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  • Israeli study finds starvation in Gaza was result of deliberate policy

    Israeli study finds starvation in Gaza was result of deliberate policy

    Two years into the war that began in October 2023, a new study from an Israeli genocide scholar has upended the Israeli government and mainstream media’s repeated denials, concluding that the widespread starvation ravaging the Gaza Strip was the result of deliberate, pre-planned state policy.

    Authored by Shmuel Lederman, a researcher specializing in genocide studies, the report titled *Data for Denial: The Smokescreen Behind the Starvation of Gaza* was published last month by the Forum for Regional Thinking at Jerusalem’s Van Leer Institute. Lederman told Middle East Eye he launched the research in response to what he calls pervasive denial across Israeli society of the humanitarian catastrophe unfolding in Gaza, a pattern he says aligns with public responses to historical cases of mass violence.

    “There is a thirst for denial,” Lederman explained, noting that most Israeli citizens seek to frame the Israeli military’s actions in Gaza and the broader occupied territories as entirely morally justified and free of systemic abuse. A separate August 2025 investigation from Israeli news outlet Walla corroborates this pattern of denial, confirming that mainstream Israeli television outlets routinely minimize or erase coverage of Gaza’s starvation crisis entirely.

    Lederman’s study pushes back against the belated, limited acknowledgement of food insecurity that emerged in some Israeli circles by mid-2025, where commentators framed starvation as an accidental, isolated bureaucratic miscalculation rather than a product of intentional state decision-making. Drawing on core principles of famine research, which holds that hunger is driven not just by total food availability but by equitable access to food, the scholar documents how Israeli policy systematically stripped Palestinians of access to sustenance. Restrictions on the entry of aid, fuel, and cooking gas, the deliberate destruction of critical food infrastructure including bakeries, and repeated disruption of humanitarian operations all combined to create catastrophic levels of food deprivation.

    The study’s core conclusion leaves little room for ambiguity: Gaza’s starvation is the product of “deliberate planning, experimentation, and manoeuvring around the humanitarian ‘red line’”, designed in large part to manage mounting international pressure on Israel throughout the course of the war.

    A central point of contention in public debates over Gaza’s hunger has been the number of daily aid trucks required to meet the enclave’s basic needs, a metric that Israeli officials have repeatedly manipulated to downplay the crisis. COGAT, the Israeli military body responsible for civil administration in occupied Palestinian territories, claimed in August 2025 that just 80 daily aid trucks would be enough to meet Gaza’s population’s needs, a figure that was widely repeated by sympathetic Israeli researchers and journalists.

    This claim has been rejected by nearly every independent and international body: human rights organizations, UN agencies, and even the administration of former U.S. President Joe Biden disputed the number. The Biden White House estimated roughly 250 trucks per day were required to avoid mass hunger, while international humanitarian organizations put the necessary number between 500 and 600. What is more, COGAT’s own past data undermines its current claim: in 2008, when Gaza’s population was 1.5 million people, 500,000 less than its current population, COGAT itself stated 178 trucks per day were needed to meet basic needs. As recently as last month, Israeli newspaper Israel Hayom reported that COGAT urged the Israeli government to cut aid truck entries to 250 per day after an October 2025 ceasefire, claiming that level met basic needs. For Lederman, this revelation is an implicit admission that the earlier 80-truck claim was a deliberate falsehood: “In practice, this is an admission of starvation,” he told MEE, speaking after COGAT released its post-report statement.

    Lederman traces the origins of Gaza’s starvation to the very start of the war in October 2023. For the first five months of the conflict, until March 2024, Israel allowed only a tiny fraction of the recommended number of aid trucks into the Strip, rapidly deepening the food crisis. UN agencies, human rights groups, and on-the-ground Palestinian testimonies all documented extreme food shortages during this period, with women and children bearing the brunt of the deprivation.

    In May 2024, mounting U.S. pressure following Israel’s deadly assault on Rafah forced Israel to allow more commercial trucks into Gaza, but the government simultaneously restricted access for humanitarian convoys. Last month, Wala also revealed that 11 major Israeli supermarket chains won an exclusive tender to supply food and aid to Gaza, generating hundreds of millions of shekels in profit. Lederman argues that this privatization of aid delivery created a profit-driven monopoly that actively worsened the humanitarian crisis, allowing a small number of connected actors to enrich themselves, often in coordination with Israeli authorities, while the vast majority of Gazans go hungry.

    While U.S. pressure produced a brief easing of the crisis, Israel reversed course in October 2024, slashing aid shipments back to minimal levels. By March 2025, Israel imposed a full blockade on all food and humanitarian aid entry, pushing Gaza over the edge into full-scale famine. In August 2025, the Integrated Food Phase Classification (IPC), the UN-backed global body that monitors hunger, officially declared famine in Gaza City.

    The report also reveals that even as COGAT publicly disputed international warnings about growing hunger, the agency privately warned the Israeli government as early as 2025 that Gaza was on the brink of catastrophic famine. Despite this internal warning, the Israeli government pressed ahead with its policy to advance a clear strategic goal: using starvation as a tool to pressure Palestinians to relocate south out of northern and central Gaza, and ultimately to leave the territory for third countries. This tactic aligns with the controversial “voluntary emigration” plan publicly backed by both the Israeli government and former U.S. President Donald Trump. Lederman cites the creation of the U.S. and Israeli-backed Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF) as further evidence of this strategy, writing: “Severe food deprivation in Gaza that would compel Gazans to travel to aid distribution centres was not a ‘mistake’, it was part of the plan.”

