As Israel heads to snap parliamentary elections on October 27, three months out from polling day, the country’s political landscape has been upended by cascading crises that have left long-serving Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu facing the greatest electoral challenge of his decades-long career. A confluence of fallout from the devastating October 7, 2023, Hamas-led attacks, the ongoing controversial military campaign across Gaza and the wider region, and mass public anger over the stalled policy of conscripting ultra-Orthodox Jewish men has gutted support for Netanyahu’s right-wing governing coalition, opening a clear path for a newly emerged opposition leader to claim power. That leader is Gadi Eisenkot, a retired 35-year Israeli military veteran and former chief of staff, who has rapidly grown into Netanyahu’s most formidable opponent to date. Public opinion polling has consistently shown that Netanyahu’s right-leaning Likud party and its existing far-right allies are on track to fall well short of the 61-seat Knesset majority required to form a new government. In contrast, Eisenkot now leads a cross-ideological broad opposition bloc that unites right-wing, centrist, left-wing Jewish factions and even Palestinian-majority parties, with recent surveys indicating he holds the strongest chance any challenger has had in years to end Netanyahu’s extended grip on Israeli leadership. Middle East Eye has profiled the former military commander who is on track to become Israel’s next prime minister. Born in 1960 in the northern Israeli city of Tiberias to Moroccan Jewish immigrant parents, Eisenkot grew up in Eilat, Israel’s southernmost Red Sea port city. He enlisted in the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) in 1978 after completing secondary school, launching a 41-year military career that culminated in his appointment as IDF Chief of Staff in 2015, before he retired from active service in 2019 after four years in the service’s top role. Over his decades-long military tenure, Eisenkot rose steadily through the ranks to hold a series of key senior command positions. During the Second Intifada in the early 2000s, he led IDF operations across the occupied West Bank, before going on to head the military’s influential Operations Directorate and later its Northern Command, which oversees borders with Lebanon and Syria. It was during his tenure leading Northern Command that Eisenkot became closely linked to the controversial “Dahieh Doctrine”, a military strategy named after Beirut’s predominantly Shia Muslim southern suburbs, which was developed during the 2006 Lebanon War. The doctrine calls for the use of overwhelming disproportionate military force against civilian infrastructure in any area from which attacks on Israel are launched, with the explicit goal of inflicting widespread destruction to achieve strategic military goals. In a 2008 interview with Israeli newspaper Yedioth Ahronoth, Eisenkot laid out the framework of the strategy in plain terms: “In every village from which they fire at Israel, we will use disproportionate force and cause tremendous damage and destruction there. From our standpoint, these are military bases.” Seven years after outlining that doctrine, Netanyahu tapped Eisenkot to become IDF Chief of Staff, appointing him to the role after he served four years as deputy to outgoing chief Benny Gantz. During Gantz’s tenure, with Eisenkot as his second-in-command, the IDF killed more than 2,000 Palestinians during the 2014 Gaza war, which stood as Netanyahu’s largest military campaign until the 2023 offensive that followed the October 7 attacks. At Eisenkot’s 2015 swearing-in ceremony, Netanyahu framed the appointment around shared priorities of countering regional threats, stating: “The Middle East is falling apart. States are collapsing. Into this vacuum an empire is charging: Iran. It aspires to arm itself with nuclear weapons. The people of Israel trust you, the government of Israel trusts you, and Gadi, I trust you.” Upon taking command, Eisenkot echoed that commitment, saying: “We will strive to deter the enemy, keep war at bay, threaten and win.” A decade later, what began as a cooperative relationship between the two men has evolved into bitter political rivalry. While Eisenkot’s tenure as chief of staff did not include a large-scale military offensive on the scale of the 2014 Gaza war, violence across the occupied Palestinian territories escalated significantly during that period. During the 2018-2019 Great March of Return protests along the Gaza-Israel separation barrier, IDF forces killed more than 200 Palestinian protesters and wounded thousands more, many of whom were shot while approaching