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Against the backdrop of fragile ongoing ceasefire talks between the United States and Iran, a striking historical parallel drawn by an ancient history scholar offers a stark warning: reaching a lasting peace may prove just as destabilizing and painful as enduring open conflict. As the future of any potential US-Iran agreement remains uncertain, with no clear consensus on its terms or longevity, Peter Edwell, an associate professor of ancient history at Australia’s Macquarie University and a specialist on ancient Persia (the historical predecessor to modern Iran), argues that the current diplomatic gridlock facing the Trump administration should come as no surprise.

For centuries, the two great competing powers of the ancient world — the Roman Empire and the Persian Empire, ruled first by the Parthian dynasty from 247 BCE to 224 CE, then by the Sasanian dynasty until 651 CE — cycled endlessly between open war and fragile peace deals that rarely resolved core disputes, and often left underlying tensions worse than before. For these ancient rivals, peace treaties were rarely tools of lasting reconciliation; instead, they were most often just strategic pauses to buy time for military rearmament and preparation for the next conflict.

The first major military clash between Rome and Parthia came in 53 BCE, when Roman general Marcus Crassus launched a disastrous invasion of Parthian territory. The campaign ended in catastrophic defeat on the plains of Carrhae, in modern-day southern Turkey, where Crassus himself was killed and thousands of Roman troops lost their lives. The defeat emboldened Parthia, and by 20 BCE, Rome was forced to accept a peace agreement that formalized the Euphrates River as the official border between the two empires — a major concession for a power that had previously known unbroken territorial expansion.

Conflict reignited in the mid-first century CE, this time over control of strategically located Armenia, a buffer state nestled between the two empires in what is now modern Armenia and eastern Turkey. After the conclusion of hostilities, Roman Emperor Nero and Parthian King Vologases I agreed to the Treaty of Rhandeia in 63 CE, which allowed Parthia to nominate Armenia’s king, on the condition that the coronation be performed by the Roman emperor in Rome. While the treaty resolved the immediate crisis, its awkward power-sharing structure proved unworkable over time. When Parthia ultimately disregarded the agreement’s terms, Roman Emperor Trajan launched a full-scale invasion of Parthia in 114 CE. Though Trajan’s forces won early victories, including capturing the Parthian capital, the invasion ultimately collapsed, and all Roman territorial gains were lost within just three years, by the time of Trajan’s death in 117 CE.

After the Sasanian dynasty replaced the Parthians as rulers of Persia in 224 CE, tensions with Rome escalated dramatically, with control of Armenia once again at the center of most disputes and peace agreements. When Roman Emperor Gordian III died during an invasion of the Sasanian Empire in 244 CE, the two powers struck a new treaty that imposed heavy financial reparations on Rome and included a clause banning any Roman interference in Armenian affairs. Within just a few years, however, Rome violated the agreement, triggering a wave of devastating Sasanian invasions of Roman territory that culminated in the capture of Roman Emperor Valerian by Sasanian forces in 260 CE. A famous rock relief from the period, which depicts Valerian kneeling in submission to Sasanian King Shapur I, remains a lasting symbol of this humiliating Roman defeat.

Rome won a major victory over Sasanian King Narseh in the late 290s CE, and the resulting 299 CE Treaty of Nisibis extended Roman influence deep into the east and gave Rome full control of Armenia. But the lopsided agreement planted deep seeds of resentment among the Sasanians. By the 350s CE, Sasanian King Shapur II launched a major invasion of Roman territory explicitly to overturn the 60-year-old treaty. The conflict escalated when Roman Emperor Julian launched a counter-invasion of the Sasanian Empire in 363 CE, a campaign that ended in devastating Roman defeat and Julian’s death on the battlefield.

While conflict between the two empires cooled slightly in the fifth century CE, it intensified dramatically again in the sixth and seventh centuries CE, when Rome and Persia were almost continuously at war. Dozens of peace treaties were negotiated during this period, but none endured. The most infamous example was the so-called Eternal Peace of 532 CE, which collapsed completely in less than eight years.