    Beyond the immediate humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza, the study frames the territory as a testing ground for a new model of population control through hunger. “Over the past two and a half years, Gaza has served to a large extent as a testing laboratory not only for methods of warfare, but also for the architecture of starvation and the management of a population through deprivation,” the report reads. Lederman warns that the implications of this experiment will extend far beyond Gaza’s borders, noting that while starvation has been used as a weapon of war in other recent conflicts, few if any cases have so systematically and openly undermined the long-standing international norm banning the practice.

    Lederman also emphasizes the shared responsibility of the United States, under both the Biden and Trump administrations, as well as other Western governments, for enabling Israel’s policy, arguing that their diplomatic and military support made the starvation campaign possible. He warns that Israel’s tactics will spread to other conflicts around the globe, as other actors feel empowered to adopt similar methods, shielded from criticism by charges of Western hypocrisy. “What Israel did in Gaza will not stay there, it already has not remained there,” Lederman said. “Therefore, this is not only a struggle against what Israel did to the Palestinians in Gaza, but a global struggle against these kinds of actions.”

  • Shaun White’s Snow League opening its second season with a team halfpipe event in New Zealand

    Shaun White’s Snow League opening its second season with a team halfpipe event in New Zealand

    Created by legendary American snowboarder and Olympic gold medalist Shaun White, the Snow League — a premier competitive circuit dedicated to halfpipe action sports — is gearing up for its highly anticipated second season, with an opening team competition set to take place in the snow-covered highlands of Cardrona, New Zealand.

    The opening round of the 2025–2026 season will run from September 18 to 20, timed perfectly to align with the Southern Hemisphere’s peak winter season. Cardrona has long held a reputation as a go-to training hub for elite action sports athletes from across the globe during the Northern Hemisphere’s off-season, making it an ideal location to kick off the new competitive calendar. This opening event will feature four squads drawn from different world regions, each consisting of one male snowboarder, one female snowboarder, one male freeskier, and one female freeskier, bringing a fresh team-focused dynamic to the traditional individual halfpipe competition format.

    Following the New Zealand opener, the circuit will travel to three iconic winter sports destinations across North America and Europe for the remainder of the season. The next stop is scheduled for Aspen, Colorado, running January 7 to 9, before the league moves on to Park City, Utah, from January 21 to 23. Park City, which is set to serve as a host venue for the 2034 Winter Olympics, will welcome back halfpipe competition for the first time since 2019, marking a key milestone for the sport’s return to the venue. The season will wrap up in Laax, Switzerland, one of the world’s most renowned alpine resorts, with the final event taking place March 11 to 13.

    In its inaugural 2023–2024 season, the Snow League drew a roster of elite Olympic talent, including freeski star Eileen Gu, snowboarders Gaon Choi and Yuto Totsuka — all Olympic medal holders. The circuit also offered one of the most generous prize purses in action sports: first-place finishers took home $50,000 per individual event last season, and six top athletes, including Gu and Totsuka, earned more than $100,000 in total prize money across the entire season, highlighting the league’s commitment to supporting elite athletes financially as they compete at the highest level.

  • Xi’s new US-China formula signals a self-confident shift in terms

    Xi’s new US-China formula signals a self-confident shift in terms

    Last month’s high-profile Xi-Trump summit in Beijing produced one particularly consequential, if intangible, outcome: Chinese President Xi Jinping unveiled a new authoritative policy formulation, or tífǎ, to frame the future of US-China relations.

    For decades, these standardized, authoritative concepts have served as a core communication tool for the Communist Party of China, allowing the top leadership to articulate its strategic priorities, policy assessments, historical judgments, and core governance agendas at key junctures. Historically, tífǎ have also acted as reliable leading indicators of shifting ideological and policy directions, enabling top leaders to outline and consolidate their political priorities across all areas of governance. This tradition has only expanded under Xi Jinping’s leadership, with official formulations now released to guide policy across domains ranging from ethnic minority governance to global diplomatic strategy.

    The new framing put forward for bilateral ties is “constructive strategic stability”, a guiding concept structured around four distinct pillars, according to official reporting from China’s state-run news agency Xinhua. These four layers are: “positive stability with cooperation as the mainstay”, “stability with moderate competition”, “stability with manageable differences,” and “an enduring stability with promises of peace.” Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi later expanded on each of these pillars in a post-summit press briefing.

    Wang explained that the first pillar – cooperation-centric positive stability – forms the baseline for healthy bilateral relations, a reflection of the deep economic interdependence that binds the two largest economies in the world, where “neither can cut the other out, nor prosper without the other.” The second pillar, stability with bounded moderate competition, signals Beijing’s clear preference for establishing formal guardrails around bilateral rivalry, to ensure that competition “is kept within proper limits and is not turned into a zero-sum game.”

    Wang went on to outline the non-negotiable bottom line that defines these “proper limits”: both nations must “respect each other’s social systems and development paths, respect each other’s core interests and major concerns, and respect each other’s right to development.” Only when this bottom line is fully honored can the two sides achieve the overarching final goal of the framework: long-term, enduring stability for bilateral ties.