the fence. One of the most defining moments of Eisenkot’s military career came in 2016, after IDF soldier Elor Azaria shot and killed injured Palestinian Abdel Fattah al-Sharif in the Tel Rumeida neighborhood of Hebron. Sharif, who had carried out a stabbing attack on Israeli soldiers, was already incapacitated and lying on the ground when Azaria shot him in the head, an incident captured on viral cellphone video that sparked international condemnation. Despite intense public and political pressure from right-wing parties and protesters to drop charges against Azaria, Eisenkot insisted the soldier face a military court martial, arguing that Azaria’s actions violated the IDF’s formal code of ethics. Azaria was ultimately convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to 18 months in prison, though Eisenkot later approved a reduction of the sentence to 14 months; Azaria was released after serving just nine months behind bars and never expressed remorse for the killing. After retiring from the IDF in 2019, Eisenkot entered electoral politics in 2022, joining his former superior Benny Gantz’s right-of-center National Unity party. He won a seat in the Knesset later that year, shortly after Netanyahu returned to power as prime minister following the 2022 elections. The October 7, 2023, attacks prompted National Unity to join Netanyahu’s wartime emergency unity government, with both Gantz and Eisenkot taking seats on the small, powerful Israeli war cabinet. But tensions between the former generals and Netanyahu quickly boiled over into public view, as Eisenkot repeatedly slammed Netanyahu’s management of the war, accusing the prime minister of failing to prioritize the release of the 251 hostages taken by Hamas during the October 7 attacks. He argued that extreme political pressure from Netanyahu’s far-right coalition partners Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben Gvir had undermined international efforts to negotiate a hostage release deal. Speaking to Israeli outlet Channel 12 News in January 2026, Eisenkot said: “Forty-six hostages who should have returned did not return, some of whom we could have brought back. We made mistakes. Netanyahu sabotaged an agreement with Hamas early in the war after initially approving it. Everyone who held a command or leadership position during the October 7 attacks must pay a price and go home.” In September 2025, Eisenkot left Gantz’s flagging National Unity party, which had seen its support collapse amid growing public dissatisfaction, to launch his own independent political movement called Yashar – Hebrew for “straight” or “honest”. Announcing his new party, Eisenkot framed it as a break from the divisive, self-serving politics of the current government, saying it would work toward “repair, healing, and hope for Israeli society” while placing “the security and national interests of the State of Israel above every other consideration” – a direct rebuke of Netanyahu, whom Eisenkot has repeatedly accused of prioritizing his own political survival over the good of the country. The decision to strike out on his own has proven to be a successful political gamble. Recent opinion polls have consistently ranked Yashar among Israel’s top two parties, with some surveys putting it ahead of Netanyahu’s Likud, and indicating that the broad opposition bloc aligned with Eisenkot holds enough projected support to secure a 61-seat governing majority. But leading Israeli political analyst Dahlia Scheindlin notes that Eisenkot’s rapid rise is as much a reflection of broader anti-Netanyahu sentiment across the country as it is of his own personal popularity. “Some of the support for Eisenkot is not because of him,” Scheindlin told Middle East Eye. “There is a whole constituency who opposed Netanyahu since the first months of the government’s formation. This camp is not small. Its support first went to Gantz after October 7 and later to former Prime Minister Naftali Bennett. It’s not really thanks to Eisenkot, but because there is a political camp searching for a leader.” Scheindlin adds that Eisenkot’s decades-long military career has significantly boosted his public standing, a common advantage for former IDF leaders in Israeli politics. “Military leaders enjoy public support since the founding of the state, due to the high level of trust the Israeli public places in the army. Like other former generals who entered politics, Eisenkot is widely viewed as efficient, pragmatic, and professional.” Beyond his military credentials, Scheindlin argues that Eisenkot’s personal story of loss has resonated deeply with a public traumatized by nearly three years of ongoing war. Between October 2023 and November 2024, Eisenkot’s