Global Pulse

分类： politics

  • China’s top envoy tells his Iranian counterpart a ‘comprehensive ceasefire’ is needed

    China’s top envoy tells his Iranian counterpart a ‘comprehensive ceasefire’ is needed

    BEIJING – In a high-profile diplomatic meeting marked by growing international concern over protracted military hostilities, China’s top foreign policy official Wang Yi conveyed deep unease Wednesday about the more than two-month-long conflict involving Iran, Israel and the United States, while stressing that an immediate full cessation of fighting is the only acceptable path forward.

    The talks held in Beijing marked a significant milestone: it was the first in-person visit to China by Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi since active hostilities broke out between the three parties on February 28. The face-to-face engagement comes as global pressure mounts for major powers to step in and de-escalate tensions that threaten to spiral into a wider regional conflict.

    Captured on video from the closed-door meeting, Wang laid out China’s clear stance on the escalating crisis. “We believe that a comprehensive ceasefire is urgently needed, that a resumption of hostilities is not acceptable, and that it is particularly important to remain committed to dialogue and negotiations,” Wang stated, emphasizing Beijing’s long-held position that diplomatic negotiation is the only sustainable solution to protracted international conflict.

    The meeting comes amid heightened global attention on China’s role in Middle Eastern diplomacy, as the country has positioned itself as a neutral broker working to reduce tensions across the region. The in-person talks between the two top diplomats signal ongoing diplomatic outreach to bring all parties back to the negotiating table amid months of stalled de-escalation efforts.

  • NSW motorists claim back $284 million in toll relief amid cost of living crisis

    NSW motorists claim back $284 million in toll relief amid cost of living crisis

    Since the New South Wales (NSW) government launched its permanent weekly $60 toll cap scheme in January 2024 to counter soaring cost-of-living pressures, more than 862,000 local motorists have collectively claimed $284 million in cashback relief, new official data reveals. Fifty-eight suburbs across the state have now crossed the threshold of $1 million in total returned toll payments, earning them a place in the scheme’s so-called “$1 million club”, with 10 suburbs even pushing past the $2 million mark for collective claims.

    The latest suburbs to secure a spot in the $1 million club include Mount Druitt, Bella Vista, Coogee, Austral, Kings Langley, Oakhurst, Macquarie Park, South Wentworthville and Box Hill. Top-performing suburbs by total relief claimed include 10 suburbs that have each received more than $2 million: Carlingford, West Pennant Hills, Punchbowl, Greystanes, Bankstown, Kellyville, Lakemba, Quakers Hill, Marsden Park and Castle Hill. At the upper end of the scale, four major areas have racked up more than $4 million in total cashback. Blacktown leads the pack with 12,030 individual claims averaging $398 per driver, followed by Auburn where the average claim hits $674, with Baulkham Hills and Merrylands rounding out the $4 million-plus group.

    NSW Premier Chris Minns emphasized that the targeted relief is reaching the communities hit hardest by ongoing economic pressures, including rising interest rates, persistent inflation and volatile fuel prices. “We’re seeing that support land where it’s needed most, across Western Sydney with suburbs like Mount Druitt, Blacktown, Auburn and Baulkham Hills claiming more than $1 million in toll relief,” Minns said. The premier noted that making the $60 weekly toll cap a permanent policy change has eliminated the uncertainty of unpredictable monthly toll bills for regular commuters, putting much-needed disposable income back into household budgets and delivering consistent financial certainty week to week.

    The toll relief scheme is part of the NSW government’s broader push to address toll inequity across Sydney. In line with that commitment, the government is set to introduce two-way tolling for the Sydney Harbour Bridge and Sydney Harbour Tunnel by 2028, a reform designed to end the current system that places disproportionate toll burden on Western Sydney motorists, who currently pay tolls in both directions for cross-city trips while Harbour crossing users only pay for one direction of travel. The existing one-way toll structure for the Harbour crossings has not seen a price increase between 2009 and 2023.

    For the 2025 calendar year, more than $100 million in unclaimed toll relief remains available to eligible motorists. Commuters who have not yet claimed their cashback for the first three months of 2025 are encouraged to visit the official Service NSW website to check their eligibility and submit their claims before closing deadlines.