    Analysts note that this new formulation carries major strategic significance for at least two key reasons. First, it marks a clear shift in Beijing’s approach to managed competition: while China has long acknowledged that US-China relations contain a substantial competitive element, the new framework formalizes Beijing’s commitment to keeping that competition bounded and controlled.

    This represents a noticeable shift from China’s position during most of the Biden administration, when it was the United States that pushed aggressively for the creation of competition guardrails, while China was far less receptive to the idea. At that time, Beijing’s stance was shaped by the widespread perception within the Chinese leadership that the United States was a declining power, a view encapsulated by Xi’s 2021 assertion that “time is on our side.”

    With Donald Trump’s return to the White House, Beijing has not abandoned its view that U.S. power is in decline. Instead, this perception has evolved: Chinese analysts now argue that a declining U.S. is far more likely to leverage military pressure and coercive diplomacy to compensate for its eroding economic competitiveness. As Jin Canrong, vice dean of Renmin University’s School of International Studies, argues, “America’s current toughness and arrogance do not reflect a true rise in strength” but rather demonstrate the acceleration of its decline through the “self-depletion” of its military, economic and diplomatic resources. In this new context, as Wang Yi put it, guardrails are now necessary to prevent the bilateral relationship from veering wildly “like a roller coaster.”

    The second, and arguably more impactful, dimension of the new framework is that it positions China as an equal peer to the United States in its contribution to global order and international stability. “A positive outlook of China-US cooperation,” Wang argued, “will provide more certainty for both countries’ development and for the international situation.” As such, “constructive strategic stability” should “be a goal both sides uphold.” As scholar Zongyuan Zoe Liu notes, the clear implication of this framing is that “the United States should respect China’s core interests, refrain from defining the relationship primarily as strategic competition and manage disputes within limits acceptable to Beijing.”

    With the Trump administration signaling acceptance of this new phraseology, even if it has not yet formally signed on to its full substance, Beijing is widely expected to view this outcome as a significant win in its campaign to define the acceptable boundaries of US-China rivalry on terms that align with Chinese core priorities. This analysis is by Dr. Michael Clarke, associate professor of international politics and strategy at the Centre for Future Defence and National Security, Deakin University, and adjunct associate professor at the Australia-China Relations Institute, University of Technology Sydney.

  • Gaza records highest death toll in six months as Israel intensifies bombing

    Gaza records highest death toll in six months as Israel intensifies bombing

    Seven months after a U.S.-brokered ceasefire was supposed to end the ongoing conflict in the Gaza Strip that launched in October 2023, rising violence has pushed monthly Palestinian fatalities to their highest level of 2024, according to official Palestinian health data. The Palestinian Ministry of Health confirmed Tuesday that Israeli forces killed at least 119 Palestinians across Gaza in May, a toll that includes 19 children and 10 women.

    The surge in deaths comes amid a clear escalation of Israeli bombardment and ground operations across the blockaded enclave, with multiple ceasefire violations recorded on a near-daily basis. Local Palestinian media outlets documented 11 separate Israeli breaches of the truce agreement in just a 24-hour period, each leaving a trail of deaths and injuries among civilian populations. On Wednesday morning, fresh attacks were reported: Israeli military vehicles opened heavy fire on locations in eastern Khan Younis, a densely populated area in southern Gaza, while separate strikes hit eastern zones of the Jabalia refugee camp in the northern part of the territory.

    Cumulative data from Gaza’s Government Media Office paints a far broader picture of sustained violence since the ceasefire took effect. Officials report more than 3,000 total Israeli violations across all of Gaza, encompassing everything from heavy shelling and precision air strikes to direct targeting of civilian communities, the complete demolition of entire residential neighborhoods, and ongoing ground incursions into populated areas. These violations have already killed more than 933 Palestinians, wounded an additional 2,868, and left at least 82 people abducted by Israeli forces since the truce went into effect.

    The mounting death toll from these attacks pushes the total number of Palestinians killed since the outbreak of hostilities in October 2023 to 72,942, with thousands more still unaccounted for, trapped and presumed dead under the rubble of destroyed buildings across Gaza.

    Gaza’s de facto governing authority Hamas has issued multiple sharp condemnations of the continued Israeli operations, labeling them ongoing “crimes and violations” of the ceasefire. In a pre-recorded address released Tuesday, Abu Obeida, the movement’s military spokesperson, denounced the persistent daily killing of Palestinian civilians and resistance fighters, noting that Israeli forces have assassinated several high-ranking Hamas leaders over the past month.

    “If our cowardly enemy imagines that it can weaken us by assassinating our leaders, then their blood is the fuel that propels our ship through difficulties and proof of the truth of our cause, our leadership, our unity with our people, and our willingness to sacrifice ourselves for them,” Abu Obeida said in his speech.

    In a separate statement, Hamas spokesperson Hazem Qassem pushed back against recent claims that the movement refuses to cede administrative control of Gaza, dismissing the allegations as “misleading lies aimed at providing cover for the occupation to continue its aggression.” Qassem placed blame for the stalled administrative transition squarely on Israel and Nickolay Mladenov, director-general of the American Board of Peace, saying the two parties have blocked a proposed technocratic committee from entering Gaza to take over governance from Hamas.

