作者: admin

  • South Lebanon: ‘It’s torture, they are razing our lives before our eyes’

    South Lebanon: ‘It’s torture, they are razing our lives before our eyes’

    Perched on a sunbaked green hill just a few kilometers south of Lebanon’s coastal city of Tyre, the long Israeli-occupied village of Mansouri is slowly vanishing. Heavily scarred by months of cross-border conflict, the community is now being systematically wiped off the map in a grim, cynical turn that has unfolded entirely during a fragile ceasefire that was supposed to bring calm to southern Lebanon.

    For weeks, the Israeli military has operated in Mansouri, labeling it a key operational stronghold for Hezbollah. In recent days, relentless waves of airstrikes and controlled explosive demolitions have reduced building after building to rubble, leaving the village’s roughly 5,000 displaced residents in despair.

    Mansouri originally sat entirely outside the Yellow Line, a unilateral Israeli-imposed security demarcation carved into Lebanese territory shortly after the latest ceasefire took effect. Even then, residents interviewed by Middle East Eye after the ceasefire expressed fears that the new boundary would eventually swallow their community. That fear has now come to pass: the Yellow Line cuts directly through the center of Mansouri, and the entire village is now under full Israeli occupation. This summer, any residents who had dared return to their homes were forced to flee once again amid ongoing Israeli air operations.

    The village mayor publicly denounced the violence in local media, detailing attacks on civilians that include artillery strikes, and the use of hand grenades and stun grenades deployed by Israeli drones. He survived an Israeli attack that left him wounded, a narrow escape shared by many in the community.

    From the nearby village of Hanniyeh, a small hilltop community also outside the Yellow Line that remains accessible to Lebanese civilians by car, visitors can see Mansouri clearly across the valley. The winding green road leading up to Hanniyeh carries an unspoken weight of fear, and residents here live constantly within firing range of Israeli troops positioned on the opposite ridge.

    Every day, dozens of displaced Mansouri residents pass through Hanniyeh, gathering at vantage points to watch as Israeli troops destroy their hometown. Most residents of Hanniyeh have fled further north to escape the violence, but the displaced Mansouri villagers remain as close as they can get to the land they call home.

    Hidden behind a tree on the side of the road, 47-year-old Ahmad stands with a phone mounted on a tripod, livestreaming the destruction to a small audience on Facebook. “Look! That yellow house is mine. It’s the only one still standing; all the others around it have been destroyed,” he told Middle East Eye. The scene is chilling and dystopian: Ahmad describes the slow, unrelenting horror of watching his village be destroyed day by day, never knowing when his own home will be next. It is as if the ongoing war and chaos that Lebanon has endured at Israel’s hands has become a grim spectator sport for the displaced.

    Ali, another Mansouri resident whose home was destroyed earlier in the conflict, stands beside Ahmad. “It is humiliating to watch this, but I want to stay here, as close to my village as possible. I don’t want to abandon it,” he says. Ali explains that the situation is unbearable: he has been out of work since he was displaced, and his farmland that sits below the village is now being burned by Israeli forces, as evidenced by the thick smoke rising from the field.

    Around 100 meters from Ahmad and Ali, three dozen displaced neighbors and lifelong friends sit in chairs arranged at the vantage point, watching the unspeakable destruction unfold and discussing the events of each passing day. Unemployed and barred from returning to their homes, they structure their days around the rhythm of Israeli military operations.

    One resident shares a disturbing video filmed just days earlier: an Israeli drone slowly lowers a explosive charge via cable, placing it precisely on a civilian rooftop before retreating. A few minutes after the drone leaves, the building explodes into rubble.

    Suddenly, the group falls silent. A cloud of dust billows along one of Mansouri’s streets as Israeli vehicles move down the road. Peering through binoculars, one man makes out a tractor clearing the rubble of a destroyed home, leaving nothing but an empty plot of land where a family once lived. “We haven’t seen any Merkava tanks today. They must be resting,” a 60-something man jokes bitterly, a grim attempt to find dark humor in unrelenting crisis.

    Ibtissem, a 38-year-old Mansouri resident, says the daily pattern of destruction is psychological torture. “Every day something happens. One day they bomb, the next they send bulldozers. Sometimes charges they have planted inside our homes explode. It’s torture, they are razing our lives before our eyes,” she says. But her resolve remains unbroken: “This land is everything to us. We will come back and rebuild, God willing.”

    In every conversation among the displaced residents, the failure of outside actors to act emerges again and again. Neither the international community nor the Lebanese government has intervened to stop the destruction. The Lebanese army is nowhere to be found in the area, and Mansouri’s residents say they have been completely abandoned to fend for themselves. They share the fate of thousands of other Lebanese living in the 63 villages spread across 460 square kilometers of southern Lebanon that are now occupied by Israel south of the Yellow Line.

    This summer, Mansouri residents held a peaceful sit-in outside a Lebanese army checkpoint in al-Amiriya, under the slogan “Mansouri is not occupied.” They called for an end to the bombardments and demanded the Lebanese army deploy to their village, saying they were ready to march alongside troops as soon as the army entered. The protest changed nothing. “Nothing happened. We and our village were abandoned. And since then, nobody has helped us, absolutely nobody, while we remain displaced and no one has work anymore,” one resident laments.

    Even Hezbollah, which for years has supported affected Lebanese communities through successive conflicts, no longer has the capacity to offer meaningful support to Mansouri’s residents, one local resident quietly acknowledges.

    Today, Mansouri, along with Tallouseh and Mais al-Jabal further east, is one of the main hubs of Israeli military activity in southern Lebanon. Many Lebanese observers see this campaign as a deliberate attempt to “finish the job”: to permanently destroy any possibility of residents returning to their land, allowing Israel to consolidate its long-term occupation of the area.

    This ongoing aggression flies in the face of the 26 June framework agreement brokered to de-escalate the conflict, which was supposed to test a new security arrangement in southern Lebanon. Under the agreement, three “pilot zones” in Froun, Srifa, and Zawtar al-Gharbiyeh were supposed to see the Lebanese army gradually retake control of the ground, secure local villages, and prevent unauthorised armed presence. The deal was overseen by the US-led Military Coordination Group for Lebanon (MCG4L).

