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  • Brazilian Supreme Court justices at odds as election and probe into failed bank loom

    Brazilian Supreme Court justices at odds as election and probe into failed bank loom

    SAO PAULO — Brazil’s highest judicial body has slid deeper into a damaging institutional crisis, after two high-profile Supreme Court justices delivered competing demands for severe disciplinary action against one another this Friday. The public feud has sent shockwaves through Brazil’s political landscape just months ahead of the country’s October general elections, raising urgent questions about the integrity of the nation’s judiciary.

    The conflict centers on two justices with starkly different political and ideological backgrounds. Alexandre de Moraes, 57, rose to national prominence last year after leading the high-profile prosecution that resulted in the imprisonment of former far-right President Jair Bolsonaro on charges related to the 2022 attempted coup d’état. His adversary on the bench, 53-year-old Andre Mendonca, made history as the Supreme Court’s first self-identified evangelical Christian justice, a direct appointment by Bolsonaro during his presidential term.

    The roots of their escalating animosity trace back to a sprawling federal investigation into large-scale financial fraud linked to the collapsed Banco Master, a once-prominent Brazilian financial institution led by disgraced ex-banker Daniel Vorcaro. The sprawling probe has already tangled multiple sitting politicians, making it an especially explosive issue ahead of the upcoming October elections.

    The crisis escalated rapidly earlier this week, when Mendonca ordered the unsealing of a portion of federal police intercepted communications between Vorcaro and third parties. The released documents include dozens of private messages from the fallen banker that suggest he repeatedly sought personal guidance from de Moraes. The revelations compound existing suspicions against de Moraes, after federal investigators uncovered that de Moraes’ wife had provided legal consulting services to Banco Master under a 130 million reais (approximately $25 million) contract.

    These disclosures have sparked a growing wave of calls for de Moraes’ resignation from across Brazil’s political sphere, media outlets, and leading legal experts. Even Flávio Bolsonaro, a presidential candidate and the son of the former president, who has himself been drawn into the Banco Master scandal over allegations he received roughly $21 million to produce a hagiographic film about his father’s political career, joined the chorus demanding de Moraes step down. In one intercepted message, Vorcaro wrote to a contact, “I am grateful to you for my life,” while in another, he pleaded, “For the love of God, see if you can block all these evil (measures against Banco Master).

    But the narrative shifted just as quickly, when Brazilian media outlets reported on Wednesday that Mendonca had held a private, off-the-record meeting with Vorcaro last year. In an official statement, Mendonca defended the gathering, framing it as a routine informational meeting similar to conversations other Supreme Court justices held on the same case. He later confirmed last Thursday that he held a second, more recent meeting with the jailed banker. What makes the encounter controversial is that Mendonca interrogated Vorcaro without the required authorization from the full Supreme Court — a mandatory step when investigating a sitting member of the court — and did not allow any federal police officers or public prosecutors to attend the questioning.

    Mendonca has justified his actions by saying Vorcaro claimed he had been subjected to mistreatment while in police custody, a claim that Brazil’s national attorney general has already formally rejected as unsubstantiated.

    By late Thursday, de Moraes had responded with swift and unprecedented action: he formally submitted a request to Supreme Court Chief Justice Luiz Edson Fachin to open a full investigation into Mendonca’s conduct. De Moraes blasted his colleague’s actions as politically motivated, and argued that Mendonca’s unauthorized, secretive interrogation of Vorcaro meets the legal standard for an impeachable offense. De Moraes is pushing for the Brazilian Senate to ultimately consider removing Mendonca from the bench.

    Brazil’s Senate, which holds the constitutional authority to initiate impeachment proceedings against sitting Supreme Court justices, currently has dozens of pending impeachment requests targeting de Moraes, with only a small handful of similar requests filed against Mendonca to date. By Friday, Brazilian media confirmed that Mendonca had submitted his own counter-request to Chief Justice Fachin, asking that de Moraes be suspended from all Supreme Court duties while the graft allegations against him are adjudicated.

    Chief Justice Fachin, speaking Friday morning at an official ceremony held at the presidential palace in the presence of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva — who has publicly stated no individual should be exempt from judicial investigation — announced his next steps. Fachin said he will request formal written clarifications from Mendonca, de Moraes, Attorney General Paulo Gonet (who is also mentioned in Vorcaro’s intercepted messages), and Federal Police Director Andrei Rodrigues. Without explicitly naming the public feud between his two colleagues, Fachin said he would “do what is right, in the time and in the shape that the legal order requires.” He added, “The institutions of the Republic must be preserved, overall in moments of the biggest tension.”

    Witnesses confirmed that de Moraes and Mendonca did not exchange a single word during two full Supreme Court sessions held Wednesday and Thursday. The two justices, who sit adjacent to one another on the court bench (seating is ordered by the date each justice was appointed), are set to gather again for official business next week.

  • Revealed: Microsoft signed $125m contract with Israel during first year of Gaza war

    Revealed: Microsoft signed $125m contract with Israel during first year of Gaza war

    An investigation by Middle East Eye has uncovered a previously hidden $125.4 million software licensing contract between tech giant Microsoft and Israel’s Ministry of Defense, signed in 2024 amid growing global outcry over the company’s military ties to Israel. The details of the agreement were buried deep within Israel’s 2024 annual budget execution report, published by the country’s finance ministry in March 2025, and only came to light after a close analysis of hundreds of entries in the document’s procurement commitments section.

    Buried among the list of the defense ministry’s largest multi-year procurements, the entry confirms the 2024 agreement is valued at approximately 464 million Israeli shekels. As of the end of December 2024, the full contract value remains outstanding, with no payments disbursed that year, and the engagement is scheduled to conclude in 2027. The public budget document provides no additional details about what specific software is covered under the deal, which Israeli defense or military units will access the licensing, or whether the 2027 end date refers to the license term, the payment schedule, or both.

    When reached for comment by Middle East Eye, Microsoft declined to answer any questions about the newly uncovered contract, stating only that it had “nothing to add from our side.”

