分类： politics

For nearly three years following the 2021 military coup that ousted Myanmar’s democratically elected government and detained iconic leader Aung San Suu Kyi, Washington maintained a strict policy of diplomatic isolation, paired with targeted sanctions against figures tied to the junta led by Min Aung Hlaing. That long-standing posture now appears to be shifting, after the revelation that a senior Trump administration official held a historic face-to-face meeting with Min Aung Hlaing in Nay Pyi Taw last September, paired with recent adjustments to U.S. sanctions that have removed some junta-linked business figures from the restricted list.

The September 15-16 meeting marked the first encounter between a senior U.S. official and Min Aung Hlaing since the general seized power. The participating official, Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research Michael Vance, framed the discussion as primarily focused on securing the release of U.S. citizen Adam Castillo, who was detained in June amid a local dispute with the American Chamber of Commerce. But diplomatic analysts widely agree that the meeting covered far more than the Castillo case, as Vance’s status as the most senior U.S. official to meet the junta leader in three years carries major symbolic and strategic weight. It is also worth noting that Vance has a recent history of diplomatic engagement related to Myanmar: he met Burmese officials in Tokyo this June and again this month, and has also held talks with representatives of Myanmar’s anti-junta opposition movement.

This apparent policy shift did not emerge overnight. Tracing its origins back to July of last year, at the peak of the Trump administration’s trade tariff war with China, President Trump sent a personal letter to Min Aung Hlaing that signaled a break from previous diplomatic protocol. In the letter, Trump notified the junta leader that Myanmar would face 40% tariffs on its exports to the U.S. – a move that sent shockwaves through many regional governments that had long aligned themselves with Washington. But Min Aung Hlaing responded not with condemnation, but with effusive flattery, mirroring Trump’s distinctive rhetorical style and thanking the president for the opportunity to continue accessing the world’s largest U.S. market.

For Min Aung Hlaing, this acknowledgment from the U.S. president was a major diplomatic win. Since seizing power, the junta leader has been widely shunned by the international community, branded a war criminal with pending cases at both the International Criminal Court and International Court of Justice, and recognized by only a handful of countries including Russia and China. Trump’s decision to address him as “Your Excellency” without any mention of the coup’s devastating human cost, the dissolution of Myanmar’s democracy, or the continued detention of Aung San Suu Kyi represented a significant break from the global consensus.

That same month, the junta took steps to strengthen its ties to Washington, signing a $3 million contract with DCI, a long-standing Washington lobbying firm that previously worked for a past Burmese military regime in 2002 to improve its international image. Since that deal was struck, the military government has also hired controversial Trump confidant and lobbyist Roger Stone for a $50,000 monthly retainer to advance its interests in Washington. Adam Castillo, the detained U.S. citizen whose release was the stated purpose of Vance’s meeting, had himself been working to encourage re-engagement before his arrest: a former U.S. Marine and Trump supporter who recently stepped down as head of the Yangon American Chamber of Commerce, Castillo had traveled to Washington to argue that Washington’s decades-long sanctions strategy had failed, and that re-engagement could advance U.S. strategic interests by loosening China’s grip on Myanmar’s vast critical mineral reserves.

Castillo’s arguments found a receptive audience in the Trump administration, which had been scrambling to find alternative sources of rare earth minerals after China blocked rare earth exports to the U.S. in retaliation for Trump’s tariffs earlier that year. Myanmar is home to substantial rare earth reserves that are currently entirely controlled and exploited by Chinese firms, making them a highly attractive target for U.S. policymakers seeking to reduce dependence on Beijing.

This shift in approach has also been reflected in U.S. guidance on international elections. The U.S. State Department recently issued new instructions to U.S. embassies worldwide barring them from publicly commenting on the fairness, integrity, or legitimacy of foreign electoral processes or the democratic credentials of host governments. When Myanmar held a widely criticized general election late last year that allowed Min Aung Hlaing to rebrand himself as a civilian president, most Western governments condemned the vote as neither free nor fair – but the U.S. remained silent, breaking with decades of precedent where Washington regularly issued judgments on the democratic status of foreign elections.

