标签: Asia

亚洲

  • Trump imposes 15% tariff on key chip and solar panel material

    Trump imposes 15% tariff on key chip and solar panel material

    In a sharp new escalation of trade and tech rivalry between the world’s two largest economies, former U.S. President Donald Trump signed an executive order Thursday introducing sweeping new trade restrictions on imported polysilicon — the critical raw material at the heart of both semiconductor manufacturing and solar energy production.

    The new measures, which will go into effect this coming December, include a 15% across-the-board tariff on polysilicon and its related downstream products, alongside mandatory minimum import pricing for all incoming shipments of the material. The action was framed as a national security response following a months-long investigation into overseas polysilicon production, and comes as the U.S. continues to ramp up efforts to counter growing Chinese dominance in advanced technology supply chains.

    Trump confirmed he approved the recommendations put forward by Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick, who first proposed the combination of tariff and minimum pricing rules. Alongside the import restrictions, the administration also announced it will roll out new financial incentives designed to stimulate domestic polysilicon production, in a bid to reverse decades of declining U.S. market share in the sector.

    In justifying the policy, Trump argued that decades of open trade policies have allowed foreign competitors to erode the position of American polysilicon manufacturers. He noted that U.S. global production share plummeted from 50% in 2005 to less than 2% by 2024, even as the material has grown increasingly critical to both military technology and consumer electronics. Today, China controls nearly the entire global supply of polysilicon, holding a near-monopoly position that the Trump administration argues poses a profound national security and economic risk.

    China currently stands as the world’s top polysilicon producer, with the sector serving as a foundational pillar for both its booming chip manufacturing industry and its fast-growing renewable energy sector. The new restrictions are explicitly designed to shield U.S. domestic manufacturers from intensifying competition from Chinese chip and polysilicon firms, a core point of ongoing friction between Washington and Beijing.

    The policy is expected to deliver immediate benefits to the two major U.S.-based polysilicon producers: Hemlock Semiconductor and German-headquartered Wacker Chemie, which operates large production facilities within the U.S. As global competition for leadership in artificial intelligence intensifies, control over semiconductor supply chains — starting with core materials like polysilicon — has become a central battleground for both the U.S. and China.

    In an official statement following the signing of the order, the Chinese Embassy in Washington condemned the move, accusing the U.S. of abusing state power to target legitimate Chinese businesses. The embassy emphasized that the new restrictions seriously disrupt bilateral trade relations, and warned that Beijing will take all necessary measures to protect the interests of its domestic companies. It also pushed back against the U.S. protectionist approach, noting that trade barriers will do nothing to improve American long-term competitiveness.

    Analysts interviewed by China’s *Global Times* framed the new tariff as the latest step in a steady escalation of U.S. efforts to cut China out of global critical technology supply chains. The move comes on the heels of a series of prior U.S. restrictions targeting Chinese tech imports, including bans and limitations on drones, humanoid robots and a wide range of other advanced technology products originating from China.

  • US Senator Fetterman struggles to defend support for Israel as progressives win big

    US Senator Fetterman struggles to defend support for Israel as progressives win big

    A high-profile interview between staunchly pro-Israel Democratic Senator John Fetterman and comedian-podcaster Jon Stewart has reignited debate over the growing ideological divide within the U.S. Democratic Party regarding U.S. policy toward Israel, as progressive voices calling for accountability for Israeli actions in Gaza gain electoral traction across the nation.

    In the recorded Tuesday conversation, Fetterman, who represents the critical swing state of Pennsylvania in the Senate, made clear that he is willing to sacrifice intra-party support rather than soften his unwavering backing for Israel, a stance that has put him sharply at odds with a rising wave of progressive Democrats who advocate for Palestinian rights. The Pennsylvania senator acknowledged that his unapologetic support for Israel following the October 7, 2023, Hamas-led attacks on southern Israel has made him increasingly unpopular among members of his own party, but emphasized that this was a deliberate choice he stands by.

    Fetterman’s hardline position emerges at a moment of notable shift within the Democratic coalition. Just one day after the interview, on Wednesday, progressive candidate Abdul El-Sayed defeated a pro-Israel opponent funded by the powerful pro-Israel lobbying group American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) in Michigan’s Democratic primary, bringing him one step closer to becoming the first Muslim U.S. senator in American history. Even former Obama advisor Rahm Emanuel, whose father was a member of the 1948 Irgun militia linked to violence against Palestinian civilians, has publicly acknowledged that the Democratic Party must move away from its longstanding posture of unconditional support for Israel.

    Though Fetterman aligns with most Democratic policy priorities, he has been an ideological outlier on all matters related to Israel since taking office in January 2023. The 56-year-old senator has publicly condemned the widespread 2024 college campus protests calling for an end to Israel’s military campaign in Gaza, a campaign that multiple holocaust experts and the United Nations have labeled a genocide. He has also backed former President Donald Trump’s hardline policy toward Iran and remains fully committed to sending unlimited U.S. foreign aid to Israel, which he describes as an irreplaceable “special ally.”

    When Stewart pressed Fetterman on whether there was any action by Israel he would criticize, Fetterman replied simply: “No.” He pushed back on claims that Israel’s actions in Gaza constitute genocide, arguing that only the Jewish people have experienced a “true genocide” and claiming that if Israel sought to eliminate all Palestinians, it would have done so already. When Stewart noted that more than 22,000 Palestinian children have been killed in the campaign and asked if actions such as displacing 2 million Gazans into a fraction of their original territory and imposing a crippling siege can be justified as self-defense, Fetterman focused solely on the violence of the October 7 attacks, repeating unsubstantiated claims that Hamas fighters raped Israeli civilians — a claim that no international organization has ever documented with direct first-person or eyewitness evidence.

    The conversation also saw Stewart push back against Fetterman’s conflation of antisemitism in the U.S. and criticism of the Israeli state. Stewart, who is Jewish, pointed out to Fetterman that “The Jewish community and Israel are not the same thing.” Fetterman also complained that the term “Zionist” is now used as a slur by some within the Democratic Party and questioned why student protesters do not target Iran for its domestic crackdowns on dissent — a point Stewart countered by noting that the U.S. does not send billions of dollars in annual military aid to Iran, instead imposing harsh sanctions on the regime.

    Fetterman repeated the common claim that Hamas steals all humanitarian aid bound for Gaza, a claim that contradicts public statements from the former Republican head of the World Food Programme, who confirmed last year there is no evidence of Hamas systematically stealing or attacking aid convoys entering the enclave.

    Observers noted multiple unusual moments during the 75-minute interview, where Fetterman struggled to recall talking points and often veered off-topic, appearing unable to fully structure responses to Stewart’s questions. These difficulties align with well-documented health challenges Fetterman has faced: three months before his 2022 Senate election victory against celebrity candidate Mehmet Oz, Fetterman suffered a major stroke. During the campaign, he struggled with verbal articulation in public appearances and his high-profile debate with Oz. Despite these challenges, he won the seat with 51% of the vote. A month after his 2023 swearing-in, Fetterman revealed he was suffering from clinical depression and spent two months in inpatient care, a decision widely praised by both parties as a courageous step in destigmatizing men’s mental health struggles.

