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  • When a beloved tree began withering away, locals suspected a killer in their midst

    When a beloved tree began withering away, locals suspected a killer in their midst

    Nestled between rolling mountains just a short distance from Seoul’s bustling city center, the quiet residential neighborhood of Buam-dong has long been a haven for visitors and locals alike. Restricted urban development, a result of its proximity to the Blue House presidential residence, has preserved the area’s quaint, charming character, dotted with independent art galleries, cozy neighborhood cafes, and pockets of lush, mature greenery. For more than a century, one ginkgo tree standing sentinel along a residential sidewalk has stood as a unifying, beloved landmark for the Buam-dong community — a tree locals have affectionately called “Grandpa Ginkgo.”

    Unlike most ginkgos in Seoul that grow tucked away in private gardens or wild forested areas, this hardy, centuries-old tree belongs to everyone in the neighborhood. Jung, a local resident who requested anonymity (and is referred to here by a pseudonym) who moved to Buam-dong just four years ago, formed an immediate, deep bond with the tree. “I pass this tree whenever I come home. I would say, ‘Grandpa, I’m home.’ Or ‘Grandpa, I’m heading out now,’” she explained. For 74-year-old lifelong resident Park Jeon-hee, the ginkgo is his oldest friend. Even 10-year-old Kim On, who walks past the tree every school day, feels its loss acutely: “It has stood since before I was born. Thinking it might fall down makes me sad.”

    It was Jung who first noticed something was terribly wrong in the summer of 2026, when Seoul’s normally lush summer foliage turned the city deep green. While other trees thrived under the humid skies, “Grandpa Ginkgo” was visibly ailing. Healthy green fan-shaped leaves were dropping to the ground en masse, an abnormality that should not occur during peak growing season. Within weeks, the base of the tree was blanketed in a rotting carpet of fallen leaves, and its branches began to thin and turn brown.

    Jung’s initial quiet curiosity quickly bloomed into urgent concern, and she rallied neighbors who had also noticed the tree’s decline to form an informal group of amateur investigators to uncover what was ailing their hardy community landmark. The mystery captured national attention across South Korea, making front-page national headlines — a level of scrutiny that left Jung uncomfortable, prompting her request for anonymity. She compares the experience to watching a beloved family member fade: “Imagine a grandfather who silently embraces you every day, listens to you, and has always been strong and full of life. Suddenly, he begins to die. How heartbreaking would that be?”

    As the community dug into the mystery, they spotted 10 white plastic funnels protruding from the soil just behind the tree’s trunk. Jung initially assumed the devices were installed to deliver nutrients to the tree, but soon began to suspect foul play. The group obtained access to nearby home security camera footage, which captured two men in white gloves crouching at the tree’s base with a power drill on an April morning. Though the footage did not definitively show the men installing the funnels, it aligned with a detail local officials had previously shared: the Whanki Museum, located steps from the ginkgo’s trunk, had previously requested permission from local landowners to remove the tree entirely. The museum claimed the ginkgo’s expanding roots were damaging its outer brick perimeter wall.

    Arborists called in to inspect the tree echoed the community’s worst fears: the funnels were almost certainly being used to inject herbicide to slowly kill the 100-year-old tree, and residents placed the blame squarely on the Whanki Museum. A group of residents accompanied by police confronted museum staff shortly after the discovery, and locals allege a museum employee essentially confirmed the institution’s involvement. The museum has never issued a public confirmation or denial of the herbicide claims, and declined repeated requests for comment from the BBC. In a brief May statement, the museum said its outer wall was collapsing due to the ginkgo’s roots, that it had contacted more than 40 local property owners to request a solution, and that after receiving no responses, its staff “attempted to resolve the situation” — offering no further details on what actions were taken. Local council officials, however, told the BBC a 2025 inspection found “no meaningful connection” between the ginkgo’s roots and the claimed wall damage, adding that any legitimate structural issue would have prompted official intervention and public notification.

    The irony of the accusation is not lost on angry local residents, as the Whanki Museum was founded in 1992 to honor the legacy of Kim Whanki, one of South Korea’s most celebrated pioneering abstract artists, often called the “Picasso of Korea.” The museum’s architect designed the space to harmonize with the natural landscape that was central to Kim’s work, and Kim himself wrote nature-focused essays under the pen name Su-wha, which translates to “conversation with trees.” “Treating life that way is ignorance and there was never any apology,” Jung said.

    Residents have adopted Kim’s pen name for their ailing tree, and partnered with local environmental activists to launch a national petition calling for the creation of an official urban tree guardian program to protect landmark community trees. Activist Choi Jin-woo, who joined the campaign, said he initially could not believe the allegations: “When I first heard that a tree next to a museum had been poisoned with herbicide and was dying, I simply couldn’t believe it. But when I saw the ginkgo shrivelling, I realised something this horrific could actually happen in our society.” Residents have filed a formal police complaint against the museum’s director, and authorities confirm an investigation is ongoing, though they have declined to release further details. They are demanding the museum reveal what substance was injected into the tree so arborists can begin targeted treatment to save it.

    Despite the grim prognosis — one arborist concluded the tree is 90% dead — the fight to save “Grandpa Ginkgo” has yielded an unexpected silver lining: it has united the Buam-dong community in a way no other event has. As Jung spent days organizing support and gathering information, neighbors left home-cooked meals on her doorstep, and she in turn shared homegrown vegetable soup with neighbors she had never met before. For Jung herself, who had struggled with mobility issues and depression after a serious illness last winter, the campaign pulled her back into community life: “I felt so depressed and hopeless but those feelings disappeared. I entered a tree-like state. The tree helped bring me back out into life again. Ironically, it was because the tree became sick.”

    For weeks, roughly 20 residents gathered daily at the tree’s base to pray for its recovery: some read aloud Kim Whanki’s own essays about nature, a local shaman led a traditional healing ritual, and the group joined hands for an “elm dance,” a ceremonial practice some ecological activists believe promotes healing for ailing trees. Notes of support and well wishes are tied to the ginkgo’s trunk, fluttering in the mountain breeze.

