标签: Asia

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  • Nepal bet nearly everything on hydropower – the floods show why that’s a problem

    Nepal bet nearly everything on hydropower – the floods show why that’s a problem

    Eight years ago, Nepal grappled with crippling energy insecurity: just two-thirds of its population had access to electricity, and connected homes endured up to 16 hours of blackouts daily. Through aggressive expansion of its hydropower sector, paired with anti-corruption reforms and strategic seasonal energy imports from India, Nepal pulled off a remarkable energy turnaround by 2018, delivering 24/7 power to nearly the entire country.

    Today, Nepal’s energy sector is almost entirely powered by the fast-flowing glacial rivers of the Himalayas, with 225 operational hydropower plants holding 3,900 megawatts of installed capacity—enough to power 3 million households simultaneously. Hundreds more projects are under construction or planned, and the nation earns nearly $200 million annually exporting surplus clean electricity to neighboring India and Bangladesh. This natural advantage, however, has turned into a critical vulnerability as climate change rapidly reshapes the Himalayan landscape, where temperatures are rising 50% faster than the global average.

    Last week’s catastrophic flash floods on the Nepal-Tibet border laid bare this existential risk. The disaster, which preliminary investigations trace to a collapsed glacial formation and bedrock collapse, has killed more than 1,300 people and left thousands more missing. Entire villages were wiped off the map, and 12 hydropower plants in the Trishuli River basin—including major international investment projects—sustained severe damage, knocking out more than 10% of Nepal’s total electricity generation capacity. Plant operators say it remains unclear whether any of the damaged facilities can be restored to service.

    The Nepal Electricity Authority (NEA), which owns six of the damaged plants, has moved to reassure domestic consumers that current power supplies remain adequate. But NEA spokesman Rajan Dhakal acknowledges that the rising frequency of climate-linked disasters has forced a long-overdue reckoning: “The time has come for a rethink of our hydropower policy.”

    Most of Nepal’s existing and planned hydropower projects are built high in the Himalayan mountains, relying on fast-flowing currents without large water storage systems. This design keeps construction costs low but leaves infrastructure extremely vulnerable to glacial outburst floods and flash floods. Between 2018 and 2024, more than 90% of all disaster events recorded in Nepal were climate-related, a trend that has accelerated in recent years: the Trishuli River basin has already been hit by two major flood events in the past two years, first in 2024 from a cloudburst and again in 2025 from a glacial lake outburst in Tibet that killed 11 people and closed a key Nepal-China border crossing for six months.

    Even with that history of hazard, critics say project planners and international lenders failed to take adequate preventive action. The $647 million Upper Trishuli-1 project, one of Nepal’s largest foreign direct investment ventures backed by the Asian Development Bank and International Finance Corporation, was all but destroyed in the latest floods. Another major project, Upper Trishuli 3A, funded by China’s Export-Import Bank, also suffered severe damage. Himanshu Thakkar, coordinator of the South Asia Network on Dams, Rivers & People, says international lenders were fully aware of the extreme risks but ignored repeated warnings and failed to implement stringent safety measures.

    “Their own reports repeatedly highlighted it. But they did not take any preventive steps, did not demand stringent checks and balances, nor were they prepared for a calamity they knew could occur,” Thakkar says.

    Dhakal of NEA concedes that even when climate risks were correctly assessed, hydropower plant designs were not adjusted to account for them: “Clearly we will need to improve in the way we build and operate our hydropower plants.”

    The conversation around rethinking Nepal’s energy strategy has split stakeholders into two broad camps, though all agree that change is needed. One path, proposed by the NEA, is shifting to reservoir-based hydropower projects that do not need to be sited in high-risk mountain areas, allowing for controlled water storage and release. But this approach carries steep economic and environmental costs that could slow Nepal’s energy expansion.

    Many energy and climate experts argue the country needs to move beyond overreliance on hydropower and diversify into wind and solar energy. A report from a German aid agency found Nepal’s total technical potential for solar power is roughly 10 times greater than its hydropower potential. “We should not be putting all our eggs in one basket in these dangerous times,” says Kushal Gurung, founder of clean tech firm WindPower Nepal. “We need to seriously embrace other alternatives as well, like solar and wind. And for that we will need to revise our energy policy that is at the moment very pro-hydropower.”

    Vivek Shastry, a researcher at Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy, echoes this view, noting that adding wind and solar capacity acts as a built-in resilience strategy that can prevent widespread system failure if a major hydropower facility is knocked offline.

    Other analysts note that while diversification makes sense, hydropower will remain Nepal’s core competitive advantage in South Asian energy markets for the foreseeable future. “While there is untapped capacity in wind and solar, hydropower really is the one that gives Nepal massive competitive advantage vis-a-vis its South Asian neighbours,” says Puspa Sharma, a senior research fellow at the National University of Singapore’s Institute of South Asian Studies.

    The financial toll of rising climate disasters is already hitting Nepal’s private hydropower sector. Over the past three years, insurers have paid out roughly $40 million in flood damage claims for more than 20 privately owned plants, and insurance premiums have risen so sharply that many operators say doing business is becoming unfeasible.

    Beyond Nepal’s borders, the disaster highlights the global inequity of climate change: Nepal is responsible for a tiny fraction of the greenhouse gas emissions driving glacial melt, yet it faces disproportionate climate risk. Manjeet Dhakal, a member of Nepal’s UN climate delegation, says climate risks are cross-border and cannot be managed by Nepal alone.

    “Nepal is among the least responsible for the greenhouse emissions that led to these exacerbated risks. Ironically, our hydropower industry is an attempt to reduce our already minimal emissions… We cannot, and should not, be made to respond to these risks alone,” he says, calling for global cooperation on shared data collection, impact assessment, and cross-border early-warning systems.

  • Jewish groups back stronger measures on Israel in letter to Andy Burnham

    Jewish groups back stronger measures on Israel in letter to Andy Burnham

    As the new Andy Burnham-led UK government prepares to unveil a sweeping package of policy measures targeting Israeli activity in the occupied West Bank—headlined by a proposed ban on goods imported from illegal Israeli settlements—the British political landscape has been split by a stark divergence of views among UK Jewish community leaders. Just days after major establishment Jewish organizations met the prime minister at Downing Street to lobby against the import ban, a coalition of progressive Jewish groups has thrown its full weight behind tougher action against Israel, while demanding the government protect the right to hold pro-Palestinian protests.

    On Monday, UK Chief Rabbi Ephraim Mirvis met Foreign Secretary Ed Miliband to warn that any form of economic sanctions targeting Israel would carry harmful consequences for British Jewish communities across the country. The Jewish Leadership Council and the Board of Deputies of British Jews, two of the most prominent institutional Jewish groups in the UK, doubled down on this opposition during their Downing Street meeting with Burnham, arguing that restrictions on settlement goods would damage the longstanding cultural and religious ties between British Jews and sites in the occupied territories.

    But just four days later, a competing open letter organized by three progressive Jewish organizations—Holocaust Survivors and Descendants against Gaza Genocide (HSD), Jewish Voice for Liberation (formerly Jewish Voice for Labour), and Jews for Justice for Palestinians—reached the prime minister’s desk, taking a directly opposite stance. The letter counts two Holocaust survivors, Stephen Kapos and Agnes Kory, among its signatories, and pushes back hard against the claim that institutional Jewish groups speak for all UK Jewish people on the issue of Israel.

