作者： admin

The ongoing US-Israeli military campaign against Iran is now sending ripple effects through the global economy, and India — the world’s fourth largest energy consumer — is already feeling the strain. On Sunday, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi delivered a public appeal urging citizens across the country to cut back on petrol and diesel usage, halt gold purchases for 12 months, and reduce foreign travel to shore up the nation’s strained foreign exchange reserves and avert widespread energy shortages.

Up to this point, India has avoided implementing domestic price increases or supply rationing for petrol and diesel, unlike many other emerging economies facing global energy market shocks. However, the government has already moved to raise prices for liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), the primary cooking fuel used by hundreds of millions of Indian households. The country sources roughly 60 percent of its total LPG imports from Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia, and 90 percent of these shipments pass through the Strait of Hormuz — a critical global chokepoint that has been effectively shut down by overlapping US and Iranian blockades amid the ongoing conflict.

Modi’s public appeal marks a clear shift in policy signaling, indicating New Delhi is preparing for impending energy shortages and broad-based price increases that will extend beyond cooking fuel to transportation fuels. Speaking at an event in the southern state of Telangana, the prime minister outlined concrete steps for households and commuters to reduce consumption. “We have to reduce our use of petrol and diesel. In cities with metro lines, we should try to travel by metro…If we must use a car, then we should try to carpool,” Modi stated.

Beyond balancing energy supplies, the appeal is rooted in urgent efforts to protect India’s foreign currency holdings, which have come under severe pressure from soaring global energy prices tied to the Iran conflict. “We must also place a strong emphasis on saving foreign exchange, as petrol and diesel have become so expensive globally,” Modi added.

In a notable departure from typical policy messaging, the prime minister specifically called for a one-year pause on domestic gold purchases, a culturally embedded preference across India where the precious metal is a traditional store of value and a staple gift for weddings and major life events. Like crude oil, global gold transactions are denominated in U.S. dollars, meaning rising domestic gold demand directly draws down foreign reserve holdings. New Delhi previously imposed higher tariffs on gold imports back in 2022 to curb demand and conserve dollars, a policy that has only been partially effective.

India’s structural reliance on foreign energy sources leaves it uniquely vulnerable to the current Middle East crisis: the country imports 90 percent of its total crude oil needs and 50 percent of its natural gas. Surging global energy prices driven by conflict-related supply disruptions have already eaten into India’s foreign exchange reserves, putting heavy downward pressure on the Indian rupee. While the rupee is not officially pegged to the U.S. dollar, capital outflows and rising import costs have driven the currency to a record all-time low against the greenback just last week.

To stabilize the rupee, the Reserve Bank of India has already stepped into foreign exchange markets, selling off U.S. dollar reserves to support the rupee’s value. Compounding the pressure, India relies heavily on dollar remittances from Indian workers based in Gulf states, particularly the United Arab Emirates. The conflict has hit regional tourism hard, and that slowdown has already reduced remittance flows into India.

Modi also called on Indian businesses and workplaces to reinstate the energy-saving remote work policies that were widely adopted during the height of the COVID-19 pandemic. “We should prioritise work from home, online conferences, and virtual meetings again,” he added.

A high-stakes political and legal standoff is unfolding in the Philippines this week, after a sitting senator who once led the implementation of former President Rodrigo Duterte’s deadly anti-drug campaign sought shelter inside the national Senate to avoid an impending arrest warrant issued by the International Criminal Court (ICC).

Filipino Senator Ronald “Bato” dela Rosa, who previously served as national police chief under the Duterte administration, was spotted fleeing into the Senate building on Monday, narrowly evading pursuing agents from the country’s National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). Footage from Senate security cameras, shown to sitting lawmakers, captured NBI officers chasing dela Rosa up multiple staircases and along an internal corridor shortly after he arrived at the complex. Following a hours-long standoff between NBI officials and Senate authorities, the NBI chief announced that law enforcement would not move to detain dela Rosa while he remained under the chamber’s protective custody.

The ICC unsealed its arrest warrant for dela Rosa hours after he entered the Senate. The warrant charges dela Rosa as an “indirect co-perpetrator” in crimes against humanity linked to the anti-drug campaign, accusing him of direct responsibility for the extrajudicial killings of at least 32 people between 2016 and 2018. Thousands of suspected drug users and dealers were killed nationwide during the crackdown launched by Duterte after he took office in 2016. This development comes two months after Duterte himself was taken into ICC custody in The Hague following his arrest in March 2025.

