分类： politics

In a direct response to recent U.S. Treasury sanctions targeting three Turkish ground service and logistics firms for ties to Iran’s privately owned Mahan Air, Turkey has announced it will halt all flight operations for the Iranian carrier, senior Turkish government officials confirmed to Middle East Eye in a Friday briefing.

The entry into force of the suspension is set for September 21, and will cover every inbound and outbound route operated by Mahan Air between Turkey and Iran, according to the officials. Earlier this month, the U.S. Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) rolled out a wide-ranging sanctions regime that targets not just Iranian civilian aviation firms, but also third-party ground handling providers, cargo operators, and aircraft parts suppliers that do business with blacklisted Iranian entities.

The sanctions framework included a short grace period for global businesses to wind down existing commercial relationships with sanctioned Iranian firms, while issuing a clear warning that any third-country service providers continuing engagements could face punitive U.S. measures. Three Turkish firms — S Sistem, Mes Cargo, and Sky Phoenix — were specifically named in the sanctions round for their work with Mahan Air, with U.S. regulators citing activity that includes supplying aircraft components, providing general sales agency services, and facilitating aircraft purchases for the carrier.

One senior Turkish official explained to Middle East Eye that the blacklisting of the three Turkish-based companies makes clear that risks from U.S. enforcement now reach every segment of Mahan Air’s operational supply chain in Turkey. “The risk now extends to every Turkish entity providing services to Mahan Air, from airport operations and ground handling to ticketing and banking. This could disrupt services and trigger further investigations,” the official said.

Turkish officials were careful to clarify that this decision does not represent a blanket ban on all Iranian air carriers operating in Turkish airspace and airports. Instead, the Turkish government will maintain a dynamic risk assessment process for other Iranian airlines, weighing factors including its existing bilateral aviation agreement with Tehran, core flight safety standards, and the potential for additional U.S. sanctions that could expose more Turkish companies to punitive penalties.

Prior to the suspension, Mahan Air maintained a robust operational footprint in Turkey, running a minimum of three daily flights between Istanbul and Tehran alone. On Friday, the airline itself issued a confirmation that it would end all services to and from Turkey starting September 21, adding that it would also suspend flight operations to Oman and Georgia in a parallel move, expanding the scope of service disruptions for the carrier across the broader Middle East and South Caucasus region.

In a lightning eight-day offensive that began on September 3, 2026, Houthi forces have seized control of nearly all of Yemen’s Red Sea coastline, including the shores of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait – one of the world’s most critical maritime chokepoints for global trade. The operation started with a push to sever the strategic highway connecting the Yemeni city of Taiz to the coastal port of Mokha, and by September 11, Houthi fighters had secured Mokha, the coastal town of Dhubab, and Mayyun Island, which sits directly at the strait’s entrance. Per United Nations estimates, the rapid advance has displaced over 100,000 people, many of whom have undertaken dangerous sea crossings to seek refuge in neighboring Djibouti, after the Houthis captured roughly 2,100 square miles of territory. This territorial shift marks the most significant change to Yemen’s frontlines since a UN-brokered truce froze conflict lines in April 2022, ending years of stalemate.

Most international analysis has framed the offensive as a new strategic tool for Iran – the Houthis’ key regional patron – to increase pressure on the United States and raise fresh threats to Saudi Arabia and global commercial shipping. While this framing is not inaccurate, it overlooks deeper, underreported drivers rooted in Yemen’s own domestic politics and the Houthis’ ongoing quest for domestic legitimacy.

To understand why the Houthis launched this attack now, it is necessary to revisit the timeline of Yemen’s decade-long civil conflict. The war entered its current phase in 2014, when the Houthi movement seized the capital Sanaa from the increasingly unpopular administration of President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi. A Saudi-led coalition intervened the following year to restore the internationally recognized government, triggering a decade of widespread destruction and famine that left the already impoverished nation in ruins. Since 2022, however, the conflict has been largely stalemated: the Houthis control most of northwest Yemen, while Saudi-backed government forces hold sway over large swathes of the south and east.

