标签: Asia

亚洲

  • The US lags other countries in social media restrictions for kids, but a reform push is growing

    The US lags other countries in social media restrictions for kids, but a reform push is growing

    On the sixth anniversary of a day that forever changed their lives, two grieving American mothers stood in Washington, D.C. this week, honoring not just their own sons, but hundreds of other children claimed by preventable harms linked to social media platforms. For Amy Neville and Kristin Bride, the shared tragedy that bonded them as soulmates has become the foundation of a national movement demanding sweeping accountability for tech companies and stronger protections for young users online.

    June 23, 2020, marked the loss of both Neville’s 14-year-old son Alexander and Bride’s 16-year-old son Carson. The two teenagers lived 1,000 miles apart and never met, but their deaths were both rooted in dangerous interactions on social media. Alexander, a bright, entrepreneurial teen with a memorable laugh, was connected to a drug dealer through Snapchat who sold him the fatal pill that killed him. Carson, a warm, funny teenager who loved connecting with others, died by suicide at 16 after experiencing relentless, unmoderated cyberbullying on major platforms.

    This Tuesday, the two boys were remembered alongside 270 other children and young people who have died from social media-related harms during a remembrance event in the nation’s capital. The date of their shared loss has been formally recognized by the U.S. Senate as Social Media Harms Victims Remembrance Day, a milestone that reflects growing public momentum around an issue long sidelined by federal policymakers.

    When Bride first joined advocacy work after her son’s death, she said she felt completely isolated in her grief and anger. Today, the grassroots online child safety movement has expanded dramatically, with hundreds of other bereaved parents joining the push for tighter regulation and legal accountability. That momentum has already shifted the landscape: this year saw a series of landmark jury verdicts against major tech firms that have cleared a path for future legal action, even as comprehensive federal reform remains stalled.

    Three jury decisions — two against Meta Platforms and one against Google parent Alphabet — have emerged as a turning point for the movement. For decades, Section 230 of the 1996 Communications Decency Act has shielded tech companies from legal liability for content posted by third-party users, creating a near-impenetrable barrier to accountability for child harm. Modern lawsuits, however, have avoided this protection by focusing not on user-posted content, but on the deliberate design choices platforms make to maximize engagement at the cost of child safety.

    Court evidence from these recent trials has pulled back the curtain on internal industry practices, including internal communications from tech employees comparing their addictive products to cigarettes and casino games. Matthew Bergman, head of the Social Media Victims Law Center, which represents more than 1,000 plaintiffs in cases against social media companies, called the fact that these cases are even proceeding to trial a watershed moment. “It is still a hurdle, but it is no longer a barrier,” Bergman said of Section 230.

    Global momentum for reform has also grown, with a growing list of countries including Australia, the United Kingdom, Turkey, and Indonesia implementing full or partial bans on social media use for children under 16. While the U.S. has not moved toward such sweeping restrictions, congressional pressure for regulation is building again after years of inaction. This week, House lawmakers unveiled a bipartisan draft bill, the Kids Internet and Digital Safety Act, which draws from portions of the Kids Online Safety Act (KOSA) that passed the Senate in 2024. But the proposal has already drawn criticism from advocates, who say it was stripped of its most critical provision: a legal “duty of care” that would require platforms to take reasonable steps to prevent harm to minors.

    “Without a duty of care, Big Tech companies will maintain the status quo of putting profit before the safety of our children,” Sen. Marsha Blackburn, R-Tenn., said in a statement criticizing the watered-down draft.

    Bride, who has outlined a three-pronged strategy of legislation, litigation, and public education, said the movement can continue to advance even if congressional reform stalls. “When one stalls, like legislation, then we have the trials and we have litigation,” she explained. “So we keep pressing forward. We’re not going to give up.”

    Major tech firms have responded to growing pressure by rolling out incremental safety updates in recent years. Snap, the parent company of Snapchat, said in a statement that it “works continuously to strengthen safety protections across its platform.” Platforms have introduced features like default private teen accounts, restrictions on stranger messaging, age-gated content limits, and dedicated parental controls. Instagram now restricts teen accounts to PG-13-rated content, while YouTube offers supervised accounts for preteens who have outgrown its dedicated kids app. But advocates argue these incremental changes do not address the core problem: platforms’ fundamental business model prioritizes maximum user engagement over child safety.

    “There have been some improvements. A 13-year-old child is not by default provided with an open account for adult predators to prey upon. So, you know, there are baby steps, but there are steps in the right direction. We just need more of them,” Bergman said.

    On Capitol Hill, a growing bipartisan coalition of senators is calling for urgent, sweeping action, with some even calling for a full repeal of Section 230. Sen. Josh Hawley, R-Mo., slammed congressional inaction, arguing that campaign contributions and millions of dollars in annual lobbying from the tech industry have blocked reform. “It’s the same reason that the companies want the kids online, want their privacy destroyed, want all their information — it’s money,” Hawley said.

    The Senate Judiciary Committee has amplified this pressure by inviting the CEOs of Meta, Alphabet, TikTok, and Snap to testify under oath at an upcoming hearing, framed with a provocative question: “Is This Social Media’s Big Tobacco Moment?” The hearing reflects a growing belief among policymakers and advocates that public awareness of social media’s harms to children has reached a tipping point.

    For Neville and Bride, who have attended every hearing and advocacy event for years, the fight remains personal and urgent. Both remain optimistic that meaningful change is coming, even as they acknowledge the long road ahead. Neville, who has dedicated her life to the movement, said the work is non-negotiable. “Every morning I wake up, lives are on the line. If we’re not talking about these things, if we’re not doing something about it, lives are on line,” she said. “And that’s probably not good for my nervous system, but that’s the state that I’ll live in until I’ll probably die on this hill.”

  • Senior UAE and regional officials referred to ICC over role in Sudan atrocities

    Senior UAE and regional officials referred to ICC over role in Sudan atrocities

    A broad coalition of global human rights and legal organizations, led by the Montreal-based Raoul Wallenberg Centre for Human Rights (RWCHR), has formally submitted a legal request to the International Criminal Court (ICC) calling for a full investigation into high-level foreign officials accused of enabling widespread war crimes and crimes against humanity in Sudan’s long-troubled Darfur region. The Article 15 communication, filed Monday, marks the second major push in weeks to hold external actors legally accountable for their alleged role in fueling the Sudanese conflict that has now entered its fourth year.

    The filing does not limit scrutiny to parties directly involved in the Sudanese civil war, which pits the country’s official Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) against the rival Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Instead, it outlines detailed allegations that external state actors and their senior officials have continued to supply both warring factions with the weapons, military equipment, financing, logistical backing, and mercenary fighters required to carry out atrocities against civilian populations, in direct violation of a decades-old United Nations arms embargo on Darfur.

    Under the Rome Statute, the ICC’s founding legal framework, the coalition is pushing prosecutors to examine potential criminal liability for foreign actors under Articles 25(3)(c) and 25(3)(d) — provisions that explicitly cover aiding, abetting, and knowingly contributing to crimes carried out by organized groups acting with a shared criminal purpose.

