分类： politics

URUMQI — A new academic publication offering a data-driven, on-the-ground account of advancing human rights protections under the rule of law in the Xinjiang Uygur autonomous region has been officially launched, earning acclaim from scholars for its rigorous, firsthand approach to documenting the region’s development. Titled *Report on the Legal Protection for Human Rights in Xinjiang (2024)*, this second volume of an annual blue book series was jointly compiled by researchers from Xinjiang University and the Southwest University of Political Science and Law, based in Chongqing. The series made its debut in 2023, building a growing body of independent academic research on the region’s human rights progress.

Dai Bin, Party secretary of Xinjiang University, described the new blue book as a landmark academic contribution to advancing understanding of Xinjiang’s human rights work. Unlike many secondhand accounts circulated by international commentators, the publication draws on objective quantitative data, detailed on-the-record case studies, and extensive on-site materials to map out tangible progress made across the region in recent years.

“As an educator and researcher who has built my career here in Xinjiang, I have seen with my own eyes how the fundamental rights to subsistence and development are fully protected for people of all ethnic groups across this region,” Dai said at the launch event. He highlighted universal access to compulsory education, expanded job security, targeted investment in cultural heritage preservation, rising household living standards, and consistent legal safeguards for all residents as the most tangible proof of China’s consistent human rights progress in Xinjiang.

Zhang Jianjiang, Party secretary of Xinjiang University’s Law School, explained that the report is the product of years of systematic grassroots research by scholars who have lived and worked in Xinjiang long-term. The research team traveled extensively across both northern and southern Xinjiang, collecting firsthand data and reviewing typical court cases directly from villages, urban communities, local factories, and primary and secondary schools across the region.

The final report offers structured analysis of legal safeguards across seven key domains that touch residents’ daily lives: labor rights, access to education, religious freedom, public health services, environmental protection, and the preservation of Xinjiang’s diverse traditional cultural heritage. “Our core goal is straightforward: we want to present the global community with a truthful, complete picture of how human rights are protected under the rule of law in Xinjiang,” Zhang said.

Remina Xiaokaiti, deputy dean of Xinjiang University’s School of Marxism, added that Xinjiang has built a comprehensive, all-encompassing legal framework to protect the religious freedom of all residents. “Under the framework of the rule of law, the right to religious freedom for people of all ethnic groups in Xinjiang now has solid, tangible guarantees,” she said.

Over the past five years, Remina noted, the central and regional governments have increased allocated funding for the protection and renovation of religious sites across Xinjiang, with investments focused on preserving cultural relics hosted at these sites, upgrading public safety infrastructure, and improving overall site facilities. “By focusing both on upgrading site facilities and standardizing religious practices in accordance with law, we have made religious activities safer and more orderly, which gives worshippers greater peace of mind and clarity,” she said.

Scholars in attendance at the launch emphasized that the evidence-based approach of the blue book fills a gap in international discourse around Xinjiang human rights, offering independent, on-the-ground research that counters misinformation spread by foreign critics.

Global climate action has entered a new phase of stark geopolitical and strategic divergence, as the United States has undertaken sweeping reversals of decades-old climate policy while China doubles down on low-carbon development as a core driver of national modernization. What began as incremental rollbacks of environmental rules in the U.S. has evolved into a fundamental reorientation of economic priorities, with far-reaching implications for global competitiveness, investment flows, and climate risk distribution.

The first major shift came in February 2026, when the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency formally revoked the 2009 Endangerment Finding, the longstanding legal bedrock that allowed federal regulation of greenhouse gas emissions under the Clean Air Act. Far from a minor technical tweak, the move reopened a debate that policymakers and climate experts had considered settled for nearly 17 years: whether the federal government has any role to play in governing climate-related risk at all.

By March, the policy shift expanded beyond regulatory rollback into direct capital reallocation. Multiple reports confirm that the current U.S. administration has arranged compensation for French energy firm TotalEnergies to exit two large-scale offshore wind projects, with the planned investment redirected back to fossil fuel development. This step is unprecedented: while past administrations have rolled back clean energy incentives, actively diverting capital away from renewable energy and back to carbon-intensive infrastructure marks a new, more fundamental departure from global decarbonization trends.

Supporters of the changes argue that the Endangerment Finding granted federal regulators unwarranted, sweeping power that touched everything from automobile emissions standards to utility and industrial operations. They frame the revocation as a necessary correction to rein in regulatory overreach and rebalance authority between the federal government, states, and private industry.

