标签： Asia

The United Kingdom is moving forward with a landmark and divisive plan to formally label Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) a national security threat, using a sweeping new anti-state threat law that entered into force just last week.

UK Home Secretary Shabana Mahmood will leverage the newly enacted National Security (State Threats) Bill to outlaw all public and organized support for the IRGC, a core institutional branch of Iran’s national armed forces that answers directly to Iran’s Supreme Leader. This action marks the UK’s official full proscription of the group, which British authorities accuse of carrying out death threats and systematic intimidation campaigns against targets on British soil.

In a formal written statement released to parliament, Mahmood detailed that nearly any form of support for the IRGC – from public expressions of favorable opinion to logistical or practical assistance – will now count as a criminal offense in the UK, carrying a maximum penalty of 14 years imprisonment.

The new legislation will also be used to target two additional groups: Harakat Ashab al-Yamin al-Islamiya (Hayi), a faction British authorities claim is aligned with Iran and has been linked to antisemitic attacks across the UK, and the volunteer wing of Russia’s foreign military intelligence agency, the GRU.

While the UK has not formally joined any open US-Israeli military conflict against Iran, it has already permitted the United States to access British military bases to launch offensive strikes against Iranian targets, aligning London with Washington’s regional pressure campaign against Tehran.

The path to this proscription action began in April, when current UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer pledged to fast-track the State Threats Bill through parliament. With the bill now law, official draft regulations for the proscription designation are ready to be laid before parliamentary representatives for formal process.

Critically, the new legislation grants Mahmood broad, unchecked authority to designate any state-affiliated organization as a national security threat if she judges it runs counter to the UK’s “safety and interests.” It criminalizes any individual found to “support, assist and obtain material benefits” – including information sharing – from groups listed as terrorist or threat-aligned organizations.

Independent experts who review UK terrorism legislation have issued stark warnings about the bill’s broadly worded provisions, noting that the vague language creates a major risk of criminalizing journalists and non-governmental organization workers who engage in routine contact with designated organizations, potentially exposing them to the same 14-year prison sentences applied to group supporters.

Home Office Minister Angela Eagle defended the proscription in an official statement, arguing the IRGC’s role far outpaces that of a conventional military force. “The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps is a central component of the Iranian state’s security apparatus, answerable directly to Iran’s Supreme Leader. Its role extends far beyond that of a conventional military force. It encompasses intelligence activity, the use of proxy actors, and the projection of influence designed to advance Iranian state objectives,” Eagle said.

Prime Minister Starmer framed the move as a necessary step to protect domestic security, stating: “We will never let Britain be a playground for states who want to spread fear, division and violence on our streets. We have already taken tough action against the Iranian regime and those linked to it, and against Russian operatives and networks targeting our country. These new powers will make it easier to prosecute and lock up anyone carrying out their dirty work here in Britain.”

As of the announcement, independent news outlet Middle East Eye has reached out to the Home Office to request additional comment and clarification on how the IRGC proscription will operate in practical terms, with no further details released publicly to date.

Israeli media has broken news of a controversial planned funding transfer: Israel’s Ministry of National Security, led by far-right politician Itamar Ben Gvir, is set to disburse 4 million shekels, equivalent to roughly $1.31 million, to Ahavat Gilad — an organization already sanctioned by multiple Western governments for its ties to illegal settler activity in the occupied West Bank.

The group was placed on sanctions lists in June this year by France, the United Kingdom, Canada, Norway, Australia and New Zealand. The international sanctions came after investigations confirmed Ahavat Gilad played a key role in enabling and funding a sharp rise in violent attacks by Israeli settlers against Palestinian communities in the occupied territory. Specifically, the organization was found to channel donations from the Farms Union, a body that provides financial and logistical support to settler agricultural operations, directly to unauthorised, illegal settler outposts that are established outside of Israeli government-approved boundaries.

According to documents obtained by Israeli newspaper Haaretz, which were submitted to relevant bodies by the Ministry of National Security, the allocated funding is officially framed as a resource to “reduce incidents of violence” and build “a network of mentors to accompany youth staying on farms throughout Judea and Samaria” — the Israeli term for the occupied West Bank. The 4 million shekel sum will be distributed over an 18-month period, with a built-in option to extend the funding agreement if the ministry chooses to do so.

This controversial funding move follows the Israeli government’s approval of a “national plan” in May, launched to address what officials described as a “negative phenomenon among youth” in the occupied West Bank. The announcement of the plan came as the country has faced growing international pressure to rein in the escalating wave of settler violence targeting Palestinian civilians and property. The national plan itself was officially designed to “prevent youths from entering cycles of violence”, according to official documents.