  • Local elections could hasten the exit of Britain’s embattled prime minister

    Local elections could hasten the exit of Britain’s embattled prime minister

    LONDON – British voters are heading to the polls on Thursday for a set of elections that carries profound implications for Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s embattled premiership and marks the latest step in the United Kingdom’s transition to an uncharted era of fragmented multiparty governance. The outcome of Thursday’s votes, which cover local government seats across England and legislative elections for the semiautonomous governments of Scotland and Wales, is widely projected to deliver a severe blow to Starmer’s center-left Labour Party.\n\nPlunged into negative approval ratings by persistent economic weakness and ongoing questions over his leadership judgment, Starmer has found Thursday’s midterm contests framed as a de facto public referendum on his two-year-old government by opposition parties. Hard-right Reform UK has even centered its campaign on the slogan “Vote Reform, Get Starmer Out,” capturing the intensity of attacks on the embattled prime minister. While the next scheduled UK national general election is not required until 2029, a catastrophic rout on Thursday could open the door to a party revolt against Starmer, less than two years after he won a landslide national victory. Luke Tryl, a senior analyst at polling firm More in Common, summed up the public mood, noting that Starmer has become a receptacle for widespread public disappointment and disillusionment across the country.\n\nStarmer’s political standing has collapsed amid a string of high-profile missteps that have piled up since he took office in July 2024. His administration has struggled to deliver on core campaign promises: boosting sluggish economic growth, repairing overstretched public services, and easing the crippling cost-of-living crisis. These challenges have been compounded by the outbreak of conflict between the U.S.-Israeli coalition and Iran, which has disrupted global oil shipments through the Strait of Hormuz, driving up energy prices and worsening economic headwinds. The prime minister’s credibility took a particularly damaging hit from his controversial decision to appoint Peter Mandelson, a figure long tied to disgraced financier Jeffrey Epstein, as Britain’s ambassador to Washington. Starmer already survived one leadership crisis in February, when a group of Labour lawmakers including the party’s Scottish leader publicly called for him to step down over the Mandelson appointment.\n\nPolitical forecasters project that Labour will lose more than half of the 2,500 local council seats it currently defends across England. The party is expected to bleed support to rivals on both its left and right flanks: the left-wing Green Party is set to gain ground in London, while Reform UK is targeting working-class former Labour strongholds in northern England. Tony Travers, a government professor at the London School of Economics, described the electoral moment as deeply perilous for Starmer. “After a series of policy U-turns and in an economy where there isn’t much money to spend on anything, his opponents are lining up,” Travers explained.\n\nA poor showing could trigger an immediate leadership challenge from high-profile Labour figures, including Health Secretary Wes Streeting, former Deputy Prime Minister Anglea Rayner, and popular Greater Manchester Mayor Andy Burnham. Under Labour Party rules, a challenger needs the backing of 80 House of Commons lawmakers – equal to one-fifth of the party’s parliamentary caucus – to trigger a formal leadership contest. For Burnham, any bid would first require him to win a seat in Parliament to be eligible for the top job. Alternately, Starmer could face growing party pressure to announce a clear timetable for an orderly departure rather than force an immediate open revolt.\n\nTim Bale, a politics professor at Queen Mary University of London, noted that Labour’s parliamentary party remains divided on the timing of any leadership change, opening the possibility of a temporary reprieve for Starmer. “His parliamentary party are unsure as to whether now is the right time to unseat him, so there might be a stay of execution,” Bale said. But he added that the broader shift within the party is clear: “it’s a case of when rather than if he goes.”\n\nBeyond the fate of Starmer’s premiership, Thursday’s election is widely seen as a defining milestone in the long-term fragmentation of Britain’s political landscape. For generations, major losses for Labour would have automatically translated into major gains for the main center-right rival, the Conservative Party. But the Conservatives remain deeply unpopular after 14 turbulent years in power that ended when Labour won the 2024 national election. Instead, the main beneficiaries of Labour’s declining support are projected to be Nigel Farage’s right-wing Reform UK, the left-leaning Green Party, and pro-nationalist devolved parties in Scotland and Wales.\n\nTravers noted that Britain’s long-standing “two-and-a-half party system” – which positioned the Liberal Democrats as the permanent third force – is rapidly evolving into a far more fragmented five-party system. This shift has created unprecedented opportunities for pro-devolution and pro-independence parties across the UK’s devolved nations.\n\nIn Wales, where Labour has dominated devolved politics for a century and held power since the Welsh Senedd was established in 1999, polls point to a historic seismic shift. Labour is projected to fall to third place, behind Plaid Cymru (the Party of Wales) and Reform UK, which are currently running neck-and-neck for the top spot. Plaid Cymru leader Rhun ap Iorwerth, who is on track to become Wales’ next first minister if current polling holds, declared that the old order of British politics is finished. “The old politics is gone,” he said. “Labour is not going to win this election.”\n\nA Plaid Cymru victory in Wales would leave three out of four of the UK’s constituent nations led by pro-independence parties. Northern Ireland has already been governed by Irish nationalist party Sinn Féin, which supports unification with the Republic of Ireland, in a power-sharing arrangement with the pro-British Democratic Unionist Party. In Scotland, the Scottish National Party (SNP), which has held power in the Scottish Parliament since 2007, has pledged to hold a second referendum on Scottish independence if it wins a majority in Thursday’s election. Scottish voters rejected independence in a 2014 referendum, but shifting public mood and long-running frustration with Westminster rule have reshaped the political landscape north of the border.\n\nWhile Plaid Cymru has said an independence referendum is not on the immediate agenda for the next term, with its short-term priorities focused on gaining greater tax-raising and spending autonomy from Westminster, the party shares the ultimate goal of breaking away from the UK. ap Iorwerth argued that the current constitutional arrangement of the UK is no longer fit for purpose, saying: “We need a fundamental redesign of Britain. This is an unequal union.”

  • ‘A big pact’: How the US plans to unite Libya through two ruling families

    ‘A big pact’: How the US plans to unite Libya through two ruling families

    Amid widespread global energy market volatility triggered by the U.S.-Israeli war on Iran, the United States is actively negotiating a landmark power-sharing agreement aimed at unifying oil-rich Libya under the control of its two most influential rival political families, multiple informed sources including current and former Western officials, regional Arab insiders, and independent analysts have confirmed to Middle East Eye.

    The proposed framework would restructure Libyan governance by aligning the western-based Dbeibeh family and the eastern-based Haftar clan, while transitioning leadership from the older generation of political strongmen to a new cohort of younger leaders. Though negotiations have been ongoing for months, the initiative has gained urgent new momentum in recent weeks as rising oil prices driven by the Iran conflict have rekindled interest from U.S. energy firms in accessing Libya, which holds the largest proven crude oil reserves on the African continent.

    Libya’s existing ruling factions have already seen a dramatic surge in revenue amid the Brent crude price rally: the country’s National Oil Corporation reported April oil revenues hit $2.9 billion, a three-fold increase from the start of 2025, and Libya’s oil minister traveled to Washington for high-level talks last week.

    “This process has been in the works for several months, and the U.S. is actively laying the groundwork for a comprehensive agreement between the two families,” explained Riccardo Fabiani, North Africa director at the International Crisis Group. “There is enormous profit to be gained from expanded upstream oil exploration, so Washington has enormous stake in this outcome—especially now with the ongoing conflict in Iran.”

    Leading the U.S. diplomatic push is Massad Boulos, U.S. President Donald Trump’s special envoy for Africa. While the proposed deal has been acknowledged in limited public discourse and faces widespread opposition from Libyan civil society groups, it has received little mainstream attention in Western capitals, overshadowed by the regional focus on the war against Iran.

    Under the terms of the draft arrangement, the Trump administration is pushing for Ibrahim Dbeibeh, a veteran western Libyan powerbroker, to replace his cousin, incumbent prime minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh, who has struggled with ongoing health issues in recent months. An Arab source familiar with negotiations and a former senior Western official confirmed that Boulos coordinated this leadership reshuffle with Turkish officials as recently as April during the Antalya Forum, which hosted a high-level Libyan delegation.