    Critics note that Israeli actions extend far beyond military strikes to undermine the terms of the truce. Beyond ongoing attacks and territorial incursions that have seen Israel seize additional land across Gaza, the Israeli government has also severely restricted the flow of humanitarian aid into the besieged enclave, worsening an already catastrophic humanitarian crisis for the 2 million Palestinians trapped in the territory. These combined actions have effectively derailed progress toward the second phase of the ceasefire agreement, which was intended to cement a lasting end to hostilities.

  • Xi closes the door after promising US CEOs to open wider

    Xi closes the door after promising US CEOs to open wider

    When a cohort of billionaire U.S. CEOs traveled to Beijing alongside former U.S. President Donald Trump just one month ago, many departed optimistic about new opportunities for deeper economic and technological cooperation between the world’s two largest economies. Today, that optimism has curdled into disillusionment, as Beijing’s policy shifts directly contradict the pledges of greater economic openness Chinese leader Xi Jinping made to the visiting American business leaders.

    Trump’s own inconsistent approach to China has already left many U.S. business leaders off-balance: he built two presidential campaigns around confronting Chinese trade practices, only to rebrand himself as an open admirer of Xi, shifting abruptly between hardline and conciliatory policy stances with little advance warning. But the more abrupt disappointment stems from the gap between Xi’s promises and Beijing’s current actions. During the summit, Xi assured the visiting executives that China would “open wider” to foreign investment and create “broader prospects” for U.S. firms in sectors from tech to consumer markets. Those assurances, given to leaders including Apple’s Tim Cook, Tesla’s Elon Musk and Nvidia’s Jensen Huang, now look like an empty feint.

    Far from expanding openness, Beijing has moved in recent weeks to tighten controls on cross-border capital flows, wall off its domestic artificial intelligence sector from global collaboration, and roll back transparency for foreign investors. A key new restriction has drawn particular global criticism: a ban on overseas travel for most Chinese AI industry experts, a policy that echoes Soviet-era restrictions on movement for academics and technical talent. Observers note the move makes it far less likely China will be able to tap into the ongoing global tech sector rally, and it has sent a deeply negative signal to international markets.

    The impact of these shifts is already visible in China’s underperforming equity markets. As of mid-2026, the benchmark CSI 300 index has gained just 7% year-to-date, a return that pales in comparison to peer Asian markets: South Korea’s main index has surged 108%, Taiwan’s is up 57%, and Japan’s has gained 33% even amid energy market disruptions stemming from Middle East tensions. China’s markets are now clearly lagging far behind their global competitors.

    These new controls are part of a broader policy response to a record surge in capital outflows. In 2025, China recorded $1 trillion in net capital outflows, double the 2021 level and the largest annual outflow since official data collection began in 2006. To stem accelerating outflows and protect foreign exchange reserves, Beijing has allowed the yuan to strengthen far more than currency analysts expected, with the yuan gaining more than 3% against the U.S. dollar in 2026 to date.

    This managed yuan appreciation serves three core strategic goals for Beijing. First, it reduces the risk that heavily indebted Chinese property developers will default on their offshore debt obligations. Second, it advances Xi’s long-term goal of positioning the yuan as a credible alternative reserve currency to the U.S. dollar. Third, it eases tensions with the Trump White House, which has repeatedly criticized China for currency manipulation to boost exports.

    Some economists argue a stronger yuan could also be supported by domestic fundamentals. Macquarie Group economist Larry Hu notes that if domestic demand strengthens in response to new government stimulus, the yuan carry trade will unwind as business confidence improves and the yield gap between the U.S. and China narrows, creating natural momentum for further yuan appreciation against the dollar.

    The shifting global currency landscape has also been shaped by growing fiscal instability in the U.S., where the national debt is now approaching $40 trillion – twice the size of China’s entire annual gross domestic product. Chatham House economist Creon Butler notes that since Trump returned to office in early 2025, his administration’s policies on trade, energy security, climate change and financial stability have broken sharply with the post-WWII global economic consensus. This so-called “Trump shock” has pushed China to accelerate its plans to distance itself from key established international economic norms. While Butler notes China is far from the only country deviating from these norms, its status as the world’s second-largest economy makes its shifts uniquely disruptive to global markets.

    This trend toward de-dollarization has reached a notable milestone this week: the European Central Bank confirmed that gold has now overtaken U.S. Treasury securities as the largest reserve asset held by global central banks. Gold now makes up 27% of global official foreign reserves, compared to 22% for U.S. Treasuries. ECB President Christine Lagarde attributed the shift to growing geopolitical fragmentation and rising tensions, which have driven strong demand for safe-haven gold among central banks. Short-term demand has also been boosted by global inflation fears, with HSBC analysts noting that ongoing conflict in the Middle East and the prolonged closure of the Strait of Hormuz have created a “super-squeeze” in commodity markets that will only intensify if the chokepoint remains closed.

    For Xi, these policy shifts stand in stark contrast to pledges he made more than a decade ago, when he first took power in 2013 and promised to let market forces play a “decisive role” in China’s economic development. Thirteen years later, China’s economy presents a striking paradox: on one hand, its industrial and tech policies have delivered major breakthroughs, with electric vehicle giant BYD overtaking Tesla in global sales and domestic AI startup DeepSeek emerging as a serious competitor to Silicon Valley incumbents. On the other hand, Xi’s ambitions for global tech leadership are being undercut by a fragile financial system and deep structural headwinds that are slowing long-term growth.