    The interview also covered broader tensions within the Democratic Party, with roughly half of the conversation focused on the growing unpopularity of the Democratic establishment, the rise of progressive democratic socialists who have energized young and working-class voters, and the economic status quo that has alienated many swing voters from centrist candidates. Fetterman argued that candidates embracing democratic socialist platforms cannot win general elections in key swing states, a framing Stewart pushed back on by pointing to El-Sayed’s policy platform — which includes banning corporate money from politics, raising taxes on billionaires to fund housing, education and universal healthcare — calling Fetterman’s labeling of progressive candidates as communist or socialist sympathizers a “caricature.”

    Fetterman denied labeling all progressives communists, but singled out popular left-wing political commentator Hassan Piker, who has endorsed El-Sayed and appeared at campaign rallies with him, arguing that Piker’s support for Palestinian rights amounts to being “pro-Hamas.” Fetterman concluded by arguing that the party has a responsibility to “police its own ranks” to avoid nominating candidates who will cost Democrats winnable swing state seats in upcoming national elections.

  • UK: Nearly one in five Prevent referrals had autism, new Home Office figures reveal

    UK: Nearly one in five Prevent referrals had autism, new Home Office figures reveal

    Fresh official data from the UK Home Office has reignited serious concerns about the discriminatory impact of the country’s divisive Prevent counter-extremism strategy, after revealing that nearly one in five people referred to the programme between October 2024 and September 2025 had recorded autism diagnoses or suspected cases.

    An independent analysis of the newly released dataset shows that 1,833 of the total 9,957 referrals logged over the 12-month period were linked to autism: 1,199 were confirmed diagnoses, while an additional 634 were marked as suspected cases. The annual referral total itself marks a historic high, the highest recorded since the programme began tracking national data in 2015, representing a 39% jump from the previous year’s figures for England and Wales. Overall, 36% of all people referred to Prevent during the reporting period had at least one recorded mental health or neurodivergent condition, with autism the most frequently documented neurodiverse trait across all cases.

    Jacob Smith, a policy and advocacy officer at human rights group Rights and Security International, told Middle East Eye that the sharp rise in autistic people entering the Prevent system is “particularly concerning” and lays bare long-standing structural flaws embedded in the government’s counter-extremism framework. “We’ve known for years that autistic people are overrepresented in Prevent referrals, but the scale of this increase over the last 12 months is especially worrying,” Smith explained. He added that Prevent has faced accusations of systemic bias and discrimination since its launch: the programme initially disproportionately targeted British Muslim communities, and while demographic patterns have shifted over time, Black and Asian people are still vastly overrepresented in referral data, a trend that has now spread to neurodivergent groups including autistic people.

    Alongside the autism findings, the data revealed a 20% year-on-year rise in referrals linked to far-right extremism. Demographic breakdowns confirm that Asian people account for 18% of referrals where ethnicity is recorded – twice their share of the general population of England and Wales. Black people are also overrepresented, making up 8% of referrals compared to just 4% of the overall population. Despite repeated government warnings that “Islamist extremism” remains the UK’s top domestic security threat, referrals categorized under this label have fallen to just 8% of all active Prevent cases.

    Smith argued that the overrepresentation of marginalized groups stems directly from the programme’s vague, subjective referral structure. Public sector workers across the UK are legally required to refer any individual to Prevent if they are deemed to pose a potential terrorism risk, a mandate that leaves huge room for implicit bias to shape decisions. “Prevent is designed in an extremely vague way that leans almost entirely on referrers’ gut instinct,” he said. “This effectively encourages bias, whether intentional or unconscious, to creep into decision-making. That, to me, is the core reason we consistently see certain groups overrepresented in the system.”

    The Home Office data also shows that the share of cases involving autism actually rises as cases move deeper into the Prevent process. Roughly 23% of cases reviewed by the multi-agency Channel panels – the bodies that assess radicalisation risk and approve de-radicalisation support – involved recorded autism, and that figure climbs to 24% for cases formally accepted into the government’s de-radicalisation programme.

    These statistics are the second set of official Prevent data to include mental health and neurodiversity tracking, following the rollout of the new Prevent Case Management Tracker (PCMT) system in 2024. The Home Office acknowledged that the new system has improved how conditions are recorded, but cautioned that data quality is still evolving. The department also stressed that the figures do not prove any causal link between neurodivergence and susceptibility to radicalisation. “It is important to note that these findings describe associations within the data rather than causal relationships,” the official report reads. “The analysis does not indicate that being neurodiverse or having a particular mental health condition increases or decreases the likelihood of progressing through the Prevent or Channel process.”

    Even so, Smith warned that the current system actively reinforces harmful, criminalizing stereotypes about autistic people. “A lot of the framing used by Prevent points to core autistic traits – for example, hyperfixation – and implies that these characteristics make autistic people more likely to pose a security risk,” he explained. “Instead of addressing the underlying bias in the system, they are doubling down by using autism diagnoses themselves as an explanation for overrepresentation.”

    Under Prevent’s operating structure, after an initial screening and assessment, referrals deemed to carry a risk of radicalisation are passed to a multi-agency Channel panel, chaired by local authorities. These panels are tasked with evaluating an individual’s risk and deciding whether to approve a tailored support package to address perceived radicalisation. Of the 1,100 Channel cases accepted in the year to September 2025 with recorded ethnicity, 76% were white, 14% were Asian, 5% were Black, and 4% were categorized as other ethnicity.

    Crucially, Smith added, even referrals that do not result in any further action can leave people facing long-term negative consequences. “As we documented in our 2024 report *Caught in the Web*, information about Prevent referrals – including cases that are dropped, found to be mistaken, or made with malicious intent – is shared widely across policing bodies, security services, immigration authorities and other public sector agencies,” he said. “While much of Prevent’s work operates behind closed doors, there is a very real risk of lasting harm for people who are referred, affecting not just their interactions with police but their access to all kinds of public services.”

  • Saudi Arabia’s last major oil route comes under Houthi pressure

    Saudi Arabia’s last major oil route comes under Houthi pressure

    In a significant escalation of maritime hostilities against Saudi Arabia, the Houthi movement announced Wednesday it had launched ballistic missiles targeting the Saudi-flagged oil tanker NCC Wafaa off the coast of Yanbu, Saudi Arabia’s key northern Red Sea export hub. This assault marks the northernmost attack the Yemeni militant group has carried out since it declared a full blockade of Saudi shipping on July 22, a strategic shift that analysts warn could amplify economic pressure on Riyadh and disrupt critical global trade lanes.

    Prior to this strike, Houthi attacks on maritime traffic were almost entirely concentrated off Yemen’s own coast, spanning the southern Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. The group claims the NCC Wafaa violated blockade terms and ignored multiple pre-strike warnings before coming under fire.

