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  • Players will boycott a Slam ‘at some point’ – Sabalenka

    Players will boycott a Slam ‘at some point’ – Sabalenka

    As the world’s top female tennis players gather in Rome for the Italian Open, a simmering dispute over Grand Slam prize money and player representation has broken into the open, with world No. 1 Aryna Sabalenka becoming the first high-profile player to openly predict a player boycott of one of the sport’s most prestigious events in the near future.

    For weeks, top-10 ranked players from both the men’s and women’s tours have united behind a set of core demands: a larger share of the billions in revenue generated annually by the four Grand Slam tournaments, enhanced benefit contributions for lower-ranked players, and more input into key decisions like tournament scheduling. Until Sabalenka’s press conference in Rome, however, players had avoided publicly discussing strike action as a potential bargaining tool.

    “I think at some point we will boycott it. I feel like that’s going to be the only way to kind of fight for our rights,” the four-time Grand Slam singles champion, from Belarus, told reporters. “I feel like the show is on us. I feel like without us there wouldn’t be a tournament and there wouldn’t be that entertainment.”

    Her comments have exposed deep divisions within the women’s game over how far to push the sport’s governing bodies. World No. 4 Coco Gauff, the reigning French Open champion, quickly backed Sabalenka’s position, saying she could “100%” see herself joining a collective boycott if all players coordinate their action. Gauff added that progress on player demands has historically required collective organizing, noting that across other professional sports, meaningful change often only comes when players unionize to push for their shared interests.

    “If we all collectively agree, then yes. I wouldn’t want to be the only one, but we definitely can move more as a collective,” Gauff said. “From the things I’ve seen with other sports, usually to make massive progress and things like this, it takes a union. We have to become unionised in some way.”

    World No. 2 Elena Rybakina, champion of the 2022 Wimbledon, also signaled she would align with the majority of players if a boycott is called, saying she had no issue joining the action if most of the tour supported it. But other top players have pushed back on the idea of a tournament boycott, arguing that direct negotiation is a more effective and less extreme path forward.

    World No. 3 Iga Swiatek, a four-time Grand Slam winner, said she fully supports calls for increased prize money but views a boycott as an overstep that risks breaking down productive dialogue between players and tournament organizers. “I think the most important thing is to have proper communication and discussions with the governing bodies so we have some space to talk and maybe negotiate,” Swiatek said, adding she hopes productive talks can be held ahead of the upcoming French Open at Roland Garros. “But boycotting the tournament, it’s a bit extreme… So it’s really hard for me to say how it would work, if it’s even there on the picture. For now, I haven’t heard anything.”

    Former US Open champion Emma Raducanu went even further, saying she would refuse to participate in any boycott. Raducanu, who withdrew from the Italian Open 12 hours before Sabalenka’s comments due to lingering post-viral symptoms, said Grand Slams hold irreplaceable value for her that extends far beyond prize money. “It gives you something that money can’t and that is what is the most important to me, and what I value the most,” Raducanu told BBC Sport. “I wouldn’t be a part of [a boycott] but each to their own.”

    The current dispute was reignited earlier this month when organizers of the 2025 French Open announced a 9.5% increase in total prize money, a raise that players dismissed as far insufficient to meet their demands. Players are currently calling for 22% of Grand Slam tournament revenue to be allocated to player prize money, a significant increase from the current share. In recent months, other major have already announced higher prize pool increases: the 2025 Australian Open raised its total fund by nearly 16% year-over-year, while the 2024 US Open increased its pot by 20%. Wimbledon is set to announce its 2025 prize money allocations next month.

    Not all leading advocates of the prize money campaign back boycott threats. World No. 5 Jessica Pegula, one of the most vocal spokespeople for the players’ movement, told BBC Sport in March that she does not expect any player to actually strike against a Grand Slam, given how much players value competing at the sport’s biggest events. “We love playing the Slams – I don’t think anyone’s going to strike against the Slams,” Pegula said. “I just think it’s us asking for what we think we deserve, but I do think that if the men and the women can come together – which we have on that front – and keep pushing, there’s nothing wrong with us just asking for what we think is right.”

    Sabalenka, for her part, said she is optimistic the two sides can reach a resolution that works for all parties, but added that women players are ready to organize to push for fair treatment. “I just really hope that we at some point are going to get to the right decision, to the conclusion that everyone will be happy with,” the 28-year-old said. “I feel like nowadays, we girls can easily get together and go for this because some of the things I feel like it’s really unfair to the players.”

  • The internet has a Strait of Hormuz problem

    The internet has a Strait of Hormuz problem

    Most conventional discussions of threats to the global economy center on kinetic military strikes or large-scale cyberattacks on onshore data infrastructure. But a far stealthier, more destabilizing risk is now building in one of the world’s most strategically critical waterways: a coordinated sabotage campaign targeting the fiber-optic cables that crisscross the Persian Gulf seabed — infrastructure that underpins nearly all of the world’s digital and financial activity.