    As previously reported and confirmed by *The New York Times*, Ibrahim has built an unusually close relationship with Boulos, and the pair have held private discussions about unlocking billions of dollars in Libyan sovereign assets that have been frozen in Western financial institutions for decades. On the eastern side of the proposed power split, 35-year-old Saddam Haftar—son of 82-year-old eastern Libyan strongman General Khalifa Haftar, who has controlled the eastern half of the country for more than a decade—would be appointed as Libya’s president.

    Saddam Haftar currently serves as deputy commander of his father’s Libyan National Army, and has already moved to rework the Haftar family’s diplomatic ties, building new relationships with former rivals including Turkey. He is widely viewed as the U.S.’s preferred successor to his aging father, and the Arab source confirmed Saddam met with the Central Intelligence Agency’s deputy director during an official visit to Washington last year. As part of Boulos’s negotiating process, Ibrahim Dbeibeh and Saddam Haftar held high-level unity talks at the Élysée Palace in Paris earlier this year.

    This latest effort to unify Libya comes after more than 14 years of fragmented governance following the 2011 NATO-backed uprising that ousted and killed long-time dictator Muammar Gaddafi. Since 2011, the country has been split into two competing political blocs: an internationally recognized government based in the western capital of Tripoli, and a parallel administration in the east led by Khalifa Haftar. The two sides fought a brutal civil war in 2019, when Khalifa Haftar launched an assault on Tripoli that devolved into a full proxy conflict: Turkey backed the UN-recognized western government, while Russia, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates provided military and financial support to the Haftar-led eastern bloc. Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh was appointed prime minister in 2021 as part of a UN-backed initiative to lead the country toward unified democratic elections, which have been repeatedly delayed and ultimately collapsed.

    “Outside powers, including the U.S., have effectively abandoned any pretense of pushing for democratic elections in Libya,” said one former senior Western official. “Their preference is to cut a deal with the already entrenched ruling families and split the country’s energy wealth between the two most corrupt factions. But the Haftar name is toxic in western Libya, and the Dbeibeh family does not exert full control over the west. This entire process bypasses the Libyan people entirely, and it could easily backfire.”

    The Dbeibeh family has built alliances with powerful militias in western Libya but faces persistent opposition from other regional factions. Any power-sharing deal that includes Saddam Haftar is expected to face fierce pushback in Misrata, a key Mediterranean coastal city with a large, influential network of independent business families. Libya’s highest religious authority, Grand Mufti Sadiq al-Ghariani, publicly came out against any power-sharing agreement between the two families in late April.

    Even within the rival clans, internal divisions threaten to derail the deal: while Saddam Haftar has consolidated control over the eastern military, he is locked in a bitter power struggle with his brothers, most notably Belqasim Haftar, who controls the lucrative Benghazi-based Fund for Development and Reconstruction.

    “Neither the Dbeibeh family nor the Haftar clan currently operate as cohesive, unified political blocs,” said Jalal Harchaoui, a Libya expert at the Royal United Services Institute. “That fragmentation could actually make this change possible. The status quo is completely unsustainable, so if a new unified government is announced, it would mark the start of a new political process for the country.”

    A former U.S. official familiar with the Libya initiative noted that the Trump administration is building on gradual reconciliation efforts first launched by the Biden administration, but the current White House’s willingness to negotiate unlocking frozen assets and approve new commercial deals has accelerated diplomatic progress. “This is not just a personal initiative from Boulos—it is a whole-of-government effort designed to open Libya up to U.S. oil companies and create new economic opportunities for Libyan stakeholders,” the former official said. “Let’s be honest: the UN-led election process never delivered on its promises.”

    Negotiators have already notched limited tactical wins: in early April, Libya’s Central Bank announced the country’s first unified national budget in more than a decade. Last month, eastern and western Libyan military units conducted joint training exercises in Sirte as part of the U.S.-led Flintlock security drills, a surprise development for many long-time Libya analysts.

    U.S. energy firms had already begun scouting investment opportunities in Libya before the outbreak of the Iran war: Chevron won an exploration license for Libya’s Sirte Basin back in February, and Exxon Mobil signed a memorandum of understanding with the National Oil Corporation to re-enter the Libyan market by August 2025. Libya’s National Oil Corporation reported oil exports hit 1.2 million barrels per day in April, a 10-year high, though some analysts question the accuracy of those figures and argue the Iran conflict has not meaningfully altered the country’s long-term investment climate.

    Most of Libya’s oil infrastructure is more than 50 years old, and official national data remains notoriously unreliable due to the lack of transparent governance across the country. Jason Pack, founder of Libya-Analysis and author of *Libya and the Global Enduring Disorder*, argues that Washington and its allies will be disappointed if they expect Libya to replace the oil volumes lost from global markets amid the Iran conflict.

    “Libya’s inability to ramp up oil production stems from deep internal governance failures, not a lack of U.S. or external support,” Pack explained. “The idea that Libya can deliver globally significant volumes of additional oil over the course of the Iran war is completely unrealistic.” Pack noted that a similar debate emerged after Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, when policymakers claimed Libya could replace Russian natural gas supplies to Europe— a goal Libya never came close to meeting. “At the start of the Ukraine war, everyone claimed Libya would become the new Algeria for European energy, and they failed to deliver. They will fail again this time,” he said.

    That said, most experts agree that a power-sharing deal that unites the two ruling families under U.S. mediation to divide Libya’s current energy profits is a far more achievable short-term goal, in large part because the external powers that once turned Libya into a proxy battleground have significantly reworked their regional alliances. Saddam Haftar has actively courted Turkey and has begun receiving new weapons shipments from Pakistan under Saudi auspices, while Egypt—once a staunch backer of Haftar and opponent of the Tripoli government—has built closer ties with the western administration and mended relations with Turkey, its former rival in Libya.

