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  • At least 18 pupils and teacher killed after school roof collapses in Pakistan

    At least 18 pupils and teacher killed after school roof collapses in Pakistan

    A devastating structural failure has struck a school in the north-western Pakistani city of Peshawar, resulting in one of the deadliest education sector incidents in the region in recent months. Local authoritative sources confirmed to the BBC that at least 18 students and one educator have been confirmed dead following the sudden collapse of the school’s roof.

    Emergency response officials have also documented that 40 additional people are being treated for injuries sustained in the collapse, with multiple patients listed in critical condition as of the latest update. Rescue operations are currently ongoing at the disaster site, where operational teams warn that several children may still remain trapped beneath the collapsed rubble.

    This is an active, developing breaking news story. BBC journalists continue working on the ground to gather additional verified details, and full updates will be made public as more information is confirmed. Readers can access the latest version of this coverage by refreshing the BBC News webpage. For real-time breaking news alerts directly to mobile devices, users can enable notifications through the BBC News mobile application, or follow the official @BBCBreaking account on the social platform X for instantaneous updates.

  • Why have Saudi air defences failed to intercept Houthi missiles?

    Why have Saudi air defences failed to intercept Houthi missiles?

    For nearly a decade, Yemen’s Houthi movement has proven it can strike deep into Saudi Arabia, targeting everything from critical energy infrastructure to the heart of the kingdom’s capital. But a recent wave of repeated missile and drone assaults on Riyadh’s primary international airport has reignited urgent debate over the fundamental limits of Saudi Arabia’s multi-billion-dollar advanced air defense network, as renewed fighting across Yemen pushes tensions to new highs.

    Since October 6 alone, these cross-border attacks have left at least 20 people dead and nearly 400 injured. The deadliest single assault on October 10 claimed 12 lives and wounded more than 300 people. Following the barrage, Saudi authorities pledged a “serious” retaliatory response, and within 24 hours, Saudi airstrikes hit energy facilities in Yemen’s capital Sanaa, triggering large-scale fires and explosions that shook the city. This escalation begs two critical questions: How have Houthi projectiles repeatedly bypassed Riyadh’s defensive shield, and what does this reveal about the kingdom’s ability to safeguard its most vital assets?

    Saudi Arabia has poured billions of dollars into assembling one of the world’s most cutting-edge air defense arsenals, purpose-built to counter exactly the kind of threats the Houthis now pose. Its inventory includes U.S.-manufactured MIM-104 Patriot systems, featuring the advanced PAC-3 variant with hit-to-kill interception technology, as well as the even more sophisticated Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system. Both platforms have a proven track record of intercepting ballistic missiles in combat. The kingdom also fields a modern, well-equipped air force with advanced F-15 fighters and Eurofighter Typhoons, designed to engage low-flying drones and cruise missiles.

    Yet Houthi missiles and drones continue to evade or penetrate these defenses, laying bare the steep challenges of securing an enormous territory and its high-value targets against sustained, asymmetric attacks. Nicholas Heras, interim executive director of the Middle East Policy Council and senior director at the New Lines Institute, explains that Saudi Arabia’s massive landmass leaves it uniquely vulnerable to attacks launched from northern Yemen.

    “Much of Saudi territory is desert, which makes it challenging to fully defend because of the distances that must be accounted for – and it costs more to have personnel maintain early warning systems in that terrain,” Heras told Middle East Eye. “The Houthis have a target-rich environment in Saudi Arabia that includes some of the most important oil infrastructure in the world that are more immediately exposed to the drone and missile attack capabilities that the Houthis possess.”

    Heras added that the strikes on Riyadh were a deliberate calculated signal to the Saudi leadership amid the resumption of large-scale fighting. “The Houthis perceived a gap in Saudi capability and attention span and struck Riyadh to send a signal to Saudi Arabia that if Sanaa is hit, Riyadh will be hit,” he said.

    Federico Borsari, a defense expert at the Centre for European Policy Analysis (CEPA), argues the recent assaults reflect a strategic escalation in the Houthis’ willingness to target core Saudi territory, rather than a sudden leap in entirely new military capabilities. The group has held long-range strike capabilities for close to a decade, and first targeted Riyadh back in 2017.

    “Since then, their arsenal has further expanded to include increasingly sophisticated ballistic and cruise missiles built with Iranian help,” Borsari told MEE. “But without evidence it is hard to tell whether some new capabilities were used.”

    For Borsari, the most worrying development is not any new weapon, but the Houthis’ demonstrated ability to carry out coordinated, repeated strikes against heavily defended targets. He also noted the timing of the attacks lines up with a deliberate strategy to impose tangible economic and political costs on Saudi Arabia as fighting resumes across Yemen.

    Freddy Khoueiry, lead Middle East and North Africa and defense analyst at risk intelligence firm RANE, echoed that uncertainty over whether the breaches stem from new Houthi technology.

    “Based on publicly available information, it is still difficult to determine whether the Riyadh attacks represent a specific new technological upgrade or simply a decision to employ existing capabilities more aggressively against civilian aviation infrastructure,” he told MEE. “In either case, the escalation is significant because the Houthis are demonstrating both the capability and willingness to impose direct costs on the Saudi capital.”

    Mohammed al-Basha, a risk analyst with the Virginia-based Basha Report, pointed out that the Houthis have spent years refining their long-range strike tactics through repeated practice, even on failed attacks. “For years, the Houthis have used their attacks on Israel to refine their long-range strike capabilities,” he told MEE. “What appeared to be failed attacks were also opportunities to learn and adapt.”

    Al-Basha said the group has likely applied lessons learned from these regional attacks, as well as from Iran’s confrontations with the U.S. and Israel, to improve their ability to outmaneuver sophisticated air defense networks. “Saudi Arabia has invested heavily in Patriot, Thaad, and other systems, but its vast territory makes comprehensive protection difficult,” he said. “The Houthis do not need to overwhelm the entire network. One successful strike can cause significant damage and disruption.”