    Recent escalations in the Middle East carry global ramifications that extend far beyond energy security, requiring urgent attention from policymakers worldwide. Iran has already disrupted oil and gas shipments through the Strait of Hormuz, the world’s busiest and most important energy chokepoint, via maritime mining operations. Now, analysts warn that a quieter, far more consequential threat is unfolding.

    On April 22, 2026, Iranian media outlets linked to the Iranian government published detailed public maps of undersea cable routes, coastal landing stations, and key regional data hubs spanning the Persian Gulf. Analysts from *The Jerusalem Post* have assessed that these public disclosures are not accidental: they represent deliberate target preparation for future sabotage.

    To grasp the scale of this risk, it is necessary to confront a little-known fact that shapes the entire global digital ecosystem: over 97% of all cross-border internet traffic travels not through orbital satellites, but through thin fiber-optic cables laid across ocean floors. These strands, no thicker than a standard garden hose, facilitate an estimated $10 trillion in global financial transactions every single day. They are the foundational infrastructure for bank transfers, stock market operations, cloud computing services, and the AI systems that are increasingly integrated into every sector of the modern global economy. Even with advances in satellite technology, satellites lack the bandwidth to replace even a fraction of this capacity if major cable networks are disabled.

    Geographic chokepoints amplify this vulnerability dramatically. At least 17 major undersea cable systems pass through the Red Sea, with several additional core routes traversing the Persian Gulf. These are not backup redundant lines — they are the primary digital arteries connecting Europe, Asia, Africa and the Middle East. Both regions are already plagued by ongoing conflict, and their narrow channels mean a single well-executed cable cut can send shockwaves across every inhabited continent.

    This threat is not hypothetical: there is a clear, documented precedent for this exact pattern of aggression. In February 2024, Yemen’s Houthi movement published a public plan on the messaging platform Telegram outlining its intent to target undersea cables connecting Europe and Asia via the Red Sea. That same day, *Foreign Policy* magazine noted that even if the Houthis lacked the independent technical capacity to carry out such an attack, Iran could easily supply the required equipment and expertise. The warning was explicit and credible, but the global community largely ignored it.

    Less than three weeks later, the warnings became reality. On February 26, 2024, four undersea cables linking Saudi Arabia and Djibouti were severed in a deliberate act of sabotage, matching the pre-attack public signaling the Houthis had already provided. The pattern was unambiguous: public threat disclosure and target mapping, followed by immediate offensive action. Today, that same pattern is repeating — this time targeting infrastructure that connects the entire global digital system, not just a regional network.

    Over the past decade, the Middle East has evolved from a primarily energy-focused global hub to a critical digital infrastructure hub as well. The region now hosts more than 300 data centers across 18 countries, with tech giants including Amazon, Microsoft, and Google investing billions of dollars in cloud facilities based in the Persian Gulf. A widespread cable cut would not just disrupt email and casual web browsing: it would strand hundreds of billions of dollars in digital infrastructure overnight, and could effectively shut down large swations of the global economy, since nearly all modern daily commerce, banking, and investment activity depends on continuous, high-volume internet connectivity.

    What makes this threat uniquely difficult to deter is also what makes it so attractive to Iran: near-perfect plausible deniability. A missile strike is an unambiguous act of aggression that would trigger immediate diplomatic and military retaliation. But a cargo vessel dragging an anchor across a cable off the coast of the Strait of Hormuz is far more ambiguous. Was it an accidental navigational error? A fishing boat that drifted off its planned course? A proxy force operating with discreet backing from Tehran?

    By the time investigators can untangle these questions — a process made even slower by the fact that cable repair vessels cannot safely operate in active conflict zones — the damage is already done. Entire global regions can remain cut off from core digital services for weeks or even months, with cascading economic consequences.

    Compounding this vulnerability is the astonishingly weak international legal framework meant to deter this type of sabotage. Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), if an undersea cable is damaged in international waters, legal jurisdiction to prosecute the perpetrator falls to the perpetrator’s home country, not the state or company that owns the cable. The outcome of this framework is predictable: no state has ever been prosecuted for a deliberate cable cut, and no case of sabotage has ever been adjudicated in an international court. When states operate through proxy groups, as Iran regularly does, confirming attribution becomes even more difficult, and the threshold for meaningful retaliation is almost never met.

    In 2024, the United States and more than two dozen allied nations signed the New York Joint Statement on undersea cable security, officially acknowledging the widespread vulnerability of this infrastructure. But a public acknowledgment of risk is not a deterrent, and no substantive enforcement measures have followed the statement.