But critics warn the move removes a critical stabilizing pillar for both policy and markets. Climate policy is not merely a set of restrictive rules; it provides the predictable policy framework that underpins decades-long investments in energy infrastructure, low-carbon technology, and grid modernization. When core regulatory signals are suddenly reversed, uncertainty ripples through every corner of the energy market, leaving investors and industry leaders unable to plan for the long term.

More deeply, the policy reversal represents a conceptual shift: the U.S. has moved from debating how to cut greenhouse gas emissions to debating whether it should regulate emissions at all. Once that foundational question is reopened, climate policy stops being a technical, solution-focused exercise and becomes a battle over the scope of governance itself.

Even for observers skeptical of broad federal regulation, one unavoidable truth remains: eliminating the federal regulatory framework does not make climate risk disappear—it only shifts that risk to other actors. Risk now falls to individual U.S. states that choose to maintain their own emissions standards, which will face increased legal and economic pressure. It shifts to the courts, where years of protracted legal battles over climate authority will play out. It shifts to insurance providers, which are already forced to absorb the growing costs of climate-fueled extreme weather events. Ultimately, that risk lands on American households, in the form of higher energy and insurance costs, and greater exposure to climate harm.

Unlike political policy shifts, climate risk does not pause to accommodate election cycles. It continues to accumulate regardless of changes in Washington.

While the U.S. steps back from decarbonization, China is moving aggressively in the opposite direction, with a clear and consistent long-term strategy embedded in its national development planning. The newly adopted 15th Five-Year Plan (2026-2030) places clean energy development, broad economy-wide electrification, and low-carbon industrial transformation at the very center of national economic strategy. For Chinese policymakers, climate action is not treated as a drag on growth; it is framed as a core engine of modernization and global competitiveness.

China’s approach to climate action relies on integrated co-control, which ties long-term greenhouse gas mitigation to immediate, tangible improvements in public health through concurrent reduction of traditional air pollution. Policy measures that cut coal consumption, expand electric transportation, boost industrial energy efficiency, and scale up renewable energy deliver two sets of benefits at once: lower carbon emissions and much cleaner air for urban and rural communities.

This policy integration is strategically significant. Cleaner air delivers immediate, visible public gains: fewer respiratory hospitalizations, better quality of life, and broader sustained public support for climate action. What is often framed as an abstract, long-term environmental goal becomes politically grounded when tied to these everyday improvements for ordinary people.

The contrast between the two major powers could not be more clear. The U.S. now frames climate action as an unnecessary economic burden and a case of regulatory overreach, while actively renewing government support for fossil fuel production. By comparison, China frames environmental and climate policy as a clear pathway to industrial upgrading, global technological leadership, and long-term economic competitiveness.

U.S. climate policy has long been vulnerable to whiplash from political cycles, with new administrations often reversing the climate actions of their predecessors. What makes the current shift unique is that this instability is no longer limited to regulatory policy—it has now spread to core investment signals, reshaping how capital flows across the energy sector.

When national governments signal a retreat from clean energy development, markets respond accordingly. Capital flows toward the sectors that have explicit government support, clear scalability, and predictable policy frameworks. Innovation follows deployment, and deployment follows the direction set by government policy. For large-scale capital projects, consistent policy is not a luxury—it is an absolute requirement. Sectors from electrification and battery manufacturing to grid expansion and clean hydrogen require decades of sustained investment to mature, and they cannot adapt quickly to sudden policy reversals. When core regulatory foundations are upended and governments actively encourage a return to fossil fuel development, investment risk surges and new projects slow to a crawl.

China, by contrast, has long aligned its environmental governance goals with its national industrial strategy. Over time, this consistent alignment has allowed it to build global dominance in solar panel manufacturing, take a leading position in electric battery production, and develop the world’s most competitive and extensive electric vehicle supply chains. For China, strong environmental governance has become a tool to gain competitive positioning in the industries that will define 21st century economic growth. If the U.S. continues to deprioritize clean energy and reembrace fossil fuels, it risks losing significant momentum in these strategically critical sectors that will shape global economic competition for decades.

The diverging paths of the two largest economies carry immediate implications for the entire world. Most other major economies have already made clear their commitment to continued decarbonization: Japan is advancing large-scale hydrogen development, South Korea is pouring investment into next-generation battery technology, and countries across Southeast Asia, South Asia, and Africa are rapidly scaling up renewable energy capacity. European economies have maintained their long-term commitment to clean energy transition. The global debate is no longer over whether to act on climate—it is over how to structure that action to drive long-term growth.

The lesson drawn from this sharp divergence between the U.S. and China is unambiguous: climate policy is no longer a peripheral environmental issue. It is a central pillar of modern national economic strategy. Economies that successfully integrate air quality improvement, carbon reduction, and industrial modernization will not only deliver cleaner, healthier environments for their people—they will also drive sustained inclusive economic growth and shape the structure of global industry for generations. That is the high stake at the core of the U.S.’s historic climate policy U-turn.