son Gal and two of his nephews were killed fighting in the IDF’s ground offensive in Gaza. “He lost his son and two nephews while the government sealed its heart to the bereaved families and to the suffering of people, at a time when most Israelis wanted a deal,” Scheindlin said. “Eisenkot is seen by many Israelis as someone who himself suffered along with the people and sacrificed his son and nephews. This creates a sharp contrast between him and Netanyahu, generates anger towards the government, and channels public rage toward the current administration.” His ethnic background has also become a core part of his political identity: if elected, Eisenkot would become Israel’s first prime minister from Mizrahi Jewish descent, the community of Jews whose families trace their origins to the Middle East and North Africa. As the son of Moroccan immigrants, he has recently been targeted by what critics describe as overtly racist dog whistles from Netanyahu’s reelection campaign. Mizrahi Jews have long faced systemic discrimination from Israel’s historically dominant Ashkenazi (European-origin) political and social elite, though Likud has long positioned itself as the political home for Mizrahi voters. Responding to the attacks from Likud, Eisenkot said: “My parents immigrated from Morocco, and I am proud of them and of my origins, but I would be glad if, first and foremost, we were proud to be Israelis.” Eisenkot has also built tentative support among Palestinian citizens of Israel, who make up roughly 20% of the country’s electorate, according to Palestinian human rights lawyer Amal Oraby. “He has a good starting point in the Palestinian society in Israel,” Oraby told Middle East Eye. “Unlike Benny Gantz, Eisenkot did not conduct a full-scale war against the Palestinians when he was chief of staff. Despite the disappointment of the Palestinian public in Israel with generals, Eisenkot’s image isn’t bad, also because he doesn’t run a racist campaign.” While Oraby notes that Eisenkot has largely stayed silent as opposition parties compete to adopt increasingly hardline anti-Palestinian rhetoric, many Palestinian citizens of Israel still view him as a far more pragmatic alternative to Netanyahu. Oraby quoted his father saying: “Netanyahu made us miss Golda Meir and Menachem Begin. The level of violence and fascism of this government led the Palestinian public to want someone normal, someone they can see as a partner for dialogue.” Eisenkot has positioned himself as a unifying leader focused on healing Israel’s deep political divides after nearly three years of war and mass internal unrest. “The difficult and prolonged war has exposed the depth of the rift and the need for a different kind of leadership – professional, unifying and committed to democratic conduct,” the Yashar party states on its official website. The party has pledged to prioritize mandatory conscription for ultra-Orthodox Jewish men, strengthen independent democratic institutions, and reduce crippling political polarization. Earlier this month, Eisenkot also vowed to repeal the controversial exemption legislation passed by Netanyahu’s government, accusing the prime minister of weakening the IDF by protecting ultra-Orthodox communities from military service. Yet analysts point out that Eisenkot has remained deliberately vague on many of the core issues that would define his premiership, most notably the decades-long Israeli-Palestinian conflict. “Eisenkot says nothing,” Scheindlin said. “He focuses on things that can be implemented immediately and on his personal life story. His ambiguity extends even to the judicial overhaul that triggered mass protests in 2023. His advisers have adopted the approach that there’s no need to talk about the Palestinian issue. It’s possible that centrist voters think Eisenkot has a willingness to reach some kind of agreement with the Palestinians, but he’s like a blank canvas onto which you project all your wishes.” Oraby argues that Eisenkot largely favors a return to Israel’s long-standing pre-Netanyahu policy of managing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict rather than pursuing permanent annexation or a two-state solution. Even so, many Palestinians see him as a more moderate option: “Palestinians can take comfort in the fact that he is not a settler,” Oraby said, referencing the current government’s push for rapid settlement expansion across the occupied West Bank. At the same time, Oraby notes that Eisenkot has made almost no effort to directly engage Palestinian citizens of Israel, or address the ongoing crisis of violent organized crime in Palestinian communities inside Israel, which has killed roughly 150 Palestinian citizens since the start