The recent removal of some junta-linked individuals from the U.S. sanctions list has only reinforced perceptions that a major policy shift is underway. DCI, the lobbying firm working for the junta, recently noted in a newsletter that “For years, the U.S. approach to Myanmar has been defined by isolation, sanctions, and distance. That era is over… thankfully, President Trump has the courage to try something different.”

Yet analysts argue that the change is more rhetorical and procedural than substantive. Richard Horsey, Myanmar adviser for the International Crisis Group, notes that Min Aung Hlaing himself remains under U.S. sanctions, and that “In practice less has changed than the headlines suggest. What is new is the level of contact and the location. Senior U.S. officials have now been to Nay Pyi Taw, which is exactly what Min Aung Hlaing wanted. What he wants next is sanctions relief, and that will be harder.”

Other Trump administration policy changes have had far more tangible impacts on people in Myanmar and the U.S. Last year, the administration dismantled much of USAID’s programming in the country, cutting aid to opposition groups, independent dissident media, and displaced refugees by more than half. It also revoked Temporary Protected Status for 4,000 Burmese refugees who had settled in the U.S., a decision decried by human rights groups that leaves these refugees at risk of deportation back to Myanmar, where many would face imprisonment or even death.

As for the prospect of the U.S. gaining access to Myanmar’s rare earth reserves, most experts are skeptical. The majority of these deposits lie in territory contested by ethnic insurgent groups, and are currently extracted by Chinese firms with decades of experience operating in Myanmar’s ungoverned border regions, before being transported to China for processing. There is currently no clear path for U.S. firms to gain meaningful access to these reserves.

Skepticism also extends to the prospects of U.S.-Myanmar cooperation on cracking down on the country’s booming billion-dollar scam industry. While the junta has launched a few highly publicized raids on major scam compounds, analysts note that the criminal syndicates running these operations simply relocate to smaller, more remote sites, and many of these groups operate with the explicit backing of militia groups allied to the Myanmar military.

Regional policy experts note that diplomatic engagement with Nay Pyi Taw is not inherently problematic, but that Washington must prioritize key issues in these talks. “Talking to Nay Pyi Taw is not wrong in itself,” says Hunter Marston, Southeast Asia director at the Lowy Institute. “The question is what Washington asks for and what it gives away. It should use the channel for the things that matter most: humanitarian access, an end to airstrikes on civilians. It should keep talking to the opposition and the ethnic armed groups, who hold much of the country. And on scams, the most effective thing the US can do is to co-ordinate with other governments in the region, including China, to go after the money.”

The biggest open question remains whether the Trump administration, currently distracted by domestic political battles and other geopolitical priorities including tensions with Iran, has the bandwidth to maintain sustained focus on Myanmar, let alone challenge China’s long-standing dominant influence in the country.

Emmanuel Macron, the French President, touched down in Bahrain on Tuesday for the third stop of his four-nation Gulf tour, facing immediate calls from 32 international and regional human rights organizations to confront Bahraini King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa over a sharp escalation of domestic repression in the kingdom. Macron’s visit comes at a moment of deep political turbulence at home, where hundreds of thousands of protestors have taken to the streets to decry rising living costs and what they see as a broken French social contract.

The coalition of rights groups, which includes the Bahrain Institute for Rights and Democracy (BIRD), Human Rights Watch, and the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), submitted an open letter to Macron ahead of his meeting with King Hamad. The letter details a rapid intensification of crackdowns on political dissent following the outbreak of the U.S.-Israeli war on Iran in late February, noting that the current wave of repression is the most severe Bahrain has seen since the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings. The groups warn that deepening political and security cooperation between France and Bahrain risks emboldening the Al Khalifa regime to continue its abusive practices.