Per the ministry’s paperwork, Ahavat Gilad was selected as the recipient of public funds specifically because of its deep existing connections to “farmers, the army, the police and government ministries” operating in the West Bank. In a statement justifying the selection, the ministry argued that “providing an effective response to the youth requires relying on ‘responsible adults’ who come from the field, are figures familiar to the youth, share their living space with them and hold their trust”.

The ministry added that the initiative is intended to build a “professional system” that aligns on-the-ground conditions in the West Bank with the policy priorities of the National Security Ministry, a step it says is necessary “to ensure effective prevention” of youth violence.

Responding to Haaretz’s reporting on the funding allocation, the ministry pushed back against criticism. It stated: “It is very unfortunate that instead of praising the ministry for leading the move to reduce and prevent violence and risky behaviors among youth, Haaretz newspaper (which ironically would have attacked the ministry if such a plan had not been implemented at all) chooses to rely on baseless claims by anti-Israel elements”.

Multiple sources with direct knowledge of the exchange have confirmed to independent outlet Middle East Eye that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan presented former U.S. President Donald Trump with a one-of-a-kind gold-plated personalized revolver during Trump’s attendance at last week’s NATO summit held in Ankara.

While Erdogan extended similar customized Turkish-made revolvers to every NATO head of state in attendance at the gathering, Trump’s firearm is the only one confirmed to feature the special gold finish, the sources add. The weapon matches the specifications of the Gumusay .357 Magnum, the first domestically produced revolver manufactured in Turkey, and arrived housed in a polished wooden case emblazoned with both the Turkish national flag and the official NATO emblem. An inscribed placard inside the case explicitly labels the gun as “the first revolver-type handgun produced in our country.” The only modification made to Trump’s version, insiders note, is the gold plating applied to the revolver’s grip. As of press time, the White House has not issued any comment in response to Middle East Eye’s requests for clarification about the gift.

This high-profile gift exchange unfolds against a backdrop of steadily warming bilateral ties between the Erdogan administration and Trump’s White House. A senior U.S. official recently characterized the personal dynamic between the two leaders as marked by “special chemistry,” a rapport that has paved the way for deeper cooperation between Washington and Ankara.

In the coming months, the Trump administration is widely expected to roll back economic sanctions imposed on Turkey under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA). Those penalties were levied in 2019 after Ankara purchased Russia’s advanced S-400 air defense missile system, a deal that sparked months of friction between the NATO ally and the United States. To resolve the long-running dispute permanently, Trump is also preparing to move forward with an agreement that would see Turkey transfer or sell the S-400 system to a third-party Gulf state, with the United Arab Emirates emerging as the leading candidate for the purchase.

The diplomatic push aligns with both warming U.S.-Turkey relations and Ankara’s broader strategic goal of expanding Turkish defense exports as a core pillar of its foreign policy. Data from the Geneva-based Small Arms Survey, cited by Reuters, shows that between 2019 and 2024, Turkey ranked as the world’s third-largest exporter of small arms globally, trailing only the United States and Italy, with total exports reaching roughly $3 billion over the five-year period.

Under existing U.S. federal ethics regulations, any gift from a foreign government valued at more than $525 automatically becomes property of the U.S. federal government, unless the recipient pays the government the full appraised value of the item to retain it. This means Trump will either be required to turn the custom revolver over to federal authorities or cover its assessed cost if he wishes to keep the unique gift in his personal possession.

The gold-plated revolver has drawn extra public interest due to Trump’s widely documented preference for gold-colored finishes and luxury decor. During his first term in office, Trump oversaw a high-profile renovation of the Oval Office that incorporated multiple gold-toned ornamental and decorative elements. This is also not the first time a foreign leader has gifted Trump a gold-plated firearm: in 2019, then-Czech Prime Minister Andrej Babis presented Trump with a limited-edition gold-plated CZ 75 pistol engraved with the year of Trump’s birth.

A fresh cycle of tit-for-tat escalation has gripped the Persian Gulf after Iran targeted commercial vessels transiting through Omani sovereign territorial waters, deepening a standoff that threatens regional economic stability and global energy trade. The sequence of retaliation began when the United States responded to the attacks by scrapping all waivers that allowed global buyers to import Iranian crude oil. This diplomatic move was followed by two consecutive nights of US punitive airstrikes against military and infrastructure targets across southern Iran. In quick reply, Iran launched a wave of ballistic missile and drone strikes targeting US military installations stationed in Bahrain and Kuwait.

While neither Iran nor the sitting US Trump administration has shown any willingness to escalate into a full-scale regional war, the new unwritten rules of limited, low-intensity violence that have emerged from the recent ceasefire are untenable for Gulf Arab states. These nations rely on open, secure shipping lanes to resume normal commercial activity and protect their core economic interests, which depend entirely on unimpeded energy exports.