    This new agreement aligns closely with a 2021 $133 million three-year contract between Microsoft and the Israeli military previously exposed by the Associated Press. That investigation revealed the Israeli military was classified as an “S500” client, a status reserved for Microsoft’s highest-priority customers, and included more than 600 individual subscriptions linked to key Israeli military units, including the elite cyberwarfare division Unit 8200. Former Microsoft employees familiar with the company’s Israeli contracts told MEE the 2024 agreement is almost certainly a three-year renewal of the 2021 deal, matching both the timeline (running 2024–2027) and the similar contract value. The Israeli budget document does not explicitly label the agreement as a renewal.

    The newly revealed contract predates the 2025 public controversy over Microsoft’s provision of cloud services to the Israeli military. In August 2025, a joint investigation by The Guardian, +972 Magazine and Local Call reported that Unit 8200 had used Microsoft’s Azure cloud platform to store recordings of millions of phone calls from Palestinians in Gaza and the occupied West Bank, with the database directly supporting Israeli military operations and air strike planning. Subsequent reporting by the Associated Press found that Microsoft’s global Azure support team responded to roughly 130 direct requests from the Israeli military in the first 10 months of the 2023–2024 Gaza war. Following the controversy, Microsoft commissioned an external review from law firm Covington & Burling, after which company president and vice chair Brad Smith announced Microsoft had “ceased and disabled a set of services to a unit within the Israel Ministry of Defense.” A leaked internal email later confirmed the company only disabled a small subset of services for a single Israeli military unit, with no additional details provided.

    The 2024 licensing agreement, recorded in the budget as of December 2024 (nine months before the service disablement), shows no connection to the small set of cloud and AI services Microsoft cut. The contract is explicitly categorized as software licensing, not the cloud or AI services that were the subject of the controversy. Microsoft has publicly confirmed that the vast majority of its existing business with the Israeli military remains active, a partnership that stretches back more than two decades. Internal documents show Microsoft maintains a dedicated team of at least nine employees focused solely on serving the Israeli military, including a senior executive who spent 14 years in Unit 8200 and a former IT leader for Israeli military intelligence. The company also maintains a substantial physical footprint in Israel, including two large server farm facilities outside Tel Aviv, a 46,000-square-meter campus in Herzliya, and a southern office that flies a large Israeli flag.

    Critics say the new contract offers clear evidence of Microsoft’s ongoing complicity in human rights violations against Palestinians. Abdo Mohamed, a former Microsoft data scientist fired after organizing a vigil for Palestinian victims at the company’s Redmond, Washington headquarters and now an organizer with the activist campaign No Azure for Apartheid, called the contract proof that company leadership intentionally doubled down on its profitable military ties amid the war. “The newly revealed deal cements the active role Microsoft, its technologies and its executives play in powering Israel’s apartheid and genocide,” Mohamed told MEE. “As Israel intensified its ongoing genocidal and ethnic cleansing campaign all over Palestine in 2023 and 2024, and as workers with our campaign at Microsoft spoke out in protest of its genocide profiteering business, Microsoft executives chose willingly to double down on their complicity in genocide and apartheid by signing this contract worth over $100m.” Mohamed added that the deal’s timing coincided with a surge in Israeli military use of Microsoft’s cloud and AI services, which reached up to 200 times pre-October 2023 levels in some use cases. “That’s why our campaign continues to apply pressure until Microsoft puts an end to its genocide-profiteering business with the Israeli military and government,” he said.

    Union organizers say growing worker outrage over the contract has spurred new efforts to organize tech workplaces to push for change. Marcus Barnett, a spokesperson for the United Tech and Allied Workers section of the UK’s Communication Workers Union, noted that tech workers are not disconnected from the global outcry over the war. “Tech workers haven’t been isolated from the rest of the world witnessing war and genocide dominate the news headlines and our phone screens,” Barnett said. “It’s no surprise that many are turning to workplace organising to assert their humanity, and we urge anyone with real concerns to stand up and form a workplace union to articulate these issues with strength.”

    Since October 2024, Microsoft has fired at least nine employees over protests against its Israeli military business, with more than a dozen total facing termination or arrest for speaking out against the partnership. The 2024 Microsoft contract is one of 33 major defense procurement deals signed by Israel that year, with the full set of agreements totaling $13.6 billion. The vast majority of that value comes from arms and military hardware purchases, mostly from the U.S. government, with Microsoft’s deal among a small handful of non-hardware engagements. The Israeli defense ministry does not label the Microsoft contract as explicitly war-related, and routine software licensing renewals for government entities are not inherently tied to military operations. MEE contacted the Israeli government and Israeli embassy in the UK for comment but received no response.

  • Nepal bet nearly everything on hydropower – the floods show why that’s a problem

    Nepal bet nearly everything on hydropower – the floods show why that’s a problem

    Eight years ago, Nepal grappled with crippling energy insecurity: just two-thirds of its population had access to electricity, and connected homes endured up to 16 hours of blackouts daily. Through aggressive expansion of its hydropower sector, paired with anti-corruption reforms and strategic seasonal energy imports from India, Nepal pulled off a remarkable energy turnaround by 2018, delivering 24/7 power to nearly the entire country.

    Today, Nepal’s energy sector is almost entirely powered by the fast-flowing glacial rivers of the Himalayas, with 225 operational hydropower plants holding 3,900 megawatts of installed capacity—enough to power 3 million households simultaneously. Hundreds more projects are under construction or planned, and the nation earns nearly $200 million annually exporting surplus clean electricity to neighboring India and Bangladesh. This natural advantage, however, has turned into a critical vulnerability as climate change rapidly reshapes the Himalayan landscape, where temperatures are rising 50% faster than the global average.

    Last week’s catastrophic flash floods on the Nepal-Tibet border laid bare this existential risk. The disaster, which preliminary investigations trace to a collapsed glacial formation and bedrock collapse, has killed more than 1,300 people and left thousands more missing. Entire villages were wiped off the map, and 12 hydropower plants in the Trishuli River basin—including major international investment projects—sustained severe damage, knocking out more than 10% of Nepal’s total electricity generation capacity. Plant operators say it remains unclear whether any of the damaged facilities can be restored to service.