    The attack comes amid a wider regional crisis triggered by the closure of the Strait of Hormuz earlier this year, which forced Saudi Arabia to reroute the vast majority of its oil exports through the Bab al-Mandab strait and Red Sea, en route to the Suez Canal for delivery to its primary Asian market. Ibrahim Jalal, a prominent Yemen-based analyst, framed the northern strike as a deliberate attempt to close off this alternative export corridor that Riyadh has become increasingly dependent on.

    Jalal outlined two core drivers behind the Houthi’s northward expansion: externally, the move bolsters Iran’s bargaining power in negotiations surrounding the Strait of Hormuz standoff; internally, it aims to reassert the group’s coercive leverage over the Saudi government.

    Maritime security analysts warn the situation has reached its most severe point since the crisis began. Matthew Wright, an analyst at leading ship-tracking firm Kpler, noted this week that threats to global crude trade have never been higher since the Houthi blockade was implemented. To date, the Houthis claim to have struck eight commercial tankers since July 22: five Saudi-flagged vessels and one Indian-flagged tanker that sank near Bab al-Mandab on August 4. Only four of these strikes have been independently verified by the United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations Centre (UKMTO), the global authoritative body for maritime security incident reporting, and Saudi government officials have yet to publicly confirm any of the attacks.

    Houthi military spokesperson Yahya Saree claimed on August 5 that at least 29 Saudi commercial vessels have already diverted away from Bab al-Mandab in the first two weeks of the blockade. Framing the campaign as “blockade for blockade”, Saree reiterated the group’s commitment to matching any Saudi escalation with proportional counteraction.

    Salah Ali Salah, a security researcher at the Sanaa Centre, warned that the Houthi movement remains on a clear escalatory trajectory, and has not yet deployed the full scope of its maritime strike capabilities against Saudi shipping. As the threat grows, shipping operators are adapting in uneven ways: Bloomberg reports that while some Saudi tankers have chosen to take the far longer route around the Cape of Good Hope in southern Africa (six vessels took this alternative route this week alone), others have disabled their onboard transponders to cross Bab al-Mandab undetected.

    The strategic importance of this waterway can hardly be overstated: Saudi oil shipments typically make up roughly 66 percent of all commercial traffic passing through Bab al-Mandab, and the Red Sea as a whole carries 10 to 12 percent of all global traded goods.

    Ryan Bohl, senior Middle East and North Africa analyst at global risk intelligence firm RANE, noted that it is unlikely the Houthis can fully block all commercial traffic in the northern Red Sea. Instead, their strategy is to establish themselves as a credible persistent threat to shipping near Egypt and the Suez Canal, forcing Saudi shipping firms to adopt costly risk-mitigation measures that cut into their bottom line. These measures include disabling transponders, paying substantial hazard pay to crew members, and absorbing the full cost of war risk insurance for all transits.

    Rerouting around the Cape of Good Hope also introduces major logistical hurdles: tankers sailing for Asia must still pass through the Suez Canal to reach Yanbu, adding a minimum of four weeks to total voyage time. Furthermore, the Suez Canal’s limited depth restrictions prevent fully loaded Very Large Crude Carriers (VLCCs) – the standard vessel for Saudi crude exports, which carry roughly 2 million barrels of oil – from transiting fully loaded. Instead, Saudi exporters must use smaller Suezmax vessels (with 1 million barrel capacity) or sail VLCCs partially loaded, drastically reducing export efficiency. Bohl explained that this means more voyages are required to deliver the same total volume of crude, adding approximately $1.6 million in extra fuel costs plus a $1 million Suez Canal toll per transit.

    Salah emphasized that the core challenge for Saudi Arabia is not simply finding an alternative route for exports, but finding one that can match the scale, cost efficiency, and reliability of its pre-crisis export network. Partial workarounds do exist: the Egyptian Sumed pipeline allows exporters to offload part of a VLCC’s cargo in deep water off Egypt’s northern coast, transit the Suez Canal with a reduced load, then reload the cargo onto the same vessel on the other side, partially offsetting the capacity losses from Suez restrictions. Saudi Arabia also uses its domestic East-West pipeline to move crude from the Persian Gulf across the country to Red Sea export terminals, and Bloomberg data shows that export volumes out of Yanbu have tripled since the Strait of Hormuz closed.

    Some analysts warn the strike on the NCC Wafaa could signal a coming expansion of Houthi targeting beyond oil tankers to include non-tanker commercial vessels and import cargo, a shift that would set a dangerous precedent for wider regional maritime disruption. Bohl, however, argues that such a move would run counter to the Houthis’ own strategic interests, as it would likely trigger a major new Saudi offensive against Houthi-held territory in Yemen, specifically targeting Hodeidah – the group’s own critical Red Sea supply lifeline.

    To date, the Houthi blockade of Bab al-Mandab has had a less severe impact on Saudi oil exports than the March 4 closure of the Strait of Hormuz. After the Hormuz closure, Riyadh rapidly shifted almost all its export capacity to Red Sea terminals, leading to an eightfold increase in traffic through Bab al-Mandab, according to Kpler data. On August 1, Yanbu recorded one of its busiest single days on record, with five supertankers simultaneously positioned for loading.

    Despite the escalating threat, Saudi state oil giant Aramco reported a 33 percent surge in second-quarter profits this week, driven by elevated global energy prices tied to the regional crisis and the efficiency of Saudi Arabia’s pipeline network for rerouting exports. Aramco CEO Amin Nasser also confirmed that previous Houthi attacks on Aramco infrastructure in July had no material impact on the company’s operations or financial performance.

    This week, emerging hopes of an Iran-Oman agreement to reopen the Strait of Hormuz led Saudi Arabia to cut its official crude price for Asian buyers by between 50 cents and $2 per barrel, a signal that Riyadh does not currently view the Houthi Red Sea blockade as an existential threat to its export capacity. Still, Salah noted that even a reopening of the Strait of Hormuz would not resolve the underlying Houthi threat to Red Sea shipping, leaving continued uncertainty for global energy markets.

  • Japan’s remarks trigger alarm

    Japan’s remarks trigger alarm

    As Japan gathered in Hiroshima on Thursday to mark 81 years since the 1945 U.S. atomic bombing, the somber commemoration was overshadowed by growing public and global pushback against controversial pro-nuclear remarks from senior Japanese government officials.

    Held at Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park, the annual memorial brought renewed attention to a dramatic shift in Japan’s long-standing post-war security posture, which has been anchored since 1971 by the Three Non-Nuclear Principles — a framework that bans Japan from possessing, manufacturing, or allowing the entry of nuclear weapons into its territory. In recent months, top ruling officials have broken decades of taboo to openly call for unrestricted debate over revising these principles, triggering widespread alarm.

    Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, who attended the ceremony, struck a familiar public note, stating that as the only nation to have suffered wartime nuclear attacks, Japan bears a unique mission to work toward global nuclear disarmament. But when pressed by reporters on whether the Three Non-Nuclear Principles would be revised during this year’s update of the country’s three core national security documents, Takaichi refused to give a clear denial, telling *The Asahi Shimbun* that it would be inappropriate to prejudge the final wording of the documents. Neither Takaichi nor Hiroshima Mayor Kazumi Matsui — who used his address to highlight the catastrophic human cost of nuclear weapons and called for multilateral nonproliferation efforts — acknowledged the full historical context of the 1945 bombings that ended World War II.