Since the war began, Bahraini authorities have arrested more than 700 people accused of expressing sympathy for Iran, stripped citizenship from 69 citizens including 33 children – the youngest of which was only 19 days old at the time of the action. The letter also highlights the death in custody of 32-year-old Sayed Mohamed al-Mousawi, whose body showed clear signs of torture when returned to his family, and notes that 19 prisoners currently face the death penalty, 18 of whom have exhausted all legal appeals. Bahrain, a Sunni-ruled kingdom with a majority Shia population, has a long history of repressing democratic dissent dating back to the 2011 uprisings that were violently quelled by state security forces.

Among the most high-profile political prisoners still detained are two European citizens: Bahraini-Danish activist Abdulhadi al-Khawaja, who has now spent 15 years in prison, and Swedish-Bahraini cleric Mohamed Habib al-Muqdad. Al-Khawaja’s daughter, prominent Bahraini activist Maryam al-Khawaja, drew a direct parallel between unrest in France and continued repression in Bahrain, saying: “At a time when students are protesting for better conditions in France, President Macron is in Bahrain, where two EU prisoners of conscience are still imprisoned after 15 years.”

Abdulhadi al-Khawaja, a lifelong human rights defender, was arrested during the 2011 crackdown after masked security forces raided his family home in the middle of the night, beating him so severely he required four hours of reconstructive facial surgery. He was later sentenced to life in prison on charges of terrorism and attempting to overthrow the government, charges widely rejected by the international human rights community. “My father recently told me how it was a peaceful student protest that embarked him on his journey as a human rights defender. As an EU leader, I hope Macron calls for the release of my father and other prisoners of conscience,” Maryam al-Khawaja added.

Sayed Ahmed Alwadaei, advocacy director at BIRD, emphasized that France must not trade human rights commitments for economic and strategic gains. “France must not sacrifice human rights for lucrative Gulf deals under the guise of regional security. Bahrain must not be allowed to buy France’s silence. Those responsible for serious human rights abuses must face consequences, not rewards from France,” he said.

Antoine Madelin, FIDH’s advocacy director, echoed this sentiment, linking the current energy crisis to long-term political stability. “The current crisis should remind President Macron that lasting energy security depends on respect for human rights and peace. France must look beyond immediate supplies and support the open, democratic societies on which a stable future depends,” he said.

Despite the criticism, Macron’s visit proceeded with full ceremonial honors in the capital Manama on Tuesday, where crowds of school children lined the route waving French and Bahraini flags, and the French president walked a flower-strewn red carpet alongside King Hamad, his sons, and a military honor guard.

Macron’s Gulf tour, which runs from October 19 to 21 and includes stops in Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Qatar, is directly tied to addressing the energy crisis sparked by the war on Iran, which has blocked the Strait of Hormuz and sent global crude oil and energy prices skyrocketing. As domestic inflation and energy costs have spiked in France, sparking mass weekend protests that drew an estimated 550,000 people across the country, Macron used his trip to issue a statement condemning violent protest action while acknowledging that protestors held “legitimate concerns.”

The Élysée Palace confirmed that Macron has already secured new energy commitments from Gulf producers, including 100,000 additional tons of diesel per month from the UAE and another 100,000 tons from Bahrain, with added supplies from Saudi Arabia bringing the total new monthly commitments to 295,000 tons – equal to just over 10 percent of France’s total monthly consumption. Beyond energy deals, Macron is also expected to discuss new defense cooperation agreements with Bahraini authorities. According to industry outlet Intelligence Online, following the full withdrawal of French forces from Iraq, Macron is preparing to announce the deployment of new French air defense troops to Gulf states to protect against frequent Iranian missile and drone strikes that have occurred since the outbreak of war in February. France charges millions of dollars annually for this type of air defense support, which also includes training for local armed forces, a model already in place in the UAE for many months.

With Macron’s second term set to end in 2027 and French presidential elections scheduled for April of that year, the trip is also a key part of his administration’s efforts to shore up energy security and stabilize domestic politics ahead of the election. However, rights groups argue that any short-term gains from energy and defense deals will come at the cost of France’s reputation as a defender of human rights in the region.