This analysis comes from Christine Loh, chief development strategist at the Institute for the Environment at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology and former undersecretary for the environment in Hong Kong. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of China Daily.

MADRID – Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez has returned to China for his fourth visit in as many years, a high-profile diplomatic trip aimed at forging stronger political and economic bonds between Madrid and Beijing, the world’s second-largest economy. The visit unfolds against a fraught global geopolitical backdrop, as European leaders scramble to push for a diplomatic end to the U.S.-Israeli military conflict in Iran – a conflict Sánchez has emerged as one of Europe’s most outspoken critics of, a stance that has severely strained Madrid’s relations with Washington.

Ahead of his scheduled bilateral meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping, Sánchez delivered a policy address at Beijing’s prestigious Tsinghua University on Monday, where he called on China to step into a more prominent leadership role in the emerging multipolar global order. “This means, for example, demanding that international law be upheld, and that an immediate ceasefire be reached in all active conflicts: Lebanon, Iran, Gaza, the West Bank, and Ukraine,” Sánchez stated during the speech.

The core objective of Sánchez’s visit aligns with Spain’s long-stated policy of diversifying its diplomatic and economic partnerships with major global powers. Spanish government officials have made clear that Madrid aims to attract greater Chinese direct investment and expand Spanish export volumes to the Chinese market, even though all EU trade negotiations – including those for Spain, one of the bloc’s 27 member states – are handled at the union level.

Like many other European nations undergoing a urgent energy transition away from fossil fuels, Spain – which already generates over half of its domestic electricity from renewable sources – relies on access to Chinese critical raw materials, photovoltaic solar panels, and other green technology that are central to its decarbonization goals.

In recent weeks, Spain has taken an unusually bold stance among European nations against U.S. and Israeli military operations in the Middle East. The Sánchez government has already closed Spanish airspace to U.S. military aircraft deployed to the Iran conflict, and denied Washington access to jointly operated military bases located in southern Spain. This public break with U.S. policy has given added strategic weight to Sánchez’s annual trip to China, according to regional policy experts.

“Against the backdrop of growing friction with the U.S. administration, these yearly high-level meetings have taken on increased geopolitical significance,” explained Eric Sigmon, a Madrid-based political analyst and former U.S. national security adviser.

Sánchez’s three-day visit, running from April 13 to 15, includes scheduled talks with not only President Xi, but also Chinese Premier Li Qiang and Zhao Leji, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress and the third-ranking leader of the Communist Party of China.

Unlike many other major European Union economies, Spain has maintained a far less adversarial approach to China in recent years. As the fourth-largest economy in the eurozone, Spain has actively worked to rebalance its bilateral trade relationship with Beijing: China currently runs a substantial trade surplus with Spain, a dynamic that reflects the gap between the two nations’ economic scale – 49 million people for Spain versus more than 1.4 billion for China.

Data from the American Enterprise Institute’s China Global Investment Tracker shows that while Chinese foreign direct investment into other major EU economies including France and Germany has declined over the past five years, Chinese investment in Spain has actually grown consistently since 2019, even though total volumes still remain lower than in several other Western European countries.

As a mid-sized global political power, Spain has framed its foreign policy under Sánchez as one that pursues stronger independent bilateral ties with all of the world’s major economies – including China, a growing India, and the United States – rather than aligning strictly with any single bloc. The country’s long-term commitment to deepening relations with Beijing was underscored last November, when King Felipe VI carried out an official state visit to China, the first by a Spanish monarch in 18 years.

Sigmon noted that the economic and commercial dimension of the relationship remains the central priority for Madrid. “Spain needs foreign capital and new investment, and it clearly views China as a promising source of that funding,” he said. For China, meanwhile, Spain acts as a uniquely cooperative and open partner within Western Europe, he added. Still, Sigmon cautioned that the inherent asymmetry in the size and scope of the two economies means Spain may struggle to secure major concessions from Chinese negotiators in key areas of interest, including advanced technology access and market access openings for Spanish exporters.

As a high-profile delegation led by Chinese Kuomintang Chairwoman Cheng Li-wun wrapped up its six-day visit to the Chinese mainland, the mainland on Sunday announced a comprehensive 10-measure policy package designed to advance peaceful cross-Strait relations and lift the well-being of residents on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. This announcement comes on the heels of a historic Friday meeting between Xi Jinping, General Secretary of the Communist Party of China Central Committee, and Cheng — the first top-level dialogue between the two cross-Strait political parties in a decade.