    To address this growing threat, policy experts argue that the international community needs a new, enforceable legal framework with real consequences. This framework would empower states that own cable infrastructure to pursue direct action against perpetrators regardless of their nationality, and would explicitly hold state sponsors accountable for attacks carried out through proxy groups. In the short term, since the U.S. already maintains a significant military presence in the Persian Gulf region, it can take immediate action to patrol and protect critical cable routes to reduce the risk of successful sabotage.

    In 2024, the Houthis publicly signaled their intent to attack undersea cables, and the attacks followed shortly after. Today, Iran is engaging in the same pattern of public signaling, but for a potentially far more devastating attack that could cripple the global economy. The only open question is whether the United States and its global partners will act to prevent the attack — before the silent fall of the global digital network.

  • Romanian PM ousted in no-confidence vote

    Romanian PM ousted in no-confidence vote

    In a significant political shakeup for the Eastern European NATO and EU member state, Romanian parliament has removed Prime Minister Ilie Bolojan from office via a successful no-confidence vote, capping weeks of growing tensions within the ruling four-party coalition over planned austerity measures.

    The motion to remove Bolojan passed with a comfortable margin: 281 Members of Parliament voted in favor of ousting the liberal Prime Minister, far exceeding the 233-vote threshold required to pass the no-confidence measure. The outcome was set in motion last month, when Romania’s largest political bloc, the left-wing Social Democrats, abandoned Bolojan’s governing coalition and aligned with far-right opposition groups to initiate the vote.

    Public friction between the Social Democrats and Bolojan has simmered for months, centered on the Prime Minister’s austerity push designed to cut Romania’s budget deficit – currently the largest in the European Union. The austerity policies have disproportionately impacted the left-wing party’s core voter base, fueling resentment that eventually led to the coalition split. Even as the alliance fractured, Bolojan’s government had made incremental progress in shrinking the deficit before the political crisis erupted.

    Romanian President Nicusor Dan, who was elected to office in a tense 2025 vote after a far-right electoral win the prior year was annulled over proven allegations of campaign fraud and Russian interference, has moved quickly to reassure both domestic stakeholders and international allies that Romania will maintain its steadfast pro-Brussels policy course. As a border state sharing a frontier with war-torn Ukraine and a key member of both the EU and NATO, the country’s geopolitical alignment carries major regional significance.

    Dan confirmed Tuesday that political negotiations to form a new government will be challenging, but called it his constitutional duty and the responsibility of all Romanian parties to guide the nation along a stable path. He is now widely expected to begin the process of building a new pro-EU coalition under a new prime minister, with the Social Democrats already signaling they are open to rejoining such an alliance under alternative leadership. Current expectations point to Dan nominating either another member of Bolojan’s liberal party or a non-partisan technocrat to fill the prime minister role. Bolojan will remain in a caretaker capacity until the new government wins parliamentary approval.

    The 10-month-old Bolojan-led coalition originally took power with the explicit goal of checking the growing influence of the far-right Alliance for Uniting Romanians (AUR), which currently holds one-third of all parliamentary seats. While a snap general election was not called following the no-confidence vote – with the next scheduled national election not due until 2028 – the ongoing political turbulence has already sparked concern among global financial markets. Analysts and investors worry that the instability could derail Romania’s commitment to deficit reduction, a key requirement under EU fiscal rules. Even before Tuesday’s vote, the Romanian national currency, the leu, dropped to an all-time low against the euro, reflecting market anxiety over the political impasse.

  • A gold-fueled mining rush scars Brazil’s Amazon, spiking deforestation and mercury risks

    A gold-fueled mining rush scars Brazil’s Amazon, spiking deforestation and mercury risks

    Driven by years of steadily climbing global gold prices, a new, destructive gold rush is tearing through protected zones of Brazil’s Amazon rainforest, accelerating irreversible deforestation and pushing mercury contamination to dangerous, public health-threatening levels, according to new research from leading environmental organizations and Brazilian law enforcement officials.

    A joint study published Tuesday by U.S.-based non-profit Amazon Conservation and Brazilian socio-environmental non-profit Instituto Socioambiental lays bare the rapid spread of unregulated mining across the Xingu region, a vast, globally significant protected forest corridor that spans the states of Pará and Mato Grosso. The research combined high-resolution satellite mapping with on-the-ground field surveys to document the encroachment of illegal operations into three formally protected conservation units, a trend that has accelerated sharply since 2024.

    The Terra do Meio Ecological Station, one of the region’s most intact protected ecosystems, recorded its first confirmed cases of illegal mining activity only in September 2024. By the end of 2025, deforestation linked to mining operations had already expanded to 30 hectares (74 acres). At the Altamira National Forest, cumulative deforestation from illegal mining reached 832 hectares (2,056 acres) between 2016 and September 2025. A newly opened mining front established in 2024 grew to 36 hectares (89 acres) by October 2025 alone, accounting for nearly half of all mining-related forest loss recorded in the conservation unit that year. Satellite monitoring also uncovered a hidden clandestine airstrip built to serve illegal miners in the Nascentes da Serra do Cachimbo Biological Reserve in 2024, where illegal mining expanded rapidly from just 2 hectares (5 acres) to at least 26.8 hectares (66 acres) in 2025.

