标签: Asia

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  • Our head teacher was an abuser. We joined forces to get justice – now we’re married

    Our head teacher was an abuser. We joined forces to get justice – now we’re married

    For decades, allegations of sexual abuse in Indonesia’s Islamic boarding schools have been shrouded in silence, pressured into darkness by institutional loyalty, social stigma, and systemic cover-ups. But a small group of brave former students from Lombok’s Abu Barokat school have risked everything to pull these allegations into the open, sparking a national reckoning with a crisis that activists call a national emergency.

    The story begins with two former star pupils, Ziadatur Rahmah (known to friends as Zia) and Yusron Azzahidi, who reconnected years after graduating while studying at university—Yusron in Jakarta, Zia in Cairo. During a late-night conversation about their old school days, Zia shared a devastating secret she had carried for years: when she was 16, their highly respected head teacher Ahmad Imanuddin Sumar, known affectionately to students as “Abah” (father), sexually assaulted her.

    Zia recalled that Abah intercepted her on school grounds when she left class to use the toilet, convinced her to follow him to his on-campus home, and assaulted her there. She only escaped when one of Abah’s children knocked on the locked front door, forcing Abah to let her slip out the back. The trauma left Zia feeling “dirty, ruined, and lost.”

    Yusron, who had long revered Abah and been taught the school’s core motto “We hear, and we obey,” struggled with the revelation. But he could not shake Zia’s story, and suggested they work with two other former classmates to gather corroborating evidence from other potential victims. As they reached out to old school friends via encrypted messaging, more accounts of abuse began to surface.

    One of the most alarming accounts came from 17-year-old Sukma Rohana, who was still a student at the school at the time. She told the group that Abah had lured her to his home for New Year’s prayers, then attempted to rape her. She only escaped after mustering the strength to kick him in the stomach and flee.

    Slowly, the group built a seven-page document outlining allegations of abuse against six students, including Zia, Sukma, and four others. The group arranged a meeting with leaders of Nahdlatul Wathan Diniyah Islamiyah (NWDI), the powerful organization that runs Abu Barokat and hundreds of other Islamic schools across Indonesia, to present their evidence. NWDI representatives initially promised to help the group take the case to police.

    But weeks later, Yusron received an urgent text from his sister asking him to call her immediately. When he did, it was not his sister on the line—it was Abah, who was in Yusron’s family home after NWDI had shared the group’s evidence document with him. What followed was a brazen attempt to force the students into silence.

    Abah pleaded with Yusron to cover up the allegations, sobbing “Cover the shame of your teacher. Everyone makes mistakes, my child,” and warning that if the story leaked to the press, he would be destroyed. He pressured Yusron to retract his evidence and lie for him, then called Zia to exert the same pressure. Unbeknownst to Abah, both Yusron and Zia recorded every word of these calls.

    The pressure did not end there. Sukma was summoned to Abah’s home, where she found two police officers and an NWDI lawyer waiting. They forced her to sign a document retracting all her allegations, a confrontation she also secretly recorded. When she later challenged Abah’s wife Hurmiati about the retraction, Hurmiati was captured on tape telling Sukma to respect the “agreement” that nothing happened, warning her that the allegations would “haunt you for the rest of your life” and ruin her chances of getting married.

    Abah even pressured Yusron’s parents to travel from Lombok to Jakarta to find Yusron at his university. Yusron hid in a hotel to avoid them, but the ordeal left his mother so stressed that she begged Yusron to drop the investigation. Reluctantly, he agreed, putting his pursuit of justice on hold.

    Throughout this ordeal, the friendship between Zia and Yusron had grown into a long-distance romance, but the trauma of the investigation left Zia struggling emotionally. Eight months after Yusron paused the probe, they learned of a grassroots advocacy group raising awareness of sexual abuse in Islamic schools, founded by a young activist named Ayu Masruroh, who had helped another survivor secure justice after an assault by a teacher at a different school. Ayu’s public calls for survivors to speak out inspired Zia to post a call for other survivors to contact her on Instagram.

    What she discovered confirmed their worst fears: even after Abah had begged Zia and Yusron for silence and promised to change his ways, he had allegedly abused another student at the school just a year later. This revelation convinced the pair that Abah had never intended to stop, and that their work for justice could not wait any longer.

    Yusron’s parents finally agreed to let the pair continue their quest, and this time they worked with Ayu to connect with an experienced lawyer who specialized in representing sexual abuse survivors. He advised them to move forward with Sukma’s case, which he deemed the strongest for prosecution. Sukma filed a formal police complaint against Abah in February of last year. To date, police have taken no action, and Abah remains in his post as head teacher.

    When the BBC reached out to Abah and his wife for comment on the allegations, they declined to respond. NWDI has stated that it is conducting an internal investigation and denies any attempt to cover up abuse claims, saying it has a “duty to safeguard the organisation from being tarnished by the alleged actions of individuals.”

    Indonesia’s National Commission on Violence Against Women has labeled sexual abuse in Islamic boarding schools a national emergency. Legal experts note that the vast majority of cases never reach court, as victims are pressured to withdraw their allegations or stay silent entirely. Joko Jumadi, the lawyer representing Zia, Yusron, and Sukma, has handled 20 such cases in West Nusa Tenggara province over the past three years, and says the known cases are “just the tip of the iceberg.” He credits the students with exceptional courage, noting that their secret recordings of pressure to stay silent—including admissions of abuse from Abah himself—are invaluable evidence that will help cut through the culture of silence.

    For Zia and Yusron, the shared struggle for justice has forged an unbreakable bond. Earlier this year, three years after they began working together, Yusron moved to Cairo to be with Zia, and the couple married last month. “I was exhausted. Jakarta had been intense, because I was dealing with the police case the whole time. So when I saw Zia… it was like medicine,” Yusron says. Zia adds, “He came all the way to Egypt for me. I trust him. That’s why I’m with him.”

    For Sukma, the fight continues. “I don’t want what happened to me, to happen to any other students. I want justice,” she says. Her courage, and the courage of Zia and Yusron, has opened a national conversation about a long-ignored crisis, giving hope to hundreds of other survivors who have remained silent for far too long.

  • Israel seeks US weapons ‘compensation’ after Saudi F-35 deal

    Israel seeks US weapons ‘compensation’ after Saudi F-35 deal

    A new report from Israeli media has revealed that Israel intends to approach the United States to seek expanded weapons transfers and enhanced defense capabilities, framing the request as compensation for Washington’s recent greenlighting of a potential F-35 fighter jet sale to Saudi Arabia.

    Israeli digital news outlet Walla first broke the story Friday, citing sources familiar with Israeli government planning that indicate senior Israeli officials will ask the Trump administration to approve a series of advanced weapons systems that the U.S. has previously rejected transferring to Israel.