Houthi military spokesperson Yahya Saree has framed the offensive as a direct response to years of Saudi military aggression and the ongoing blockade of Houthi-held territory. This grievance is not fabricated: UN agencies have repeatedly documented the severe humanitarian damage caused by coalition restrictions on access to Yemeni ports and airspace throughout the conflict. The Houthis also trace the collapse of the informal truce to a July 13, 2026, strike on Sanaa International Airport’s main runway, carried out by Yemeni government forces with Saudi air support. The attack forced an Iranian aircraft carrying senior officers of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to divert mid-flight, prompting the Houthis to declare their ceasefire with Saudi Arabia over that same day. Within hours, they launched a missile strike on Abha International Airport in southern Saudi Arabia, announced a naval blockade of Red Sea shipping one week later, and opened a sustained missile campaign in early August, weeks before the September 3 ground offensive.

But analysts argue the coordinated ground campaign and seizure of Bab el-Mandeb’s strategic islands cannot be dismissed as mere retaliation for a single airstrike. Multiple interconnected, deliberate strategic calculations underpinned the move.

First, Iran’s own regional maneuvering created a unique opening. After Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz – another critical global energy chokepoint – in March 2026, following joint U.S.-Israeli strikes on Iranian targets, Saudi Arabia rerouted roughly eight times more crude oil exports through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait than it did in 2025. Houthi control of the strait gives Iran a second strategic chokehold that mirrors the leverage it holds over Hormuz. Yemeni security sources have also confirmed that a senior IRGC commander, Abdul Reza Shahlai, was deployed on the ground to oversee parts of the September operation. For the Houthis, the move also carries clear economic incentives: since closing Hormuz, Iran has charged commercial vessels up to $2 million per ship for safe passage through the strait, and the Houthis are widely believed to be seeking similar economic leverage to shore up their war-battered movement.

The most impactful domestic driver, however, is the Houthi calculation that conditions on the ground had become uniquely favorable for an offensive. Their fractured opposition in southern Yemen has grown even more divided after a 2025 diplomatic rift between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates led the UAE to withdraw all support for anti-Houthi militias in the south, leaving coastal government forces exposed. With the broader Middle East engulfed in multiple concurrent conflicts and Saudi Arabia focused on other regional priorities, the Houthis saw a window to act.

Crucially, the Houthis have framed the Bab el-Mandeb operation as a sovereign, national Yemeni action rather than a proxy move for Iran, with senior officials repeatedly rejecting claims they are merely an extension of Tehran’s regional agenda. The movement’s core goal has always been securing power within Yemen itself. As recently as 2023, Saudi Arabia and the Houthis were negotiating a comprehensive national ceasefire that would have ended Saudi restrictions and sanctions on Houthi rule, but talks collapsed after the 2023-2024 Red Sea crisis, when the Houthis ramped up attacks on commercial shipping in protest of Israel’s military campaign in Gaza. Riyadh has since shown no urgency to revive diplomatic negotiations.

The Houthis’ bet is that escalating the conflict on Yemeni ground – where any further conflict carries massive strategic and economic costs for Saudi Arabia – is the most reliable way to force Riyadh back to the negotiating table. This time, the movement calculates it holds enough leverage to secure the formal political recognition it has long sought, rather than settling for just the limited economic concessions Saudi Arabia was willing to offer in 2023.

Despite these rapid military gains, the offensive carries severe long-term risks for the Houthi movement that could undermine their core goal of securing domestic legitimacy. Throughout modern Yemeni history, no governing authority has ever managed to maintain full military and political control over the entire country. While the Houthis hold unrivaled military power across most of northwest Yemen, they have never pursued a broad inclusive political bargain with the internationally recognized government or other Yemeni political factions, prioritizing exclusive military control over power-sharing.

The group has taken tentative steps to consolidate popular support in newly captured territories: Houthi-affiliated media confirms that within days of seizing Mokha, the group reopened the port’s customs office, cut port fees and customs duties by up to 50%, distributed 20,000 food baskets to local residents across the coastal region, and offered a general amnesty to anti-Houthi fighters who surrendered control of the coast. Houthi leader Abdulmalik al-Houthi has also directly addressed southern Yemeni communities, clarifying that his forces only target Saudi-backed troops, not local residents.