    On the ground, the reality has diverged sharply from the agreement. In Zawtar al-Gharbiyeh, Israeli soldiers were recently accused of opening fire near deploying Lebanese troops. On 18 September, an Israeli force approached a Lebanese army position in Deir Mimas and threw stun grenades, triggering a confrontation that was only defused at the last minute by MCG4L mediation.

    “We no longer trust anyone to come and help us,” says Abbas, a 26-year-old displaced resident from Hanniyeh, his voice breaking with tears. “My dream is to get my land back, my neighbours, to rebuild my house. I don’t have much hope left. To have any hope, the Lebanese army would need to be capable of holding the ground, and as long as the international community does not put pressure on Israel, we may never see our land again.”

  • Morocco appoints its first woman prime minister

    Morocco appoints its first woman prime minister

    One week after her centre-right Authenticity and Modernity Party (PAM) secured victory in Morocco’s legislative elections, King Mohammed VI has tapped Fatima Ezzahra El Mansouri to lead the North African nation’s new government — marking an unprecedented milestone for gender representation in the country’s history.

    For the 50-year-old lawyer, the appointment caps a decades-long trailblazing political career. Back in 2009, at just 33 years old, El Mansouri made national headlines as the first woman to serve as mayor of Marrakesh, Morocco’s top tourist destination, and she won a second term in that role in 2021, a position she still holds today. When a devastating earthquake struck the region in 2023, she emerged as a visible, empathetic leader, making repeated visits to impacted communities to assess needs and support recovery efforts.

    Beyond her local leadership, El Mansouri currently serves as national coordinator of the PAM, outgoing minister of housing and spatial planning, and a newly re-elected member of parliament. Her path to the premiership also places her in rare company: she is only the third woman to hold the top government role across the entire Arab world, following Tunisia’s Najla Bouden and Sarra Zaafarani.

    In her first public remarks after her royal audience at the royal palace in Rabat, El Mansouri framed the appointment as a breakthrough for all Moroccan women. “This is truly a historic moment,” she told public media. “For the first time in our country’s history, a woman is taking on the responsibility of leading the government. This is not only a source of pride for me, but for all Moroccan women.”

    Born in 1976 to a well-connected Marrakesh family with close ties to Moroccan power circles, El Mansouri earned advanced law degrees from universities in Montpellier, France, and New York City. She launched her professional career at the law firm of Hicham Naciri, a prominent influential advisor to the Moroccan monarchy, before joining the PAM when it was founded in 2008. The party was established by Fouad Ali El Himma, a close confidant of King Mohammed VI, as a political counterweight to the growing influence of the Islamist-leaning opposition Justice and Development Party (PJD), a role that has led critics and media outlets to frequently label the PAM as the “king’s party” or “palace’s party” for its proximity to the monarchy.

    While the PAM won a plurality of 97 seats out of the 395 total seats in the House of Representatives, the party fell far short of the absolute majority required to form a government on its own. The newly minted prime minister now faces the immediate task of negotiating a viable governing coalition with other parties ahead of the parliamentary session set to open on October 9, for a five-year term.

    The election results themselves were notable for several reasons. Voter turnout hit just 38%, the lowest recorded in nearly 20 years, a signal of widespread public disengagement from formal politics. The PAM’s former coalition partners, outgoing Prime Minister Aziz Akhannouch’s National Rally of Independents (RNI) took second place with 66 seats, while Istiqlal Party finished third with 65 seats. On the opposition side, the PJD defied expectations to quadruple its seat count from 13 in the last parliament to 54 this cycle, but the party has already ruled out any possibility of joining the governing majority.

    In Morocco’s constitutional framework, the king retains authority over all key strategic policy directions, including foreign affairs, security, and religious policy, leaving the prime minister to oversee domestic governance and daily administration. Even so, El Mansouri steps into the role at a moment of deep, simmering social tension that will test her leadership from day one.

    The election was held less than two months after the Ceuta migration crisis, when tens of thousands of mostly young Moroccan migrants crossed illegally into the Spanish enclave of Ceuta from the northern Moroccan border town of Fnideq. The event laid bare the deep economic frustration and hopelessness driving many young Moroccans to risk dangerous migration. The vote also coincided with the one-year anniversary of widespread protests organized by the anonymous youth collective GenZ 212, which led near-daily demonstrations across the country last year demanding major improvements to underfunded public education and healthcare systems.

    The six-day gap between the election result and the royal announcement of El Mansouri’s appointment — far longer than the two to three day wait that followed past legislative elections — fueled widespread political speculation, particularly since current budget minister and popular Royal Moroccan Football Federation president Fouzi Lekjaa had also been widely tipped as a leading contender for the role.

    Controversy has also shadowed the PAM’s election win. Tangier mayor Mounir Laymouri, a party member, was arrested on suspicion of electoral fraud, with investigators currently probing allegations that hundreds of ballots were falsified at two local polling stations. El Mansouri has also faced her own scandals, with some media outlets publishing allegations of illicit enrichment, which she has forcefully dismissed as baseless, politically motivated smears.

    Moving forward, El Mansouri’s core priorities will include rebuilding public trust in Morocco’s political class, a challenge amid years of discontent. She will also need to address pressing economic issues: curbing skyrocketing living costs that have strained household budgets across the country, and tackling persistently high youth unemployment that fuels social unrest. On the global stage, her government will oversee preparations for the 2030 FIFA World Cup, which Morocco is co-hosting alongside Spain and Portugal, a high-stakes project that will require major infrastructure investment and national coordination.

    Under Morocco’s existing political structure, El Mansouri will need to navigate competing demands from opposition groups, coalition allies, and the monarchy, as she works to turn her historic appointment into tangible progress for the Moroccan people.

  • Labour minister: British Muslims haven’t always been heard but Burnham will change that

    Labour minister: British Muslims haven’t always been heard but Burnham will change that

    For years, productive dialogue between British Muslim civil society groups and the UK central government was largely non-existent. The blame for this disconnection does not lie with Muslim communities, but with successive Conservative Party governments that made little to no effort to build open, trusting relationships with mainstream Muslim organizations — a gap that grew particularly pronounced after 2020, before the Conservatives were voted out of power in 2024.