    These on-the-ground findings align with data from Amazon Mining Watch, a public tracking platform launched in 2023 by Amazon Conservation in partnership with Earth Genome and the Pulitzer Center. The platform uses continuous satellite monitoring to track mining activity across the entire Amazon basin dating back to 2018. Since 2018, the platform records that approximately 496,000 hectares (1.2 million acres) of Amazon rainforest have been cleared to make way for mining operations, with nearly half of that total – around 223,000 hectares – located in the Brazilian Amazon. Amazon Conservation’s analysis estimates that 80% of all mining-related deforestation in Brazil carries a high risk of being illegal.

    While mining accounts for a relatively small share of total annual deforestation in Brazil compared to agribusiness expansion – the leading driver of forest loss – environmental researchers emphasize that the impact of mining is uniquely destructive because it disproportionately targets protected conservation areas and Indigenous territories. “What makes mining particularly problematic is that it targets protected areas and Indigenous territories,” explained Matt Finer, director of Amazon Conservation’s Monitoring of the Andes Amazon program. Protecting Indigenous territorial boundaries is widely recognized by climate and forest scientists as one of the most effective strategies to curb Amazon deforestation. As the world’s largest tropical rainforest, the Amazon plays a critical role in regulating global climate patterns, and continued large-scale forest loss threatens to accelerate long-term global warming.

    Brazilian authorities launched a high-profile, large-scale crackdown on illegal gold mining in the Yanomami Indigenous territory along the Venezuela border in 2023, after a surge in unregulated mining triggered a severe humanitarian and public health crisis. Data from Amazon Conservation confirms that the annual growth rate of newly mined areas in Yanomami fell sharply following the crackdown. While illegal mining has not been fully eradicated from the territory, nearly all of the 5,500 hectares (13,590 acres) of total mining-related deforestation in Yanomami occurred before the 2023 enforcement operation.

    Despite this localized success, targeted enforcement has failed to curb the spread of illegal mining across the broader Brazilian Amazon. Law enforcement officials describe the ongoing battle against illegal operations as a persistent “cat-and-mouse game”: when authorities destroy mining equipment and shut down operations in one location, miners simply relocate or resume activity within days of officials leaving the area. “Last year, I took part in an operation that destroyed more than 500 dredges on an Indigenous land,” said federal prosecutor André Luiz Porreca, who specializes in investigating illegal mining in the western Brazilian Amazon. “The following week, Indigenous people showed me photos proving the miners had already returned.”

    Porreca and other investigators note that illegal gold mining is largely financed and organized by Brazil’s largest transnational criminal organizations, including the Red Command and First Capital Command (PCC), which maintain a presence in roughly one-third of all municipalities across the Brazilian Amazon. “They have the money to bankroll these operations. Some dredges cost as much as 15 million reais,” Porreca explained. While enforcement has reduced pressure in the Yanomami territory, illegal mining has intensified rapidly across other regions, particularly Indigenous lands in the Xingu River basin. The Kayapo Indigenous territory is currently facing the most severe crisis, with an estimated 7,940 hectares (19,620 acres) of rainforest already cleared by illegal mining operations – the largest area of mining-related deforestation on any Indigenous land in the Brazilian Amazon.

    The current surge in illegal activity is directly tied to record-breaking global gold prices, which have risen sharply as investors turn to gold as a safe-haven asset amid growing global economic and geopolitical risk. “It’s basic market logic. With more buyers, there are more people exploiting gold,” Porreca said. He added that Brazil’s current system for regulating mineral exports remains weak, creating loopholes that allow criminal networks to launder illicit gold and pass it off as legally mined product for export.

    Beyond irreversible forest loss, illegal mining causes severe, long-lasting environmental and public health harm. Unregulated small-scale mining operations dump large volumes of raw mercury into Amazonian rivers, where the toxic metal accumulates in the food chain, contaminating drinking water supplies and fish that are the primary source of protein for riparian and Indigenous communities. In April 2025, Porreca submitted a formal report to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights documenting widespread mercury contamination across the Brazilian Amazon. The report cites analysis from leading Brazilian public health research institution Fiocruz, which found that 21.3% of fish sold in public markets across the Amazon region contain mercury levels that exceed World Health Organization safety limits. Most alarmingly, the study found that children between the ages of 2 and 4 are consuming mercury at levels up to 31 times higher than the WHO’s recommended maximum safe intake.