But analysts characterize these moves as performative legitimacy-building, more public relations than substantive policy reform, and fall far short of the inclusive political bargain needed to unify Yemen. A decade of Houthi rule in Sanaa has demonstrated the movement has little interest in power-sharing, with a long-standing pattern of ruling through military force rather than broad political coalition.

More broadly, controlling the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and restricting Saudi shipping through the waterway reinforces the narrative – both across much of the world and within large parts of Yemen – that the Houthis remain an instrument of Iranian regional policy, regardless of their stated domestic objectives. The offensive also almost guarantees a forceful response from Houthi enemies, which could erode the movement’s newly gained military advantages. Saudi Arabia, which has already waged a decade of war in Yemen at enormous cost to Yemeni civilians, is unlikely to stand by. While few analysts expect Saudi-backed forces to attempt to retake Sanaa by force, the Houthis’ new territorial gains expose both their own fighters and Yemeni civilians to a new wave of devastating airstrikes from the Saudi-led coalition.

In the end, the Houthi gamble carries a high risk of backfiring. Seizing territory is a far simpler task than holding it and consolidating legitimate rule. The movement may now find itself controlling a strategic chokepoint that the international community is determined to reopen, while still failing to secure the one thing control of the strait can never deliver: the consent of the Yemeni people to their rule.

As Houthi attacks against Saudi Arabia grow more frequent and intense, Pakistan’s defense minister is calling for the immediate implementation of a trilateral defense agreement signed earlier this year with Saudi Arabia and Turkey. In an interview with Pakistan’s Geo News on Wednesday, Khawaja Asif reaffirmed his country’s unwavering commitment to defending Saudi Arabia and its two holiest Islamic sites, Mecca and Medina, noting that Pakistan bore a moral and strategic duty to protect these locations even in the absence of a formal agreement.

“The Mecca Agreement is binding on us, and we will honor every obligation it entails,” Asif stated, though he declined to provide specific details on what actions Pakistan might take to fulfill its commitments under the pact. The statement comes amid rising tensions after Houthi forces intensified drone and missile strikes targeting Saudi territory, raising concerns about regional stability and the security of key religious and energy infrastructure.

Houthi representatives have pushed back against claims that their operations target holy sites, insisting their military actions are strictly limited to Saudi oil facilities and military installations, which are located far from Mecca and Medina. “Our operations only target Saudi oil facilities and military bases, which are far removed from these sacred sites,” Houthi spokesman Yahya Saree clarified.

Asif also confirmed that Pakistan has acted as an intermediary, conveying a formal message from Saudi leadership to Iran at a time when Riyadh has grown increasingly alarmed over the escalating attacks. Asif noted that he does not believe Iran, as a sovereign state, will choose to open a new military front in the region, given its existing commitments to ongoing conflicts across the Middle East. He added that Pakistan will continue its diplomatic efforts to prevent the current crisis from spilling over into a wider regional conflict.

Asif’s comments came on the heels of a deadly attack reported by Saudi state television on Thursday: Saudi air defense systems intercepted a Houthi-launched drone over the southwestern governorate of Taif, but falling debris from the drone killed one Yemeni resident and injured two others. This incident marks the first reported fatality on Saudi soil this month since Houthi forces ramped up their cross-border attacks against the kingdom.

In recent years, Pakistan has positioned itself as a neutral regional mediator, having previously facilitated high-level talks between the United States and Iran, while simultaneously deepening its bilateral military cooperation with both Saudi Arabia and Turkey. That growing collaboration led to the signing of the Joint Defense Agreement, commonly referred to as the Mecca Pact, by the three nations on August 7. The core principle of the pact mirrors that of NATO’s Article 5, holding that an armed attack against one member is considered an attack against all three. While the pact drew immediate comparisons to the Western security alliance, analysts have warned against overinterpreting the mutual defense provision as an ironclad commitment to immediate military intervention.