    The repeated breaches have also sparked questions about whether Saudi Arabia maintains a large enough stockpile of interceptors to sustain defenses through a prolonged campaign. After years of steady use in the wider regional standoff with Iran, Riyadh’s interceptor supplies may now be depleted. Repeated waves of drone and missile attacks can rapidly consume the high-cost interceptors required to stop incoming threats, and the U.S. has also drawn down its own stocks of Patriot and THAAD interceptors to support other conflicts, creating supply chain pressures that could take years to reverse.

    Borsari called interceptor depletion a “credible explanation” for the recent defensive failures, though he warned against framing it as the only possible cause. He noted recent media reports have already suggested Riyadh was facing shortages of ballistic missile interceptors ahead of the latest wave of attacks. “If true, this would create difficult operational trade-offs for air-defence commanders when deciding which threats to engage, how many interceptors to allocate, etc,” he said. “These decisions become even more problematic during mass salvos.”

    Another factor that works in the Houthis’ favor is their tactic of saturating Saudi defenses by launching mixed salvos of different weapon types at once, combining one-way attack drones, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles. Even the most advanced, layered air defense systems cannot guarantee 100% interception of every incoming projectile during a sustained bombardment.

    Borsari said it would be “naive to deny” that the Riyadh strikes raise “serious questions” about the effectiveness of Saudi Arabia’s ballistic missile defenses, particularly their ability to protect fixed, high-value targets under repeated attack. Khoueiry similarly argued that the strikes are less evidence of “a fundamental deficiency” in Saudi air defenses than a stark reminder that even the most advanced systems have inherent limits.

    “Saudi Arabia has to defend a very large territory and prioritize coverage around major cities, military sites and critical infrastructure, while interceptor availability is also under pressure,” he said. “Direct ballistic-missile impacts could reflect those constraints, but on their own they do not prove a severe interceptor shortage.”

    “We don’t know what the specific cause of this failure is,” Borsari said of the recent breaches. He noted that an air defense network’s overall effectiveness relies on multiple interconnected components, not just advanced interceptors. “The effectiveness of a defensive network depends not simply on the sophistication of its interceptors but also on sensor coverage and integration, proficient C2 (command and control), ammunition availability, etc. So it could be any of these, or – most likely – a combination thereof.”

    Saudi Arabia’s geography only amplifies these challenges. Its airports, oil facilities, ports, and military bases are spread across thousands of kilometers of land, making continuous, full-coverage protection extremely expensive and logistically difficult to sustain.

    “The main challenge is detection, and for that you need to rely on various assets, including aircraft, to ensure proper early warning,” Borsari said. “But maintaining such a detection regime over time is very costly and a sustainment burden on both the equipment and personnel.”

    While lower-cost options for countering drones do exist, including automated anti-drone turrets and low-cost short-range interceptors, these require supporting infrastructure and careful integration into existing defense networks to work effectively. “So I’m afraid we will continue to see drones penetrating Saudi territory for the foreseeable future,” Borsari added.

    For Khoueiry, the latest Houthi strikes, paired with recent Iranian attacks on U.S. and regional targets, are part of a broader, coordinated learning curve for Iran and its regional partners, who are actively adapting their tactics to defeat layered air defense systems, rather than relying on luck. “Iran and its partners appear to be learning how to operate against layered air defence networks, adapting flight routes and tactics to improve penetration and impose higher interception and economic costs,” he said.

    “The lesson for Saudi Arabia and the wider region is that increasingly sophisticated air defences still need dense surveillance, sufficient interceptor stocks and constant adaptation to keep pace with evolving missile and drone threats.”

  • Australian woman charged with lacing colleague’s curry with snail poison

    Australian woman charged with lacing colleague’s curry with snail poison

    A shocking case of workplace poisoning has emerged in Western Australia, where a 43-year-old local woman has been formally charged with intentionally contaminating her romantic partner’s homemade curry with lethal snail poison, law enforcement officials have confirmed. The incident dates back to February this year, when the 58-year-old alleged victim brought a batch of homemade curry to her workplace to share with colleagues during a morning tea gathering. After the group finished their shared meal, the leftovers were stored at the office for the victim to eat later during her lunch break.

    When the victim returned to consume the leftover curry, she immediately spotted unusual bright green granules scattered through the food that were not present when she originally prepared the dish. Curious about the strange additive, she took a small taste, and quickly developed a disturbing numbness on her tongue – a clear warning sign that something dangerous had been added to her meal.

    Rather than discarding the food, the victim turned the contaminated curry over to investigating police officers, who launched a months-long probe into the suspected poisoning. Forensic testing later confirmed that the unknown substance was metaldehyde, a toxic active ingredient commonly found in commercial snail and slug pellets used to kill garden pests. Western Australia Police Commissioner Col Blanch emphasized to reporters that this type of poison is capable of causing severe permanent injury or even death if consumed in sufficient quantities. “We’re just very thankful that the person who tasted the curry was aware of something that wasn’t quite right,” Blanch told reporters in comments published by Australia’s Seven Network.

    Investigators have also uncovered key pre-incident behavior that links the accused to the contamination: police allege the 43-year-old suspect, who is in a romantic relationship with the victim, visited an on-site chemical storage shed shortly before returning to the staffroom where the leftover curry was being stored. Following the months-long investigation, the accused has been charged with one count of endangering the life, health, and safety of another person. She is scheduled to make her first court appearance on 5 November, and has not been publicly named to protect ongoing investigative processes.

  • Desperate to clear toxic haze, Indonesia to douse its skies with dry ice

    Desperate to clear toxic haze, Indonesia to douse its skies with dry ice

    Indonesia is facing the most catastrophic wildfire crisis it has seen in ten years, with an exceptionally powerful El Niño weather pattern amplifying severe drought conditions that have turned small blazes into uncontrollable infernos raging across rainforests and carbon-rich peatlands. As thick, toxic smog continues to blanket large swathes of the archipelago and drift across international borders to neighboring countries, authorities are turning to an untested experimental technique to clear the hazardous haze.

