分类： politics

In a recent call for coordinated global action on trade imbalances, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz has emerged as the most high-profile advocate for a second Plaza Accord, a scheme designed to deliberately push up the value of China’s yuan to erode what he frames as the country’s unfair export advantage. Merz claims the Chinese currency is undervalued by roughly 30%, alleging Beijing deliberately keeps it cheap to flood global markets with artificially low-priced goods. He warns that state-subsidized overcapacity in key Chinese manufacturing sectors is destabilizing a global economy still recovering from years of successive shocks. Merz’s grievances are far from isolated in European leadership: European Central Bank President Christine Lagarde has previously estimated the yuan’s undervaluation at around 16%, while European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has publicly described China’s current export competitive edge as fundamentally unsustainable for the global trading system.

Despite this broad European criticism of China’s currency and trade practices, economic analysts broadly agree that a 1985-style currency pact modeled after the original Plaza Accord – which forced a sharp appreciation of Japan’s yen to correct US trade imbalances – is deeply unlikely to resolve the grievances European leaders have raised, and carries major risks of unintended consequences. There are two core structural flaws in the proposal from the outset: first, China is not a member of the Group of Seven, the bloc that orchestrated the original 1985 agreement among major advanced economies. Second, the 2026 global financial system is unrecognizable from the mid-1980s landscape, making a four-decade-old framework a poor fit for modern challenges.

Attempting to force a sharp, rapid appreciation of the yuan would carry significant downside risks for the global economy, experts warn. A sudden revaluation would exacerbate China’s already persistent deflationary pressures, deepen long-running structural imbalances in the country’s economy, and worsen the ongoing crisis in its struggling property sector. Many analysts argue that the economic damage from a forced yuan revaluation would ultimately outweigh any perceived benefits from reducing China’s export competitiveness, for both China and its global trading partners.

History also directly undermines the case for Merz’s proposal, as the original Plaza Accord failed to deliver long-term benefits and triggered severe economic harm for Japan. Bill Mitchell, a leading currency expert at Australia’s University of Newcastle, points out that the United States is highly unlikely to succeed in bullying China into accepting a currency deal on the terms it forced on Japan in the 1980s. Mitchell notes the original accord was extremely economically disruptive, directly contributing to Japan’s massive 1980s asset bubble and the decades of stagnation that followed, with little to no lasting economic gain for the United States.

Another major complication is that Merz’s proposal puts it on a potential collision course with US President Donald Trump’s own competing trade plan, the self-named “Mar-a-Lago Accord”, which attempts to revive a global trade framework that no longer exists in modern markets. Neither leader’s political track record suggests a coordinated US-Eurozone effort to pressure China on currency would proceed smoothly. Trump has long favored unilateral transactional pressure over multilateral coordinated diplomacy, making joint action unlikely.

For its part, Beijing has closely studied the economic fallout of the 1985 Plaza Accord, which it views as the starting point of Japan’s decades-long stagnation. Chinese leaders have repeatedly made clear they have no interest in repeating Japan’s experience, a position that shapes the country’s ongoing tight management of the yuan via daily central bank fixings and strict capital controls. Chinese officials have also stressed that meaningful, externally forced revaluation is completely off the table until the yuan becomes fully convertible under Beijing’s policy timeline.

Merz and Trump also underestimate the significant political and economic leverage Chinese President Xi Jinping holds to resist external pressure, a stark contrast to the position of Japanese Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone in the 1980s. Xi also has a factually defensible argument: Chinese authorities have actively intervened to prop up the yuan’s value in recent months, even as domestic deflationary pressures would normally drive the currency lower.

Today’s global power dynamics also make the original Plaza Accord playbook unworkable. The 1985 agreement succeeded because the US held overwhelming dominance over the then-Group of Five, and Japan relied heavily on access to American consumers to fuel its export-led growth. Today, US global economic influence has eroded significantly: years of Trump-era tariffs and ongoing geopolitical tensions over Iran have left the US more isolated internationally and its domestic economy more exposed to global shocks. By contrast, China is now the world’s largest trading nation, while the European Union’s 27 member states remain deeply divided on China policy and are still grappling with post-pandemic economic fragility. Germany alone runs a roughly 90 billion euro ($102 billion) annual trade deficit with China, leaving Berlin with very little bargaining leverage to force concessions from Beijing.