    Specific high-level officials from the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and other regional states that have openly or covertly backed the RSF are named in the submission, including officials and intermediaries based in Libya, Ethiopia, Chad, Somalia, Kenya, and Uganda. The document also outlines broader alleged links between Iran, Turkey, and Egypt and crimes committed by the SAF, the Sudanese national military.

    The coalition’s case draws on a combination of confidential source intelligence and open-source investigative findings from multiple independent outlets and watchdog groups. A detailed annex included with the filing maps out alleged RSF supply lines that originate at three major UAE airports — Abu Dhabi International, Al Ain International, and Ras Al Khaimah International — with suspected arms cargo routed through transit hubs in Chad, Libya, and Ethiopia. The submission notes that transfers of military supplies increased dramatically starting in April 2023, when full-scale civil war resumed between the SAF and RSF, and have continued uninterrupted to the present day.

    These allegations align with a growing body of independent investigations that have documented the Gulf state’s material support for the RSF, despite consistent official denials from the UAE that it supplies weapons or military assistance to the paramilitary group. Multiple independent probes have confirmed that weapons and military materiel have been transported to RSF forces via a secret air bridge through Chad’s Amdjarass, with the UAE repeatedly identified as the primary supplier. A January 2024 investigation by Middle East Eye uncovered a sprawling network of supply lines and regional alliances stretching through Libya, Chad, Uganda, and breakaway regions of Somalia that the UAE uses to funnel arms to the RSF. A separate 2024 New York Times investigation found the UAE had disguised weapons shipments to the RSF as humanitarian aid. In April 2024, Middle East Eye revealed the RSF receives covert support from an Ethiopian military base in Asosa, matching the coalition’s allegations. Most recently, Human Rights Watch documented that Colombian mercenaries hired by a UAE-based private security firm transited Emirati military bases before deploying to Sudan to fight alongside the RSF.

    the ICC already holds jurisdiction over atrocities committed in Darfur, following a 2005 United Nations Security Council referral that grants the court authority to prosecute any individual — regardless of nationality — for international crimes committed in the region. While legal scholars note this jurisdiction could theoretically extend to Emirati officials accused of aiding RSF crimes, significant procedural obstacles remain: the UAE has never ratified the Rome Statute, and securing evidence and state cooperation would require extensive international support.

    Irwin Cotler, the founder and international chair of the RWCHR and former Canadian Minister of Justice and Attorney General, emphasized that meaningful accountability for Darfur’s atrocities cannot stop at the warring parties on the battlefield. “The suffering of the Sudanese people will not end so long as the perpetrators of atrocity crimes – and the networks of impunity that enable and sustain them – continue to act without consequence,” Cotler said in a statement accompanying the filing.

    This submission is the second high-profile request to the ICC in as many weeks targeting foreign complicity in Darfur. Earlier this month, a group of Sudanese atrocity survivors filed their own separate Article 15 communication targeting senior Emirati officials and business leaders, including UAE Vice President Mansour bin Zayed Al Nahyan.

    ICC officials confirmed earlier this year that the court’s prosecutor’s office is already actively investigating atrocities committed in Darfur since the resumption of full-scale conflict in April 2023, but to date no investigation has been opened into the role of external enablers. In a January 2025 report to the UN Security Council, the ICC prosecutor’s office explicitly acknowledged that external actors have prolonged the crisis, describing the RSF’s 500-day deadly siege of North Darfur’s capital El Fasher as “entirely manmade.” The report noted, “This conflict has been perpetuated by regional and international actors whose material and financial assistance only guarantees that this catastrophe in Darfur worsens and that war crimes and crimes against humanity will needlessly continue.”

    To date, the ICC has not issued any arrest warrants for Sudanese individuals connected to the current 2023–2025 conflict. A court spokesperson told Middle East Eye that the prosecutor’s office is currently prioritizing investigations into gender-based violence and crimes against children, abuses that a recent UN report confirmed are widespread: last week, a UN assessment found the RSF is responsible for the vast majority of sexual violence crimes committed by all warring parties in Sudan over the past three years.

    The coalition of NGOs that submitted Monday’s communication says it remains hopeful that the ICC prosecutor’s office will agree to open a formal investigation into the foreign officials and networks that have continued to sustain atrocities in Darfur from abroad.

  • Congo rallies to a 3-1 win against Uzbekistan to seal place in the World Cup knockouts

    Congo rallies to a 3-1 win against Uzbekistan to seal place in the World Cup knockouts

    For more than half a century, the Democratic Republic of Congo carried only one painful memory from its brief appearance on soccer’s global grandest stage: a demoralizing 9-0 thrashing at the hands of Yugoslavia during its only prior World Cup run, when the nation competed under the name Zaire in 1974. That outdated, humiliating legacy has been permanently rewritten by a bold new generation of Congolese talent, who etched their names into the country’s history books by sealing a first-ever trip to the World Cup knockout round, setting up an eagerly awaited round of 32 matchup against England.

    Saturday’s night’s decisive group stage clash against tournament debutants Uzbekistan looked to be heading the wrong way for Congo early on. Just 10 minutes into the fixture, striker Eldor Shomurodov put Fabio Cannavaro’s side ahead with a clever lobbed finish, putting Sébastien Desabre’s squad on the brink of elimination — a draw would not be enough to send them through, meaning a win was the only acceptable outcome.

    The turning point came in the 68th minute, when striker Yoane Wissa, who would end the night as his side’s hero, was fouled in the box by defender Abdukodir Khusanov to earn a penalty. Wissa stepped up to the spot himself, sending goalkeeper Abduvohid Nematov the wrong direction with a calm roll into the bottom corner to level the score, unlocking a late flurry of game-changing goals.

    Ten minutes after the equalizer, substitute Fiston Mayele put Congo in front, flicking a finish past Nematov at the near post. The goal sparked chaotic, jubilant celebrations, with substitute players sprinting off the bench and across the pitch to mob their match-winning teammate. Wissa put the result beyond all doubt in stoppage time, curling a precise strike into the bottom corner to seal a 3-1 comeback win, sending Congo into the knockout round alongside Cape Verde as one of the tournament’s biggest surprise packages.

    This historic result follows an earlier shocking upset for the Congolese side, which held Cristiano Ronaldo’s star-studded Portugal to a 1-1 draw earlier in the group stage — the nation’s first ever World Cup point. Saturday’s win marked Congo’s first ever victory at the tournament, enough to advance as one of the best third-placed teams, and made it the eighth African nation to progress to the knockout round at this year’s tournament.

    Speaking after the final whistle, Wissa reflected on the magnitude of the moment, noting the heavy expectations the squad carried heading into the fixture. “The weight on our shoulders was hard to bear,” he said. “We told ourselves we can’t give up, we have to get that win because getting a tie would kick us out. So we got that win.” Head coach Desabre highlighted his side’s characteristic resilience, adding: “We’re a team that knows how to respond when we concede a goal; we keep fighting with determination.”

