标签： Asia

Just days after announcing “Project Freedom”—a U.S. military initiative designed to reestablish safe commercial navigation through the strategically critical Strait of Hormuz—former U.S. President Donald Trump announced a halt to the operation. In a social media statement, Trump explained the pause was intended to create space for U.S. diplomatic teams to negotiate a conflict-ending agreement with Iran.

Iran’s state-run media quickly framed the suspension of the U.S. mission as a clear setback for Washington. This development comes on the heels of repeated Iranian threats to target any commercial or military vessels attempting to transit the waterway, followed by a series of missile and drone strikes against civilian commercial ships and targets in the United Arab Emirates. Today, the future trajectory of the conflict remains deeply uncertain, but one factor is widely agreed upon by global observers: China will play a decisive role in any eventual outcome.

Over the opening two months of the ongoing conflict, China has served as the primary pillar sustaining Iran’s struggling economy. Even before the outbreak of hostilities, China absorbed as much as 90% of Iran’s total crude oil exports, purchasing more than one million barrels of Iranian oil daily. That steady flow of crude continued uninterrupted in the conflict’s early stages: CNBC data confirms that at least 11.7 million barrels of Iranian oil were shipped to Chinese buyers between February 28 and March 10.

To bypass harsh U.S.-led Western sanctions that block Iran from accessing the U.S.-dominated SWIFT global payment network, payments for Iranian crude are processed through Chinese financial infrastructure, including Bank of Kunlun and China’s Cross-border Interbank Payment System (CIPS). These platforms allow for oil trade transactions to be settled in Chinese yuan, effectively keeping Iranian oil revenues beyond the reach of the U.S. Treasury Department and enabling Tehran to continue earning critical foreign currency despite international pressure.

While the volume of Iranian oil flowing to China has declined since mid-April, when the U.S. enforced a naval blockade around Iranian export ports, China still maintains a limited but critical revenue lifeline for the Iranian government moving forward. On May 2, China’s Ministry of Commerce issued an official order directing Chinese companies not to comply with newly imposed U.S. sanctions targeting five Chinese refiners linked to the Iranian oil trade. This ruling allows these refiners to continue processing Iranian crude that arrives via overland rail routes or that was already stored in facilities outside the U.S. blockade zone. As of April 21, industry estimates indicate roughly 160 million barrels of Iranian crude were already in transit or held in floating storage at sea, much of it bound for Chinese markets.

China’s sustained economic support for Iran has emerged as a major new point of diplomatic friction between Washington and Beijing, just ahead of a scheduled high-stakes summit between Trump and Chinese leader Xi Jinping. During a May 4 interview with Fox News, U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent characterized China’s continued purchases of Iranian oil as equivalent to “funding global terrorism.”

Despite rising U.S. criticism, China’s outsized economic influence over Iran also grants Beijing significant diplomatic leverage over Tehran, and available evidence suggests a negotiated end to the conflict aligns with China’s core strategic interests. Global energy price spikes triggered by the Hormuz disruption have already started to put downward pressure on China’s domestic economy, and brokering a peaceful resolution would also bolster Beijing’s goal of positioning itself as a responsible global power on the international stage.

China has already played a substantial behind-the-scenes diplomatic role in de-escalating tensions. While Pakistan has served as an official public mediator between the U.S. and Iran, many independent analysts credit China as the primary driving force behind the temporary ceasefire reached in April. During that period, Iranian officials confirmed that China had publicly called on Tehran to demonstrate flexibility and work to reduce confrontational tensions.

Beijing has continued its diplomatic push for negotiations in the weeks following the ceasefire. Mere hours after Trump announced the pause on Project Freedom, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi traveled to Beijing for talks with his Chinese counterpart Wang Yi—marking the first visit by Iran’s top diplomat to China since the conflict began. In an official statement released after the May 6 meeting, China’s foreign ministry reiterated that “a complete cessation of fighting must be achieved without delay … and that continuing to negotiate remains essential.” For his part, Araghchi confirmed Iran would defend its “legitimate rights and interests in the negotiations” while signaling openness to “accept a fair and comprehensive agreement.”