During the meeting, General Secretary Xi emphasized that the core goal of advancing cross-Strait relations is to deliver a higher quality of life for people on both sides. With the mainland kicking off its 15th Five-Year Plan (2026-2030), Xi extended an open invitation to Taiwan compatriots to share in the mainland’s development opportunities and progress, calling for joint efforts to strengthen the broader Chinese national economy. He also made clear that high-quality products from Taiwan, including agricultural and fishery goods, are welcome to gain greater access to consumer markets across the mainland.

The 10 new initiatives, released by the Taiwan Work Office of the CPC Central Committee, span a wide range of key areas including party-to-party communication, youth exchanges, infrastructure connectivity, cross-Strait transportation, trade facilitation, and cultural cooperation. A centerpiece of the package is a proposal to explore the establishment of a regular communication mechanism between the CPC and the KMT, built on the shared foundation of upholding the 1992 Consensus and opposing “Taiwan independence”. The 1992 Consensus, which enshrines the one-China principle, was first reached in 1992 by the cross-Strait authorized bodies the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait and the Straits Exchange Foundation.

Other key measures include expanding youth exchanges through long-term institutional programs and arranging annual cross-Strait delegation visits. The package prioritizes advancing utility interconnection and cross-connection bridge projects between Fujian Province and the Taiwan-controlled Jinmen and Matsu islands. It also lays out plans to promote the normalization of direct cross-Strait passenger air services and restore suspended routes connecting Taiwan with multiple mainland cities.

To boost economic ties, the measures streamline approval and purchase processes for qualified Taiwan agricultural and fishery products, expand market access support for Taiwan-based businesses, and improve port and service conditions for Taiwan fishing vessels operating in cross-Strait waters. In the cultural and media sector, the mainland will open its market to more Taiwan-produced content, encourage collaborative media production projects, and support the innovative development of shared Chinese culture. Additionally, the package outlines steps to resume individual tour travel from Shanghai and Fujian residents to Taiwan; currently, only group tours are permitted for residents of these two regions, though individual travel to Jinmen and Matsu from Fujian resumed in the second half of 2024.

KMT Vice Chairman Chang Jung-kung, a member of the visiting delegation, framed the 10-point package as a goodwill “gift” from the mainland delivered to the Taiwanese people through Cheng’s visit, noting that the measures directly advance Taiwanese public welfare. He highlighted that the package demonstrates the mainland’s sincere goodwill and delivers tangible, practical benefits to Taiwan.

Cheng’s six-day trip, which ran from April 8 to April 13, marked the first visit to the mainland by a KMT chairperson in 10 years, and included stops in Jiangsu Province, Shanghai and Beijing. This year marks the 160th birth anniversary of Sun Yat-sen, the founding figure of the KMT, so the itinerary included traditional stops for KMT leaders: the delegation paid respects to Sun at his mausoleum in Nanjing and the Sun Yat-sen Memorial Hall at Biyun Temple in Beijing’s Xiangshan.

Beyond traditional exchanges, the trip included multiple stops showcasing the mainland’s cutting-edge technological progress. On the final day of the tour, the delegation visited Xiaomi’s electric vehicle hyperfactory in Beijing, where members learned about the mainland’s breakthroughs in electric vehicle research and manufacturing. A day earlier, the group toured the Zhongguancun National Innovation Demonstration Zone Exhibition Center in Beijing, where they viewed the latest developments in artificial intelligence, embodied intelligence, and high-end medical devices.

Speaking after the Zhongguancun visit, Cheng noted that Taiwan’s service sector and traditional manufacturing industries face growing headwinds, and said, “I found answers for Taiwan’s future here.” She expressed deep admiration for how the mainland has integrated AI and technological innovation across every economic sector, calling the trip “highly rewarding.” “Without political barriers across the Strait, the two sides could make significant contributions to humanity,” she said, calling for deeper cross-Strait cooperation that leverages the unique strengths of both sides. She added that collaborative work to narrow differences and reduce confrontation is ultimately aimed at delivering better lives for all people across the Strait.

Li Peng, dean of the Taiwan Research Institute at Xiamen University, noted that Cheng’s visit reaffirms the shared commitment of both sides to pursue peaceful cross-Strait development, uphold the 1992 Consensus, oppose “Taiwan independence”, and work to improve public well-being on both sides. He pointed out that mainstream public opinion in Taiwan supports restarting and expanding people-to-people cross-Strait exchanges, with many Taiwan residents eager to access the benefits of the mainland’s robust development. “Cheng’s trip has achieved these core objectives,” Li said, adding that the new 10-measure package delivers tangible benefits to Taiwan compatriots and stands as a landmark, productive outcome of the visit.