    Wissa emphasized the national significance of the achievement, saying: “We’re going to savor this moment because it’s been tough. All the guys — the substitutes, those who’ve worn the jersey before, and those who’ll wear it tomorrow — we should be proud. Thank you to all the Congolese people; it’s for moments like these that we do what we do. We did it!”

    For Uzbekistan, the first World Cup appearance in the nation’s history ended in disappointment with three consecutive losses. Cannavaro, the former World Cup-winning captain with Italy, framed the campaign as a foundational experience for his young side. “I hope this tournament will give us big experience. I hope this experience will give us more motivation for the future,” he said.

  • What news reports from 1600s tell us about life in Mughal India

    What news reports from 1600s tell us about life in Mughal India

    Long before European printing presses turned newspapers into a mass information medium, the sprawling Mughal Empire of South Asia built one of the early modern world’s most sophisticated, far-reaching news networks. From the late 1500s onward, armies of trained scribes, court agents, and administrative secretaries produced regular documents called *akhbarat* — handwritten Persian bulletins that captured everything from royal court intrigue and military campaigns to official appointments, treasury updates, and even elite gossip.

    Drafted quickly on fragile paper, these hybrid documents served multiple purposes at once: they functioned as internal intelligence briefings, official government circulars, and public news bulletins rolled into one. On any given day, hundreds, and possibly thousands, of these reports circulated between the imperial court in Delhi and provincial administrative hubs across the subcontinent. For a empire that, at its 17th century peak, controlled most of South Asia and ruled nearly a quarter of the global population, this network was the glue that held its sprawling territories together. Many reports were read aloud to gathered local officials, carrying updates from the emperor’s court to the most distant corners of his domain.

    For decades, tens of thousands of pages of these *akhbarat*, along with complementary administrative orders and records, have rested dormant in archives and libraries across India and the United Kingdom. While the historical community has long been aware of their existence, very few scholars have ever committed to deep dives into these unindexed, massive collections. That changed when University of California, Berkeley historian Munis D. Faruqui dedicated nearly 20 years of his academic career to untangling the stories held within these documents.

    Faruqui began his work in 2007, diving into the *Akhbarat-i Darbar-i Mualla* (Newsletters of the Exalted Court), a massive collection split across archival institutions in both India and the UK. Working through more than 6,500 pages held at Kolkata’s National Library alone, Faruqui traced the lives of princes, military generals, court advisors, royal women, imperial eunuchs, and other lesser-known historical figures across tens of thousands of individual entries. The product of this decades-long work is an upcoming new history of Mughal emperor Aurangzeb — also known by his regnal title Alamgir — and the Mughal state during the late 17th century that promises to rewrite long-held assumptions about both the emperor and how his empire actually functioned.

    Today, four major collections of these *akhbarat* are confirmed to exist, held in London, Bikaner, Sitamau, and Kolkata, though historians suspect additional caches may be held in private collections. One large set of documents was stored for decades in bundles in the cool, dry basement of Jaipur Fort. In the early 1800s, James Tod, an East India Company official and early antiquarian, borrowed a large portion of these reports, but failed to return them when he departed for Britain in 1823. He later donated the entire collection to the library of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, where it remains today.

    The most extensive surviving collection is held at Kolkata’s National Library, which holds 21 full volumes of *akhbarat* specifically documenting the reign of Aurangzeb, who ruled the Mughal Empire from 1658 to 1707 as its last great expansionist emperor. These volumes were once part of the personal archive of Sir Jadunath Sarkar, the pioneering Indian historian and Aurangzeb’s most influential 20th century biographer.

    At first glance, the content of the reports can seem overwhelmingly mundane. Most entries focus on routine administrative details: new official appointments, local land disputes, troop movements, ceremonial gift exchanges, reports of royal illnesses, and endless granular administrative updates. But when read as a whole, Faruqui argues, these documents create something extraordinarily rare: an almost uninterrupted record of an empire monitoring its own day-to-day operations.

    Archival coverage of Aurangzeb’s first 20 years on the throne is spotty, but surviving material from the early 1680s onward is remarkably extensive, providing an almost daily record of court and empire life for years at a time. All together, the documents shed new light on roughly a third of Aurangzeb’s 49-year reign.

    Faruqui, who has spent his entire academic career studying late 17th century Mughal India — a period when the empire was at its territorial peak, but already showing early signs of the decline that would eventually open the door for British colonial rule — says the *akhbarat* have completely reshaped his understanding of the era. “My whole experience of working with the akhbarat has been one big eureka moment after another!” he explained in an interview. “It never ceases to amaze me how the density of the informational ecosystem was at the time.”

    The reports Faruqui studied were originally created for the Raja of Jaipur, but hundreds of other regional nobles, princes, and high officials almost certainly received similar regular updates from their own agents stationed across the empire. This created a connected information ecosystem that was remarkably advanced for the pre-modern world. “I am floored when I think about the ecosystem that spawned such rich knowledge gathering and transference,” Faruqui added.

    The sheer volume of information flowing through the network confirms that, by pre-modern standards, the Mughal state maintained a surprisingly detailed awareness of events across its vast territories. While Faruqui notes the state’s ability to act on this information was inconsistent, the network’s reach shaped the lives of tens of millions of people, for better and for worse.

    Time and again, the contents of the *akhbarat* upended long-held historical assumptions that Faruqui had accepted early in his career. For example, he found very little evidence in the reports of the widespread forced religious conversions that have long been closely associated with Aurangzeb’s rule. The research also revealed that the imperial harem and the corps of imperial eunuchs wielded far more political influence than most modern historians have recognized.

    Aurangzeb himself comes off as less distant and coldly austere than popular and historical narratives have often portrayed him. Faruqui also found far fewer hostile references to Sikh communities and leaders than he expected, a finding that contradicts a long-standing Sikh historical tradition that holds Aurangzeb responsible for the persecution of Sikh communities and spiritual leaders as early as 1711.

    Many of Faruqui’s most important discoveries came not from dramatic single revelations, but from noticing repeated patterns across hundreds of entries. One name that appeared again and again throughout the newsletters was Zinat-un-Nisa, Aurangzeb’s daughter. While historians have long known of her existence, almost nothing had been written about her actual role in Aurangzeb’s court. But entry after entry placed her at the center of key political events.

    Within weeks of starting his research, Faruqui realized Zinat-un-Nisa was far from a minor royal figure. He found she was a powerful political actor in her own right, and an “extraordinarily influential and important political bulwark for her ageing and politically vulnerable” father during the final years of his reign. She will now feature prominently in Faruqui’s new discussion of the political role of the Mughal imperial harem.