    The Nepal Electricity Authority (NEA), which owns six of the damaged plants, has moved to reassure domestic consumers that current power supplies remain adequate. But NEA spokesman Rajan Dhakal acknowledges that the rising frequency of climate-linked disasters has forced a long-overdue reckoning: “The time has come for a rethink of our hydropower policy.”

    Most of Nepal’s existing and planned hydropower projects are built high in the Himalayan mountains, relying on fast-flowing currents without large water storage systems. This design keeps construction costs low but leaves infrastructure extremely vulnerable to glacial outburst floods and flash floods. Between 2018 and 2024, more than 90% of all disaster events recorded in Nepal were climate-related, a trend that has accelerated in recent years: the Trishuli River basin has already been hit by two major flood events in the past two years, first in 2024 from a cloudburst and again in 2025 from a glacial lake outburst in Tibet that killed 11 people and closed a key Nepal-China border crossing for six months.

    Even with that history of hazard, critics say project planners and international lenders failed to take adequate preventive action. The $647 million Upper Trishuli-1 project, one of Nepal’s largest foreign direct investment ventures backed by the Asian Development Bank and International Finance Corporation, was all but destroyed in the latest floods. Another major project, Upper Trishuli 3A, funded by China’s Export-Import Bank, also suffered severe damage. Himanshu Thakkar, coordinator of the South Asia Network on Dams, Rivers & People, says international lenders were fully aware of the extreme risks but ignored repeated warnings and failed to implement stringent safety measures.

    “Their own reports repeatedly highlighted it. But they did not take any preventive steps, did not demand stringent checks and balances, nor were they prepared for a calamity they knew could occur,” Thakkar says.

    Dhakal of NEA concedes that even when climate risks were correctly assessed, hydropower plant designs were not adjusted to account for them: “Clearly we will need to improve in the way we build and operate our hydropower plants.”

    The conversation around rethinking Nepal’s energy strategy has split stakeholders into two broad camps, though all agree that change is needed. One path, proposed by the NEA, is shifting to reservoir-based hydropower projects that do not need to be sited in high-risk mountain areas, allowing for controlled water storage and release. But this approach carries steep economic and environmental costs that could slow Nepal’s energy expansion.

    Many energy and climate experts argue the country needs to move beyond overreliance on hydropower and diversify into wind and solar energy. A report from a German aid agency found Nepal’s total technical potential for solar power is roughly 10 times greater than its hydropower potential. “We should not be putting all our eggs in one basket in these dangerous times,” says Kushal Gurung, founder of clean tech firm WindPower Nepal. “We need to seriously embrace other alternatives as well, like solar and wind. And for that we will need to revise our energy policy that is at the moment very pro-hydropower.”

    Vivek Shastry, a researcher at Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy, echoes this view, noting that adding wind and solar capacity acts as a built-in resilience strategy that can prevent widespread system failure if a major hydropower facility is knocked offline.

    Other analysts note that while diversification makes sense, hydropower will remain Nepal’s core competitive advantage in South Asian energy markets for the foreseeable future. “While there is untapped capacity in wind and solar, hydropower really is the one that gives Nepal massive competitive advantage vis-a-vis its South Asian neighbours,” says Puspa Sharma, a senior research fellow at the National University of Singapore’s Institute of South Asian Studies.

    The financial toll of rising climate disasters is already hitting Nepal’s private hydropower sector. Over the past three years, insurers have paid out roughly $40 million in flood damage claims for more than 20 privately owned plants, and insurance premiums have risen so sharply that many operators say doing business is becoming unfeasible.

    Beyond Nepal’s borders, the disaster highlights the global inequity of climate change: Nepal is responsible for a tiny fraction of the greenhouse gas emissions driving glacial melt, yet it faces disproportionate climate risk. Manjeet Dhakal, a member of Nepal’s UN climate delegation, says climate risks are cross-border and cannot be managed by Nepal alone.

    “Nepal is among the least responsible for the greenhouse emissions that led to these exacerbated risks. Ironically, our hydropower industry is an attempt to reduce our already minimal emissions… We cannot, and should not, be made to respond to these risks alone,” he says, calling for global cooperation on shared data collection, impact assessment, and cross-border early-warning systems.

  • Jewish groups back stronger measures on Israel in letter to Andy Burnham

    Jewish groups back stronger measures on Israel in letter to Andy Burnham

    As the new Andy Burnham-led UK government prepares to unveil a sweeping package of policy measures targeting Israeli activity in the occupied West Bank—headlined by a proposed ban on goods imported from illegal Israeli settlements—the British political landscape has been split by a stark divergence of views among UK Jewish community leaders. Just days after major establishment Jewish organizations met the prime minister at Downing Street to lobby against the import ban, a coalition of progressive Jewish groups has thrown its full weight behind tougher action against Israel, while demanding the government protect the right to hold pro-Palestinian protests.

    On Monday, UK Chief Rabbi Ephraim Mirvis met Foreign Secretary Ed Miliband to warn that any form of economic sanctions targeting Israel would carry harmful consequences for British Jewish communities across the country. The Jewish Leadership Council and the Board of Deputies of British Jews, two of the most prominent institutional Jewish groups in the UK, doubled down on this opposition during their Downing Street meeting with Burnham, arguing that restrictions on settlement goods would damage the longstanding cultural and religious ties between British Jews and sites in the occupied territories.

    But just four days later, a competing open letter organized by three progressive Jewish organizations—Holocaust Survivors and Descendants against Gaza Genocide (HSD), Jewish Voice for Liberation (formerly Jewish Voice for Labour), and Jews for Justice for Palestinians—reached the prime minister’s desk, taking a directly opposite stance. The letter counts two Holocaust survivors, Stephen Kapos and Agnes Kory, among its signatories, and pushes back hard against the claim that institutional Jewish groups speak for all UK Jewish people on the issue of Israel.