    According to Walla’s reporting, the scope of Israel’s requested capabilities stretches far beyond cutting-edge fighter aircraft and stealth technology. The proposed request covers a range of high-end military assets, including space-based weapons platforms and support for the domestic development and manufacturing of interceptor aircraft. Additionally, Israeli officials are set to ask for bunker-busting munitions and specialized underground military systems engineered to operate deep beneath rugged, rocky mountain terrain. All of these asks are tied directly to the U.S.’s approval of the potential Saudi F-35 deal, with Israel seeking a compensatory package to preserve its military positioning in the Middle East, the outlet reported.

    The revelation of Israel’s planned request follows a formal announcement from the U.S. State Department, which gave preliminary approval to a potential $24.3 billion arms package that would deliver 48 F-35 Lightning II fifth-generation fighter jets to Riyadh. Alongside the aircraft, the proposed deal includes 49 Pratt & Whitney F135-PW-100 engines, specialized communications and cryptographic security equipment, electronic warfare support systems, pilot and maintenance training, and full logistics support, according to the formal notification the State Department submitted to Congress.

    Despite the State Department’s preliminary approval, the proposed sale still faces a key procedural hurdle: it must secure final approval from the U.S. Congress before it can move forward.

    Middle East Eye (MEE), an independent outlet focused on regional coverage, has tracked the progression of the deal for months, with multiple U.S. and Arab sources confirming that negotiations have moved at an accelerated pace. In November, MEE first reported that the F-35 purchase would be fast-tracked as part of a new comprehensive defense partnership between Washington and Riyadh, an agreement finalized during Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s high-profile visit to the White House. A follow-up MEE report in December revealed that the Trump administration had launched a formal review of Israel’s long-recognized qualitative military edge in the region, a required step in processing the Saudi sale.

    Early this year, senior U.S. military officials held a series of closed-door, confidential meetings with members of Congress to brief lawmakers on the details of the proposed deal. This summer, Saudi Defense Minister Khaled bin Salman made multiple trips to Washington, with advancing the F-35 deal a top priority on his agenda, multiple U.S. officials confirmed to MEE.

    If the sale is finalized, Saudi Arabia will become the first Arab nation to operate the F-35, the most advanced stealth fighter jet in current U.S. military inventory. For the moment, Israel remains the only country in the Middle East that operates the aircraft.

    As international news outlet Reuters noted, the proposed sale puts Washington’s decades-long policy of guaranteeing Israel’s qualitative military edge over all regional adversaries to the test.

    The move to acquire advanced fighter jets comes as Saudi Arabia faces escalating security threats from ongoing Houthi missile and drone attacks on its territory. At the same time, the Saudi-backed, internationally recognized Yemeni government has struggled to repel a recent Houthi offensive that has allowed the group to seize control of Yemen’s entire Red Sea coastline, as well as the Arabian Gulf side of the strategic Bab al-Mandeb Strait.

  • EU presses Washington to reverse visa ban on Palestinian UN delegation

    EU presses Washington to reverse visa ban on Palestinian UN delegation

    For the second straight year, Washington has blocked travel visas for Palestinian Authority officials seeking to attend the United Nations General Assembly in New York, drawing sharp international criticism from the European Union and top UN officials over what observers call a clear violation of US hosting obligations.

    The European Union’s diplomatic service publicly called on the United States to reverse its decision Saturday, stressing that Washington holds binding legal responsibilities under its headquarters agreement with the United Nations as the host of the global body’s headquarters. EU spokesman Anouar El Anouni stated, “In light of its existing headquarters agreements with the UN and its obligations as host state, we urge the United States for this decision to be reconsidered.” The bloc also expressed deep regret over the continuation of the travel ban, which bars the official Palestinian delegation from taking part in in-person UNGA proceedings.

    UN Secretary-General António Guterres has already aligned with the EU’s position, saying he holds serious concern that the visa refusals directly undermine the State of Palestine’s ability to fully participate in UN institutional work. In a partial workaround, the UNGA recently passed a vote to allow Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas to address the upcoming 81st General Assembly session via a pre-recorded video statement.

    The US State Department confirmed earlier this week that it is extending visa restrictions to cover both PA and Palestine Liberation Organization officials. Washington has justified the ban by leveling multiple accusations against Palestinian leadership, claiming the PA has failed to implement required domestic reforms and pursues actions that harm prospects for two-state peace. Specific US grievances include the PA’s push for international recognition of Palestinian statehood outside of direct negotiations with Israel, and its practice of providing financial stipends to the families of Palestinians imprisoned by Israeli authorities.

    Critics have highlighted a stark double standard in Washington’s visa policy: no comparable travel ban has been imposed on Israeli officials, even as the International Criminal Court has an active arrest warrant outstanding for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu over alleged war crimes in the Gaza Strip.

    Even with the in-person travel block, Abbas’s pre-recorded address, scheduled for next week, is expected to ramp up international pressure for widespread formal recognition of Palestinian statehood. The speech will build on growing momentum over the past year, as major Western nations including the United Kingdom, France, and Canada have extended formal recognition to the Palestinian state. Abbas is also set to draw global attention to the catastrophic humanitarian crisis unfolding in Gaza, the accelerating expansion of illegal Israeli settlements in the occupied West Bank, and rising violent attacks against Palestinian communities by Israeli settlers in the territory.

    Palestine’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has welcomed the UNGA resolution allowing a virtual address, framing the vote as a meaningful victory over efforts to exclude Palestine from the annual UNGA gathering.

    In a contrasting move that has drawn further attention to US visa policy, the State Department announced this week that it has approved visas for a limited number of Iranian officials to attend the UNGA, after weeks of uncertainty. The announcement came via a cryptic post on X from State Department spokesperson Tommy Pigott, who framed the restricted access as a punitive measure against the Iranian government. “While ordinary Iranians endure brutal repression, water and electricity shortages, and soaring inflation, the regime’s officials want to go on shopping sprees in New York. Not on our watch,” Pigott wrote. He added that the US would not allow Iranian regime elites to use the UNGA gathering for luxury shopping sprees funded by Iranian public money, at a time when the regime diverts national wealth to support what the US labels terrorist proxy groups.

    According to reporting from The New York Times, the approved visas include strict geographic restrictions that limit the Iranian delegation’s movement within Manhattan, and the total number of visiting officials will be smaller than the delegation that attended last year’s UNGA. The delegation is expected to be led by newly elected Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, who has served as Iran’s lead nuclear negotiator with the US alongside parliamentary speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf. This UNGA gathering comes as cross-border tensions between the US, Israel and Iran have remained elevated for seven consecutive months.

  • ‘Hyperzionism’: How Germany’s conflation of antisemitism and anti-Zionism allowed a far-right return

    ‘Hyperzionism’: How Germany’s conflation of antisemitism and anti-Zionism allowed a far-right return

    Days ahead of a critical round of German state elections, a public confrontation on a Berlin subway laid bare deep contradictions in how Germany frames antisemitism, debates the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and enables far-right political gain. The incident centered on Karoline Preisler, a Free Democratic Party (FDP) politician and lawyer who has built a public profile staging provocative solo counter-protests at pro-Palestine demonstrations across the country.