    Political analysts say the incremental string of provocative nuclear-related statements from Japanese officials is a deliberate strategy to test public opinion and lay groundwork for abandoning the country’s post-war pacifist security commitments. “The government is gradually reshaping Japan’s deep-rooted domestic anti-nuclear sentiment through these small, repeated shifts in rhetoric,” explained Hiroshi Shiratori, a political science professor at Tokyo’s Hosei University. Last month, Japanese Defense Minister Shinjiro Koizumi went as far as stating that Japan should debate all aspects of nuclear policy “without taboos,” including a rewrite of the decades-old Non-Nuclear Principles. Late last year, a senior security and defense advisor to the Prime Minister’s Office publicly stated Japan should acquire its own nuclear weapons.

    Since taking office in October last year, the Takaichi administration has already advanced revisions to Japan’s core national security documents and repeatedly raised the prospect of rolling back the Three Non-Nuclear Principles’ “no introduction” rule. Proponents of the change argue it would strengthen the credibility of the U.S. nuclear “extended deterrence” arrangement, under which Washington commits to defending Japan using its full military arsenal, including nuclear weapons. But critics warn the shift puts Japan at greater, not reduced, risk. “Japan-U.S. consultations on nuclear deterrence do not lower Japan’s risk of nuclear attack,” said Ukeru Magosaki, a former Japanese foreign ministry official and current director of the Tokyo-based East Asian Community Institute. “Instead, these talks expand Washington’s nuclear strike options against other nuclear-armed states, which makes Japan far more likely to become a target itself.”

    The Takaichi administration’s increasingly assertive pro-nuclear security agenda stands in stark opposition to the strong anti-nuclear and anti-war sentiment held by the majority of the Japanese public. *The Tokyo Shimbun* reported that since Takaichi took office, at least 128 local assemblies across 36 of Japan’s prefectures have submitted formal written petitions to the national parliament urging the government to preserve the Three Non-Nuclear Principles — a record high for such advocacy. Magosaki added that upholding the principles is not just a symbolic commitment: it is the foundation of Japan’s own security, because a non-nuclear Japan poses no threat to neighboring countries, strengthening regional stability.

    The shift has also drawn sharp criticism from China, which condemned Japanese right-wing forces for exploiting the country’s status as a nuclear attack victim to gain international sympathy while advancing plans to acquire nuclear capabilities. “Japanese right-wing forces have long distorted historical fact and deliberately downplayed Japan’s wartime invasion, which killed and wounded tens of millions of people in neighboring Asian countries, all to escape accountability for their war crimes,” said Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian in an online statement Thursday. Lin added that the Japanese government has recently accelerated large-scale military buildup, sought enhanced nuclear protection from the U.S., and actively worked to break free from the constraints of the Three Non-Nuclear Principles. China urged Tokyo to honor its binding nuclear nonproliferation obligations under international law and abandon its moves to erode post-war security commitments.

    Shiratori added that the Takaichi administration’s broader policy shifts — including easing restrictions on arms exports under Japan’s Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology — make clear that the current government no longer prioritizes Japan’s long-standing pacifist principles, signaling a historic break from the post-war order that has shaped East Asia for nearly 80 years.

  • India is a nation of walkers – but its cities forgot them

    India is a nation of walkers – but its cities forgot them

    For generations, navigating Indian cities on foot has never been a straightforward, guaranteed right—it has been a daily battle through a chaotic obstacle course. This personal experience, shared by millions across the country, frames a long-simmering crisis of urban planning that has only recently been thrust into the national spotlight by a landmark Supreme Court ruling.

    Growing up in Kolkata, the author navigated sidewalks swallowed entirely by rows of street vendors. A move to Delhi revealed a road network built almost exclusively for private motor vehicles. Now based in Gurugram, the pattern holds: footpaths are often reduced to rubble heaps and garbage dumps, blocked abruptly by parked cars or construction work, or built so high above street level that they are unusable for most people. It was against this backdrop that India’s Supreme Court ruled in June that the right to walk safely on designated footpaths qualifies as a fundamental right—a decision that felt less like overreach and more like common sense arriving 40 years too late.

    What makes this systemic neglect particularly striking is that India remains first and foremost a nation of walkers. Census-based estimates put the number of people who commute to work on foot at roughly 45 million, compared to just 5.4 million who travel in private cars, jeeps, or vans. Nearly one in three urban workers walks to their job, and every public transit journey—from bus to metro—begins and ends on foot. When including school trips, daily errands, and shopping runs, walking accounts for the majority of urban mobility: a 2019 survey of major Indian cities found that 63% of all daily journeys are made on foot, making pedestrians the single largest group of road users in the country.

    Most of these pedestrians are what researchers term “captive walkers”: people who do not choose to walk out of preference, but because they cannot afford any other mode of transport. Women, low-income workers, and young people are disproportionately dependent on walking, yet this group—who contribute the least to traffic congestion and urban air pollution—faces the highest risk of harm on India’s roads.

    The scale of unsafe infrastructure for pedestrians is sobering. Even when formal footpaths exist, they are often cracked, overly narrow, and completely inaccessible to older adults, children, and people with disabilities. They are routinely blocked by parked motorcycles, occupied by informal encroachments, or dug up for utility work with no temporary alternative route. Faded, poorly maintained zebra crossings are largely ignored by motorists, and elevated flyovers speed up car traffic while forcing pedestrians to take dangerous, circuitous detours at ground level.

    A landmark 2011 study of six major Indian cities confirmed what pedestrians have long known: India’s streets systematically fail walkers due to consistently poor and unsafe infrastructure. The *Walkability in Indian Cities* report, published by the Clean Air Initiative for Asian Cities (CAI-Asia), awarded surveyed cities a median walkability score of just 47 out of 100. The worst conditions were found around public transport hubs—ironically, the very locations where most walking trips begin and end.

    As Geetam Tiwari, a leading transport scholar at the Indian Institute of Technology (IIT) Delhi, puts it: pedestrians have been “pushed to the margins of the road networks”, forcing them to compete for limited space alongside fast-moving motor vehicles. This neglect has a deadly human cost. Official data records pedestrians as accounting for roughly one-fifth of all road deaths in India, but independent research cited by Tiwari puts the actual share closer to 30% to 40%. Pedestrians are already the second-largest group of road accident fatalities, behind only two-wheeler riders, and in major metro areas including Delhi and Mumbai, they make up more than half of all annual road deaths. A World Bank analysis estimates that road crashes cost India between 3% and 5% of its GDP every year, through lost productivity, emergency healthcare costs, and permanent disability.