At the same time, there are clear signs that China is hedging its strategic bets to account for multiple possible outcomes. A prolonged, draining conflict that ties down substantial U.S. military resources in the Middle East offers clear strategic benefits for China, most notably by diverting Washington’s attention and military assets away from the Asia-Pacific region. U.S. intelligence assessments indicate Beijing has actively considered providing direct military support to Iran if open hostilities resume. Multiple outlets, including CNN, reported in April that China has weighed transferring shoulder-fired anti-air missiles (Manpads) to Iran, potentially routing shipments through third countries to obscure Beijing’s direct involvement. China has repeatedly denied these claims, stating it “has never provided weapons to any party to the conflict.”

Beyond potential arms transfers, Chinese technical assistance has already improved the operational capacity of Iran’s military since the conflict began. Since 2021, Iran has gradually integrated China’s BeiDou satellite navigation system, an alternative to the U.S.-run Global Positioning System (GPS). BeiDou has assisted in guiding Iranian missile strikes during the conflict and enabled more consistent monitoring of U.S. military deployments across the region.

From the conflict’s opening weeks to the current diplomatic impasse, China has shaped the trajectory of hostilities in meaningful ways. Given its unique combination of economic, diplomatic and limited military influence over Iran, Beijing will remain a core determinant of whether the crisis moves toward a lasting negotiated settlement or reignites into open, large-scale conflict.

In a high-stakes legal ruling that caps another chapter of South Korea’s post-2024 political upheaval, the Seoul High Court has slashed the prison sentence of former prime minister Han Duck-soo, a key figure in ex-President Yoon Suk Yeol’s failed December 2024 martial law declaration that ultimately toppled Yoon’s administration.

Han, a 76-year-old veteran career bureaucrat hand-picked by Yoon, originally received a 23-year prison term from a lower Seoul district court in January over his conviction on rebellion charges tied to the unconstitutional power grab. Yoon himself was sentenced to life in prison on the same rebellion charges just one month after Han’s initial conviction.

Handing down its decision Thursday, the appellate court upheld nearly all of the guilty verdicts against Han, but adjusted his total sentence to 15 years behind bars. The ruling reaffirmed all core charges against the former prime minister, including that he took intentional steps to lend an air of legitimacy to Yoon’s illegal martial law decree by securing the measure’s endorsement at a formal Cabinet meeting. The court also upheld findings that Han participated in discussions to cut water and electricity access to major South Korean media outlets, falsified official documents related to the martial proclamation, ordered the original document destroyed, and committed perjury during investigation proceedings.

In its ruling statement, the Seoul High Court emphasized the extreme severity of Han’s offenses, noting that as the second-highest ranking official in the Yoon administration, he betrayed the enormous public trust placed in his position and actively collaborated in the rebellion against South Korea’s constitutional order.

Park SungBae, a prominent South Korean criminal law specialist, noted that both the lower district court and the appellate court have consistently framed Han’s crimes as exceptionally serious. Park explained that the revised 15-year sentence aligns with the broader sentencing pattern for other senior officials convicted in connection with the martial law plot: for example, Yoon’s former Interior Minister Lee Sang-min received a seven-year prison term for his role, a benchmark the appellate court likely considered when adjusting Han’s sentence.

Park added that the special prosecutor handling the case actually requested a 15-year sentence for Han during the original trial at Seoul Central District Court. While the 23-year initial sentence handed down by the lower court was harsher than many legal observers anticipated, it still fell within the standard sentencing range for the gravity of Han’s crimes, Park noted.

Both legal teams for Han and the office of the special prosecutor now have a seven-day window to file a further appeal to South Korea’s Supreme Court, the nation’s highest judicial body.

A seasoned public servant with a four-decade career in government, Han has held the post of prime minister twice: first under liberal President Roh Moo-hyun from 2007 to 2008, and again under conservative Yoon starting in 2022. After Yoon was suspended from office following his martial law attempt, Han served as one of three interim caretaker leaders before the formal impeachment process concluded.

The chain of events triggered by Yoon’s martial law declaration ultimately ended in his removal from power: South Korea’s National Assembly impeached Yoon, and the Constitutional Court formally ordered his permanent removal from office in April 2025. Liberal opposition leader Lee Jae Myung won a subsequent snap presidential election to succeed Yoon as the country’s head of state.

On Tuesday, a former high-ranking US official made a stark prediction about long-term control of the strategic Strait of Hormuz, arguing that Iran will retain dominance of the critical waterway indefinitely—no matter what provisions any eventual US-Iran peace deal includes. This outlook, he says, is already pushing vulnerable Gulf Arab states to accelerate the construction of alternative oil and gas export infrastructure to escape Iran’s strategic chokehold over the world’s most important energy chokepoint.