    “There are several Jewish ‘communities’ and a wide diversity of views on Israel among Jewish people in the UK and we trust that you will meet with us and other members of the Jewish Bloc in the near future,” the letter, which was reviewed by Middle East Eye (MEE), states. The signatories also welcomed Burnham’s earlier commitments to stronger action against Israel and his public apology for the previous Keir Starmer-led Labour government’s slow response in calling for a ceasefire in Gaza.

    The groups make clear that their members regularly join the large Jewish Bloc contingent in national pro-Palestine marches, where they publicly condemn what they frame as an ongoing genocide of Palestinians in Gaza. They also reject widespread claims that pro-Palestine protest movements are hubs of antisemitism, noting that signatories have only experienced goodwill and solidarity from fellow pro-Palestine demonstrators. Any antisemitic hostility at protest events, they argue, has originated from pro-Israel counter-demonstrators, not pro-Palestine organizers or attendees.

    This advocacy builds on a similar effort earlier this year, when 44 Holocaust survivors and their descendants sent an open letter to then-Prime Minister Keir Starmer urging him to abandon proposed restrictions on repeated pro-Palestine marches. Starmer had floated the restrictions after an antisemitic stabbing attack that injured two Jewish men in Golders Green, a majority-Jewish neighborhood in northwest London. Then-Policing Minister Sarah Jones responded to that 2024 letter by affirming that the right to peaceful protest is a core pillar of British democracy, but defended new expanded police powers to impose restrictions on intimidating protests near houses of worship, as well as a new requirement for senior officers to weigh the cumulative impact of repeated protests when approving conditions for demonstrations.

    In their new letter to Burnham, the progressive Jewish groups reiterate this call, demanding the new prime minister block any future efforts to restrict or shut down pro-Palestine marches. They also criticize the Starmer-era Labour Party’s handling of antisemitism allegations, which saw roughly 70 Jewish Labour members publicly or internally accused of antisemitism for their pro-Palestine views. The letter argues that this pattern of disciplinary action has given Israel unwarranted political cover for its military actions in Gaza and the West Bank, while eroding core rights to free speech and peaceful protest in the UK.

    Jenny Manson, co-chair of Jewish Voice for Liberation and a former Labour Party member who left the party in 2023, told MEE that establishment Jewish groups have long been granted regular access to UK government leaders, while alternative Jewish voices critical of Israel are sidelined. “Generally, the diversity of Jewish communities and Jewish views is largely ignored. We are not given any audience by the government, unlike the Jewish establishment bodies which are regularly welcomed in Whitehall,” Manson said.

    She added, “We ask that Andy Burnham recognise that the mass marches in support of Gaza are a legitimate expression of the widespread horror felt in Britain at Israel’s war crimes and ethnic cleansing in Gaza and the West Bank. Many Jews feel this anger and misery too.” Manson also called on Burnham to act on the core demand of pro-Palestine protesters: an immediate end to all UK arms sales to Israel.

    The upcoming policy announcement from the Burnham government was first teased last month by Miliband, who confirmed the government would unveil new measures in response to Israel’s advancement of the E1 settlement project east of Jerusalem. If completed, the E1 development would cut the occupied West Bank into two disconnected parts, effectively ending any possibility of a contiguous Palestinian state.

    Alongside the opposition from institutional Jewish leaders, another UK-based anti-occupation Jewish group, Na’amod, has publicly welcomed the proposed measures, framing them as the bare minimum appropriate response to Israel’s ongoing expansion of illegal settlements and military activity in the occupied territories. As of Thursday evening, MEE has reached out to Downing Street for official comment on the progressive groups’ letter, and has not yet received a response.

  • UN nuclear agency members draft resolution reporting Iran to the UN Security Council

    UN nuclear agency members draft resolution reporting Iran to the UN Security Council

    Diplomatic sources confirmed Thursday that the United States, Britain, France and Germany have finalized a draft resolution for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors that would formally bring Iran’s ongoing noncompliance with nuclear nonproliferation rules before the United Nations Security Council, a move that comes after months of stalled diplomacy and heightened regional conflict over Tehran’s atomic program.

    Under the terms of the global Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Iran bears a legal obligation to fully disclose all nuclear material and activities to the IAEA, and grant the Vienna-based watchdog’s inspectors unimpeded access to verify that no nuclear resources are diverted toward weapons development. For decades, this framework has formed the foundation of international oversight of Iran’s nuclear program, but cooperation collapsed dramatically this year amid escalating military activity.

    The push for a formal referral dates back to June 2025, when the IAEA Board of Governors issued its first formal finding of Iranian noncompliance in 20 years — a ruling that came just one day before the U.S. and Israel launched coordinated military strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities. For months, action on a referral was paused to give diplomatic efforts a final chance to resolve the standoff, but senior Western officials say that path has been exhausted.

    “The IAEA board has to follow its mandate and act now,” a senior Western diplomat, speaking on condition of anonymity due to the sensitivity of the negotiations, told reporters. “Not only has Iran refused to cooperate, all meaningful communication has ceased.”

    Since the June 2025 strikes that came amid a 12-day open conflict between the U.S., Israel and Iran, Tehran has blocked IAEA inspectors from accessing nuclear sites damaged in the bombings, despite its legal requirements under the NPT. The watchdog has also been unable to verify the current status of Iran’s stockpile of near-weapons-grade uranium, a challenge compounded by the broader ongoing war that began when the U.S. and Israel launched large-scale strikes on Feb. 28, with fresh exchanges of fire between the two sides continuing this week.

    In a confidential IAEA report obtained by the Associated Press this Tuesday, the agency warned that Iran’s continued refusal of access and failure to cooperate on material verification constitutes a critical “proliferation risk” that must be “addressed with the utmost urgency.”