    “There are several Jewish ‘communities’ and a wide diversity of views on Israel among Jewish people in the UK and we trust that you will meet with us and other members of the Jewish Bloc in the near future,” the letter, which was reviewed by Middle East Eye (MEE), states. The signatories also welcomed Burnham’s earlier commitments to stronger action against Israel and his public apology for the previous Keir Starmer-led Labour government’s slow response in calling for a ceasefire in Gaza.

    The groups make clear that their members regularly join the large Jewish Bloc contingent in national pro-Palestine marches, where they publicly condemn what they frame as an ongoing genocide of Palestinians in Gaza. They also reject widespread claims that pro-Palestine protest movements are hubs of antisemitism, noting that signatories have only experienced goodwill and solidarity from fellow pro-Palestine demonstrators. Any antisemitic hostility at protest events, they argue, has originated from pro-Israel counter-demonstrators, not pro-Palestine organizers or attendees.

    This advocacy builds on a similar effort earlier this year, when 44 Holocaust survivors and their descendants sent an open letter to then-Prime Minister Keir Starmer urging him to abandon proposed restrictions on repeated pro-Palestine marches. Starmer had floated the restrictions after an antisemitic stabbing attack that injured two Jewish men in Golders Green, a majority-Jewish neighborhood in northwest London. Then-Policing Minister Sarah Jones responded to that 2024 letter by affirming that the right to peaceful protest is a core pillar of British democracy, but defended new expanded police powers to impose restrictions on intimidating protests near houses of worship, as well as a new requirement for senior officers to weigh the cumulative impact of repeated protests when approving conditions for demonstrations.

    In their new letter to Burnham, the progressive Jewish groups reiterate this call, demanding the new prime minister block any future efforts to restrict or shut down pro-Palestine marches. They also criticize the Starmer-era Labour Party’s handling of antisemitism allegations, which saw roughly 70 Jewish Labour members publicly or internally accused of antisemitism for their pro-Palestine views. The letter argues that this pattern of disciplinary action has given Israel unwarranted political cover for its military actions in Gaza and the West Bank, while eroding core rights to free speech and peaceful protest in the UK.

    Jenny Manson, co-chair of Jewish Voice for Liberation and a former Labour Party member who left the party in 2023, told MEE that establishment Jewish groups have long been granted regular access to UK government leaders, while alternative Jewish voices critical of Israel are sidelined. “Generally, the diversity of Jewish communities and Jewish views is largely ignored. We are not given any audience by the government, unlike the Jewish establishment bodies which are regularly welcomed in Whitehall,” Manson said.

    She added, “We ask that Andy Burnham recognise that the mass marches in support of Gaza are a legitimate expression of the widespread horror felt in Britain at Israel’s war crimes and ethnic cleansing in Gaza and the West Bank. Many Jews feel this anger and misery too.” Manson also called on Burnham to act on the core demand of pro-Palestine protesters: an immediate end to all UK arms sales to Israel.

    The upcoming policy announcement from the Burnham government was first teased last month by Miliband, who confirmed the government would unveil new measures in response to Israel’s advancement of the E1 settlement project east of Jerusalem. If completed, the E1 development would cut the occupied West Bank into two disconnected parts, effectively ending any possibility of a contiguous Palestinian state.

    Alongside the opposition from institutional Jewish leaders, another UK-based anti-occupation Jewish group, Na’amod, has publicly welcomed the proposed measures, framing them as the bare minimum appropriate response to Israel’s ongoing expansion of illegal settlements and military activity in the occupied territories. As of Thursday evening, MEE has reached out to Downing Street for official comment on the progressive groups’ letter, and has not yet received a response.

  • Hussam Abu Safiya: Abducted Palestinian doctor still subject to torture by Israel

    Hussam Abu Safiya: Abducted Palestinian doctor still subject to torture by Israel

    A prominent Palestinian paediatrician detained without charge by Israel since late 2024 has alleged he faces persistent physical abuse, threats, and cruel treatment at the hands of his Israeli custodians, according to accounts shared by his legal representative and human rights advocates.

    Hussam Abu Safiya, the former medical director of Gaza’s Kamal Adwan Hospital, told his lawyer during a recent visit that Israeli guards have repeatedly beaten him across multiple areas of his body—including sensitive regions—using their hands, feet, and batons. The mistreatment does not end with physical violence: Abu Safiya also reported that guards deliberately disrupt his sleep overnight with constant noise and repeated public announcements, a deliberate tactic to inflict psychological distress. He added that the assault took place shortly before his lawyer’s most recent meeting, and that guards have explicitly threatened him against disclosing the horrific conditions of his detention to outside parties.

    Abu Safiya was taken by Israeli forces in December 2024 and has remained in custody without any formal charges or trial. He is being held under Israel’s Unlawful Combatants Law, a piece of legislation that independent United Nations human rights experts have long ruled violates core tenets of international humanitarian and human rights law.

    Back in July 2026, a group of UN special rapporteurs—including leading rights experts Francesca Albanese, Tlaleng Mofokeng, Morris Tidball-Binz, and Ben Saul—issued an urgent call demanding Israel immediately release Abu Safiya and all other healthcare workers being held in arbitrary detention. The experts argued that Abu Safiya’s ongoing detention without due process is not an isolated incident, but rather a reflection of a systematic Israeli campaign targeting Palestinian medical personnel and dismantling Gaza’s already fragile healthcare system. In their statement, they warned that this deliberate targeting is designed to impose conditions that would lead to the collective physical and mental destruction of the Palestinian people living in Gaza.

    The allegations of ongoing abuse have renewed international calls for action, with public health and human rights advocates adding their voices to the demand for Abu Safiya’s immediate release. Dr. James Smith, a lecturer in Humanitarian Policy & Practice at University College London and an emergency physician who completed volunteer deployments in Gaza in both 2023 and 2024, published an op-ed earlier this July repeating the urgent call for Abu Safiya’s liberation, a call shared publicly by independent outlet Middle East Eye on July 9, 2026.

    Physicians for Human Rights, the organization that confirmed the details of Abu Safiya’s account alongside his legal team, has echoed the UN experts’ demands, highlighting that the abuse of a detained healthcare worker represents a fundamental violation of international law that protects medical personnel and detainees in conflict zones. The case continues to draw international scrutiny over Israel’s treatment of Palestinian detainees and its targeting of Gaza’s health infrastructure amid the ongoing regional crisis.

  • In Algeria, new focus on English in schools rekindles debate over French colonial legacy

    In Algeria, new focus on English in schools rekindles debate over French colonial legacy

    A seismic shift is reshaping Algeria’s national education system, as English moves to center stage as the first mandatory foreign language for primary school students – a change that comes at the expense of French, and has stirred fierce national debate over pedagogy, colonial legacy, and geopolitical alignment. For the 2024-2025 school year, the reform takes full effect: three years after English was first piloted in primary education, all third-grade pupils will now learn only English, with French instruction delayed until fourth grade, when it will be taught as a second foreign language alongside English.

    This policy marks a break from a 61-year status quo. From Algeria’s independence from French colonial rule in 1962 through 2023, French held the position of the only foreign language taught to third-grade primary students. The current overhaul traces back to a directive from President Abdelmadjid Tebboune, who has framed the expansion of English as a strategic investment: he argues English is the global lingua franca of modern science, making early instruction critical for Algeria’s younger generations. The reform does not stop at primary school; secondary education will also see expanded English teaching hours and a higher weighting for the subject in national end-of-cycle exams, though French instruction in high school remains unchanged for the moment.

