Global Pulse

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  • Israel killing Palestinian children in the West Bank at highest rate since 1967, B’Tselem says

    Israel killing Palestinian children in the West Bank at highest rate since 1967, B’Tselem says

    In a damning new report released Monday, leading Israeli human rights organization B’Tselem has exposed an unprecedented crisis of civilian harm in the occupied West Bank, documenting that Israeli forces are killing Palestinian children at a rate not seen since Israel’s 1967 occupation of the territory began. The group’s figures show 54 Palestinian children have been shot dead by Israeli forces in the West Bank in 2025 alone, with minors accounting for nearly one in every four Palestinians killed by Israeli troops in the territory since October 2023 – the highest share of child fatalities recorded in 58 years of occupation.

    Crucially, B’Tselem emphasizes that these child deaths are not accidental or rogue violations of military protocol. Instead, the organization attributes the soaring fatalities to a deliberate Israeli state policy that enforces loose rules of engagement, broadly labels Palestinian people as “terrorists” to justify lethal force, and systematically shields soldiers from legal consequences for unlawful killings. As of the report’s release, no Israeli service members have faced indictment or any form of accountability for child killings in the West Bank carried out since October 2023.

    “The widespread, unprecedented killing of Palestinian children and teenagers in the West Bank is the result of a broader Israeli policy that enables the killing of Palestinians with virtually no accountability,” stated Yuli Novak, Executive Director of B’Tselem. Novak pointed to recent public comments from Israel’s top military commander for the West Bank that confirm this institutional pattern: when commander Avi Bluth openly boasted that Israeli forces are killing Palestinians “like we haven’t killed since 1967”, he inadvertently confirmed that the Israeli system not only backs troops who use lethal force, but grants them effective license to kill.

    Bluth, a West Bank settler who has led Israeli military operations in the territory since 2024, made the remarks during a closed-door forum earlier this year. In those comments, he explicitly defended the relaxed rules of engagement that allow troops to open fire on unarmed Palestinians, and acknowledged a stark discriminatory double standard: Jewish Israeli civilians who engage in stone-throwing are never targeted with lethal force, while Palestinians who carry out the same action are shot. Bluth also framed the escalating killing campaign as a deterrence strategy, claiming that the high death toll has prevented a new mass uprising, noting “the Arabs understand that ‘if someone rises to kill you, kill him first’ is part of the rules of the Middle East, and therefore we are killing like we have not killed since 1967.”

    Beyond the permissive rules of engagement and discriminatory targeting, B’Tselem documented additional contributing factors to the child death toll. In nearly 25 percent of the cases the organization investigated, Israeli forces deliberately delayed or denied access for medical teams to reach wounded children, directly worsening fatality outcomes. Israeli authorities have also seized the bodies of dozens of Palestinians killed in operations, and as of the report, 18 of the children killed in 2025 remain withheld from their families for burial.

    Official United Nations data aligns with the scope of the crisis outlined by B’Tselem: the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) confirms that Israeli forces have killed 1,105 Palestinians across the occupied West Bank and East Jerusalem since October 7, 2023, a count that includes at least 242 children.

    B’Tselem also draws a direct connection between the escalating killings in the West Bank and the ongoing Israeli military campaign in Gaza, where Israel has been accused of genocide that has disproportionately targeted children. The organization notes that more than 21,000 Palestinian children have been killed in Gaza to date, and argues that the international community’s failure to hold Israel accountable for mass casualties in Gaza has directly encouraged the expansion of the same lethal policy into the West Bank.

    “By allowing Israel to kill on such a scale in Gaza without consequences, the international community has effectively given it a green light to pursue the same lethal policy in the West Bank,” the report reads. “As long as Israel continues to enjoy near-total impunity in the world, the lives of Palestinians – including children – will remain unprotected and exposed.”

  • How Andy Burnham can win back the Muslim voters Labour has lost

    How Andy Burnham can win back the Muslim voters Labour has lost

    Following a devastating collapse in support for Keir Starmer’s Labour Party triggered by last month’s local elections, Andy Burnham is poised to enter Downing Street without a contested leadership race, after widespread rallying by Labour parliamentarians who see him as the only figure capable of reversing the party’s electoral hemorrhaging.

    Starmer’s strategic approach, crafted over his tenure by former chief of staff Morgan McSweeney, centered on courting right-leaning voters who might otherwise back the Conservatives or Reform UK. The strategy operated under the flawed assumption that traditional left-wing and British Muslim voters had no alternative political home and would remain loyal to Labour regardless of the party’s direction. That calculation backfired spectacularly, sparking a mass exodus of core Labour supporters and fueling the explosive growth of the Green Party over the past 12 months.

    The long-held orthodoxy that Reform posed the greatest threat to Labour was shattered in last month’s local votes, which ultimately led to Starmer’s resignation: data confirmed Labour lost far more votes to the Greens than to Reform. The shift has been especially dramatic among British Muslim voters, who once formed a reliably loyal Labour bloc. In 2019, more than 80% of Muslim voters backed Labour, but new polling from heavily Muslim-populated constituencies puts that number at just 33% today. Many have shifted their support to the Greens or independent candidates, a trend that directly impacted the 2024 general election results: four Labour MPs, including former cabinet-hopeful Jonathan Ashworth of Leicester South, lost their seats to independent challengers, while senior figures including current Home Secretary Shabana Mahmood and former Health Secretary Wes Streeting only held their seats by razor-thin margins.

    Contrary to the popular narrative that British Muslim voters hold unique, sectarian policy priorities, data shows their concerns align closely with other traditional left-wing Labour voters who have abandoned the party. Cost of living topped the list of issues for Muslim voters in the 2025 local elections, followed by widespread opposition to Britain’s foreign policy on Israel and Gaza. This alignment is not an isolated trend: a recent study found that more than half of former Labour voters who now plan to back other centre-left parties cite Israel’s military campaign in Gaza as a core factor in their decision to leave the party.

    There are clear signs Burnham is already aware of the urgent need to repair Labour’s fractured relationship with Muslim and left-wing voters. Ali Milani, chair of the Labour Muslim Network (LMN), has been a close ally of Burnham for years and played a key role in his successful campaign to win the Makerfield parliamentary seat earlier this month. Milani, who rose to national prominence after challenging Boris Johnson in the 2019 Uxbridge and South Ruislip by-election, warned early in 2024 that Starmer’s unwavering support for Israel’s actions in Gaza would destroy Labour’s standing with Muslim voters.