    Hong Kong University of Science and Technology economist Keyu Jin explains this paradox by noting that China is undergoing a deep structural transition, not just a temporary cyclical slowdown. “It’s among the world’s most dynamic technological powers, producing breakthroughs in AI, electric vehicles, and advanced manufacturing at an accelerating pace, yet economic growth continues to slow,” Jin says. “The old model is giving way to a new one, which has yet to take hold.”

    The biggest drag on growth remains the troubled property sector, which holds roughly 70% of Chinese household wealth. Stabilizing the housing market is a prerequisite to reviving consumer spending and sustaining the government’s 5% annual growth target. Without bold, credible action to support housing prices and boost consumer confidence, persistent deflationary pressure will continue to drag on expansion.

    Beijing also faces a long list of other urgent structural challenges: it must build more dynamic, transparent domestic capital markets, reduce stubbornly high youth unemployment, rein in unsustainable local government debt, curtail the outsize dominance of state-owned enterprises, and expand the social safety net to encourage households to shift from saving to spending. Most analysts also agree that granting greater independence to the People’s Bank of China and moving toward full currency convertibility are critical steps to building a modern, resilient economy.

    Yet Xi’s recent policy moves suggest Beijing is focusing on managing short-term symptoms rather than addressing deep-rooted structural causes. Analysts point to unresolved investor uncertainty from the 2020 crackdown on Chinese tech giants that began with the assault on Alibaba co-founder Jack Ma, which still lacks a clear public justification. That uncertainty now hangs over new restrictions on cross-border capital movement and AI expert travel, leaving global investors skeptical that Beijing has learned the lessons of past policy missteps.

    For the U.S. CEOs who traveled to Beijing with high hopes last month, the contrast between Xi’s promises of greater openness and Beijing’s new push for tighter control could not be clearer. What was billed as a new era of economic cooperation has instead turned into a stark demonstration of China’s growing turn inward.

  • Australian court bans man from contacting Norwegian princess studying in Sydney

    Australian court bans man from contacting Norwegian princess studying in Sydney

    An Australian court has handed down a two-year restraining order barring a 63-year-old local man that prohibits any contact with Norway’s Princess Ingrid Alexander — a Norwegian royal studying abroad in Sydney — and her immediate family. The ruling, finalized on Wednesday at Newtown Court House in Sydney, imposes clear limitations on David James Cook: he is banned from setting foot on the University of Sydney campus, conducting online searches for the 22-year-old princess, and reaching out to Ingrid or any member of her family through any channel.

    This legal measure, officially classified as an Apprehended Violence Order under Australian law, is designed to shield individuals from potential violence, intimidation, and persistent harassment. Cook, speaking to reporters after leaving the court, claimed the entire incident stemmed from an innocent gesture: a friendship request card he sent to the princess, who is second in line to the Norwegian throne.

    “I sent her a card just asking for friendship, that’s all,” Cook told Australia’s Nine News. “I did not intentionally upset her in any way and I wouldn’t do so. She’s a nice person. I bumped into her at an event and I followed up with the card.”

    The situation took an abrupt turn immediately after the court proceeding, when Cook was charged with assaulting a news photographer covering the hearing. A formal police statement confirmed the photographer sustained only minor physical injuries from the altercation. Cook was subsequently released from police custody following his arrest, and has been scheduled to enter a plea and face trial for the assault charge at a future court date on July 17.

    Princess Ingrid, the eldest child of Norway’s Crown Prince Haakon and Crown Princess Mette-Marit, relocated to Australia last year to begin a three-year undergraduate degree program in international relations at the University of Sydney, and has resided on the institution’s campus since her arrival. Recent local and international media reports indicate the princess recently departed Australia to return to Norway, where she will stay with her mother Crown Princess Mette-Marit, who is currently battling a serious illness.

  • The mirage of Israel-Lebanon rapprochement

    The mirage of Israel-Lebanon rapprochement

    For analysts who have tracked the winding, often tragicomic trajectory of American diplomatic efforts in the Middle East for decades, the April 2026 gathering of Israeli and Lebanese officials at the US State Department convened by Secretary of State Marco Rubio stirred a familiar sense of weary deja vu.

    On the surface, the event marked a historic milestone: the first direct formal negotiations between Israel and Lebanon in decades, hosted on American soil. Media visuals were carefully staged, diplomatic niceties were observed, performative optimism filled the room, and officials dutifully noted that expectations had been tempered. As is so often the case with high-profile diplomatic openings, the weight of history was left outside the meeting room doors.

    Yet history has a way of inserting itself uninvited into these processes. For the first time since the 1983 May 17 Agreement collapsed, Israel and Lebanon’s sitting government have officially launched direct talks aimed at reaching a full peace deal and disarming the Hezbollah militia. It is worth recalling that the 1983 agreement was negotiated in the wake of an earlier Israeli invasion of Lebanon, and it collapsed within 12 months, undone by fierce Syrian pressure and widespread domestic opposition inside Lebanon. That legacy should give even the most enthusiastic backers of the current talks reason for caution. As the old adage goes, history does not always repeat itself, but in the volatile Levant, it has a striking tendency to rhyme.