    “Turkey and Egypt are both willing to support a deal between the two sides because the regional political context is completely different than it was even a few years ago,” Pack said. “This dynamic has nothing to do with the current U.S. administration.” Harchaoui added that the U.S. already has formal backing from Turkey, which remains one of the most influential military actors on the ground in Libya. “There are clear signs that Turkey is comfortable with whatever major announcement is coming, and that carries a lot of weight,” he said. “Saudi Arabia will likely back whatever Turkey agrees to, largely because of shared strategic interests in Sudan.”

    The initiative also gives Washington an opportunity to push Russia out of its foothold in eastern Libya: Russia has deployed private mercenary forces to support Haftar for years and has long sought permanent port access in the country. With a Russian-backed military regime in neighboring Mali on the brink of collapse amid an advance by al-Qaeda-linked militants, U.S. officials see an opening to shift Haftar away from Moscow. “It is not just energy money drawing U.S. policymakers to this initiative. Russia is already retreating in Mali, so it is not unreasonable to think they could be pushed out of Libya too,” Harchaoui said.

  • Trump says US to pause operation to guide vessels through Strait of Hormuz

    Trump says US to pause operation to guide vessels through Strait of Hormuz

    In a sudden announcement Tuesday evening, former President Donald Trump disclosed that the United States will suspend its recently launched operation to escort stranded commercial vessels through the strategically critical Strait of Hormuz for a temporary period. Codenamed Project Freedom, the maritime security initiative launched just days earlier will be halted by mutual agreement between Washington and Tehran, Trump said, citing significant headway toward a new negotiated agreement with Iran.

    Iranian state media has framed the pause as a clear strategic victory for Tehran, framing the decision as a forced retreat for Trump following repeated failures to force the Strait of Hormuz, a vital chokepoint for global energy supplies, to reopen unilaterally. The announcement came concurrently with a statement from US Secretary of State Marco Rubio confirming that Operation Epic Fury, the opening joint US-Israeli air offensive against Iran launched in late February, has concluded after meeting all its stated military objectives.

    Trump took to social media to clarify that the decision to pause Project Freedom came at the request of Pakistan, which has served as a neutral diplomatic intermediary between Washington and Tehran throughout the recent escalation. He emphasized that the existing US economic and naval blockade of Iranian ports will remain in place, keeping the core pressure campaign against Iran intact.

    The sudden reversal caught many observers off guard, as it directly contradicted messaging from top US administration officials just 24 hours earlier. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Gen. Dan Caine, and Rubio himself had all publicly pledged just one day prior that Project Freedom would continue until full freedom of navigation was restored to both the Strait of Hormuz and the broader Persian Gulf. Speaking to reporters Tuesday, Rubio acknowledged the administration’s preference for a diplomatic settlement, noting “We would prefer the path of peace. What the president would prefer is a deal.”

    The future trajectory of the standoff remains deeply uncertain. The Trump administration has repeatedly stressed that Project Freedom was a separate, independent initiative from the ongoing port blockade, which is designed to squeeze Iran’s economy into making concessions. The core goal of Project Freedom was to guide dozens of stranded commercial vessels out of the Persian Gulf and reopen the waterway to regular global trade, a move intended to ease pressure on energy markets and stabilize the global economy. If the temporary pause sees shipping companies and their maritime insurers continue to face interference from Iranian authorities, Trump will struggle to claim the operation achieved its core goals. On the other hand, administration insiders have suggested that pausing the initiative — which Tehran strongly condemned as a violation of its territorial sovereignty — could be a confidence-building measure to lure Iranian negotiators back to the bargaining table.

    Rubio’s Tuesday statement followed a sharp uptick in tit-for-tat clashes that had stoked widespread fears that the months-long US-Iran ceasefire was on the brink of collapse. On Monday, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) reported that its air defense systems had intercepted Iranian missiles and drones for the second consecutive day, including an alleged strike on an oil export terminal in the Emirate of Fujairah, located just outside the Strait of Hormuz. The UAE called the incident a “dangerous escalation” of regional tensions. Iran issued a flat denial of any involvement in attacks on the UAE Tuesday, with a military spokesperson stating “If such an action had been taken, we would have announced it firmly and clearly.”

    Late Tuesday, the UK Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) agency confirmed that a verified source had reported a commercial cargo vessel was hit by an “unknown projectile” in the Strait of Hormuz. No additional details on the vessel, crew, or extent of damage were immediately released.

    The current crisis traces back to February 28, when the US and Israel launched Operation Epic Fury, a large-scale wave of air strikes across Iranian military and infrastructure targets. In direct response, Tehran blocked all commercial transit through the Strait of Hormuz, the waterway through which roughly 20 percent of the world’s daily oil and liquefied natural gas supplies pass. A ceasefire was brokered between the two sides in early April, under which Iran agreed to halt all drone and missile strikes on Gulf Arab states including the UAE. Despite the ceasefire agreement, very few commercial vessels have been able to transit the strait in the months since, and the US maintained its own naval blockade of Iranian ports in parallel.

    Clashes flared again just one day before Trump’s announcement. The US said it had destroyed seven Iranian fast attack craft operating in the strait, while Iran claimed it had fired warning shots at a US naval vessel. Both sides rejected the other’s claims. Two separate commercial vessels reported coming under attack Monday, while one confirmed it had successfully exited the strait under US military escort as part of Project Freedom.

    Speaking to reporters Tuesday, Rubio warned that Iran had so far rejected the path of negotiation, adding “What that may lead to in the future is speculative.” He claimed the joint US-Israeli air strikes had inflicted “generational destruction to their [Iran’s] economy” and urged Iranian leaders to “check themselves before they wreck themselves in the direction that they’re going.”

    For his part, Hegseth stressed that the existing ceasefire with Iran remains in effect, telling reporters “Right now the ceasefire certainly holds, but we’re going to be watching very, very closely.” Gen. Caine added that while Iran had carried out 10 separate attacks on US forces since the ceasefire went into effect, all had been “below the threshold” required to resume full-scale hostilities “at this point.”

    When asked by reporters what actions by Iran would constitute a ceasefire breach, Trump simply replied “You’ll find out because I’ll let you know.” The president reaffirmed his belief that a negotiated settlement to end the standoff is still achievable.