    While LMN is not formally affiliated to the Labour Party, it maintains deep connections within the party and draws heavy attendance from Labour MPs at its events. A 2025 LMN poll of Muslim Labour elected officials found that 82% believed Starmer had handled the Gaza war badly, two-thirds said Muslim representatives did not receive equal treatment within the party, and 64% agreed the party operated a “hierarchy of racism” that sidelined Muslim voices.

    A recent revelation that Burnham has asked James Purnell, a former Blair and Brown era minister and one-time chair of Labour Friends of Israel, to serve as his chief of staff has sparked speculation about the incoming prime minister’s policy direction, with Muslim and left-wing groups calling for a clean break from Starmer’s legacy.

    Samayya Afzal, vice chair of LMN, laid out the scale of the challenge in an interview with Middle East Eye, acknowledging the decades-long relationship between Labour and British Muslim communities had been pushed past the breaking point. “The Labour Party has lost the trust of Muslim communities and voters,” Afzal said. “From the scale of Islamophobia within our own party and its prevalence in wider society, to our approach to the genocide in Gaza, we have seen a historic relationship between British Muslims and the Labour Party driven well past the point of crisis.”

    Still, Afzal framed Burnham’s leadership as a rare opportunity to reset the fractured relationship. “With a real commitment to truly engage with the breadth of our Muslim communities, ending the factional and unfair treatment of Muslim representatives, and taking seriously the concerns around the genocide in Gaza, Sudan and ongoing situation in Kashmir, we may be able to begin to rebuild relationships with Muslim voters,” she added.

    Other Muslim advocacy organizations echoed the call for sweeping change on both domestic and foreign policy. Mustafa al-Dabbagh, assistant secretary general of the Muslim Council of Britain, emphasized that British Muslim voters demand to be treated as equal partners, not spoken through third-party gatekeepers. “Any incoming prime minister must also reckon honestly with the deep anger felt over the genocide in Gaza and our government’s response to it,” al-Dabbagh said. “They must not only fix our broken public services, ensure a better NHS and education, and tackle this cost-of-living crisis, but bring people and communities together.”

    Abubakr Nanabawa, a spokesperson for The Muslim Vote (TMV), a campaign group that backed independent challenges to pro-Starmer Labour candidates in 2024, said any meaningful trust-building requires a total rejection of Starmer’s policy approach. “If Andy Burnham wants to win back the trust of voters, he needs a clear break with the legacy of Keir Starmer,” Nanabawa said. “In the short term that means a complete arms embargo on Israel and sanctions on all trade with the West Bank. He also needs to put ordinary Britons first and that means delivering a bold economic agenda that deals with the cost-of-living crisis. The strategy is simple: stop supporting genocide and make life affordable for everyone.”

    Early hints of a potential policy shift have already emerged from the UK Foreign Office. Current Foreign Secretary Yvette Cooper recently acknowledged the need for stronger action on Israel-Palestine, with Whitehall sources confirming the Foreign Office has long pushed for tougher measures against Israel, only to be blocked by Downing Street under Starmer. Privately, Foreign Office ministers have accepted that banning goods from illegal Israeli settlements is consistent with Britain’s official position on the occupied territories.

    It remains unclear who Burnham will appoint to the critical foreign secretary role. Some speculate Cooper could retain her post, while others point to Wes Streeting, who ruled out a leadership challenge and is widely expected to receive a senior cabinet role. Streeting, who narrowly held his Ilford North seat in 2024 against a challenge from British Palestinian independent candidate Leanne Mohammed, has privately pushed Starmer for a harder line on Israel and publicly accused Starmer of ignoring evidence of Israeli war crimes, making a significant policy shift likely if he takes the foreign secretary post. Even a formal acknowledgment that Israel has committed war crimes – a step no UK government has taken to date – would mark a major break from Starmer’s approach.

    Other potential candidates for the role include Emily Thornberry, chair of the parliamentary foreign affairs select committee and former shadow foreign secretary under Jeremy Corbyn, who has emerged as a leading internal voice calling for stronger action against illegal settlements in the West Bank. Burnham is also widely expected to consider appointing progressive, pro-ceasefire MPs to senior roles, including Abtisam Mohamed, the 2024 elected Sheffield Central MP and Britain’s first Yemeni-origin MP who sits on the Foreign Affairs Committee, as well as the eight backbench MPs who resigned their shadow ministerial posts in 2023 to vote for a Gaza ceasefire. That group includes high-profile figures such as Naz Shah, Andy Slaughter and Sarah Owen, all of whom retain strong credibility with Muslim and left-wing voters.

    Despite some media speculation that Burnham will avoid major foreign policy changes, advocacy leaders argue a significant course correction is non-negotiable. Chris Doyle, director of the Council for Arab-British Understanding (Caabu), noted Burnham has long supported the organization and traveled to the occupied West Bank with Caabu and Labour Friends of Palestine in 2012. “Burnham will need to make a really significant course correction on Middle East foreign policy,” Doyle said, adding that the incoming prime minister will need to resist pressure from the U.S. Trump administration and avoid caving to demands for continued unwavering support for Israel.

    Caabu and the British Palestine Project have laid out five core policy pledges they are calling on Burnham to adopt: banning all UK trade with goods and services from illegal Israeli settlements, upholding international law, guaranteeing unrestricted access for UN and humanitarian agencies, opening the occupied territories to international journalists and investigators, and working with allies to end unlawful regional occupations. The call for a full ban on settlement goods has broad backing within the parliamentary Labour Party, with recent polling showing 87% of rank-and-file Labour members support the ban, compared to just 6% who oppose it.

    Rohan Talbot, director of advocacy and campaigns at Medical Aid for Palestinians, laid out clear expectations for the new prime minister: “The next prime minister must do what Starmer would not to end these horrors: stop providing arms to Israel, stop trading with illegal settlements in the West Bank, guarantee unrestricted humanitarian access, and ensure that those responsible for crimes against humanity are held fully accountable.”