    As autumn settles over Seoul, turning the city’s deciduous trees into vibrant shades of gold and yellow, Buam-dong’s most famous tree still stands with mostly crispy, brown, bare branches. Jung says the tree’s fate is now “in the hands of heaven,” and all the community can do is stay by its side and hope for a miracle. For Buam-dong, the tree is far more than just greenery along a sidewalk: it is a centurylong companion, a community landmark, and an irreplaceable part of the neighborhood’s identity. Residents cannot imagine an autumn without pausing to admire “Grandpa Ginkgo” in his full, golden, feathery glory — and they are not ready to let him go.

  • ​​​​​​Sahel instability pushes Algeria to rethink its long-standing non‑intervention doctrine

    ​​​​​​Sahel instability pushes Algeria to rethink its long-standing non‑intervention doctrine

    On August 30, following an official request from Niger’s transitional authorities and direct orders from Algerian President Abdelmadjid Tebboune, Algiers made an unprecedented public announcement: it had deployed four Su-30 fighter jets, one refueling aircraft, and one military transport plane to Niger, to support its southern neighbor in countering rising internal instability.

    This deployment came just one day after a foiled mutiny against the government led by General Abdourahamane Tiani, who seized power via a military coup in July 2023. Over August 28 and 29, renegade soldiers attacked multiple key sites across Niamey, Niger’s capital, including the presidential palace, Diori-Hamani International Airport, and Military Base 101, sending tensions surging across the already volatile Sahel nation.

    A senior anonymous researcher from The Sentry, a U.S.-based non-profit investigative and policy organization, explained that the mutineers’ anger stems from deep-rooted institutional and military inequities within Niger’s armed forces. Rank-and-file soldiers have suffered repeated heavy casualties in counter-insurgency operations across the country’s rural regions, while Tiani’s loyal Presidential Guard remains concentrated in the capital, equipped with superior hardware and receiving far better benefits and treatment. The researcher added that a deadly clash that killed approximately 18 soldiers near the city of Dosso just one week before the mutiny was the immediate trigger for the uprising, a tragedy that is part of a years-long pattern of devastating insurgent attacks on Niger’s military. In 2019 alone, Islamic State in the Greater Sahara claimed two major attacks that killed 160 Nigerian soldiers near the Malian border: 71 at the Inates military base in December, and 89 more at the Chinagodrar outpost just one month later. A suicide attack claimed by the group also struck central Niamey in January this year, underscoring the persistent threat Tiani faces from both militant groups and internal military discontent.

    For Algeria, which shares a 950-kilometer porous border with Niger, this spiraling instability has forced a long-overdue reckoning: can Algiers continue to stand on the sidelines as chaos, armed insurgency, human trafficking networks, and political fragmentation take hold along its southern frontier, and across the broader Sahel region?

    Regional analysts broadly view Algeria’s open deployment of military assets to Niger as a potential turning point in the country’s foreign policy, breaking with a strict doctrine of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states that has been a cornerstone of Algiers’ approach to global affairs since it won independence from France in 1962.

    “Algeria can no longer protect its own national security and core interests just by guarding its own borders. It has to secure its strategic depth,” explained Riccardo Fabiani, North Africa Project Director at the International Crisis Group. What makes this move particularly notable is that Algiers has chosen to openly communicate the operation to the public, a sharp departure from its past preference for quiet diplomacy. Algeria’s official press agency ran full coverage of the deployment, video footage of Algerian aircraft arriving in Niger circulated publicly, and a joint press conference was held between Nigerien officials and the Algerian military delegation led by Major General Rachid Cheblaoui.

    Fabiani noted that this deployment signals the emergence of a new, far more pragmatic foreign policy for Algeria, one where the country is prepared to take on direct security and military roles in the region, rather than relying exclusively on diplomatic engagement to advance its goals in a rapidly shifting regional landscape. This public show of force also serves a second key purpose: it asserts Algeria’s regional influence amid growing competition from outside and regional powers seeking to expand their footprint in the Sahel.

    Fabiani added that Algeria has deep historical and cultural ties with Niger, and a core strategic interest in protecting the sovereignty of Sahel nations against interference from third parties such as Morocco, Israel, and the United Arab Emirates. “Algeria does not want any foreign interference, official or unofficial, in Niger’s political and security affairs,” he said. In fact, Algiers’ suspicion of foreign involvement in the region escalated to a formal break in diplomatic relations with Abu Dhabi on September 10, after months of growing tensions; Algeria accuses the UAE of indirectly funding armed separatist groups in the Sahel, including through multimillion-dollar ransom payments for released hostages.

    The Sahel has in recent years become a hotspot for competing foreign interests: Morocco has deepened security and economic cooperation with Niger since the 2023 coup, Turkey supplies combat drones to the Nigerien military, Italy maintains a deployment of over 300 soldiers at Military Base 101 in Niamey, and Russia maintains a presence through the Africa Corps paramilitary group, which local reports say assisted in foiling the late August mutiny.

    Beyond security and geopolitical competition, the partnership between Algiers and Niamey carries major economic stakes, particularly in the energy sector. The Senty senior researcher explained that the two countries have rebuilt cooperation around two major projects: the Bilma oil block in northeastern Niger, and the 4,100-kilometer Trans-Saharan Gas Pipeline, which plans to transport natural gas from Nigeria through Niger to export markets via Algeria’s Mediterranean coast. Morocco has backed a competing 5,600-kilometer pipeline project running from Nigeria along the Atlantic coast to Morocco, arguing that persistent instability in Niger makes the trans-Saharan route unfeasible. With construction of Algeria’s section of the Trans-Saharan pipeline already kicking off in the Adrar region in June, maintaining a stable pro-Algeria government in Niamey serves both security and economic goals for Algiers.

    Mourad Preure, an Algerian energy and strategy consultant, argues that military support is just one piece of a broader, development-focused Algerian strategy to stabilize Niger. “Algeria already supports Niger’s electricity sector, providing small-scale power plants. The Trans-Saharan Gas Pipeline will generate transit fees for Niger, creating a steady source of revenue and affordable energy for the country,” Preure said. “Algeria is also building a trans-Saharan road and rail corridor to enable the transit of goods and people, advancing deeper regional integration.”