    The conflicting messaging from senior US administration officials points to a broader reluctance within Washington to resume large-scale military operations, a move that would roil already fragile global energy markets, send oil prices skyrocketing, and face strong opposition from a large majority of the American public. Trump also confirmed that he is currently consulting with Japanese leaders on the strait reopening and expects to hold a constructive discussion on the issue with Chinese President Xi Jinping during his upcoming visit to China next week.

    Iran’s parliamentary speaker Mohammad Ghalibaf, who also served as Tehran’s lead negotiator in last month’s US-Iran talks, struck a defiant tone in comments earlier Tuesday. “We know well that the continuation of the status quo is intolerable for America, while we are just getting started,” Ghalibaf said. He blamed the United States and its allies for undermining shipping and energy security through ceasefire violations and the ongoing blockade, adding “However, their evil acts will fail.”

  • Hegseth claims ceasefire holds despite attacks on Iranian vessels

    Hegseth claims ceasefire holds despite attacks on Iranian vessels

    Tensions remain high in the strategically critical Strait of Hormuz one month after the Trump administration secured a ceasefire agreement with Iran, with top U.S. defense officials confirming Tuesday that the truce still stands while outlining an aggressive new U.S. naval presence in the global oil chokepoint.

    Speaking alongside Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman General Dan Caine, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth told reporters that the ceasefire has held despite expected fluctuations in security, noting that U.S. forces have operated with robust deterrence in the waterway. “The ceasefire is not over,” Hegseth said. “We expected there would be some churn, which happened, and we said we would defend and defend aggressively, and we absolutely have.” He added that while the U.S. is not seeking wider conflict, the administration retains full authority to resume major combat operations against Iran if President Donald Trump judges it necessary.

    At the center of the new U.S. posture in the strait is Project Freedom, an initiative formally launched Monday that frames the U.S. military presence as a boon to global commerce. Hegseth described the U.S. deployment as a metaphorical “powerful red, white, and blue dome” over the key shipping route, calling it a “direct gift from the U.S. to the world.” The operation, which he emphasized is separate from the ongoing U.S. military campaign to eliminate Iran’s missile and nuclear capabilities that launched February 28, involves U.S. naval forces guiding commercial vessels through the strait.

    The closure of the Strait of Hormuz dates back more than two months, when Iran blocked the waterway in retaliation for the unprovoked U.S.-Israeli military assault on the country. In response, the U.S. Navy has imposed its own blockade on vessels traveling to and from Iranian ports.

    Fresh violence erupted in the area Monday, on the first day of Project Freedom’s formal operations. U.S. Central Command commander Admiral Brad Cooper told reporters that U.S. warships intercepted and shot down Iranian cruise missiles fired by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) at convoys the U.S. was escorting out of the strait. U.S. Army attack helicopters also sank six Iranian military speedboats in the engagement, Cooper said.

    However, conflicting accounts of the clash have emerged. Common Dreams reported Tuesday that an IRGC commander told Iranian state media that U.S. forces actually struck two small civilian vessels carrying passengers traveling between Oman’s Khasab coast and Iran, killing five civilians, and hit no IRGC craft.

    Hegseth rejected any suggestion of U.S. responsibility for escalation, labeling Iran the sole aggressor in the standoff while repeating that the Trump administration will not hesitate to resume large-scale combat operations if required.

    The briefing also touched on a contentious constitutional question: whether the administration would seek congressional authorization before restarting major combat against Iran. Last Friday, ahead of a 60-day deadline set by the 1973 War Powers Act, which requires presidents to end unauthorized military hostilities within that timeline, Trump notified Congress that hostilities with Iran had been terminated following the April 7 ceasefire.

    Hegseth argued that the War Powers Act’s 60-day clock stops ticking while the ceasefire is in place, meaning any resumption of combat would fall within the president’s existing authority as commander-in-chief, rather than requiring a new congressional sign-off. “If it were to restart that would be the president’s decision. That option is always there and Iran knows that,” he said.

    Critics have pushed back hard against this legal interpretation. NBC News senior national politics reporter Jonathan Allen noted that the administration’s reasoning has no precedent in U.S. political practice. Fred Wellman, a Democratic congressional candidate in Missouri, called the framing a deliberate end-run around congressional war powers. “Understand that what he is doing here is desperately trying to avoid the War Powers Act,” Wellman said. “They made up a new interpretation that says the 60-day clock is ‘paused’ for a ceasefire. Now they are lying and saying this is an all-new, shiny war and not the same one.”

  • IS families in Syria have booked tickets home to Australia, minister says

    IS families in Syria have booked tickets home to Australia, minister says

    In a development that has reignited debate over how countries handle citizens linked to terrorist groups, the Australian government has confirmed that 13 individuals — four women and nine children with ties to the Islamic State (IS) extremist network — have purchased commercial airline tickets to return to Australian territory after years of detention in a Syrian displacement camp.

    This cohort is part of a larger group of 34 IS-linked people, 23 of whom are children, who have been held at the al-Roj camp in northern Syria since 2019, when IS was defeated and ousted from its final controlled territory in the country. According to official updates, the entire 34-person group left the camp back in February with plans to arrange repatriation, but was forced to return to the facility for unspecified technical reasons, as the Australian government has consistently declined to facilitate official government-led repatriation for the cohort.

    Speaking to reporters on Wednesday, Australia’s Home Affairs Minister Tony Burke emphasized that the federal government has not provided and will not provide any logistical, financial or official support to the group for their journey home. “These are people who made the horrific choice to join a dangerous terrorist organisation, and they chose to put their children in an unspeakable situation,” Burke told media. “As we have stated repeatedly, any member of this group who has committed criminal acts will face the full weight of Australian law.”

    Burke added that Australian authorities were notified of the planned return immediately after the airline bookings were confirmed earlier this same day, noting that there are strict legal limitations on the government’s ability to block its own citizens from entering the country. “We have had long-standing, tested plans in place to manage and monitor this cohort’s return since 2014,” Burke said, confirming ongoing preparation across national security and law enforcement agencies.