    Liverpool Labour MP Kim Johnson, one of the most prominent progressive voices within the party, emphasized that Gaza is not a peripheral issue but a core test of Labour’s values and credibility. “If Andy wants to win back traditional Labour voters, especially those who feel abandoned on foreign policy, he has to show the moral clarity [Starmer] has too often lacked on Gaza,” Johnson said. “He needs to be prepared to say clearly what Starmer would not: that a genocide is ongoing and that Labour’s refusal to speak honestly and act decisively about it has come at a huge political cost.”

    Recapping the damage of Starmer’s approach in last month’s local elections, Johnson noted: “We lost 58 percent of the seats we were defending in England and lost almost four times as many voters to the Greens than to Reform UK. We cannot deny that Gaza is a major reason many have walked. Foreign policy isn’t a side issue. It’s about values, credibility and whose side you are on when it matters.”

    For Burnham, the path to holding power and reuniting the Labour movement will depend entirely on whether he is willing to make the bold breaks from Starmer’s legacy that disaffected voters are demanding.

  • Lebanon-Israel deal could block war crimes accountability, experts warn

    Lebanon-Israel deal could block war crimes accountability, experts warn

    A US-mediated framework accord reached between Lebanon and Israel late last month has ignited fierce domestic and international backlash over a hidden provision that critics argue could permanently block Lebanese efforts to hold Israel accountable for alleged war crimes committed since the start of its 2024 military campaign. Signed on June 26 in Washington D.C. by the U.S., Lebanon, and Israel, the 14-point trilateral deal’s Article 13 requires both signatory nations to commit to “good faith measures demonstrating positive intent”, which explicitly includes halting all hostile or adversarial actions in international political or legal bodies. For Lebanese legal and human rights advocates, this wording amounts to a blanket ban on pursuing justice for thousands of civilian casualties documented over the past eight months of conflict.

    Halima Kaakour, a Lebanese member of parliament, international law scholar, and prominent human rights activist, was among the first to condemn the provision. Speaking to Middle East Eye, Kaakour emphasized that decades of documented Israeli violations against Lebanese civilians have cemented the inherent legal right of the Lebanese state and public to demand full reparations for harms suffered. “This clause strips that right away and robs the Lebanese people of the justice they are owed,” she said. “The right to justice cannot be traded away for any political deal, no matter how important it is framed to be.” Kaakour further noted that the provision exposes a calculated political bargain by Lebanon’s ruling authorities: the government has agreed to abandon international legal action in exchange for a promised Israeli withdrawal from occupied Lebanese territory, a withdrawal that is already Lebanon’s legal right under existing UN resolutions, and should never have been conditional on surrendering justice.

    Since October 2023, Israel’s military campaign in Lebanon has been linked to widespread accusations of war crimes, including the forced displacement of over 1 million Lebanese civilians and the deliberate targeting of civilian infrastructure and non-combatants. Official figures put the total Lebanese death toll from Israeli strikes at more than 8,000 people since the conflict began. A sharp escalation in hostilities that followed Israel’s March 2024 strike on Iran has pushed the four-month death toll alone above 4,200, including more than 300 medical and rescue workers and 11 professional journalists.

    Farouk al-Moghrabi, a former senior legal advisor to the Lebanese government, echoed Kaakour’s criticism, arguing the deal represents a deliberate attempt to override longstanding international legal frameworks designed to protect victims’ rights and guarantee accountability for mass atrocities. “This right to justice belongs exclusively to the Lebanese people and the individual victims of these crimes,” al-Moghrabi told Middle East Eye. “Not even the Lebanese state, nor any authority signing this agreement, has the legal power to eliminate this inalienable right.” He added that the provision is fundamentally unconstitutional under Lebanese law, which explicitly enshrines that valid international treaties take precedence over domestic legislation, meaning no domestic political deal can erase the rights granted to victims under international human rights law. Al-Moghrabi also raised urgent questions about the upcoming planned visit of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights to Lebanon, which is intended to document war crimes on the ground, asking whether the terms of the agreement would force Lebanon to block the UN’s investigation.

    Lebanon’s National Human Rights Commission released an official statement backing these criticisms, stressing that no sovereign agreement can supersede the fundamental right of victims to pursue legal redress. “The commission underlines that prosecuting perpetrators of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and torture does not qualify as a hostile act or partisan political position,” the statement read. “It is simply the legitimate exercise of the core human right to justice.” Middle East Eye attempted to contact Lebanon’s presidency for an official response to these criticisms but received no reply before the publication of its original report.

    A key complicating factor in this debate is that neither Lebanon nor Israel are member states of the International Criminal Court (ICC), meaning the court currently holds no formal jurisdiction over crimes committed on Lebanese territory. For decades, regional human rights organizations have pressured the Lebanese government to grant the ICC jurisdiction over its territory, a move that would open the door to formal investigations of alleged war crimes committed by all parties to the conflict. For the ICC to gain jurisdiction over crimes committed during the current conflict, either nation would need to ratify the Rome Statute, the court’s founding international treaty, or Lebanon could submit a special declaration under Article 12(3) of the statute that grants the court temporary jurisdiction over crimes committed on its soil. This exact mechanism was used by Ukraine in 2014 after Russia’s invasion of Crimea, when Ukraine was not yet an ICC member.

    Lebanese civil society groups have pushed for exactly this step since October 2023, after the outbreak of the latest conflict. In April 2024, the Lebanese government came close to meeting their demands: the Council of Ministers formally instructed the country’s foreign minister to submit the Article 12(3) declaration, granting the ICC jurisdiction over all crimes committed on Lebanese territory starting October 7, 2023. The move came after Israeli forces killed Reuters journalist Issam Abdallah and independent investigators confirmed Israel had illegally used white phosphorus against civilian populations. Just one month later, however, the government reversed its decision without any public explanation, and the declaration was never filed. Unconfirmed reporting from Middle East Eye indicates the reversal stemmed from fears the ICC would also open investigations into military actions carried out by Lebanese armed groups against Israel.

    The June 26 framework deal, which capped five rounds of direct talks brokered by the U.S. starting in April, includes a pilot program that would allow Lebanese military forces to take control of two small areas currently occupied by Israel, as well as a vague process aimed at the disarmament of Hezbollah. Critically, the agreement sets no clear timeline or conditions for Israel to withdraw from the much larger swathes of Lebanese territory it currently occupies, instead tying any full withdrawal to progress on Hezbollah disarmament and unspecified “security improvements” that eliminate threats to Israel.