    On Thursday, a specialized trial is set to launch in South Sumatra, one of the regions worst impacted by the ongoing crisis, where an aircraft will dump 1.5 tons of solid carbon dioxide, commonly known as dry ice, into the lower atmosphere. Unlike conventional haze mitigation strategies already in use across the country, this new approach does not aim to trigger rainfall. Instead, according to Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs Dudung Abdurachman, the dry ice will work to break apart trapped haze particles, allowing them to rise out of lower atmospheric layers where they accumulate and threaten public health. If the pilot trial delivers successful results, officials plan to roll out the technique to other severely affected hotspots, including Central Kalimantan and surrounding areas.

    For weeks, Indonesian authorities and their counterparts in neighboring Malaysia have relied on cloud seeding, a well-established weather modification method that works by dispersing compounds like silver iodide into clouds to encourage the condensation of water vapor and trigger rainfall that clears haze and douses fire hotspots. Additional cloud seeding operations are still scheduled for Thursday and Friday in Central Kalimantan, even as the new dry ice trial gets underway. On the ground, hundreds of firefighters have been working around the clock to contain the spreading blazes, and dozens of helicopters have been deployed to support water bombing efforts. However, thick haze has repeatedly disrupted these operations, cutting visibility and making it difficult to target active fire hotspots.

    Local communities across South Sumatra and Kalimantan are currently bearing the full brunt of the crisis, with urban air turning a murky, toxic amber as pollutant concentrations spike well beyond safe limits. The smog has also crossed national boundaries, pushing air quality indexes into unhealthy ranges in Singapore and multiple regions of Malaysia, including the capital Kuala Lumpur and Johor Bahru, a southern city bordering Singapore. Malaysian authorities have launched their own cloud seeding operations to mitigate the cross-border haze, and last month Indonesia granted Malaysian teams approval to operate in Indonesian airspace along the shared border to expand these efforts.

    Data from independent forest monitoring platform Nusantara Atlas shows that more than one million fire hotspots have been detected across Indonesia so far in 2025, with the blazes already consuming nearly 900,000 hectares of land. Much of the public anger over the crisis has centered on agricultural corporations, which commonly use slash-and-burn tactics as a low-cost method to clear large tracts of land for plantation development. In response to widespread outrage, Indonesian police have launched sweeping investigations, naming over 200 individuals and nine major companies as official suspects linked to the illegal burning that sparked many of the ongoing wildfires.

    Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto has issued an urgent mandate to all relevant government agencies, calling for accelerated efforts to extinguish remaining wildfires and minimize the public health and economic impacts of the toxic smog that continues to emanate from active fire zones.

  • Houthi strikes mark the end of Saudi Arabia’s Yemen ‘containment strategy’

    Houthi strikes mark the end of Saudi Arabia’s Yemen ‘containment strategy’

    Ten years after Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman led Saudi Arabia into a costly war to oust the Houthi movement from power in Yemen, the kingdom’s years-long strategy to contain the group while pursuing ambitious domestic economic growth has collapsed—creating one of the most severe challenges to the crown prince’s rule since he took power, according to international analysts and diplomatic sources.

    The 2015 intervention quickly devolved into a deadly quagmire, draining Saudi state resources and drawing global condemnation over widespread civilian casualties from the kingdom’s bombing campaigns. By 2022, Riyadh chose to cut its losses, agreeing to an uneasy truce that held for nearly two years—until a July 2024 Saudi airstrike on Sanaa International Airport, carried out to block a plane carrying Houthi officials and reportedly Iranian, Syrian and Hezbollah military advisors alongside advanced weapons systems, reignited full-scale hostilities.

    “This is the collapse of Saudi Arabia’s containment strategy,” explained Rob Geist Pinfold, an international security researcher at King’s College London, in an interview with Middle East Eye. Pinfold drew a parallel between Riyadh’s approach to the Houthis in recent years and Israel’s pre-October 7 strategy toward Hamas in Gaza: “The Saudis felt they had the Houthis exactly where they wanted them. They weren’t ready to pursue a full political settlement, but they believed they had created enough deterrence to stop the group from launching major escalations.”

    That deterrence has shattered completely. In response to the Sanaa strike, the Houthis announced a full blockade of Saudi shipping and launched a rapid, coordinated offensive along Yemen’s Red Sea coast that has left Saudi forces and their Yemeni allies struggling to repel advances. Military experts emphasize that this round of conflict poses far greater risks to Saudi Arabia than previous fighting, for two key reasons: the kingdom has far more economically at stake today, and the Houthis have evolved into a far more capable, technologically advanced adversary.

    Where past Houthi missile and drone attacks were largely inaccurate, the group’s targeting capabilities have improved dramatically in recent months. Over a single seven-day period, Houthi strikes hit Riyadh International Airport three consecutive days, with a Saturday attack leaving at least 13 dead and more than 300 injured. Days later, the group struck the headquarters of Saudi state oil giant Aramco in Dhahran, a major eastern Saudi city, underscoring their ability to hit critical, high-value infrastructure deep inside the kingdom.

    The repeated successful strikes have raised sharp questions about the performance of Saudi Arabia’s costly military, which relies heavily on imported U.S. defense systems including Patriot and THAAD air defenses. With 6.5% of its GDP dedicated to military spending—one of the highest ratios globally, per Stockholm International Peace Research Institute data—many observers have expressed surprise at the Houthis’ consistent ability to penetrate Riyadh’s defenses.

    “It’s quite striking, literally, that the Houthis can hit these incredibly important facilities in Saudi Arabia at will, and the Saudis cannot stop them,” said Gregory Gause, a leading Gulf scholar at the Middle East Institute. “They clearly have far more advanced missiles and targeting technology than they did in previous rounds of fighting.”

    A Western defense official based in Riyadh, speaking on condition of anonymity, acknowledged that while Saudi defenses intercept roughly 90% of incoming projectiles, the Houthis have refined tactics to bypass these systems. “The Houthis are a lot more effective than Iran was back in February. They learned from earlier escalations this year,” the official said. “Their success comes from a mix of tactical innovation, rapid operational speed, and up-to-date intelligence.”