Dela Rosa has publicly stated that he will remain on Senate premises and take every possible step to avoid being extradited to the Netherlands to face trial. His legal team has already filed a petition with the Philippine Supreme Court seeking to block his arrest, arguing that no valid domestic judicial warrant has been issued for his detention. On Tuesday morning, the senator addressed supporters who had gathered outside the Senate building, urging them to maintain a continuous vigil outside the complex until the Supreme Court issues its ruling.

In a direct challenge to President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., whose political bloc has been locked in a bitter feud with the Duterte political dynasty, dela Rosa called on Marcos to file domestic criminal charges against him if he believes the senator is guilty of wrongdoing. “If I have an obligation, I will answer it in the local court, not a foreign one,” dela Rosa told reporters, echoing longstanding objections to ICC jurisdiction over Philippine citizens raised by Duterte and his allies.

The standoff comes at a moment of extreme political tension in the Philippines, as relations between the Duterte and Marcos political clans collapse after three years of uneasy alliance. The two blocs ran together on a unified ticket to win the 2022 national election, but their partnership has fractured entirely in recent months. On Monday, the same day dela Rosa fled into the Senate, the 24-member chamber, which is currently controlled by Duterte allies, elected a new Senate president, Alan Peter Cayetano, who immediately confirmed that the body would only recognize arrest warrants issued by domestic Philippine courts. In contrast, allies of Marcos hold a majority in the country’s lower House of Representatives, which voted earlier on Monday to impeach incumbent Vice President Sara Duterte, Rodrigo Duterte’s daughter, for a second time.

Sara Duterte, who is currently the leading front-runner in polling for the 2028 presidential election, has publicly accused Marcos of using ICC arrest warrants and impeachment proceedings as political weapons to weaken her ahead of the upcoming vote. Rodrigo Duterte and his allies have repeatedly rejected the ICC’s jurisdiction over the drug war cases, pointing to the Philippines’ 2019 withdrawal from the Rome Statute, the international treaty that established the court. However, judges from the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber rejected that legal argument just last month, ruling that the alleged crimes under investigation took place between 2011 and 2019, a period when the Philippines remained a full member of the court. That ruling cleared the legal path for the court to move forward with arrests and an eventual trial for Duterte and his top aides.

Just days ahead of U.S. President Donald Trump’s scheduled state visit to China, the Biden administration (under Trump’s second term) has rolled out a fresh round of unilateral sanctions targeting multiple companies and individuals linked to mainland China and Hong Kong. Washington accuses these parties of aiding Iran in acquiring components for drones and ballistic missile systems, a move that has already stoked new bilateral tensions just as high-level diplomatic talks are set to begin.

Announced by the U.S. Treasury Department on May 8, the latest punitive measures are part of Washington’s ongoing “Economic Fury” campaign aimed at disrupting Tehran’s weapons procurement networks. The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) placed a total of 10 individuals and entities across the Middle East, Asia, and Eastern Europe on its sanctions blacklist, while the U.S. State Department issued separate designations for four additional entities linked to Iran’s conventional arms programs. Washington claims the operation targets networks that supply critical materials and components for Iran’s Shahed-series unmanned aerial vehicles and long-range ballistic missile programs.

The China and Hong Kong-linked sanctions cover four distinct categories of alleged activity. First, in the aerospace materials sector, Hitex Insulation Ningbo Co. Ltd. and its legal representative Li Genping stand accused of supplying or attempting to supply millions of dollars worth of carbon fiber, honeycomb fabric, and other high-spec aerospace-grade materials to Pishgam Electronic Safeh Company, an Iranian entity already blacklisted by the U.S. Second, three trading firms — Yushita Shanghai International Trade Co Ltd, Hong Kong-based AE International Trade Co Ltd, and HK Hesin Industry Co Ltd — are alleged to have facilitated procurement for Iran’s Center for Progress and Development, which the U.S. rebranded from its previously designated Center for Innovation and Technology Cooperation. Third, Mustad Ltd is accused of enabling financial transactions tied to weapons procurement worth millions of dollars by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Finally, two Chinese geospatial technology firms — Meentropy Technology Hangzhou Co Ltd (operating as MizarVision) and The Earth Eye Co (Beijing Mumei Starry Sky Technology Co Ltd) — were sanctioned for allegedly providing satellite imagery to support Iranian military operations.