    Today, that landscape has shifted dramatically. At the 2026 Labour Party conference in Liverpool, attendees across Muslim MPs, party members and civil society representatives shared a widespread sense of cautious optimism: after years of estrangement, relations between the government and British Muslim communities are finally on the mend. One senior parliamentary advisor even described the shift as “a new hope,” echoing the iconic line from *Star Wars* to capture the mood of change.

    This transformation is widely credited to Prime Minister Andy Burnham’s leadership. While Keir Starmer’s previous Labour government did take initial steps to improve engagement, the relationship remained deeply strained. A large share of Muslim voters abandoned Labour over the party’s unwavering support for Israel during the Gaza conflict, creating a rift that took time to heal. Under Burnham, however, ties between the government and Muslim civil society are now closer than they have been in decades.

    The shifting dynamic was on clear display at a Sunday evening event hosted at Liverpool’s Hilton Hotel, marking the second anniversary of Equi, a prominent Muslim think tank based in the UK. The venue was filled to capacity with representatives from Muslim civil society groups, rank-and-file Labour members, and multiple sitting MPs.

    Professor Javed Khan, director of Equi, opened his remarks by sharing a landmark moment of engagement: just days before the conference, he was invited to the Foreign Office by Foreign Secretary Ed Miliband, ahead of Miliband’s official announcement of new sanctions targeting illegal Israeli settlements in the occupied Palestinian territories.

    Khan explained: “We were invited because the Foreign Office recognizes that every action it takes internationally has a ripple effect here at home. I came out of that meeting quite enthused. There is still a long journey to travel on these issues, but what this government has done already is far better than any previous British government. To sit with the foreign secretary and hear him directly lay out the logic and purpose of his policy was particularly impressive.”

    Foreign Office minister Uma Kumaran followed with a keynote address, acknowledging the long history of exclusion that British Muslim communities have faced. “I know that over the past two years, there have been many moments when British Muslim voices and this community have felt like they have not been heard,” she said. “I am not going to stand here and pretend otherwise. This is something I have spoken about openly, and Foreign Secretary Ed Miliband has acknowledged that this has to change. I hope you have already seen the first shoots of that change over the past few weeks.”

    Even amid the celebration of progress, attendees and speakers universally highlighted a pressing shared threat: the rapid rise of far-right extremism across the UK, which targets Muslim communities and seeks to deepen societal division. “They want to divide us because a divided Britain suits their agenda and their politics,” Kumaran said. “What we cannot do is fall victim to that division. Instead, we have to join this fight together.”

    Bolton South and Walkden MP Yasmin Qureshi echoed this sentiment, noting that public discourse around British Muslims too often frames the community as a source of problems, rather than core contributors to British society. “Muslims are constantly talked about in relation to challenges, not recognized as full members of this society who contribute so much to every part of our national life,” she said.

    Later in the event, former faith minister Lord Wajid Khan took the stage, with Javed Khan joking that the peer “broke all land speed records for the number of meetings he held as minister — the civil servants are still recovering.” In his remarks, Lord Khan framed faith communities as a critical resource for the UK, calling them an “emergency service” that reaches parts of society the government often cannot. He pointed to key examples: the work of faith groups during the coronavirus pandemic, the national vaccine rollout, and the 2024 race riots, where community organizations stepped in to de-escalate tension and support vulnerable neighborhoods when official response fell short.

    The event also featured remarks from Osman Koray Ertas, Turkish ambassador to the UK, who noted that divisive, populist rhetoric is a global challenge, not just a British one. “We are all living in a world where divisive politics and rhetoric is rampant, not only here, but in all corners of the world, all the way from Asia to Europe and then the Americas,” he said. “The work Equi is doing is not only valuable for this country, but globally.”

    Alongside its anniversary celebrations, Equi used the event to launch a new landmark report on migration to the UK, copies of which were distributed to all attendees. The report challenges widespread misperceptions about migration in Britain: while two-thirds of the UK public believe migration levels are still rising, the data shows migration has actually fallen sharply in recent years. It draws on official data to highlight the widespread economic contributions of migrant communities, noting that migrant-owned businesses sustain more than 400,000 jobs across the UK, and that migrant nurses and doctors contribute £166,000 more in tax over their lifetimes than they draw in public services, according to the UK government’s own Migration Advisory Committee.

    To build greater public understanding of migration’s role in British society, the report recommends embedding migration history into the national curriculum as part of the Department for Education’s ongoing reforms to bring diverse communities together. Writing in the report’s foreword, Fraser Nelson, former editor of *The Spectator*, praised Equi’s balanced, fact-based approach: “Equi does not pretend that migration is simple, nor does it shy away from the pressures that immigration creates. But any serious discussion must begin with facts. And the facts are striking. Migrants have been central to Britain’s economic success, from pre-war Britain to sustaining the NHS today.” Nelson added that “immigration works when those who arrive can find jobs, homes and schools and play their parts as citizens. It fails when the pace of change outruns the ability of communities and public services to absorb it.”

    After speeches from additional Labour MPs including Sarah Owen, Zubir Ahmed and Afzal Khan, attendees gathered to cut and share a large anniversary cake marking Equi’s two years of work.

    Conventionally, meaningful engagement with all segments of civil society — including faith-based groups and representative organizations — is a core pillar of Britain’s model of multicultural governance. But for British Muslims, this basic standard of engagement has been out of reach for years, a lingering legacy of Conservative Party policy. Even under the new Labour government, gaps remain.

    Most notably, the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB), the UK’s largest umbrella body for Muslim civil society with more than 500 affiliated organizations and a democratically elected leadership, remains excluded from official government engagement. The boycott originated under the Conservative government (it has never been formalized as official policy) and was inherited by Labour, and no government department has been able to publicly explain why the exclusion remains in place. While Equi holds significant influence and credibility across British Muslim civil society, it cannot replace the MCB’s role as the nation’s peak representative body for Muslim communities, nor can other groups like the British Muslim Trust, which monitors anti-Muslim hate, fill that gap.

    Still, one anonymous Labour MP told Middle East Eye that the status quo is set to shift soon, with ministers preparing to resume formal engagement with the MCB. Whether that change comes to pass remains to be seen. What is undeniable, however, is that Andy Burnham’s government has turned a decisive new page in the relationship between the UK government and British Muslim civil society, ending years of estrangement and opening a new era of dialogue.