    The rollout of the reform has unfolded against a backdrop of institutional upheaval. Algeria’s largest teachers’ union, Cnapeste – which previously criticized the English expansion as a reckless, unprepared move citing a critical shortage of properly trained educators – was dissolved by state authorities last July over alleged violations of strike regulations. Union leaders reject the charges, framing the dissolution as an intentional effort to silence a vocal critic of government policy. With the main union body eliminated, no major teachers’ association has issued formal comment on the final implementation of the reform.

    Opinions are deeply split among other stakeholders. The National Federation of Parents of Students Associations, which typically aligns with the education ministry’s policy agenda, has welcomed the change. The group argues that mastery of English opens doors to global science, technology, and improved higher education and employment opportunities for Algerian youth. But many parents share Cnapeste’s earlier concerns, questioning whether the government can deliver on the promise of quality English instruction.

    Rachida Mahi, a 36-year-old Algiers-based engineer, is one skeptical parent. Her son is starting third grade this year, the first cohort to receive English-only instruction at that level, and she worries the rushed rollout will harm his academic progress. “How will the state manage to provide every school with qualified English teachers in sufficient numbers? Where does it plan to find them?” Mahi asked in an interview with Middle East Eye. Like many Algerians of her generation, Mahi learned French throughout her schooling and completed her engineering degree in French, speaking very little English – leaving her unable to support her son with his homework, a reality that leaves her panicked.

    To understand the stakes of this language shift, one must look back at decades of linguistic policy in post-independence Algeria. Immediately after ending French colonial rule in 1962, the new government established Arabic as the sole national and official language, launching a gradual process of Arabization to erase colonial linguistic legacy. That policy reached its peak in 1991, when a law mandated the use of Arabic across all areas of public life and education. But Arabization never fully succeeded: while law and social sciences were transitioned to Arabic instruction at the university level, scientific fields including medicine and engineering remained French-led, due to a lack of Arabic-language teaching materials and a shortage of educators trained to teach these subjects in Arabic. Even today, most leading global academic research is only accessible in foreign languages, primarily French and English. In line with his primary school reform, Tebboune has already announced plans to phase out French and replace it with English in medical studies by 2025, framing the move as a “wise” step that will align Algerian higher education with global scientific standards, where English is the dominant working language.

    Education and language specialists widely share concerns about the rushed implementation of the reform. Salah Derradji, a veteran language didactics specialist and former university rector, says he has long supported the gradual expansion of English across all education levels – but argues the current rollout lacks the deliberate planning the project requires. “This project must be carried out thoughtfully. And that is not the case today,” Derradji told Middle East Eye. He characterizes the reform as a political, rather than pedagogical, decision, noting that “You cannot train teachers in a few weeks and send them into classrooms. You first need qualified trainers,” adding that the government failed to hold broad consultation with academic specialists before moving forward.

    Rabeh Sebaa, a retired professor of sociology and anthropology at the University of Oran, echoes this criticism, arguing simply that “Algeria does not have the means to teach English – or teach in English – whether in schools or universities.” Back in 2022, as the government prepared to introduce English in primary schools, it launched a high-profile recruitment drive to hire 60,000 new English teachers, targeting university graduates with degrees in English language, literature, and interpretation. But education unions immediately criticized the campaign, pointing out that most new hires lacked any formal pedagogical training and received only rushed, inadequate preparation before entering classrooms.

    Hamid Hani, a 42-year-old parent from Bejaia, has seen the impact of underqualified hiring firsthand. His daughter is entering secondary school this year, and after two years of English instruction with an untrained young teacher, she still cannot speak English comfortably. “This teacher admitted to me during a parent-teacher meeting that she had to manage on her own to find teaching materials and organise her lessons,” Hani said. He accuses the government of gambling with children’s futures through “improvised measures” that put political goals ahead of quality education. Ahmed Tessa, an education specialist and author of a book on the status of French in Algerian schools, agrees, arguing that the reform “is an ideological rather than pedagogical decision.” He questions how quality instruction can be expected when new graduates are sent into classrooms without the minimum two years of initial pedagogical training required to teach effectively.

    Beyond questions of implementation, the reform has reignited a decades-long national debate over the legacy of French colonialism and Algeria’s ongoing relationship with France. The push to downgrade French comes at a moment of already heightened diplomatic tensions between Algiers and Paris, which escalated in 2024 after French President Emmanuel Macron publicly endorsed Morocco’s claim to sovereignty over Western Sahara – a position that directly contradicts Algeria’s longstanding support for the Polisario Front’s push for an independent Sahrawi state.

    Proponents of the reform frame the shift as a necessary assertion of national sovereignty and a break from colonial oppression. El Hachemi Djaaboub, a former minister from the Movement of Society for Peace (MSP), an Islamist-aligned party known for its criticism of French influence, has called the delay of French instruction an act of national sovereignty, and accused critics like Tessa of advancing foreign interests. Abderrazak Makri, former president of the MSP, has called for a complete break from French linguistic legacy: “We must put an end to France’s colonial legacy. Even President Macron speaks more English than French abroad. Today, English is the universal language; it is time for Algerians to adopt it and align themselves with great nations,” he said in 2022. This view resonates with a segment of the Algerian public, with social media discussions reflecting growing support for framing French as a colonial leftover that should be removed entirely from national education. In France, right-wing and far-right media have already seized on the reform, criticizing Algeria’s move as an intentional effort to erode French cultural and political influence in North Africa.

    Critics of the reform, however, push back against the ideological framing, arguing that language policy should be separated from anti-colonial politics. A small number of Algerian political parties, including the Rally for Culture and Democracy and the Workers’ Party, oppose downgrading French, arguing that foreign language instruction should be complementary, not a tool for ideological conflict. Sebaa characterizes the push to eliminate French from education as “visceral, ideologically driven postures.” He notes that many proponents of the shift studied at English-language universities and view English as a neutral global language, while framing French exclusively as a symbol of colonial domination. But Sebaa, who has published research on Algerians’ historical relationship with French, challenges this narrative. He points out that at independence, less than 20% of Algerian children attended colonial schools, meaning the “francisation” of Algerian culture was far less pervasive than often claimed. For most Algerians who lived under colonial rule, French was not only a tool of oppression but also a path to social advancement and cultural expression: the mid-20th century saw the rise of a vibrant body of Algerian literature written in French, with iconic writer Kateb Yacine famously describing French as “a war booty” that Algerians had claimed as their own.

    Critics warn that downgrading French will carry long-term harmful consequences for Algeria. Tessa argues that the move threatens to erode Algeria’s existing French-language cultural production and erase a key strand of the country’s collective memory that is expressed in French. He also warns that shifting away from French will distance Algeria from its neighboring geopolitical environment, which remains majority francophone, and break cultural and social ties between Algerian citizens and the millions of Algerian diaspora members and their descendants living primarily in France and French-speaking Quebec. Today, Algeria is the third-largest francophone country in the world by population, according to the International Organisation of La Francophonie, with an estimated 15.6 million Algerians – roughly one-third of the total population – speaking French.

  • Eben Etzebeth roars back into form to help South Africa level All Blacks rugby series

    Eben Etzebeth roars back into form to help South Africa level All Blacks rugby series

    Just one month ago, South African rugby critics were already writing off Eben Etzebeth, the most capped player in Springboks history. They called for the veteran lock to hang up his boots and step into early retirement, with plenty of fuel for their skepticism: ahead of New Zealand’s historic, highly anticipated tour of South Africa this August, Etzebeth had played only a single match all year, with his 2024 season disrupted by an eye-gouge suspension, a nagging hip injury and a painful head knock. Doubts about his match fitness and form swirled across rugby circles.