    The core question now is whether this military deployment marks a permanent break with Algeria’s 60-year tradition of non-interventionism. It is true that Algeria deployed military forces as part of an Arab coalition supporting Egypt and Syria during the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars, but these were widely viewed as exceptional cases, rooted in core pan-Arab interests, rather than a shift in doctrine. Non-interventionism, rooted in Algeria’s post-independence non-alignment stance, remained a central principle of its foreign policy even after those conflicts. The principle was never formally codified in the constitution, creating inherent legal ambiguity, but in practice, Algiers long favored quiet diplomacy and mediation over overt military engagement – the 2015 Algiers Peace Accord between Mali’s government and northern Tuareg rebel groups is a key example of this approach.

    A turning point began to emerge in 2020, one year into Tebboune’s presidency, when the government passed a sweeping constitutional revision, born out of the 2019 Hirak pro-democracy movement that toppled long-time leader Abdelaziz Bouteflika. Article 91 of the revised constitution grants the president the authority to deploy Algerian military forces abroad, contingent on approval by a two-thirds majority vote in both chambers of parliament. Article 32 also permits Algerian participation in United Nations, African Union, and Arab League peacekeeping operations, and rules out offensive war that would undermine the sovereignty of other states. At the time of the revision, the amendment sparked significant pushback from civil society and Hirak activists, who opposed any potential deployment of Algerian troops to foreign conflicts.

    Notably, the current deployment to Niger – which for now only includes technical personnel to operate the deployed aircraft, no frontline combat troops – has not received parliamentary approval. Fabiani argues that from Algiers’ perspective, this deployment does not qualify as a long-term combat presence that would require legislative sign-off. “Direct combat deployment would be politically problematic, both domestically and regionally. But deploying equipment and supporting personnel falls outside that framework,” he explained. This is not Algiers’ first recent military support to Niamey: the country donated four helicopters and additional military equipment to Niger in early August, before the late August mutiny. What is new is the open, public acknowledgment of the deployment, designed to send a clear political as well as military signal to regional and global actors.

    Whether this operation is an isolated case or the first sign of a deeper, permanent shift in Algeria’s security doctrine remains unclear. No analysts contacted for the original reporting were willing to make definitive predictions, noting that everything depends on how the Sahel’s security situation evolves in the coming months. Preure emphasized that Algeria’s role remains limited to responding to requests from neighboring states: “When Algeria is asked, it provides assistance as a good neighbor, but it is not Algeria’s role to take on responsibility for the national defense and security of other states.”

    The Sentry researcher similarly noted that any future Algerian engagement across the Sahel will be decided on a case-by-case basis, rather than representing a blanket policy shift. Neighboring Mali, where Algiers has recently repaired relations after years of diplomatic tension over the Tuareg insurgency, offers a clear example: even with rapprochement, a similar military deployment to Mali is not on the table in the near term. “Relations between Algeria and Niger are far less complicated, because the Tuareg issue that has long poisoned Algeria-Mali ties does not carry the same weight in Algiers’ relationship with Niamey,” the researcher explained. That allows Algeria to deploy aircraft and provide military support without being drawn into the complex, sensitive internal conflicts that have complicated its engagement with Mali.

    Still, faced with continued deterioration of security across the Sahel, Algiers has clearly concluded that it can no longer rely solely on border defense to protect its national interests. Instead, it must now proactively shape its strategic environment. As Africa’s second largest military power by size and its largest defense spender, a more proactive Algerian role in the Sahel could fundamentally reshape the region’s security dynamics for years to come.

  • Ben Gvir supporters hand out gun-shaped keyrings to Israeli students

    Ben Gvir supporters hand out gun-shaped keyrings to Israeli students

    Ahead of Israel’s upcoming national elections, a traditional high school mock election designed to engage young voters with the country’s political process devolved into chaos this week after far-right supporters distributed inflammatory, weapon-themed promotional items to students.

    Supporters of Itamar Ben Gvir, Israel’s far-right National Security Minister and leader of the Otzma Yehudit party, handed out gun-shaped keyrings emblazoned with the slogan “Guns Save Lives” to 11th and 12th grade students at Blich High School in Ramat Gan on Thursday. Local Israeli newspaper Haaretz first reported that the keyrings – which also double as bottle openers – either carried the shape of a firearm or featured an image of Ben Gvir holding one. Party activists also attempted to distribute noose-shaped keyrings, but the school’s headmaster intervened to stop the distribution before they could be handed out.

    Otzma Yehudit has defended the promotional stunt, framing it as a creative way to educate younger generations on Ben Gvir’s long-standing push for looser gun laws in Israel. The minister’s weapons reform agenda has already resulted in expanded gun access for Israelis living in settlements across the occupied West Bank: in January this year, Ben Gvir approved gun licenses for Israeli settlers in 18 additional settlements in the territory. The far-right party has also championed other hardline policies, including a Knesset-approved law passed in March that makes the death penalty the default punishment for Palestinians convicted of lethal attacks against Israelis in Israeli military courts.

    The promotional stunt quickly turned the school’s annual mock election into a scene of disorder. Multiple political figures from opposing parties reported verbal harassment and physical intimidation from Otzma Yehudit supporters. Gilad Kariv, a Knesset member for the left-wing Jewish Democrats party, wrote on his social media platform X that supporters of Ben Gvir shoved, cursed, and elbowed his activists during his speech, and threw bottles toward the stage. Merav Ben Ari, a lawmaker from the centre-right Together party, also reported being targeted, writing on X that supporters threw a cup at her while shouting slogans in support of Ben Gvir. She condemned the far-right minister’s time in office as being defined by “violence and racism”.

    When the votes were counted, the centre-right Yashar party led by Gadi Eisenkot secured first place with 32.2% of the student vote, followed by Naftali Bennett’s Together party with 22.4%. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s ruling Likud party came third with 15.5%, while Ben Gvir’s Otzma Yehudit placed fourth with 9.4% – outperforming the Jewish Democrats, who earned 7.1%.

    While the results put Otzma Yehudit behind mainstream centre-right and right-wing parties, the 9.4% showing marks a notable increase in support for the far-right party at Blich High School compared to the 2022 election cycle. Two years ago, when Otzma Yehudit ran as part of a joint alliance with Religious Zionism, the bloc only earned 4.6% of the vote at the school. This year, Otzma Yehudit and Religious Zionism combined earned 11% of the vote, with an additional 3.6% going to the new far-right party Amcha Yisrael, which has publicly called for the expulsion of all Palestinians from the Gaza Strip.