    Current IAEA data puts Iran’s stockpile of uranium enriched to 60% purity at 440.9 kilograms (972 pounds). Enrichment to 90% purity qualifies as weapons-grade material, meaning 60% enrichment is just one short technical step from a weapons-capable material. IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi warned in an AP interview last year that this stockpile is large enough to allow Iran to build up to 10 nuclear bombs if it chooses to pursue weaponization — though he emphasized this does not mean Tehran currently possesses a nuclear weapon.

    The Tuesday report also confirmed that the IAEA has made no progress on its long-running investigation into unexplained uranium traces found at multiple undeclared sites across Iran. Western intelligence officials suspect these traces could indicate Iran ran a secret nuclear weapons program prior to 2003, a claim Iran has consistently denied. Tehran has repeatedly maintained that its entire nuclear program is for peaceful purposes, including energy production and medical research.

    A referral to the Security Council would shift oversight of the dispute to a higher international body with the authority to impose legally binding punitive measures, including sweeping economic sanctions and asset freezes. However, substantive UN action is widely expected to face an immediate block: Iran’s allies Russia and China both hold permanent veto power on the Security Council, and have previously blocked punitive measures against Tehran.

    The draft resolution, which was first reported by Reuters and reviewed by the AP, requests that Grossi transmit the text, alongside all previously adopted IAEA resolutions on Iran’s noncompliance, to all IAEA member states, as well as the UN Security Council and General Assembly, in line with the IAEA’s founding statute. Even in the face of expected Security Council gridlock, Western powers argue that a formal referral carries significant diplomatic weight.

    Notably, the draft also reaffirms the co-sponsors’ commitment to a negotiated end to the standoff. The text “stresses its support for a diplomatic solution to the challenges posed by the Iranian nuclear programme and its implications for regional peace and stability leading to an agreement that addresses all international concerns related to Iran’s nuclear activities, and encourages all parties to constructively engage in diplomacy.”

    Diplomats caution that the draft remains in active negotiation, and has not yet been formally submitted to the 35-member IAEA Board of Governors. The text could still be amended before a vote, which is scheduled to take place during next week’s Board meeting in Vienna.

    Iran has long rejected international pressure to restrict its nuclear program, and has repeatedly criticized IAEA investigations as politically motivated by Western powers.

  • Hussam Abu Safiya: Abducted Palestinian doctor still subject to torture by Israel

    Hussam Abu Safiya: Abducted Palestinian doctor still subject to torture by Israel

    A prominent Palestinian paediatrician detained without charge by Israel since late 2024 has alleged he faces persistent physical abuse, threats, and cruel treatment at the hands of his Israeli custodians, according to accounts shared by his legal representative and human rights advocates.

    Hussam Abu Safiya, the former medical director of Gaza’s Kamal Adwan Hospital, told his lawyer during a recent visit that Israeli guards have repeatedly beaten him across multiple areas of his body—including sensitive regions—using their hands, feet, and batons. The mistreatment does not end with physical violence: Abu Safiya also reported that guards deliberately disrupt his sleep overnight with constant noise and repeated public announcements, a deliberate tactic to inflict psychological distress. He added that the assault took place shortly before his lawyer’s most recent meeting, and that guards have explicitly threatened him against disclosing the horrific conditions of his detention to outside parties.

    Abu Safiya was taken by Israeli forces in December 2024 and has remained in custody without any formal charges or trial. He is being held under Israel’s Unlawful Combatants Law, a piece of legislation that independent United Nations human rights experts have long ruled violates core tenets of international humanitarian and human rights law.

    Back in July 2026, a group of UN special rapporteurs—including leading rights experts Francesca Albanese, Tlaleng Mofokeng, Morris Tidball-Binz, and Ben Saul—issued an urgent call demanding Israel immediately release Abu Safiya and all other healthcare workers being held in arbitrary detention. The experts argued that Abu Safiya’s ongoing detention without due process is not an isolated incident, but rather a reflection of a systematic Israeli campaign targeting Palestinian medical personnel and dismantling Gaza’s already fragile healthcare system. In their statement, they warned that this deliberate targeting is designed to impose conditions that would lead to the collective physical and mental destruction of the Palestinian people living in Gaza.

    The allegations of ongoing abuse have renewed international calls for action, with public health and human rights advocates adding their voices to the demand for Abu Safiya’s immediate release. Dr. James Smith, a lecturer in Humanitarian Policy & Practice at University College London and an emergency physician who completed volunteer deployments in Gaza in both 2023 and 2024, published an op-ed earlier this July repeating the urgent call for Abu Safiya’s liberation, a call shared publicly by independent outlet Middle East Eye on July 9, 2026.

    Physicians for Human Rights, the organization that confirmed the details of Abu Safiya’s account alongside his legal team, has echoed the UN experts’ demands, highlighting that the abuse of a detained healthcare worker represents a fundamental violation of international law that protects medical personnel and detainees in conflict zones. The case continues to draw international scrutiny over Israel’s treatment of Palestinian detainees and its targeting of Gaza’s health infrastructure amid the ongoing regional crisis.

  • Watch: Inside court as judge declares a mistrial in Lindsay Clancy case

    Watch: Inside court as judge declares a mistrial in Lindsay Clancy case

    In a stunning turn of events that has sent shockwaves through the local community of Massachusetts, a judge has formally declared a mistrial in the high-profile case of Lindsay Clancy, the 32-year-old mother charged with the murders of her three young children. The BBC’s correspondent Ione Wells was inside the Plymouth County courtroom to witness the dramatic development firsthand, capturing the tension and somber mood that filled the room as the ruling was handed down.

    Clancy was accused of killing her 5-year-old daughter Cora, 3-year-old son Dawson, and 8-month-old infant Callan in their family home in Duxbury, a quiet coastal suburb of Boston, in January 2023. Prosecutors had alleged that Clancy strangled the three children before attempting to take her own life by jumping from a second-story window of her home, leaving her permanently paralyzed from the waist down. The case had drawn widespread national attention due to the horrific nature of the crimes and ongoing discussions about maternal mental health, postpartum depression, and the treatment of psychological distress among new parents.