    Etzebeth’s 2024 campaign got off to a rocky start when he took the field for his second game of the year against a relentless Argentina side in hostile Buenos Aires on August 8. While the lock put in significant work on the pitch, he lacked his signature sharpness, but the match still served its purpose: it shook off the months of inactivity rust that had built up. Next came the first test against the All Blacks at Johannesburg’s Ellis Park, where Etzebeth started slow and never found his top form, turning in what many called an unremarkable performance as South Africa suffered a shocking 16-33 defeat.

    That underwhelming outing only amplified calls for Etzebeth to be benched. But last weekend in Cape Town, for the second test against the world-famous All Blacks, Etzebeth showed the world why he has been a core of South African rugby for 14 years. Turning in a vintage performance that bore all the hallmarks of his best form, Etzebeth wreaked havoc on New Zealand’s lineout, disrupting three of the visitors’ attacking throw-ins and securing five clean catches of his own. He added 18 tackles to the tally, two of which were dominant defensive stops, forced a fumble from an All Blacks carrier, competed aggressively for a loose ball and got a finger to a pass that nearly resulted in an interception. By the final whistle, South Africa had claimed a thrilling 33-26 win, leveling the three-test series.

    Veteran former Springbok lock Victor Matfield, who held the record for most Springbok test appearances before Etzebeth broke it earlier in 2024, sang Etzebeth’s praises on the *Rugby Rivals* podcast. “He was under immense pressure in South Africa – everyone was saying ‘He hasn’t played much, he’s not in good form’ – but he stood out when it mattered most,” Matfield said. “At the lineout he was incredible, his work rate was just unbelievable, and that’s the Eben Etzebeth we all know. For me, it meant so much that our most experienced player stepped up in a week with so much on the line.”

    The deciding third test is set for this Saturday at Johannesburg’s iconic FNB Stadium, with the series trophy on the line.

    Despite the patchy start to his 2024 season, Etzebeth has never questioned the strategy of Springboks head coach Rassie Erasmus, whom he has supported fully since Erasmus took charge of the national side in 2018. Etzebeth served as South Africa’s captain in 2017, and willingly ceded the role to close friend Siya Kolisi – a friendship that dates back to their teenage years – without any resentment. Etzebeth credits Erasmus with rebuilding the Springboks’ winning culture, telling *The Verdict* podcast: “Being a Springbok became special again. We were willing to go to the dark places, put in the hard work necessary to get wins and results. In the past, it almost felt like just being selected as a Springbok was enough. Rassie brought back that belief, that hunger and that excitement for winning.”

    That cultural shift has delivered major silverware, with back-to-back Rugby World Cup titles in 2019 and 2023 – achievements that Etzebeth was central to, starting in both final matches.

    ### Far from Retirement Plans

    Far from planning to hang up his boots any time soon, the 34-year-old Etzebeth says his career is being extended by the Springboks’ famous “Bomb Squad” impact substitution strategy. Of his 144 test appearances to date, Etzebeth has started 133, though he comes off the bench more frequently than he did earlier in his career. The lock says he has no issue with the reduced minutes, noting that not being selected at all hurts far more than being called on to contribute off the bench. He says he wants to keep playing for as long as his body allows, and has not set a retirement date. He will turn 35 next month, and will turn 36 the day before a potential 2027 Rugby World Cup quarterfinal clash between South Africa and New Zealand in Sydney – a match he is already targeting.

    “Every year the younger lads are bigger, better and faster than the cohort before them,” Etzebeth said. “They push me to keep improving, and that’s exactly how it should be.”

    Etzebeth has spent his career breaking records: he became the youngest Springbok ever to hit 50 test caps at 24 in 2016, and the youngest to reach 100 caps at 30 in 2022. That 100th cap was intentionally scheduled for a Cape Town match so that his father Harry, who was battling cancer at the time, could attend the milestone match. On that historic day, Etzebeth’s then-fiancée Anlia performed the South African national anthem, and Etzebeth was named man of the match. Harry died the following year, while Etzebeth was in New Zealand with the team. The lock chose to stay and captain the side, saying it was what his father would have wanted.

    Etzebeth was born into a family of professional wrestlers, a background that gave his family a reputation for toughness and grit. He did not find his place in rugby until age 15, when he experienced a dramatic growth spurt that added 20 centimeters in height and 20 kilograms in weight. He was moved from the wing to the lock position, and has grown into the 2.03-meter, 120-kilogram enforcer that opposes scrumhalves now fear. He made his Springbok debut at just 20 years old in 2012, filling the gap in the second row left by legends Matfield and Bakkies Botha. When the two veteran stars returned to the national side, they fit seamlessly around the rising young talent, who carried on the post-apartheid legacy of fearsome Springbok enforcers who wear the iconic No. 4 jersey, a line that includes Adri Geldenhuys, Kobus Wiese, Mark Andrews and Botha.

    Matfield, who partnered Botha for a world-record 62 tests together in the second row, was on hand when Etzebeth broke his 127-appearance Springbok record earlier this year. He says he has long marveled at Etzebeth’s unique combination of relentless work rate and uncompromising on-pitch attitude.

    “You always want that one guy that, when you run out onto the field, the opposition’s forward pack knows they don’t stand a chance going up against him,” Matfield said. “That’s what Eben has been giving our pack for the last 14 years.”

  • Top Reform officials filmed allegedly plotting to break law on foreign donations

    Top Reform officials filmed allegedly plotting to break law on foreign donations

    A major political controversy has erupted in British politics just as Reform UK opened its annual national conference in Birmingham, after undercover reporting exposed alleged attempts by two senior party officials to circumvent UK electoral law to secure an illegal £500,000 foreign donation from an individual based in the United States.

    The bombshell investigation, broadcast Thursday night on Channel 4 News and conducted by independent investigative group Verbatim Investigations, captured damning on-camera conversations showing the party’s head of policy — James Orr, a serving associate professor at the University of Cambridge — outlining a scheme to disguise a donation from a U.S. national. Under UK electoral regulations, political parties may only accept financial contributions from individuals registered on the UK electoral roll or companies formally registered and operating within British borders, which rules out direct or indirect donations from overseas actors.

    In the filmed exchange, Orr proposed a workaround to an undercover reporter posing as a UK-based donor: the reporter’s American father, played by an actor working with the investigation team, would transfer the full £500,000 to the reporter, who would then officially register as the donor to the party. The plan first centered on an initial £18,000 payment to fund an opinion poll supporting Reform’s general election campaigning, before expanding to the larger six-figure donation.

    The footage also captured party leader Nigel Farage joining a lunch meeting with Farage’s senior personal aide Dan Jukes, the undercover reporter and the actor posing as the American donor. In the meeting, Farage can be seen celebrating the poll’s results, which showed strong public support for Reform, calling the survey “amazing” and praising it for delivering strong “bang for buck.” When the reporter laid out the proposed scheme to channel the American father’s money into the party through his own UK registered donor status, Farage responded simply: “Thank you. Well, both of you. Thank you.”

    By Friday morning, just 24 hours after the report aired and on the first full day of Reform’s conference, both Jukes and Orr stepped down from their official party positions pending the outcome of an internal party investigation. The opposition Labour Party and the centrist Liberal Democrats have already formally reported Reform UK to the Metropolitan Police over the allegations. The Electoral Commission, the UK’s independent elections regulator, confirmed Friday that it is reviewing all available evidence related to the case and has been in direct contact with Metropolitan Police leadership, who announced Thursday night they would launch a formal assessment of the claims to determine whether a criminal investigation is warranted.