    Hezbollah, the dominant Lebanese armed and political movement, has long maintained it will only agree to disarm if Israel fully withdraws from all occupied Lebanese territory and ends all threats to Lebanese sovereignty. Hezbollah Secretary-General Naim Qassem has already rejected the framework deal outright, calling it “null and void” and demanding an unconditional Israeli withdrawal with no concessions required.

    For Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, the deal represents a major diplomatic win. Netanyahu confirmed that the agreement permits Israeli forces to remain in occupied southern Lebanon indefinitely if Hezbollah refuses to disarm, and framed the accord as a significant geopolitical defeat for Iran, which provides political and military support to Hezbollah. “Iran is trying to force us out of southern Lebanon through violence,” Netanyahu said. “In this agreement, Israel, Lebanon, and the United States are collectively telling Iran: this conflict is no business of yours.”

    The United States, which served as the broker and third signatory to the deal, hailed the agreement as a historic breakthrough. U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio called the signing “the beginning of the beginning” of a long-term peace process between the two long-adversarial nations.

  • ‘Calmly resilient’: Injury-hit New Zealand guts out a rare test series win in England

    ‘Calmly resilient’: Injury-hit New Zealand guts out a rare test series win in England

    When the final test of New Zealand’s 2024 series against England kicked off at Nottingham’s Trent Bridge, few pundits gave the understaffed Kiwi side a chance. The Black Caps entered the series decider missing virtually all of their standout match-winners: top wicket-takers Matt Henry and Kyle Kyle Jamieson, first-innings century-maker Glenn Phillips, and franchise totem Kane Williamson – the team’s all-time leading run-scorer – who had pulled out of the clash while the camp was based in London. Adding to the pressure, New Zealand had not secured a test win on Trent Bridge soil in four decades, and had fallen to a humbling defeat against England just days earlier in the series. On the opposite side, England entered the match at full strength, retaining fast bowler Jofra Archer over Ollie Robinson – the star of England’s opening series victory at Lord’s – to lead their attack.

    Against all pre-match predictions, and despite even more injury setbacks unfolding during play, New Zealand walked away with a dominant 160-run win just after lunch on the fifth day, sealing a 2-1 series victory. This historic result marks only the fourth time New Zealand has claimed a test series win on English soil in 95 years of touring the country.

    The story of this win is one of relentless team resilience and depth, starting on the opening day amid a British heatwave. Long written off for their poor run of form leading into the match, opening pair Tom Latham and Devon Conway defied expectations to put on a 317-run opening stand that set the foundation for New Zealand’s total. Early in the match, enforced change Blair Tickner – one of the uncapped replacements brought in to cover the absentees – was forced out with concussion after being hit by a high bouncer, forcing 26-year-old allrounder Zac Foulkes into only his sixth test match. Foulkes stepped up immediately, claiming three key wickets on day three to help New Zealand secure an 84-run first-innings lead.

    A middle-order collapse that left New Zealand at 51-3 threatened to derail their progress, but 24-year-old rising star Rachin Ravindra steadied the innings, partnering with Daryl Mitchell to calm the dressing room and rebuild the total. Ravindra fell just six runs short of a century on the fourth morning, but Mitchell held firm, absorbing 13 blows to his body and gloves en route to his fourth career test century against England. The massive first-innings total left New Zealand with a 372-run lead heading into England’s second innings, putting the hosts under unrelenting pressure.

    More injury trouble hit New Zealand on the final morning: senior seamer Will O’Rourke, who had already been playing through a split fingertip, pulled his left hamstring and was forced to leave the field, leaving a second-string attack to finish the job with England on 133-6. The ragtag group of replacements – Nathan Smith, Foulkes, travelling reserve Ben Sears, and part-time spinner Mitchell Santner, backed up by wicketkeeper Tom Blundell’s sharp work behind the stumps – rose to the challenge, wrapping up England’s innings shortly after lunch to secure the win.

    The stunning result arrived alongside the sudden announcement of England captain Ben Stokes’ retirement from international test cricket, capping a dramatic final day of the series. Brendon McCullum, England’s head coach and former New Zealand captain, acknowledged the gulf in performance after the match, simply saying “We were outclassed.”

    This win extends New Zealand’s outstanding recent away form: the Black Caps have now claimed eight wins from their last nine test matches played outside of New Zealand. Latham, New Zealand’s stand-in captain for the series, made history as the first skipper in the 21st century to lead test series wins in both India and England in the same cycle.

    “Probably the most pleasing thing — different guys who have put their hands up at different times,” Latham told reporters after the win. Nathan Smith, who entered the series as the fourth-choice seamer in the Kiwi squad, finished the match with six wickets and ended the tournament as the series’ leading wicket-taker with 16, earning him player of the series honors. Daryl Mitchell, whose unbeaten century and five catches anchored New Zealand’s second innings, was named player of the match.

    “To come here and do it in a style that’s true to us as Black Caps and as Kiwis is something we’re really proud of. It’s going to be a cool one to reflect on,” Mitchell said. “We’re a small country down the bottom of the Earth and it’s something that I guess we pride ourselves on is that we just get stuck into whatever’s needed to be done and try and get the job done. Sometimes it’s been pretty and sometimes it’s getting dirty and doing the little things really well.”

    Former New Zealand captain Jeremy Coney, who led the first Kiwi side to win an English test series back in 1986, praised the current side’s unique team culture. “(This is a) different side than we had. But calmly resilient,” Coney told the BBC. “They play for each other. They care about each other. They’ve grown up together. If someone doesn’t have a good day, someone else fills the gap.”

  • Wall Street’s got China’s currency ambitions all wrong

    Wall Street’s got China’s currency ambitions all wrong

    For nearly 20 years, Wall Street has operated under a pervasive, yet fundamentally flawed assumption about China’s long-term financial ambitions. The consensus held that Beijing ultimately sought the same global financial status as Washington: control of the world’s primary reserve currency, the deepest and most liquid capital markets on the planet, and the unmatched geopolitical leverage that comes with systemic financial dominance.