    Each new discovery forced Faruqui to rethink decades of established scholarship. “Many of the stories I had been telling myself since the 1990s [when I first heard about the akhbarat] required rethinking,” he said. The *akhbarat*, he argues, offer historians a once-in-a-generation chance to reassess not just Aurangzeb’s legacy, but the entire structure and function of the Mughal Empire.

    So why have most historians avoided working with these vast collections? Faruqui says he understands the hesitation. Early in his own career, he spent seven frustrating weeks working through another massive unindexed Mughal archive before ultimately abandoning the project. That experience left him wary of large, unorganized collections for nearly a decade.

    The *akhbarat* present exactly the same challenge. “Searching for anything in it is like hunting for a needle in a haystack,” he says. With no central index and tens of thousands of unorganized entries, working through the archive requires extraordinary patience, stamina, and a willingness to read hundreds of pages just to identify subtle patterns and critical information.

    Faruqui notes that Aurangzeb has remained one of the most debated figures in Indian history in part because of the sheer volume of surviving documentary evidence from his reign. While the surviving record for earlier Mughal emperors is relatively sparse, by Aurangzeb’s rule the documentary trail expands dramatically: administrative archives, private correspondence, regional court histories, biographical collections, poetry, European trading company records, and traveller accounts are all abundant.

    For Faruqui’s research, the *akhbarat* were irreplaceable, but they are only one small part of a much larger body of underused Mughal archival material. “Dozens of books, if not more, can be written based on all the materials that are out there waiting for intrepid historians to come along and utilise them,” he says.

    When Faruqui first opened the Kolkata collection nearly 20 years ago, he had no idea how transformative the material would be. “Upon turning the very first page of the first volume, I realised what an extraordinary resource this collection is,” he recalls. “I immediately saw storylines that had been long ignored or barely touched.”

    His upcoming book only explores a small fraction of the new historical narratives held in the collection. “There are so many, many others that remain to be explored by others,” he says.

  • Palantir: How a US spy-tech firm with links to Israel’s genocide infiltrated the British state

    Palantir: How a US spy-tech firm with links to Israel’s genocide infiltrated the British state

    Palantir Technologies, the U.S.-based data surveillance firm long mired in controversy over its ties to human rights violations in occupied Palestinian territories, has secured more than £670 million in public sector contracts across the United Kingdom’s civilian and defence industries since 2020, triggering fierce debate over both ethical accountability and national security risks from lawmakers and advocacy groups.

    The largest of these agreements include a £330 million data platform contract with the UK’s National Health Service (NHS), a £240 million military AI deal with the Ministry of Defence (MoD), and a £15 million contract linked to Britain’s national nuclear deterrent programme. Transparency advocates have documented at least 34 additional Palantir contracts across UK public sectors, including law enforcement, child social care, refugee resettlement initiatives, and environmental management, with many details of the agreements undisclosed to the public.

    International scrutiny of Palantir’s activities intensified after the company announced a partnership with Israel’s Ministry of Defence in January 2024 to deploy its technology for “war-related missions” in Gaza, where Israeli drone strikes using targeted technology have killed hundreds of civilian non-combatants, including journalists and humanitarian aid workers. When confronted with accusations that his company’s tools facilitated the deaths of Palestinian civilians in Gaza earlier this year, Palantir CEO Alex Karp publicly responded, “mostly terrorists, that’s true”.

    United Nations Special Rapporteur Francesca Albanese concluded that Karp’s comment confirms the company has “executive-level knowledge and purpose vis-a-vis the unlawful use of force by Israel” in occupied Palestinian territories. Separately, the U.S. Pentagon has launched an investigation into whether Palantir’s AI-powered targeting system Maven was involved in a February U.S. double-tap missile strike on an Iranian girls’ school that killed more than 170 people, the majority of whom were children.

    Human rights campaigners have condemned Palantir’s expanding footprint in UK public life. “Palantir’s software has been used to support Israel’s ongoing genocide and apartheid in occupied Gaza… a company profiting from human rights abuses should have no place in British public services, including in our NHS,” said Kristyan Benedict, crisis response manager at Amnesty International UK. “The contracts should be terminated and replaced with providers that are not contributing to genocide, apartheid and other international crimes.”

    Beyond its role in the Middle East conflict, Palantir has faced repeated criticism for its extreme ideological positioning. In a 22-point public manifesto outlining the company’s core goals, Palantir was widely condemned for promoting ethnic supremacist rhetoric, claiming that “Some cultures have produced vital advances; others remain dysfunctional and regressive” and asserting “No other country in the history of the world has advanced progressive values more than [the US]”. The manifesto also openly embraced the development of AI-powered autonomous weapons.

    Founded by right-wing U.S. tech billionaire Peter Thiel, with initial partial funding from the Central Intelligence Agency, Palantir is deeply tied to far-right U.S. political networks. Thiel, who once famously declared “I no longer believe that freedom and democracy are compatible”, is a top donor to the Republican Party and hosted a lavish celebration for Donald Trump’s 2025 presidential inauguration at his Washington D.C. home, attended by Vice President JD Vance and leading tech CEOs including Meta’s Mark Zuckerberg and OpenAI’s Sam Altman. Recent leaked documents have also exposed Thiel’s secretive annual “Dialog” retreats for 200 of the world’s wealthiest and most powerful figures, which have hosted panels on cult-building, extreme political preparation for World War III, and exploitative gender dynamics.

    Newly unsealed records from the Jeffrey Epstein investigation have also revealed unreported historical ties between Palantir’s leadership and the convicted sex offender. Epstein was the one who first introduced former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak to Thiel in 2013 and advised Barak to invest in or partner with Palantir. The records also confirm close ties between Epstein and disgraced former British ambassador to the U.S. Peter Mandelson, whose lobbying firm Global Counsel has long counted Palantir as a key client. Mandelson accompanied UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer on a visit to Palantir’s Washington D.C. headquarters in February 2025, and no meeting minutes have been released to the public, despite repeated Freedom of Information requests from independent media outlets including Middle East Eye.

    Just months after the Washington visit, in December 2025, Palantir secured its £240 million no-bid strategic partnership with the MoD to “boost military AI” and develop an integrated battlefield “kill chain” to improve attack lethality, a deal three times larger than a 2022 contract for similar work. When questioned about the non-disclosure of the 2025 Palantir briefing, Starmer described it as a “routine meeting”, while Mandelson called the subsequent US-UK Technology Prosperity Deal that included the Palantir partnership “my personal pride and joy”.

    Critics warn that Palantir’s penetration of the UK’s most sensitive national security systems, including its nuclear deterrent programme, creates unacceptable risks for the country, particularly given the UK government’s ongoing intelligence and military support for Israel’s military campaign in Gaza. “The British government is already deeply complicit in the genocide in Gaza. In making public services dependent on Palantir’s proprietary technology, successive UK governments will be less able to break free from this sordid company, and from its alignment with US foreign policy and militarism more broadly,” said Sam Perlo-Freedman, research coordinator at the Campaign Against the Arms Trade (CAAT). “The willingness of the British government to embrace Palantir shows their prioritisation of the interests of the arms industry, and of corporate power more generally.”