    Kariv framed the overall results as evidence that contrary to popular narratives, not all young Israeli voters have shifted sharply to the far right. Blich High School’s headmaster emphasized that the event aligned with the school’s mission of civic education, telling Israeli outlet Maariv that “civic education is also education for pluralism, tolerance, and the ability to conduct disagreement with respect and attentiveness,” and praised participating students for creating what he called a “fruitful and enriching day.”

    This mock election comes as Israel prepares for its first national election since the outbreak of the Israel-Gaza war in October 2023, with young voters poised to play a key role in the outcome. Recent independent research has documented rising anti-Palestinian sentiment among segments of young Israeli society, with some supporting the exclusion of Palestinian citizens of Israel from public life. Students who have publicly opposed Israel’s military campaign in Gaza have also faced formal disciplinary action from school authorities: earlier this year, an 11th grade student in Ramat Gan was summoned to a disciplinary hearing after distributing flyers urging classmates to refuse compulsory military service.

  • Turkey busts Israel-linked ‘scam empire’ behind alleged $266m fraud

    Turkey busts Israel-linked ‘scam empire’ behind alleged $266m fraud

    In a major coordinated law enforcement operation targeting cross-border financial crime, Turkish security forces have taken down an elaborate organized fraud network with alleged ties to Israeli principals that scammed victims across three continents out of at least $266 million over two years, Turkish Justice Minister Akin Gurlek announced Friday.

    The multi-agency investigation, carried out in partnership with Turkey’s National Intelligence Organization (MIT) and Interpol, uncovered 42 fraudulent call centers operated under the cover of 28 fake corporate entities, with 239 suspects currently identified as persons of interest in the case. Dawn raids were executed simultaneously across 236 locations in two major Turkish regions, Istanbul and Mugla, to disrupt the network’s operations.

    According to Gurlek, investigators confirmed that individuals with documented links to Israel served as the primary owners and final beneficiaries of all the front companies involved in the scheme. Turkish law enforcement officials have connected this bust to the notorious transnational criminal syndicate widely referred to as the “Scam Empire”, a network that has operated across dozens of countries for more than a decade. The criminal group was first brought to widespread public attention in an expose by the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP), which previously detailed how scam rings based out of Israel and European countries stole hundreds of millions from defrauded investors via deceptive telephone-based investment schemes.

    The mechanics of the fraud follow a well-worn but effective pattern documented by investigators. The network hired multilingual customer service agents to lure victims from target regions into fraudulent foreign exchange investment schemes. Once victims signed up, they were granted access to controlled, fake investment platforms that displayed artificially inflated fabricated profits. This deceptive display convinced victims to deposit increasingly large sums of money, which was immediately siphoned off by the organizers. All stolen funds were quickly transferred out of Turkey to offshore bank accounts and untraceable cryptocurrency wallets, officials confirmed. Individual victims lost anywhere from $10,000 to hundreds of thousands of dollars each, according to current victim statements and evidence collected during the raids.

    One of the key alleged masterminds of the Turkish operation, identified only by the initials YA, is an Israeli national who also holds Portuguese citizenship, Turkish investigators confirmed. This bust is not the first high-profile case of Israeli-linked investment fraud targeting global victims: in 2016, Reuters exposed a similar scheme run by Israeli trading firm NRGbinary, which stole millions of dollars from European investors before Israeli authorities shut the company down later that year. In a 2025 follow-up investigation, OCCRP mapped out two similar scam call center networks operating out of Israel, Eastern Europe and Georgia that persuaded more than 32,000 global victims to invest a combined total of at least $275 million.

    Investigators familiar with the current Turkish probe say the network mirrored operational structures documented in the earlier OCCRP investigation. Call center agents were required to use entirely false identities and forged supporting documents to build trust with victims. Against a backdrop of escalating diplomatic tensions between Turkey and Israel in recent years, Turkish security officials assess that Israel-based scam networks have actively shifted a portion of their operational infrastructure to Turkey to avoid detection by domestic law enforcement in their home country.

    To avoid being traced, organizers set up empty shell companies that serve as front operations for the scam call centers, then hire local staff fluent in a wide range of target market languages, including Japanese, Hindi, French and Spanish. Employees are hired under specific roles labeled “conversion agents” and “retention agents”, each with a clear function in luring and manipulating victims. All new recruits undergo a one-week training program where they are assigned fake aliases and coached to build entirely false personal backstories designed to impress victims and build false credibility, including common claims that the agent is an elite graduate of Oxford University or another top international institution.

    To protect the network from infiltration, organizers require all new hires to pass a polygraph test before starting work, designed to uncover any hidden connections to law enforcement or security agencies. Strict internal rules govern day-to-day operations: speaking Hebrew inside call center facilities is completely banned, and agents never identify the actual shell company they work for. Instead, they pose as representatives of fake investment platforms whose names are changed on a rotating basis by the Israeli organizers to evade tracking. One of the most strictly enforced rules, investigators found, is that the network never targets Israeli citizens for scams, limiting all fraudulent activity to victims outside of Israel.

    In their assessment of the network’s structure, Turkish investigators found that transnational scam networks operated by Israeli fraudsters have cultivated what the syndicate describes as a mutually beneficial, “win-win” relationship with the state of Israel, though no further evidence or details of this relationship were provided in the official announcement.

  • Ms Rachel matches Macklemore with $1m donation for Palestinian children

    Ms Rachel matches Macklemore with $1m donation for Palestinian children

    A prominent children’s content creator has stepped forward to match a landmark $1 million donation from rapper Macklemore to the Palestine Children’s Relief Fund, issuing a public call for other high-profile, wealthy celebrities to use their platform and privilege to stand up for Palestinian children amid the ongoing humanitarian crisis in Gaza.

    Rachel Griffin-Accurso, known widely to her young audience and their parents as Ms Rachel, announced her pledge in an Instagram post Thursday. The announcement came just days after Macklemore was dropped as an opening act from Ed Sheeran’s North American tour, a move the rapper says was orchestrated by New England Patriots owner and pro-Israeli businessman Robert Kraft, following Macklemore’s on-stage comments condemning Israeli military action in Gaza and declaring “Free Palestine.”