    The group has had significant time and opportunity to build its capabilities: the 2022 ceasefire allowed the Houthis to entrench their positions in Yemen’s rugged northwestern mountains, and they honed their offensive tactics attacking commercial shipping in the Red Sea after October 7 2023, in what they framed as an act of solidarity with Palestinians in Gaza. Multiple reports confirm the group has received increased military support from both Iran and Russia in recent months.

    The gap between offensive missile capabilities and defensive air defenses is not a new strategic challenge—Israel continuously updates its defense systems, and the war in Ukraine has become a live testing ground for new military hardware—but the stakes for Saudi Arabia today are uniquely high. Unlike 2015, the kingdom is far more integrated into the global economy, and Riyadh is set to host its flagship annual Future Investment Initiative conference later this month, making a prolonged closure of Riyadh International Airport a major economic and diplomatic embarrassment.

    Even before the latest escalation, the Saudi economy faced significant headwinds: the kingdom projects a 3.6% GDP contraction for 2024 and has already been forced to scale back the signature megaprojects that form the core of Crown Prince Mohammed’s Vision 2030 economic transformation plan. A prolonged, expanded war would put massive additional strain on public finances.

    Unlike the Houthis, who control little formal modern economic infrastructure to protect, Saudi Arabia’s dense network of critical economic targets makes every successful strike far more costly for Riyadh than any retaliatory strike is for the Houthi movement. “A Houthi strike on Riyadh airport is so much more damaging to the Saudis than a Saudi strike on Sanaa airport is to the Houthis,” Gause noted.

    One bright spot for Saudi Arabia in the current conflict is the increased international sympathy it has garnered, thanks in large part to its comparatively restrained response to the attacks. Footage of Umrah pilgrims caught in the Houthi strike on Riyadh airport sparked widespread global condemnation of the movement, and Riyadh has worked to maintain international support through new strategic overtures. Earlier this month, the kingdom activated the Mecca Pact, a joint defense agreement with Pakistan and Turkey; Islamabad has already deployed military assistance, with Ankara expected to follow suit. The United States, Saudi Arabia’s closest major ally, has so far avoided public involvement in the fighting but has provided covert defensive support and intelligence sharing. Notably, prominent Democratic Senator Chris Murphy, one of the most vocal critics of Saudi Arabia’s 2015 Yemen war, visited Riyadh earlier this month and did not call for a Saudi de-escalation.

    Still, some regional analysts argue Saudi Arabia’s restraint has gone too far. “I think you need to flex some muscle. Being dovish when you are being attacked is not quite wise,” said Bader al-Saif, a security scholar at Kuwait University. “The Houthis need to be pushed to the negotiating table, and that means forcing changes on the ground.”

    A major structural barrier to an effective Saudi counteroffensive is Riyadh’s reluctance to deploy its own ground troops into Yemen, forcing the kingdom to rely on fractured local Yemeni allies. While Riyadh backs Yemen’s internationally recognized government, that force is deeply divided and has performed poorly in the current offensive, which aims to retake all territory the Houthis seized in 2014. A Western official tracking the offensive described the government’s military performance as deeply disappointing: “The capabilities of Yemeni government forces have been hyped up in recent months, but they have been pretty defective. One force showed up to fight without food and water. Other units have just melted away, leaving the flanks exposed.”

    The most effective fighters against the Houthis are Yemeni separatist factions backed by the United Arab Emirates, but long-running tensions between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi over the separatists’ goal of an independent southern Yemen have prevented a coordinated front. While Saudi Arabia hosted UAE Vice President Mansour bin Zayed last month in an effort to repair bilateral relations, the continued public push for southern independence was on full display this week, when exiled separatist leader Aidarous al-Zubaidi released a video positioned in front of a map of the former independent southern Yemeni state, calling for global recognition of his proposed state even as he mobilized against the Houthis.

    “His appearance was unnecessary and revealed the underlying Saudi-Emirati divergence despite Abu Dhabi’s messaging of solidarity. His statement was not one of cohesion,” noted Ibrahim Jalal, an independent Yemeni and Gulf security expert. Jalal added that the counteroffensive remains in its early stages, and Saudi Arabia could still take more aggressive steps to strengthen its local allies, including increasing arms shipments to the Yemeni government.

    Most analysts agree that a long-term solution will require broader regional diplomacy, specifically between the United States and Iran. While the Houthis have their own domestic political motivations for the current offensive, their strategy is closely tied to stalled de-escalation talks between Tehran and Washington. “The only practical path the Saudis have right now is pushing the US to reach a political understanding with Iran to end this cycle of conflict,” Gause said. “The only way the Houthis get restrained here is if the Iranians tell them to. That can only come from a US-Iran political deal.”

  • Houthis reframing the narrative casting them as an Iranian proxy

    Houthis reframing the narrative casting them as an Iranian proxy

    On October 10, a devastating Houthi assault on Riyadh’s primary international airport left 13 people dead and hundreds more injured, marking the deadliest attack on Saudi soil since the outbreak of the U.S.-Israeli war against Iran in February 2026. The deadly opening strike was followed by successive, less lethal missile barrages in the subsequent days, and it landed just as Saudi Arabia prepared to host a landmark gathering of global oil producers. For long-time observers of Yemeni politics, this wave of violence is far more than an isolated militant incident: it lays bare both the deepening regional stalemate gripping the Middle East and the far-reaching spillover effects of Yemen’s decade-long civil war that extend far beyond the country’s borders.

    The Houthi movement first emerged as a militarized political force in Yemen in 2004, and has fought a years-long civil war against the Saudi-backed, internationally recognized Yemeni central government. Today, the group controls roughly one-third of Yemen’s territory and is home to two-thirds of the country’s population, making it the most powerful armed faction in the nation despite its lack of an air force. Over years of conflict, it has built an advanced arsenal of long-range missiles and unmanned aerial drones. For decades, the Houthis have been widely labeled by their adversaries and many external analysts as a mere proxy for Iran, Saudi Arabia’s primary regional rival.