Beyond currency dynamics, Merz faces far more pressing structural challenges to European industrial competitiveness. The real “China Shock 2.0” is not driven by exchange rates, but by the rapid rise of Chinese technology leaders in cutting-edge strategic sectors, from electric vehicle giant BYD to artificial intelligence innovator DeepSeek. These companies’ growing global market share is already reshaping Europe’s industrial landscape: German automaker Volkswagen is reportedly considering closing four domestic factories and cutting 100,000 jobs as Chinese brands expand their global footprint.

Analysts stress that European industrial weakness cannot be blamed solely on Chinese competitiveness. Europe’s own weak domestic demand and longstanding industrial complacency are major contributing factors. As Volkswagen shareholder Ingo Speich noted in comments to Reuters, “The high costs are merely a symptom, not the cause… the root cause is weak sales.” His point underscores a core reality: unless European manufacturers develop products that global consumers actually want, debates about currency valuation and cost-cutting will do little to reverse declining market share. Volkswagen’s predicament is a microcosm of Europe’s broader challenge in an era of rising Chinese industrial power. While a stronger yuan might have boosted European manufacturers decades ago, China’s rapid ascent up the global value chain has completely altered this calculation. Today, China’s competitive advantage in electric vehicles, batteries, solar energy and advanced manufacturing stems from industrial policy, economies of scale and technological innovation, not cheap labor or undervalued exchange rates. Even a 10 to 20% yuan appreciation would not erase these competitive advantages, though targeted higher trade barriers might alter market dynamics at the margin.

China is now accelerating structural shifts that are reshaping the entire global economy. When China joined the World Trade Organization in 2001, it unleashed a wave of low-cost, subsidized exports of basic goods like textiles, furniture and entry-level electronics. Today’s phase of Chinese export growth is far more consequential: China is now targeting high-value growth sectors including electric vehicles, clean energy and advanced manufacturing, reshaping competitive dynamics in the industries that will define the 21st century global economy.

Addressing this new wave of Chinese industrial competition requires far more than symbolic currency diplomacy, analysts argue. Chris Bradley, an analyst at the McKinsey Global Institute, notes that advanced economies need to pursue a deep transformation of domestic productivity, invest in innovation, specialize in less cost-sensitive high-value sectors, and implement policies that create a more level global playing field. Bradley’s analysis finds that a 30% boost to domestic productivity, combined with cost convergence in equipment, energy and raw materials, and faster execution of industrial projects modeled on China’s “speed to market” could close between 30 and 80% of the current cost gap between Western and Chinese manufacturers. Bradley adds that achieving a sustainable new global trade equilibrium requires advanced economies to specialize in future-defining industries, revive domestic innovation, and overhaul outdated industrial policy frameworks to address modern competitive distortions. In short, Europe’s core challenge is not just China’s economic rise – it is Europe’s own need to adapt to a new global economic order.

For the euro area, China’s current deflationary pressures and manufacturing glut create unique spillover risks. Valentina Aprigliano, an economist at the Bank of Italy, explains that “For the euro area, the most immediate transmission channel operates through import prices.” Weak domestic price growth in China, combined with robust manufacturing output, is exported abroad via lower-priced imported goods. This channel is particularly impactful for the euro area, which imported more than 430 billion euros in manufactured goods from China in 2025. Import volumes from China grew across most product categories in 2024 and 2025, while per-unit import values declined sharply, especially in 2025.

This dynamic has led many analysts to warn that Europe is at risk of misdiagnosing its trade problems with China. Focusing on currency valuation only addresses surface-level symptoms, not the underlying competitiveness gap between European and Chinese manufacturers. Given China’s ongoing industrial policy momentum, it is no longer credible to argue that yuan appreciation would halt China’s ascent up the global value chain, nor would exchange rate shifts suddenly restore Western Europe’s industrial dominance. A currency agreement alone cannot rebalance EU-China trade, or US-China trade for that matter.

Scott Kennedy, an economist at the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies, notes that China’s high-tech industrial drive has made enormous, uneven progress across key sectors over the past few decades. “These advances have directly translated into enhanced international power and influence for China. The United States and like-minded countries need to respond pragmatically to maximize the opportunities and minimize the risks resulting from these developments,” Kennedy said.

