标签： Asia

April 13 delivered a packed day of geopolitical developments that sent ripples across global politics: a stunning electoral defeat for Hungary’s long-serving authoritarian prime minister Viktor Orbán, the widely predicted collapse of US-Iran diplomatic negotiations in Islamabad (with conflicting reports of the meeting’s duration), a surprise announcement from former president and current US leader Donald Trump ordering a US Navy blockade of the strategic Strait of Hormuz, and a closing controversy in the form of a late-night verbal tirade from Trump against Pope Leo XIV over the pontiff’s public call for peace over conflict.

While Orbán’s defeat has been broadly interpreted as a reassuring sign that democratic institutions remain robust in this Euroskeptic EU member state, and Trump’s angry rebuke of the pope is seen by many as confirmation that the Catholic Church is standing on the right side of global tensions, the evolving standoff between the US, Iran and key regional ally Israel leaves far more room for uncertainty. Across military, political, and economic lines, cautious optimism about a peaceful de-escalation remains possible but difficult to sustain.

By deploying a naval blockade to counter Iran’s repeated claims of authority over shipping through the strait — a chokepoint that normally carries roughly one-fifth of the world’s global oil supply via commercial tanker traffic — Trump’s move is framed as a high-stakes gambit to call Iran’s bluff and force the country’s leadership to back away from the hardline position its negotiators took during the Islamabad talks. Strategically, the logic holds: if Iran’s primary leverage over the West is its ability to disrupt global energy flows through the strait, directly challenging that control would seemingly undermine Tehran’s bargaining position. Compared to more aggressive military options floated in recent weeks, including potential ground invasions of Iranian-held islands or coastal territory, the blockade also carries a lower immediate risk of catastrophic casualties, on paper at least.

Even so, the move opens three dangerous new pathways to escalation. First, Iran could respond with a direct strike on a US Navy warship to assert its control over the waterway. Second, by intercepting all tankers departing Iranian ports, the US risks a direct military confrontation with Chinese commercial vessels, since most Iranian oil exports currently flow to China. Third, the already volatile global energy market could see a prolonged and deepening crisis that drives prices sharply higher for importing nations across the globe.

A fully enforced blockade would indeed cut off a major stream of export revenue for Iran, worsening the country’s already fragile economy and putting additional pressure on its regime to negotiate. But Iran does not stand alone: both China and Russia have long provided Tehran with financial and military support, and both are capable of ramping up that assistance to counter US pressure.

Unless the behind-the-scenes signals from the Islamabad talks — held between US Vice President JD Vance and Iranian negotiators — point to more room for compromise than official public statements have suggested, analysts widely expect the Iranian regime to retaliate to demonstrate its strength before any return to negotiations. The most likely immediate step is renewed missile and drone attacks on US-aligned Gulf states including Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, a threat Tehran has already issued. But a direct strike on US naval vessels cannot be ruled out, as Iran would seek to prove that it alone controls security in the strait.

There is also the possibility that this escalation is exactly what Trump wants: by goading Iran into launching an attack, he would gain a public pretext for the massive bombing campaign he threatened before the current two-week ceasefire took effect. It was Trump’s incendiary threat to “destroy a whole civilization” that prompted Pope Leo XIV’s criticism, which in turn sparked Trump’s late-night angry outburst against the pontiff.

While few analysts believe Trump intends to follow through on the genocidal framing of his earlier threat, there is strong reason to suspect that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is pushing hard for a resumption of full-scale hostilities, and that Trump is open to his arguments. The ceasefire has been fragile from its inception, and the US blockade — which qualifies as an act of war under international law — is itself a clear violation of the ceasefire terms, a fact Iranian leaders have already highlighted. It would take very little to trigger a new round of large-scale destruction that would likely only end with another fragile, temporary truce rather than a lasting resolution.

For Trump, there is an additional long-term risk to consider if the blockade persists beyond a matter of days. Most of the tankers Iran authorizes to depart the Gulf are either Chinese-flagged or carry Iranian crude bound for Chinese markets. Trump’s apparent bet is that the resulting disruption will push Chinese President Xi Jinping to pressure Iran into making concessions ahead of the planned US-China summit in Beijing scheduled for May 14 and 15. But the gamble could backfire spectacularly, bringing the US Navy into direct confrontation with Chinese commercial or military vessels in the strait ahead of the critical meeting.