    Preisler shared a video of the subway encounter on the social platform X, where she is shown holding up a sign reading “Intifada is a call to violence” directed at two men she labeled “racist white terror supporters.” A supporter accompanying Preisler later claimed they had “experienced antisemitism up close” at the hands of a pro-Palestine activist. But the encounter carried a striking twist: neither Preisler nor her supporter are Jewish, while the activist accused of antisemitism is Jewish, and was wearing a shirt that read “Another Jew for a free Palestine.”

    Francesca Albanese, the United Nations Special Rapporteur for the occupied Palestinian territories, quickly responded to the incident with sharp criticism. “Feeling threatened by Jews who oppose genocide defies epistemology. Time to patent misplaced victimhood,” she wrote.

    This small but loaded confrontation unfolded just one week before Germany’s far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) secured a historic landslide victory in the eastern state of Saxony-Anhalt, marking the strongest electoral result for a far-right party in Germany since the end of World War II. The win carries troubling weight: official data shows far-right actors are responsible for 84 percent of all antisemitic hate crimes committed in Germany, making them the dominant source of anti-Jewish violence in the country today.

    Yet across mainstream German political and public discourse, antisemitism is routinely conflated with anti-Zionism and criticism of the state of Israel – even when that criticism comes from Jewish people themselves. This framing has enabled harsh, often violent repression of pro-Palestine speech and public protest across the country. The AfD led the charge on this shift as early as 2019, when it tabled a parliamentary motion to fully ban the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement calling for economic pressure on Israel over its occupation of Palestinian territory.

    That motion paved the way for the German federal government to pass a non-binding anti-BDS resolution, urging all public institutions to refuse platforming any individual even remotely connected to the boycott movement. The policy has already led to dozens of public figures being disinvited from events or de-platformed for their support of BDS or Palestinian rights.

    Far-right parties like the AfD have leveraged this mainstream framing to whitewash their own long history of antisemitism, experts argue. By positioning themselves as outspoken proponents of Israel and loud opponents of antisemitism, they have escaped scrutiny for their core ideological commitments. “As antisemitism has been equated with the critique of Israel, far right actors have been able to hide their antisemitism and present themselves as transformed,” explained Esra Ozyurek, an expert on Holocaust memory at the University of Cambridge. “Even though the AfD downplays its antisemitism and emphasizes its Zionism, it still follows the same playbook with its fascist predecessors in demonizing a religious/ethnic minority, scapegoating them for problems in society which have nothing to do with them, and trying to unite a ‘nation’ through the exclusion of a minoritised group.”

    AfD officials have openly embraced this strategy. When the 2019 BDS ban motion was tabled, AfD MP Jurgen Braun claimed his party was the only “true friend of Israel” in the German parliament, repeating the false claim that “antisemitism comes from the left and Islam.” The party even elevated Yair Netanyahu, son of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, to a prominent poster figure for their cause after he labeled the European Union an “evil globalist organisation.”

    While Germany’s diplomatic ties to Israel date back to the early years of the Israeli state, the framing of unwavering support for Israel as a core pillar of modern German national identity is a relatively recent shift, rooted in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. It was during this era that Germany began externalizing guilt for the Holocaust onto Muslim communities, redefining national “redemption” from its Nazi past through unconditional support for Israel. That shift was formalized in 2008, when then-Chancellor Angela Merkel delivered a landmark speech to the Israeli Knesset declaring that unwavering support for Israel’s security is part of Germany’s Staatsrason – its core “reason of state.”

    For Hans Kundnani, editor of the book *Hyper-Zionism*, that speech marked a fundamental redefinition of how Germany remembers the Nazi era. “Germany went from a universalist understanding of the lessons of the Nazi past to a more particularist one,” he explained, shifting the meaning of the post-Holocaust mantra “Never Again” from a universal commitment to stopping all genocide to a narrow pledge to protect the state of Israel – not Jewish communities globally. “Merkel wanted to take support for Israel out of democratic contestation, to kind of lock it in before it is too late,” Kundnani added.

    Today, this commitment cuts across Germany’s entire political spectrum. Even nominally left-wing parties, including the German Greens and Die Linke, routinely conflate pro-Palestine sentiment with Nazism and antisemitism. Remarkably, this elite consensus is not reflected in German public opinion. 2025 polling shows nearly 80 percent of German voters view Israel’s military campaign in Gaza as unjustified, while 62 percent describe it as genocide. Only 10 percent of respondents fully support the idea that Israel’s security should be Germany’s core reason of state, a view that holds across all political divides.

    This gap between elite and public opinion is partially driven by generational and demographic change. Younger Germans and Germans with immigrant backgrounds are far more likely to oppose Israel’s actions and support Palestinian statehood, and Berlin is home to the largest Palestinian diaspora community outside the Middle East. For Kundnani, figures like Preisler – the FDP politician behind the subway confrontation – embody the moral arrogance of Germany’s pro-Israel elite. He describes Preisler as a “moral crusader” who actively seeks out confrontation with pro-Palestine members of the public, driven by a sense of national moral superiority.

    “The way Germans think about it is that we did our exemplary engagement with the Nazi past, we have this exemplary memory culture, better than anyone else, and thus feel morally superior to the whole world,” Kundnani explained. Under this framework, antisemitism is framed as an external problem that has already been solved within Germany, with immigrant communities – particularly Muslim immigrants – blamed for “reimporting antisemitism” into the country.

    Daniel Cohen, a historian at Rice University, argues this framing is tied to a narrow, exclusionary vision of German national identity. “It has become a matter of national identity,” Cohen told Middle East Eye. “Anybody who is defending Palestinian rights is labelled ‘unGerman’ or ‘non-German’ in the interest of protecting a certain German identity – a German white identity, since the fear of antisemitism is also the fear of immigrants.” He added: “Support for Israel has less to do with love for Zionism, but mostly the necessity at all costs to protect the redemption of Germany,” referencing the widespread elite narrative that Germany has fully purged itself of antisemitism to create a post-redemption national identity free of anti-Jewish hate.

    Central to enforcing this narrative is Germany’s network of state-appointed Antisemitism Commissioners, who regularly intervene in public discourse to de-platform and cancel figures linked to the pro-Palestine movement. Most of these commissioners are not Jewish; the majority are self-identified Christians who have targeted everyone from German-Israeli academics to Jewish South African photographers for their support of Palestinian rights.

    In one high-profile example, commissioner Michael Blume sparked widespread backlash when he labeled *Judische Stimme* (Jewish Voice for a Just Peace in the Middle East) – a network of German Jews who advocate for Palestinian rights – “ostensibly Jewish,” drawing an official formal complaint from the organization. Blume has a long history of controversial statements about Judaism: in a 2015 public conference, he told audiences that Jews are not an ethnic or racial group, but part of an ancient intellectual school that brought literacy to the world, and that the roots of antisemitism lie in public resentment of this supposed special Jewish gift for literacy.

    Cohen explains this form of opportunistic “philosemitism” emerged immediately after World War II, allowing German elites to preserve problematic myths about Jewish identity while co-opting Jewish history for their own national narrative. Even today, this dynamic persists: despite Germany having a tiny Jewish population, Jewish-themed baby names are the most popular among non-Jewish German parents, and the trend of non-Jewish Germans converting to Judaism has drawn criticism as an attempt to atone for family members’ Nazi pasts without addressing structural inequities.