    Under current Brazilian federal law, all mining activity is prohibited on Indigenous territories. Brazil’s Ministry of Indigenous Peoples stated in an official comment that combating illegal mining on Indigenous lands is a top priority for President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s administration, noting that mining invasions are sustained by transnational criminal networks, and that eliminating the activity requires fully dismantling their financial and logistics supply chains. Brazil’s Ministry of Environment acknowledged that mercury contamination from illegal gold mining remains a persistent, growing threat in the Amazon, adding that the government is expanding scientific monitoring of contamination while supporting federal enforcement efforts. Brazil’s Federal Police did not respond to multiple requests for comment from the Associated Press for this report.

  • German car-ramming suspect’s motive remains unclear. Officials say he had psychiatric treatment

    German car-ramming suspect’s motive remains unclear. Officials say he had psychiatric treatment

    BERLIN – Investigators working on the deadly car-ramming attack that shook Leipzig’s busy central shopping district last week have released key updates on Tuesday, confirming the incident left two civilians dead and does not appear tied to ideological, political or religious extremism. Authorities have instead highlighted that the 33-year-old German suspect, who was taken into custody on Monday afternoon, recently completed a voluntary inpatient stay at a psychiatric hospital.

    According to official accounts, the suspect drove his vehicle hundreds of meters through a crowded pedestrian shopping street before police intervened to stop him and place him under arrest. The confirmed fatalities are a 63-year-old German woman and a 77-year-old German man, while six additional pedestrians sustained injuries in the attack, two of which are categorized as serious.

    The suspect currently faces formal charges of murder and attempted murder, with law enforcement confirming they have concluded the ramming was a deliberate act of violence. As of Tuesday, the full motive behind the attack remained under active investigation.

    In a joint statement released by police and public prosecutors, officials confirmed there is no current evidence linking the attack to political or religious extremism. The suspect had already come to law enforcement’s attention earlier this year, however, following reports of threats and defamatory offenses committed against other individuals.

    On April 17, police responded to a phone call placed by the suspect himself. Following the response, the man agreed to voluntarily admit himself to a specialized psychiatric hospital for treatment focused on his acute psychological condition. He remained in inpatient care until last Wednesday, when he was discharged. Investigators have confirmed the suspect has no prior criminal convictions, and there were no other open legal cases against him leading up to the attack.

    German national news agency dpa quoted the Saxony State Ministry of Social Affairs confirming that during his inpatient treatment, the man did not display any behavior that indicated he posed a danger to himself or the general public. Medical officials also determined there was no clinical justification to extend his stay or block his discharge from the facility.

  • Ethiopia and Sudan accuse each other of attacks

    Ethiopia and Sudan accuse each other of attacks

    Fresh cross-border accusations have sent already strained relations between Ethiopia and Sudan into a dangerous new phase, with Khartoum leveling claims of direct military aggression involving the United Arab Emirates that Addis Ababa has roundly rejected. On Tuesday, the neighboring nations traded blistering allegations of territorial incursions and support for hostile insurgent groups, a escalation that analysts warn is deepening the overlap between the two countries’ ongoing internal conflicts and drawing outside powers into an increasingly volatile regional crisis. Sudan, which has been gripped by a brutal civil war between the national army and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) paramilitary since 2023, has faced expanding conflict that has pushed against its border with Ethiopia, which itself grapples with multiple active insurgencies across its territory. Experts warn these parallel conflicts are merging, creating risks of a wider regional confrontation.

    The latest exchange of accusations opened with a public statement from Ethiopia’s foreign ministry, released via the social platform X from its Addis Ababa headquarters. The ministry claimed that Sudan’s regular army has become a logistics and training hub for anti-Ethiopia factions, specifically providing weapons and funding to mercenary fighters aligned with the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). The TPLF waged a two-year civil war against Ethiopia’s federal government that ended in 2022, but tensions between the group and national authorities remain unresolved. The Ethiopian statement also accused TPLF fighters of operating as mercenaries inside Sudan in exchange for Sudanese backing for cross-border raids into Ethiopia’s western frontier.

    Senior TPLF official Amanuel Assefa quickly dismissed the federal government’s claims in comments to AFP, denying any official connection to Sudanese authorities and arguing that the Addis Ababa government is scapegoating external actors to distract from its own policy failures.

    Hours before Ethiopia released its accusations, Sudan had already announced it would recall its ambassador to Addis Ababa for urgent consultations following a series of alleged drone strikes. At a Khartoum press conference, Sudanese army spokesperson Assim Awad made the unprecedented allegation that drone attacks targeting Sudanese army positions were launched from Ethiopian territory in direct collaboration with the United Arab Emirates, a claim that adds a new international dimension to the ongoing Sudanese conflict.

    The UAE is widely perceived as the primary foreign backer of the RSF, the paramilitary group fighting to overthrow Sudan’s civilian-military government, though it has repeatedly denied all allegations of military support. Awad told reporters that Khartoum holds conclusive evidence linking UAE-manufactured drones launched from Ethiopia’s northeastern Bahir Dar airport region to strikes on Sudanese army positions across multiple states on March 1 and March 17. He added that drone attacks originating from the same base have targeted sites in Khartoum since last Friday, including Khartoum International Airport on Monday. To back the claims, Awad said data recovered from a drone shot down over El-Obeid, capital of North Kordofan state, confirms the aircraft belonged to the UAE and took off from Bahir Dar.