    The Supreme Court case that led to the ruling grew out of an unthinkable tragedy: a five-year-old boy was crushed by a truck while walking to school alongside his father. In response, the court delivered an unusually impassioned judgment. “Walking is the simplest of the simple human activity, inextricably connected to life,” wrote Justice PS Narasimha. He added that the state carries a core duty to provide safe footpaths as part of its road network, declaring: “The fundamental right to walk on demarcated footpaths shall override the privilege of a motorised vehicle.”

    The judgment directly challenges decades of conventional urban planning in India, where progress has long been measured by the number of kilometers of new expressways, flyovers, and elevated corridors built. For generations, streets have been engineered to move motor vehicles as quickly as possible, while the pedestrian— a role every single citizen shares—has been largely erased from urban planning priorities. “People know about the latest cars, but walking has become invisible,” explains Rishi Aggarwal, a Mumbai-based activist who has spent more than a decade working to shift public and policy mindsets.

    Through his advocacy group the Walking Project, Aggarwal organizes community walks and public discussions to encourage city residents to re-examine the neglected spaces around them: broken sidewalks, blocked crossings, and unsafe junctions that have become normalized over time. “When people become apathetic, they stop observing the street,” he says. In Mumbai alone, an estimated 15 million walking trips happen every day, and Aggarwal argues that both the footpaths and the millions of dependent pedestrians have been rendered invisible by car-centric planning.

    For Rahul Goel, a transportation researcher at IIT Delhi, the root of the crisis lies in broken governance. “Are footpaths maintained and cleaned? Does the city ensure they aren’t encroached upon?” he asks, noting that even in Delhi where many roads are formally built with footpaths, poor upkeep and mismanagement leave most unusable. Poor design exacerbates the problem: cars parked perpendicular to the curb often block or conceal sidewalks, and parking directly on footpaths is a common sight across the country. Many footpaths are too narrow to accommodate peak pedestrian volumes, others are built too high above the road for people with limited mobility to access, and many end abruptly, forcing walkers out onto busy vehicle carriageways. “If the footpath is discontinuous, it’s simply more convenient to keep walking on the road,” Goel notes.

    The deeper issue, he argues, is a long-standing misalignment of policy priorities. “Urban transport governance is still centred on moving vehicles. Reducing congestion and maximising road space for motor traffic take precedence over pedestrians,” he says. Civic agencies are often reluctant to widen footpaths because they view existing vehicle lane space as untouchable, a mindset reinforced by public discourse that frames traffic jams as the top urban mobility crisis. Traffic congestion dominates newspaper headlines and social media conversation, pushing authorities to prioritize keeping vehicles moving at all costs. In Delhi, for example, many mid-block pedestrian crossings have been removed and replaced with U-turns to cut vehicle stoppages, forcing pedestrians to use narrow, often poorly maintained foot overbridges to cross the road. “People don’t just need to walk along a road,” says Goel. “They need to be able to cross it safely too.”

    This systemic bias has created stark urban inequality. In Gurugram, a high-speed arterial road cuts through dense residential neighborhoods with almost no safe pedestrian crossings, forcing domestic workers, daily wage laborers, and other low-income pedestrians to dodge speeding traffic. Dozens were killed before authorities finally approved construction of footbridges in response to public outcry. Across Indian cities, those who cannot afford private motor vehicles are forced to risk their lives on roads that barely accommodate walking, while car owners claim an ever-growing share of public road space. Walking has increasingly been rebranded as a leisure activity, confined to gated residential communities, urban parks, or gym treadmills—a shift that carries major public health consequences at a time when India is grappling with rising rates of obesity and lifestyle-related disease.

    It is clear that transforming walking from a fundamental right on paper to a safe daily reality will require far more than a single court order. “Walking as a fundamental right should lead to pedestrian-friendly cities, not just pedestrian-friendly streets,” Tiwari says. That means a complete rethink of how Indian cities are designed. Many high-income countries have adopted default urban speed limits of 30km/h (20mph) to protect pedestrians, a policy that requires redesigning streets to narrow traffic lanes, alter road surfaces, and add other traffic-calming measures. Tiwari also argues that walking infrastructure needs to accommodate more than just movement: it should include space for street vendors, shaded rest spots for older adults, and even small play areas for children.

    In its judgment, the Supreme Court also highlighted the unique cultural and historical role of walking in India, noting that it is far more than just a way to get from one place to another. It can be “necessity for the poor, meditation for some, an act of resistance for others and a path to discovery”. The court also noted that walking was central to India’s freedom struggle—a point echoed by writer Sumana Roy, who points out that India’s modern political history has often unfolded on foot, from Mahatma Gandhi’s iconic Salt March to Dandi to Subhas Chandra Bose’s “Delhi Chalo” movement and countless protest marches that shaped the nation.

    For decades, Indian cities have centered their planning around a single question: how do we move more vehicles, faster? The Supreme Court’s landmark ruling has forced urban leaders and residents to ask a far simpler, more fundamental question: how do we let people walk safely? For millions of captive pedestrians across the country, the ask is not extravagant: just an unbroken, usable footpath that can carry them from one end of the street to the other, without risking their lives.

  • Israeli bulldozers uproot West Bank olive trees ahead of harvest season

    Israeli bulldozers uproot West Bank olive trees ahead of harvest season

    On a Wednesday just weeks before Palestinian farmers were set to begin their annual olive harvest, Israeli bulldozers moved into two Palestinian villages near Jenin in the occupied West Bank, felling dozens of olive trees in a continuation of a widespread campaign to uproot cultivated groves across the territory.

    This latest round of destruction targeted agricultural plots in Ajjah and Zububa, two villages located in close proximity to Israel’s controversial separation barrier. For local families who have tended these lands for multiple generations, the destruction has delivered a devastating blow to both their livelihoods and cultural heritage.

    Zaki Jaradat, who leads Zubaba’s Village Council, confirmed that the incident on Wednesday is far from an isolated action. He reported that since the beginning of 2024, Israeli forces have already uprooted more than 2,950 olive trees across more than 300 dunams (nearly 75 acres) of prime Palestinian agricultural land in the area.

    Fuad Yahya Maqalda is one of the dozens of local farmers whose generational landholdings were destroyed in the latest operation. From the rooftop of his home, which overlooks his family’s olive groves, he was forced to watch helplessly as bulldozers cleared the land, unable to reach the site to stop the work.

    “We are unable to do anything,” Maqalda told reporters from Middle East Eye. “We cannot understand the intentions behind this uprooting. The occupation uprooted olive trees that have stood on our land since the time of our grandparents.”

    The timing of the destruction has compounded the grief for affected families, with the annual olive harvest – the most economically important event of the year for thousands of West Bank Palestinian households – mere weeks away. Maqalda detailed the full scope of his own loss: three generational family plots were targeted, with 111 trees destroyed on one plot and an additional 215 cleared from a second. “Every single one of those trees has been removed,” he said.

    Tareq Ighbariya, a spokesperson for the Palestinian Commission Against the Wall and Settlements in Jenin, explained that the actual damage on the ground frequently exceeds the limits set out in formal Israeli military orders authorizing land clearing.