    In a statement to Middle East Eye, an MoD spokesperson defended the contracting process, saying, “There are robust processes in place to ensure government contracts are awarded fairly and transparently, including for the direct award of contracts. Commercial decisions are a matter for individual departments made based on their individual needs.” Palantir UK CEO Louis Mosley has maintained that none of the Israeli military systems publicly reported to be conducting targeting operations in Gaza use Palantir software, though he has acknowledged the company does supply software to the Israeli military.

    One of the most contentious of Palantir’s UK contracts is its 2023 £330 million agreement to build a centralised patient data platform for NHS England, which is up for renewal in 2027. Thiel has a long history of open hostility to the UK’s public health system, once saying the NHS “makes people sick” and describing British public support for the service as “Stockholm syndrome”. In early June 2025, cross-party MPs on the Science, Innovation and Technology Committee called on the government to exercise the 2027 break clause in the contract and replace Palantir with an in-house UK-developed alternative, warning that growing public sector reliance on Palantir creates an “unacceptable point of weakness” that could leave critical services “at the mercy” of foreign actors.

    Palantir first secured its foothold in the NHS during the Covid-19 pandemic, when it offered a struggling, cash-poor NHS an initial £1 contract to test its technology. Then-Health Secretary Matt Hancock used special ministerial powers to bypass national patient confidentiality rules to allow Palantir to process patient data. A 2023 report from the National Audit Office highlighted that the government’s chief commercial officer warned Palantir’s low-cost initial offer to gain a market foothold violated public procurement rules requiring open competition.

    Donald Campbell, director of advocacy at UK tech campaign group Foxglove, described this as a deliberate “land and expand” strategy, similar to a free-trial subscription model that locks public bodies into long-term reliance on Palantir’s services and allows the company to raise prices over time. “This might seem like a good deal, but with Big Tech there’s no such thing as a free lunch,” Campbell said. The strategy has already been called into question over a lobbying scandal: earlier this year, the Department for Health and Social Care’s permanent secretary Samantha Jones was forced to apologise for failing to declare past consultancy work with a Palantir partner firm while overseeing the awarding of the NHS contract. A DHSC spokesperson said Jones had no involvement in the contracting process and stepped down from all private sector roles before taking her position. NHS England maintains the contract was awarded through a “rigorous, competitive” tender process.

    Mosley has accused critics of prioritising “ideology over patient safety”, but multiple NHS hospital trusts have rejected Palantir’s technology, saying it would reduce rather than improve digital functionality. Campbell argues the ideological alignment of the company cannot be separated from the contract. “Ultimately, if Palantir is embedded across our vital public services, and the UK’s defence and security, and one day Trump decides he wants to exert some pressure by threatening to pull the plug, who are they going to listen to?”

    Concerns have also been raised over unregulated cross-sector data sharing between Palantir’s civilian and military systems. The company recently signed a $30 million contract with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and independent tech outlet 404 Media uncovered that Palantir is developing a tool called “Elite” that pulls data from U.S. Department of Health and Human Services records to locate undocumented people for deportation. The Doctors’ Association UK has warned that Palantir’s NHS data platform Foundry could be linked to Gotham, Palantir’s military-grade targeting software, creating unacceptable risks for patient confidentiality.

    Palantir’s growing presence extends to UK local government as well. In May 2025, Labour-run Coventry City Council renewed a £750,000 contract for Palantir to provide AI tools to summarise social worker notes for children’s services, despite opposition from councillors and trade unions who raised “serious ethical questions” about the partnership. A council spokesperson said the decision followed a “comprehensive strategic review” and that “strong safeguards are in place” to protect resident data, with no automated decision-making about individual cases.

    Financial questions have also been raised about the cost of Palantir’s contracts to UK taxpayers. Palantir initially provided its services for the UK government’s Homes for Ukraine refugee hosting programme for free for six months, before securing subsequent 12-month contracts that rose from £4.5 million to £5.5 million year-over-year. In 2026, a UK government department confirmed it saved millions of pounds after replacing Palantir’s system with an in-house built alternative. Additionally, Palantir paid an effective tax rate of just 8% on its £25.3 million in pre-tax UK profits in 2024, far below the 25% statutory rate for large businesses.

    In law enforcement, London Mayor Sadiq Khan initially blocked a proposed £50 million Metropolitan Police contract with Palantir in May 2025, citing clear, serious violations of procurement rules and noting the deal failed to demonstrate value for money, as well as his own “concerns about using public money to support firms who act contrary to London’s values”. But Khan reversed his decision after Palantir launched legal action against the veto, approving a 12-month pilot project with an option for extension. A 2025 investigation by Liberty Investigates found that a Palantir contract with East of England police forces will build a mass surveillance network that pulls together sensitive personal data including citizens’ political opinions, religious beliefs, health records, trade union membership, sexual orientation, and race. When the Good Law Project, a UK legal advocacy and campaign group, sent freedom of information requests to all 45 UK police forces, three quarters refused to confirm or deny whether they hold a contract with Palantir, deepening transparency concerns.

    Multiple human rights and open government advocates warn that Palantir’s expanding UK surveillance operations pose a fundamental threat to civil liberties, particularly amid the rise of far-right political forces in the UK. “A world where all the governments want hyper surveillance is a world where Palantir is super profitable,” said Duncan McCann, head of tech and data at the Good Law Project. McCann noted that the core risk is not that Palantir will sell public data, but that it enables governments to use mass surveillance for authoritarian ends, a dynamic that is particularly dangerous as the far-right Reform Party pushes for mass deportation programmes. “Ultimately, surveillance works well with the new far right, and it works really well for Palantir, and that is why they seem such great bedfellows. This is why it has evolved into a firm which is turbocharging fascism and authoritarianism.”

  • Why Kim Jong Un never talks about his mother – or her controversial bloodline

    Why Kim Jong Un never talks about his mother – or her controversial bloodline

    For 15 years of leadership under Kim Jong Un, one secret has remained among the most tightly guarded in the isolated authoritarian state: the public identity of his mother. Within North Korea’s ruling ideology, the legitimacy of the Kim family’s dynastic rule hinges entirely on the mythologized “Mount Paektu bloodline”—a lineage tied to Dangun, the legendary founder of the Korean people, and cultivated for decades to frame the Kims as inherently entitled to power. But the truth of Kim Jong Un’s maternal heritage directly undermines this foundational narrative, making his mother’s identity not just a state secret, but a potential existential threat to the regime.

    Mount Paektu, the volcanic peak straddling the China-North Korea border, has long been central to the Kim dynasty’s legitimacy-building. Myth holds it is the birthplace of Dangun, founder of Korea’s first ancient kingdom. Centuries later, North Korea’s founding leader Kim Il Sung framed the mountain as his guerrilla hideout during Japan’s colonial occupation of the Korean Peninsula, while his son and successor Kim Jong Il was officially proclaimed to have been born on the mountain’s sacred slopes—despite widespread evidence of his actual birth in the Soviet Union. As former exiled North Korean diplomat Ryu Hyun-woo noted in his book *Kim Jong Un’s Secret Vault*, Kim Jong Un’s rise to power as an untested man in his 20s was enabled solely by this carefully constructed Paektu bloodline narrative.