    The sudden collapse of the trial comes after weeks of jury selection and opening arguments, though specific details on what led the judge to grant a mistrial have not been fully released to the public. Legal analysts note that mistrials are most commonly declared when a serious procedural error has occurred that cannot be remedied through jury instructions, when new critical evidence that could prejudice the jury emerges mid-trial, or when the jury is unable to reach a unanimous verdict. As of this reporting, neither the prosecution nor the defense has issued an official statement on whether they will seek to retry Clancy at a later date.

    Wells, reporting from the courthouse immediately after the ruling, described the scene as deeply somber, with Clancy’s legal team appearing visibly shaken and members of the victims’ extended family declining to speak to reporters as they exited the building. The case has already sparked intense public debate across the United States about the intersection of domestic violence, maternal mental health access, and the criminal justice system’s handling of defendants with documented histories of psychological illness. Advocacy groups for postpartum mental health have highlighted the case as evidence of widespread gaps in screening and treatment for expectant and new parents, while victim’s rights advocates have emphasized the need for accountability for the three young lives lost.

  • In Algeria, new focus on English in schools rekindles debate over French colonial legacy

    In Algeria, new focus on English in schools rekindles debate over French colonial legacy

    A seismic shift is reshaping Algeria’s national education system, as English moves to center stage as the first mandatory foreign language for primary school students – a change that comes at the expense of French, and has stirred fierce national debate over pedagogy, colonial legacy, and geopolitical alignment. For the 2024-2025 school year, the reform takes full effect: three years after English was first piloted in primary education, all third-grade pupils will now learn only English, with French instruction delayed until fourth grade, when it will be taught as a second foreign language alongside English.

    This policy marks a break from a 61-year status quo. From Algeria’s independence from French colonial rule in 1962 through 2023, French held the position of the only foreign language taught to third-grade primary students. The current overhaul traces back to a directive from President Abdelmadjid Tebboune, who has framed the expansion of English as a strategic investment: he argues English is the global lingua franca of modern science, making early instruction critical for Algeria’s younger generations. The reform does not stop at primary school; secondary education will also see expanded English teaching hours and a higher weighting for the subject in national end-of-cycle exams, though French instruction in high school remains unchanged for the moment.

    The rollout of the reform has unfolded against a backdrop of institutional upheaval. Algeria’s largest teachers’ union, Cnapeste – which previously criticized the English expansion as a reckless, unprepared move citing a critical shortage of properly trained educators – was dissolved by state authorities last July over alleged violations of strike regulations. Union leaders reject the charges, framing the dissolution as an intentional effort to silence a vocal critic of government policy. With the main union body eliminated, no major teachers’ association has issued formal comment on the final implementation of the reform.

    Opinions are deeply split among other stakeholders. The National Federation of Parents of Students Associations, which typically aligns with the education ministry’s policy agenda, has welcomed the change. The group argues that mastery of English opens doors to global science, technology, and improved higher education and employment opportunities for Algerian youth. But many parents share Cnapeste’s earlier concerns, questioning whether the government can deliver on the promise of quality English instruction.

    Rachida Mahi, a 36-year-old Algiers-based engineer, is one skeptical parent. Her son is starting third grade this year, the first cohort to receive English-only instruction at that level, and she worries the rushed rollout will harm his academic progress. “How will the state manage to provide every school with qualified English teachers in sufficient numbers? Where does it plan to find them?” Mahi asked in an interview with Middle East Eye. Like many Algerians of her generation, Mahi learned French throughout her schooling and completed her engineering degree in French, speaking very little English – leaving her unable to support her son with his homework, a reality that leaves her panicked.

    To understand the stakes of this language shift, one must look back at decades of linguistic policy in post-independence Algeria. Immediately after ending French colonial rule in 1962, the new government established Arabic as the sole national and official language, launching a gradual process of Arabization to erase colonial linguistic legacy. That policy reached its peak in 1991, when a law mandated the use of Arabic across all areas of public life and education. But Arabization never fully succeeded: while law and social sciences were transitioned to Arabic instruction at the university level, scientific fields including medicine and engineering remained French-led, due to a lack of Arabic-language teaching materials and a shortage of educators trained to teach these subjects in Arabic. Even today, most leading global academic research is only accessible in foreign languages, primarily French and English. In line with his primary school reform, Tebboune has already announced plans to phase out French and replace it with English in medical studies by 2025, framing the move as a “wise” step that will align Algerian higher education with global scientific standards, where English is the dominant working language.

    Education and language specialists widely share concerns about the rushed implementation of the reform. Salah Derradji, a veteran language didactics specialist and former university rector, says he has long supported the gradual expansion of English across all education levels – but argues the current rollout lacks the deliberate planning the project requires. “This project must be carried out thoughtfully. And that is not the case today,” Derradji told Middle East Eye. He characterizes the reform as a political, rather than pedagogical, decision, noting that “You cannot train teachers in a few weeks and send them into classrooms. You first need qualified trainers,” adding that the government failed to hold broad consultation with academic specialists before moving forward.

    Rabeh Sebaa, a retired professor of sociology and anthropology at the University of Oran, echoes this criticism, arguing simply that “Algeria does not have the means to teach English – or teach in English – whether in schools or universities.” Back in 2022, as the government prepared to introduce English in primary schools, it launched a high-profile recruitment drive to hire 60,000 new English teachers, targeting university graduates with degrees in English language, literature, and interpretation. But education unions immediately criticized the campaign, pointing out that most new hires lacked any formal pedagogical training and received only rushed, inadequate preparation before entering classrooms.

    Hamid Hani, a 42-year-old parent from Bejaia, has seen the impact of underqualified hiring firsthand. His daughter is entering secondary school this year, and after two years of English instruction with an untrained young teacher, she still cannot speak English comfortably. “This teacher admitted to me during a parent-teacher meeting that she had to manage on her own to find teaching materials and organise her lessons,” Hani said. He accuses the government of gambling with children’s futures through “improvised measures” that put political goals ahead of quality education. Ahmed Tessa, an education specialist and author of a book on the status of French in Algerian schools, agrees, arguing that the reform “is an ideological rather than pedagogical decision.” He questions how quality instruction can be expected when new graduates are sent into classrooms without the minimum two years of initial pedagogical training required to teach effectively.