    Today, that long-held consensus is looking increasingly misaligned with Beijing’s actual policy choices — and if the assumption is indeed wrong, global investors are likely underestimating one of the most consequential structural shifts unfolding in international finance right now.

    Signs of this revised strategy were clearly on display at this month’s Lujiazui Forum in Shanghai, an annual gathering widely viewed as China’s equivalent of the Davos World Economic Forum, where top policymakers and financial leaders gather to outline official priorities. At the event, senior Chinese officials unveiled a new suite of policy measures aimed at expanding offshore renminbi markets, strengthening cross-border financing infrastructure, boosting international participation in China’s domestic capital markets, and solidifying Shanghai’s positioning as a leading global financial hub.

    Key initiatives announced included a new renminbi repurchase facility open to foreign central banks and sovereign wealth institutions, expanded offshore renminbi trading frameworks, and additional programs to deepen cross-border liquidity and payment settlement channels. Most global investors interpreted the announcements through the same lens they have used for decades: as just another incremental step in China’s long-stalled push to fully internationalize the renminbi. The market reaction was muted, with the announcements dismissed as incremental progress on a familiar goal. But this reading may turn out to be a critical misjudgment.

    What many observers are missing is that China is no longer seeking to displace the U.S.-led global financial system. Instead, its core goal is to eliminate its exclusive dependence on that system. These two objectives could not be more different. One requires an all-out push to unseat the dollar as the world’s leading reserve currency. The other focuses on reducing the strategic vulnerability that comes with operating entirely within a dollar-dominated global financial order.

    This distinction carries far-reaching implications for nearly every dimension of global finance: from geopolitical power dynamics and cross-border capital flows to sanctions risk management, global reserve diversification, and the long-term pricing of all classes of international financial assets.

    For decades, mainstream discussion of China’s financial ambitions has revolved around a single question: Can the renminbi ever replace the dollar? The data to date strongly suggests that answer remains no, at least for the foreseeable future. The U.S. dollar still makes up roughly 58% of global foreign exchange reserves, compared to just 2% for the renminbi. It is also involved in nearly 90% of all global foreign exchange transactions. U.S. capital markets remain unrivaled in their size, depth of liquidity, strong institutional frameworks, and broad global investor confidence. By every traditional metric, dollar dominance remains firmly intact.

    But Beijing’s recent policy moves make clear that displacing the dollar may no longer be its goal. Instead, China is pursuing a far more achievable, and ultimately more market-shifting, objective: building a self-controlled financial ecosystem that can operate alongside the existing dollar-based system, rather than being entirely contained within it.

    Crucially, this new ecosystem does not need to replace the dollar to succeed. A useful analogy is not found in 20th century monetary history, but rather in the development of China’s digital economy. For years, Western analysts assumed China’s internet sector would eventually converge with the global open internet. Instead, Beijing built a separate, self-governing domestic ecosystem, developing its own homegrown search engines, mobile payment platforms, social media networks, cloud infrastructure providers, e-commerce giants, and independent regulatory frameworks. China never replaced the global internet — it just built a parallel system that it fully controls. Increasingly, the same logic is shaping China’s modern financial strategy.

    Over the past two decades, China has quietly assembled almost all the core components required for a parallel global financial architecture. Beijing has negotiated dozens of offshore renminbi clearing agreements and more than 40 bilateral currency swap deals with central banks around the world. It developed the Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS), which processed more than 175 trillion yuan ($24.5 trillion) in transactions in 2025, marking a 43% year-over-year increase. Today, more than 1,700 direct and indirect participants from nearly 190 countries and territories use the system.

    China has also rapidly expanded cross-border renminbi settlement, advanced central bank digital currency pilot programs, and gradually opened targeted segments of its domestic capital markets to foreign investors. Meanwhile, China’s banking sector, with total assets exceeding $60 trillion, is now the largest national banking system in the world.

    None of these individual developments threaten dollar dominance on their own — and they do not need to. Taken together, however, they achieve a fundamentally different strategic goal: they reduce China’s reliance on U.S.-controlled financial infrastructure, and create alternative channels for global trade, financing, liquidity provision, and investment in the event that geopolitical tensions escalate sharply.

    In effect, China is building a parallel financial architecture. But unlike all previous challengers to dollar hegemony, Beijing does not seem to believe this system must replace the existing order to meet its core strategic needs.

    This priority has grown far more urgent in recent years. Chinese policymakers have carefully studied the impact of Western sanctions on Iran, the financial restrictions imposed on Russia after the 2014 annexation of Crimea, and most notably, the freezing of more than $300 billion in Russian sovereign foreign exchange reserves following the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Regardless of one’s perspective on these policy decisions, they made one reality undeniable: U.S. and Western financial power carries extraordinary global reach, and core components of the existing global financial system — reserve assets, payment networks, and clearing infrastructure — are no longer politically neutral.

    From Beijing’s vantage point, excessive financial dependence on the West has become an unacceptable strategic vulnerability. For global investors, this shift signals that China is preparing for a future in which financial fragmentation, elevated sanctions risk, and persistent great power competition become permanent, structural features of global markets, rather than temporary disruptions.

    This framework helps resolve the apparent contradiction that has long confused Western investors about China’s financial reforms. On one hand, Beijing actively courts greater international participation in its domestic capital markets. On the other, it refuses to cede control over capital flows, exchange rate policy, and critical financial infrastructure. The reality is that China may never have been pursuing traditional Western-style financial liberalization at all. Instead, it is prioritizing financial resilience — and for Beijing, resilience is a far more important goal than global financial dominance.

    So while global investors continue to debate whether the renminbi will eventually displace the dollar as the world’s top reserve currency, Beijing is asking a very different question: Can China maintain stable trade financing, provide sufficient cross-border liquidity, support its global economic partners, and sustain domestic economic stability through a prolonged period of geopolitical confrontation with the U.S.?

    These are fundamentally different objectives. China does not need to build a carbon copy of the U.S. financial system to reshape the global geopolitical balance, alter long-term global capital allocation, reduce the effectiveness of Western sanctions, and force markets to re-evaluate decades-old assumptions about financial globalization. It only needs to build a system that works well enough for its core needs when access to the U.S.-led system becomes uncertain.