    “Based on this documented evidence, we affirm that what the two states of Ethiopia and the United Arab Emirates have carried out constitutes direct aggression against Sudan and will not be met with silence,” Awad stated, adding that Sudanese armed forces have been placed on the highest level of operational readiness. At the same press conference, Sudan’s army-aligned foreign minister Mohieddin Salem went further, saying Khartoum is fully prepared to enter into an open military confrontation with Ethiopia if the situation requires it.

    Ethiopia’s foreign ministry immediately dismissed Sudan’s allegations as completely baseless, marking the second time in recent months it has denied claims of facilitating attacks from its territory. Back in March, the Sudanese military first made public claims that drone attacks were launched from inside Ethiopian territory, a charge Addis Ababa rejected at that time, along with repeated claims that it hosts RSF or UAE military personnel on its soil. The UAE has also yet to respond to AFP’s request for comment on the latest round of accusations.

    Beyond the high diplomatic standoff, drone attacks across Sudan have intensified in recent months, carried out by both the Sudanese army and the RSF. On Tuesday, a drone strike hit a civilian fuel station in Kosti, White Nile state, around 300 kilometers south of Khartoum, killing three civilians and wounding two more, according to security and medical sources speaking to AFP. Last year, the RSF launched a wave of drone strikes across Khartoum that mostly targeted military infrastructure, power grids and water facilities. After a period of relative calm in the capital over recent months, attacks resumed last week: five civilians were killed in southern Omdurman, across the Nile from central Khartoum, and a hospital in the southern Jebel Awliya district was damaged.

    According to militia sources speaking to AFP, a Sunday RSF drone strike targeted the home of Abu Aqla Kaykal, commander of the army-aligned Sudan Shield Forces in central Sudan, killing nine of his relatives. Kaykal, a former RSF commander who defected to the Sudanese army in October 2024, has led recent government offensives that recaptured large swathes of central Sudan, including parts of Al-Jazirah state and sections of Khartoum. Just last week, another senior RSF commander, al-Nour al-Guba, also defected and was received in Khartoum by army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, in what is seen as a major boost for government forces. Despite these small gains, active fighting continues across most of Sudan, including the war-torn western region of Darfur and southern Kordofan. The conflict has recently spread into southeastern Blue Nile state, which borders both Ethiopia and South Sudan, stoking international fears of a prolonged, fragmented conflict that could destabilize the entire Horn of Africa region.

  • Zambia blasts the US over a $2 billion health deal in exchange for critical minerals

    Zambia blasts the US over a $2 billion health deal in exchange for critical minerals

    Diplomatic tensions between Zambia and the United States have boiled over into public view, as Lusaka accuses Washington of linking a $2 billion critical health assistance package to preferential access to Zambia’s strategic mineral reserves — reserves that are central to the global green energy transition. The escalating row also exposes growing pushback across Africa against the Trump administration’s new “America First” aid framework, which has redefined traditional development support as transactional deals weighted toward U.S. commercial and geopolitical interests.

    In a sharply worded statement released Monday, Zambian Foreign Affairs Minister Mulambo Haimbe pushed back against outgoing U.S. Ambassador Michael Gonzales, who had publicly accused Zambian leaders of rampant corruption and negotiation gridlock that had derailed the aid talks. Haimbe dismissed Gonzales’ claims as “mischievous, deeply regrettable and undiplomatic,” saying the allegations violate longstanding norms of mutual respect between sovereign nations. He clarified that negotiations have been stalled for months not because of Zambian intransigence or graft, but because of two non-negotiable U.S. demands Zambia finds unacceptable: intrusive data-sharing requirements that violate Zambian citizens’ right to privacy, and an insistence that U.S. companies receive preferential treatment for access to Zambia’s critical mineral reserves.

    Zambia’s position is clear, Haimbe added: the southern African nation retains full sovereignty over its natural resources, and no single strategic partner will receive preferential treatment over others. The U.S. has rejected Zambia’s accusations, with Gonzales calling the claims of a mineral-for-aid link “absolutely and patently false” and “disgusting.” The U.S. Embassy in Zambia has not yet issued an official response to Haimbe’s latest remarks.

    The dispute is not an isolated incident: it is the most high-profile example of growing pushback against the Trump administration’s complete overhaul of U.S. foreign aid policy. The administration has dismantled longstanding aid architectures including the United States Agency for International Development and the global AIDS relief program PEPFAR, replacing them with bilateral country-by-country agreements that frame aid as a reciprocal transaction. Under the new model, U.S. health funding is tied to a series of strict conditions, including commercial concessions, mandatory domestic spending commitments, broad disease surveillance access, pathogen sharing, and even religious provisions. As of mid-2000s, Washington has secured agreements with roughly 30 countries, most of them in aid-dependent African nations.