    Australian Federal Police (AFP) Commissioner Krissy Barrett confirmed that when the 13-person group arrives on Australian soil, some individuals will be taken into custody and formally charged with criminal offenses. For more than a decade, Barrett explained, Australian investigators have been compiling evidence of potential terrorism offenses, as well as crimes against humanity including involvement in the slave trade, linked to members of the group. While Barrett declined to specify exactly how many of the 13 will face arrest, she confirmed that any individuals not taken into custody will remain the subject of active ongoing investigations.

    For the returning children, Australian authorities have outlined a support plan that includes community integration initiatives, mental health and therapeutic support, and programming designed to counter violent extremism and support long-term reintegration.

    Mike Burgess, director-general of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO), the country’s domestic spy agency, told public broadcaster the Australian Broadcasting Corporation that he does not see immediate major security risks from the group’s return, but that all members will remain under close ongoing monitoring. “It’s up to them what they do when they get here,” Burgess said. “If they start to exhibit signs that concern us, we and the police, through our joint counter-terrorism teams, will take swift action.”

    Earlier in 2025, Australia issued a temporary exclusion order barring one member of the 34-person cohort from returning to the country for a period of up to two years. Australia is not alone in its approach to repatriation: a number of other Western governments, including France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, have also refused to repatriate the majority of their own citizens still detained in Syrian camps linked to IS.

  • Trump-Xi summit at best may codify new US-China coexistence rules

    Trump-Xi summit at best may codify new US-China coexistence rules

    Next week, when U.S. President Donald Trump travels to Beijing for a high-stakes meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping, the diplomatic choreography will follow the familiar, carefully scripted playbook for top-level bilateral encounters. Behind the polished ritualistic exchanges, crafted public reaffirmations and statesman-like rhetoric, however, lies an unavoidable reality: this meeting is not aimed at reconciling deep-seated differences, but at managing a rivalry that has become fundamentally structural, with the modest overarching goal of preserving fragile global stability.

    The United States and China together account for more than 42% of the world’s total gross domestic product, making them the dual anchors of the global supply chain network. This interconnected system is already reeling from disruptions triggered by protracted geopolitical conflicts in Europe and the Middle East, which have sent shockwaves through global commodity markets and threatened livelihoods and food security across every region of the world. Even so, analysts do not expect the upcoming summit to deliver any sweeping, utopian resolution to the U.S.-China rivalry. At most, the two leaders are expected to openly acknowledge the structural nature of their competition and commit to joint efforts to keep it contained.

    ### Moving Beyond Détente to Building Tacit Guardrails

    Cold War-era comparisons between current U.S.-China relations and 20th-century U.S.-Soviet ties often confuse rather than clarify the current dynamic. There is no path to the kind of wide-ranging détente that defused tensions between Washington and Moscow in the 1970s. Today, Washington and Beijing lack mutual strategic trust, have seen no ideological softening toward one another, and share no overlapping long-term strategic vision.

    Instead of formal détente, the two powers are now focused on developing unwritten “guardrails” — informal limits to escalation that can prevent small crises from spiraling into open, catastrophic conflict. Unlike the formal, codified arms control agreements that structured U.S.-Soviet relations in the Cold War, these new mechanisms will not be written into public treaties or celebrated in joint announcements. They will exist only as quiet, tacit understandings between the two sides.

    This incremental approach reflects a far more complex reality than the dominant narratives of either full détente or total decoupling can capture. Since 2022, Washington has built an extensive export control regime targeted directly at China, restricting access to cutting-edge semiconductors, artificial intelligence technology and other frontier technologies critical to future great power competition. Beijing has responded by leveraging its global dominance in critical raw materials including gallium and germanium, key inputs for semiconductor and clean energy manufacturing. Even amid this escalating technological standoff, however, deep economic interdependence between the two economies remains intact. Bilateral trade continues to flow at massive scale, financial linkages remain strong, and cross-border production networks remain deeply integrated by design.

    What has emerged from this dynamic is a stratified, complex form of interdependence: high, fortified barriers around technologies that will define future global power, while maintaining open trade and investment in sectors where mutual economic benefits still outweigh strategic risks. Full decoupling is neither economically feasible nor politically desirable for either side, so the core challenge now becomes restructuring guardrails to allow this limited interdependence to survive.

    ### Geo-Economics as the New Face of Geopolitical Rivalry

    In recent years, the center of gravity of the U.S.-China rivalry has shifted decisively from the military domain to the economic sphere. Export controls, targeted sanctions and the reorganization of global supply chains now serve as core instruments of strategic coercion, replacing traditional military posturing as the primary tool of competition. Economic tools are now regularly deployed to advance geopolitical goals, and the line between commercial policy and national security strategy has blurred almost beyond recognition. Trade policy is now inextricably tied to each side’s core national security doctrines.

    This transformation has created acute dilemmas for third countries across the globe. Governments now must carefully navigate between two competing great power ecosystems, each with constantly evolving rules of conduct and demands for strategic alignment. The choice is no longer a simple binary between aligning with Beijing or Washington; instead, states operate in a complex landscape where their policy autonomy is constrained, and the boundaries of strategic flexibility grow increasingly hard to define.

    Given this context, any lasting outcome from the Beijing summit will not take the form of a grand bilateral bargain or a formal, public treaty. Following the pattern of the previous Xi-Trump meeting in Busan, the summit is expected to produce a set of technical, opaque, yet highly consequential mutual understandings that leave room for varying interpretations by both sides.

    Recent frictions in the South China Sea and around Taiwan underscore the constant risk of inadvertent escalation between the two powers. The lack of a formal, codified crisis management mechanism only amplifies these risks. In this context, even the most modest agreements — for restored direct communication channels, shared operational protocols, or agreed thresholds for escalation — could have a transformative impact on regional and global security. After the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, the U.S. and Soviet Union moved quickly to establish de-escalation mechanisms to prevent accidental war. Today, U.S.-China relations require a similar, even if less formalized, framework of mutually accepted guardrails to reduce risk.