The designation of the two satellite firms comes on the heels of a separate unproven allegation that Beijing has already publicly denied. On April 15, the *Financial Times* cited leaked Iranian military documents to claim Iran had secretly acquired a Chinese-built satellite called TEE-01B, which it claimed would give the IRGC Aerospace Force improved targeting capabilities for U.S. military facilities across the Middle East. The outlet reported the satellite was launched from Chinese territory and transferred to Iranian control in late 2024. Notably, the May 8 sanctions did not address other recent unconfirmed media reports alleging Chinese shipments of missile-related materials to Iran. In early March, *The Washington Post* claimed two cargo ships owned by a previously sanctioned Iranian shipping firm had departed a Chinese chemical storage port carrying suspected rocket fuel precursor materials bound for Iran. *The Telegraph* followed with an April 3 report claiming five vessels carrying sodium perchlorate — a key precursor for solid-fuel rocket propellant, enough to build hundreds of ballistic missiles — had been sighted at or near Iranian ports.

This latest round of sanctions marks an escalation from measures imposed by OFAC just weeks earlier. In late April, the agency sanctioned Hengli Petrochemical (Dalian) Refinery Co Ltd over allegations it purchased Iranian crude oil, alongside roughly 40 shipping companies and vessels accused of moving Iranian crude via a shadow tanker fleet. The May 8 action is far more sensitive, however, because it targets alleged support for Iran’s weapons supply chain rather than just Iran’s oil export revenue. It also comes after Trump issued a blunt warning on April 8 that any country supplying military equipment to Iran would face a 50% across-the-board tariff on all goods exported to the U.S., with no exceptions or exemptions.

The timing of the announcement carries deliberate political weight. Trump is scheduled to travel to Beijing for meetings with Chinese President Xi Jinping from Wednesday to Friday, with Iran, cross-Strait relations, trade, and U.S. export controls expected to top the list of sensitive agenda items. Beijing formally confirmed the upcoming visit for the first time during a regular press briefing by Foreign Ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun on Monday.

Guo emphasized that the visit will mark the first trip to China by a sitting U.S. president in nearly nine years, noting that “President Xi will have in-depth exchanges of views with President Trump on major issues concerning China-U.S. relations and world peace and development.” He added that head-of-state diplomacy plays a critical guiding role in bilateral relations, and that Beijing stands ready to work with Washington to expand mutually beneficial cooperation, manage differences constructively, and bring greater stability to an increasingly volatile global order.

Despite Beijing’s constructive framing, many Chinese analysts argue the sanctions have cast a clear shadow over the upcoming summit. “The U.S. seems to believe that with Trump’s visit already locked in, it can impose new sanctions to boost its bargaining position, regardless of how China feels,” wrote a Shandong-based columnist who goes by the pen name Xiaoliu. “But China’s swift, forceful legal countermeasures, paired with Iran’s confident response, make clear that other parties have no intention of following Washington’s script,” she added, referencing Beijing’s recent move banning domestic firms and banks from complying with U.S. sanctions targeting independent Chinese refiners. “Sanctions and counter-sanctions have become a normalized tool in the China-U.S. rivalry. At such a sensitive moment, Washington’s choice to play this card again raises a question: is this a clever tactical calculation, or an arrogant misjudgment that could backfire? When Trump’s plane lands in Beijing, will the shadow of these sanctions hang over the negotiating table?”

A Guangdong-based commentator surnamed Chen echoed this criticism, noting that this pattern of pre-summit pressure is nothing new. “This is not the first time the U.S. has taken such unilateral action on the eve of high-level exchanges. Ahead of past bilateral meetings, Washington has often used sanctions or tough rhetoric to create leverage. This time, using Iran-related issues to sanction Chinese entities reflects the same game-playing mentality,” he said. Chen added that this approach will not deliver the outcomes Washington wants, and will only erode the foundation of mutual trust between the two powers. If Washington truly wants to use the visit to improve bilateral ties, he argued, it should show sincerity rather than applying coercive pressure ahead of talks.