Exchange rate shifts will not slow the momentum behind China’s Made in China 2025 industrial strategy. Chinese firms like BYD, which now outsells Tesla globally, and AI firm DeepSeek, which has upended competitive dynamics among Silicon Valley’s leading technology giants, demonstrate that Beijing’s top-down industrial strategy is delivering tangible results. These successes stem not from an undervalued currency, but from coordinated long-term investment to dominate strategic growth sectors.

Beijing’s latest Five-Year Plan pledges to accelerate China’s technological development and its ongoing structural pivot toward a consumption-led growth model. Keyu Jin, an economist at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, explains that this shift is “not only about rebalancing growth, but also about anchoring it more firmly at home. Domestic demand offers insulation from external shocks, and along with developed capital markets, it can go a long way toward strengthening autonomy.”

Jin notes that China currently faces a striking paradox: it is among the world’s most dynamic technological powers, delivering accelerating breakthroughs in artificial intelligence, electric vehicles and advanced manufacturing, yet overall economic growth continues to slow. The reason is no mystery: as China’s latest Five-Year Plan recognizes, the country is undergoing a broad structural transition, not a temporary cyclical slowdown. The old investment and export-led growth model is giving way to a new consumption and innovation-led model that has not yet fully taken hold, and the transition is proceeding more slowly than many global investors would like. Economists broadly agree that Xi must accelerate the transition to convince global markets that technological self-sufficiency and ambitious industrial policy are not just core priorities, but achievable long-term goals.

The yuan’s value plays a complex role in Xi’s current strategic priorities. A stable or gradually appreciating yuan serves three key Beijing policy goals: it reduces the risk of offshore defaults among heavily indebted Chinese property developers, supports the long-term goal of yuan internationalization to establish it as a major global reserve currency, and helps manage trade tensions with Washington, where the Trump administration remains highly sensitive to any hint of competitive devaluation. A firm yuan also helps China avoid importing additional inflation from global commodity markets: in May, Chinese producer prices rose 3.9% year-on-year, a “bad inflation” dynamic also being felt in Japan as Middle East geopolitical conflict drives up global commodity prices.

Still, Beijing is increasingly sensitive to global perceptions that it is boosting American living standards at the expense of Chinese domestic growth. Premier Li Qiang’s recent “China Opportunity 2.0” branding at the Summer Davos forum reflects this sensitivity, a narrative that would be far harder to sell if Beijing allowed the yuan to weaken significantly while pursuing its 4.5 to 5% annual economic growth target.

The yen’s recent dramatic slide to a 40-year low against the dollar adds another layer of complexity to the situation. With the Trump administration taking a largely hands-off approach to the yen’s decline, Beijing may feel it has greater political cover to allow the yuan to drift lower gradually. The yen’s 3.1% drop against the dollar has created broader regional currency ripples, and could tempt Chinese policymakers to test the limits of their currency management just as Merz and other European leaders push for a new Plaza Accord.

When U.S. President Donald Trump touched down in Ankara for the 2026 NATO Summit this week, long-simmering domestic anger over Turkey’s 74-year membership in the transatlantic military alliance reached a fever pitch, fueled by the ongoing humanitarian crisis in Gaza and sweeping government restrictions on dissent ahead of the high-stakes gathering.

While left-wing groups in Turkey have opposed NATO membership for decades, the alliance’s failure to condemn Israel’s military campaign in Gaza – paired with the Turkish government’s decision to ban all protests across Ankara for the full duration of the summit – has galvanized unprecedented cross-ideological opposition to the conference. In a challenge to NATO’s official narrative of collective European defense, the Workers’ Party of Turkey (TIP), a left-wing opposition party holding three seats in the Turkish parliament, organized a parallel Anti-Imperialist Peace Summit in Istanbul this past weekend, bringing together hundreds of anti-war activists and international socialist figures from across the globe.

The counter-summit’s founding manifesto, titled *No to NATO*, directly pushes back against the landmark commitment all NATO member states agreed to in 2025: a mandate to raise annual defense spending to 5% of national GDP by 2035. “The 2026 Ankara Summit opens a new era where working people across all NATO member states face greater vulnerability to exploitation and war, even as they are forced to bear the burden of rising defense budgets,” the pamphlet reads. “This policy diverts hard-earned working-class wealth to fund U.S. and Israeli-led wars around the world, and line the pockets of giant arms industry monopolies that profit from global conflict.”