    Beyond questions of implementation, the reform has reignited a decades-long national debate over the legacy of French colonialism and Algeria’s ongoing relationship with France. The push to downgrade French comes at a moment of already heightened diplomatic tensions between Algiers and Paris, which escalated in 2024 after French President Emmanuel Macron publicly endorsed Morocco’s claim to sovereignty over Western Sahara – a position that directly contradicts Algeria’s longstanding support for the Polisario Front’s push for an independent Sahrawi state.

    Proponents of the reform frame the shift as a necessary assertion of national sovereignty and a break from colonial oppression. El Hachemi Djaaboub, a former minister from the Movement of Society for Peace (MSP), an Islamist-aligned party known for its criticism of French influence, has called the delay of French instruction an act of national sovereignty, and accused critics like Tessa of advancing foreign interests. Abderrazak Makri, former president of the MSP, has called for a complete break from French linguistic legacy: “We must put an end to France’s colonial legacy. Even President Macron speaks more English than French abroad. Today, English is the universal language; it is time for Algerians to adopt it and align themselves with great nations,” he said in 2022. This view resonates with a segment of the Algerian public, with social media discussions reflecting growing support for framing French as a colonial leftover that should be removed entirely from national education. In France, right-wing and far-right media have already seized on the reform, criticizing Algeria’s move as an intentional effort to erode French cultural and political influence in North Africa.

    Critics of the reform, however, push back against the ideological framing, arguing that language policy should be separated from anti-colonial politics. A small number of Algerian political parties, including the Rally for Culture and Democracy and the Workers’ Party, oppose downgrading French, arguing that foreign language instruction should be complementary, not a tool for ideological conflict. Sebaa characterizes the push to eliminate French from education as “visceral, ideologically driven postures.” He notes that many proponents of the shift studied at English-language universities and view English as a neutral global language, while framing French exclusively as a symbol of colonial domination. But Sebaa, who has published research on Algerians’ historical relationship with French, challenges this narrative. He points out that at independence, less than 20% of Algerian children attended colonial schools, meaning the “francisation” of Algerian culture was far less pervasive than often claimed. For most Algerians who lived under colonial rule, French was not only a tool of oppression but also a path to social advancement and cultural expression: the mid-20th century saw the rise of a vibrant body of Algerian literature written in French, with iconic writer Kateb Yacine famously describing French as “a war booty” that Algerians had claimed as their own.

    Critics warn that downgrading French will carry long-term harmful consequences for Algeria. Tessa argues that the move threatens to erode Algeria’s existing French-language cultural production and erase a key strand of the country’s collective memory that is expressed in French. He also warns that shifting away from French will distance Algeria from its neighboring geopolitical environment, which remains majority francophone, and break cultural and social ties between Algerian citizens and the millions of Algerian diaspora members and their descendants living primarily in France and French-speaking Quebec. Today, Algeria is the third-largest francophone country in the world by population, according to the International Organisation of La Francophonie, with an estimated 15.6 million Algerians – roughly one-third of the total population – speaking French.

  • Argentine court clears return of Nazi-looted portrait to Jewish dealer’s heir

    Argentine court clears return of Nazi-looted portrait to Jewish dealer’s heir

    BUENOS AIRES, Argentina — A decades-long battle for the restitution of a World War II-looted Italian portrait has reached a pivotal resolution, after an Argentine court greenlit a landmark agreement that will see the artwork returned to the sole surviving heir of its original Jewish owner. The deal comes after the daughter of a fugitive high-ranking Nazi official agreed to surrender all ownership claims to the piece in exchange for avoiding criminal prosecution.

    The 18th-century work, long known as *Portrait of a Lady*, was part of the massive, world-renowned collection assembled by Jacques Goudstikker, a leading Dutch-Jewish art dealer operating in pre-war Europe. When Nazi Germany invaded the Netherlands in 1940, Goudstikker fled Amsterdam with his family, but died in a shipwreck shortly after his escape. His entire collection — numbering more than 1,100 works by masters including Rembrandt and Vermeer — was seized and sold under extreme duress, with a large portion falling into the hands of Nazi leader Hermann Göring, Hitler’s infamous right-hand man who amassed one of the largest stolen art collections of the war.

    The portrait in question ended up in the hands of Friedrich Kadgien, a top Nazi financial official who served as Göring’s adviser on confiscated property sales, foreign currency, and precious metals. Kadgien evaded justice for his Nazi-era crimes after Germany’s defeat, fleeing first to Switzerland before settling in Argentina, where he died in 1978 without ever facing arrest or charges. The painting passed to his daughter, Patricia Kadgien, who lived with her husband Juan Carlos Cortegoso in the coastal Argentine city of Mar del Plata.

    The modern legal saga that led to the portrait’s recovery began in August 2025, when Dutch journalists investigating Kadgien’s post-war escape spotted the artwork hanging above a green velvet couch in an online real estate listing for the couple’s rustic Mar del Plata home. Within hours of the Rotterdam-based newspaper Algemeen Dagblad publishing its discovery, the listing was taken down. Argentine police launched multiple raids on Kadgien and her sister’s Mar del Plata properties, but failed to locate the painting. More than a week later, Kadgien’s legal team turned the artwork over to authorities. Last year, the couple was formally charged with aggravated cover-up, accused of deliberately hiding the looted painting while knowing Argentine and international investigators were actively searching for it.

    Under the terms of the court-approved deal, obtained by the Associated Press, Kadgien and Cortegoso have relinquished all legal claims to the portrait and consented to its transfer to Goudstikker’s heir, Marei von Saher, a Connecticut resident who has spent decades working to recover her family’s stolen art. In exchange, the pair avoid a public criminal trial, and will instead serve two years of court-supervised probation. As part of the agreement, they will also make charitable donations to a local Mar del Plata hospital, and are required to notify authorities of any changes to their residence during the supervision period.