    In her social media statement, Griffin-Accurso wrote: “I’ll match Macklemore’s donation and I invite every wealthy white celebrity to match it and speak out against the genocide in Gaza. Over 20,000 precious Palestinian children have been killed and children continue to be killed every day. We’ve a moral obligation to use our privilege and platforms to protect children and human rights.”

    This is not the first time the children’s content creator has backed Palestinian relief efforts. Griffin-Accurso joined the Palestine Children’s Relief Fund as a global ambassador in 2025, building on months of prior fundraising work for the non-profit. Her prior advocacy includes highlighting the stories of conflict survivors on her digital platform, including a meeting with Rahaf, a young girl who survived Israeli airstrikes in Gaza, and she previously organized a 2024 fundraising drive through Save the Children to support children displaced and harmed by the ongoing war.

    Shortly after Griffin-Accurso shared her pledge, Macklemore—born Benjamin Haggerty—publicly responded to her post with warm praise: “Wow. Love you so much.”

    Macklemore first announced his own $1 million donation last week, committing all net proceeds from his sets on Sheeran’s tour to Palestinian support organizations. In his initial statement, the rapper wrote: “With everything that has happened over the last 48 hours, I want to bring the conversation back to where it belongs, to the Palestinian people who are still being killed, still living under military occupation, and still fighting for their freedom. Whatever we disagree about, perhaps we can agree on this: Palestinian lives are worth protecting.”

    Macklemore was removed from the tour line-up after his September 4 and 5 performances at New Jersey’s MetLife Stadium, where he openly addressed the war in Gaza, called for freedom for Palestine, and performed his protest track *Hind’s Hall*, named after the late four-year-old Palestinian girl Hind Rajab who was killed by Israeli forces while trapped in a car with her extended family.

    Following Macklemore’s removal, every remaining supporting act pulled out of the tour in a show of solidarity. Artists including Lukas Graham, Aaron Rowe, Finneas and Beoga all announced their departures from the tour schedule within an hour of one another on Tuesday.

    This reporting was originally sourced from independent outlet Middle East Eye, which provides dedicated, unfiltered coverage of events across the Middle East and North Africa region.

  • Gaza’s children with Down syndrome struggle to rebuild skills lost to genocide

    Gaza’s children with Down syndrome struggle to rebuild skills lost to genocide

    Dust clinging to her clothes and exhaustion weighing on her shoulders, 13-year-old Heba Alataar completes the long walk from her displacement camp to a small makeshift tent in central Gaza’s al-Zawaida. What this tattered canvas structure lacks in infrastructure, it makes up for in hope: it is the new temporary home of classes run by the Right to Live Society (RLS), the only organization that long provided specialized support for children like Heba, who has Down syndrome.

    Inside the tent, split crudely into two classrooms, Heba sits cross-legged on the bare ground alongside her peers—all children with Down syndrome—working slowly to reclaim skills they lost amid the violence and upheaval of Israel’s military campaign in Gaza. Heba is one of more than 1,000 children with Down syndrome in the besieged enclave, a group that has suffered disproportionately amid the wider humanitarian catastrophe that has unfolded across Gaza since October 2023.

    Before the war, RLS was a lifeline for generations of these children and their families. Founded in 1993, the organization operated three purpose-built facilities across Gaza, employing 200 trained staff to deliver a full spectrum of care: early intervention support from birth, specialized education, physical rehabilitation, and mental health counseling for caregivers navigating the unique challenges of raising a child with Down syndrome. For Heba’s father Alaa Alattar, that support transformed his deepest fears into hope.

    “When I first learned my daughter had Down syndrome, I cried for days. I had no understanding of her condition, no idea how to care for her, and I was terrified for what her future would hold,” Alattar told Middle East Eye. “All of that fear melted away when we joined RLS. We saw how the children were cared for, how much they could achieve, and we knew Heba would be okay.”

    By age 10, Heba had mastered foundational skills: basic comprehension, clear speech, independent personal hygiene, and she was just beginning to learn to read and write. Alattar says he had started to imagine a full, meaningful future for his daughter—until Israeli attacks destroyed every RLS facility across Gaza in the months that followed the outbreak of war. Hundreds of children with disabilities were killed in the bombardment, and many more remain missing. The survivors were displaced, trapped in overcrowded camps with no access to the specialized care they depended on, and the trauma of constant violence erased years of slow, hard-won progress.

    Watching Heba lose every skill she had gained was devastating for Alattar. “The war took everything from her. She lost all her skills, her interests, her daily routine. She went right back to square one, as if she had never received any care or education at all,” he said, his voice breaking. “There are no words to describe that heartbreak—years of my daughter’s hard work, the tireless effort of her teachers and our family, all gone in an instant. To see my little girl depressed, sitting alone in a displacement camp, that is a pain no parent should ever know.”

    Other families share the same agony. Nabila Abed Rabbo says her 13-year-old daughter Saja, who also has Down syndrome, regressed completely after months of terror and displacement. “Every explosion left her terrified. She would cover her ears, scream, and cling to me, refusing to let me leave her side,” Abed Rabbo said. “Between the constant fear and the terrible conditions in the camp, Saja lost every basic skill she had. She couldn’t even use the toilet anymore, and diapers were almost impossible to get because of the blockade. We had no other options.”

    Bahjat Sultan’s 14-year-old daughter Fatima has experienced similar regression. “The war changed her completely. She lost the ability to talk about her feelings, and she started having outbursts of aggressive behavior that we never saw before,” Sultan said. “At night, she can’t sleep. She wakes up screaming from nightmares, terrified all over again.”

    Raoufa Salama, RLS’s director of rehabilitation programs, explains that the war’s impact on this vulnerable group has been catastrophic. Beyond the widespread loss of skills in communication, self-care, and social interaction, the organization has recorded a sharp, unexpected rise in new cases of Down syndrome births. Before the war, RLS saw one to two new cases a week; today, that number has jumped to four to five. Salama attributes this increase to widespread exposure to toxic pollution from Israeli explosives and the chronic extreme psychological stress that all pregnant people in Gaza now endure.

    Amid all the loss, fragments of hope remain. Fatima Sultan has carried her old RLS uniform with her through every round of displacement, refusing to leave it behind. “She puts it on all the time and asks me to take her back to the center,” her father said. “I just promise her we’ll go soon, and I hold on to the hope that one day we will.”