Despite the counter-summit being a legally registered political event, Turkish authorities blocked dozens of international delegates from entering the country. A TIP spokesperson, speaking to Middle East Eye on condition of anonymity, confirmed that multiple scheduled attendees were turned away at border crossings, while delegates from organizations including the International Peace Bureau and the youth wing of Germany’s left-wing Die Linke party were detained overnight at Istanbul’s airport, had their personal devices confiscated, and deported shortly after. “These are peaceful activists and political representatives who came to participate in a public, legal meeting,” the spokesperson said. “Their treatment proves exactly what we have long argued: the security framework built around NATO summits is not directed at external threats – it is aimed at silencing people who oppose war.”

In the weeks leading up to the main summit, Turkish security forces have carried out a widespread crackdown on opposition voices, arresting at least 225 people. While authorities claim most detainees are supporters of the armed leftist DHKP/C group or the Islamic State, the detainee list also includes prominent non-violent dissidents: academic Emel Memis, LGBTQ rights activist and journalist Yildiz Tar, Nevzat Ozer of the environmental NGO Tema Foundation, Burcu Arikan, spokesperson for the independent labor union Umut-Sen, and Semra Demir and Kursat Bafra, lawyers from the Progressive Lawyers Association. The TIP spokesperson added that 17 additional party members have been detained since the summit opened.

Turkey’s complicated history with NATO stretches back to 1952, when the country joined the alliance in exchange for Western support, after committing troops to the Korean War. At the height of the Cold War, Turkey’s geographic location along the Soviet Union’s southern border made it one of NATO’s most strategically valuable members, a role that nearly triggered global nuclear catastrophe during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. The deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons in Turkey targeting the Soviet Union was a core driver of the crisis, and their secret removal was the key concession that prevented open nuclear war. Today, Turkey hosts the critical Incirlik and Konya air bases that have been central to Western military operations across the Middle East for decades, and boasts the second-largest standing military in the alliance, outranked only by the United States.

For successive Turkish governments, NATO membership has long been seen as a critical security guarantee, protecting the country from threats ranging from the Soviet Union to armed separatist groups and hostile neighboring states in the Middle East. But for Turkish leftists and pro-democracy campaigners, NATO has played a far more insidious role at home: it has backed the training of far-right death squads, supported the creation of clandestine anti-communist Counter-Guerrilla groups, and propped up a Turkish military establishment that has repeatedly intervened to curtail democratic governance.

Outside analysts echo many of these criticisms. Khem Rogaly, a senior research fellow at the Common Wealth think tank, argues that NATO’s new 5% GDP defense spending mandate functions first and foremost as a mechanism of economic extraction, funneling public funds from European governments straight into the U.S.-dominated military industrial complex. “Mandatory military spending targets reshape entire economies around the arms industry,” Rogaly explained to Middle East Eye. “This leaves deep, long-lasting economic damage: military spending generates far less economic growth and far fewer jobs than equivalent investments in other public priorities. By forcing members to massively ramp up military spending, the new target means underfunding social programs that would deliver far broader shared economic benefits.”

The alliance’s response to the ongoing Gaza crisis has done more than any other recent issue to inflame anti-NATO sentiment in Turkey, even uniting normally opposed leftist and Islamist factions in opposition. TIP’s spokesperson points out that no NATO mechanism has ever been activated to restrain Israel’s military campaign, and that the most consequential item on the 2026 summit agenda is a plan to fully integrate Israel’s security apparatus into NATO’s regional strategy. The spokesperson added that the Turkish government’s high-profile public criticism of Israel amounts to little more than “crocodile tears,” as bilateral trade between the two countries continues uninterrupted. Recent high-profile disputes between Turkey and other NATO allies are also largely political theater, the spokesperson argued: “Politically, NATO membership gives the government bargaining power with Washington and a seat at the imperialist table. Economically, Turkey’s growing domestic arms industry is fully integrated into the alliance’s supply chains, so rising military budgets mean rising profits for the corporations closest to the ruling regime. Occasional anti-Western rhetoric is just for domestic consumption – the core institutions of imperialism operate without disruption on Turkish soil.”