    For decades, global investors have priced assets based on the assumption that financial globalization and integration would continue to expand indefinitely. Beijing increasingly appears to be betting on the opposite outcome. While Wall Street continues to debate whether China can replace the dollar, Beijing has already concluded that it does not need to.

    This analysis comes from Nigel Green, founder and chief executive officer of the deVere Group, a leading independent financial advisory firm.

  • Azerbaijan issues rare rebuke against key ally Israel over Armenian genocide recognition

    Azerbaijan issues rare rebuke against key ally Israel over Armenian genocide recognition

    In a move that has upended long-standing diplomatic ties between Israel and one of its closest regional partners, the Israeli government’s Sunday cabinet vote to formally recognize the 1915 Armenian genocide has drawn sharp public pushback from Azerbaijan, a strategic energy and military ally that has stood alongside Israel for decades.

    Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs released an official statement quickly after the Israeli announcement, framing the recognition as a matter of profound diplomatic concern. The Baku administration rejected Israel’s position as a deliberate misrepresentation of documented history, arguing that a nuanced historical debate had been reduced to a cynical political calculation. The statement emphasized that the Israeli ruling lacked any credible legal or academic foundation, branding the decision fundamentally unacceptable to Azerbaijan.

    “Steps of this nature do nothing to foster reconciliation or build cross-community understanding,” the foreign ministry statement read. “On the contrary, they widen existing divides and erode ongoing efforts to cement lasting peace and stability across the South Caucasus region.” The ministry closed its statement by calling on Israeli officials to reverse course and reconsider the controversial decision.

    The diplomatic fallout comes against a backdrop of deep, mutually beneficial ties between the two states. For years, Azerbaijan has ranked among Israel’s top crude oil suppliers, while Israel has become Baku’s primary source of advanced military hardware, a partnership that strengthened during and after the 2020 Second Nagorno-Karabakh War. Just last year, Azerbaijan leveraged its good relations with both Turkey and Israel to host reconciliation talks between the two nations, aimed at de-escalating tensions rooted in disputes over Gaza and Syria.

    Turkey, Azerbaijan’s closest strategic partner bound by a mutual defense pact under the 2021 Shusha Declaration, also quickly condemned the Israeli move. The agreement commits both nations to mutual military support if either faces foreign aggression, and both Ankara and Jerusalem backed Baku during the 2020 conflict that saw Azerbaijan retake large swathes of Nagorno-Karabakh from Armenian occupation. In its own statement Sunday, Turkey argued that Israel’s recognition was a calculated distraction from growing international legal pressure on Israeli leadership: just weeks prior, the International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and senior Israeli officials over alleged war crimes in Gaza, while Israel also faces ongoing genocide proceedings at the International Court of Justice.

    Notably, the Israeli cabinet’s recognition is not yet the official position of the Israeli state. The measure still requires passage through the Knesset, Israel’s unicameral parliament, to take full legal effect. Dunya Basol, an academic researcher specializing in Israeli political affairs, told Middle East Eye that Azerbaijan is likely to ramp up diplomatic pressure on Jerusalem to block the resolution from advancing through the legislative process. Basol added that it remains surprising that Israeli lawmakers appear willing to dismiss Baku’s well-documented sensitivity to the Armenian genocide issue, and underestimate the depth and strategic importance of the Azerbaijan-Turkey alliance.

  • Russia rejects Turkish ceasefire push in Ukraine ahead of Nato summit, sources say

    Russia rejects Turkish ceasefire push in Ukraine ahead of Nato summit, sources say

    In mid-June, during a high-profile diplomatic visit to Moscow, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan tabled a new peace initiative aimed at halting active hostilities between Russia and Ukraine and reopening bilateral negotiations, multiple anonymous sources with direct knowledge of the talks confirmed to Middle East Eye. But the proposal, which called for establishing a tentative ceasefire window and aligning on a foundational framework to resume dialogue, was firmly turned away by Russian officials, who declined to open discussions on the terms.

    Fidan held meetings with Russia’s top leadership during his trip, including Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and President Vladimir Putin. Had the Turkish initiative gained traction, the plan would have brought Russian and Ukrainian negotiating teams to Turkey for formal talks coinciding with the upcoming NATO summit scheduled to be held in the country in July. For now, that diplomatic path appears all but closed, according to sources familiar with Ankara’s strategic planning.

    Russia’s non-negotiable precondition for any lasting agreement with Kyiv remains unchanged: Ukraine must formally recognize Russia’s 2014 and 2022 annexations of the Donbas region’s provincial borders, a demand Kyiv has repeatedly rejected outright. While Ukrainian officials have pushed back against claims of expanding Russian control along the Donbas frontline, recent on-the-ground reporting from *The New York Times* confirms Russian forces have advanced into the outskirts of Kostyantynivka, one of the last remaining major Ukrainian-held urban centers in the region.

    Russia currently holds more than 80 percent of Donetsk Oblast, the economic heart of Donbas, and is continuing offensive operations to encircle both Kostyantynivka and Lyman. The neighboring city of Druzhkivka has been reduced to a largely uninhabitable wasteland by months of heavy fighting, leaving Sloviansk and Kramatorsk as Kyiv’s last significant fortified strongholds in the oblast. Despite Kyiv’s unwavering public commitment to retaking all of Donbas, military analysts warn that many of the region’s key population centers may be left unrecognizable by the time frontline fighting stabilizes, leaving little infrastructure or civilian presence to defend.

    Parallel to Russia’s incremental territorial gains in eastern Ukraine, which come even as Ukraine expands its long-range strike capacity to hit Russian energy infrastructure deep inside Russian territory including within Moscow, multiple independent economic analyses paint an increasingly grim picture of strain on Russia’s domestic economy. The Russian government has already imposed intermittent full shutdowns of mobile internet access in parts of the country to curb unrest, and after more than two years of full-scale invasion and sweeping Western sanctions, deep structural fissures have begun to emerge in the country’s financial sector.

    A confidential European economic analysis reviewed by MEE reveals that Russian regulators and top government officials are deeply alarmed by growing systemic risk in the domestic banking industry, which faces overlapping threats that could trigger a widespread sectoral crisis. The report notes that Russian banks’ balance sheets have been artificially inflated by aggressive risk-taking designed to attract new investment, leaving institutions heavily exposed to widespread loan defaults from borrowers who overstate their income and creditworthiness.

