditation to attend the tournament. Though the Palestinian men’s national team did not qualify for this year’s World Cup, Rajoub planned to join fellow global football governing body delegates to watch matches in the U.S. Instead, U.S. consular officials rejected his visa application, leaving him stuck in Mexico City, where he watched the tournament’s opening fixture between Mexico and South Africa earlier this week.

    Rajoub has framed the visa refusal as a politically motivated attack on the fundamental right of global football representatives to participate in the world’s biggest sporting event. He highlighted the stark double standard between this tournament and the 2018 World Cup in Russia, where he traveled and attended matches without any diplomatic barriers. “I don’t believe that it’s fair to use or to abuse and deny the right of all footballers all over the world to attend,” he said, adding the restriction is fundamentally unfair.

    The refusal comes just one month after Rajoub declined a public request from FIFA President Gianni Infantino to shake hands with the head of the Israeli Football Association. Rajoub explained at the time that such a symbolic gesture would merely serve to whitewash Israel’s widely condemned unlawful actions in Palestinian territories.

    Rajoub is far from the only accredited World Cup stakeholder blocked from entering the U.S. The visa issues have already touched nearly every corner of the global football community, from top referees to national team delegations, working journalists, and ordinary ticket-holding fans.

    In one recent high-profile incident, Omar Abdulkadir Artan, named 2025 African Referee of the Year, was denied entry to the U.S. even though he held a fully valid visa issued by the U.S. Department of State. Members of Iraq’s official national delegation, including star striker Aymen Hussein and the team’s official photographer, were held for seven hours of detention at Chicago O’Hare International Airport. While Hussein was ultimately granted entry after extended questioning, the photographer was turned away and deported.

    The International Sports Press Association has confirmed that dozens of journalists from African nations and Iran have also been blocked from obtaining the multi-entry visas required to travel between all three co-host nations to cover matches. Even fans with confirmed match tickets have not been spared: fans from Scotland and Morocco have seen their pre-approved travel authorizations revoked or their visa applications rejected at the last minute, just days before they were set to travel for the tournament. Iran’s government additionally confirmed that the 8 percent ticket allocation allocated to official Iranian fans was revoked just days before the tournament kicked off, leaving hundreds of Iranian supporters who had already booked flights and accommodation stranded with no way to attend.

    Compounding growing tensions over access to the tournament, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security recently confirmed that U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) enforcement agents will be deployed inside World Cup stadiums hosted on U.S. soil as part of the tournament’s security plan. More than 120 U.S. and international civil rights organizations have condemned the decision, warning that the presence of uniformed immigration enforcement agents inside venues will undermine the personal safety of both international visitors and stadium staff, particularly for fans and workers from immigrant backgrounds.

    In response to widespread criticism of the visa restrictions and disruptions, FIFA issued a formal statement asserting that the governing body does not intervene in the domestic immigration and visa adjudication processes of the tournament’s host nations. This neutral stance has already drawn comparisons to FIFA’s 2023 decision to strip Indonesia of the right to host the Under-20 World Cup, after Indonesian local government officials objected to Israel’s participation in the tournament.

    This independent reporting was originally produced by Middle East Eye, a global outlet focused on in-depth coverage of the Middle East and North Africa region.

  • UK lords working for consulting firm lobbying for UAE

    UK lords working for consulting firm lobbying for UAE

    An investigation by independent outlet Middle East Eye has uncovered a contentious link between three sitting members of the UK House of Lords and a global consultancy firm that is registered to lobby senior UK officials on behalf of the United Arab Emirates, a Gulf state widely accused of enabling widespread human suffering in Sudan’s ongoing civil war.

    The three peers in question are Thangam Debbonaire, a former Labour Member of Parliament and shadow culture secretary elevated to the House of Lords by Prime Minister Keir Starmer in 2024; Conservative peer Ruth Porter, a former deputy chief of staff to ex-prime minister Liz Truss who serves as a managing director at the firm FGS Global; and Andrew Cooper, an independent peer and former senior advisor to ex-prime minister David Cameron, who holds a partner role at the company.

    Per filings with the UK’s Foreign Influence Registration Scheme, FGS Global has conducted active lobbying outreach to UK parliamentarians, senior civil servants, and other key stakeholders on behalf of the UAE since October 2025. The firm’s registered activities include organizing in-person meetings, telephone calls and email correspondence to boost awareness of the UAE-UK bilateral relationship, alongside providing strategic media guidance and content support to the UAE’s embassy in London.