    “Military orders may specify a certain area for tree uprooting or land clearing, but when they are carried out, the affected area is often much larger,” Ighbariya told Middle East Eye. “In some cases, bulldozers enter agricultural land and begin clearing it without any prior military order.”

    The mass clearing in Zububa is part of a broader pattern of encroachment on Palestinian agricultural land across the Jenin governorate. Ighbariya noted that the commission has documented similar destruction across roughly 300 dunams of farmland in recent months, adding that ongoing assessments mean the final count of damaged and cleared land may be even higher than current records show.

    For Palestinian communities in the occupied West Bank, the annual olive harvest holds meaning far beyond economic survival. While the crop provides a critical, steady source of income for thousands of families, it is also deeply woven into Palestinian cultural and social identity, with groves passed from parent to child over centuries.

    In recent years, the lead-up to and during harvest season has brought growing levels of disruption and risk for Palestinian farmers across the territory. Reports have surged of increased restrictions on access to farmland, particularly near Israeli settlements and designated military zones, alongside widespread incidents of settler violence, deliberate vandalism, crop theft, and targeted uprooting of olive groves. For many farming communities, what should be a vital annual harvest has now become a period of significant uncertainty, with families bracing for potential loss of land or attacks as they attempt to tend and collect their crops.

  • Should fans put their phones down at concerts? This K-pop band thinks so

    Should fans put their phones down at concerts? This K-pop band thinks so

    When rising K-pop boy band Cortis kicked off their debut global tour in Incheon, South Korea, on July 18, the five-member group made an opening statement that has divided their fanbase far beyond the packed stadium walls. Dressed in laid-back, street-style fits that leaned into their signature cool, unapologetic energy, one member stepped forward and shouted to the crowd: “Put your phone down.”

    Thousands of screaming fans responded with a sea of glowing phone screens held high, and a second, louder repetition only prompted a small portion of the audience to tuck their devices away. What could read as a lighthearted on-stage bit is actually the core mission of the tour, which bears the name *Put Your Phone Down*. After wrapping its initial stop in Incheon, the tour will travel to major North American cities including New York and Los Angeles before wrapping with a homecoming show in Seoul later this month.

    For Cortis, the message is nothing new: the group has long pushed for fans to trade viewing a show through a six-inch screen for immersive, in-the-moment connection with their performance. The stance, however, has clashed with the deeply ingrained norms of K-pop fan culture, where fan-recorded content functions as a valuable social and community currency.

    The divide is clear even among fans who attended the Incheon shows. For 22-year-old Park Ji-yeon, capturing every second of the performance was non-negotiable. She splurged on a rental of a high-end new smartphone for both days of the concert, motivated by the once-in-a-lifetime nature of the front-row spot she secured. “I don’t know if I’ll ever get this opportunity again,” Park explained in an interview with the BBC. “I usually film concerts because I know a lot of those memories will fade as soon as I leave the venue.”

    Other fans have embraced the group’s call to disconnect. Twenty-five-year-old Kim Ga-eun, who watched the shows from the venue’s amphitheater seating, noted that groups of fans in the standing section put down their phones to dance together, embodying exactly what the tour set out to achieve.

    Cortis, which debuted just over a year ago under BigHit Music — the same label that launched global supergroup BTS — has had a meteoric rise in the entertainment industry. Most of the group’s members are still teenagers, with the oldest, James, only 20 years old. Each of their music videos has racked up millions of views online, and just this past weekend, the group earned a major career milestone with a performance at Chicago’s iconic Lollapalooza music festival. The group’s name itself, derived from the phrase “colour outside the lines,” reflects their ethos of breaking convention — a value that clearly extends to their stance on concert phone use.

    Cortis is far from alone in this push. A growing number of high-profile artists across the globe have pushed for fans to put away their phones during live shows, taking increasingly bold stances. Singers Phoebe Bridgers and Alicia Keys have gone as far as requiring concertgoers to store their devices in sealed lock pouches for the entirety of a performance. In 2023, Welsh rock band Suede’s frontman Brett Anderson made headlines when he climbed over a stage barrier during a Singapore show to grab phones out of fans’ hands. Even Billie Eilish, who has acknowledged that filming helps fans hold onto memories after a show, has gently urged front-row audiences: “Put your phone down, I’m right here.” Back in the K-pop world, Cortis’ labelmates BTS have also made similar requests of their crowds, with member Jungkook once teasing an audience to stop staring at their screens and look at him directly.

    From an artist perspective, the push for phone-free shows centers on the value of live connection. “Interacting with fans is a really important part of performing, so I think they want people to focus more on that than on their phones,” Park said of Cortis’ request.

    But for K-pop fandoms, the practice of filming shows serves a purpose that extends far beyond personal memory. Fancams — close-up, individual clips focused on a single group member — are a cornerstone of online K-pop community life. Once shared, these clips are pored over by fans, who dissect choreography, hunt for tiny, unplanned moments of expression, and repurpose clips into fan-made content that keeps fan communities active long after a tour ends.

    This cultural context explains why Cortis’ repeated requests have left some fans frustrated. Disgruntled comments began circulating online immediately after the tour’s opening day, with many fans pointing to the exorbitant cost of attending live shows. Park, who spent more than 1 million won (roughly $700) to attend both days of the Incheon leg, noted: “I think a lot of fans spent similar amounts of money, so constantly hearing them asking us to put our phones down made some fans even more frustrated.”

    It appears the group heard these fan concerns, and softened their message by the second day of the Incheon run. Kim recalled that the framing shifted noticeably between the two shows: “On the first day, the message felt more like, ‘Let’s put our phones down and have fun together.’ On the second day, it changed slightly to, ‘We understand why you want to film, so let’s just make sure we enjoy ourselves together.’ They said filming was okay, but they wanted us to enjoy the concert together, and that ‘Put Your Phone Down’ was more of a mindset.”

  • Netanyahu’s ultra-Orthodox alliance shows signs of fracture before crucial election

    Netanyahu’s ultra-Orthodox alliance shows signs of fracture before crucial election