    Multiple factors have amplified this risk. Widespread government subsidies for low-interest mortgages have driven a rapid surge in residential property prices, creating the conditions for a potentially destabilizing property bubble that could pop once demand cools, triggering mass defaults on home loans. Additionally, public-private partnership schemes used to fund regional development projects have shifted billions in regional debt onto the balance sheets of private and state-owned Russian banks, forcing financial institutions to absorb losses from unprofitable infrastructure projects as regional governments struggle to repay their obligations. As of 2024, Russia hosts roughly 3,500 active public-private partnership projects with a combined total valuation of nearly €50 billion, all of which place additional pressure on the banking sector.

    Industry projections indicate that more than a dozen Russian banks will be forced to cease operations by the end of 2025 amid mounting insolvency risk. Personal financial distress is also spreading rapidly across the country: more than 500,000 Russian individuals filed for personal bankruptcy in 2025, marking a 31.5 percent jump from the total number of filings recorded in 2024.

  • ‘I’m done’: Ben Stokes has no regrets about England retirement call

    ‘I’m done’: Ben Stokes has no regrets about England retirement call

    One of the most influential figures in modern English cricket has closed the book on his 15-year international career, and Ben Stokes says he leaves with zero regrets. In an announcement that sent shockwaves through the global cricket community on Sunday, the 32-year-old all-rounder revealed his retirement from all international cricket mid-way through the third Test against New Zealand at Trent Bridge in Nottingham.

    Stokes’ final appearance in an England uniform came on Monday, as New Zealand sealed a 160-run victory to claim the series 2-1. The retiring star watched the closing hours of the match from the balcony of England’s dressing room, wrapping up an iconic tenure that redefined Test cricket under the “Bazball” revolution.

    A day after his bombshell announcement, the BBC asked Stokes how he would feel watching England’s upcoming 2025 home Ashes series against Australia from the comfort of his sofa. “I am incredibly content with everything right now,” Stokes responded. “It’s a decision that you don’t take lightly. It has taken a lot of time. I’ve spoken to a lot of people close to me. I’m done, mate, and I’m very happy.”

    The retirement caps a turbulent few weeks for Stokes, who captained England to an opening Test win at Lord’s before a controversial post-victory night out. The incident, which saw Stokes present at a nightclub where an England security staff member was allegedly assaulted by a Saracens rugby player, led to his suspension from the second Test for breaching team contractual rules. After an internal investigation concluded, he was reinstated to the side for the third Test.

    Stokes described the sequence of recent events as “unfortunate” and “interesting”, acknowledging that they “maybe” contributed to his final call to step away. But he emphasized that long-term physical and mental toll from 15 years at the top of the sport was the core driving factor behind his retirement. “Over the last 6-12 months I think everything that I’ve done over a long period of time has taken its toll,” he explained. “Being in this role as captain — as good as it is, as exciting as it is, how big an honor it is — there’s some negative effects to doing it. I guess that’s the unfortunate side that people don’t always get to see.”

    Reflecting on the controversy that marked his final match, Stokes joked that the off-field drama fit the narrative of his entire career. “I can probably look back on the week and have a bit of a laugh that there was a bit of controversy around my last game for England, but I guess you could relate that to me as a player throughout,” he said. “I’m a little bit hit and miss sometimes, here and there, and obviously something pretty simple ended up being a bit complicated.”

    Over his 15-year international tenure, Stokes cemented his legacy as one of England’s greatest ever match-winners. He played central roles in England’s historic 2019 50-over World Cup victory and 2022 T20 World Cup title, and took over Test captaincy in 2022 to launch the aggressive, win-at-all-costs “Bazball” approach that upended decades of conventional Test cricket strategy. Off the field, Stokes has long been open about his struggles with mental health, and previously made headlines after being acquitted of affray charges following a 2018 late-night street brawl in Bristol.

    Stokes’ sudden departure has thrown the future of England’s existing cricket leadership structure into question. Head coach Brendon McCullum, who partnered with Stokes to build the Bazball project, has confirmed he still intends to stay in his role, which now covers both Test and white-ball teams. McCullum, who said he tried to persuade Stokes to reverse his retirement decision, reaffirmed his long-term commitment to English cricket. “My commitment to English cricket has never wavered,” he said. “I firmly believe in the direction that we can get this team to take.”

    The New Zealand series was meant to serve as a reset for England after a lopsided 4-1 Ashes defeat in Australia, where questions were already raised about player professionalism and a problematic team drinking culture. Critics argue the recent nightclub incident involving Stokes shows no corrective action has been taken, and poor recent results — seven losses in nine Tests — point to a team in steady decline. Former England captain Michael Vaughan has said he would be shocked if the current leadership group remains in place. “There must be change,” Vaughan told the BBC, “after what we’ve seen here in terms of a cricketing sense now over a period of time.”

  • Israel uproots hundreds of West Bank olive trees amid fears of wider destruction

    Israel uproots hundreds of West Bank olive trees amid fears of wider destruction

    On Sunday, Israeli military bulldozers carried out a large-scale destruction of Palestinian agricultural land in the village of Zububa, located near the city of Jenin in the occupied West Bank, just meters from the controversial separation wall that splits Israeli and Palestinian territory. Local officials confirm that at least 500 mature olive trees across 50 dunams (roughly 12.4 acres) of farmland were completely uprooted – a devastating blow to local communities just three months ahead of the annual olive harvest, the primary economic lifeline for tens of thousands of Palestinian families across the West Bank.

    What makes the destruction even more alarming for Zububa’s residents is that the operation is far from over. Zaki Jaradat, head of the Zububa Village Council, confirmed to reporters that an additional 120 dunams (nearly 30 acres) of established olive groves are at imminent risk of being razed in the coming days. For affected landowners like Mahmoud Jaradat, the destruction has already erased years of labor and eliminated any prospect of income from this year’s harvest. “All my hard work and years of toil vanished in a single moment,” Mahmoud Jaradat, a Zububa resident whose entire plot of dozens of trees was destroyed, told Middle East Eye. “I’ll have to buy olive oil instead of selling it this year. This is a heartbreaking scene I have no words for.”