Amos Hochstein, who served as a senior energy and Middle East policy advisor to former US President Joe Biden, laid out his assessment in an interview with Bloomberg. When asked about ongoing negotiations between the Trump administration and Iran aimed at ending the ongoing US-Israeli military campaign against the Islamic Republic, Hochstein left little room for ambiguity: “The Strait of Hormuz is under Iranian control forever — basically for the foreseeable future. Nobody in the market should look at what the deal says eventually and believe it on [the] straits. Iran will control the straits.”

Hochstein noted that while political leaders in Washington may accept any language about reopening the strait in a final agreement, regional Gulf states understand full well that Iran will hold de facto power over access to the waterway moving forward. “Everybody in Washington will believe it. Nobody in the Gulf,” he said. “They know the Iranians are now going to control this.”

The strategic waterway has emerged as the central sticking point in the current US-Iran peace negotiations, with both sides imposing blockades to assert territorial and military control. Iran has been blocked from moving its own oil tankers out of the Strait of Hormuz and the adjacent Gulf of Oman, but Tehran has in turn blocked exports from neighboring Gulf Arab states through the waterway. Tensions have escalated sharply in recent days: earlier this week, Iran announced it had struck a US warship that attempted to breach its blockade, and also launched drone and missile attacks targeting the United Arab Emirates, in what was widely interpreted as a response to US naval activity in the region.

Following the Trump administration’s rejection of an Iranian proposal to reopen the strait in exchange for a ceasefire and a delay to negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program, Iran confirmed Wednesday it is reviewing a new peace proposal put forward by the US. For his part, Trump said Wednesday he believes a final agreement with Iran is “very possible,” but issued a blunt threat to resume large-scale bombardment of the country if talks collapse, adding that the US will only accept nothing less than Iran’s “surrender.”

Against this backdrop of uncertainty, Hochstein says Gulf states have already begun moving forward to build new pipeline infrastructure that bypasses the Strait entirely. Smaller Gulf nations including Kuwait and Bahrain have been completely cut off from their traditional export routes through the waterway, and Qatar’s liquefied natural gas exports have been brought to a complete halt, forcing the country to extend force majeure on LNG shipments through June.

Larger regional players that already had partial bypass infrastructure in place have fared far better. Saudi Arabia, for example, continues to export roughly five million barrels of crude per day via its East-West Pipeline, which moves oil from Gulf production fields to the Red Sea for export. The UAE operates a pipeline to the Indian Ocean port of Fujairah, allowing it to maintain exports at roughly half of pre-war levels. Iraq, another major oil exporter heavily reliant on the Strait, is also rushing to develop alternative routes: this week, Baghdad launched its first crude oil exports via the al-Yarubiya-Rabia border crossing with Syria, with 70 tanker trucks carrying crude north for export out of Mediterranean ports. Iraq is also working to expand the capacity of an existing oil pipeline running north to Turkey to boost alternative exports.

Far from being a prohibitive investment, Hochstein argued that the cost of new bypass infrastructure is relatively modest given the scale of energy exports from the region: “It’s not even that expensive. A few billion dollars. But a few billion dollars in what we’re talking about doesn’t cost very much.”

Beyond the geopolitical shift, the disruption to Strait of Hormuz shipping has already created massive dislocations in global energy pricing, with huge gaps between benchmark futures prices and the actual physical cost of crude. Hochstein pointed out that benchmark prices quoted on global markets do not reflect actual trading costs, noting: “$110 of Brent oil is only available on a Bloomberg terminal. You can’t buy that barrel. That barrel of Brent oil is selling for $150. $145 some days, $155, even $170.”

This discrepancy is not new: HSBC CEO Georges Elhedery noted last month that extreme price disparities exist across different markets, with the most severe impacts hitting energy-importing low-income nations with no domestic oil production. Elhedery reported that spot crude prices have reached as high as $286 per barrel in Sri Lanka. Hochstein warned that this supply shortage will not stay confined to vulnerable low-income countries: “We have physical shortage already, but it’s just in countries we don’t care about. But then it will go to middle-income countries, like Vietnam and Thailand, then it goes to Japan and Korea, and then it comes here.”