    In an official statement released Friday morning, a Reform UK spokesperson confirmed the internal probe had been launched, noting: “Reform UK has launched an investigation following the broadcast of a Channel 4 News programme. Both individuals involved have stepped down from their respective positions pending the outcome of the investigation. The party believes it is important that the investigation is allowed to proceed independently and without prejudice. No further comment will be made while the investigation is ongoing.”

    Party leaders have pushed back aggressively against the claims, however. Deputy leader Richard Tice told BBC Radio 4 Friday that the party had already received a formal legal opinion from a senior King’s Counsel asserting no electoral rules had been broken, and he accused Channel 4 of orchestrating entrapment to damage the party’s reputation. Speaking to LBC radio, Farage himself also insisted no wrongdoing had occurred.

    The controversy comes as Farage already faces an ongoing parliamentary investigation over an undeclared £5 million gift he received ahead of his election as a Member of Parliament in 2024, which Farage has repeatedly denied was any violation of parliamentary rules. The latest allegations also add to growing public scrutiny of Reform’s long-rumored ties to foreign political actors, a topic that has drawn increasing media and regulatory attention over the past six months.

    Independent outlet Middle East Eye has previously documented the growing close relationship between Reform, a hardline anti-immigration party, and the government of the United Arab Emirates. Farage made an official trip to Abu Dhabi last December, with all travel and accommodation costs covered by the Emirati government, during which he held meetings with multiple senior Emirati cabinet ministers, including the country’s foreign minister. In April 2025, reporting revealed that senior Reform officials had been actively exploring fundraising from wealthy foreign donors based in low-tax jurisdictions including Monaco, Switzerland and the UAE.

    Notably, multiple Emirati diplomats are scheduled to attend Reform’s Birmingham conference Friday, alongside diplomatic representatives from other major nations including the United States, Israel and India. Political analysts note that the UAE and Reform share a common public opposition to political Islam, a longstanding policy priority for Abu Dhabi that it has advanced across the Middle East since the 2011 Arab Spring, and increasingly in European and North American political circles in recent years.

  • To sustain global influence, Gulf economies recalibrate foreign investments as war drains revenues

    To sustain global influence, Gulf economies recalibrate foreign investments as war drains revenues

    The six member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) – Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates – are grappling with severe economic turbulence spurred by the ongoing US-Israeli war on Iran, a conflict that has upended long-standing investment strategies across the region. The escalation of hostilities has injected unprecedented uncertainty into critical maritime trade chokepoints, including the Strait of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandeb, triggering a sharp collapse in cross-border capital flows. Data shows foreign direct investment into the GCC has plummeted by as much as 67 percent since the war commenced in February, eroding a core pillar of regional economic growth.

    Beyond the drop in inbound capital, the long-standing capacity of GCC states to deploy large volumes of outbound investment – a tool that has shaped their global financial and political influence over the past 40 years – has come under intense strain. This fiscal pressure has forced widespread strategic recalibration across both cross-border investment portfolios and domestic budget allocations, forcing governments to scale back previously ambitious development targets, most notably in Saudi Arabia.
    Justin Alexander, an economist focused on GCC economic dynamics, told Middle East Eye that the conflict has triggered immediate downward pressure on government fiscal revenues. As a result, he explains, some regional governments are no longer able to allocate new capital to their sovereign wealth funds, and a growing number are even drawing down existing SWF assets to cover ongoing public spending obligations.
    Kuwait became the first major state to take this step this week, announcing it would borrow from its $1 trillion-plus Future Generations Fund, the country’s primary sovereign wealth vehicle, to close widening gaps in its public budget. Meanwhile, Bloomberg reported earlier this week that Saudi Arabia is actively pursuing up to $8 billion in new loans through its central debt management office, as part of efforts to expand non-oil revenue streams and cover budget shortfalls.

    At the core of the growing fiscal squeeze is the near-total disruption of GCC oil and natural gas exports stemming from the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, forcing governments to reallocate billions of dollars to emergency domestic infrastructure projects designed to bypass the chokepoint. The most high-profile of these projects is a second oil pipeline the UAE has commenced construction to connect its inland oil fields to the port of Fujairah on the Arabian Sea, which would allow exports to bypass the Strait of Hormuz entirely.
    Ben Cahill, a senior fellow at the Washington-based Atlantic Council think tank, notes that these large-scale infrastructure projects have historically been driven more by geopolitical priorities than pure economic efficiency, with collective price tags expected to run into the tens of billions of dollars. “These pipelines are expensive and geopolitically complicated, but the Gulf states will spend serious money for back-up options,” Cahill explained.

    Securing capital for these urgent domestic projects has become far more challenging amid a 30 percent drop in hydrocarbon export revenues across the bloc, the same fiscal pressure that pushed Kuwait and Saudi Arabia to pursue emergency borrowing this week. Experts note that while Saudi Arabia has regularly taken on debt to fund its large-scale megaprojects in recent years, the current urgency of its borrowing is atypical. For Kuwait, the move to draw down its flagship sovereign wealth fund is nearly unprecedented: the only other time the country pursued such a step was in 1990, immediately after Iraq’s invasion that devastated the country’s economy.
    Alexander projects that the ongoing shift from outbound global investment to urgent domestic spending will persist for the foreseeable future. “The demand for domestic spending for recovery and in new infrastructure will compete to some extent with foreign investment priorities,” he said.

    Not all GCC member states are facing identical pressures or adopting identical responses, according to Robert Mogielnicki, a leading independent researcher and consultant focused on Gulf political economy. While Saudi Arabia has simply accelerated the strategic budget shifts it already had underway before the outbreak of the war, Mogielnicki notes the UAE has prioritized efforts to restore pre-war economic normalcy, while Qatar is still working to manage growing fiscal strains driven by its extensive exposure to trade routes through the Strait of Hormuz.

    For years, GCC economies have systematically pursued economic diversification strategies designed to reduce their reliance on volatile hydrocarbon exports, investing heavily in emerging sectors from logistics and tourism to competitive e-sports. Alexander notes that this pre-conflict diversification has provided a critical buffer for regional economies amid the current downturn. While the war has disrupted almost all sectors, broader, more diversified domestic economic bases have softened the blow of collapsing hydrocarbon production.
    That said, many of the sectors that were at the core of GCC diversification strategies have also been hit hard by the conflict. Regional tourism arrivals have dropped sharply, delivering record losses to domestic airline and hospitality industries, while returns on foreign tourism investments held by states like Qatar have not been enough to offset lost hydrocarbon export revenues. Other key sectors targeted for diversification, including heavy manufacturing, have also faced major disruptions from the Hormuz closure, with some aluminium processing facilities and digital data centres sustaining direct damage from cross-border strikes, Alexander added.
    While economic diversification remains a core long-term policy objective for all GCC states, the war has pushed many planned diversification initiatives down the list of immediate priorities, Mogielnicki explained. He cites the example of the new UAE Fujairah pipeline, a project that was originally framed as a long-term diversification asset but is now primarily a tool to mitigate immediate Hormuz-related export disruptions. These emergency infrastructure projects pull capital away from diversification for growth, creating long-term tradeoffs: “clearly, lots of excess infrastructure is not the most cost-efficient approach to economic diversification,” Mogielnicki said.