    Susan Neiman, who once wrote a 2019 book praising Germany’s model culture of Holocaust memory, has since acknowledged that the process has gone “haywire,” contributing to what Kundnani terms “hyper-zionism.” Neiman has labeled the current crackdown on pro-Palestine speech “philosemitic McCarthyism,” arguing that “the determination to root out antisemitism has shifted from vigilance to hysteria” in the months following the October 7, 2023 Hamas attack on Israel.

    Amid this nationwide “witchhunt,” as Neiman terms it, *Judische Stimme* was formally classified as a “foreign extremist organization” by Germany’s domestic intelligence service – a designation that was later overturned by a Berlin court. Udi Raz, a board member of *Judische Stimme* and author of the upcoming book *JEW. DESPITE GERMANY*, argues that the entire framework of tying German post-Nazi redemption to Zionism is rooted in the same supremacist ideology that drove Nazism itself.

    “For Germany’s governing policymakers, Zionism is the answer to Nazism,” Raz explained. “However, these are…continuations of the same supremacist ideology put into practice by Nazism. But while Nazism placed Jews outside the category of the superior, Zionism places us within it.” Raz added: “The unconditional support of Germany’s government for Israel suggests that Germany has never fully de-Nazified.”

  • Saudi Arabia cancels oil shipments to European refineries

    Saudi Arabia cancels oil shipments to European refineries

    The escalating conflict across the Middle East has triggered fresh disruptions to global energy flows, with Saudi Arabia confirming it will halt planned October crude oil deliveries to at least two European refining customers that purchase oil under long-term term supply contracts. Such pauses are permitted under force majeure clauses, which allow suppliers to cancel obligations during unforeseen extraordinary events outside of their control.

    This latest supply disruption comes just weeks after Qatar extended a force majeure declaration for liquefied natural gas shipments through early November, a move prompted by escalating maritime tensions that have threatened safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz, the world’s busiest chokepoint for global energy trade. For weeks, Saudi Arabia had managed to avoid major disruptions to its export network thanks to its 1,200-kilometer East-West Pipeline, which connects oil fields in the Persian Gulf directly to the Red Sea export terminal at Yanbu. This critical infrastructure allowed the kingdom to bypass rising tensions around the Strait of Hormuz, where Iran and the United States have engaged in escalating tit-for-tat confrontations that threatened shipping lanes. Before the latest wave of conflict, the pipeline enabled Saudi Arabia to maintain roughly 6 million barrels per day of pre-conflict export volumes, equivalent to around 4 million barrels per day, keeping global markets relatively stable.

    That stability shattered last week, when a drone attack targeting the East-West Pipeline disabled the critical infrastructure. Saudi officials have traced the attack to militant groups based in southern Iraq that are aligned with Iran, while Houthi militants based in Yemen have separately claimed responsibility for coordinated attacks on the Yanbu port and other key oil facilities operated by Saudi Aramco, the kingdom’s state-owned national oil company.

    The current escalation traces back to a recent Houthi offensive in Yemen that gave the group full control over Yemen’s entire Red Sea coastline. Since seizing that territory, Houthi forces have launched a steady campaign of drone and missile attacks against Saudi energy infrastructure, while the Saudi-led coalition has responded with intensive airstrikes on Houthi-held territory in Yemen. In response to the Houthi declaration of an embargo on all Saudi-flagged and Saudi-bound shipping, the kingdom has rerouted remaining oil shipments through the Suez Mediterranean Pipeline to maintain access to European and North American markets.

    The combination of supply disruptions and heightened geopolitical risk has already pushed global energy prices sharply higher. Brent crude, the global benchmark for oil prices, was trading at $103 per barrel as of Friday, but energy analysts warn that this publicly traded price does not reflect the actual physical market cost of securing immediate crude deliveries. Prices for refined products critical to global transportation and industry, including diesel and jet fuel, have climbed even faster than crude, with U.S. diesel prices jumping 7.7% in just one week despite the United States’ relative insulation from global Middle East disruptions thanks to its large domestic energy production sector.

    This current chapter of conflict comes 10 years after Houthi forces seized large swathes of northwestern Yemen, prompting Saudi Arabia to lead a coalition of Arab states aimed at ousting the group from power and restoring the internationally recognized Yemeni government to power. In 2015, the coalition launched a large-scale military intervention, but after years of stalemate, Saudi Arabia began efforts to extricate itself from the conflict following a 2022 ceasefire agreement between the Houthi movement and the Yemeni government. To date, however, Saudi Arabia has maintained a strict air and sea blockade of Houthi-controlled ports and airports, a core demand the Houthi movement says must be met before it will end its current embargo on Saudi shipping.

  • US lifts sanctions on Eritrea with Red Sea in focus

    US lifts sanctions on Eritrea with Red Sea in focus

    On Friday, the United States announced it has removed sweeping sanctions imposed on the Eritrean military, the country’s long-ruling political party, a major state-linked trading firm, and a top presidential adviser, a move that comes as growing global attention turns to the strategic Red Sea nation amid intensifying regional power shifts.

    The U.S. Treasury Department confirmed in an official statement that the sanctions relief applies to three key Eritrean entities: the People’s Front for Democracy and Justice, the ruling party that has governed Eritrea for decades; the Eritrean national military; and the Red Sea Trading Corporation, which dominates nearly all of the East African country’s cross-border commercial activity. The administration also lifted punitive measures targeting Hagos Ghebrehiwet, a leading economic advisor to Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki.

    The original sanctions were implemented in 2021 by the Biden administration, imposed in response to Eritrea’s direct military intervention alongside the Ethiopian federal government during the two-year civil conflict in Ethiopia’s northern Tigray region. The African Union has estimated that the brutal conflict claimed as many as 600,000 lives, and it drew widespread global condemnation over documented allegations of mass atrocities and systematic civilian massacres.

    Afwerki has led Eritrea since the country secured full independence from Ethiopia in 1993, and the two neighbors have had a long history of fractious relations. While they formed a temporary tactical alliance to fight together in the Tigray conflict between 2020 and 2022, that partnership quickly collapsed after the war, leaving the two nations locked in bitter tension across multiple regional flashpoints.

    In recent years, Ethiopia has increasingly aligned itself with the United Arab Emirates and Israel, a shift that has reshaped power dynamics across the Horn of Africa. Multiple independent outlets including Middle East Eye have reported that Ethiopia is backing the UAE’s support for Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces in the ongoing Sudanese civil war, and Addis Ababa has allowed the deployment of Emirati-built drones and other advanced weapons systems from its territory. In contrast, Eritrea has thrown its support behind the opposing Sudanese Armed Forces, aligning with Egypt, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia in the Sudanese conflict.