Edwell notes that history repeatedly demonstrates that even highly celebrated peace agreements, celebrated as breakthroughs at the time of signing, often lay the groundwork for future discord and renewed conflict. It took more than 400 years of intermittent war and dozens of failed negotiations before Rome and Persia finally reached a lasting agreement to partition Armenia between the two powers in the 380s CE.

Centuries of cyclical conflict, broken treaties, and stalemate preceded even that partial resolution. Today, as the US pursues a peace deal with Iran against the backdrop of a shaky ceasefire, the question lingers: will the current negotiations follow the same fraught path as the ancient clashes between Rome and Persia? Only time will reveal the answer — but the scholar’s hope is that a lasting resolution will not take centuries this time around.

In a recent appearance on Tucker Carlson’s political talk show, prominent American author and geopolitical analyst Brandon Weichert has delivered a scathing assessment of the US-Iran ceasefire memorandum of understanding, reached after months of joint US-Israeli military action against Iran, calling the document nothing less than a formal conditional surrender by the United States.

Weichert’s core argument centers on the massive drawdown of American missile stockpiles over the course of the conflict, which he says left the Trump administration with no viable option but to enter negotiations and accept a deal that ultimately handed Iran a strategic victory.

“Ultimately, this is a conditional surrender document,” Weichert stated during the interview. “The United States started a war and it promptly lost. The Iranians have, unfortunately, at a strategic level, achieved victory.” He added that while the Trump administration had no other choice given the pressing timeline of looming resource shortages that left it backed into a corner, the end result remains a surrender regardless of the administration’s reasoning.

Weichert’s controversial remarks land amid intense ongoing partisan and policy debate over the text of the memorandum, which establishes a foundational framework for sustained diplomatic negotiations between Washington and Tehran and codifies the ceasefire that halted months of open military confrontation between the two sides. Citing only unclassified, publicly available data on American weapons usage throughout the conflict, Weichert laid out staggering figures for depleted US munitions inventories.

According to his analysis, roughly half of the United States’ total stockpile of Patriot ballistic missile interceptors were fired during the war, alongside between 50% and 80% of the nation’s Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) interceptors. Weichert also claimed that more than 1,000 Tomahawk cruise missiles — approximately one-third of the entire US stockpile — were expended in the conflict. He added that large numbers of JASSM air-to-surface standoff missiles were used, and that nearly the entire pre-war inventory of newly produced Precision Strike Missiles was completely consumed in military operations.

Beyond ground and air-launched munitions, Weichert argued that US naval forces faced far greater and more underreported threats during the kinetic phase of the war than the White House has publicly acknowledged. “The Navy reports that they expended large quantities of their SM-3 and SM-6 naval interceptors,” he said. “That indicates to me, if I may conjecture here, that there must have been one hell of a fight over the security of our ships when the war was in its kinetic phase.” From these figures, he concluded that the White House deliberately misled the public when it claimed US naval vessels operating in the region remained completely safe throughout the conflict, arguing the high interceptor expenditure proves American ships faced severe, unacknowledged risks.

One of the most alarming parts of Weichert’s assessment is his projection of multi-year delays to replenish these drained arsenals. According to his timeline, Precision Strike Missiles can be fully restocked by the end of this year, while JASSM inventories will not be fully replaced until the middle of 2026. Naval SM-3 and SM-6 interceptors, he estimates, will not be back to pre-war levels until 2028. Patriot and THAAD interceptor stockpiles could take until roughly 2030 to fully replenish, and Tomahawk cruise missile inventories may require another five years to restore.

“So, we’d better hope that the Chinese or some other area of interest is no longer requiring our assistance because we have depleted ourselves,” Weichert warned.

Weichert’s analysis aligns with a recent bombshell report from *The New York Times*, which revealed that former President Trump and senior Pentagon leaders have been pressuring major defense contractors to speed up weapons production, while simultaneously pushing Congress to approve an extra $70 billion in funding to cover war costs and restock depleted arsenals. The *Times* reporting confirms that defense companies have told the Trump administration that expanding production capacity will require massive new capital investment, and the administration’s funding request is already projected to face fierce bipartisan opposition on Capitol Hill. The *Times* also independently verified the broad scope of US munitions depletion, confirming that the military used roughly 1,100 long-range stealth cruise missiles, more than 1,000 Tomahawk missiles, over 1,200 Patriot interceptors, and more than 1,000 Precision Strike and ATACMS missiles throughout the conflict.