  • Muqtada al-Sadr says US should compensate Iraqis as last American forces leave

    Muqtada al-Sadr says US should compensate Iraqis as last American forces leave

    As the final contingent of U.S. troops wraps up their 12-year military presence in Iraq and departs the country, influential Iraqi Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr has issued a bold demand: the United States must pay compensation to the Iraqi people for decades of destruction and harm caused by its military occupation.

    Sadr released his official statement on Wednesday, the exact deadline set for the full withdrawal of American forces. In the remarks, he celebrated what he called Iraq’s newfound full independence and paid tribute to all factions that had taken up arms against the U.S. deployment. “We demand compensation from the American army for all the damages that occurred as a result of its occupation of Iraqi lands,” Sadr stated, adding a call for all affected parties to pursue formal legal claims to secure reparations.

    The timeline of U.S. military involvement in Iraq stretches back more than two decades. The U.S. first launched a full-scale invasion and occupation of the country in 2003, which resulted in the overthrow of longtime leader Saddam Hussein. U.S. forces initially withdrew in 2011, but they returned three years later in 2014 at the invitation of the Iraqi government to combat the rapid expansion of the Islamic State group, which had seized roughly one-third of Iraq’s territory at the height of its advance.

    The 2003 U.S.-led invasion remains widely condemned by the international community as an illegal act of aggression. Throughout the years of occupation, American forces faced repeated accusations of systematic war crimes and widespread human rights abuses against Iraqi civilians. Estimates of the total death toll stemming from the invasion vary widely, with most credible counts placing the number of excess violent deaths between hundreds of thousands and more than one million.

    Beyond his demand for compensation, Sadr called on both the United States and Iraq’s neighboring countries to end all forms of external interference in Iraq’s domestic affairs. He warned that continued meddling would risk severing diplomatic ties, trigger reciprocal policy actions, and drag Iraq into devastating regional conflicts, particularly in the spheres of political and ideological rivalry. “We hope that the United States will reciprocate diplomatically and not act arrogantly towards Iraq, its government, and its people,” he added.

    Sadr has long occupied a central role in Iraqi political and military life. During the initial U.S. occupation, he led the Mahdi Army, an armed faction that fought against coalition forces, and later reorganized the group as Saraya al-Salam, or the Peace Brigades. He and his political bloc have positioned themselves as leading Iraqi nationalist voices, opposing both U.S. influence in the country and interference from neighboring Iran, a regional power with extensive sway over Iraqi Shia politics.

    In Wednesday’s statement, Sadr announced a major restructuring of his armed movement: remaining elements of the former Mahdi Army will be reorganized into a new entity called the Supporters of Imam al-Mahdi Foundation, named for a revered figure in Shia Islam who believers believe remains in hiding and will return at the end of days alongside Jesus to establish justice. He also called for all sitting Iraqi politicians to resign from their posts to make way for new leadership, a step he says is necessary to root out systemic corruption and push through long-delayed political reform. He additionally reaffirmed his longstanding position that all weapons in Iraq must be placed exclusively under the control of the Iraqi state.

    The question of integrating powerful non-state armed factions into Iraq’s official security forces has become inextricably linked to the U.S. troop withdrawal. While the process of disarmament and integration was originally scheduled to be completed by the September 30 withdrawal deadline, Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi announced last week that he was extending the deadline to June 2027.

    Several of Iraq’s most powerful Iran-backed armed factions, including Kataeb Hezbollah, Harakat al-Nujaba and Kataeb Sayyid al-Shuhada, have already publicly stated they will not give up their weapons. Current regional tensions, fueled by the ongoing U.S.-Israel military campaign against Iran-linked forces across the Middle East, make it extremely unlikely that Iran will pressure these allied factions to disarm, analysts say.

    Hayder al-Shakeri, a research fellow in the Middle East and North Africa programme at London-based think tank Chatham House, explained the complexities of the disarmament process in an interview with Middle East Eye. “Disarmament needs a political agreement inside Iraq, a credible way of integrating fighters and command structures into the state, and some answer to the political, economic and ideological power these factions have built up over years,” he said. “For the groups closest to Iran, it will also be extremely difficult without Iranian agreement or a broader regional de-escalation. Otherwise, you risk simply moving the weapons into another institution while leaving the same networks and chains of command intact.”

  • Exclusive: Zack Polanski says UK should defy Israel on fate of British Consulate in East Jerusalem

    Exclusive: Zack Polanski says UK should defy Israel on fate of British Consulate in East Jerusalem

    As an October 8 deadline for the closure of the British Consulate in East Jerusalem looms, the leader of the UK Green Party, Zack Polanski, has issued an exclusive call to the British government to reject Israel’s demands and keep the diplomatic mission open, in comments provided to independent outlet Middle East Eye.

    Polanski’s public intervention adds mounting pressure on the newly seated Labour government to step back from what was widely expected to be compliance with Israel’s closure order, which came in direct retaliation for a sweeping sanctions package on Israeli settlements announced by Foreign Secretary Ed Miliband earlier this month.

    Speaking to Middle East Eye Wednesday morning, Polanski made clear the core of his stance: “East Jerusalem is illegally occupied Palestinian territory, and Israel has no sovereignty over it. The UK must ignore Israel’s order and keep the British Consulate open.”

    Earlier this same month, the Labour government made a historic policy shift, officially recognizing Israel’s occupation of Palestinian territory as illegal — an alignment with the landmark 2024 advisory opinion issued by the International Court of Justice. Polanski argued that this formal recognition rings hollow if the UK caves to Israeli demands to exercise control over the occupied territory.

    “Britain’s recognition that the occupation is illegal means nothing if, whenever Israel attempts to exercise sovereign control over occupied Palestinian territory, our government simply complies,” Polanski said. He added that the consulate serves as a critical diplomatic lifeline between the UK and Palestinian communities across East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and Gaza. Closing it, he warned, would only deepen Palestinian isolation and eliminate the UK’s ability to maintain direct engagement with Palestinian stakeholders.

    “If the government means what it says about the occupied Palestinian territories, it must put that position into practice,” Polanski emphasized.

    While political observers had initially assumed the UK would abide by Israel’s order, Middle East Eye revealed Monday that no final decision has been finalized by Downing Street. During an LBC interview Monday evening, Miliband acknowledged the government is still evaluating all possible paths forward, and stressed that the Labour administration does not want the consulate to shutter.