Current US strategy in the standoff has been widely assessed as ineffective. Washington’s approach relies exclusively on coercive pressure to force the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to abandon its de facto control over the Strait of Hormuz, but punitive airstrikes alone cannot compel the IRGC to surrender what it views as a critical strategic asset gained through decades of regional influence-building. Under a temporary memorandum of understanding crafted to manage the current crisis, Iran has been given a 60-day window to guarantee unhindered freedom of navigation through all regional waterways. But Tehran has made clear it will only accept terms set by its own leadership, a dynamic that risks granting Iran disproportionate leverage over how Gulf states conduct global trade.

The root of the latest escalation traces back to Oman’s efforts to open a new southern shipping corridor along its own sovereign coastline. This corridor was designed to act as an alternative shipping route that would weaken Iran’s stranglehold over the Strait of Hormuz, the chokepoint through which roughly 20% of global oil supplies pass daily. The IRGC responded with targeted attacks on vessels using the new corridor, drawing a clear red line to signal that it will not accept any challenge to its regional authority. Even a single successful demonstration that commercial shipping can reliably bypass the Strait of Hormuz through the Omani corridor would erode the regional dominance the IRGC has worked to establish.

For the IRGC, control over the Strait of Hormuz has become as much a matter of national prestige and authority as it is an economic tool. Some analysts have proposed a simple arrangement where Iran charges a shipping toll for passage through the strait, but this solution overlooks key political and economic realities. Any legitimate toll tied to actual navigation services would only generate hundreds of millions of dollars annually, far less than the billions Iran could gain through a broader political settlement. The only path to large-scale economic benefit for Iran comes through comprehensive concessions: lifted international sanctions, the release of billions of dollars in frozen overseas assets, and renewed access to global investment markets.

This dynamic exposes a deep internal rift within Iran’s ruling regime. Pragmatic factions within the government recognize that Iran’s greatest long-term prize is a full return to global energy markets, a goal that endless confrontation will only put further out of reach. For the IRGC, however, which leads Iran’s maritime activities in the strait, a quick toll scheme offers immediate, off-budget revenue that the corps can control directly, while negotiations over sanctions relief could drag on for years without delivering immediate gains.

This is why regional Gulf states must step forward to broker a diplomatic bargain that aligns Iran’s incentives with open navigation, the analysis argues. The solution does not lie in further military escalation from either side. Instead, Gulf states must craft a credible framework that guarantees Iran immediate rewards for restraint today in exchange for long-term sanctions relief and economic benefits tomorrow. This would allow Tehran’s moderate leadership to make the case to hardline factions that patience and diplomacy deliver greater gains than continued aggression.

Critics often argue two opposing positions: that Iran will simply accept economic concessions while continuing to disrupt shipping, or that Iran will never agree to any binding deal that compromises its control over the strait. Both positions miss the mark. The first incorrectly assumes that revenue is Iran’s primary motivation, when prestige and authority currently outrank financial gains for the IRGC. The second ignores the position of Iranian pragmatists, who acknowledge that prolonged international sanctions represent a long-term dead end for Iran’s economy. The reality is that Iran currently benefits from keeping the situation ambiguous, as ambiguity costs Tehran nothing. The task for Gulf negotiators is to make continued ambiguity far more costly than a negotiated settlement.

For Gulf states, any permanent change to the status of the Strait of Hormuz is unacceptable, and prolonged limbo is just as unaffordable as full-scale war. For the United States, a negotiated settlement would also offer a face-saving exit from a bombing campaign that has failed to achieve its core strategic goals.

The core conclusion of the analysis, authored by Andreas Krieg, Associate Professor in the Defence Studies Department at King’s College London, is that Gulf states must take the lead on resolving the crisis, rather than relying on Western military intervention. Washington has long been the primary external security guarantor for Gulf states, but it has grown increasingly unreliable in the face of determined Iranian resistance. The Trump administration’s impulsive, unplanned approach to statecraft has already become a liability, dragging Gulf nations into cycles of escalation that have left Kuwait and Bahrain particularly vulnerable to retaliatory attacks as hosts for US military infrastructure.

Krieg argues that Gulf states should immediately build a durable, regional coalition anchored by Qatar’s extensive diplomatic networks and Oman’s on-the-ground position as a steward of the new southern corridor. This diplomatic effort should be paired with joint Gulf maritime security capabilities to escort commercial vessels and clear the waterways of drones and naval mines. At the strategic level, this coalition should work toward a Saudi-led joint security framework between Gulf states and Iran, centered on a formal non-aggression pact and established deconfliction channels to prevent accidental escalation.

The most effective incentive Gulf states can offer to pull Iran away from its self-defeating course of confrontation is a credible path to meaningful economic compensation tied to verifiable guarantees of open navigation. A regional security framework that recognizes Iran’s legitimate regional interests, paired with the promise of long-term economic gains, will achieve far more than the ongoing US campaign of distant airstrikes, which have done little to break Iran’s high tolerance for pain, Krieg concludes.