Beyond the immediate military implications of drawn-down stockpiles, Weichert argued that the conflict has accelerated an irreversible long-term geopolitical shift across the Middle East, moving the region rapidly toward what he calls a “post-American” order that diminishes the central role Israel has played for decades as the anchor of Washington’s regional security architecture.

“There is now going to be a new Middle East,” he said, outlining his prediction that five regional powers will shape the future balance of power in the area: Saudi Arabia, Iran, Pakistan, Egypt, and Turkey. Weichert argued that Turkey’s rapidly expanding domestic defense industry, Pakistan’s established nuclear capabilities, and the competing regional influence of Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Egypt will combine to form a new regional order that is far less dependent on Washington for security and governance. “Those greater Middle East powers are gonna form a new post-American order,” he said. “Where it goes from here really is up to Mr Netanyahu and his government.”

To date, the White House and senior US military officials have publicly defended the memorandum, framing it as a favorable deal that advances US national interests. Even so, the Trump administration has faced widespread criticism from across the US political spectrum for failing to achieve the core stated objectives it laid out at the start of the conflict, including removing the Iranian government, permanently weakening Iran’s regional influence, and decimating its military capabilities.

A new firestorm has erupted in New York City’s charged political landscape after more than 700 pro-Israel rabbis and cantors signed an open letter released Friday calling on Mayor Zohran Mamdani to walk back inflammatory remarks that compared the powerful pro-Israel lobbying group the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (Aipac) to monsters.

Widely recognized as one of the most influential foreign policy advocacy organizations in the United States, Aipac has built its reputation by spending millions of dollars to defeat electoral candidates who take public critical stances toward Israel. The open letter was organized by The Jewish Majority, a relatively new advocacy group launched by Jonathan Schulman, a former Aipac staffer with nearly 20 years of experience working with the organization.

The letter opens by acknowledging the diverse ideological backgrounds of its signatories: “We are rabbis and cantors from across the United States. We serve different communities, hold different political views, and do not speak with one voice on every question concerning Israel, American politics or the war in Gaza.” But it quickly establishes unified condemnation of Mamdani’s rhetoric, adding: “But we are united in our belief that Mayor Zohran Mamdani’s recent speech about pro-Israel civic participation is dangerous, unacceptable and beneath the office he holds.”

Mamdani first made the controversial comments during a June 18 campaign rally alongside independent US Senator Bernie Sanders. At the event, he framed Aipac as a group of “monsters” that leverages millions in unreported dark money to advance a singular goal: holding onto political power by sowing division among the American public.

In the open letter, the rabbis argue that Mamdani’s language constitutes an act of dehumanization that amplifies rising antisemitism across the United States. “History demonstrates that campaigns against Jews often begin with rhetoric portraying them as uniquely sinister, uniquely powerful and somehow less deserving of equal treatment,” the letter reads. “Mr. Mamdani’s words invoke a familiar story about Jewish power, Jewish money and Jewish manipulation of public life.”

For his part, Mamdani has long pushed back against claims that criticism of Israel or anti-Zionist views equate to antisemitism, and he has refused to apologize for his remarks. When pressed by reporters to clarify his comments earlier this week, the mayor doubled down on his criticism, tying his remarks directly to the ongoing humanitarian crisis in Gaza.

“I want to be very clear. We’re talking about a status quo where children are being killed on a daily basis. More than 1,000 Palestinians have been killed by the Israeli military since the so-called ceasefire, [including] Al Jazeera journalist Ahmed Wishah, who was killed this past Saturday by an Israeli strike,” Mamdani told reporters.

“When I am speaking about Aipac, I’m speaking about an organisation that has been supportive of the status quo, that has fought any attempt to actually deliver safety to people, not just in Palestine, but frankly, through much of the region – and it is a status quo for immorality,” he added. “It is one that I will not accept.”