    “It would damage the very important work that we are doing helping people in those communities, including Palestinians,” Miliband said. He noted that the consulate has operated continuously in East Jerusalem for nearly 200 years, representing a long-standing pillar of UK diplomatic presence in the region. Miliband also confirmed he is consulting with foreign ministers across the globe on the crisis, and reaffirmed that maintaining a UK diplomatic foothold in Jerusalem remains “very, very important.”

    A decision to defy Israel’s order would almost certainly escalate already strained diplomatic relations between the two countries, which have been tense since the announcement of the settlement sanctions. While Israeli security forces are not expected to forcibly remove UK diplomatic staff from the consulate premises, analysts warn Israel could take punitive measures such as imposing entry bans that would bar British diplomats from returning to Jerusalem after traveling out of the region for leave. There are also growing concerns about rising harassment targeting diplomatic personnel, particularly locally hired Palestinian staff, given the heavy presence of Israeli settlers in areas surrounding the consulate.

    Independent legal analysis backs the argument that Israel’s demand to close the consulate itself violates international law. Vincent Fean, a former British consul-general to East Jerusalem and current trustee of the British Palestine Project, told Middle East Eye that “Israel’s threat to close the British consulate-general is not just wrong – it is illegal.”

    The British Palestine Project commissioned a formal legal opinion from Dominic Grieve KC, who served as UK Attorney General under the previous Conservative government. In the opinion reviewed by Middle East Eye, Grieve confirmed that Israel’s order constitutes “an unlawful assertion of sovereignty over occupied Palestinian territory.”

    Grieve noted that successive British governments have long maintained that Israel’s rights in East Jerusalem are only those held by an occupying power, not a sovereign state. “Israel is asserting a right it does not possess as an occupying power to impose sovereign control over East Jerusalem,” he wrote. He also pointed out a key procedural fact that undermines Israel’s demand: British consul-generals based in East Jerusalem do not hold accreditation to the Israeli government, meaning Israel has no legal grounds to withdraw that accreditation.

    Beyond diplomatic precedent, Grieve warned the closure would have tangible harm for civilians. “The closure falls on Palestinians, not on Britain alone. Closure threatens consular services, including for British pilgrims, other visitors and residents of Palestine. It hampers aid oversight and reporting from the West Bank and Gaza,” he said.

  • Six smugglers jailed for manslaughter over worst Channel small boats disaster

    Six smugglers jailed for manslaughter over worst Channel small boats disaster

    In a landmark verdict closing one of the darkest chapters in European migrant crossing history, a French court has convicted six people traffickers of causing the deaths of 31 migrants who drowned in the deadliest small-boat disaster ever recorded in the English Channel.

    After four weeks of testimony and deliberation in a Paris courtroom, the six defendants were found guilty of involuntary homicide and handed prison sentences ranging from six to 10 years. Seven lower-level co-defendants received lesser sentences of up to four years, while one additional person accused in the case was acquitted of all charges.

    The tragedy unfolded in the early hours of November 24, 2021, just moments after the overloaded migrant vessel sent repeated distress calls to both French and British coast guard authorities. Of the 33 people packed into the unfit craft, only two men survived the sinking. The list of victims includes a 7-year-old child, with the vast majority of the deceased identifying as Iraqi Kurds; others were Afghans, Egyptians, and Iranian Kurds.

    Court documents detail that the criminal networks intentionally launched the migrants from the French coast in a vessel that was fundamentally unfit for open sea travel: it was poorly constructed, lacked official safety certification, was critically overloaded, and did not carry properly functioning life jackets for all passengers. The trial confirmed that the convicted traffickers belonged to two separate, cooperating smuggling rings — one led by Iraqi Kurds, the other by Afghans — that worked together to move migrants to coastal departure points and coordinate the dangerous crossing to the United Kingdom.

    In an unusual step that centered the human cost of the disaster, the trial opened with emotional testimony from family members of the victims, who traveled to France from Iraqi Kurdistan to share their stories. Speaking after the verdict, Matthieu Chirez, the lawyer representing the victims’ families, called the conviction a relief for all civil plaintiffs, as it formally confirms the criminal responsibility of the smuggling networks. He added that the high-profile trial had given dignity and a voice to the grieving families, humanizing a story that has often been reduced to political rhetoric.

    Zana Marmand Muhammed, whose younger brother Twana died in the wreck, told the court his brother had been driven to attempt the crossing by ongoing regional violence and a desire to find stable work in England. “No-one in the family wanted him to leave, but we could not dissuade him,” Muhammed testified. Nabi Mustafa Mina, father of 19-year-old victim Zanyar, shared a similar account: he offered his son everything he had to convince him to stay — including help to marry, full ownership of the family home, and half of his monthly salary — but Zanyar insisted he could build a better life in the UK. “I ran out of arguments,” Mina told the court.

    Family members explained how they had paid smuggling deposits in local banks in Iraqi Kurdistan, then tracked their loved ones’ dangerous journey through Turkey, Italy, and finally to northern France. One of the final social media posts from Twana was a photo of himself standing in front of the Eiffel Tower.

    A statement from Issa Omar, one of the two survivors, was read to the court by his lawyer. “I would have liked to appear before the judge but I do not have the strength,” Omar said. “Since the wreck I have the impression that part of me disappeared beneath the waves.” Chirez detailed the harrowing ordeal Omar endured to survive: he clung to floating bodies and a stray life jacket for hours, staying awake through sheer will to avoid slipping under the water and swimming constantly to keep his heart from stopping in the frigid Channel water.

    French investigators used phone tracking data to unmask members of the two smuggling networks, mapping out how lower-level operatives provided shelter to migrants, transported them across France to the informal “jungle” camp outside Calais, and assisted with final preparations on the night of departure. The alleged head of the Iraqi Kurd network, a man identified as Bashdar, was not among the defendants in this trial — he remains in custody in Iraq. Bashdar’s close aide, Harem Ahmed Abawaker, received an eight-year prison sentence. The harshest sentence, 10 years behind bars, was given to Obaidullah Maroofkhel, the leader of the Afghan smuggling ring, who was tried in absentia alongside one other defendant.