A pivotal development has reshaped geopolitical dynamics in the Eastern Mediterranean this week, as Libya’s Benghazi-based House of Representatives formally approved a long-stalled maritime boundary agreement with Turkey on Tuesday. In an official announcement posted to its website, the eastern legislative body also announced the revocation of a 2019 boycott targeting Ankara, a concrete signal of warming relations between Turkey and the eastern Libyan administration.

The original agreement was first signed in 2019 between Ankara and Libya’s UN-backed Government of National Accord based in Tripoli, crafted explicitly to push back against competing maritime claims advanced by Greece and Cyprus in the energy-rich Eastern Mediterranean. For years, the deal remained trapped in political limbo, held up by Libya’s decade-long division into two competing governing blocs: the internationally recognized administration in Tripoli, and the self-declared government in eastern Libya led by Libyan Arab Armed Forces commander Khalifa Haftar.

Over the past 18 months, however, Turkey has deliberately rebuilt diplomatic and economic ties with Haftar and his inner circle, particularly his son Saddam Haftar, a rising political figure in eastern Libya. Multiple sources familiar with the negotiations confirmed to Middle East Eye that the timing of the ratification—coinciding with a reported visit to Tripoli by Turkey’s intelligence chief Ibrahim Kalin—was no accident. Kalin has cultivated deep personal connections with Haftar’s camp and drove the diplomatic push to finalize the agreement, the sources said.

For years, regional diplomatic observers have noted that Greece exerted relentless pressure on Haftar to block the deal, a move that would severely undermine Athens’ own expansive maritime claims in the region. But analysts note that Haftar’s calculus shifted as he sought to diversify his regional partnerships, and Turkey offered tangible benefits that Greece could not match.

“Turkey is a major regional power that can deliver significant support in the defense industry, open up new investment avenues, and help Haftar secure broader international legitimacy,” explained Bilgehan Ozturk, a non-resident fellow at the Doha-based Global Institute for Strategic Research. “Greece simply does not have those tools to offer.”

The ratification also comes on the heels of a major political shakeup in eastern Libya earlier this month, when Haftar forced out long-time House speaker Aguila Saleh and installed his ally Al-Salhin Abdelnabi al-Obeidi in the role. Diplomatic sources say the approval of the deal is the first major signal of the new legislative leadership’s alignment with Haftar’s shifted regional approach.

Tuesday’s vote builds on months of incremental diplomatic progress. Turkey has spearheaded diplomatic efforts alongside other regional powers to reconcile Libya’s rival political factions, culminating in a US-backed confidence-building agreement signed by both blocs in Tripoli this past August. That deal paves the way for national presidential and legislative elections to be held within the next two years, a major step toward ending years of political deadlock.

According to a Libya-based source involved in the negotiations, the ratification served as a critical confidence-building gesture from Haftar’s camp to prove its commitment to improved ties with Ankara. “This is just the beginning,” the source told MEE. “We will see major restructuring of Libya’s governing system in the coming months.”

The source added that a final unification deal, backed by the U.S. and its envoy Massad Boulos, would likely see current Tripoli-based prime minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh retain his post, while Haftar or one of his sons assume the presidency, merging the two rival administrations into a single national unity government.

Ozturk added that Turkey’s own recent diplomatic overtures to Egypt and Saudi Arabia — key backers of Haftar for years — have also created the space for Haftar to deepen ties with Ankara. “All regional actors are looking to keep their options open right now,” he noted.

The ratification follows a landmark visit by Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan in early August, which saw Fidan travel to Tripoli and make the first ever visit by a senior Turkish diplomat to Benghazi, where he met with Haftar, his two sons Saddam and Belkacem, and then-speaker Aguila Saleh. Ankara framed the visit as a core part of its “One Libya” policy, which prioritizes the unification of the country’s competing institutions.