When asked specifically if he regretted using the term “monsters”, Mamdani claimed he was quoting a widely cited line from Italian Marxist philosopher Antonio Gramsci, though scholarly analysis has repeatedly found the specific phrasing he used is often misattributed or misquoted. “The old world is dying and the new world struggles to be born. Now is the time of monsters,” Mamdani explained, arguing he used the term to describe all actors blocking systemic change, not just Aipac.

Mamdani’s refusal to apologize drew fierce condemnation from right-wing media outlets across the US, which lambasted the mayor for his stance. The open letter from rabbis comes just one week after Mamdani’s progressive political movement passed a critical early electoral milestone: all three of the congressional candidates he endorsed won hotly contested Democratic primary races.

All three of the winning candidates have maintained open, consistent criticism of Israeli policy toward Gaza. In the most high-profile upset, public defender and first-time candidate Darializa Avila Chevalier defeated five-term incumbent Congressman Adriano Espaillat, chair of the Congressional Hispanic Caucus. Former city comptroller Brad Lander unseated incumbent Representative Dan Goldman, while state assembly member and former union organizer Claire Valdez defeated Brooklyn Borough President Antonio Reynoso in the race to fill the open seat left by retiring Representative Nydia Velazquez.

Supporters of the progressive movement quickly celebrated the three victories as evidence that Mamdani’s political project is not a passing fad, but rather the start of a lasting ideological shift within New York’s Democratic Party. Not all reactions were positive, however: the Anti-Defamation League (ADL), a prominent national pro-Israel organization, labeled the primary wins antisemitic, claiming they sent a “chilling” message to Jewish New Yorkers. On Friday, the ADL publicly endorsed the rabbis’ open letter on its social media platform X.

Alongside backing the letter, the ADL also issued condemnations of two unrelated political developments this week: a recent United Nations report that documents allegations of Israeli forces intentionally targeting Palestinian children, and a nuclear deal signed by former President Donald Trump’s administration to end escalating hostilities with Iran.

After the most recent round of direct military confrontation between the United States and Iran de-escalated, a curious public spectacle emerged: Washington declared its mission a success, Tehran claimed its own victory, and Israel reaffirmed it retained full autonomy to launch strikes against Lebanese Hezbollah. Competing claims over whether Lebanese de-escalation was a formal part of the agreement have left many outside observers writing off the deal as a confused, bad-faith arrangement already teetering toward collapse. But for scholars of war termination and peace durability who have spent decades studying how conflicts end, these apparent contradictions are not a red flag — they are evidence that negotiations are working as intended. The real threat to long-term peace is not competing narratives, but what the Trump-brokered ceasefire leaves unaddressed.

Diplomacy is never a single negotiation between two parties. Political scientist Robert Putnam famously framed international statecraft as a “two-level game,” where leaders must simultaneously strike a deal abroad and sell that agreement to domestic political audiences. No international agreement survives unless it can win buy-in at home. The U.S.-Iran deal is far more complex: it functions as a five-level negotiating game. Washington must satisfy not only Iran, but also its closest regional ally Israel, a divided U.S. Congress, skeptical Gulf Arab partners, and wary European allies. For Tehran, the domestic and international constraints are equally daunting: leaders must win approval from Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Iran’s most powerful military institution, contain widespread public anger over crippling economic sanctions that could spill over into mass unrest, and maintain the support of its key global backers Russia and China.

Every concession and gain negotiated at the international table has to be packaged for stakeholders who were never present for the talks. This inherent dynamic is exactly what produces the contradictory public messaging that confuses outside observers. Each side is not speaking to its negotiating rival — it is speaking to its own domestic audience. Washington frames sanctions relief as a temporary, reversible move to appease hardline critics at home, while Tehran emphasizes its uncompromised national sovereignty to rally its public. Israel, meanwhile, underscores its unrestricted right to strike to satisfy its own domestic political base. This is not bad faith; it is standard diplomatic practice, with roots stretching back thousands of years.