    Once a close partner of the UAE that hosted a Gulf state military base at its strategic Red Sea port of Assab, located just a short distance across the water from Yemen, Eritrea’s diplomatic and security ties with Abu Dhabi have deteriorated sharply in recent years. In an exclusive interview with Middle East Eye, Eritrean Foreign Minister Osman Saleh openly accused the UAE of pursuing “port imperialism” across the African continent, alleging the Gulf power is seeking to establish a joint Red Sea naval base with Israel.

    Eritrea’s geographic position carries outsized global strategic importance: the country controls more than 1,000 kilometers of continuous Red Sea coastline, and its territorial waters form one side of the critical Bab el-Mandeb Strait, alongside the territorial waters of Djibouti and Yemen. At its narrowest point, the water crossing between Eritrean territory and Yemen is just 20 nautical miles, making the country a key player in any efforts to secure Red Sea shipping lanes.

    Recent months have seen dramatic military shifts across the Red Sea: Houthi forces have completed a sweeping offensive that has given them full control over Yemen’s entire Red Sea coastline, and they are now advancing to capture the inland cities of Taiz and Marib, gains that would further erode the already limited authority of Yemen’s internationally recognized government.

    Speaking to Middle East Eye, Saleh emphasized that Asmara rejects the idea that a military victory can end the ongoing conflict across the Red Sea. “There is no military option in Yemen, which must be given a chance to be peaceful,” he stated. He added that Red Sea littoral states should collectively oversee and manage freedom of navigation through the key waterway, but that any coordinated effort is severely complicated by Yemen’s lack of a unified, functional central government.

  • Gulf-Eurasian energy crunch pushes Europe to the edge of an inflationary crisis

    Gulf-Eurasian energy crunch pushes Europe to the edge of an inflationary crisis

    Across two of the world’s most critical energy chokepoints and Eurasian transit routes, overlapping geopolitical conflicts have converged to create an unprecedented strain on Europe’s oil and gas supplies, leaving the continent reliant on a mix of proactive policy and sheer good fortune to avoid a full-scale economic breakdown.

    What makes this energy predicament particularly acute is that disruptions are not limited to a single supply corridor. Conflicts spanning the Eastern Mediterranean, Red Sea, Bab el-Mandeb Strait, Black Sea and Caspian Sea have laid bare a harsh reality: Europe has failed to build resilient, secure supply chains for its most critical energy imports, even as tensions in these regions have simmered for years.

    Compounding this vulnerability are Europe’s own structural weaknesses: shallow strategic oil and gas reserves, an overreliance on volatile spot markets, and growing uncertainty around winter weather patterns that could swing heating demand dramatically. Against this backdrop, even small disruptions have the potential to trigger cascading price shocks across the continent.

    The most immediate disruption is unfolding along the Red Sea, where Houthi forces have made rapid territorial gains in recent weeks. After seizing Yemen’s Port of Mokha on September 10, the group captured Mayun and Perim Islands in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait just one day later, followed by the Greater and Lesser Hanish Islands four days afterward. These landmasses lie directly atop the world’s busiest shipping lanes for crude tankers and liquefied natural gas (LNG) carriers, giving the Houthis outsized strategic leverage even without physically closing the strait.

    “The Houthis do not need to physically close Bab el-Mandeb to extract strategic value from their position,” explained Abdi Guled, editor of Horn Briefs and a former correspondent for the Associated Press and Reuters, in an interview with Middle East Eye. Even the presence of a capable, hostile force in the area is enough to upend commercial shipping: war-risk insurance premiums for Red Sea transits have already surged to levels that make many routine voyages financially unviable.

    Early data already shows a sharp drop in vessel transits through the strait. Major global insurance providers have pulled war-risk coverage for the Bab el-Mandeb, forcing many shipping lines to divert their fleets on the much longer route around the Cape of Good Hope. This detour adds 10 to 14 days of travel time per voyage, driving up costs across every link of global supply chains that Europe depends on.

    This Red Sea disruption comes as global energy markets are still reeling from a months-long closure of the Strait of Hormuz earlier this year. That closure, which lasted from February through early September, removed an estimated 17 to 19 million barrels of crude per day from global markets, forcing Europe to turn to alternative suppliers in the Atlantic Basin and Caspian region to meet demand.

    For months, Saudi Arabia helped mitigate the global supply shock by diverting crude through its East-West Pipeline to the Yanbu export terminal on the Red Sea. The kingdom ramped up flows from roughly 2 million barrels per day at the start of the year to around 6 million barrels per day, near the practical limit imposed by Yanbu’s loading infrastructure (the pipeline itself can technically carry up to 7 million barrels daily). That relief came to an abrupt halt on September 11, when a drone attack on one of the pipeline’s pumping stations forced an immediate shutdown. As of this writing, there is no timeline for when the line will reopen.

    Most recently, Saudi Arabia notified European refineries that they should not expect any crude oil deliveries from the kingdom next month, removing another key source of supply just as the crisis deepens.

    The combined effect of these overlapping disruptions is already showing up in Europe’s economic data. Reduced energy supplies, higher shipping costs, and widespread refinery outages have directly pushed up prices for diesel, electricity, and basic food goods. “The current energy crisis is morphing into a global financial crisis with symptoms in Europe now evident as eurozone inflation is accelerating at 3.3 percent and energy inflation jumping at 14.3 percent,” said Costantinos Stambolis, Chairman of the Institute of Energy for South-East Europe, in comments to MEE.

    Europe’s core quandary is that conflict is squeezing supplies from both of its traditional major sources: Russia and the Gulf. European sanctions already limit alternative inflows of Russian energy, and recent Ukrainian strikes on Russian refineries and Black Sea export terminals have created new industrial bottlenecks that cut output even further. This week, former U.S. President Donald Trump claimed that Kyiv and Moscow had agreed not to target energy infrastructure, but Ukrainian officials stated any agreement is conditional, and no public confirmation of the deal has been issued by the Kremlin.

    Europe pinned much of its hope for supply diversification on Kazakhstan, which has emerged in recent years as one of the few major producers with spare capacity to help ease Europe’s tightening oil balance. But more than 80 percent of Kazakhstan’s crude exports move through the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), which terminates at Russia’s Novorossiysk export terminal on the Black Sea. If Ukraine chooses to target the terminal, Kazakhstan loses its primary export outlet, and alternative routes are far too limited to make up the difference.

    “There’s a difference between shortages and total crisis, but Europe is now exposed because several supply routes are under strain at once,” noted John Roberts, a former editor at *Financial Times Energy* and non-resident fellow at the Atlantic Council. “Ukraine seems capable and indeed willing to attack Novorossiysk,” he added.

    The most viable alternative for Kazakh exports is a southern route through the Caspian Sea, via Azerbaijan and Turkey to Mediterranean export terminals. Current infrastructure along this route, including the Baku-Supsa pipeline, can only handle around 150,000 barrels of crude per day – a tiny fraction of Kazakhstan’s typical export volumes. Adding extra capacity through the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline makes Azerbaijan’s infrastructure a critical pillar of Europe’s energy security, but the entire Caspian route is not immune to conflict risk.