    Outbound foreign investment has long served as a deliberate tool of soft power for GCC states, delivering geopolitical leverage, cultural influence, and structural economic power across the globe. That dual function of investment – delivering both commercial returns and geopolitical influence – remains central to the region’s recalibrated strategies, Alexander says. “Gulf investments often have dual objectives of commercial returns and cementing bilateral relationships.”
    Despite the widespread shift to domestic priorities, GCC investors have still closed a number of record-breaking large-scale outbound deals in recent months, though most of these deals had been negotiated and had momentum before the war began. In early August, a Saudi-led consortium completed the $55 billion leveraged buyout of American video game developer Electronic Arts, the studio behind global hit franchises *FIFA* and *The Sims*, marking the largest private buyout of a technology company in corporate history.

    Even more recently, on August 24, the governments of France and Saudi Arabia announced a joint partnership to build three new theme parks just outside of Paris, including one attraction themed around the global manga franchise Dragon Ball Z. The project is backed by a $7 billion investment from Saudi Arabia’s state-affiliated Qiddiya Investment Company, and was formally announced by French President Emmanuel Macron during an official visit by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman – a high-profile public display of how Gulf states continue to use outbound investments to advance their geopolitical standing on the global stage.

    Kristian Alexander, a Gulf security analyst at the Middle East Institute, explains that these high-profile outbound investments are designed to deliver both financial returns and expanded cultural influence for Saudi Arabia. “The EA acquisition provides access to global franchises and digital audiences, while the Paris project potentially gives Saudi-owned Qiddiya an international operating platform and European visibility,” he said.

    These large outbound deals come as Saudi Arabia faces major setbacks to its domestic megaproject agenda, most recently announcing a full halt to construction on The Line, the 170-kilometer flagship smart city project at the core of the kingdom’s $1 trillion Neom development initiative, with construction not expected to resume until at least 2030. The project has already undergone extensive restructuring after projections showed original costs could balloon by as much as 800 percent, and shrinking oil revenues and logistical challenges have forced the kingdom to pivot its domestic focus to AI data centers and digital infrastructure instead. Even the large-scale domestic investments that once defined the Gulf’s economic boom are now feeling the war’s fallout, forcing rapid reprioritization across government budgets.

    For Qatar, global soft power influence continues to be anchored in strategic investments in the international luxury tourism sector, a low-friction path to expanding geopolitical influence that avoids the political scrutiny that comes with investments in sensitive sectors like defense or energy. Over the past three decades, Qatar has accumulated a sprawling portfolio of luxury hospitality acquisitions across major global hubs including New York, London, Paris, Barcelona, Singapore, Rome, and Zurich, giving the small emirate a strategic foothold at the intersection of global luxury and finance. “A tourism project is easier to present as employment, environmental tourism and economic development,” Kristian Alexander explains, making these investments far less politically controversial than alternative forms of influence-building.
    The most recent example of this strategy is a new ultra-luxury resort project on Seychelles’ Assomption Island, where a Qatari-led consortium acquired development rights for the high-end property. The site is located adjacent to the Aldabra Atoll, a UNESCO World Heritage Site, and the project has already drawn fierce criticism from global environmental groups concerned about the ecological damage of construction in the sensitive protected ecosystem.
    More significantly, Assomption Island was previously selected by the Indian military for development as a new naval outpost, part of New Delhi’s “necklace of diamonds” strategy to counter China’s growing “string of pearls” military and economic presence across the Indian Ocean. The Qatari luxury hotel investment allows Doha to establish a permanent economic and political foothold in this strategically critical region, at a time when Gulf states are increasingly competing with China and India for influence across the Indian Ocean littoral. This project perfectly embodies Qatar’s “luxury diplomacy” model, Kristian Alexander says: “Qatar can consequently obtain presence, relationships and reputational visibility in a strategically important location without requesting the explicit sovereign privileges associated with a military base.”

    Looking ahead, GCC states recognize that they will need to continue investing abroad to sustain the economic and political influence built up through decades of cross-border dealmaking, particularly as the region takes on an increasingly central diplomatic role in global negotiations over the future of the Strait of Hormuz. But sustaining that outbound investment will become far more challenging in the coming months, as the closure of Hormuz and the war’s broader fiscal toll squeeze government budgets at the worst possible moment. Persistent uncertainty over when hydrocarbon exports will return to pre-war levels adds to the pressure, as urgent domestic infrastructure spending consumes available capital, leaving GCC economies increasingly financially stretched.

  • UAE-linked networks supplying weapons and fighters for Sudan atrocities, UN finds

    UAE-linked networks supplying weapons and fighters for Sudan atrocities, UN finds

    A United Nations-led independent international investigation has delivered a damning new assessment of Sudan’s 16-month-old civil conflict, concluding that cross-border flows of foreign weaponry, advanced military technology, and contracted mercenaries are prolonging the war and enabling widespread attacks on civilian targets that may rise to the level of war crimes. The long-awaited report from the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for Sudan, released publicly Thursday, confirmed there are reasonable grounds to believe a coordinated transnational network has provided the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), Sudan’s main paramilitary opposition group, with a steady stream of arms, logistical backing, combat training, and foreign personnel.

    Investigators traced the sprawling network, which includes private companies, middlemen, and individual actors, to operations based in or transiting through the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Colombia, Chad, Libya, and Somalia. While the UAE has repeatedly denied all accusations of supporting the RSF, extensive independent reporting from Middle East Eye and other open-source research has long linked the Gulf state to arms and supply shipments to the paramilitary group. In recent weeks, global human rights organizations have submitted two formal communications to the International Criminal Court, calling for investigations into the role of foreign actors—specifically senior UAE officials—in aiding and abetting alleged RSF atrocities.

    Beyond the RSF’s foreign support, the UN mission also uncovered preliminary evidence that foreign-provided drone technology has drastically expanded the long-range strike capacity of Sudan’s official Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), allowing the military to hit targets deep in territory held by the RSF. “The consequences of this external support are being felt most acutely by civilians,” said Mohamed Chande Othman, chair of the fact-finding mission. “This external support has not brought greater protection for civilians. Instead, civilians are paying the price through attacks on homes, hospitals, schools, markets and places of refuge.”

    The report’s casualty figures underscore the devastating human cost of these externally enabled attacks: between January and May 2026 alone, more than 1,000 civilians were killed in drone strikes across the country. Investigators documented deliberate strikes on protected civilian infrastructure by both warring parties, including an RSF attack on a kindergarten, displacement camp, and hospital in Kalogi, South Kordofan, in December 2025. Successive RSF drone strikes hit the Nabaa al-Hanan kindergarten, first responders who rushed to the scene, and a nearby rural hospital, killing 114 people—roughly 60 of whom were children—and wounding 35 more. The mission’s investigation found no evidence that either the kindergarten or the hospital was being used for military purposes, stripping the attack of any legal justification under international law. The RSF also carried out a lethal strike on a former International Organization for Migration building that sheltered displaced families in Kulba, killing at least five civilians including multiple children.

    On the SAF side, the mission confirmed the military carried out a major strike on Ad-Da’ein Teaching Hospital in East Darfur on the first day of Eid al-Fitr in March 2026. The attack killed at least 70 people, injured 146 more, and completely disabled the only major referral hospital serving more than two million people in the region. Even after investigating claims that wounded RSF fighters were receiving care at the facility, the mission emphasized that providing medical treatment to injured combatants does not revoke a hospital’s protected status under international humanitarian law. The report also attributed strikes on the Abu Zaima market in North Kordofan and the Yabus market in Blue Nile to the SAF, finding no identifiable military targets at either impact site. Investigators noted that deliberate attacks on clearly civilian sites meet the legal definition of potential war crimes.