    Of the 14 total defendants in the case, most are Afghan or Iraqi Kurd. All but one were allowed to remain free while the trial proceeded, prompting the court to issue six new arrest warrants immediately following the guilty verdict.

    Separate from the trafficking trial, a parallel police investigation is ongoing into seven members of the French armed forces who are accused of failing to respond to the migrants’ distress calls on the night of the sinking. The seven individuals are assigned to the regional sea rescue center or serve on a French navy vessel, and prosecutors are investigating allegations that they ignored repeated distress signals from the sinking boat. A decision on whether to bring criminal charges against the service members and send them to trial is expected in the coming months.

    The guilty verdict comes as France and the United Kingdom have officially announced the end of the controversial “one-in, one-out” migrant returns scheme, a one-year policy that required France to accept irregular migrants turned away by the UK in exchange for the UK taking in asylum seekers with approved claims. French officials had previously criticized the program, noting it failed to deliver on its core goal of disrupting the financial business model of people smuggling networks, with only slightly more than 1,000 migrants processed through the scheme during its operation.

  • Hegseth expected to fire more top ranking US military

    Hegseth expected to fire more top ranking US military

    A sweeping personnel shakeup at the highest levels of the U.S. Armed Forces is poised to move forward this week, with Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth reportedly set to announce the removal of roughly 20 percent of all active-duty admirals and generals across the nation’s military branches. Multiple U.S. media outlets confirm the announcement is scheduled to take place Wednesday at Marine Corps Base Quantico, Virginia, marking the second major round of senior leadership cuts in less than a year, following an initial round of reductions in 2025.

    Latest official data from the U.S. Defense Department puts the total number of active-duty general and flag officers across the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force and Space Force at more than 800. A 20 percent cut would remove more than 160 senior officers from their posts, making it one of the largest drawdowns of top military leadership in modern U.S. history.

    This planned purge is not an unexpected move from Hegseth. During a previous gathering of military leaders at Quantico in September 2025, he delivered a scathing rebuke of the Defense Department’s current culture, calling the institution overly “woke” and attacking senior leaders for poor physical fitness, infamously claiming that “fat generals and admirals” were “a bad look” for the U.S. military.

    The upcoming firings are the centerpiece of a broader top-to-bottom overhaul of the U.S. defense establishment that Hegseth has spearheaded since taking office. His agenda centers on instilling what he terms a “war fighter ethos” throughout the department, even going so far as to propose a formal rebrand that would rename the Defense Department to the Department of War.

    According to CBS News, a partner of the BBC, at least 20 senior officers and civilian defense leaders have already been removed from their posts or stepped down voluntarily since Hegseth assumed the role of Defense Secretary. That earlier shakeup already included the high-profile firing of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as well as top uniformed leaders from the Army, Navy and Air Force.

    Current U.S. federal law already sets a statutory cap on the total number of general and flag officers, and there is no legal requirement that any positions left vacant by the planned firings be filled by replacement officers. That structure allows Hegseth to permanently shrink the size of the military’s senior leadership corps as he has proposed.

    The controversial drawdown has already sparked fierce pushback from across the political spectrum and civil society. Multiple prominent civil rights organizations, including the NAACP and the National Women’s Law Center, have accused Hegseth of systematically blocking promotions for Black service members and women, raising allegations of systemic discrimination in his personnel decisions.

    Democratic Senator Mark Kelly of Arizona echoed that criticism during press remarks on Tuesday, calling the move a deliberate purge of the military’s most capable and experienced leaders. “Hegseth is in the process of purging the upper echelon of the military from its best leaders,” Kelly told reporters. “We need strong leaders. These folks have decades of experience, some of the best leadership our military has ever had. He’s getting rid of them.”

    Notably, the push for reducing the number of senior military leaders does have some backing from nonpartisan policy analysts. A May report from the nonpartisan Congressional Research Service outlined several well-documented downsides to an oversize senior officer corps, including significantly higher personnel costs associated with employing top-ranked service members compared to junior officers, and the risk that excessive layers of senior leadership can slow down critical military decision-making processes.

    The overhaul of the U.S. military’s top ranks comes at a moment of heightened global strain, as the U.S.-led military campaign against Iran in the Israel theater has stretched into its seventh consecutive month. That ongoing conflict has drawn heavily on U.S. ammunition stockpiles, leaving many defense analysts questioning whether the mass leadership shakeup comes at a precarious moment for U.S. military readiness.

  • Israel-bound flight makes emergency landing in Saudi Arabia after ‘pilot altercation’

    Israel-bound flight makes emergency landing in Saudi Arabia after ‘pilot altercation’

    A commercial Flydubai flight en route to Israel was forced to execute an unscheduled emergency landing in northwestern Saudi Arabia on Wednesday, after the aircraft transmitted an urgent hijacking distress signal that triggered immediate regional security responses. The flight, which was traveling from the United Arab Emirates’ main hub of Dubai to Tel Aviv’s Ben Gurion Airport, carried 180 passengers holding Israeli citizenship, according to initial details released after the incident. It touched down safely at King Abdulaziz Air Base in Tabuk, the Saudi city located just hundreds of kilometers from the Israeli border, shortly after the alert was issued.

    The emergency notification set off a rapid security mobilization across Israeli leadership, with top government officials convening urgent closed-door security meetings to coordinate a response to the potential threat. The Israeli military also scrambled fighter jets to respond to the possible aircraft hijacking, underscoring how seriously the initial alert was treated amid persistent regional security tensions.

    However, within hours of the landing, Israeli officials publicly downplayed the threat, confirming that no hijacking had actually occurred. They clarified that the distress signal was triggered accidentally in the wake of a physical and verbal altercation between the two pilots operating the flight. As of Wednesday evening, full details of what sparked the dispute between the cockpit crew remained undisclosed, with Israeli authorities noting that a full, formal investigation would be launched once all facts from the Saudi side of the incident are compiled. No injuries among passengers or crew have been reported to date, and updates on the investigation and the flight’s onward journey are expected to emerge in the coming hours.

    This report is part of independent regional coverage from Middle East Eye, which provides specialized reporting on the Middle East, North Africa, and surrounding global affairs.