In the volatile geopolitical landscape of the Middle East centered on Iran, there is an old, unwritten rule: if you have to publicly explain that you have achieved victory, you have already suffered a quiet defeat. That unforgiving standard now applies to President Donald Trump’s stunning last-minute reversal: just one day after launching Operation Freedom, a U.S. Navy escort initiative for commercial cargo transiting the Strait of Hormuz, the president announced he was putting the mission on hold. The sudden policy shift has left observers baffled, as has Trump’s claim that a breakthrough peace deal with Tehran’s ruling regime is within close reach.

It is worth noting that fixating on the president’s frequent policy shifts can quickly become disorienting. No external observer has access to the full scope of classified intelligence that Trump reviews daily; only the president himself knows his ultimate strategic objectives and the path he intends to take to reach them. That said, retired U.S. Marine Colonel Grant Newsham, author of *When China Attacks: A Warning to America*, draws a parallel between this moment and several landmark missteps in recent U.S. foreign policy history—ones that have echoed through global security for decades.

Newsham compares the early halt to the Hormuz mission to 1991, when President George H.W. Bush ended the first Gulf War just 72 hours too soon, leaving Saddam Hussein’s regime intact and setting the stage for decades of conflict and a second U.S. invasion a dozen years later. The same ominous feeling arose in 2001, when President George W. Bush allowed Osama bin Laden to escape the Tora Bora mountains in Afghanistan rather than closing the net and eliminating the al-Qaeda leader. A similar missed opportunity played out in the 1990s, when the U.S. had a clear opening to halt the Kim family regime’s nuclear weapons program in North Korea, but President Bill Clinton declined to act—with backing from former President Jimmy Carter, who infamously declared Kim Il Sung “a good man we can do business with.”

More recently, Newsham points to missteps during Trump’s first term that fit the same pattern. When Chinese telecommunications giants Huawei and ZTE—widely accused of functioning as arms of Beijing’s intelligence apparatus—were on the brink of collapse from U.S. sanctions, Trump stepped in to relieve pressure and allow the firms to rebuild. The same goes for TikTok, the popular short-video app repeatedly flagged as a continuous Chinese intelligence collection and influence operation, which the first Trump administration ultimately failed to ban or force a sale of.

Across these cases, Newsham argues, American leaders have lost the ability to follow through on defeating adversaries, instead choosing to redefine “victory” to match incomplete, half-finished policy outcomes.

A particularly troubling element of the current shift, Newsham notes, is the Trump administration’s reported willingness to allow Pakistan to mediate any future deal with Iran. Pakistan, he argues, has long been firmly aligned with Beijing, taking strategic direction from China on key regional issues. This dynamic is analogous to the Biden administration relying on Russia to mediate U.S.-Iran talks—a move that ignores basic geopolitical realities: it is critical to correctly identify which nations are genuine allies and which are not.

Pakistan has a long track record of double-dealing that undermines U.S. interests, from its duplicitous behavior throughout the 20-year U.S. campaign in Afghanistan to its decade-long hosting of Osama bin Laden after his 2001 escape. Islamabad has also waged a sustained terror campaign against India for years, a campaign that rivals the destructive activities of Iran’s Quds Force. Newsham questions why a nation with this track record would be trusted to mediate a deal critical to U.S. national security.

To be fair, Newsham acknowledges that the president has access to intelligence that outside commentators do not, and there could be sound justifications for pausing Operation Freedom. Perhaps the U.S. is facing a shortage of interceptor missiles, and leaders fear Iranian strikes on critical desalination plants operated by Gulf Cooperation Council nations. Maybe the United Arab Emirates, which has already suffered Iranian attacks on its oil infrastructure, intervened to request a hold on military escalation.

Even so, the sudden about-face defies explanation: less than 12 hours before the pause, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman General Michael Cain publicly announced plans for a multi-layered defense “Red, White and Blue Dome” to protect shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. That proposal was abruptly pulled off the table within a single day.

Another possible explanation is that Trump believes he can reach a favorable deal with self-identified “moderates” within the Iranian regime. But Newsham pushes back on this: nearly 50 years of dealing with the Islamic Republic should have taught U.S. leaders that genuine moderates do not hold power in Tehran—most Iranians who favor liberalization live in exile abroad. The ruling regime that just brutally suppressed domestic unrest, killing an estimated 40,000 protestors, has not changed its core ideological or strategic goals.

Geopolitical windows of opportunity do not stay open forever, Newsham warns, and this moment to neutralize Iran’s nuclear and regional threat may be closing—closing at the hands of the U.S. itself. Even if a deal is reached, Tehran has a long track record of breaking its international commitments. The regime will almost certainly rebuild its military capabilities, continue its push for a nuclear weapon, reactivate its network of regional proxy militant groups, and brutally eliminate all domestic opposition—the same opposition that Trump publicly promised “help is on the way.”