    U.S. officials defend the framework as a pragmatic shift that reduces long-term donor dependency, empowers local governments to take ownership of their health systems, and protects core U.S. interests — most notably countering China’s growing economic and political influence across the African continent. China is already a dominant infrastructure and trade partner in Zambia and many other African countries, and Washington has made it a priority to secure alternative access to African minerals critical for manufacturing solar panels, electric vehicle batteries, and grid energy storage systems, key components of the global transition to clean energy.

    But African governments and global health experts have raised widespread alarm about the new model, with multiple nations already rejecting or pausing proposed deals over unacceptable terms. Last week, Ghana turned down a drafted agreement over the lack of safeguards for sensitive public health data. Zimbabwe previously walked away from a $367 million aid package over identical concerns. In Kenya, a $2.5 billion agreement signed last December remains frozen after a court challenge argued it violates national data protection legislation. In Lesotho, local negotiators only managed to reduce a U.S. demand for 25 years of unrestricted access to health data and biological samples down to a five-year term.

    Critics warn that the data-sharing provisions disproportionately benefit U.S. interests, with information flowing almost exclusively one-way to Washington. Following the U.S. withdrawal from the World Health Organization in January, the country abandoned multilateral global pathogen-sharing and vaccine access negotiations currently led by the WHO, and is instead pursuing direct bilateral access to disease surveillance data and biological samples from African nations. Health advocates warn this approach risks creating a fragmented parallel global health system that undermines multilateral coordination. In Zimbabwe’s earlier rejected deal, government officials noted the U.S. offered no guarantee that Zimbabwe would gain access to future medical innovations such as vaccines, diagnostics, or treatments developed using the shared data and samples. This echoes the inequitable experience of the COVID-19 pandemic, when many African nations contributed critical data and viral samples but were last in line to access life-saving vaccines.

    The closed-door negotiation process for the new deals has also drawn fire for a lack of transparency and public accountability. “Secrecy is at the center of this. That puts accountability for results at risk,” said Asia Russell, executive director of global health advocacy group Health GAP. “It’s impossible to evaluate these deals properly without seeing the full terms. Part of what made PEPFAR successful was transparency. Now that’s been taken away.”

    Beyond data and transparency concerns, the new agreements carry stricter financial terms: most offer lower overall funding than previous U.S. assistance programs, while requiring recipient nations to increase domestic health spending, with total funding at risk if domestic targets are not met. “These are going to be very heavy lifts,” said Jen Kates, senior vice president at U.S.-based non-profit health policy organization KFF. “Countries are already under strain.”

    Critics ultimately warn that tying life-saving health support to commercial and geopolitical goals erodes global health security for all nations. “When health becomes a bargaining chip, everyone becomes less safe,” Russell warned.

  • Albanese government to spend $74m on dedicated national online terrorism centre

    Albanese government to spend $74m on dedicated national online terrorism centre

    The Australian federal government led by Prime Minister Anthony Albanese has unveiled a $74 million investment to create a dedicated national hub focused on detecting and disrupting escalating online terror and violent extremism threats, with a particular focus on stopping the manipulation of vulnerable children and young people across the country.

    Announced on Tuesday alongside harrowing new testimony before the Royal Commission into Antisemitism and Social Cohesion, the two-year funding package will establish the Counter Terrorism Online Centre, a collaborative venture jointly operated by Australia’s top security agencies – the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) and the Australian Federal Police (AFP). The new unit will partner with domestic law enforcement teams and global counterparts to target bad actors operating in digital spaces, prioritizing groups and individuals that seek to radicalize impressionable young Australians.

    Speaking on the announcement, Minister for Home Affairs Tony Burke emphasized that the rate of online radicalization among Australian youth is growing at an alarming pace. “It happens fast,” Burke noted, pointing out that Australia already operates specialized centers for child protection and cybercrime response. Building a standalone institution focused on online violent extremism and terrorism, he argued, is the logical next step to address a rapidly evolving digital threat landscape.

    Burke added that the new centre will expand the monitoring reach of security personnel into private digital spaces, including closed chatrooms where extremist recruitment often occurs. “A bolstered online threat capability will give AFP and ASIO the resources they need to target terrorists and violent extremists online,” he said.

    The $74 million allocation for the centre forms part of a broader $80 million commitment for the 2026–27 fiscal year, all earmarked for boosting national online counter-terrorism capacity and preventing youth radicalization and violent extremism. Government officials have warned that violent extremists are increasingly radicalizing recruits via overlooked digital spaces, including mainstream online video game platforms and encrypted private chatrooms, out of view of traditional monitoring efforts.