The earliest recorded peace treaty in human history, struck between Egypt and the Hittite Empire after the 13th century BCE Battle of Kadesh, follows this exact pattern. Two distinct versions of the treaty survive, each carved into stone for a domestic audience, with framing that serves each side’s narrative. Peace between the two great powers endured not because they agreed on a single public story, but because each could sell the outcome to their own people. The cost of compromise varies by context: in Washington, it may come in the form of electoral backlash, while in Tehran, hardline factions have a long history of extracting severe political costs from leaders who negotiate with the West, as former President Hassan Rouhani and Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif learned after the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action nuclear deal.

Contradictory public messaging is not the core problem with this latest deal. The real flaw is that the same multilevel negotiating pressures that produce messy public narratives also shape what negotiators are willing to include in the final text. Each side fights hard to secure visible, immediate rewards they can showcase to their domestic audiences, and pushes back hard against binding enforcement penalties that would force them to answer for noncompliance down the line. The result is a deal that is heavy on immediate benefits for all sides, and almost entirely lacking in credible enforcement mechanisms.

Research on conflict resolution bears out this risk. In research for the 2009 book *Securing the Peace*, it was found that negotiated settlements ending civil wars break down at roughly twice the rate of conflicts that end in clear military victory. While the research focused on internal conflicts, the core lesson applies broadly to all war settlements: agreements fail not because of conflicting public narratives, but because they lack credible enforcement once implementation begins. This weakness is hidden at the time of signing, when all parties are still collecting the immediate benefits the deal promises. It only emerges later, once those rewards are exhausted, and there are no penalties left to deter parties from defecting.

The 1979 Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty illustrates the alternative path to durable peace. The deal endured not simply because Egypt regained the Sinai Peninsula and Israel earned formal international recognition, but because those gains were embedded in a robust enforcement structure. Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai was phased and tied directly to ongoing compliance, the U.S. committed to long-term economic and military assistance for both nations, and the Multinational Force and Observers was deployed in 1981 to monitor demilitarization. More than four decades later, the treaty remains intact, proving the value of built-in enforcement.

For the U.S.-Iran deal, this lesson is clear: lasting peace depends not just on what parties gain immediately, but on the institutions and incentives built to enforce compliance long after the signing ceremony ends. Measured by that standard, the current agreement is built on unstable ground. It offers generous immediate rewards: the U.S. lifts economic blockades, issues oil export waivers, releases billions in frozen Iranian assets, and promises over $300 billion in reconstruction support. In exchange, Iran reopens the Strait of Hormuz and agrees to dilute its enriched uranium stockpile on domestic soil, while retaining all the infrastructure to ramp up enrichment again in the future. Almost every step delivers immediate benefit to one side or the other, and almost no step imposes meaningful costs on a party that chooses to walk away from the deal.

Enforcement is left to a hypothetical United Nations Security Council resolution that has not even been drafted, and the most contentious issue — long-term uranium enrichment limits — has been kicked down the road to a final agreement that may never be negotiated. An even deeper structural flaw is that the most powerful actors capable of derailing the deal are not bound by its terms at all. Israel, Hezbollah, and the broad network of Iranian-backed militias across the Middle East were never signatories to the agreement. They gain little from complying with its terms, and risk nothing if they choose to defect, leaving the deal with no mechanism to impose costs on spoilers that break the peace.

None of this means the deal is destined for immediate collapse. The history of peacemaking, from the Battle of Kadesh to the Dayton Accords that ended the Bosnian War to the Belfast Agreement that resolved Northern Ireland’s decades-long sectarian conflict, shows that public disputes and threats to walk away are normal growing pains, not proof of imminent failure. But surviving early turbulence is not the same as lasting for the long term. History shows that setbacks are inevitable; the question is whether parties will build robust institutions to deter defection before the immediate rewards are exhausted and the incentives to comply disappear.

The core task for negotiators moving forward is not what most analysts are focused on: it is not reconciling competing public narratives. It is building automatic, meaningful consequences for any actor that returns to violence — including the powerful regional actors that never took a seat at the negotiating table.

This analysis is by Monica Duffy Toft, Professor of International Politics and Director of the Center for Strategic Studies at The Fletcher School, Tufts University, republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license.