    While it is accurate that the Houthi movement has maintained long-standing broad alignment with Tehran and shared many of its regional strategic goals, the relationship between the two groups is far more nuanced and complex than the simple proxy narrative suggests. Crucially, the Houthi movement’s evolution remains deeply rooted in Yemen’s domestic political landscape and a unique, centuries-old internal Yemeni feud, a reality long documented by regional scholars.

    What makes the current escalation particularly significant is the deliberate strategic narrative shift Houthi leadership has pursued throughout 2026: the group is actively reframing its military campaign to distance itself from the perception that its actions are directed by Iran, a choice that reveals how Houthi leaders leverage narrative to build legitimacy for their operations both domestically and regionally.

    After the United States and Israel launched their offensive against Iran on February 28, 2026, many regional analysts predicted the Houthis would quickly join the conflict. The group’s 2023–2025 Red Sea campaign in support of Palestinians during the Gaza war had already proven its ability to disrupt global maritime traffic, creating a clear blueprint for similar action through the critical Strait of Hormuz. That earlier campaign carried significant symbolic weight: it positioned the Houthis as defenders of Palestinian interests at a time when many Arab governments were seen as abandoning the Palestinian cause, while also demonstrating the movement’s capacity to upend global supply chains and international trade thousands of miles from Yemeni territory.

    Yet despite widespread expectations, the Houthis remained on the sidelines for months following the initial strikes on Iran. The group even ignored reported requests from Iranian leadership in July 2026 to close the Strait of Bab el-Mandeb to commercial shipping. The assumption that the Houthis would automatically follow Tehran’s orders reflected a fundamental misreading of Yemeni politics and the identity factors that shape the movement’s legitimacy. While supporting Palestinians could be framed as an act of pan-Arab solidarity that resonated with Yemeni audiences, acting on behalf of a non-Arab, Persian Shia power was far harder to justify in majority Sunni Yemen, where Twelver Shia Islam has no significant presence.

    When the Houthis re-entered open regional conflict in August 2026, they tied their campaign explicitly to their long-standing rivalry with Saudi Arabia, rather than Iran’s regional conflict. While Houthi actions may indirectly advance Iran’s own strategic goals, the movement frames its military campaign against Saudi Arabia first and foremost as an act of Yemeni national self-defense.

    The catalyst for this escalation came in an incident that received almost no coverage in Western media earlier in the summer of 2026. Seeking to assert sovereignty over Houthi-controlled territory, the group facilitated the surprise departure and return of a commercial flight from Sanaa International Airport bound for Tehran. The capital’s airport had been closed since late 2024 following Israeli strikes, and its ongoing closure left movement in and out of Houthi-held areas restricted by the faction’s adversaries, including the internationally recognized government based in Aden. For the Houthis, this restriction represented an unacceptable infringement on their claimed sovereignty, limiting both civilian travel and the group’s ability to move personnel and military supplies.

    On July 13, as the flight from Tehran approached Sanaa, Saudi warplanes bombed the airport’s runway, giving the Houthis a clear casus belli to reignite open confrontation with Riyadh. After more than three years of a de facto ceasefire and stalled negotiation efforts, Saudi Arabia had been seeking to extricate itself from the long-running Yemeni conflict, mirroring its efforts to de-escalate tensions with Iran. Sensing Riyadh’s desire for exit, Houthi leadership responded with a deliberate policy of tit-for-tat retaliation.

    Today’s Houthi tactics directly mirror the 2015 Saudi-led bombing campaign and blockade that Houthi-held Yemen has endured for over a decade. The group now claims the right to impose reciprocal pressure on Saudi Arabia, targeting critical infrastructure including ports, energy facilities, and airports.

    This new strategic framing serves two core political goals for the Houthis. First, it shifts blame for Yemen’s ongoing catastrophic economic and humanitarian crisis away from the group’s own governance failures, mismanagement, and corruption, and onto the Saudi-imposed blockade. Second, it provides a legitimate, popularly supported rationale for escalating conflict across the region.

    The Houthis have already demonstrated pragmatic flexibility in recent years: after the October 2025 Gaza ceasefire, the group halted attacks on Israeli-linked shipping in the Red Sea despite repeated Israeli bombardments, and it suspended attacks on U.S. vessels under a May 2025 agreement with the Trump administration. These moves align with the movement’s pattern of balancing ideological rhetoric with practical strategic calculation, even as it resumed military engagement this year: U.S. diplomatic sources have reported that American diplomats met with Houthi representatives in Oman as recently as September 2026.

    With Saudi Arabia, however, the Houthis have felt far less incentive to show restraint. Riyadh is already grappling with repeated missile attacks from Iran tied to its alliance with the U.S., and facing mounting pressure on its energy export operations. The high-profile attack on Riyadh’s airport, the Houthis calculate, has put Saudi Arabia in an intractable position, with ramifications that will ripple through the global economy.

    This retaliatory strategy gained additional momentum in early September, when Houthi forces secured partial control over the Strait of Bab el-Mandeb, one of the world’s most critical maritime chokepoints for global trade. This position gives the group significant leverage over commercial shipping bound for and departing Saudi Arabia via the Red Sea. As the Riyadh airport attack demonstrated, the Houthis’ arsenal of drones and ballistic missiles also gives them the capacity to strike targets across nearly all of Saudi territory.

    The targeting of civilian infrastructure, including major transportation hubs, highlights the retaliatory logic the Houthis now rely on to justify their escalating campaign. It remains impossible to predict the full consequences of this increasingly aggressive Houthi strategy. The Middle East appears poised for a new period of sustained, widespread conflict, and it remains an open question whether the United States – which has been reluctant to reengage in full-scale regional conflict – will be drawn back into the fray.

    Amid all the focus on regional geopolitics, however, the ongoing suffering of Yemeni civilians must not be overlooked. This latest escalation serves as a stark reminder that a decade of war has devastated a population that was already the poorest in the Middle East before the conflict began, destroying what little infrastructure the country possessed.