    For decades prior to its recovery, the portrait was formally attributed to Italian Baroque painter Giuseppe Vittore Ghislandi, matching the attribution listed in Goudstikker’s original pre-war collection records; it was even exhibited under Ghislandi’s name in Amsterdam before the Nazi invasion. However, a court-ordered forensic analysis by Argentina’s National Academy of Fine Arts reattributed the work to another 18th-century Italian master, Giacomo Antonio Melchiorre Ceruti. Independent experts have since authenticated the piece as part of Goudstikker’s original collection, and valued it at approximately €250,000 (equivalent to $290,000 U.S.).

    In a nod to the years-long investigation in Argentina, von Saher has agreed to allow the portrait to be exhibited in the country before it is transferred to her custody. During the 2025 raids on Kadgien family properties, police also seized two additional 19th-century paintings, along with a collection of prints and engravings. Argentine authorities have confirmed they are still conducting provenance investigations into these additional works to determine if any were also looted during the Nazi era.

    Associated Press writer Isabel DeBre contributed reporting from Buenos Aires.

  • Trump’s response is key as Argentina’s Falklands demands get louder

    Trump’s response is key as Argentina’s Falklands demands get louder

    Long before Argentine President Javier Milei delivered his late-night national address announcing new sanctions earlier this week, tensions over the long-running Falkland Islands dispute had already been rising steadily across Argentina. The high-profile celebration of Argentina’s World Cup victory over England this summer, where jubilant players held up a banner declaring “Las Malvinas son Argentinas” in front of euphoric fans, provided a striking visual of this growing friction – yet this simmering resentment stretches back far deeper into modern history.

    Opening his televised address from an Argentine perspective, Milei walked through a condensed narrative of the islands’ dispute, doubling down on the core argument that has anchored Argentina’s position for decades: the territory rightfully belongs to Buenos Aires. He framed the 1833 British presence as a colonial invasion that violently seized the land from Argentine control.

    The UK government has pushed back on this framing, pointing to key contextual details Milei omits from his retelling. For centuries leading up to the 1830s, multiple European powers had traded control of the unpopulated island chain. When British forces re-established a presence on the islands in 1833, the small Argentine settlement that had been established there had already been removed two years prior – not by British forces, but by the United States. The USS Lexington destroyed an Argentine outpost in December 1831 during a dispute over fishing and sealing rights in the region.

    But even as the U.S. played an unacknowledged role in clearing the way for 19th-century British control, Milei is now betting that Washington will become his strongest ally in advancing Argentina’s 21st-century claim to the islands. That confidence comes directly from former (and current candidate for) U.S. President Donald Trump, who recently announced he is re-evaluating the long-standing U.S. position on the Falklands. In a national address to the Argentine people, Milei declared that “winds of change” are blowing for the dispute.

    For decades, the U.S. has officially recognized British sovereignty over the Falklands while framing its policy as neutral. That neutrality has always been qualified, however: during the 1982 Falklands War, President Ronald Reagan provided critical material support to British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, a move that reinforced the decades-long transatlantic “Special Relationship” between London and Washington.

    For Trump, though, that historic alliance has already frayed. He blames current UK Prime Minister Andy Burnham’s predecessor Keir Starmer for the breakdown, after the UK declined to join the U.S. in its war against Iran. In a recent interview with GB News, Trump made his frustration clear: “You weren’t there to help me.” He also dismissed the Falklands as “a long way away” from the U.K. – a point that Falkland Islanders, who voted 99.8% to remain a British overseas territory in a 2013 referendum, have pushed back on: the distance from London to the Falklands is actually slightly shorter than the distance between Washington, D.C. and the U.S. territory of Guam in the western Pacific.

    Regardless of that factual pushback, Trump’s comments have already given a major boost to Milei, who is facing growing political pressure at home ahead of next year’s presidential election. His former vice president, Victoria Villarroel, one of his most prominent challengers, has positioned herself as a far harder-line defender of Argentine national sovereignty, repeatedly attacking Milei’s diplomatic approach to the Falklands as weak and ineffective. To counter that attack, leaning into the Falklands dispute and leaning on Trump’s support has become a key political strategy for the incumbent.

    Domestic political calculation is far from the only driver of the renewed tension, however. Milei has framed the dispute as newly urgent, warning of what he calls “a clear and urgent danger.” That urgency stems from upcoming energy exploration work: within the next two years, two energy firms – Israeli-owned Navitas Petroleum and UK-based Rockhopper Exploration – plan to begin drilling operations in the Sea Lion oilfield located off the Falklands coast. Milei has rejected this activity outright, arguing Argentina “cannot allow” the companies to “appropriate the oil reserves under our sea” and vowing that Buenos Aires will “not stand by with our arms folded.” FIFA also fined the Argentine Football Association after the World Cup banner incident, which violated global football rules banning political messaging during matches.

    Beyond economic and domestic political concerns, the dispute also ties into a broader ideological realignment in the Western Hemisphere. Milei and Trump share deep ideological and personal ties, and Milei has openly framed Argentina as a reliable, “trustworthy partner” for Washington. The two leaders have aligned behind what Trump has dubbed the “Don-roe Doctrine” – a playful reworking of the 19th-century Monroe Doctrine, which established U.S. hegemony across the Americas. The core of this new vision is simple: only ideologically aligned leaders should hold power across the Western Hemisphere.

    Within this new framework of reordered spheres of influence, many analysts note it is entirely plausible that Trump will side with his ideological ally Milei over the British Prime Minister, even as the dispute’s implications extend far beyond personal or partisan ties. As the countdown to the U.S. presidential election and Argentine exploration begins, the central question hanging over the coming months is whether this new “Don-roe Doctrine” will outweigh the decades of shared history that define the U.S.-UK Special Relationship.