    ## The Unspoken Structural Barrier
    Beneath the diplomatic fanfare lies a fundamental obstacle that few stakeholders are willing to address openly. The core barrier to a lasting Israel-Lebanon agreement is not a shortage of goodwill among Beirut’s ruling coalition nor a lack of American diplomatic energy. It is the persistent reality that the Lebanese state does not exercise full sovereign control over its own territory, military decision-making, or foreign policy.

    Lebanon’s new reformist government, which took office in January 2025, approved the “National Shield” plan, a five-phase roadmap to disarm Hezbollah. The initiative has been backed by $230 million in US funding earmarked for strengthening the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF). Officials announced that the plan’s first phase had been completed successfully. But just two months later, on March 2, Hezbollah resumed cross-border strikes against Israel from southern Lebanon, directly contradicting that claim. This episode encapsulates the core paradox of Lebanese politics: the government in Beirut may be willing to rein in the militia, but it lacks the capacity to enforce its will in the country’s southern regions.

    When Israeli ground forces crossed the UN-demarcated Blue Line into southern Lebanon in mid-March 2026, LAF units withdrew rather than engaging the invading troops. Commanders cited operational constraints and a lack of clear orders from Beirut. This was not a failure of courage; it was an honest reflection of the institutional status quo. The LAF is a small force, poorly equipped to secure the country’s borders, and legally barred from confronting foreign forces unless explicitly ordered to do so by the sitting government. The $230 million in American investment, it turns out, cannot buy the Lebanese state full control over a militia that has spent 30 years building entrenched regional infrastructure, relies on decades of Iranian patronage, and holds significant political sway across the country.

    ## The Lingering Ghost of 1983
    Washington’s current enthusiasm for these talks bears an uncomfortable resemblance to the hype that surrounded the 1983 May 17 Agreement four decades ago. Then, as now, an Israeli military campaign had devastated large swathes of Lebanese territory and weakened the precursor forces to Hezbollah. Then, as now, a US administration believed it had carved out a unique diplomatic opening. Then, as now, any prospective agreement depended entirely on the Lebanese government’s ability to impose its authority on armed groups that reject that authority.

    The 1983 agreement collapsed within a year, brought down by domestic Lebanese opposition and pressure from Ba’athist Syria, which was backed militarily by the Soviet Union. Today, Syria is far weaker than it was in 1983, but Iran has stepped into that power vacuum, and Hezbollah—though weakened by recent conflicts and leadership losses—has proven its ability to survive setbacks before.

    That said, it would be disingenuous to dismiss the current moment as nothing more than a repeat of past failure. There are genuinely new dynamics at play this time around. Lebanon’s current government ran on a reformist platform that explicitly included disarming non-state armed groups, and senior officials publicly condemned Hezbollah’s decision to restart hostilities with Israel. This is not an insignificant shift. For decades, successive Lebanese governments maintained deliberate ambiguity about Hezbollah’s armed wing, treating it as an awkward, permanent houseguest that paid no rent but controlled outsized political influence. The current Aoun-Salam government has abandoned that pretense, at least in its public rhetoric.

    Furthermore, Iran is currently facing an unprecedented period of strategic upheaval. The death of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has removed the ideological anchor of the Islamic Republic’s regional proxy project. A Hezbollah that no longer has a confident, stable Iranian patron is a fundamentally different organization than the group that existed just a few years ago, though the full extent of this shift remains to be seen.

    ## The Inherent Limits of American Diplomatic Brokerage
    Realist observers must repeat a long-held warning about American diplomacy in the Middle East: for decades, Washington has repeatedly mistaken diplomatic process for actual progress, assuming that bringing parties to the negotiating table in Washington is itself an achievement of statecraft. It is not.

    As the Council on Foreign Relations cautiously noted, the April 2026 US-brokered talks create an opportunity for peace—nothing more, nothing less. Opportunities in the Levant have a long history of going unused.

    The deeper, unaddressed question is whether the current US administration has the sustained focus and leverage to see through a complex, multi-year process of disarmament and normalization. This is particularly uncertain given the Trump administration’s inclination toward dramatic, headline-grabbing announcements rather than the slow, unglamorous work of institution-building on the ground. A peace deal between Israel and Lebanon that does not include a credible enforcement mechanism for Hezbollah disarmament is not a real peace agreement—it is merely a press release.

    None of this is an argument for outright fatalism. The case for genuine rapprochement is supported by one underdiscussed reality: both Lebanon and Israel face strong material incentives to end a conflict that has inflicted massive damage on both sides. Lebanon’s economy has been collapsing for years, and another full-scale war would accelerate that collapse into total failure. For Israel, there is no long-term strategic gain to permanent occupation of southern Lebanon, a project that has historically spawned insurgency rather than security.

    If a path to lasting peace exists, it runs through incremental, practical security agreements on the ground, not grand ceremonial declarations in Washington. The 2022 maritime border deal between the two countries—quiet, technically focused, and rooted in shared mutual interest—offers a far better model than the 1983 agreement. Small, functional agreements that deliver tangible results are far more valuable than large, ambitious deals that collapse before they can be implemented.

    Cynics are right to point out that the international community has walked this path before. Optimists are not entirely wrong to note that regional conditions have rarely aligned this favorably for a breakthrough. The honest assessment is that in the Middle East, windows of diplomatic opportunity have a habit of closing far faster than observers expect. And genuine American enthusiasm for a deal, however sincere, cannot replace the slow, difficult structural work of state-building, disarmament, and regional reordering that any lasting peace requires.