    ### The Impact of Divergent Leadership Styles

    The contrasting personal leadership styles of the two presidents add an extra layer of complexity to summit negotiations. Trump’s diplomatic approach is inherently transactional, focused on securing immediate, visible, tangible outcomes that can be marketed as political wins back home. By contrast, Xi’s approach is rooted in long-term strategic planning, embedded in a broader vision for China’s continued rise as a global power. This fundamental disconnect in negotiating priorities will shape the final outcomes of the Beijing meeting.

    Trump will arrive pushing for demonstrable, short-term gains: adjustments to bilateral trade balances, symbolic concessions from Beijing, or explicit security assurances on contentious issues. As host, Xi will calibrate his responses to ensure any concessions made align with China’s long-term strategic trajectories, and do not undermine core national interests.

    As a result, even the most successful agreements emerging from the summit are likely to be tactical, reversible arrangements. They will deliver useful short-term stabilization but will be insufficient to build a durable, long-term framework for managing competition. Any deals will also remain contingent on the personal dynamics of the two leaders, rather than being rooted in institutionalized cooperation that can outlast changes in leadership.

    The most consequential dimensions of the U.S.-China rivalry also extend far beyond their bilateral relationship. Across Asia, Africa and Latin America, states are increasingly being pulled into competing visions of development, governance and global connectivity. China’s Belt and Road Initiative has already built a significant physical and institutional presence across the developing world, embedding Chinese infrastructure standards and financing models in dozens of countries. The Trump administration has struggled to articulate a coherent alternative vision to the BRI, and has often resorted to coercive hard power tactics to counter Chinese influence, as seen in recent actions in Venezuela and Iran.

    For countries across the global south, the question is no longer which great power vision is normatively preferable, but which can deliver tangible, reliable economic benefits. In the end, the outcome of the U.S.-China rivalry will be determined not by deals struck in summits, but by the long-term global credibility of each power’s model.

    ### Selective Coordination for Competitive Coexistence

    Paradoxically, even amid deep structural rivalry, global systemic shocks can open limited space for targeted cooperation between the two powers. Issues including volatile global energy markets, emerging pandemic risks, transnational terrorism, and nuclear proliferation are all areas where Washington and Beijing share overlapping priorities, even as they compete in every other domain.

    The ongoing market disruptions tied to conflicts in the Middle East illustrate this dynamic clearly. For different strategic and economic reasons, both the U.S. and Chinese economies depend on stable global energy markets, and both are deeply vulnerable to extreme price volatility. Even without broader strategic alignment, these shared vulnerabilities can open narrow corridors for transactional, issue-specific cooperation.

    This dynamic aligns with what international relations scholars term “competitive interdependence”: a relationship marked by intensifying strategic rivalry alongside persistent economic and technological entanglements that neither side can fully unwind without inflicting massive damage on itself.

    The cumulative effect of these overlapping dynamics is that bilateral engagements will continue to face regular setbacks, full containment of China’s rise is practically impossible for the U.S., and full convergence of interests between the two powers has proven illusory. What remains is selective coordination to enable competitive coexistence.

    In this framework, bilateral stability does not come from deep mutual trust or shared ideological values. Instead, it emerges from a clear recognition of mutual vulnerability and the catastrophic costs of unconstrained escalation. The U.S.-China relationship today follows a simple logic: rivalry will persist, but it must be bounded by mutual necessity.

    ### What to Expect From the Beijing Summit

    Against this backdrop, the upcoming Beijing summit is not expected to resolve the core tensions at the heart of the U.S.-China rivalry. The Taiwan question will remain a deeply contested flashpoint, technological competition will continue to intensify, and long-standing mutual strategic suspicion will endure. What the summit may achieve is a modest, yet highly consequential outcome: it will buy valuable time for both sides to adjust to the new reality of structural competition.

    In an international system marked by widespread uncertainty and growing fragmentation, time is a critical strategic resource. Managed rivalry, for all its imperfections, is unquestionably preferable to unconstrained competition that risks open conflict.

    Trump and Xi do not view each other as reliable partners, and there is little prospect that this meeting will change that fundamental dynamic. At a deeper level, they are rivals by design: leaders of two great power systems whose long-term trajectories are fundamentally at odds, but whose peaceful coexistence is the only viable option for both sides and for the world. The understandings they reach in Beijing will not end their rivalry. At best, they will clearly define its boundaries. For now, that is likely the most the world can hope for from this high-stakes meeting.

    *This analysis is by Swaran Singh, Professor of International Relations at Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi.*

  • Rubio rising? Duel with Vance for 2028 heats up

    Rubio rising? Duel with Vance for 2028 heats up

    The quiet jockeying for the 2028 Republican presidential nomination burst into public view this week, as a high-profile turn at the White House briefing podium catapulted Secretary of State Marco Rubio into the center of speculation about a post-Trump GOP future, intensifying his implicit rivalry with Vice President JD Vance.

    On Tuesday, 54-year-old Rubio stepped in to fill in for White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt, who is currently on maternity leave. Standing before a packed room of Washington journalists, he handled a range of pressing foreign policy questions covering Iran, Cuba, and U.S.-China relations with a relaxed, affable demeanor that stood in stark contrast to the combative, invective-laden appearances former President Donald Trump often delivers from the same podium. Even as he joked about the chaotic scrum of reporters waving for his attention — telling the crowd “this is chaos” — Rubio appeared at ease, weaving in personal asides and pop culture references that won over many in the room and won viral praise online. A self-described hip-hop fan, he even dropped a line from Cypress Hill’s iconic track to describe Iran’s leadership, calling them “insane in the brain.”

    Conservative voices were quick to hail the performance as a breakout moment for Rubio. “Rubio just wrapped up his FIRST White House Press Briefing, and he absolutely knocked it out of the park,” conservative influencer Nick Sortor posted on X, adding “This man is a SERIOUS contender for 2028.”

    The moment could not have been more different for Vance, 41, Rubio’s most likely competitor for the 2028 nomination, who was hundreds of miles away from Washington that day, campaigning across the heartland and headlining a Republican fundraiser in Oklahoma.