of 2026, most of whose cases remain unsolved. “He doesn’t speak to the Palestinian electorate as a public he wants to persuade, and he has offered no proposals to tackle violent crime in Palestinian communities inside Israel,” Oraby said. “There is an understanding among the Palestinian public in Israel that a government led by Eisenkot won’t perform miracles and certainly won’t resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Palestinian public just wants a return to normalcy.” Scheindlin agrees that the core difference between Eisenkot and Netanyahu is less about long-term ideological vision and more about political style. “While Eisenkot is vague, he doesn’t want to establish the Kingdom of Judah that controls the entire territory and expels Palestinians,” she said. “That’s the meaning of pragmatic. He won’t move toward a fundamentalist vision.” Eisenkot’s own public comments confirm that framing: he has voiced support for maintaining Israeli control over large parts of the occupied West Bank while opposing full unilateral annexation, a priority for Netanyahu’s far-right coalition partners. “A reality in which we annex the Palestinians to Israel would be a severe threat to the Zionist project,” he told Channel 13, adding that Jewish settlement construction should continue within existing Israeli legal frameworks. “I have never spoken about a Palestinian state,” he said earlier this month, pushing back against claims from the right that he is a secret left-wing candidate, but added that he will do everything in his power to block Smotrich’s full annexation plan for the West Bank, calling the proposal “foolish, completely insane”. He has also stated that Israel needs to separate “between terror and the population” when it comes to Palestinian communities. On the future of Gaza, Eisenkot has argued that Hamas must be completely eliminated as a military and governing force, and replaced by a reformed, de-radicalized Palestinian Authority. “The Palestinian Authority in Gaza is a less bad solution than Hamas,” he told i24News last month. “Hamas must be eliminated as a military and governmental force, and a different leadership must arise, one affiliated with an upgraded Palestinian Authority, which will undergo a thorough process of de-radicalisation.” Whether Eisenkot can convert his strong polling numbers into an outright electoral victory and a working governing majority remains uncertain. “His chances aren’t bad,” Scheindlin said. She notes that opposition parties have held a majority in most public opinion polls ever since Netanyahu returned to power in 2022. “For three and a half years now the opposition parties have had a majority in most public opinion polls, it is now much harder for Likud to form a government after the elections.” Much of the final outcome will likely depend on whether Eisenkot is willing to formally include Palestinian-majority parties in his governing coalition. Most polls show that Eisenkot’s Yashar party and its Jewish opposition allies fall just short of the 61-seat majority needed to form government without the support of Palestinian factions. Together, the United Arab List (known by its Hebrew acronym Raam) and the Hadash-Taal alliance are projected to win roughly 10 seats, which would make them the decisive kingmakers in post-election coalition negotiations. Many Israeli opposition parties have already ruled out working with Palestinian parties, an unnecessary move that limits their coalition options, Scheindlin argues. But Eisenkot has left the door open to cooperation, at least with the conservative Raam party. “He leaves the door open to cooperation with Raam,” Scheindlin said, noting that Eisenkot’s three core principles – maintaining Israel as a Jewish and democratic state, upholding the values of the Declaration of Independence, and supporting military or civilian national service – provide enough common ground to work with the party. Eisenkot’s emphasis on civilian national service as an alternative to military conscription, a policy long supported by Raam, is widely seen as a clear signal that he would be open to including the party in a future coalition. Even so, Scheindlin warns that Netanyahu remains an extremely formidable political opponent, even with his coalition’s weak polling numbers. By consolidating his base on the far right and reshaping his coalition ahead of election day, “there’s a not-small chance that Netanyahu will be able to form a government”, she said. Even if neither side secures a clear parliamentary majority, Scheindlin notes that Netanyahu could still force Israel into yet another round of snap elections – a scenario that has repeatedly prolonged his time in power over the past decade.