    The report dedicated specific analysis to the RSF’s foreign supply lines for its operations in Darfur, where the mission previously found evidence of acts bearing the hallmarks of genocide against non-Arab communities. It traced weapons, personnel, and supplies through interconnected air, maritime, and land routes that pass through Bosaso in Somalia’s Puntland region, southeastern Libya, and Chad. Among the military equipment supplied to the RSF are Chinese-made NORINCO AH-4 howitzers, FK-2000 air defense systems, and CH-95 reconnaissance and strike drones. Investigators noted that much of this materiel matches specifications of equipment previously exported to the UAE, a finding that reinforces existing links between Emirati-linked entities and the RSF supply chain.

    Witness testimony collected by the mission documented repeated cargo flights departing from the UAE, transiting through Chad, before moving supplies and foreign contractors into RSF-controlled territory. While investigators stopped short of holding the Emirati state officially responsible for the network’s actions, they concluded that individuals and entities registered, based, or linked to the UAE play a “significant role” in recruiting, financing, and transporting military contractors and delivering other critical support to the RSF. In its response to investigators, the UAE rejected all allegations of arms supplies or mercenary facilitation, insisting it has remained neutral in the conflict and that internal inquiries found no evidence linking entities under its jurisdiction to mercenary activity in Sudan. Even so, the fact-finding mission urged Emirati authorities to launch more robust investigations and take enforcement action against companies and individuals operating from its territory that support the RSF.

    Colombian contractors emerged as a particularly critical component of the RSF’s advanced weapons operations, the report found. Investigators estimate that as many as 2,000 former Colombian military personnel have been recruited to support the RSF since August 2024. Multiple witnesses confirmed that some of these contractors received combat training at a military-style facility in Ghayathi, UAE, before traveling to Sudan via Somalia, Libya, or Chad. Contractors belonging to a unit calling itself the “Desert Wolves” were present in el-Fasher before, during, and after the RSF’s seizure of the city, operating drones, artillery, and other advanced weapons systems.

    “This support fed into RSF operations in Zamzam camp and later during the takeover of el-Fasher, where the mission documented grave violations and international crimes, including conduct displaying hallmarks of genocide,” said Mona Rishmawi, a member of the fact-finding mission. The mission has previously confirmed that RSF forces and their allied militias committed war crimes and crimes against humanity during the el-Fasher campaign, and that their systematic targeting of non-Arab communities meets the criteria for potential acts of genocide.

    While investigators identified multiple unpublicized foreign individuals and entities linked to the support network, the report only publicly names individuals already sanctioned by the UN Security Council’s Sudan sanctions committee. That list includes retired Colombian colonel Alvaro Andres Quijano Becerra, founder of one of the main recruitment firms in the network, who was based in Abu Dhabi. His wife, Claudia Viviana Oliveros Forero, is accused of coordinating recruitment activities inside Colombia. Both were sanctioned by the Security Council in April for their role in recruiting and deploying former Colombian soldiers to Sudan. The mission confirmed it maintains confidential dossiers on other unnamed suspects, which it will share with international judicial and accountability bodies as needed.

    Colombian authorities have acknowledged that Colombian companies and individuals have recruited contractors for deployment to Sudan, but the state has denied directing or supporting these activities, and the fact-finding mission made no finding of official Colombian state responsibility for the network. Under international criminal law, any individual who knowingly provides practical assistance that substantially contributes to the commission of international crimes can be held liable for aiding and abetting, even if their support was not strictly indispensable to the crime.

    “Accountability cannot stop with those who carry out the attacks,” said mission member Joy Ngozi Ezeilo. Investigators are calling for full inquiries that trace accountability through the entire chain of command, including individuals who order, finance, supply, or otherwise facilitate international crimes in Sudan.

    To curb the ongoing flow of weapons fueling the conflict, the mission urged the UN Security Council to expand the existing partial arms embargo covering only Darfur to the entire territory of Sudan. It also called on all UN member states to halt all transfers of weapons, drones, and military technology to any Sudanese party when there is a substantial risk the equipment will be used to facilitate serious violations of international humanitarian and human rights law.

    Sudan’s ongoing civil war erupted in April 2023, triggered by a bitter power struggle between SAF chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and RSF commander Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, widely known as Hemedti. The conflict has killed at least tens of thousands of people, displaced more than 13 million from their homes, and pushed more than 19.5 million Sudanese to the brink of famine. The UN and European Union have both described the crisis as the world’s largest humanitarian and displacement emergency currently unfolding. Both warring parties have faced widespread accusations of systematic atrocities, and repeated international diplomatic efforts to negotiate a lasting ceasefire have all collapsed to date.

  • UAE president pardons Egyptian poet Abdul Rahman Yusuf al-Qaradawi

    UAE president pardons Egyptian poet Abdul Rahman Yusuf al-Qaradawi

    In a move that follows widespread international pressure from human rights organizations and United Nations experts, the United Arab Emirates’ president Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan has granted a pardon to Egyptian dissident poet and activist Abdul Rahman Yusuf al-Qaradawi, who had been sentenced to a decade in prison in the Gulf state, Emirati state media has confirmed.

    The pardon, issued Friday, comes less than three months after Qaradawi’s conviction on August 27 by the Cybercrime Circuit of the Abu Dhabi Federal Court of Appeal, which handed down the 10-year custodial sentence alongside a fine of 200,000 Emirati dirhams (equivalent to roughly $54,450).

    A dual Egyptian-Turkish national, Qaradawi was first apprehended by Lebanese security officials in January this year, before being extradited to the UAE to face charges of spreading “fake news” and “disturbing public security”. The charges stem from a social media video he recorded during a visit to Syria, in which he publicly criticized the governments of Egypt, the UAE and Saudi Arabia. Both Cairo and Abu Dhabi submitted formal extradition requests for the activist, and Lebanese authorities ultimately moved to enforce the UAE’s warrant on January 8.

    In the more than 200 days that followed his extradition to the UAE, Qaradawi was held in what human rights outlet Middle East Eye described as “forced disappearance”, with no public confirmation of charges or official indictment. The unacknowledged detention sparked fierce international pushback, with leading rights groups and UN experts repeatedly calling for his immediate release.

    London-based Amnesty International, one of the most vocal organizations calling for Qaradawi’s freedom, warned early in the case that his extradition represented a “flagrant violation of due process guarantees and other international human rights obligations, notably the principle of non-refoulement”. By March, a coalition of UN independent human rights experts issued a public statement raising alarm over Qaradawi’s ongoing unacknowledged detention, calling on UAE authorities to immediately disclose his location and ensure fair legal process.

    The experts also raised pointed concerns over the unusual legal mechanism that enabled the extradition: an arrest warrant issued through the Arab Interior Ministers’ Council (AIMC), a relatively obscure regional security body. The coalition argued the entire process was politically motivated rather than rooted in neutral legal criteria, warning that the AIMC’s cross-border arrest framework “is being abused by some states to silence criticism, shut down dissent, and pursue activists beyond their borders”.

    Amnesty International further confirmed that during Qaradawi’s initial detention in Lebanon, he was interrogated over two separate cases: a 2017 in-absentia verdict from an Egyptian court that convicted him of spreading false information in a widely condemned politically motivated case, and the separate extradition request from the UAE. The 2017 verdict added a five-year prison sentence to Qaradawi’s record in Egypt.

    Reaction to the news of the pardon has been largely positive among human rights advocates, though many have called for urgent action to complete Qaradawi’s release and allow him to reunite with his family. Samar Elhussieny, executive director of the Egyptian Human Rights Forum, welcomed the pardon in comments to Middle East Eye, urging Emirati officials to speed up final administrative procedures. “I hope the procedures will be finalised as soon as possible for him to be reunited with his family,” Elhussieny said. “Then he can live his life with his daughters in peace and safety, and heal from this traumatic experience.”