    For months, public polling has shown Vance holding a substantial lead over other potential candidates among registered Republican voters. Neither Vance nor Rubio has officially announced a 2028 presidential bid, and Rubio has repeatedly downplayed speculation, describing the vice president as a friend and saying publicly he would not challenge Vance if he enters the race. Trump, who remains the undisputed leader of the MAGA movement, has also not yet publicly named a preferred heir to his political legacy.

    But behind the scenes, Washington speculation has grown in recent weeks that Trump is increasingly leaning toward supporting Rubio over Vance. Prediction markets have already reflected this shift, with Vance’s odds of securing the nomination dropping sharply over the past month.

    Vance’s political profile holds clear appeal for the MAGA base: his personal story of growing up in poverty in an Appalachian community ravaged by the opioid crisis was seen as a perfect fit for Trump’s working-class political brand. But he has repeatedly struggled to connect with broad swathes of the Republican electorate, and many hardline Trump supporters still view him with suspicion. That distrust dates back to 2016, when Vance compared then-candidate Trump to Adolf Hitler; as an anti-interventionist former Marine, he has also kept a notably low profile amid Trump’s recent military operations against Iran, a stark contrast to Rubio’s long record as a foreign policy hawk.

    Rubio has earned Trump’s public praise for his handling of recent military actions in Venezuela and Iran, and this week it was Rubio, not Vance — a devout Catholic convert — that Trump sent to meet newly installed Pope Leo XIV amid escalating tensions over Iran. Even the official White House X account seemed to signal implicit support for Rubio on Tuesday, promoting his briefing with the teasing caption “Another job?” and sharing his photo across dozens of administration channels.

    Vance, for his part, was far from idle during his time out of Washington. His itinerary included a stop in Iowa, the critical early nominating state that first launched Trump to the GOP nomination in 2016 and will carry outsize influence in the 2028 primary. His Oklahoma fundraising stop also highlighted a less-discussed advantage he holds: his role as finance chief for the Republican National Committee, a position that lets him build loyalty and support across party infrastructure at a time when many establishment Republicans still have not fully embraced his candidacy. He also made a stop in his home state of Ohio, where he previously served as a U.S. senator, to vote in a state primary, where his 10-year-old son Vivek cast a mock vote between the Easter Bunny and the Tooth Fairy — a moment Vance shared with reporters, joking that his son picked the Easter Bunny by a comfortable margin.

    When asked directly if his briefing room turn was a trial run for a 2028 presidential bid, Rubio declined to comment. He knows better than most that two years is an eternity in American politics, pointing to the 2016 race where another former secretary of state, Hillary Clinton, suffered a shocking upset loss to Trump. For now, Rubio seems content to enjoy his newfound viral momentum, keeping his long-term political ambitions close to the vest — even when it comes to joking about his recent viral turn as a wedding DJ over the weekend, where he was spotted manning the decks during a reception while Iran negotiations were ongoing. When asked what his DJ stage name would be, Rubio grinned and told reporters: “My DJ name? You’re not ready for my DJ name.”

  • Rubio plays down Trump attacks on pope before Vatican trip

    Rubio plays down Trump attacks on pope before Vatican trip

    As U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio prepares for a high-stakes scheduled meeting with Pope Leo XIV at the Vatican this Thursday, the devout Catholic has sought to downplay escalating public criticism of the first American-born pope by President Donald Trump. The diplomatic visit, arranged long before the recent verbal clash between the White House and the Holy See, remains on track despite sharp rhetoric from the commander-in-chief that has put a bilateral religious-diplomatic relationship under unprecedented strain.

    Speaking to reporters at the White House on the eve of his departure Tuesday, Rubio acknowledged the public tension but framed the encounter as a necessary opportunity to address shared priorities between the Trump administration and the Vatican. “It’s a trip we had planned from before, and obviously we had some stuff that happened,” Rubio told assembled media. “There’s a lot to talk about with the Vatican.” He pointed to religious freedom as a key area of alignment between the two sides, a policy issue that has long united conservative U.S. leaders and Catholic Church authorities.

    The conflict erupted last month after Pope Leo XIV took firm public stances that directly challenged the Trump administration’s foreign policy: he called for an immediate ceasefire to the ongoing Israel- and U.S.-led war in the Middle East, defended the rights of global migrants, and publicly rejected Trump’s inflammatory call to permanently destroy Iranian civilization, labeling the rhetoric “unacceptable.” In response, Trump launched an extraordinary public attack on the leader of the world’s 1.4 billion Catholics, posting on social media that the pope was “WEAK on crime, and terrible for foreign policy.”

    The president doubled down on his criticism in an interview with conservative talk show host Hugh Hewitt late Monday, falsely claiming that Pope Leo XIV supports Iran acquiring a nuclear weapon. “I think he’s endangering a lot of Catholics and a lot of people,” Trump told Hewitt. “But I guess if it’s up to the Pope, he thinks it’s just fine for Iran to have a nuclear weapon.”

    Pope Leo XIV pushed back on the allegations when speaking to reporters Tuesday, reaffirming the Catholic Church’s longstanding, unambiguous opposition to all nuclear weapons and framing his public calls for peace as a core part of the Church’s mission. “The Church’s mission is to preach the Gospel and to preach peace,” the pope said. “If anyone wishes to criticize me for proclaiming the Gospel, let them do so truthfully. The Church has spoken out against all nuclear weapons for years, so there is no doubt about that, and I simply hope to be heard for the sake of the value of God’s word.”

    The growing rift between Trump and the pope carries notable political risks for the president ahead of any future electoral contests. Polling conducted in March and April already shows sliding approval for Trump among American Catholic voters, a key demographic that delivered a majority to Trump in his 2024 presidential election victory.

    Beyond religious freedom and the current diplomatic clash, another core topic on Rubio’s agenda for the Vatican talks will be Cuba. The Holy See has long maintained an active diplomatic role on the island, and Rubio, a Cuban-American who has spearheaded the Trump administration’s hardline pressure campaign against the Cuban communist government, is expected to press Vatican leaders for alignment on that front.