    In July, a Ukrainian drone strike targeting an Iranian vessel in the Caspian Sea proved that long-range attacks on energy shipping in the basin are possible. While a temporary understanding between Kyiv and Tehran has eased immediate fears, the risk of further disruption remains. If Kazakhstan cannot ship its crude west to Europe, it will have no choice but to sell most of its output to China, leaving even less supply available for European markets. “They don’t want to be dependent on a monopsonist customer,” Roberts explained of Central Asian producer nations.

    With supply options dwindling, many analysts are pinning their only hope for easing inflation and supply strain on “demand destruction” – a dynamic where lower-income nations cut back on energy consumption because they can no longer afford sky-high prices, freeing up extra volumes to flow to Europe.

    Weather will also play a decisive role in how severe the crisis becomes. A mild winter would give Europe much-needed breathing space by reducing heating demand, but forecast models point to major uncertainty driven by the 2026-2027 El Niño weather pattern. In a July 2026 assessment, analysts from Rystad Energy and ICIS warned that while El Niño could bring a mild start to the 2026-2027 winter, a sudden atmospheric shift could trigger severe cold snaps in February 2027, leading to a late-season spike in natural gas and electricity demand.

    Historical data from energy market analyst ICIS adds another layer of risk: strong El Niño events typically reduce European wind power generation by as much as 9.8 percent during winter months, forcing fossil fuel power plants to burn extra natural gas to make up for the shortfall.

    Even if European leaders wanted to ramp up imports in the short term to build reserves, existing EU regulations are limiting their room to maneuver. New EU methane regulations set to take effect in 2027 require all gas and LNG importers to prove that overseas producers meet strict EU-level monitoring and verification standards. Ben Cahill, a senior energy analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), notes that this will split the global market into compliant and non-compliant exporters overnight. Most Central Asian producers, which Europe is counting on for extra supply, currently lack the monitoring equipment and data infrastructure to meet the EU’s standards, meaning compliant supplies will become even more expensive.

    Proposals to expand Caspian transit capacity to bring more Central Asian oil and gas to Europe face major financial and political barriers. One widely discussed plan would build a short interconnector between Turkmenistan’s offshore Caspian platforms and Azerbaijan’s existing infrastructure, with a capacity of around 5 billion cubic meters of gas per year. Proponents estimate the project would cost around $500 million, or as much as $1 billion for an expanded 10-12 billion cubic meter capacity. Because the pipeline would only pass through the territorial waters of two countries, the 2018 Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea limits Russia and Iran’s ability to block the project outright. Even so, both nations can leverage environmental impact assessment processes to delay and derail the project indefinitely. Financially, the EU cannot provide investment capital or long-term contracting for new fossil fuel projects due to its own climate and environmental regulations, leaving the project without a clear source of funding.

    In the end, Europe’s unfolding energy crisis has become an industrial and inflationary challenge that cannot be resolved with incremental policy or regulatory fixes alone. While the long-term transition to renewable energy may insulate Europe from similar shocks in the future, there is little that policymakers can do in the short term to ease immediate pressure. For the coming months, luck will matter far more than policy to see the continent through the crisis.

  • US approves visas for Iranian officials to attend United Nations General Assembly

    US approves visas for Iranian officials to attend United Nations General Assembly

    As the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) prepares to kick off its annual session next week in New York, the U.S. State Department confirmed Thursday it has cleared visa applications for a small contingent of Iranian officials to attend the global diplomatic gathering, in a move that comes alongside escalating economic pressure on Tehran and a repeat of controversial travel restrictions on Palestinian leaders.

    The New York Times was the first outlet to break news of the visa approvals, citing an official emailed statement. Prior to the confirmation, State Department spokesperson Tommy Pigott had only posted a cryptic message on social media platform X hinting at the limited entry for Iranian diplomats.

    In his public remarks, Pigott struck a sharply critical tone toward Iran’s ruling establishment, arguing that regime elites sought to use the UNGA trip for luxury shopping at the expense of ordinary Iranian citizens grappling with severe domestic crises. “While ordinary Iranians endure brutal repression, water and electricity shortages, and soaring inflation, the regime’s officials want to go on shopping sprees in New York. Not on our watch,” Pigott said.

    He emphasized that Washington would not allow Iranian leadership to splurge on high-end goods funded by public resources, at the same time Tehran diverts national wealth to arm what the U.S. labels terrorist proxy groups across the Middle East. “We will continue to ban Iranian UN Mission officials, visiting officials, and their dependents from buying wholesale club memberships or luxury goods here,” Pigott added, issuing a warning to New York-area retailers to avoid becoming complicit in what he framed as violations of U.S. restrictions.

    Per the New York Times’ reporting, the approved visas come with strict geographic limitations, confining the Iranian delegation’s movement to specific areas of Manhattan, and the total number of visiting officials will be smaller than the group that attended the 2024 UNGA. The delegation is set to include newly elected Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and Foreign Minister Abbas Aragchi, who has served as Tehran’s chief negotiator in indirect talks with Washington.

    The limited visa approval comes amid an ongoing military escalation between the U.S. and Iran, now in its seventh month. While the second Trump administration has sought to downplay the conflict, framing intermittent skirmishes as no longer qualifying as an active war, dozens of Iranian civilians were killed in U.S. strikes just last month alone. Iran has responded with increasingly frequent and targeted attacks on U.S. military and energy infrastructure across the region, while maintaining tight control over the strategic Strait of Hormuz, through which a large share of global oil supplies pass.

    To ramp up pressure on Tehran, the U.S. Treasury Department launched what it dubbed “Operation Economic Outcast” last month, with the stated goal of asphyxiating Iran’s economy. New sanctions are now being implemented multiple times per week, and on Thursday, the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control announced the designation of BitBank, a digital assets venture controlled by Iranian financier Babak Zanjani. In a statement accompanying the designation, Pigott claimed BitBank has helped the Central Bank of Iran circumvent restrictions to access the U.S.-dominated international financial system.

    Beyond the restrictions on Iran, the Trump administration has extended its controversial visa ban on Palestinian leadership for the second consecutive year. Washington has once again denied a travel visa to Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas, and barred all PA and Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) officials from entering the U.S. to attend UNGA.

    The Palestinian Ministry of Foreign Affairs condemned the decision in strong terms, calling it an unjustified measure that directly undermines efforts to rebuild trust, advance Palestinian-American relations, and create a political environment conducive to implementing a two-state solution and securing long-term regional peace and stability.

    The State Department justified the ban by claiming the PA has failed to implement required reforms, despite its commitments to the U.S., and has continued activities that erode prospects for peace. This justification comes at a time when no formal peace negotiations are active, no U.S.-mediated talks are ongoing, and the Trump administration has effectively abandoned any formal commitment to a two-state solution. Both Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his main challenger in next month’s Israeli national election, Gadi Eisenkot, have publicly rejected the establishment of an independent Palestinian state.

    As host of UN headquarters in New York, the U.S. has historically avoided imposing broad visa restrictions on delegations attending UNGA, in keeping with its diplomatic agreements with the international body. That longstanding practice shifted after the Trump administration took office in January 2025, marking a break with decades of precedent.