  • White House defends new press secretary amid questions about her legal credentials

    White House defends new press secretary amid questions about her legal credentials

    Controversy is swirling around the White House’s newly appointed press secretary Katie Zirkin, as questions about her repeated claims to hold active legal credentials continue to escalate, putting the Trump administration on the defensive. When former President Donald Trump announced Zirkin’s appointment last week, he explicitly introduced her as an attorney, a label Zirkin has also used to describe herself publicly for years. But when pressed by a reporter Tuesday while standing alongside Trump, Zirkin gave an evasive answer that only fueled skepticism: when asked which U.S. state she had passed the required bar exam to practice law, she replied, “When I moved to China.”

    Public records show no active bar registration for Zirkin in any U.S. state she has previously resided. Undeterred by the growing questions, White House Communications Director Steven Cheung came to Zirkin’s defense this week, arguing she is “uniquely qualified and whip smart to help inform the American people” of the administration’s priorities. In her own written statement addressing the credential controversy, Zirkin asserted that she “practiced international transaction law, with all the appropriate credentials.”

    By Wednesday, the scrutiny had translated into formal action: nonpartisan government watchdog group Campaign for Accountability filed an official complaint with the California State Bar Association, demanding a full investigation into whether Zirkin “repeatedly held herself out to the public as entitled to practise law without a licence to do so” — conduct that California state law classifies as a misdemeanor crime.

    Pepperdine University, Zirkin’s California-based law school, has confirmed the 42-year-old former political strategist graduated from its law program in 2011. Crucially, a law degree alone does not grant permission to practice law in the United States, where passing a state-administered bar exam and holding active bar registration is mandatory for legal practice.

    Zirkin told *The New York Times* Wednesday that when she first began appearing as a political commentator on cable news, she reached out to Pepperdine administration to ask how she should describe her professional background. She claimed the university president advised her she could refer to herself as a lawyer, but not an attorney — a distinction that has done little to quiet criticism of her public misrepresentation.

    Citing multiple anonymous sources with direct knowledge of Zirkin’s career, *The Wall Street Journal* reported that Zirkin did attempt to pass the California bar exam shortly after her 2011 graduation, but ultimately failed the test. California’s bar examination is widely recognized as one of the most difficult such assessments in the United States, with historical pass rates hovering below 60% in most years. Sources told the outlet that Zirkin took the exam at a time when she was juggling wedding planning and preparations to relocate to Beijing with her fiancé, who had accepted a job there.

    Following the wedding, Zirkin did move to Beijing, where her husband worked for an American private equity firm. She has repeatedly claimed she worked on international transactional legal matters during her time in the country. Her public LinkedIn profile lists a two-year stint as an associate at Beijing-based Zhong Lun Law Firm between 2011 and 2013. However, Chinese law restricts active law practice licenses to Chinese citizens only; foreign nationals may only work at domestic Chinese law firms in non-licensed support or administrative roles, and cannot represent clients in legal proceedings or offer formal legal advice.

    In a February 2023 appearance on the conservative talk radio program *The Clay Travis and Buck Sexton Show*, Zirkin claimed she had served as outside counsel for both the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and the World Bank during her time living in China. The BBC has reached out to both the World Bank and IFC to request comment on Zirkin’s claim. It is understood that the World Bank Group contracts outside law firms for legal work, and it is the contracted firms, not the World Bank Group, that assign individual legal professionals to specific matters.

    Zirkin’s LinkedIn profile also lists a role as general counsel for Fix California, a conservative nonprofit organization founded by Ric Grenell, a long-time ally of Donald Trump who served as acting director of national intelligence during Trump’s first term. The controversy over Zirkin’s credentials comes as she prepares to lead the White House’s press operations, a high-profile role that requires regular engagement with the White House press corps and accountability to the American public.

  • North Korea and China open new bridge after 12-year delay

    North Korea and China open new bridge after 12-year delay

    After nearly a decade of delays and shifting diplomatic tides, the New Yalu River Bridge, a key cross-border infrastructure project linking China and North Korea, has officially opened to traffic, Chinese state media has confirmed. The 3-kilometer (1.9-mile) crossing connects China’s northeastern border city of Dandong to North Korea’s northwestern town of Sinuiju, and is positioned to become the primary land corridor for bilateral trade between the two long-time allies.

    Construction of the bridge wrapped up years ago, with an initial opening date targeted for 2014. However, the project was put on indefinite hold after North Korea paused work on connecting roads and customs infrastructure on its side of the crossing, amid a period of strained relations between Beijing and Pyongyang in the 2010s.

    The modern crossing was built to serve as a higher-capacity alternative to the aging Sino-Korean Friendship Bridge, a structure originally constructed between 1937 and 1943 during Japan’s imperial occupation of the region. Ahead of the official opening, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning described the bridge as a critical connectivity hub for the two neighboring countries, noting that the new route will further boost bilateral trade and deepen people-to-people cultural and social exchanges.

    China holds the position of North Korea’s largest trading partner, and has long acted as a key economic buffer for Pyongyang amid harsh international sanctions imposed over North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. Bilateral trade between the two countries hit $2.7 billion last year, bouncing back fully to pre-pandemic levels, with the growth driven primarily by Chinese exports to North Korea.

    Despite the optimistic marker of the bridge’s opening, experts warn that rapid, large-scale expansion of cross-border trade remains unlikely. “UN sanctions on North Korea are still in effect, which will cap major trade growth,” explained Kang Jun-young, a professor of Chinese studies at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies in Seoul. “Pyongyang is also cautious of a sudden flood of Chinese imports that would dramatically increase Beijing’s influence over its domestic market. China is well aware of these concerns, so trade growth is far more likely to proceed gradually rather than spiking suddenly.”

    The geopolitical relationship between Beijing and Pyongyang is rooted in a decades-long mutual defense alliance – the only active mutual defense pact China holds with any sovereign state – and has historically been described as “as close as lips and teeth.” But the partnership has faced notable friction over the past 15 years. Throughout much of the 2010s, relations turned icy as Beijing grew increasingly frustrated with Pyongyang’s repeated nuclear and missile tests. Only in recent years has the relationship warmed, as China shifted to a softer public stance on North Korea’s nuclear program.