    The reality of Kim’s maternal origins tells a far different story. Historians and biographers have documented that Kim Jong Un’s mother, Ko Yong Hui, was born in 1952 in Osaka, Japan, to ethnic Korean parents originally from Jeju Island, off the southern coast of modern-day South Korea. Ko’s family were Zainichi Koreans—ethnic Koreans who resided in Japan during its 1910–1945 colonial rule of Korea. When Ko was around 10 years old, her family joined an estimated 93,000 Zainichi Koreans who resettled in North Korea between 1959 and 1984, lured by state promises of free healthcare, education, and stable employment.

    While early Zainichi migrants were initially envied for the cash, clothing, and appliances they brought from Japan, they were quickly labeled “jjaepo”—a derogatory term for people deemed contaminated by foreign capitalist ideologies. Under North Korea’s strict hierarchical social classification system called songbun, jjaepo fall into the “wavering class,” positioned between the regime’s trusted core class and the marginalized hostile class. They face constant state surveillance and are routinely barred from elite universities and high-level government positions. This stands in stark contradiction to the regime’s narrative of pure, sacred Paektu bloodline. “The [regime’s] Paektu bloodline is seen as sacred,” explains Kim Hyung-su of the Northern Research Association. “So the idea of the leader being a jjaepo’s son is unimaginable.”

    Unlike most Zainichi Korean migrants, Ko avoided the lower-caste fate of her community after catching the attention of Kim Jong Il, who was already being groomed as Kim Il Sung’s successor. At the time, Kim Jong Il was already in an arranged political marriage to Kim Young Sook, daughter of a high-ranking military official, and had two other known mistresses. But Ko, a performer with the elite Mansudae Art Troupe, won Kim Jong Il’s attention through her natural beauty and dancing skill, according to Japanese journalist Yoji Gomi, who published a book on Ko in 2025. The pair went on to have three children together, though their relationship was never officially recognized by the North Korean regime.

    Because children born outside of official wedlock carry severe social stigma in North Korea, Ko and her children were sequestered in the coastal town of Wonsan, 130 miles outside of Pyongyang, where Kim Jong Il’s official wife resided. Even so, Gomi notes Ko lived what he describes as a “Cinderella-like life” of elite privilege hidden from public view. Still, she was never publicly recognized as Kim Il Sung’s daughter-in-law, and the founding leader never appeared in public with Ko’s children. Dr. Cheong Seong-chang of the Sejong Institute notes that if Ko had won Kim Il Sung’s approval, photos of him with his grandchildren would have been widely distributed to the public.

    After Kim Il Sung’s death in 1994, Kim Jong Il took power, and Ko became the de facto first lady of North Korea. She accompanied Kim on military inspections, built close ties to his inner circle, and even was consulted on policy decisions before they were finalized, according to Kenji Fujimoto, Kim Jong Il’s former personal chef. A 2011 state documentary included footage of Ko joining Kim on local tours, but it never named her or disclosed her social background. The film was only screened for senior party officials in 2012 before it was leaked, spreading to ordinary citizens via smuggled USB drives. “As it spread… people’s curiosity about Ko Yong Hui skyrocketed, so the regime quickly recalled [the documentary],” Dr. Cheong explains, adding that her background could directly call the regime’s legitimacy into question. Ko died of breast cancer at a Paris hospital in 2004, and her death was never acknowledged or reported by North Korean state media.

    The question of how Kim Jong Un, the second son of an unacknowledged mistress, ultimately inherited power begins with the elimination of other potential heirs. Kim Jong Il’s official wife only had daughters, who were barred from succession under the dynasty’s patriarchal norms. His first son with another mistress, Kim Jong Nam, was long considered a potential candidate until he fell out of favor: Gomi, who corresponded with Kim Jong Nam for years, notes that he openly questioned North Korea’s hereditary system and advocated for political reform, and gained a reputation for a jet-setting, party-focused lifestyle that included frequent trips to foreign casinos. After years in exile in Macau, Kim Jong Nam was assassinated with a lethal nerve agent at a Malaysian airport in 2017. Kim Jong Un’s older brother Kim Jong Chul was also ruled out, with former diplomat Ryu reporting that he was disqualified due to a severe opium addiction.

    Ko, aware that her family would face peril if her son did not take power, actively pushed to position Kim Jong Un as the next heir on the advice of her own sister, according to journalist Anna Fifield in her book *The Great Successor: The Secret Rise and Rule of Kim Jong Un*. Kim Jong Un quickly became his father’s favorite, with analysts citing his strong leadership demeanor and competitive nature. Though he briefly studied in Switzerland as a teenager, he remained far more isolated from foreign influence than his older half-brother Kim Jong Nam. When Kim Jong Il died in 2011, 27-year-old Kim Jong Un secured his position as the third supreme leader of North Korea, and has since elevated his sister Kim Yo Jong to a senior role leading the country’s powerful propaganda department, according to South Korea’s Unification Ministry.

    Even after more than a decade in power, the secret of his mother’s origins continues to shape the North Korean leader’s public behavior. Analysts point to the fact that Kim Jong Un’s birthday has never been declared a national holiday, unlike the birthdays of his grandfather and father—drawing attention to his birth would inevitably raise uncomfortable questions about his mother and his childhood sequestration outside Pyongyang. Experts also argue that his decision to publicly introduce his wife Ri Sol Ju early in his rule was shaped by this secrecy: unlike Ko, Ri comes from an upper-middle class Pyongyang family with a solid songbun status, a former singer with an elite performance troupe who studied classical music in China, per South Korean intelligence.

    “The sense of illegitimacy and resentment Kim Jong Un experienced because of his mother’s background paradoxically became a powerful motivation for him to publicly reveal his wife Ri Sol Ju and daughter Ju Ae at an early stage,” Gomi says, adding these public displays stem from a “perceived ‘deficiency’” surrounding Ko’s origins. For the North Korean regime, the risk of this secret coming to light is catastrophic. Ryu argues that if Ko’s Japanese-born Zainichi Korean origins became widely known to the North Korean public, “it would not only shake his legitimacy but also destabilise the hereditary system at its roots. It would have the impact of a nuclear bomb on North Korean society.”

  • Trump bombs Iran after strike on cargo ship in Strait of Hormuz

    Trump bombs Iran after strike on cargo ship in Strait of Hormuz

    Tensions in the Middle East reignited dramatically on Friday when former U.S. President Donald Trump announced the resumption of military strikes against Iranian targets, just days after the two sides reached a fragile ceasefire memorandum and hours after an alleged drone attack on a commercial cargo vessel in the strategically critical Strait of Hormuz. The escalation comes as the U.S., Israel, and Lebanon signed a separate trilateral framework to de-escalate conflict along the Israel-Lebanon border, raising urgent questions about whether regional ceasefire efforts can hold.