  • Ethiopia fighting escalates in Tigray killing 52 civilians, medic tells the BBC

    Ethiopia fighting escalates in Tigray killing 52 civilians, medic tells the BBC

    After months of simmering tension that followed a 2022 peace agreement ending a two-year civil conflict, full-scale fighting has erupted once again in Ethiopia’s northern Tigray region, triggering a catastrophic humanitarian emergency and raising fears of a wider regional escalation. Multiple sources on the ground have confirmed that at least 52 civilians, including infants as young as three days old, have been killed in three days of intense artillery and explosive clashes centered on the border town of Alamata.

    Verified social media footage captured heavy military hardware, including tanks and armored vehicles, moving through Alamata’s streets, as federal government forces appear to have seized control of the town from Tigrayan regional fighters. Military analysts say the advance positions government troops to push north toward Mekelle, Tigray’s administrative and population center. The Alamata general hospital anonymous medical source told the BBC that 12 civilians alone died in a single strike targeting the town’s crowded market, with residential neighborhoods heavily damaged by shelling that caught ordinary residents in crossfire. Displaced people from surrounding rural areas have flooded into Alamata seeking safety, only to find all essential services completely cut off.

    The resumption of hostilities traces back to the collapse of the 2022 ceasefire deal, with both sides trading blame for the outbreak of violence. The Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), the governing party of the Tigray region, claims the renewed fighting began in response to a federal offensive that included drone strikes on TPLF positions. The Ethiopian federal government, by contrast, accuses TPLF fighters of instigating the conflict by seizing regional airports and launching offensive operations first.

    The conflict has already spilled beyond Tigray’s borders, drawing in allied armed groups and affecting neighboring regions. In Amhara region, fighting between federal forces and an Amhara militia allied with the TPLF has disrupted life around the iconic UNESCO World Heritage Site of Lalibela, the location of ancient 13th-century rock-hewn churches that draw Orthodox Christian pilgrims and international tourists from across the globe. Thirty-three foreign tourists remain stranded in Lalibela after the local airport was closed to commercial traffic amid the military deployment. A anonymous British tourist trapped in the town told the BBC that continuous gunfire and artillery fire could be heard throughout the past week, with a heavy military contingent deployed across Lalibela. Though fighting has quieted in the area over the past 48 hours, local residents remain on edge, as military convoys continue moving north toward the Tigray frontline. Some tourists have already been evacuated: 14 Israelis were extracted by military helicopter earlier this week, and five more left via a non-governmental organization road convoy against official travel safety advice. The remaining stranded tourists include citizens of the United States, United Kingdom, South Korea, South Africa, New Zealand, Mexico and other nations.

    Fighting has also broken out in Ethiopia’s Afar region, where TPLF fighters control a strategic corridor that connects landlocked Ethiopia to the Port of Djibouti, the country’s primary gateway for international trade. Medical humanitarian organization Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) reports that more than 700 wounded people have been admitted to hospitals the group supports across Tigray, overwhelming strained medical resources.

    Wider concerns are growing that the conflict could draw in neighboring Eritrea, which played a key role in the earlier Ethiopian civil war. The Ethiopian federal government has publicly accused Eritrea of providing military and logistical support to the anti-government alliance, a charge that Asmara has repeatedly denied.

    Independent on-the-ground reporting from Tigray and surrounding conflict zones remains impossible, as all communications infrastructure to the region has been shut down. The Ethiopian government has suspended all banking services across Tigray, freezing the accounts of even Tigrayans who have relocated to the capital Addis Ababa and other parts of the country. A former Mekelle resident who moved to Addis Ababa two months ago told the BBC that his Tigray-registered bank account remains frozen, leaving him unable to pay for basic goods and services. “It has created havoc for many people like me who escaped the situation in Tigray,” he said. “Many Tigrayans are now in trouble.”

    For residents trapped in Tigray by the internet and telecoms blackout, a small lifeline has been launched by the Tigray Broadcasting Service, which operates out of Addis Ababa. The broadcaster has started collecting short video greetings and personal updates from family members outside Tigray via its Telegram channel, then airing the messages on satellite television for those able to receive the signal inside the region. While limited to brief personal updates, the initiative provides one of the only connections between separated families amid the full communications shutdown.

    A local source in Alamata described the rapidly worsening humanitarian situation, with thousands of displaced people crammed into the town with no access to food, fuel, or cash. “All the residents of the surrounding areas entered the town of Alamata by walking on foot for as long as an hour, hoping the town would be safe. Unfortunately, everything is blocked – no banking service, no money transfer, no power, no internet, no phone. Hence people are in crisis, simply suffering, everyone is desperate and frustrated.”

  • Baptism of Houthi fire for Mecca mutual defense pact

    Baptism of Houthi fire for Mecca mutual defense pact

    In August, when Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan signed onto a landmark mutual defense agreement dubbed the Mecca Alliance, most international observers dismissed it as little more than a symbolic political statement. Stipulating that an armed assault on any one member would be treated as an attack on all three, alongside commitments to deepen cross-border military cooperation, the pact was widely written off as empty diplomacy. Just months later, that assessment is already outdated: the three nations have moved rapidly to turn the paper promise into a functional, institutionalized security framework.

    The quick implementation of the agreement began amid ongoing security pressures, as Houthi attacks from Yemen continue to target Saudi territory and critical infrastructure along the Red Sea. On September 19, Turkey publicly confirmed it stood ready to fulfill its mutual defense obligations by meeting any urgent military needs Saudi Arabia may face. Four days after Ankara’s statement, Pakistan appointed the first-ever secretary-general to oversee the trilateral arrangement, officially named the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement, marking the first permanent institutional position for the pact.

    The pace of progress accelerated on the sidelines of the annual United Nations General Assembly on September 25, when the three nations’ foreign ministers gathered to review work on institutionalizing the agreement and issued a call for an immediate meeting of their top military leaders. That same day, the defense chiefs convened in Riyadh to advance work on three core pillars: cross-border intelligence sharing, coordinated operational planning, and the integration of complementary military capabilities across the three states.

    These rapid steps are far more than routine bureaucratic security procedure. They signal a tangible shift in regional security dynamics, as the Mecca Pact evolves beyond basic territorial defense to address the overlapping, interconnected security challenges roiling the Middle East, from ongoing tensions with Iran to the years-long conflict in Yemen.