    “Just a decade ago, Beijing was openly critical of North Korea’s nuclearization and publicly pushed for Pyongyang to pursue denuclearization,” noted Edward Howell, a lecturer in East Asian studies at the University of Oxford. “Today, China says little to nothing on the issue publicly.”

    The opening of the New Yalu River Bridge is the latest in a series of steps to rebuild bilateral connectivity after North Korea lifted its strict pandemic-era border closures. In March of this year, Air China resumed direct passenger flights between Beijing and Pyongyang, after a six-year pause, and cross-border passenger train services between the two countries also restarted that same month.

    Even as Beijing moves to deepen its ties with Pyongyang, it is keeping a careful watch on the rapidly growing partnership between North Korea and Russia, which has expanded dramatically since Moscow launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Last month, Pyongyang and Moscow opened their first cross-border road bridge, which Russian state media reports will be able to accommodate up to 300 vehicles and more than 2,000 cross-border travelers every day.

    Analysts frame the opening of the Chinese-North Korean bridge as a deliberate step by Beijing to strengthen its long-standing ties and reaffirm its influence in Pyongyang, amid shifting regional alliances. Chinese President Xi Jinping made his first overseas state visit of 2025 to Pyongyang back in June, where he held a high-profile meeting with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un.

    “The opening of the New Yalu River Bridge makes clear that bilateral relations are genuinely improving, and that President Xi’s June visit to Pyongyang was more than just a symbolic gesture,” said Leif-Eric Easley, a professor of international studies at Ewha Womans University in Seoul. “At the same time, the years of delays, compounded by North Korea’s pandemic self-isolation and domestic socioeconomic policies, highlight just how challenging a partner Pyongyang can be for Beijing.”

  • Why some pro-Palestine activists have turned their backs on Mamdani

    Why some pro-Palestine activists have turned their backs on Mamdani

    When Zohran Mamdani swept into office as New York City’s mayor, he entered office with a historic reputation as the most openly pro-Palestinian chief executive in the city’s modern history. Throughout his campaign, the Israeli military campaign in Gaza dominated his policy platform, with Mamdani repeatedly denouncing Israel’s actions and labeling the conflict a genocide against Palestinian people. Within days of taking office, he acted quickly to roll back two hardline pro-Israel executive orders enacted by his predecessor, Eric Adams.

    The first order he revoked codified New York City’s adoption of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) working definition of antisemitism, a framework long criticized by pro-Palestinian activists for unfairly equating legitimate criticism of the Israeli state with antisemitic hate speech. The second revoked ban barred city employees from participating in the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement, the Palestinian-led grassroots initiative that describes its mission as ending international support for Israel’s occupation and oppression of Palestinian people. In his high-profile first meeting with U.S. President Donald Trump at the White House, Mamdani also centered pro-Palestinian demands, using the Oval Office audience to push for the release of detained Palestinian activist Leqaa Kordia. Standing alongside Trump, Mamdani doubled down on a core campaign pledge: to redirect New York City tax revenues away from investments tied to Israel and toward domestic infrastructure and services for city residents.

    Nearly a year into his term, however, the same progressive pro-Palestinian organizers and activists that swept Mamdani into office have turned against him, sparked by a string of unfulfilled high-profile campaign pledges that have left supporters feeling betrayed. One of the most prominent broken promises revolves around the 2024 International Criminal Court arrest warrant for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu over alleged war crimes in Gaza. During the campaign, Mamdani vowed that if Netanyahu visited New York City, his administration would uphold the ICC warrant and take the Israeli prime minister into custody, publicly calling Netanyahu a war criminal.

    The test of that pledge came in July, during an interview with *The New York Times*, when Mamdani was asked directly if he would follow through on the arrest promise. He reaffirmed that Netanyahu “belongs in The Hague,” noting that his legal team was holding active discussions to clarify whether local law enforcement had the legal authority to execute the international warrant, and that he would take whatever action the law permitted. Just three days later, however, Mamdani released a public video backing away from the pledge, confirming that his administration did not hold the legal authority to enforce the ICC warrant.

    When Netanyahu ultimately traveled to New York in September to address the annual United Nations General Assembly, he received a formal police escort from the New York City Police Department (NYPD) and faced no detainment during his visit. While Netanyahu spoke inside the UN headquarters, thousands of pro-Palestinian protesters — including grassroots organizers, civilian activists, actors, and elected officials — took to city streets to condemn Israel’s military campaign and Netanyahu’s leadership, with roughly 74,000 Palestinians reported killed in Gaza since the war began. Dozens of member state delegations also staged a walkout during Netanyahu’s address inside the assembly hall.

    Many of the protesters who gathered outside UN headquarters were politicians who had previously endorsed or been endorsed by Mamdani, participating in a mass demonstration organized by Jewish Voice for Peace (JVP). More than a dozen of these protesters were ultimately arrested by NYPD officers, including high-profile public figures: congressional candidate Darializa Avila Chevalier, New York City Council member Chi Osse, former New York City Comptroller Brad Lander, and New York State Senate candidate Aber Kawas. Mamdani did not join the protest, nor did he follow through on his pledge to arrest Netanyahu. Instead, he posted a wordless social media video showing himself planting an olive tree at Gracie Mansion, the city’s mayoral residence, alongside Palestinian families displaced from Gaza.

    The backlash was immediate: activists condemned Mamdani for making a populist pledge to arrest Netanyahu, only to allow the Israeli leader to visit unimpeded while permitting the arrest of peaceful pro-Palestinian protesters under his watch.

    This month marks three years since the Hamas-led attack on southern Israel that killed hundreds and triggered Israel’s military campaign in Gaza. On the anniversary, Israeli Voices for Peace, an anti-occupation group that advocates for a secure future for both Israelis and Palestinians, held a public vigil in Manhattan’s Union Square to mourn all lives lost, including the 300 attendees killed at the Nova music festival attack in southern Israel. Mamdani appeared alongside the group at the event, a decision that sparked direct confrontation with pro-Palestinian demonstrators.