  • Damascus races to reassure Beirut as Trump pushes Syria to take on Hezbollah

    Damascus races to reassure Beirut as Trump pushes Syria to take on Hezbollah

    In recent months, successive public statements from U.S. President Donald Trump suggesting Syria take charge of addressing the Hezbollah issue have rekindled deep-seated anxiety in Lebanon over a potential return of Syrian military involvement to the country, even as Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa and his administration have repeatedly rejected any plans for armed intervention. Trump’s increasingly explicit framing of a Syrian role has also exposed apparent inconsistencies in the Biden administration’s earlier messaging, directly contradicting a previous categorical denial from U.S. Ambassador to Syria Tom Barrack, who dismissed claims Washington had pressured Damascus to deploy troops into Lebanon as “false and inaccurate.”

    The most recent comments from Trump came during a June 21 interview with Fox News, where the U.S. leader expressed open disappointment with Israel’s ongoing campaign against Hezbollah, criticizing the operation for its widespread collateral damage. “They can’t do anything without knocking buildings down,” Trump told the outlet, adding “I’m close to giving it over to Syria.” Notably, Trump offered no additional context to clarify his use of the phrase “giving it over,” leaving observers uncertain whether he was referencing a full-scale Syrian military operation, regional political mediation, targeted pressure on Hezbollah, enhanced cross-border security coordination, or expanded cooperation with Lebanon’s central government. Even so, his remarks mark the latest in a string of public signals that the White House has actively explored assigning Damascus a formal role in managing the Lebanese armed group.

    The discourse around a potential Syrian involvement first emerged in public view on March 17, when Reuters published a report claiming U.S. officials had encouraged Damascus to consider deploying military forces into eastern Lebanon to support efforts to disarm Hezbollah. Citing five anonymous sources with direct knowledge of the behind-the-scenes talks, the outlet noted that Syrian officials had already expressed reluctance to move forward with the proposal, warning that intervention could drag Syria into a wider regional conflict and reignite volatile sectarian tensions in both Syria and Lebanon. According to the report, the proposal was first raised during bilateral talks between U.S. and Syrian officials in 2025, before being revisited in late February, shortly after the outbreak of the U.S.-Israeli war on Iran. Within hours of the report’s publication, Barrack issued a forceful public rejection of the claims, writing on the social platform X that “Reporting regarding the United States encouraging Syria to send forces into Lebanon is false and inaccurate.”

    Despite these denials, regional outlet Middle East Eye (MEE) subsequently reported that Sharaa held a meeting with leaders of Syrian armed factions shortly after the Reuters report to discuss the circulating claims. A Syrian source briefed on the gathering told MEE that “Those present agreed that Syria had neither the intention nor the desire to intervene militarily in Lebanon.” A separate senior Lebanese source also confirmed to MEE that Lebanese authorities in Beirut had received multiple formal reassurances that Damascus had no plans to deploy troops across the shared border. The outlet further reported that Syrian officials have begun coordinating with regional allies including Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey to push back against U.S. pressure for intervention. A second senior Syrian source told MEE that to avoid directly complying with Washington’s demands, Sharaa has laid out a series of preconditions for any Syrian involvement that would be nearly impossible for the U.S. to meet.

    Trump first floated the idea of a Syrian role in Lebanon publicly during a June 5 appearance on NBC’s *Meet the Press*, where he called for a more “surgical” campaign against Hezbollah and suggested Washington could either directly assist the effort or “recommend Syria” take the lead. “We can help them with that, or we can recommend Syria,” Trump said at the time, praising Sharaa and claiming the Syrian leader “would love to help.” While that initial stop stopped short of an explicit call for Syrian troops to enter Lebanon, Trump adopted a far more direct tone during a press availability at the G7 summit in Evian-les-Bains, France, on June 16. “I suggested to Israel to let Syria take care of Hezbollah, because, to be honest with you, I think they do a better job of doing it,” he told reporters. He doubled down on his criticism of Israel’s campaign, arguing it has progressed too slowly, caused unnecessary civilian casualties, and destroyed large swathes of residential infrastructure. He also reiterated his praise for Sharaa, claiming the Syrian leader has done an “amazing job” consolidating state control across Syria and “does not like” Hezbollah.

    The following day, when pressed by reporters to confirm whether he had directly discussed the Hezbollah issue with Sharaa, Trump confirmed the conversation had occurred but declined to share whether the Syrian leader had agreed to take on a role, saying only that he would address the matter at a later date. The exchange confirmed that Trump’s proposal was not merely an abstract suggestion for Israeli policymakers, but that the prospect of a Syrian role had already been raised directly with the Damascus government.

    In recent weeks, Sharaa has moved aggressively to quell growing speculation over potential intervention. During a June 11 meeting with dignitaries from the Damascus countryside, he dismissed reports of an imminent Syrian military entry into Lebanon as baseless rumors. Later, in an interview with Al Arabiya, Syrian presidential adviser Ahmed Muwaffaq Zaidan confirmed that Washington had proposed Syrian involvement amid the ongoing regional escalation, but said Damascus had rejected any military or security role in Lebanon. He added that Syria supports extending the authority of Lebanon’s central government across all of its territory, but that this goal should be achieved by strengthening Lebanese state institutions rather than deploying Syrian troops.

    Sharaa expanded on this position in a June 21 interview with Al Mashhad TV, pushing back against claims that Trump’s comments were a signal Syrian forces would enter Lebanon imminently. He argued Trump’s remarks had been misinterpreted, explaining that the U.S. president had raised concerns over the ongoing war and discussed potential Syrian contributions to a peaceful, secure resolution, rather than calling for an invasion. Sharaa emphasized that Syria’s top priority is ending the war and halting Israeli bombardment, noting that Damascus has discussed political, economic, and social pathways forward with U.S. officials. “Our vision is based on supporting the Lebanese state once again, strengthening its institutions, and seeking a solution that everyone believes in,” he said. “We are looking for economic channels between Lebanon and Syria, not military ones.” Sharaa also noted that Damascus is open to dialogue with all Lebanese political factions, including Hezbollah, acknowledging that the group’s role in Syria’s civil war left a “deep Syrian wound” but adding he would meet with Hezbollah representatives if it advanced the shared interests of both Lebanon and Syria.

    Lebanese President Joseph Aoun welcomed Sharaa’s public clarification, saying the reassurances had been well received in Beirut and helped put an end to rampant speculation over a Syrian military role. While Syrian statements have eased immediate public anxiety in Lebanon’s capital, Trump’s repeated calls for a Syrian role, paired with conflicting accounts of earlier U.S.-Syrian talks, have left lingering, unresolved questions about what role Washington ultimately expects Damascus to play in the future of Hezbollah and Lebanese stability.