    The connection comes amid grave international allegations against the UAE: rights groups and United Nations Security Council investigators have repeatedly documented that the Gulf state has funneled weapons and logistical support to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a Sudanese paramilitary group that has carried out mass atrocities over three years of civil war. The conflict has displaced an estimated 13 million Sudanese people and left hundreds of thousands dead, with UN investigators confirming that an RSF attack on the besieged city of El Fasher in October 2024 bore clear “hallmarks of genocide” that killed at least 6,000 people in just three days. The UAE has consistently denied all allegations of providing support to the RSF.

    FGS Global has stated that no wrongdoing has occurred, emphasizing that all of its staff adhere strictly to UK transparency, disclosure and advocacy rules. The firm also clarified that none of the three House of Lords members associated with the company have worked on the UAE client account. No evidence has been presented to suggest the peers have engaged in any improper activity related to the UAE contract.

    Despite these denials, transparency and human rights campaigners have raised urgent alarms about the conflict of interest inherent in having senior parliamentarians hold paid roles at firms lobbying for foreign governments accused of mass human rights violations. Steve Goodrich, head of research and investigations at Transparency International UK, argued that the current regulatory framework fails to address clear risks to democratic accountability. “When members of the House of Lords hold senior roles at firms lobbying for foreign governments, it’s hard to know whose interests are being represented,” Goodrich told Middle East Eye. “Peers are in Parliament to serve the public, not to open doors for paying clients. The rules should require peers to choose: keep their seat in the Lords, or keep their interests in the lobbying industry.”

    Kristyan Benedict, crisis response manager at Amnesty International UK, echoed these concerns, noting that all parliamentarians have a duty to scrutinize the entities they associate with, particularly when those entities work for governments accused of breaking international law. The case of Debbonaire, one of the three peers, has added layers of controversy: she has previously been a vocal critic of outside paid lobbying for lawmakers, calling for a ban on second jobs for House of Commons members during a 2021 parliamentary standards debate, where she declared that “MPs should not be for sale” and that lawmakers are elected to serve the public good rather than private interests. In 2024, she also publicly opposed a proposed UAE-led takeover of UK media outlets the Telegraph and the Spectator, arguing that a foreign power-backed acquisition should not be approved.

    Further scrutiny of FGS Global’s ties to UK politics has emerged following the investigation: the firm donated more than £27,000 to the UK Labour Party in 2024, with a portion of the funds used to second an FGS staff member, Kamella Hudson, as an election campaign advisor to current Chancellor of the Exchequer Rachel Reeves. Hudson was previously accused of arranging private meetings between UK ministers and Chinese fast-fashion giant Shein, another FGS client, in 2024. The donations also funded a high-profile drinks reception following Reeves’ keynote speech to the 2024 Labour Party conference, UK media reports confirm.

    The controversy also overlaps with longstanding criticism of the UK government’s continued arms sales to the UAE. Despite a full UN arms embargo on Sudan imposed in 2024, and UN findings that UK-manufactured arms are being diverted to the RSF via the UAE, the UK government has approved multiple arms export licenses to the Gulf state in 2025, including components for military vehicles, drone parts and gun silencers. “The UAE has been a known hub for arms diversion for years and the UK government has long been aware of weapons being routed through the Emirates to conflict zones like Sudan and Libya,” Benedict said. “The UK government has committed to help end the conflict in Sudan and to work to prevent atrocities, but it still hasn’t suspended all arms sales to the UAE, which it must do immediately.”

    FGS Global’s lobbying work for the UAE extends far beyond the UK: the firm is also registered as a foreign agent for the Gulf state in the United States, where it has additionally represented the breakaway Somali region of Somaliland. Per US disclosure filings, FGS was contracted by the UAE to shape US policy on bilateral trade, investment and geopolitical issues through outreach to policymakers, media outlets, think tanks and academic circles. The UAE’s expanded global lobbying push comes as the country navigates a major diplomatic rift with its former ally Saudi Arabia, driven by disagreement over the UAE’s backing of secessionist movements across Yemen, Libya and Somalia.

    In addition to the UAE, FGS Global’s UK client roster includes US tech giant Oracle, a company co-founded by billionaire Larry Ellison with close ties to the second Trump administration. Oracle is a major funder of the Tony Blair Institute for Global Change, a think tank chaired by former UK prime minister Tony Blair that sparked widespread controversy in February 2025 after it was revealed that institute staff had drafted plans for a post-war Gaza dubbed the “Trump Riviera”, a proposal widely condemned for appearing to endorse the ethnic cleansing of the territory’s Palestinian population. Blair currently serves on US President Donald Trump’s so-called “Board of Peace”, a body tasked with overseeing the besieged enclave after a planned end to Israeli hostilities.