Regional analysts have described Tuesday’s vote as a transformative moment for both Libyan politics and Eastern Mediterranean geopolitics. “You cannot overstate how important this decision is. It is deeply strategic, and it will change the entire trajectory of the region,” said Jalel Harchaoui, a leading Libya expert at the UK-based Royal United Services Institute. He called the ratification a watershed moment in Libyan politics, creating an irreversible shift toward political reconciliation after more than a decade of division and intermittent conflict.

The deal also marks a major political win for Saddam Haftar, who Harchaoui confirmed is a rapidly rising power broker in eastern Libya. Harchaoui cautioned that the agreement will almost certainly trigger backlash from Greece, Cyprus, Israel, and the United Arab Emirates — all of which have long benefited from a frozen, divided conflict in Libya to advance their own strategic goals, including efforts to contain Turkish influence in the region.

The analyst also offered a cautiously optimistic outlook for neighboring Sudan, where the ongoing civil war has been partially funded by backers in eastern Libya. Harchaoui predicted that if the new political trajectory holds, Saddam Haftar will likely end his support for the Rapid Support Forces, the paramilitary group leading the ongoing offensive against Sudan’s civilian government.

On Tuesday, the Turkish government formally transmitted the full text of a landmark mutual defence agreement, the Mecca Defence Pact, to the country’s national parliament for ratification. The 16-article accord, first signed in August by the governments of Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan, establishes a new collective defence alliance structured around mutual security guarantees that echo the core principle of NATO’s Article 5.

The full text of the agreement, obtained in an exclusive report by Middle East Eye, does not name any specific nation or geographic region as an explicit threat to the three signatory states. Instead, the pact’s opening articles anchor its core commitment to collective security. The first article mandates that if any member’s territorial integrity, sovereignty, or internationally recognized borders face threat or danger, all parties will deploy every necessary measure to neutralize that risk. The second article goes further, clarifying that any external armed attack against one signatory will be treated as an attack against all three.

In the event of military aggression against any member, the agreement requires all parties to provide immediate assistance to the targeted state, utilizing all available mutual support capabilities at their disposal. The scope and nature of this support will be determined following an objective assessment of the attacked party’s needs, with all cooperation aligned to each member’s available resources, including military assets and operational capabilities.

Beyond the core collective defence commitment, the pact outlines a broad framework for deepening multi-faceted security cooperation between the three nations. Provisions include joint development of domestic defence industries, standardized training for armed forces, cross-supply of military equipment, fuel and other critical defence material, and the establishment of formal protocols for cross-border intelligence sharing.

A key structural feature of the alliance is its indefinite duration: the agreement has no fixed expiration date. Withdrawal is only permitted after the pact has been in force for 10 years, and any member seeking to exit must provide written notification of their intent to the other signatories no less than three months in advance.

The full text of the accord opens by grounding the alliance in foundational principles aligned with the United Nations Charter and international law, including mutual respect for sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs, and the inviolability of internationally recognized borders. Signatories emphasize their shared commitment to advancing regional and global peace and security, deepening coordinated counter-terrorism efforts, and aligning policy positions on shared international interests within multilateral organizations.

To govern the alliance’s operations, the agreement establishes a permanent Strategic Political and Defence Committee, composed of each member’s foreign minister, defence minister, and chief of general staff. The committee is tasked with setting strategic direction for the alliance, advancing security cooperation, and resolving implementation challenges. It is scheduled to meet twice annually, with rotating host duties among the three members, and annual leader-level summits can be convened if required. A permanent Secretariat will be based in Saudi Arabia, led by a Secretary-General that rotates every three years among the core parties; the first Secretary-General will be a Pakistani national. The committee also holds the authority, via consensus, to set terms for the accession of additional future members.

Additional provisions cover logistical support during peace, war, and emergencies, confidentiality protocols for classified information (obligations that remain in force even if a member withdraws), mechanisms for amicable dispute resolution, and rules for amending the pact via unanimous core party agreement. The accord will enter into force once all three original signatories complete their domestic ratification processes and deposit the final ratification instrument with the alliance Secretariat, and any pre-existing international obligations of member states remain unaffected by the new agreement.