    For almost 30 years, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has anchored his political power on a foundational alliance with ultra-Orthodox Jewish political parties, a partnership that has kept him in office through multiple terms. But as he prepares for one of the most competitive elections of his decades-long career, that long-standing governing coalition faces unprecedented strain, with the decades-long dispute over mandatory military conscription for ultra-Orthodox men pushing the partnership to a breaking point. The escalating conflict has laid bare deep fissures within Netanyahu’s right-wing bloc, leaving political observers questioning whether his two most reliable allies—United Torah Judaism (UTJ) and Shas, partners since his first term as prime minister in 1996—could abandon his bloc to align with a rival government. “There is deep disappointment and anger across the ultra-Orthodox public about their current standing,” Pnina Pfeuffer, director general of the Ultra-Orthodox Public Organisation, a civil society group focused on the community, told Middle East Eye. Pfeuffer notes that the future political alignment of ultra-Orthodox parties is now so uncertain that a break from Netanyahu is no longer a far-fetched scenario—including a potential shift to a government led by Gadi Eisenkot, Netanyahu’s most formidable challenger in years. “Eisenkot is not viewed as anti-ultra-Orthodox by the community,” she explained, referencing the former Israel Defense Forces chief’s reputation among religious voters. Avi-ram Tzoreff, an Israeli historian and human rights activist specializing in Jewish cultural, political and religious history, says the growing rift between Netanyahu and his ultra-Orthodox allies has opened unexpected new pathways for Israel’s opposition. “There is clearly a rupture between the ultra-Orthodox community and the right-wing bloc,” Tzoreff told MEE. Echoing a common slogan chanted at anti-conscription protests, Tzoreff added: “The ultra-Orthodox as a political force have made their position clear: they would rather die than be drafted. The alliance between ultra-Orthodox parties and the right is no longer a foregone conclusion.” Tzoreff argues that an Eisenkot-led opposition bloc could leverage these internal divisions to break apart what he calls the Israeli right’s “unnatural political alliance” with the ultra-Orthodox. For opposition parties aiming to oust Netanyahu, he says, a full rethink of traditional coalition-building strategies is necessary. “Once political alliances are structured around the question of ultra-Orthodox military conscription, it becomes far harder to build broad, inclusive coalitions,” he explained. “If the centre-left wants to take power, it needs to redefine how it draws the boundaries of its political camp.” The long-running exemption of ultra-Orthodox men from compulsory military service has existed for decades, allowing the group to focus on full-time religious study at yeshivas. But the issue exploded into Israel’s most divisive political flashpoint after the launch of Israel’s war on Gaza, which has seen hundreds of thousands of reservists mobilized for active duty. The unprecedented demand for military manpower has massively intensified public pressure to end the long-standing exemption. Netanyahu’s governing coalition has repeatedly failed to pass new legislation to regulate ultra-Orthodox conscription, triggering mass protests organized and backed by UTJ and Shas, and leading to the detention of dozens of ultra-Orthodox men charged with draft evasion. Last year, lawmakers from both ultra-Orthodox parties resigned from their cabinet posts to protest the coalition’s failure to advance a draft law that met their demands, though they continued to cooperate with the government on core legislative priorities. The dispute has also split Netanyahu’s own Likud party, where multiple sitting lawmakers have characterized attempts to pass a new conscription law that preserves most exemptions for ultra-Orthodox communities as an unacceptable concession to the alliance partners. Dan Illouz, a Knesset member who left Likud last month over the issue, told Israeli outlet Ynet that the right-wing bloc “has become idolatry” that “undermines our ability to advance right-wing economic and security policy,” including guaranteeing the Israeli military has sufficient personnel to meet its operational needs. For their part, ultra-Orthodox leaders have openly questioned their decades-long partnership with Netanyahu in recent months. In May, Rabbi Dov Lando, the influential spiritual leader of Degel HaTorah—one of the two factions that make up UTJ—publicly declared that “we no longer have trust in Netanyahu,” adding that the party was no longer politically “committed to him.” Last month, a senior Degel HaTorah official told Israeli newspaper Ma’ariv that “there is no such thing as a right-wing bloc anymore,” noting the party would open coalition negotiations with any political bloc that agrees to meet its core demands on conscription. Beyond the immediate tensions within Netanyahu’s coalition, the conscription dispute has laid bare deep ideological rifts among Israel’s ultra-Orthodox leadership over the country’s military campaigns and the role of the secular state. While most opposition parties across the political spectrum agree that ultra-Orthodox men should be required to serve, analysts say the debate also reflects starkly diverging views on Israel’s war in Gaza and broader regional military engagement. Those differences were thrown into sharp relief last month, when 96-year-old Rabbi Lando delivered an unusually harsh rebuke of the Religious Zionist movement, whose supporters have played a high-profile role in both the Gaza war and the expansion of Israeli settlements in the occupied West Bank. “They wage wars not for the sake of rescue, only for the sake of the state’s honour,” Lando said, accusing Religious Zionists of being “evil” and murderers. His comments drew widespread condemnation from across Israel’s political landscape, including from Netanyahu, who called the remarks “awful” and rejected them outright. But Lando’s statements are consistent with his long-held ideological positions. Last year, he claimed Religious Zionists had “brought physical disasters, not only spiritual ones, upon the Jewish people,” arguing that Zionist actions had left Arabs hating Jews “like never before.” Pfeuffer argues that Lando’s remarks should not be read as a direct political challenge to Netanyahu’s coalition. “Rabbi Lando is expressing an ethics-based position on the situation, not a political one, and as evidence, he never demanded leaving the government over the war,” she told MEE. Instead, she says the comments reflect a long-standing ultra-Orthodox worldview that distances the community from the Israeli state’s core military ethos. “The ultra-Orthodox don’t perceive the war as their own,” Pfeuffer said, noting that over the course of the nearly 10-month conflict, “life continued fairly normally” in ultra-Orthodox communities across Israel and the occupied West Bank. Even without immediate political fallout, Pfeuffer says Lando’s intervention is significant because it offers a clear alternative to the dominant Israeli narrative surrounding the war. “It represents moderation and restraint, which stems from a perception that our place in this land is not guaranteed and that we need to live alongside our enemies,” she explained. Tzoreff echoes that analysis, noting that Lando’s comments stem from a deeply held theological position rather than a tactical political move. “If you send someone to kill in the name of the honour of the state, you’re actually elevating the theological status of the state at the expense of Torah study,” he said. “This isn’t just a random statement. It was released to the media, and even if it doesn’t currently have broad public traction, its purpose was to build support for this position over time.” Even so, Lando’s anti-war, anti-conscription position sits uneasily with a broader shift toward the right among parts of Israel’s ultra-Orthodox electorate. According to Pfeuffer, far-right National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir has made significant inroads among traditional Shas and UTJ voters, complicating the political calculations of ultra-Orthodox party leaders. “Part of Shas’s constituency aren’t classic Shas voters—they could vote for Ben Gvir or Likud, because they don’t live strictly ultra-Orthodox lives. Therefore, Shas needs to show that it is part of the right-wing bloc and aligned with Netanyahu,” she explained. While Pfeuffer notes that Shas remains far more committed to Netanyahu’s coalition than UTJ, Tzoreff says the party has steadily drifted toward the far right since the 2013 death of its founding spiritual leader, Rabbi Ovadia Yosef. Shas, he says, has “undergone a process of Ben Gvirization,” as hardline religious figures such as the late Rabbi Meir Mazuz have gained increasing influence over the party’s policy and ideological direction. “Rabbi Ovadia was a bulwark against moving rightward,” Tzoreff explained. “Since the revered spiritual leader’s death, Shas has been struggling to set clear red lines. The party’s leadership, similar to other parties, doesn’t act to lead public opinion, but acts to please it.” Tzoreff says this rightward shift extends beyond Shas, pointing to increasingly close ties between ultra-Orthodox communities and Israel’s settler movement, as well as the growing adoption of nationalist rhetoric within many ultra-Orthodox communities. He also notes the strengthening of links between settlers and ultra-Orthodox communities in the occupied West Bank, alongside the growing acceptance of the idea that Torah study itself contributes to Israel’s national security. “But on the other hand, there’s a strong movement against military conscription,” he added. For Israel’s opposition parties, Tzoreff argues, this internal contradiction within the ultra-Orthodox community creates a unique political opening. “The role of the centre-left is to divide and conquer within the right-wing bloc,” he said. Rather than automatically ruling out cooperation with ultra-Orthodox parties, he says Netanyahu’s opponents should pursue pragmatic engagement with the group. “They need to consider partnership with the UTJ and Shas not out of idealization of the ultra-Orthodox, but because there is a political opening that can be exploited,” he added.