    In July 2024, the surviving RLS team began the slow work of rebuilding their services from scratch. Working out of makeshift tents across three locations in Gaza, the team restarted programming with recreational activities and home visits, eventually expanding back to early intervention, specialized education, and rehabilitation. Their core goals: support families through trauma, help children regain lost skills, and raise awareness of the unique risks disabled children face amid ongoing war and displacement.

    For families who had been turned away from every other school because of their children’s condition, the return of RLS brought overwhelming joy. “I tried to enroll Saja in so many different schools, and they all rejected her because of her disability,” Abed Rabbo said. “When we got the invitation from RLS, she was so happy she could finally go to her own school, learn, and make friends.”

    Today, RLS serves more than 1,000 children with Down syndrome and autism across its three tent sites. But the obstacles remain nearly insurmountable. The 16-year blockade of Gaza and widespread destruction have left the organization facing crippling shortages of every essential: no proper classroom space, no specialized educational equipment, no consistent access to medical supplies. Teachers improvise, cutting educational materials from cardboard left over from aid packages and scavenging bits of colored paper to make learning tools.

    The biggest threat, however, remains ongoing violence. Even after a ceasefire was announced in October 2023, Israel continues to carry out near-daily attacks across Gaza, and maintains a near-total blockade on most aid. Since the ceasefire took effect, Israeli forces have killed at least 1,386 Palestinians, including 300 children. Fourteen-year-old RLS student Ahmed Al-Mabhouh was shot five times by an Israeli soldier while playing near his home east of Al-Bureij refugee camp, leaving him severely wounded and unable to attend classes. Each new round of violence and displacement can erase weeks of progress, sending children back into the trauma that erased their skills in the first place.

    Still, against all odds, the children and their families are pushing forward. Slowly but steadily, they are regaining lost skills, rebuilding routines, and reclaiming their joy. For Heba, the center has already transformed her life. “Learning is her whole new routine now. It takes up most of her day, and she’s always so excited to go to class,” Alattar said. “She comes home and tells us all about her friends and what she learned. She’s happier, more focused, and we are so grateful for everything the RLS team has done for us.”

    Watching his daughter progress again has restored Alattar’s hope for the future—even as he waits for the war to end for good. “I hope that the fighting stops completely, that our children never have to fear air strikes or being forced to run from their homes again,” he said. “I hope Heba gets a safe, proper place to learn, that she can fully recover, thrive, and one day achieve our shared dream: she wants to be a teacher for other children with Down syndrome.”

  • Turkey to halt Iranian Mahan Air flights over US sanctions risk

    Turkey to halt Iranian Mahan Air flights over US sanctions risk

    In a direct response to recent U.S. Treasury sanctions targeting three Turkish ground service and logistics firms for ties to Iran’s privately owned Mahan Air, Turkey has announced it will halt all flight operations for the Iranian carrier, senior Turkish government officials confirmed to Middle East Eye in a Friday briefing.

    The entry into force of the suspension is set for September 21, and will cover every inbound and outbound route operated by Mahan Air between Turkey and Iran, according to the officials. Earlier this month, the U.S. Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) rolled out a wide-ranging sanctions regime that targets not just Iranian civilian aviation firms, but also third-party ground handling providers, cargo operators, and aircraft parts suppliers that do business with blacklisted Iranian entities.

    The sanctions framework included a short grace period for global businesses to wind down existing commercial relationships with sanctioned Iranian firms, while issuing a clear warning that any third-country service providers continuing engagements could face punitive U.S. measures. Three Turkish firms — S Sistem, Mes Cargo, and Sky Phoenix — were specifically named in the sanctions round for their work with Mahan Air, with U.S. regulators citing activity that includes supplying aircraft components, providing general sales agency services, and facilitating aircraft purchases for the carrier.

    One senior Turkish official explained to Middle East Eye that the blacklisting of the three Turkish-based companies makes clear that risks from U.S. enforcement now reach every segment of Mahan Air’s operational supply chain in Turkey. “The risk now extends to every Turkish entity providing services to Mahan Air, from airport operations and ground handling to ticketing and banking. This could disrupt services and trigger further investigations,” the official said.

    Turkish officials were careful to clarify that this decision does not represent a blanket ban on all Iranian air carriers operating in Turkish airspace and airports. Instead, the Turkish government will maintain a dynamic risk assessment process for other Iranian airlines, weighing factors including its existing bilateral aviation agreement with Tehran, core flight safety standards, and the potential for additional U.S. sanctions that could expose more Turkish companies to punitive penalties.

    Prior to the suspension, Mahan Air maintained a robust operational footprint in Turkey, running a minimum of three daily flights between Istanbul and Tehran alone. On Friday, the airline itself issued a confirmation that it would end all services to and from Turkey starting September 21, adding that it would also suspend flight operations to Oman and Georgia in a parallel move, expanding the scope of service disruptions for the carrier across the broader Middle East and South Caucasus region.