Controversy has also extended to press access for the summit: multiple Turkish reporters from prominent independent outlets including *Cumhuriyet*, *Sozcu*, *Anka*, *T24*, and *Medyascope* were denied press accreditation. When Middle East Eye reached out to NATO for comment, a spokesperson referred the outlet to a social media post stating that the alliance relies on the host nation to manage all accreditation decisions.

This year’s summit has been marked by unusual behind-the-scenes tensions, with two core sources of anxiety for alliance organizers: first, ongoing uncertainty over Donald Trump’s commitment to the alliance, even with less than three years remaining in his current term. Trump’s repeated public criticisms of NATO have pressured member states to make concessions to keep the U.S. engaged. Second, many NATO members and key allies including Israel have repeatedly questioned Turkey’s alignment in recent years, due to Ankara’s continued diplomatic and economic engagement with NATO rivals Iran and Russia.

These anxieties have driven the Turkish government’s harsh crackdown on dissent, according to Selim Koru, founder of the *Kulturkampf* Substack. Koru argues that the protest ban and mass arrests are a deliberate move by an intensely geopolitically focused government to prevent domestic unrest from embarrassing Turkey on the global stage. “Turkey is the only NATO member whose value to the alliance is constantly being questioned by fellow members, and that is in large part due to the ruling government’s own bombastic rhetoric,” Koru explained. “Over the past decade, Turkish policy has swung wildly between strident opposition to NATO orthodoxy from 2013 to 2023 and staunchly pro-U.S., pro-NATO diplomacy today. It also seems alliance leaders have figured out that Turkey’s ruling class responds well to public praise, so they have been very generous with compliments.”

So far, that approach appears to have paid off for both sides. Ahead of the summit, Trump announced he was considering lifting the F-35 fighter jet sale ban he imposed on Turkey during his first presidential term, and plans to roll back additional sanctions imposed on Ankara. Trump called Turkey an “extraordinary” NATO ally, offering far warmer praise for the country than he extended to many other alliance members – including Spain, which Trump threatened to cut off from all U.S. trade.

For TIP and the anti-NATO movement, the 2026 Ankara summit exposes the lie at the heart of NATO’s branding as a defender of Western liberal values. “Today, the 5% GDP spending target agreed last year means every dollar cut from healthcare, education, and housing across Europe is redirected to the arms industry,” the TIP spokesperson said. “Militarization does not make European people safer. It fuels escalation, strengthens far-right movements, deepens economic inequality, and pulls the continent closer to war. Genuine security for Europe comes from disarmament, diplomacy, and robust social welfare – not an arms race that only weapons monopolies win.”

A diplomatic and regulatory dispute has emerged between South Korea and the United States after a U.S. congressional committee published a report accusing Seoul of unfair, discriminatory treatment of U.S.-listed e-commerce giant Coupang, prompting a sharp pushback from South Korean government officials.

The controversy traces back to June 2024, when South Korea’s Personal Information Protection Commission (PIPC) imposed a record-breaking 625 billion won ($403 million) fine against Coupang following a massive 2023 data breach that exposed personal information belonging to more than 37 million individuals, 33 million of whom are active Coupang customers. According to PIPC findings, the breach was not the result of advanced, sophisticated hacking; rather, it stemmed from severe gaps in Coupang’s internal security protocols. A former Coupang employee retained unauthorized access to customer databases using a stolen security key after leaving the company, and lax internal controls allowed an unidentified Chinese developer to access all stored user data without detection for an extended period. Regulators also noted that Coupang violated South Korean data protection law by failing to report the breach within the mandatory 72-hour window, a failure that compounded risks to consumers.

On Wednesday, the U.S. House Judiciary Committee released a 35-page report that framed the fine and preceding investigation as part of a pattern of growing discrimination against U.S.-owned businesses operating abroad. The report went as far as to accuse South Korean antitrust and privacy regulators of using coercive investigation tactics and running a deliberate harassment campaign against the company.

The South Korean government issued a formal, firm rejection of these claims just one day later. Foreign Ministry spokesperson Park Il stated that the U.S. congressional report relies exclusively on one-sided claims from Coupang and completely omits Seoul’s official position on the case. Park emphasized that all investigative steps and regulatory penalties against Coupang were conducted in full compliance with South Korea’s domestic laws, and rejected assertions that the company faced unfair treatment or discriminatory regulation.