    Official data underscores the urgency of the initiative: over the past two years alone, 27 young Australians have been charged with offences related to violent extremist material, and 15 of those suspects were 17 years old or younger.

    The announcement comes as the Royal Commission into Antisemitism and Social Cohesion, convened following the October 2024 Bondi Beach terror attack, continues to receive disturbing evidence from members of Australia’s Jewish community. In one shocking testimony, Joshua Gomperts, a St John Ambulance volunteer, told the inquiry that during a 2011 New Year’s Eve event, a firefighter pulled out a large hunting knife and told him, “I would skin you the way my family skinned yours in the camps.”

    This new counter-terrorism investment marks one of the most significant Australian government policy shifts focused on domestic digital extremism in recent years, as authorities race to close gaps in monitoring and disruption of online threats targeting minors.

  • Race to find port for hantavirus-stricken cruise ship

    Race to find port for hantavirus-stricken cruise ship

    In the aftermath of three fatalities linked to a suspected hantavirus outbreak aboard a Dutch-operated expedition cruise ship, global and national health authorities were in a urgent race on Tuesday to secure a port of disembarkation for the vessel, which remained anchored off the coast of Cape Verde after local officials blocked it from docking.

    The MV Hondius, operated by Netherlands-based Oceanwide Expeditions, launched its journey on April 1 from Ushuaia, Argentina, bound for Cape Verde off the western coast of Africa, carrying 147 passengers and crew representing 23 nationalities. To date, the World Health Organization (WHO) has confirmed two cases of hantavirus infection, with five additional suspected cases, resulting in three deaths, one critical case, and three people experiencing mild symptoms.

    According to WHO, the virus strain responsible for the outbreak has not yet been definitively identified. Genetic sequencing is currently being conducted by South African health laboratories, and officials expect results imminently. Maria Van Kerkhove, director of WHO’s epidemic and pandemic preparedness and prevention division, told reporters in Geneva that the leading working assumption among experts is that the pathogen is the Andes virus, a specific hantavirus variant endemic to South America that has been linked to rare cases of human-to-human transmission in past outbreaks.

    Two of the three people who died and one infected patient previously disembarked the vessel before the outbreak was declared. Most notably, a female passenger who fell ill after disembarking flew to Johannesburg, South Africa, and died on April 26. Health officials have already launched contact tracing operations to identify and monitor all passengers and crew that may have been exposed to the woman during her flight.

    The first two fatalities were a Dutch couple that joined the expedition in Argentina. The husband died aboard the Hondius on April 11, and his wife disembarked in Saint Helena on April 24 to accompany his remains home. She developed gastrointestinal symptoms, her condition deteriorated during a flight to Johannesburg, and she died the day after arriving. A British passenger remains in intensive care in Johannesburg, while two crew members – one British and one Dutch – require urgent medical evacuation that could see them flown to the Netherlands for care.

    Van Kerkhove noted that the typical incubation period for hantavirus ranges from one to six weeks, leading WHO investigators to conclude that the initial infected Dutch couple most likely contracted the virus before boarding the vessel, or during one of the multiple shore excursions the expedition made to Atlantic islands for birdwatching and outdoor activities. “There could be some source of infection on the islands,” she explained.

    Hantavirus is a rare but potentially lethal infection that is most commonly spread to humans through contact with infected rodents or their excreta. While human-to-human transmission is extremely rare for most hantavirus strains, Van Kerkhove said investigators believe limited transmission among close contacts may have occurred on the Hondius. She stressed that even for the Andes variant, spread is almost exclusively limited to close personal contacts, and the risk to the broader global population remains very low, per WHO assessments.

    The WHO announced Tuesday that the MV Hondius would be redirected to Spain’s Canary Islands for a full epidemiological investigation and complete disinfection. However, Spanish health officials clarified that no final decision on which specific port will accept the vessel has been made, pending a full review of all epidemiological data collected from the ship while it remained off Cape Verde. Once the two crew members requiring urgent care are evacuated, the vessel will be cleared to travel to its assigned destination.

    All passengers and crew remaining aboard the Hondius have been in isolation since the outbreak was detected, after Cape Verdean authorities refused the ship permission to dock. Spanish officials have confirmed they will accept the vessel to complete the outbreak response, conduct full public health risk assessments for all people on board, and carry out complete sanitation of the ship.

  • Hantavirus may have spread between passengers on cruise ship, WHO says

    Hantavirus may have spread between passengers on cruise ship, WHO says

    A deadly hantavirus outbreak on a Dutch-operated cruise vessel has left three passengers dead and prompted an urgent international investigation into the rare possibility of sustained human-to-human virus transmission, the World Health Organization (WHO) has confirmed. The outbreak unfolded on the MV Hondius, an expedition cruise ship operated by Netherlands-based firm Oceanwide Expeditions, which launched its transatlantic voyage roughly one month ago from an Argentine port.