    At the same time as the vigil, CUNY Students for Justice in Palestine held a parallel march from City Hall to Union Square to honor the tens of thousands of Palestinians killed in Gaza. The two gatherings converged, and pro-Palestinian protesters turned their anger directly on Mamdani, chanting “traitor” and accusing the mayor of having “blood on his hands.” Leading the protest was Hadeeqa Malik, a former intern for Mamdani who has spent three years organizing to push CUNY to divest from companies that supply Israel’s military. Speaking to Middle East Eye, Malik argued that Mamdani’s participation in the Union Square vigil amounted to “normalisation of the Zionist regime” and normalizing settler colonialism.

    Malik also pointed to another unfulfilled demand: Mamdani’s failure to restructure the CUNY Board of Trustees, which controls the university system’s investment decisions. “Instead of investing into CUNY students and workers, they have decided to invest over one million dollars in weapons manufacturers,” Malik explained. “And Zohran Mamdani is one of the two people, alongside the governor of New York State, responsible for the board of trustees. So we are demanding that he abolish the board of trustees today.”

    Beyond the Gaza-related pledges, activists have also slammed Mamdani for backtracking on a promise to dismantle the NYPD’s Strategic Response Group (SRG), a specialized unit trained to suppress large-scale city mobilizations and civil unrest through aggressive crowd control tactics and mass arrests. The New York Civil Liberties Union has long labeled the SRG “notoriously violent,” accusing officers of escalating confrontations and injuring New Yorkers exercising their First Amendment right to protest. Shortly after launching his 2024 mayoral campaign, Mamdani publicly pledged to disband the unit in a post on X, but he has not taken any action to follow through on that promise.

    Calls to disband the SRG intensified last week after a U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) officer shot and killed a man in the Bronx, with the unit deployed to suppress anti-ICE protesters who gathered in response to the killing. JVP is one of the leading organizations calling for the unit’s dissolution, and has also demanded the ouster of current NYPD Commissioner Jessica Tisch, a billionaire heiress who retained her post after Mamdani took office. Mamdani, the first New York City mayor in 80 years to decline to appoint his own police commissioner, kept Tisch — a self-described “proud Zionist” originally appointed by Eric Adams — in her leadership role.

    In a recent public statement, JVP argued: “Jessica Tisch’s virulent Zionist politics, connection to big tech surveillance, and commitment to sharing tactics between the NYPD and Israeli military should have led to her immediately being fired at the start of the new mayoral administration.” The Democratic Socialists of America, which supported Mamdani’s campaign, also signed an open letter last week demanding the SRG be disbanded and Tisch fired. Earlier this week, however, Mamdani publicly defended Tisch and rejected calls to remove her, pointing to a historic drop in city homicides during their time working together. “Over the last ten months that we have worked together, we delivered the lowest recorded number of Murders in our city’s history,” he said. A day after facing widespread backlash over the decision, Mamdani announced a first-of-its-kind comprehensive review of NYPD use-of-force policies — the first such review in a decade — alongside new measures to strengthen police accountability.

    Mamdani has also faced criticism from pro-Palestinian activists over his recently released Strategy to Combat Antisemitism, with opponents arguing the plan allocates public funding to what they call “Zionist propagandist groups,” including the Jewish Community Relations Council of New York.

    This report was originally published by Middle East Eye, an independent media outlet covering the Middle East, North Africa and surrounding regions.

  • Retired US generals call on Pentagon to cancel ‘barbaric’ execution livestream

    Retired US generals call on Pentagon to cancel ‘barbaric’ execution livestream

    A coalition of 72 retired senior U.S. military officers, including 45 generals, 12 admirals, and multiple former top legal advocates for the armed forces, has issued a public open letter calling on the White House, Congress, and the American public to block the Pentagon’s controversial plan to livestream the execution of convicted Fort Hood mass killer Nidal Hasan.

    Hasan, a former Army psychiatrist, carried out the deadliest non-combat attack on a U.S. military installation in history in 2009, when he opened fire on unarmed service members at Fort Hood, Texas, killing 13 people and wounding dozens more. During his trial, Hasan admitted to the shooting, claiming he acted to protect Muslims and the Taliban in Afghanistan from U.S. military operations. He was left paralyzed after being shot by first responders during the attack and now uses a wheelchair. His execution by firing squad is scheduled for December 3.

    The Pentagon, led by Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, announced the livestream plan last week, which would mark the first public execution held in the United States in nearly 100 years. While former President Donald Trump stated publicly last week that he “absolutely” supports the plan, CBS News — the U.S. media partner of the BBC — has reported that multiple senior administration officials now oppose the proposal, and no final decision had been issued by the president as of this week.

    The retired military leaders, whose ranks include decorated veterans of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars and several officers who retired during Trump’s first presidential term, clarified in their letter that they do not oppose capital punishment for Hasan. Instead, they argue that broadcasting the execution to a global public audience violates fundamental American values laid out in the U.S. Constitution.

    They contend that a public livestream would transform a solemn, grave punishment into a sensational spectacle for morbidly curious onlookers. The letter emphasizes that the exploitative broadcast, which they say erodes basic human dignity, will tarnish the honor of both the U.S. military that carries it out and the nation that permits it to go forward. Most notably, the officers warn that a public execution will play directly into the narrative of jihadist extremists, allowing American adversaries to frame Hasan as a martyr, stoke anti-U.S. hatred globally, and ultimately put American service members and civilians at greater risk of future attacks.

    The list of high-profile signatories includes retired Major General Tony Taguba, who led the Army’s landmark investigation into prisoner abuse at Iraq’s Abu Ghraib prison; retired Air Force Colonel Moe Davis, a former Guantanamo Bay detention camp prosecutor who has publicly condemned waterboarding as torture; former NASA Administrator Charles Bolden, a retired U.S. Marine Corps Major General; and retired Lieutenant General Claudia Kennedy, the first woman to achieve the rank of three-star general in the U.S. Army.

    The plan has already drawn widespread bipartisan criticism from lawmakers across the political spectrum, as well as condemnation from religious leaders, legal scholars, and human rights experts. The pushback from dozens of retired top military officers adds significant new weight to the growing opposition to the livestream proposal ahead of Trump’s expected final decision.