    The 2024 visa ban on Abbas drew widespread international criticism of Washington’s role as UN host, and sparked calls to relocate the annual UN meeting on Palestinian issues to Geneva, Switzerland. Ultimately, the UN General Assembly voted 145-5 to allow Abbas to deliver his address to the assembly remotely last year.

  • Tata Sons: India’s corporate crown braces for upheaval amid boardroom revolt

    Tata Sons: India’s corporate crown braces for upheaval amid boardroom revolt

    A high-stakes corporate conflict has erupted at Tata Sons, one of India’s oldest and most influential conglomerates that owns iconic global brands including Jaguar Land Rover and Tetley Tea, after the company’s board defied its majority shareholder Tata Trusts to reappoint N Chandrasekaran as chairman and advance plans for a public listing of the holding company.

    Tata Trusts, which holds a 66% controlling stake in Tata Sons, has denounced the board’s decision as unlawful under the company’s articles of association and has made clear its opposition to the public listing, setting the stage for months of potential corporate upheaval and a drawn-out legal battle at Bombay House, the Mumbai headquarters of the 158-year-old industrial group. Boardroom conflicts are not new to the Tata Group, but the current rift has cast a wide cloud of uncertainty over the conglomerate’s operations, strategy, and leadership at multiple levels.

    While the board has approved Chandrasekaran’s reappointment, the decision still faces a critical vote at the company’s upcoming Annual General Meeting (AGM), where Tata Trusts is almost certain to block the move, throwing Chandrasekaran’s future as chairman into question. The previous AGM was adjourned earlier this year due to a lack of quorum, and Indian regulations require the meeting to be held by the end of December 2026, though no new date has been announced yet.

    Nitin Potdar, a prominent Mumbai-based corporate lawyer, spoke to the BBC about the irregularities of the board’s move, noting that “The Nomination and Remuneration Committee of the Board of Tata Sons which reappointed him has no power to take this decision. They can only make a recommendation. Also, their decision flies against the governance code of the company that requires executives to step down from active roles at 65. These are serious lapses.” Chandrasekaran, who was granted a five-year extension, will not turn 65 until 2028.

    As tensions between the board and Tata Trusts mounted, Tata Group equities swung wildly, first rallying then plummeting as investors reacted to competing hopes for stable leadership and growing uncertainty over the group’s direction, particularly amid several high-risk, currently loss-making investments led by Chandrasekaran in emerging sectors such as semiconductors and commercial aviation.

    Beyond the leadership tussle, the most contentious long-term issue facing the group is the mandatory public listing, which former Tata Sons chief strategy officer Nirmalya Kumar says “now looks increasingly inevitable.”

    The roots of the listing requirement stretch back to 2022, when the Reserve Bank of India (RBI), India’s central bank, classified Tata Sons as an “upper layer non-banking financial company” due to its systemic importance to India’s economy and its large-scale investment activities. This classification imposes a mandatory listing requirement on the conglomerate. Tata Sons attempted to avoid the classification by repaying outstanding debt and arguing that it does not borrow directly from public markets, but after holding the company’s appeal for more than two years, the RBI rejected the bid to reverse the classification earlier this month, pushing the holding company much closer to an initial public offering (IPO).

    In a public statement, Tata Trusts reaffirmed its longstanding opposition to a listing, noting that “all available options and not a listing alone” are being explored, even as the trust’s own trustees are no longer unified in their stance on the issue. Potdar argues that the Indian regulator has no legal authority to force any private company to go public, and he expects Tata Trusts to mount a legal challenge to the RBI’s ruling. In a pre-emptive move, the RBI has already petitioned the courts to be the first party heard in any legal dispute related to the listing.

    The listing debate has sharply divided corporate governance experts and long-time observers of the Tata Group. For decades, prominent Tata figures including the late Ratan Tata and veteran director N.A. Soonawala have argued strongly for keeping Tata Sons a private entity. A publicly traded Tata Sons would significantly erode the control and special governance rights that Tata Trusts currently holds over the group. The Trusts’ unique structure, as a charitable majority shareholder that uses dividend income from Tata’s commercial operations to fund hospitals, universities, and public research across India, would be fundamentally altered by a listing, opponents argue. Outside public shareholders would prioritize short-term financial returns over the Trusts’ social and long-term industrial goals, potentially undermining the group’s core character.

    Potdar outlined this risk, noting “A new group of shareholders might say, ‘Don’t declare dividends; we need to reinvest this money in the companies.’ What happens then? The first casualty will be the hospitals they run.” Opponents of the IPO also warn that bringing in outside public investors would weaken the group’s ability to support and restructure distressed businesses within its portfolio, while also forcing the group to answer to quarterly earnings pressures that run counter to its long-term strategy.

    Timing is another major point of criticism. Soonawala outlined these concerns in a recent op-ed for the *Times of India*, writing “The group currently faces large financial commitments from recently formed subsidiary companies, including Air India, investments in long gestation projects, and losses in newer ventures. The current situation in the case of Air India would be an acid test. All these would need to be disclosed fully in an IPO prospectus. Consolidated financial statements – reflecting subsidiary losses and borrowings – may not present an especially attractive picture to sophisticated investors, pointing to wrong timing for an IPO at the present time.”

    Many experts also point out that globally, industrial foundations similar to Tata Trusts are increasingly protected as sources of patient long-term capital that can fund multi-year infrastructure, research, and social projects. By forcing Tata Sons to list, India is moving counter to this global trend.

    Supporters of the listing, however, argue that greater transparency and accountability are long overdue for a conglomerate of Tata’s systemic importance to the Indian economy. Kumar notes “There should be tougher scrutiny of their capital-allocation decisions being so central to the Indian business ecosystem. Everybody wants complete control over their empire and the freedom to take capricious decisions, but that is not a good thing for the organisation.”

    According to data from independent investment advisory firm InGovern, the combined market capitalization of already listed Tata Group companies such as Tata Motors and Tata Consultancy Services exceeds $260 billion, and the group’s decisions impact more than 17.7 million retail shareholders, pension funds, insurance firms, and mutual funds across India. InGovern’s recent report notes that Tata Sons “cannot reasonably remain outside the governance and transparency expectations increasingly associated with systemically important financial and industrial conglomerates.” The report also adds that existing shareholders of listed Tata companies are already indirectly affected by Tata Sons’ decisions, even though they hold no direct voting rights at the holding company level.

    Furthermore, as the Tata Group pursues high-stakes global partnerships including manufacturing iPhones for Apple, collaborating with Nvidia on artificial intelligence development, and working with Boeing, Airbus, and Singapore Airlines on aerospace and aviation projects, InGovern argues that a “flexible and transparent capital structure [is] increasingly important” to support these growth plans.

    Some industry analysts argue that a public listing may now be the only path to de-escalate the fractious conflict between the Tata Sons board and its majority shareholder, tensions that are already causing damage not just to the conglomerate but to India’s broader economy. Tata Trusts holds controlling economic interest and veto power over board appointments and major capital allocation decisions above a set threshold at Tata Sons. If the rift between the board and its largest shareholder continues, it will be nearly impossible for Tata Sons to move forward on critical projects of national importance, from turning around Air India to raising capital to pay out SP Group, a minority shareholder that urgently needs cash to avoid a potentially catastrophic default.