  • Hezbollah supporters protest in Beirut against Israel deal

    Hezbollah supporters protest in Beirut against Israel deal

    Fresh turmoil has erupted in Lebanon’s capital Beirut after hundreds of Hezbollah supporters launched mass street demonstrations opposing a landmark framework agreement brokered by the United States between Beirut and Jerusalem to end months of cross-border fighting. The protests, which stretched from late Friday into Saturday, saw demonstrators cruise through central Beirut, near the national parliament building, and along the key airport highway on motorbikes and mopeds, just hours after the deal was formally announced in Washington.

    Local media and social media footage captured crowds of protesters gathering in Dahieh, Hezbollah’s stronghold in southern Beirut — a neighborhood that was heavily damaged by Israeli airstrikes during the recent escalation of hostilities. Lebanon’s state-run National News Agency (NNA) confirmed that some demonstrators blocked a major arterial road near the prime minister’s office, while other groups used burning tires to shut down the airport road. Lebanese military forces intervened to disperse the blockading protesters, reopened the route, and deployed temporary security checkpoints across multiple districts of Beirut to contain unrest.

    The framework deal, hammered out over five rounds of direct negotiations between Israeli and Lebanese delegations in the U.S. capital, outlines a pilot plan that would see Lebanese armed forces take control of two small parcels of territory currently held by Israeli troops, alongside a formal process aimed at disarming Hezbollah, the Iran-aligned militant group that has long operated as a de facto military force independent of the Lebanese state. Critically, the agreement leaves the timeline and conditions for a full Israeli withdrawal from all occupied areas of southern Lebanon undefined, tying any pullout to improved security conditions and the elimination of what Israel defines as threats to its territory — effectively making full withdrawal dependent on the completion of Hezbollah’s disarmament.

    Hezbollah has repeatedly rejected any demand to surrender its weapons as long as Israeli occupation of Lebanese territory remains in place and the country faces security threats from Israel. Hassan Fadlallah, a senior Hezbollah member of Lebanon’s parliament, issued a stark warning Friday, arguing that Lebanese national authorities would only be able to enforce the Washington-brokered deal if they launched a civil war against the group with backing from the U.S. He added that the agreement was an intentional effort to undermine a prior U.S.-Iran understanding designed to prevent a full-scale regional war that would engulf Lebanon, and that no provision of the deal would be implemented without Hezbollah’s acquiescence.

    Even as protests unfolded in Beirut, cross-border activity continued Saturday: the NNA reported that an Israeli military drone carried out a strike in the Nabatieh region of southern Lebanon, and a second drone dropped an explosive sound device near a Lebanese army checkpoint in the town of Nabatieh al-Fawqa.

    Fadlallah reaffirmed that Hezbollah would actively resist all attempts to enforce the deal, and that the group would only strengthen its hold on its weapons stockpiles. He emphasized that Hezbollah’s opposition is uncompromising and would block the Lebanese government from meeting any of its commitments under the framework, but stressed that the group has no intention of clashing with the Lebanese national army. “The army will remain, the resistance will remain and the people will remain,” Fadlallah said.

    Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu welcomed the deal, framing it as a diplomatic victory that allows Israeli forces to maintain their occupation of southern Lebanon until Hezbollah is fully disarmed. He positioned the agreement as a significant setback to Iran, which has long backed Hezbollah as a proxy force. “Iran is trying to force us into a withdrawal from southern Lebanon by force. In effect, Israel, Lebanon, and the United States are telling them: this is none of your business,” Netanyahu said.

    A senior anchor on Israel’s Channel 12 echoed a common strategic reading of the deal, noting that sowing internal division in Lebanon has long been a core Israeli policy goal. “It seems we’re leading Lebanon to a civil war. Maybe it’s not so bad for us, let the Lebanese government fight Hezbollah… That’s been the goal from the start,” the anchor said.

    The emerging standoff over the framework agreement has already raised fears of renewed domestic unrest in Lebanon, a country already grappling with a years-long economic collapse and the lingering fallout of months of cross-border conflict between Israel and Hezbollah.

  • Iran and US trade attacks in worst escalation since peace deal

    Iran and US trade attacks in worst escalation since peace deal

    Tensions between Iran and the United States have surged to their most dangerous level since the two parties signed an interim peace deal to end a four-month conflict, after a pair of consecutive days of reciprocal strikes that have threatened stability across a critical global waterway.

    The spiral of violence was triggered by an attack on a cargo vessel on Thursday, after which both sides traded accusations that the other had broken the terms of the ceasefire agreement. Washington immediately pinned responsibility for the assault on Tehran.

    Just two days later, the United Kingdom’s leading maritime security watchdog, UK Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO), confirmed another incident: a commercial tanker was hit by an unguided projectile while transiting the Strait of Hormuz. The strike caused significant damage to the vessel’s bridge, but official updates confirmed that all crew members escaped unharmed, and no leakage of fuel or cargo has resulted in environmental damage to the strait’s waters.

    In response to the string of recent hostile incidents, the Joint Maritime Information Center — a multinational naval coalition tasked with safeguarding commercial shipping in the region — has announced an upward adjustment to its regional security threat level, stepping up defensive patrols and alerting commercial operators to increased risks.

    On Saturday, Iranian officials confirmed that they had launched what they described as “defensive” strikes against military targets with links to the United States. The operation was framed as a direct response to US airstrikes that hit Iranian facilities on the country’s southern coast the previous day. Tehran condemned the US attack as a “barbaric air strike” that targeted coastal surveillance outposts, arguing that the action violated core principles of the United Nations Charter.

    While Iran’s foreign ministry declined to disclose the exact locations of its retaliatory strikes, Bahrain — which hosts the US Navy’s Fifth Fleet — issued a formal condemnation of what it called an Iranian drone strike on Bahraini territory.

    For its part, the US military defended its own pre-emptive strikes, saying they were carried out in direct response to an Iranian drone attack on the cargo vessel in the Strait of Hormuz.

    The Strait of Hormuz, one of the world’s most vital chokepoints for global energy supplies, has seen a resumption of regular commercial traffic over the past two weeks after months of disruptive tensions. In that period, Iran has moved aggressively to assert its sovereign authority over shipping transiting the waterway, requiring vessels to obtain Iranian approval to use designated transit channels. While Tehran has not issued an official comment on specific reports of attacks on commercial ships, Iranian state television reported that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps had fired warning shots at vessels that attempted to use unapproved channels. The incident has pushed a growing number of commercial shipping operators to apply for Iranian transit permits before entering the strait.

    US Vice President JD Vance issued a public statement reaffirming that Washington had fully abided by the terms of the ceasefire agreement, and placed sole blame for the renewed escalation on Iran. “Iran signed a ceasefire agreement. We have honored it. If they have disagreements about how the MOU is being applied, they can pick up the phone. But violence will be met with violence,” Vance wrote in a post on the social platform X.