For the rest of the world, the single greatest risk is a prolonged deepening of the energy and commodity market crisis sparked by disrupted Persian Gulf supplies. Russia stands to benefit from this outcome: elevated global crude and natural gas prices would offset the geopolitical loss of Putin’s close ally Viktor Orbán in the EU, as well as the ongoing damage Ukrainian drone and missile strikes have inflicted on Russia’s own oil export infrastructure. But every other major energy-importing region — including the whole of Europe — would face severe economic pain from prolonged high energy prices.

The scale of that pain depends entirely on how long the US-Iran standoff drags on. Hopes that the existing ceasefire could hold even without a long-term formal agreement have already dimmed significantly. Since there is no way to predict whether Trump’s gambit will lead to full-scale escalation, a continued stalemate, or a return to constructive negotiations, governments around the world are already caught in contradictory policy positions: encouraging public energy conservation while simultaneously rolling out consumer subsidies to soften the blow of high oil and gas prices.

In reality, the world is not facing a shortage of energy. Over the coming years, new pipeline routes and alternative supply chains will be developed to bypass the Strait of Hormuz. In the longer term, nations will almost certainly accelerate investments in renewable energy sources including wind, solar, and geothermal power, as well as slower, costlier options like nuclear energy, to build greater resilience against politically driven volatility in global energy markets. But these long-term solutions offer no relief from the immediate economic and security pain that a prolonged confrontation would inflict on communities across the globe.

A decade after King Salman rose to power in Saudi Arabia, human rights campaigners have sounded the alarm over a chilling new benchmark: the kingdom has carried out more than 2,000 executions since 2015, a surge that rights groups call a ‘frightening milestone’ that exposes the gap between official promises of reform and on-the-ground human rights abuses.

Data collected by London-based human rights organization Reprieve confirms the 2,000 mark was crossed just last week. When compared to the five-year period before King Salman took the throne, the scale of the increase is stark: between 2010 and 2014, Saudi Arabia averaged just 71 executions per year. Today, that rate has jumped fivefold, with 345 executions recorded in 2023 and at least 356 in 2024.

Rights advocates say the sharp rise in capital punishment is no accident, arguing that de facto ruler Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (widely known as MBS) has leveraged the death penalty as a tool of political repression. Jeed Basyouni, head of Reprieve’s Middle East work, told Middle East Eye that the steep spike in executions over the past two years follows a consistent pattern: the Saudi government uses periods of international crisis to cover up widespread human rights violations.

A breakdown of 2024 executions reveals that more than two-thirds – 232 cases – involved people convicted of drug-related offenses. The remainder were charged with terrorism, a charge defined so broadly under Saudi law that many convictions are based on vague, unsubstantiated claims. International law only permits the use of the death penalty for the ‘most serious crimes,’ defined as intentional acts resulting in death, meaning the large volume of drug-related executions likely violates global human rights standards. The kingdom resumed capital punishment for drug offenses in late 2022, ending a three-year moratorium on the practice for these cases.

Two high-profile executions in recent weeks underscore the political nature of many of these death sentences. Last week, two Shia citizens from Saudi Arabia’s restive Eastern Province were put to death after being convicted of terror charges. Just one week earlier, 42-year-old businessman Saud al-Faraj was executed for his role in 2011 Arab Spring anti-government protests that called for greater democracy and reform in the kingdom. Faraj, who was convicted in 2022 of charges including running a terrorist cell and killing police officers, had consistently maintained his innocence, alleging he was tortured into a false confession. Court and prison records show he was forced to attend interrogation sessions while being transported in a wheelchair between prison hospital stays, and he was held in solitary confinement for 21 consecutive months.

Julia Legner, executive director of Saudi-based human rights group Alqst, noted that the 2,000-execution milestone lays bare the kingdom’s steady rollback of human rights over the past 11 years, even as MBS has cultivated a global image as a progressive reformer. ‘Despite the crown prince’s repeated promises to curb the use of the death penalty, the reality has only worsened, both in scale and scope, with ever more red lines being crossed, from the execution of journalists to that of child defendants,’ Legner told Middle East Eye.