The sanctions come as Washington and Beijing have been negotiating a potential trade package to announce during the summit. Reuters reported on May 7 that the two sides are working to establish a new bilateral Board of Trade mechanism, designed to identify opportunities to expand bilateral commerce without compromising either side’s national security or critical supply chains. The proposed deal is also reported to include potential Chinese purchases of U.S. agricultural goods, Boeing commercial aircraft, and American energy exports including coal, crude oil, and natural gas. Observers note that Trump’s ability to secure formal Chinese commitments for increased U.S. purchases could have a direct impact on Republican efforts to retain control of both the House and Senate in November’s midterm elections.

The dispute unfolds against a backdrop of fragile regional security in the Middle East, where a U.S.-Iran ceasefire brokered by Pakistan remains on shaky ground. The original two-week ceasefire agreed on April 8 was extended as indirect and direct talks continued via Pakistani mediation, but Trump has yet to secure the core outcome Washington has demanded: the permanent elimination or verifiable neutralization of Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile.

In recent weeks, Iran has deepened diplomatic engagement with Beijing. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi hosted his Iranian counterpart Seyyed Abbas Araghchi for meetings in Beijing on April 23 and again on May 6, where Araghchi briefed Chinese officials on the latest status of U.S.-Iran negotiations and Tehran’s planned next steps. During the April meeting, Wang noted that China and Iran have supported one another for years, deepened political mutual trust, expanded practical cooperation, and stood together against unilateralism and coercive diplomacy, making the strategic value of their bilateral ties more prominent than ever. During the May 6 talks, Araghchi stressed that political crises cannot be resolved through military force, saying Iran will defend its national sovereignty and dignity while continuing to pursue a comprehensive, lasting settlement through peaceful negotiation. He added that Iran trusts China’s role in preventing further escalation and hopes Beijing will continue to work toward advancing regional peace. “China is a trustworthy strategic partner of Iran,” Wang reaffirmed in response. “China is willing to consolidate and deepen political mutual trust with Iran, maintain and strengthen high-level exchanges, deepen mutually beneficial cooperation across all fields, and continue to advance the China-Iran comprehensive strategic partnership.”

A Jiangsu-based commentator writing under the pen name Jingting Guoji noted that the U.S. had prepped a response even before Araghchi arrived in Beijing on May 5, and would have moved quickly to expand sanctions, intercept shipments, or rally allies to pressure China had Beijing and Tehran struck a new military agreement. But Araghchi adopted a shrewd diplomatic approach, he argued: instead of requesting new weapons, Iran asked Beijing to support the development of a new regional security framework for the Middle East. “Iran showed great diplomatic wisdom by not falling into the ‘military confrontation’ trap set by the U.S.,” Jingting wrote. “Instead, it engaged Washington at the political and diplomatic level, using the balance of power between major powers to win greater strategic space for itself.” He added that Wang’s public response made clear China’s attitude and determination to support a new security architecture for the region.

For years, Beijing has advanced a proposal for a new inclusive Middle East security framework as a core component of its regional diplomacy. Unlike the U.S.-led security order that relies on military blocs and great power rivalry, Beijing’s approach centers on balancing relations with all major regional powers, including Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Turkey, and Egypt, to foster collective security through dialogue and cooperation. A commentary from Hong Kong-based pro-Beijing outlet Flamingwheels noted that Pakistan has also played a skillful diplomatic role as ceasefire mediator, noting that in late April, Islamabad passed the *Territorial Transit Goods Ordinance 2026* to open six dedicated land transit routes for third-country goods to enter Iran via Pakistani territory. The new routes not only deliver economic benefits to local Pakistani communities but also give the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and the port of Gwadar an expanded strategic role amid the ongoing regional crisis.

Chinese media reports note that while the U.S. military blockade of Iranian ports has now lasted nearly a month, China continues to ship an estimated 100 to 150 containers of goods to Iran per week via cross-continental rail. The trains depart from Xi’an and travel through Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan before reaching Tehran, though this volume accounts for only around 5% of the total seaborne cargo Iran received before the blockade was imposed.