Separately, Reuters reported this week, citing three anonymous Iranian sources, that China has privately urged Iran to exert its influence over the Houthi movement to de-escalate attacks, after Saudi Arabia formally requested diplomatic assistance from Beijing. While China has publicly called for all parties to exercise restraint, engage in diplomatic dialogue, and restore safe navigation through key regional waterways, private diplomatic channels saw Beijing pressure Tehran to help prevent further disruptions to critical energy supply routes that are economically vital to China. The sources did not disclose how Beijing delivered this message, nor whether the request was raised during Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi’s official visit to China on Wednesday. Per the sources, Iran’s response to China’s request asserted that lasting peace and stability in the region can only be achieved by ending what it described as the U.S.-led “war on Iran.”

A highly controversial address critical of Islam has been held inside the UK Parliament this week, drawing growing scrutiny over the far-right and anti-religious views espoused by the speaker and his parliamentary backers. The event, titled *The Challenge of Islam*, was delivered Tuesday evening in the Attlee Suite of Westminster by British writer Tim Dieppe, an affiliate of the conservative Christian advocacy group Christian Concern.

Public records and social media materials confirm the talk was hosted by Jim Allister, a Member of Parliament and leader of Traditional Unionist Voice, a hardline right-wing unionist party based in Northern Ireland. While Allister has not issued an official confirmation of his role as host, he was photographed in attendance at the event, and Middle East Eye has reached out to the MP for additional comment on the gathering.

According to promotional materials shared by Christian Concern on its official website, the talk was organized on behalf of the Protestant Truth Society, a small ultra-conservative Protestant group. The invitation specified the event was primarily intended for sitting parliamentarians and senior Christian church leaders, though it was open to any member of the public who wished to attend. No audio or video recording of Dieppe’s remarks has been released to the public as of yet, but pre-existing public comments from Dieppe have already made clear the incendiary nature of his arguments, guaranteeing the event will draw fierce pushback in Westminster and across British public life.

Dieppe, who published a 2025 book expanding on his anti-Islam views under the same title as his parliamentary talk, has a long paper trail of public statements calling for broad restrictions on Islamic practice and influence in the UK. In public comments and writing dating back to 2024, he has argued that growing Islamic influence in British society must be opposed through legislative and political action. He has called on Christian institutions in the UK to prepare resources to empower believers to confront Islamic influence at every level of public and private life, from personal interactions with neighbors to public debates in media and policy spaces.

Dieppe’s core claims are unapologetically critical: he asserts that “Islam is already threatening our democracy and changing our culture”, and has argued that while individual Muslims may be open to redemption, the religion of Islam itself is not. In a 2024 interview with British right-wing media outlet GB News, he called for increased state monitoring of Islamic educational institutions and religious teachings, going on to argue that specific Islamic practices deserve to be formally banned in the UK – a position he attempted to soften slightly by noting he does not call for a full ban on Muslim worship in mosques.

Earlier in 2025, Dieppe wrote in an article published on Christian Concern’s platform that “Islam, as assessed by its texts, and by the example of its founder, is not a peaceful religion”, claiming that Western skepticism of the religion is fully justified. In an August 2024 column published in the conservative magazine *The Critic*, he also repeated the baseless claim that Islam is inherently antisemitic, arguing that anti-Jewish prejudice is inherent to the religion’s foundational texts and dates back to the time of the Prophet Muhammad, a claim that has been widely rejected by religious scholars and interfaith leaders. He further framed the growing presence of Islam in the UK as filling a “spiritual and moral vacuum” created by declining adherence to Christianity, framing the religion as an existential challenge to British national identity.

The Protestant Truth Society, which co-sponsored the parliamentary event, has a well-documented history of anti-Islam rhetoric. Earlier this year, the group drew public criticism after it sent an open letter to King Charles III following the monarch’s annual public greeting to British Muslims marking the holy festivals of Ramadan and Eid. In the letter, the group urged the king to stop issuing any future public messages of greeting for Muslim religious holidays, and called on him to repent and return exclusively to Christian faith.

The hosting of an event with such explicitly anti-religious views within the grounds of the UK Parliament is expected to reignite debates over the normalization of anti-Muslim prejudice in British mainstream politics, with interfaith organizations and anti-racism campaigners likely to condemn the event in the coming days.