In recent months, the kingdom has violated its own public pledges and international law by executing multiple people who were minors when their alleged crimes were committed. International human rights law, including the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child – a treaty Saudi Arabia has ratified – explicitly bans the death penalty for offenses committed by people under the age of 18. Facing global backlash in 2020, Saudi authorities announced a royal order ending judicial discretion to sentence child defendants to death. But Reprieve’s data confirms at least 17 child defendants have been executed since that promise was made.

Foreign nationals are also disproportionately represented among recent executions, adding another layer of abuse to the kingdom’s capital punishment system. Basyouni emphasized that the chasm between MBS’s public rhetoric of reform and modernization and the reality of capital punishment could not be clearer. ‘The distance between MBS’s public narrative of reform and modernisation, and the reality of death sentences meted out to child defendants, vulnerable migrants and political protesters, is wider than ever,’ Basyouni said. ‘Two thousand executions, including at least 17 child defendants, is a frightening milestone, and this number will continue to rise while the world looks away.’

Against the backdrop of escalating ongoing conflict in the Middle East and a rapidly shifting global multipolar order, experts and policymakers from across the world gathered in Jakarta on April 14 for the Middle Powers Conference, where they centered discussion on China’s growing, critical role in advancing global peace and amplifying the collective voice of the Global South.

Organized by the Foreign Policy Community of Indonesia (FPCI), the forum brought together analysts, scholars, and former leaders to examine how middle powers and Global South nations can reshape a more inclusive international system. Speaking via video link to attendees, Islamabad-based policy analyst and journalist Nasim Zehra outlined China’s active behind-the-scenes diplomatic efforts to de-escalate Middle East tensions. Zehra explained that China has strongly supported Pakistan’s ongoing mediation work between the United States and Iran, noting that Pakistan has launched daily diplomatic outreach to Washington while its foreign minister conducted an official visit to Beijing to coordinate on peace efforts. She also noted that other major middle powers including Egypt, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia have taken up similar complementary roles in pushing for conflict resolution.

Jonathan Berkshire Miller, co-founder of Canada’s Pendulum Geopolitical Advisory, offered context for the evolving intersection of global diplomacy and economic cooperation, noting that modern nations increasingly structure diplomatic and commercial decisions around core national interests. Miller pointed out that traditional divides between economic engagement and security cooperation have dissolved in contemporary international relations. “The reality is now those sectors are blurred. People do not distinguish between the economic tools and the national security and defense tools,” he told the forum.

FPCI founder and chairman Dino Patti Djalal expanded on the growing influence of middle powers in global governance, noting that any middle power that joins the BRICS bloc can strengthen the group’s capacity to shape the future of the emerging global order. Djalal raised a key open question for the community of middle powers: whether these nations can successfully mediate persistent conflicts and step into leadership roles to reform a strained multilateral system. Still, he emphasized that “one thing is clear: the role of middle powers is not preordained,” leaving space for new actors to carve out meaningful contributions to global governance.

Haroldo Ramanzini Jr, an associate professor at the University of Brasilia’s Institute of International Relations, stressed that middle powers and Global South nations have emerged as leading advocates for a legitimate, inclusive multipolar international order that rejects selective exclusion. Ramanzini warned that a global system without universally agreed multilateral rules is fundamentally unstable and insecure for all nations. He called for deeper cross-regional cooperation between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and South America’s MERCOSUR trade bloc to strengthen support for initiatives led by the Global South and middle powers, highlighting existing collaborative efforts including India’s Global Biofuels Alliance launched at the 2023 New Delhi G20 Summit and Brazil’s Global Alliance Against Hunger and Poverty launched during its 2024 G20 presidency.

Former Australian foreign minister Gareth Evans added that a growing network of regional trade and cooperation bodies already provide frameworks for nations to align on shared interests. He pointed to existing blocs including ASEAN, MERCOSUR, and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), as well as major multilateral trade agreements such as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) as examples of existing cooperative structures that can be leveraged to advance collective peace and prosperity.

The forum’s discussion underscored a growing global recognition of China’s unique position as a bridge between major powers and the Global South, particularly as traditional multilateral institutions struggle to address protracted conflicts like that in the Middle East.