  • Why Israel’s opposition no longer wants Palestinian parties in government

    Why Israel’s opposition no longer wants Palestinian parties in government

    As Israel prepares for its pivotal national election on October 27, a striking political shift is reshaping the country’s opposition landscape, with almost all anti-Netanyahu leaders moving to rule out power-sharing coalitions with Palestinian Arab parties – a reversal of the historic 2021 power-sharing arrangement that ended Benjamin Netanyahu’s 12-year tenure in office.

    Gadi Eisenkot, a retired Israeli general and leader of the Yashar party who has emerged as a key contender for prime minister, was the latest opposition figure to formalize this stance during a recent security conference hosted by Israeli outlet Yedioth Ahronoth and the Institute for National Security Studies. He announced his goal of forming a self-described “Zionist majority” government holding 63 to 64 parliamentary seats. If he cannot secure this threshold, he said he would pressure ultra-Orthodox parties to join his bloc, and would call for fresh elections rather than turn to Palestinian Arab parties for support.

    Eisenkot’s position reflects a broader trend across the anti-Netanyahu camp. Former prime minister Yair Lapid and former alternate prime minister Naftali Bennett, who jointly partnered with the United Arab List (Ra’am) – a Palestinian Arab party – to oust Netanyahu in 2021 and defended that partnership as a necessary political experiment at the time, now echo Eisenkot’s refusal to collaborate with Palestinian Arab factions. This shift comes despite repeated public statements from Ra’am leader Mansour Abbas affirming his willingness to negotiate with any Jewish-majority bloc seeking to replace Netanyahu.

    Political analysts trace this sharp reversal directly to the post-7 October 2023 security and political context that has transformed Israeli public opinion. Following the Hamas-led attacks, cooperation with Palestinian Arab parties has been framed by right-wing factions as a compromise on both national security and the Jewish identity of the Israeli state. This framing has made any outreach politically toxic for opposition parties, even centrist blocs that previously supported inclusion. Data from the December 2025 Israel Democracy Institute Democracy Index underscores this shift: 71.5% of Jewish Israelis now oppose including Palestinian Arab parties in any governing coalition, and a separate 2025 Institute for National Security Studies survey found 57% of all Israelis reject the creation of a Palestinian state under any circumstances, reflecting a broad hardening of public sentiment.

    Palestinian political analyst Ehab Jabareen argues that Netanyahu and his right-wing bloc spent years weaponizing the question of collaboration with Palestinian Arab parties, successfully framing any cooperation as politically illegitimate. “Today, the political cost of being seen as close to Palestinian Arab parties has become very high,” Jabareen explained to Middle East Eye. While he notes that some opposition blocs may still quietly leave open the option of partnering with Palestinian Arab parties if parliamentary math leaves no other path to power, few are willing to state this publicly during the campaign: “They keep the back door open, but the front door is locked.”

    This new political landscape has forced Palestinian Arab parties – which represent the roughly 2 million Palestinian citizens of Israel, who make up 21% of the country’s total population – to rethink their electoral strategies. The community are descendants of Palestinians who remained on their land after the 1948 Nakba, when Zionist militias displaced an estimated 750,000 Palestinians to establish the state of Israel. After decades of systemic discrimination, Palestinian citizens formed political parties to advocate for civil equality, an end to the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories, and recognition of Palestinian national rights. For decades, these parties remained on the margins of Israeli politics, as collaboration with governing coalitions was viewed as toxic by both most Jewish voters and many Palestinian citizens. That taboo was only broken in 2021, when Ra’am’s four seats provided the critical margin for Bennett and Lapid to form their narrow majority.

    Now that the taboo has reasserted itself, Ra’am’s Abbas has adopted a bold new approach to expand the party’s influence: Israeli media has confirmed that the party has reached a preliminary agreement to add former Yesh Atid lawmaker Yoav Segalovich, a Jewish politician, to its electoral list. A recent Channel 13 poll projects this move could boost Ra’am’s seat count from the currently projected five to an unprecedented seven seats.

    Jabareen argues that Abbas’ strategy is targeted at three distinct audiences. For Palestinian Arab voters, he positions himself as the only leader pursuing pragmatic, achievable political progress. For the fragmented anti-Netanyahu camp, he leaves open a pathway to secure his party’s support if they cannot form a majority without it. And for the Israeli political establishment, he signals that Ra’am remains a reliable, institutional negotiating partner. But the strategy carries clear risks: “He is signalling a willingness to negotiate with a side that publicly says it has no interest in negotiating with him,” Jabareen notes. “That creates an image of weakness because the balance of power is not in his favour.”

    Other Palestinian party leaders reject the framing that Palestinian Arab factions should prioritize joining governing coalitions. Aida Touma-Sliman, a Knesset member from the Palestinian-led party Hadash, argues that the refusal of Jewish opposition parties to collaborate with Palestinian factions is not just about electoral calculations – it reflects deep-rooted ideological bias. “The leaders of these parties know the Israeli public does not want any partnership with Palestinian Arab parties after years of incitement,” she said. “They lack the courage to present a genuine alternative to the current government’s policies. In reality, they also hold Zionist and discriminatory positions.”

    Touma-Sliman emphasized that Palestinian Arab representation in the Knesset has never been solely focused on joining ruling coalitions. Instead, it serves as a platform for political struggle: to represent Palestinian citizens, expose discriminatory government policies, and defend the community’s collective rights. Even as parliament becomes an increasingly hostile space, she argues that abandoning it would only erase Palestinian political influence at a critical moment: “our political weight is needed to confront fascism, even if that only means preventing the formation of another far-right government.”

    For Jabareen, the core challenge facing Palestinian Arab parties extends far beyond the current election cycle or coalition negotiations. After years of centering campaigns around the question of which bloc they might support to form a government, he argues it is time for a fundamental reset, amid a dramatically shifted Israeli political landscape. “The important question is no longer who will invite us into a coalition,” he said. “The real question is how we rebuild Palestinian political power inside Israel over the next decade in a way that makes ignoring us politically costly.”

    Current polling puts the Eisenkot-led anti-Netanyahu bloc and Netanyahu’s right-wing bloc in a dead heat. Some surveys suggest Eisenkot could secure a majority without support from Palestinian Arab parties, while others indicate neither bloc will be able to reach the required threshold without backing from Palestinian factions, leaving the final outcome of the October 27 election still deeply uncertain.