    Washington has succeeded in opening the door to talks. Ultimately, it is up to Lebanon to decide whether it can step through.

  • Rare albino buffalo named after Donald Trump for its golden locks draws crowds at Bangladesh zoo

    Rare albino buffalo named after Donald Trump for its golden locks draws crowds at Bangladesh zoo

    A rare albino buffalo with a striking tuft of golden-blond hair and a 1,500-pound frame has become the most unexpected viral sensation in Bangladesh, packing the Dhaka National Zoo with curious visitors nearly a week after the animal was relocated from a rural farm to the capital’s public facility.

    The unusual saga began when a local farmer noticed the buffalo’s pale coat and distinctive hairstyle bore an uncanny resemblance to the signature look of former U.S. President Donald Trump. The farmer shared a short clip of the horned mammal to social media, and the video spread like wildfire across regional platforms, drawing hundreds of sightseers to the small farm located on the outskirts of Dhaka in the days that followed.

    What makes the story even more surprising is the buffalo’s original fate: the animal had been purchased ahead of Eid al-Adha, the annual Muslim Festival of Sacrifice, and was marked for slaughter. Instead, Bangladesh’s Ministry of Home Affairs ordered the buffalo seized and transferred to the Dhaka zoo, citing growing public safety risks from the uncontrolled crowds gathering at the rural farm. Authorities issued a full refund to the buyer who had purchased the buffalo for the holiday ritual to finalize the transfer.

    Since the move, hundreds of visitors have continued to brave sweltering, humid Bangladeshi summer temperatures each day to catch a glimpse of the viral buffalo. On Tuesday, crowds pressed against the railings of the animal’s enclosure, many holding up smartphones to capture footage, with parents lifting small children onto their shoulders to get a clearer view of the attraction. Zoo staff have rolled out special pampering care for the new star: keepers regularly style its blond hair, spray it down with cool water, and set up fans nearby to help it beat the heat.

    Many visitors who traveled from across the country say the comparison to the former U.S. president is impossible to miss. “There is a clear resemblance to Donald Trump in its eyes, hairstyle, and skin color,” said Mohammed Nasim, a university student based in Dhaka. “And just as Donald Trump has a one-of-a-kind personality and lives a life that’s always in the spotlight, this buffalo, after going viral, is living a similar life now – it gets endless attention and special treatment that no other animal here gets.”

    Not everyone has welcomed the joke, however. Initially, the zoo posted a display sign next to the enclosure that openly labeled the buffalo “Donald Trump,” but that signage has since been removed. The zoo’s head curator was fired from their post the previous Saturday, with no official explanation released for the dismissal, a move widely linked to backlash over the naming.

    Critics argue that attaching the name of a prominent global political leader to a farm animal is a disrespectful misstep. “Giving a farm animal the name of one of the world’s most influential leaders was certainly the wrong thing to do,” said Mohammad Joynal Adedin, a Dhaka resident who still visited the zoo to see the buffalo despite his objection. “It seems disrespectful. I think the farmer who did this made a poor decision.”

    For many other visitors, though, the viral fame of the buffalo was reason enough to make the trip. “Since before Eid, I had been seeing posts on Facebook saying that ‘Donald Trump’ would be sacrificed. Later, I heard that instead of being slaughtered, it had been placed in the zoo,” said Mohammad Habibur Rahman, a traveler who made the trip to Dhaka from Jashore, a city in southwestern Bangladesh. “So, I thought I would come to the zoo and see ‘Donald Trump’ for myself.”

  • Foreign nationals among at least 21 killed in Delhi fire

    Foreign nationals among at least 21 killed in Delhi fire

    A devastating fire that swept through an unregulated multi-story guest house in New Delhi, India’s capital, has left at least 21 people dead and multiple others injured, local law enforcement confirmed this week. Many of the fatalities were foreign nationals from neighboring South Asian countries, who had traveled to the national capital to seek medical treatment or accompany family members receiving care at nearby medical facilities, according to local media reports.

    The building, located in the busy Malviya Nagar neighborhood of south Delhi, was operating as an informal bed-and-breakfast specifically catering to patients and their families visiting a large private hospital just a short distance away, officials confirmed. As of the latest updates, more than 40 people have been pulled from the charred structure and transported to local hospitals for emergency care. Authorities have not yet been able to confirm an exact headcount of how many people were staying in the building when the fire ignited, and the origin and cause of the blaze remain under active investigation.

    Emergency response teams got the fire fully contained and under control rapidly, according to senior fire department official AK Malik. “The fire was brought under control quite early on – it was contained very quickly. We have now cleared the building and opened it up for the police,” Malik told reporters. Rescue and evidence-gathering operations are still ongoing at the site as investigators work to piece together what caused the fire and whether any regulatory violations contributed to the death toll.

    Delhi’s local government minister Ashish Sood stated that authorities are probing whether the building held all the necessary legal permits to operate as a commercial accommodation facility. Sood confirmed that any individuals found responsible for regulatory violations will face full criminal prosecution.

    In the aftermath of the tragedy, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi issued formal condolences to the families of the deceased and announced state compensation: 200,000 Indian rupees (approximately $2,088 USD) to the next of kin of those killed, and 50,000 rupees to those who sustained injuries in the blaze.