  • Houthi leader denies Yemeni group targeted Mecca with drone

    Houthi leader denies Yemeni group targeted Mecca with drone

    Amid escalating regional tensions that have sent global energy markets reeling, the top leader of Yemen’s Houthi movement has issued a firm public denial of allegations that the group launched a drone attack targeting Saudi Arabia’s holy city of Mecca. In a televised address broadcast to followers and international observers alike, Abdul-Malik al-Houthi dismissed the accusation of targeting the Islamic holy site as a “major lie”, emphasizing that the Houthi movement holds a core commitment to protecting all of Islam’s sacred locations. Instead of claiming or acknowledging any strike on Mecca, al-Houthi shifted blame to what he called the “Zionist enemy” — a reference to the State of Israel — framing Israel as the true source of danger to the region’s holy sites. Al-Houthi warned that Israel seeks to target all major Islamic sacred sites, including Mecca, Medina, and Jerusalem’s Al-Aqsa Mosque, and called for a unified Islamic alliance to confront this purported threat, stating that the movement stands ready to join this collective defensive effort. The denial comes on the heels of major territorial advances and military actions by the Houthis, formally known as Ansar Allah, that have upended security along one of the world’s most critical energy chokepoints. Over just one weekend, the group seized large swathes of Yemen’s coastline adjacent to the Bab-el-Mandeb strait, a key Red Sea chokepoint through which a large share of global maritime energy trade passes. Immediately following this territorial gain, the Houthis carried out an attack on the East-West Pipeline, a critical Saudi energy infrastructure that transports roughly 4% of the world’s total daily oil supply. According to reporting from Reuters, Saudi Arabian energy officials estimate that repairing the damage from the drone strike on the pipeline will take between five and six weeks, leaving a key piece of the kingdom’s energy network offline for more than a month. The recent Houthi advances have already caused significant volatility in global energy markets. Oil prices rose sharply last week in response to the group’s rapid offensive, which secured full control of the Yemeni side of the Bab-el-Mandeb strait, a pinch point for Saudi oil exports heading to global markets. For their part, Houthi officials have framed their ongoing military campaign as a direct response to what they say are unprovoked Saudi attacks on Yemeni territory, including a recent drone strike that targeted Yemen’s capital city of Sanaa. In his address, al-Houthi pushed back against claims that the Houthis are the aggressor in the long-running regional conflict, stating that Saudi Arabia has been the party that initiated hostilities at every turn of the conflict. “We are in a defensive position. We are not the ones who initiate aggression,” al-Houthi said. This original reporting was produced by Middle East Eye, a media outlet that provides independent, in-depth coverage of the Middle East, North Africa, and surrounding global regions. Information on republishing MEE content and details about the organization are available through the outlet’s official channels.

  • Houthi advance aids Iran but saps rebel support in Yemen

    Houthi advance aids Iran but saps rebel support in Yemen

    In a lightning eight-day offensive that began on September 3, 2026, Houthi forces have seized control of nearly all of Yemen’s Red Sea coastline, including the shores of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait – one of the world’s most critical maritime chokepoints for global trade. The operation started with a push to sever the strategic highway connecting the Yemeni city of Taiz to the coastal port of Mokha, and by September 11, Houthi fighters had secured Mokha, the coastal town of Dhubab, and Mayyun Island, which sits directly at the strait’s entrance. Per United Nations estimates, the rapid advance has displaced over 100,000 people, many of whom have undertaken dangerous sea crossings to seek refuge in neighboring Djibouti, after the Houthis captured roughly 2,100 square miles of territory. This territorial shift marks the most significant change to Yemen’s frontlines since a UN-brokered truce froze conflict lines in April 2022, ending years of stalemate.

    Most international analysis has framed the offensive as a new strategic tool for Iran – the Houthis’ key regional patron – to increase pressure on the United States and raise fresh threats to Saudi Arabia and global commercial shipping. While this framing is not inaccurate, it overlooks deeper, underreported drivers rooted in Yemen’s own domestic politics and the Houthis’ ongoing quest for domestic legitimacy.

    To understand why the Houthis launched this attack now, it is necessary to revisit the timeline of Yemen’s decade-long civil conflict. The war entered its current phase in 2014, when the Houthi movement seized the capital Sanaa from the increasingly unpopular administration of President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi. A Saudi-led coalition intervened the following year to restore the internationally recognized government, triggering a decade of widespread destruction and famine that left the already impoverished nation in ruins. Since 2022, however, the conflict has been largely stalemated: the Houthis control most of northwest Yemen, while Saudi-backed government forces hold sway over large swathes of the south and east.

    Houthi military spokesperson Yahya Saree has framed the offensive as a direct response to years of Saudi military aggression and the ongoing blockade of Houthi-held territory. This grievance is not fabricated: UN agencies have repeatedly documented the severe humanitarian damage caused by coalition restrictions on access to Yemeni ports and airspace throughout the conflict. The Houthis also trace the collapse of the informal truce to a July 13, 2026, strike on Sanaa International Airport’s main runway, carried out by Yemeni government forces with Saudi air support. The attack forced an Iranian aircraft carrying senior officers of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to divert mid-flight, prompting the Houthis to declare their ceasefire with Saudi Arabia over that same day. Within hours, they launched a missile strike on Abha International Airport in southern Saudi Arabia, announced a naval blockade of Red Sea shipping one week later, and opened a sustained missile campaign in early August, weeks before the September 3 ground offensive.

    But analysts argue the coordinated ground campaign and seizure of Bab el-Mandeb’s strategic islands cannot be dismissed as mere retaliation for a single airstrike. Multiple interconnected, deliberate strategic calculations underpinned the move.

    First, Iran’s own regional maneuvering created a unique opening. After Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz – another critical global energy chokepoint – in March 2026, following joint U.S.-Israeli strikes on Iranian targets, Saudi Arabia rerouted roughly eight times more crude oil exports through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait than it did in 2025. Houthi control of the strait gives Iran a second strategic chokehold that mirrors the leverage it holds over Hormuz. Yemeni security sources have also confirmed that a senior IRGC commander, Abdul Reza Shahlai, was deployed on the ground to oversee parts of the September operation. For the Houthis, the move also carries clear economic incentives: since closing Hormuz, Iran has charged commercial vessels up to $2 million per ship for safe passage through the strait, and the Houthis are widely believed to be seeking similar economic leverage to shore up their war-battered movement.

    The most impactful domestic driver, however, is the Houthi calculation that conditions on the ground had become uniquely favorable for an offensive. Their fractured opposition in southern Yemen has grown even more divided after a 2025 diplomatic rift between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates led the UAE to withdraw all support for anti-Houthi militias in the south, leaving coastal government forces exposed. With the broader Middle East engulfed in multiple concurrent conflicts and Saudi Arabia focused on other regional priorities, the Houthis saw a window to act.

    Crucially, the Houthis have framed the Bab el-Mandeb operation as a sovereign, national Yemeni action rather than a proxy move for Iran, with senior officials repeatedly rejecting claims they are merely an extension of Tehran’s regional agenda. The movement’s core goal has always been securing power within Yemen itself. As recently as 2023, Saudi Arabia and the Houthis were negotiating a comprehensive national ceasefire that would have ended Saudi restrictions and sanctions on Houthi rule, but talks collapsed after the 2023-2024 Red Sea crisis, when the Houthis ramped up attacks on commercial shipping in protest of Israel’s military campaign in Gaza. Riyadh has since shown no urgency to revive diplomatic negotiations.