    For Saudi Arabia, which led the negotiations to launch the alliance, the pact answers a pressing strategic priority: boosting the kingdom’s ability to deter threats to its land, airspace, and critical Red Sea trade corridors, while reducing overreliance on external security guarantees from outside the region. Today, protecting Saudi national security means safeguarding more than just border territory; it requires securing the maritime shipping lanes that connect the kingdom’s $1 trillion energy-driven economy to global markets.

    ### The Link Between Territorial Defense and Corridor Security
    The Mecca Agreement took shape against a backdrop of intensifying security risks for Saudi Arabia and its Gulf Cooperation Council partners, including rising missile and drone attacks linked to regional tensions and continued Houthi offensive operations originating in Yemen. But defending Saudi territory is only half the challenge.
    As tensions around the Strait of Hormuz, the world’s busiest energy chokepoint, have escalated in recent years, Saudi Arabia has increasingly shifted a larger share of its energy exports through its western coast and the Red Sea as a reliable alternative route. The East-West Pipeline, which transports Saudi crude across the kingdom to the Red Sea port of Yanbu, allows oil shipments to bypass the Strait of Hormuz entirely, but this strategic shift has created a new critical vulnerability: the Bab el-Mandeb strait, the narrow waterway connecting the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden.

    This context connects two seemingly separate regional security initiatives that were launched within weeks of one another. On July 30, Saudi Arabia joined 13 other nations to launch the Multinational Maritime Defense Alliance, tasked with protecting commercial shipping transiting the Bab el-Mandeb, Red Sea, and Gulf of Aden. Both Turkey and Pakistan are full members of that maritime coalition, and just days after the coalition launched, the three nations unveiled the Mecca Pact.
    The two frameworks address complementary components of the same core strategic problem. The Mecca Pact provides a structured framework for territorial and air defense, while the multilateral maritime coalition focuses on securing the sealanes that Saudi Arabia’s economy now depends on for energy and trade exports. The line between these two missions is increasingly blurry: an attack on a Saudi pipeline, coastal port, or oil tanker threatens the same core national security interests as a strike on Saudi airspace.
    The ongoing Houthi offensive against Saudi targets underscores this blurring of lines. Attacks launched from Yemeni territory have made clear that Saudi Arabia’s security vulnerabilities do not stop at its borders. A missile or drone strike targeting onshore Saudi infrastructure and a maritime attack on Red Sea shipping use different weapons and operate in different environments, but both can severely disrupt the kingdom’s economic security. It was against this backdrop that the September 25 trilateral meeting convened, as the divide between territorial and maritime security risks continues to erode.

    ### Turkey’s Unique Role as a Connective Bridge
    Turkey holds a unique position that links the two parallel security tracks. Saudi Arabia brings critical regional geography, massive financial resources, and a direct, urgent stake in stabilizing the Arabian Peninsula and Red Sea corridor. Pakistan brings decades of close defense ties with Riyadh and a large, battle-tested conventional military force. Turkey, by contrast, contributes a rapidly expanding, advanced domestic defense industry – including cutting-edge drone technology and integrated air defense systems – alongside a broad diplomatic and military strategic footprint that stretches from the Eastern Mediterranean across the Red Sea to the Horn of Africa.
    This combination gives Ankara an irreplaceable role in making the alliance functional. For the Mecca Pact’s mutual defense commitment to move beyond rhetoric, member states need compatible capabilities, shared intelligence, coordinated command structures, and interoperable equipment. The maritime coalition faces a similar challenge: turning broad political statements in support of freedom of navigation into a sustained, effective security presence. Turkey is uniquely positioned to contribute to both efforts.
    To be clear, the two coalitions remain separate entities. They have different membership rosters and distinct core mandates, and there is no evidence of a unified joint command structure that integrates the Mecca Pact into the broader maritime coalition. The September meeting of military chiefs also does not signal that the three nations are preparing to launch joint offensive operations against Houthi targets in Yemen. To date, all efforts have focused on building coordination, sharing intelligence, and integrating complementary capabilities. The significance of this development is not the emergence of a new NATO-style collective defense bloc in the Middle East, but rather the growing synergy between separate regional security initiatives that once operated independently.

    ### Saudi Arabia’s Strategic Hedging for Regional Autonomy
    These unfolding developments must also be understood against the backdrop of Saudi Arabia’s long-standing security relationship with the United States. Riyadh is not replacing its decades-old security partnership with Washington with a new alliance anchored in Ankara and Islamabad. The Mecca Pact does not require such a strategic shift, and Saudi Arabia continues to rely heavily on U.S. military equipment, training, intelligence sharing, and security cooperation. However, repeated regional crises over the past two decades have strained this reliance, prompting Riyadh to proactively hedge against the risks of over-dependence on external security guarantees from any single power.
    What is shifting is the diversity of security partners operating around the kingdom, and the degree to which Saudi Arabia is now proactively shaping its own security architecture. The Mecca Pact is best understood as an additional layer of regional security, rather than a complete wholesale realignment of Saudi Arabia’s long-standing global alliances.
    Regional states in the Middle East have long balanced dependence on outside major powers against a persistent push for greater strategic autonomy. This tension has been amplified by the current security environment in and around the Persian Gulf, where the threats facing Saudi Arabia can no longer be neatly split into discrete, separate categories.
    The same logic applies to the multilateral maritime coalition. While a U.S. naval presence has long provided security for commercial shipping in the region, the creation of a broad regional coalition gives Saudi Arabia and its partner states a formal mechanism to take greater direct responsibility for the security of the waters their economies depend on. It also gives Turkey and Pakistan a more institutionalized role in shaping regional security dynamics that extend far beyond their immediate borders.
    It remains too early to tell whether these incremental steps will add up to a fully new regional security architecture. The institutions created by the Mecca Pact are still in their infancy, core military commitments are still being formalized, and the broad membership of the maritime coalition does not guarantee that all members will be willing to deploy combat forces when needed.
    Even so, these developments are deeply significant because they mark a clear shift in how Saudi Arabia is addressing its evolving security vulnerabilities. Missile defense, maritime security, and protection of critical energy infrastructure can no longer be treated as separate, disconnected challenges. A disruption in one part of the kingdom’s strategic geography can quickly ripple out to impact every other area – and the Mecca Pact is Riyadh’s most concrete step yet to address that new reality.