The regional and global ripple effects of this reversal are already taking shape, Newsham argues. Chinese leader Xi Jinping had been thrown off balance by the strong U.S. military display and demonstrated political will during recent operations in Venezuela and the opening stages of the Iran conflict. Now, Xi will have little reason to fear U.S. resolve. He will learn that the U.S. rarely follows through on its threats, and that Beijing only needs to hold out and outwait American political will.

For U.S. allies across the Middle East and Indo-Pacific that counted on Washington to see the mission through and confront aggressive regional powers, this reversal will sow deep uncertainty and mistrust. In the end, Newsham concludes, it will not take long for the outcome of this policy shift to become clear. If the Trump administration finds itself having to convince the world that it won in Iran, that old unwritten rule still holds: the explanation itself is proof of defeat.

Israeli far-right National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir has ignited fierce international condemnation after sharing a provocative TikTok video that leverages a popular viral trend to glorify the recent Knesset approval of capital punishment for Palestinian prisoners.

The clip, posted on May 4, adapts the viral “I know I should sleep, but the voices in my head go…” audio trend to feature a montage of AI-generated images of everyday objects shaped into gallows and execution nooses. In the caption of the post, written in Hebrew, Ben-Gvir wrote: “I dream of the death penalty for terrorists. What do you dream of?” The caption was paired with relevant hashtags and the trend’s official audio track.

This public glorification of execution is far from an isolated incident for the ultranationalist minister. Ben-Gvir has spent years aggressively campaigning to expand the death penalty to Palestinian detainees, a policy that secured final approval from Israel’s parliament, the Knesset, in a 62-48 vote across second and third readings on March 30. Just days before the TikTok post, Ben-Gvir faced widespread criticism for celebrating his 50th birthday with a multi-tiered birthday cake topped with a golden noose, emblazoned with the message “Congratulations Minister Ben-Gvir, sometimes dreams come true.” A smaller cake from his wife Ayala bore the same slogan, with photos from the event showing Ben-Gvir smiling alongside the controversial dessert.

Within hours of the TikTok going live, it drew intense backlash across global social media platforms, with users across X, Instagram and other platforms decrying the minister’s rhetoric as dangerous and dehumanizing. Many commentators labeled the video “sickening,” “morally rotten” and “sadistic,” warning it exposes the eliminationist core of the current Israeli government’s ideology toward Palestinians.

One post on X argued that the minister’s fixation on executing Palestinian detainees lays bare the “genocidal mindset of the Israeli occupation,” adding that Ben-Gvir is not a fringe outlier, but a representative of the current ruling majority — a reality that, the commenter noted, is already proven by the ongoing catastrophic humanitarian crisis in Gaza. Another Instagram user called the clip “unashamed evil,” while commentators have questioned the minister’s psychological state, with one comment bluntly labeling him a psychopath, and another comparing his ideology to Nazism.

Other critics framed the video against the backdrop of ongoing Israeli military operations in Gaza and attempts by humanitarian aid flotillas to break Israel’s blockade of the enclave. One commentator flipped Ben-Gvir’s framing, arguing that the only criminals in the current context are not the starving Palestinian people, but the activists who bring food and aid to starving Gaza children, as labeled by Israeli officials.

Many social media users even raised the prospect of future international accountability for Ben-Gvir, with one comment noting: “When eventually Ben-Gvir is caught up on his war crimes and tried, don’t nobody tell me he shouldn’t get the noose.”

Ahmad Tibi, an Arab member of the Knesset, also condemned the sequence of events, saying both Ben-Gvir and his wife “need a psychiatrist immediately.” Tibi pointed out that ordinary people celebrate birthdays with wishes for peace and prosperity, but Ben-Gvir’s circle instead “sanctify hatred and death.”

Human rights organizations have already labeled the newly passed death penalty law discriminatory and racist, warning that Ben-Gvir’s “dream” of widespread executions would formalize state-sanctioned killing of Palestinian prisoners, most of whom are already held in Israeli detention facilities under documented conditions of torture, inadequate medical care and severe food deprivation. According to Addameer, a Palestinian prisoners’ rights advocacy group, more than 9,600 Palestinians are currently held in Israeli custody as of 2024.