    The Houthis’ bet is that escalating the conflict on Yemeni ground – where any further conflict carries massive strategic and economic costs for Saudi Arabia – is the most reliable way to force Riyadh back to the negotiating table. This time, the movement calculates it holds enough leverage to secure the formal political recognition it has long sought, rather than settling for just the limited economic concessions Saudi Arabia was willing to offer in 2023.

    Despite these rapid military gains, the offensive carries severe long-term risks for the Houthi movement that could undermine their core goal of securing domestic legitimacy. Throughout modern Yemeni history, no governing authority has ever managed to maintain full military and political control over the entire country. While the Houthis hold unrivaled military power across most of northwest Yemen, they have never pursued a broad inclusive political bargain with the internationally recognized government or other Yemeni political factions, prioritizing exclusive military control over power-sharing.

    The group has taken tentative steps to consolidate popular support in newly captured territories: Houthi-affiliated media confirms that within days of seizing Mokha, the group reopened the port’s customs office, cut port fees and customs duties by up to 50%, distributed 20,000 food baskets to local residents across the coastal region, and offered a general amnesty to anti-Houthi fighters who surrendered control of the coast. Houthi leader Abdulmalik al-Houthi has also directly addressed southern Yemeni communities, clarifying that his forces only target Saudi-backed troops, not local residents.

    But analysts characterize these moves as performative legitimacy-building, more public relations than substantive policy reform, and fall far short of the inclusive political bargain needed to unify Yemen. A decade of Houthi rule in Sanaa has demonstrated the movement has little interest in power-sharing, with a long-standing pattern of ruling through military force rather than broad political coalition.

    More broadly, controlling the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and restricting Saudi shipping through the waterway reinforces the narrative – both across much of the world and within large parts of Yemen – that the Houthis remain an instrument of Iranian regional policy, regardless of their stated domestic objectives. The offensive also almost guarantees a forceful response from Houthi enemies, which could erode the movement’s newly gained military advantages. Saudi Arabia, which has already waged a decade of war in Yemen at enormous cost to Yemeni civilians, is unlikely to stand by. While few analysts expect Saudi-backed forces to attempt to retake Sanaa by force, the Houthis’ new territorial gains expose both their own fighters and Yemeni civilians to a new wave of devastating airstrikes from the Saudi-led coalition.

    In the end, the Houthi gamble carries a high risk of backfiring. Seizing territory is a far simpler task than holding it and consolidating legitimate rule. The movement may now find itself controlling a strategic chokepoint that the international community is determined to reopen, while still failing to secure the one thing control of the strait can never deliver: the consent of the Yemeni people to their rule.

  • Jagtar Singh Johal granted bail nine years after being detained in India

    Jagtar Singh Johal granted bail nine years after being detained in India

    After nearly nine years of incarceration without a final conviction in India, Scottish Sikh activist Jagtar Singh Johal has secured a major legal victory with a bail grant from the Delhi High Court, bringing cautious relief to his family and supporters who have long campaigned for his freedom.

    Johal, a 39-year-old native of Dumbarton, Scotland, was first taken into custody in India’s Punjab region in 2017, just weeks after he married there. Indian federal authorities have leveled serious terror-related charges against him, alleging he played a role in a string of targeted assassinations of religious and political figures. Last year, Johal was formally acquitted of charges that he provided financial backing to the Khalistan Liberation Force (KLF), an outlawed group that has carried out attacks in Punjab, but unresolved federal charges have kept him behind bars up to this ruling.

    The terms of Johal’s bail come with significant restrictions: he is required to surrender his passport, deposit a personal bond of 500,000 Indian rupees (equivalent to roughly £3,907), is limited to access to just one personal phone, and is prohibited from making any media statements related to his ongoing case. For Johal’s family, who have spent years lobbying for his release, the ruling is a long-awaited breakthrough, though they stress it is only the first step toward bringing him home to Scotland.

    “It is a really important milestone for Jagtar’s campaign,” Johal’s brother Gurpreet Singh Johal told BBC Radio Scotland Breakfast. “It has been a long haul and an expensive rollercoaster but the community and the public have kept me going to campaign to bring Jagtar home. This will be a huge relief for him.” Gurpreet added that the entire family has been overwhelmed by the news: “It is a momentous moment for the family, his wife has been crying since this morning. Everyone was joyful, my kids went to school saying they cannot wait to see their uncle coming home. It is just a first step, but it is a step in the right direction.”

    Campaigners and supporters have long maintained that Johal’s detention is unjust. They argue he was targeted specifically for his online blogging documenting alleged human rights violations against the Sikh community in India, and that he was coerced into signing a false confession admitting involvement in the killings. A United Nations working group formally classified Johal’s detention as arbitrary back in 2022, and Johal himself has repeatedly alleged he was tortured while in custody. Indian authorities have consistently rejected the torture claims and have maintained that all judicial proceedings have followed full due process. The Johal family further assert that no credible evidence has ever been presented against Jagtar, noting that the case relies heavily on witness testimony that has since been recanted in open court.

    Gurpreet, who has lobbied multiple UK governments for diplomatic intervention to secure his brother’s release, previously described a December 2025 meeting with then-UK Foreign Secretary Yvette Cooper as “disappointing.” A spokesperson for the UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office has previously stated that British officials have repeatedly raised concerns over Johal’s prolonged detention with the Indian government at all appropriate diplomatic opportunities. Johal was denied bail in a 2024 application, making this week’s ruling a notable shift in his legal trajectory.

    Political leaders in Scotland have welcomed the court’s decision. Scottish First Minister John Swinney called the bail grant a “significant and positive development,” adding: “I hope to see Mr Johal released from custody as soon as the necessary procedures are completed and continue to underline the importance of a fair, transparent and timely judicial process.”

    Legal charities Redress and Reprieve, which represent Johal in the UK, have also welcomed the ruling but warn that major challenges remain. Dan Dolan, deputy executive director of Reprieve, pointed out that Johal still faces capital punishment on what the organization calls “trumped up charges.” “We must now watch closely to ensure this order is actually implemented and not obstructed in any way. The conditions attached are likely to be onerous,” Dolan said. Chris Esdaile, senior legal advisor at Redress, emphasized that the bail grant cannot reverse the harm Johal has already endured. “Granting bail can’t undo the intolerable suffering caused by nine years of arbitrary detention. The need for accountability for the allegations of torture and the deeply flawed proceedings against Jagtar remains urgent,” Esdaile said.