    No matter the outcome of the listing and leadership disputes, industry experts agree that India’s most high-profile corporate asset is entering completely uncharted territory. As Kumar puts it, “a new twist” can be expected every week as this corporate drama unfolds.

  • When a beloved tree began withering away, locals suspected a killer in their midst

    When a beloved tree began withering away, locals suspected a killer in their midst

    Nestled between rolling mountains just a short distance from Seoul’s bustling city center, the quiet residential neighborhood of Buam-dong has long been a haven for visitors and locals alike. Restricted urban development, a result of its proximity to the Blue House presidential residence, has preserved the area’s quaint, charming character, dotted with independent art galleries, cozy neighborhood cafes, and pockets of lush, mature greenery. For more than a century, one ginkgo tree standing sentinel along a residential sidewalk has stood as a unifying, beloved landmark for the Buam-dong community — a tree locals have affectionately called “Grandpa Ginkgo.”

    Unlike most ginkgos in Seoul that grow tucked away in private gardens or wild forested areas, this hardy, centuries-old tree belongs to everyone in the neighborhood. Jung, a local resident who requested anonymity (and is referred to here by a pseudonym) who moved to Buam-dong just four years ago, formed an immediate, deep bond with the tree. “I pass this tree whenever I come home. I would say, ‘Grandpa, I’m home.’ Or ‘Grandpa, I’m heading out now,’” she explained. For 74-year-old lifelong resident Park Jeon-hee, the ginkgo is his oldest friend. Even 10-year-old Kim On, who walks past the tree every school day, feels its loss acutely: “It has stood since before I was born. Thinking it might fall down makes me sad.”

    It was Jung who first noticed something was terribly wrong in the summer of 2026, when Seoul’s normally lush summer foliage turned the city deep green. While other trees thrived under the humid skies, “Grandpa Ginkgo” was visibly ailing. Healthy green fan-shaped leaves were dropping to the ground en masse, an abnormality that should not occur during peak growing season. Within weeks, the base of the tree was blanketed in a rotting carpet of fallen leaves, and its branches began to thin and turn brown.

    Jung’s initial quiet curiosity quickly bloomed into urgent concern, and she rallied neighbors who had also noticed the tree’s decline to form an informal group of amateur investigators to uncover what was ailing their hardy community landmark. The mystery captured national attention across South Korea, making front-page national headlines — a level of scrutiny that left Jung uncomfortable, prompting her request for anonymity. She compares the experience to watching a beloved family member fade: “Imagine a grandfather who silently embraces you every day, listens to you, and has always been strong and full of life. Suddenly, he begins to die. How heartbreaking would that be?”

    As the community dug into the mystery, they spotted 10 white plastic funnels protruding from the soil just behind the tree’s trunk. Jung initially assumed the devices were installed to deliver nutrients to the tree, but soon began to suspect foul play. The group obtained access to nearby home security camera footage, which captured two men in white gloves crouching at the tree’s base with a power drill on an April morning. Though the footage did not definitively show the men installing the funnels, it aligned with a detail local officials had previously shared: the Whanki Museum, located steps from the ginkgo’s trunk, had previously requested permission from local landowners to remove the tree entirely. The museum claimed the ginkgo’s expanding roots were damaging its outer brick perimeter wall.

    Arborists called in to inspect the tree echoed the community’s worst fears: the funnels were almost certainly being used to inject herbicide to slowly kill the 100-year-old tree, and residents placed the blame squarely on the Whanki Museum. A group of residents accompanied by police confronted museum staff shortly after the discovery, and locals allege a museum employee essentially confirmed the institution’s involvement. The museum has never issued a public confirmation or denial of the herbicide claims, and declined repeated requests for comment from the BBC. In a brief May statement, the museum said its outer wall was collapsing due to the ginkgo’s roots, that it had contacted more than 40 local property owners to request a solution, and that after receiving no responses, its staff “attempted to resolve the situation” — offering no further details on what actions were taken. Local council officials, however, told the BBC a 2025 inspection found “no meaningful connection” between the ginkgo’s roots and the claimed wall damage, adding that any legitimate structural issue would have prompted official intervention and public notification.

    The irony of the accusation is not lost on angry local residents, as the Whanki Museum was founded in 1992 to honor the legacy of Kim Whanki, one of South Korea’s most celebrated pioneering abstract artists, often called the “Picasso of Korea.” The museum’s architect designed the space to harmonize with the natural landscape that was central to Kim’s work, and Kim himself wrote nature-focused essays under the pen name Su-wha, which translates to “conversation with trees.” “Treating life that way is ignorance and there was never any apology,” Jung said.

    Residents have adopted Kim’s pen name for their ailing tree, and partnered with local environmental activists to launch a national petition calling for the creation of an official urban tree guardian program to protect landmark community trees. Activist Choi Jin-woo, who joined the campaign, said he initially could not believe the allegations: “When I first heard that a tree next to a museum had been poisoned with herbicide and was dying, I simply couldn’t believe it. But when I saw the ginkgo shrivelling, I realised something this horrific could actually happen in our society.” Residents have filed a formal police complaint against the museum’s director, and authorities confirm an investigation is ongoing, though they have declined to release further details. They are demanding the museum reveal what substance was injected into the tree so arborists can begin targeted treatment to save it.

    Despite the grim prognosis — one arborist concluded the tree is 90% dead — the fight to save “Grandpa Ginkgo” has yielded an unexpected silver lining: it has united the Buam-dong community in a way no other event has. As Jung spent days organizing support and gathering information, neighbors left home-cooked meals on her doorstep, and she in turn shared homegrown vegetable soup with neighbors she had never met before. For Jung herself, who had struggled with mobility issues and depression after a serious illness last winter, the campaign pulled her back into community life: “I felt so depressed and hopeless but those feelings disappeared. I entered a tree-like state. The tree helped bring me back out into life again. Ironically, it was because the tree became sick.”

    For weeks, roughly 20 residents gathered daily at the tree’s base to pray for its recovery: some read aloud Kim Whanki’s own essays about nature, a local shaman led a traditional healing ritual, and the group joined hands for an “elm dance,” a ceremonial practice some ecological activists believe promotes healing for ailing trees. Notes of support and well wishes are tied to the ginkgo’s trunk, fluttering in the mountain breeze.

    As autumn settles over Seoul, turning the city’s deciduous trees into vibrant shades of gold and yellow, Buam-dong’s most famous tree still stands with mostly crispy, brown, bare branches. Jung says the tree’s fate is now “in the hands of heaven,” and all the community can do is stay by its side and hope for a miracle. For Buam-dong, the tree is far more than just greenery along a sidewalk: it is a centurylong companion, a community landmark, and an irreplaceable part of the neighborhood’s identity. Residents cannot imagine an autumn without pausing to admire “Grandpa Ginkgo” in his full, golden, feathery glory — and they are not ready to let him go.