    Qaradawi, a well-known figure in Arab political and cultural circles, was a prominent public supporter of the 2011 Egyptian revolution that ousted long-time authoritarian president Hosni Mubarak. He also worked on the presidential campaign of former International Atomic Energy Agency head Mohammed el-Baradei, who ran for Egypt’s highest office following Mubarak’s resignation.

    In the years after 2011, Qaradawi was banned from publishing work and appearing on media outlets in Egypt, and joined hundreds of other Egyptian dissidents in self-imposed exile in Turkey. His family has also faced repeated pressure from Egyptian authorities: his sister Ola has been arbitrarily detained in Egypt for four years on unsubstantiated terrorism-related charges, widely seen as retaliation for the activist’s work. Qaradawi’s father, Yusuf al-Qaradawi, one of the most prominent and widely published Islamic scholars in the modern Arab world, died in Qatar in 2022.

  • ‘There was blood everywhere’: Survivors recount US strike on wedding in Iran

    ‘There was blood everywhere’: Survivors recount US strike on wedding in Iran

    What was supposed to be the most joyful milestone in the lives of young Iranian couple Maryam Mallahi and Ziaeddin became one of the deadliest civilian tragedies of the latest round of US military strikes across Iran, leaving five people dead and dozens injured, many of them children.

    On the evening of September 1, around 350 guests gathered in the small coastal community of Kuhestak, located in Sirik County along Iran’s Hormozgan province eastern shore, to mark the couple’s marriage. Following long-held local custom, the celebration was split across two separate venues: male guests assembled at a relative’s residence, while women and children waited for the newlyweds at the bride’s family home. Strings of colored lights were strung across the property, guests dressed in vibrant traditional attire, and anticipation built as the crowd waited for Maryam and Ziaeddin to make their entrance.

    The idyllic scene shattered at approximately 9 p.m., as the United States launched a sweeping new wave of air attacks across southern Iran. Multiple explosions echoed across Kuhestak, a small settlement where the wedding venue sat just 200 meters from a telecommunications tower that was among the initial targets hit. Moments after the first blasts, a projectile tore through the roof of the bride’s single-story home, where dozens of women and children had gathered.

    Majid, a 41-year-old guest at the nearby men’s gathering whose wife and five-year-old child were both wounded in the strike, described the chaos that unfolded in the attack’s immediate aftermath. “We were talking to other guests when suddenly we heard a terrifying sound. At first we thought it was an earthquake. We panicked and ran outside,” he recounted to Middle East Eye. “We rushed toward the bride’s house and saw smoke and fire everywhere. I pulled my wife and my child out from under the rubble. Screams came from every direction, there was blood everywhere, and everyone was scrambling to pull the wounded to safety.”

    Ali Mallahi, the bride’s father and owner of the destroyed home, told reporters he heard a second and third blast, and immediately realized the explosions were centered on his property. “The first explosion completely destroyed the single-story house and left it uninhabitable. The second struck the courtyard, damaging a car and other parts of the property. The house is not a home any more. It is gone,” he said.

    One projectile left a 1.5-meter-deep crater in the floor of one of the home’s main rooms, according to local on-site reporting.

    Mina, a female guest who was trapped under rubble before being rescued and transported to Abolfazl Hospital in nearby Minab, described the casual horror of the moment the attack hit. “We were eating ice cream – the weather is still very hot in Hormozgan this time of year, you know – and we were waiting for the bride and groom to arrive when suddenly we heard this terrifying explosion nearby,” she said. “A second blast hit the house almost immediately and tore a hole through the roof. Bricks and chunks of ceiling and walls came crashing down on us. Everyone was screaming, everyone was calling for help, nobody knew what had happened. I was trapped under the rubble. I was just lucky to get out alive.”

    Nineteen-year-old Zahra, another wounded guest, recalled the gruesome scene inside the home that had been decorated just hours earlier for a celebration. “Every carpet in the house was stained with blood. The shoes, the serving dishes, the lights they had put up for the wedding all had blood on them,” she said.

    Local residents launched a frantic search for survivors before formal emergency response teams could reach the remote site. A Red Crescent rescuer who arrived moments after the strike, who requested anonymity for security reasons, said that uninjured guests and nearby neighbors had already begun pulling survivors from the rubble by the time his team arrived. “People who had escaped the building and others who saw the attack from outside were already trying to pull the wounded and survivors out from under the rubble,” he said. “They were so terrified that we had to spend a large part of our time just calming them down. Of course they were terrified. This was a real tragedy. It took only a few moments for their wedding to turn into mourning.”

    Fifteen ambulances were deployed to the area, with most casualties transported to hospitals in Sirik and Minab, and the most severely injured admitted directly to intensive care units. Iranian officials initially recorded two deaths and 50 injuries, but the toll climbed steadily in the days after the attack. The final confirmed death toll stands at five: 50-year-old Zarkhatoun Taheri, 43-year-old Kolsoum Mallahi-Nezhadnia, 16-year-old Mohammad Mallahi, four-year-old Amir Mohammad Karimi, and 22-year-old Asieh Molaeinejad, who succumbed to her injuries in hospital on Thursday.

    Provincial authorities confirm 68 people were wounded in total, 19 of whom are children under the age of 10. Fatemeh, a lightly injured guest who knew Amir Mohammad and his family, shared the devastating heartbreak of the young boy’s death: “Amir Mohammad was supposed to start preschool in just a few days, when the new school year began. Now his parents have to attend his funeral. The grief is unbearable.”

    To date, no official Iranian or US statement has confirmed exactly what type of weapon struck the wedding venue. Witnesses interviewed by Middle East Eye gave conflicting accounts, with some identifying the projectile as a missile and others saying it came from a drone. Razieh Alishvandi, deputy for international and humanitarian affairs at the Iranian Red Crescent, has officially characterized the incident as a projectile strike on a private residential home during a civilian wedding. All residents and witnesses interviewed confirmed the home was purely residential, with no military, security, or intelligence infrastructure located nearby.

    The Kuhestak strike was part of a broader wave of US attacks across Hormozgan and other regions of southern Iran that night. Iranian officials confirmed additional strikes and explosions in Bandar Abbas, Qeshm, Jask, Konarak, and Chabahar. In Kuhestak, the strike also damaged the local telecommunications tower, portions of the town pier, and critical electricity and communications infrastructure, cutting mobile phone and internet service for Kuhestak and the nearby village of Mishi for several hours.

    For local residents, the attack immediately stirred traumatic memories of a February strike on the Shajareh Tayyebeh girls’ school in Minab that killed 156 people, most of them children, on the first day of US-Israeli strikes against Iran earlier this year.

    US officials have not publicly confirmed what the intended target in Kuhestak was. US Central Command said in a statement that the night’s strikes targeted Iranian radar, communications, and maritime capabilities, adding that the US military does not intentionally target civilians. US Vice President JD Vance later stated that Washington was launching an investigation into the incident.

    Maryam and Ziaeddin survived the attack only by chance: neither had arrived at the bride’s home when the projectile struck. While the couple escaped physical harm, all of the dead and injured are close relatives, friends, and guests they had invited to celebrate their marriage. A close friend of the bride, who requested anonymity, said Maryam remains in deep shock and fragile mental health. “Maryam is in a very bad state – very, very bad,” she said. “She had dreamed about this night for so long. She wanted to celebrate the beginning of her married life with her family and friends. Now her mental state is so fragile that we honestly do not know how she will cope with this tragedy.”