“Our handling of the Coupang case has focused on addressing the personal data breach and protecting South Korean consumers,” Park said, adding that all investigative actions and penalties were implemented lawfully and without bias. “Claims that our government carried out discriminatory investigations and imposed unfair regulations on the company simply do not align with the facts.”

For its part, Coupang has apologized to affected customers for the security failure, but has moved to challenge the fine through South Korea’s administrative court system. The company argues that the privacy regulator failed to adequately recognize steps it has taken to strengthen security protocols and mitigate harm to users after the breach was discovered. In an emailed statement, Coupang said it regrets the circumstances that led to the congressional investigation, and affirmed its commitment to reaching a constructive resolution that allows the company to continue acting as a connector for U.S.-South Korea trade and investment.

Headquartered in Seattle, Coupang brands itself as a U.S. technology and Fortune 150 company that links thousands of American businesses and brands to global markets. Despite its U.S. corporate registration, the vast majority of the company’s revenue comes from its operations in South Korea, where it is a leading e-commerce platform famous for its same-day and next-day delivery of groceries, prepared food, and general consumer goods.

According to reporting from South Korea’s Yonhap News Agency, which cites U.S. Senate lobbying disclosure documents, Coupang has spent more than $1 million on lobbying activities in the U.S. since the data breach scandal became public in November of last year. Those lobbying efforts have targeted both the White House and Congress, as the company works to build support for its position in the dispute with South Korean regulators.

In high-stakes diplomatic talks held in New Delhi on Thursday, Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi have concluded their summit with a sweeping package of bilateral agreements designed to deepen ties across defense, economic coordination, and maritime security.

Following the closed-door negotiations, Modi outlined the key outcomes of the meeting to reporters, noting that the two nations will move forward with joint development of naval radio antenna infrastructure and have formally adopted a shared roadmap guiding long-term economic security collaboration. Beyond these core initiatives, Modi added that the leaders had reached consensus on ramping up joint work across a portfolio of high-priority strategic sectors, including artificial intelligence, commercial and military shipbuilding, renewable biogas energy, semiconductor supply chain development, and other cutting-edge critical technologies.

“For both India and Japan, economic security is not a separate policy concern — it is a shared core security interest,” Modi emphasized in his post-summit remarks.

The deepening partnership builds on decades of growing economic ties between the two Asian powers. Japan currently ranks among India’s top sources of foreign direct investment, and has anchored signature infrastructure projects across India, most prominently the Mumbai-Ahmedabad high-speed rail line, one of India’s most ambitious modern transit upgrades. Today, more than 1,400 Japanese firms maintain active operations in India, with nearly half of those businesses focused on manufacturing activity.

Fresh official data from the Indian government puts bilateral trade between the two nations at $27.5 billion for India’s 2025-26 fiscal year. Japanese investment inflows into India between April and December 2025 alone totaled $3.2 billion, a figure that aligns with Tokyo’s 2024 pledge — made during Modi’s official visit to Tokyo last year — to more than double its cumulative investment in India to over $61 billion over the coming decade. Takaichi’s three-day visit to New Delhi was held to mark the 16th iteration of the annual India-Japan summit, a recurring dialogue that has grown in strategic importance in recent years.

Both India and Japan have made boosting bilateral collaboration in the Indo-Pacific a top foreign policy priority, and both are core members of the Quad, a regional security grouping that also includes the United States and Australia. The Quad was established to coordinate on maritime security, defense cooperation, and infrastructure development to counter the growing influence of China across the Indo-Pacific region.

Takaichi reaffirmed that New Delhi and Tokyo share unwavering commitment to Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) initiative, which is rooted in principles of unimpeded freedom of navigation and universal respect for established international law. “Expanding our partnership on maritime security is particularly critical to upholding peace and stability across the entire region,” Takaichi stated.

Notably, the summit came as regional tensions over Indo-Pacific strategy remain high, and Chinese officials pushed back against the initiative Thursday. During a regular Beijing press briefing, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun argued that some outside powers frame their initiatives as promoting “freedom and openness” while actually pursuing policies of confrontation and division within the region. Guo stressed that this kind of approach directly contradicts the widespread desire among Indo-Pacific nations for peace, shared development, and cross-border cooperation.

“The Asia-Pacific needs stability, not turmoil; it needs a laser focus on cooperation, not bloc-based division,” Guo said. Associated Press correspondent Ken Moritsugu contributed reporting from Beijing for this article.