    Social media footage and broadcast news clips from the scene show large flames billowing from the building’s upper floors as onlookers gathered nearby. Video of the aftermath shows the building’s entire exterior blackened by soot and fire damage, as emergency workers comb through debris searching for additional victims and evidence.

    Eyewitnesses described chaotic, panic-stricken scenes as the fire spread through the structure faster than most occupants could escape, trapping dozens of people on the second and third floors. Local residents rushed to help before professional emergency crews arrived, pulling several people to safety and creating makeshift landing zones with mattresses pulled from a nearby corner shop to catch people jumping from upper floors.

    “The fire broke out at about 08:50… we rushed to the spot to see that the entire building was on fire. There is a mattress shop at the corner from where we took out mattresses and laid them on the road,” local resident Wasim Raj told the Indian news agency ANI. “People started to jump out of the building from the second and third floors. The fire-fighting team had reached the spot immediately and started rescue work.”

    Another nearby resident, Sher Khan, described hearing trapped people screaming for help from upper floors as the fire grew in intensity. “As the fire intensified, it seemed as if there was no way to jump from here. People spread mattresses, and some from the third floor jumped out with a little kid… She was saying that she fractured her leg,” Khan recalled.

    Local lawmaker Satish Upadhyay confirmed that multiple occupants of the guest house were citizens of Bangladesh and other South Asian nations, all in Delhi for medical care.

    This deadly incident has once again highlighted India’s long-running crisis of unenforced building safety regulations. Fires resulting in mass casualties are a recurring problem across the country, from commercial factories and residential coaching centers to hospitals and public entertainment venues. For decades, repeated investigations into major Delhi blazes have exposed a persistent gap between strict safety codes on paper and lax, irregular enforcement in practice. Common contributing factors across past incidents include infrequent safety inspections, unmaintained and faulty electrical wiring, and buildings regularly operating for purposes outside their approved construction permits.

  • Australian judges weigh Indigenous activist’s bid to prosecute King Charles for genocide

    Australian judges weigh Indigenous activist’s bid to prosecute King Charles for genocide

    MELBOURNE, Australia — A landmark legal bid by a senior Indigenous Australian activist to pursue a private genocide prosecution against Britain’s King Charles III, who also serves as Australia’s ceremonial head of state, moved to the state’s highest appeals court Wednesday, where three judges deferred their decision to a later date.

    The 68-year-old claimant, widely known by his community honorific Uncle Robbie Thorpe, brought the appeal to Victoria’s Supreme Court of Appeal after two lower courts dismissed his original filing in the Melbourne Magistrates’ Court. Thorpe’s legal argument centers on the claim that King Charles, alongside the Australian federal government and its national institutions, perpetuates ongoing genocide against Indigenous Australians through entrenched systemic disadvantage across socioeconomic sectors, a status that has left Indigenous communities the most marginalized demographic group in the country.

    Official Australian demographic data bears out the stark inequalities Thorpe highlights: Indigenous people make up just 4% of the national population, yet have significantly lower life expectancies, higher rates of chronic health conditions, disproportionate rates of incarceration and double the unemployment rate of non-Indigenous Australians.

    Speaking to reporters from The Associated Press ahead of Wednesday’s hearing, Thorpe signaled that if his domestic legal challenges are exhausted without success, he will escalate the case to the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague, Netherlands, invoking the UN Genocide Convention to pursue the claim.

    “It’s clear that they’re unwilling, unable, reluctant to deal with these international legal issues like genocide,” Thorpe told the AP, referencing Australian judicial institutions. During his address to the appellate panel, Thorpe emphasized that compounding systemic disadvantage is resulting in preventable deaths of Indigenous people across the country. “The Crown is responsible for all this mess,” he said. “Australia’s got away with genocide of Aboriginal people since [British colonizers] arrived here.”

    The legal roots of the claim stretch back to 1788, when the British Empire began its colonization of the Australian continent, seizing traditional Indigenous lands without any formal treaty with the native peoples. Colonial policies systematically targeted Indigenous culture: native languages were banned, traditional cultural practices were criminalized as part of a forced assimilation campaign to convert Indigenous people to Christianity and Western social norms, and an estimated 100,000 Indigenous children were forcibly removed from their families over more than a century in policies that have since been universally discredited as genocide.

    For Wednesday’s hearing, Thorpe wore a traditional possum-skin coat and carried a feather from a wedge-tailed eagle, a sacred totem for many Indigenous Australian communities. He asked the court to address him as Uncle Robbie, or by his traditional tribal name Djuran Bunjileenee — a request granted by presiding Justice Karin Emerton. Court documents formally name the defendant as Charles Philip Arthur George Windsor.

    Thorpe’s legal team bases the prosecution on three overlapping legal frameworks: Indigenous law that has operated on the Australian continent for more than 65,000 years, Victorian state common law, and Australian federal criminal law. When lower courts dismissed the case last year, judges ruled that local magistrates lack jurisdiction to consider Indigenous law, that genocide is not codified as an offense under Australian common law, and that any federal genocide prosecution requires formal approval from the federal attorney-general, which has not been granted.

    After a two-hour hearing Wednesday, Justice Emerton confirmed the three-judge panel would issue its ruling at an unspecified future date. If Thorpe’s appeal fails here, his last domestic legal recourse is to bring the case before Australia’s High Court. If that effort also fails, he will move forward with his plan to file the prosecution with the ICC in The Hague.