    Israeli military officials had previously notified local residents that the land clearing was being carried out to expand a security buffer zone along the separation wall, which already cuts through vast swathes of land that Zububa’s residents have owned and cultivated for generations. The entire at-risk zone holds roughly 2,000 productive olive trees, all of which were being carefully tended by local families in preparation for the critical October harvest. Even more disconcerting for villagers, Sunday’s bulldozing extended far beyond the 127 dunams the military had previously marked for clearing. According to Zaki Jaradat, the total area slated for destruction could ultimately exceed 250 dunams (more than 61 acres), all under the guise of security needs. “They told us they would bulldoze 127 dunams, but from what we see now, what they will bulldoze will exceed 250 dunams from all directions, all under the pretext of security,” Zaki Jaradat said.

    This latest operation is just the latest chapter in a years-long pattern of land dispossession for Zububa. Once encompassing roughly 14,000 dunams (3,459 acres) of territory, the village has lost more than 89 percent of its total land since the 1948 Nakba and the 1967 Israeli occupation of the West Bank. Today, local Palestinian residents can only access roughly 1,500 dunams (371 acres) of their historic territory, with the remainder seized for Israeli infrastructure, settlements, or the construction of the separation wall. The village is already one of many Palestinian communities in the occupied West Bank subjected to routine collective punishment measures, including frequent movement restrictions, road blockades, near-daily home raids, and mass arrests.

    Following Sunday’s destruction, the Israeli military distributed leaflets to Zububa residents warning young people against approaching the separation wall or adjacent security fence, threatening collective consequences for the entire village if any such movement occurs. Data collected by the Colonisation and Wall Resistance Commission, a Palestinian grassroots organization tracking land violations, confirms that this destruction is part of a rapidly accelerating trend across the occupied West Bank. Since 2020, the commission estimates that Israeli forces have uprooted, damaged, or poisoned at least 120,000 Palestinian-owned trees, the vast majority of them productive olive trees critical to local livelihoods.

    Attacks on olive groves have surged sharply in recent years: in 2024, 14,212 trees were destroyed, 10,459 of them olive trees. That figure more than doubled in 2025, when 35,273 trees were uprooted or damaged, including 26,988 olive trees. In the first five months of 2026 alone, more than 10,000 trees have been destroyed, 6,700 of them olive trees, with 4,414 destroyed in April 2026 alone.

  • Iran’s Hormuz toll gambit is doomed to fail

    Iran’s Hormuz toll gambit is doomed to fail

    Tensions in the Middle East have reached a fresh boiling point, as the United States and Iran have exchanged targeted strikes near the strategic Strait of Hormuz, one of the world’s most critical maritime chokepoints. This latest escalation comes on the heels of alleged Iranian drone strikes on a commercial cargo ship attempting to pass through the waterway, with both Washington and Tehran now accusing one another of violating the terms of a recently agreed 60-day interim peace agreement.

    In the wake of coordinated attacks on Iranian targets by the U.S. and Israel, Tehran has increasingly signaled its intention to formalize permanent control over the strait, a move that has sparked global anxiety over potential permanent tolls on the roughly 130 commercial vessels that transit the waterway each day. While Iran has framed potential tolls as a stable new source of state revenue, international analysts argue that such a policy is neither legally justified nor practically enforceable.

    Global concern over the situation is well-founded. Since the outbreak of the latest regional conflict, Iran has targeted more than 40 neutral commercial vessels passing through the strait, using drones, missiles, and sea mines to disrupt shipping. These attacks have left multiple innocent merchant mariners dead, and have brought regular commercial traffic through the chokepoint to a near-standstill for more than three months, triggering substantial ripple effects across global supply chains and energy markets.

    Anxiety has been amplified by the careful wording of the 14-point interim peace deal, which only requires Iran to use its “best efforts” to guarantee free, uncharged passage of commercial vessels for the 60-day term of the agreement. The deal states that future transit arrangements will be negotiated between Iran, Oman, and other Gulf states “in line with applicable international law and the sovereign rights of coastal states of the Strait of Hormuz.” This vague language has left policymakers and shipping industry leaders worried that Iran intends to formalize tolls once the interim deal expires.

    However, under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the Strait of Hormuz is classified as an international strait, meaning all commercial and military vessels hold an inherent right of unimpeded transit passage that no coastal state can legally suspend. While sections of the strait do overlap with Iran’s territorial waters, the International Maritime Organization’s official traffic separation scheme — the designated shipping lanes that act as maritime “roadways” for safe transit — lie almost entirely within Omani territorial waters, leaving Iran with no legal authority to restrict or charge for passage through the main shipping route.

    Beyond legal barriers, permanent tolls face steep practical challenges that make enforcement nearly impossible. Many point to the Suez and Panama Canals as precedents for tolled waterways, but these routes are fundamentally different from the Strait of Hormuz. Both canals are narrow, man-modified transit routes that lie entirely within the territory of a single state, with a tightly controlled entry and convoy system that makes non-compliance impossible. The Suez Canal, for example, has a navigable channel of only roughly 200 meters wide, requiring all vessels to take on local pilots and follow a rigid schedule that enforces toll payment.

    By comparison, the Strait of Hormuz is nearly 39 kilometers wide at its narrowest point, spanning territorial waters controlled by both Iran and Oman. This vast geographic scale makes it physically impossible to stop, inspect, and coerce every vessel that refuses to pay a toll. Unlike confined canals, there is no single entry point to monitor, and the wide expanse of the strait gives ship captains multiple routes to avoid Iranian enforcement.

    Beyond geography, a permanent Iranian toll would face widespread global opposition. The issue extends far beyond added shipping costs: imposing tolls on transit through an international strait would set a dangerous precedent that undermines the fundamental principle of freedom of navigation enshrined in international law, threatening shipping routes through straits around the world. Even Oman and other neighboring Gulf states have publicly warned that tolling arrangements would destabilize global maritime trade.

    Unlike canal authorities that charge tolls in exchange for maintaining the waterway and providing navigation services, Iran would be charging vessels to exercise a right that all ships already hold under international law. For shipping companies and flag states, there is no incentive to voluntarily comply with such a demand, meaning Iran would have to rely on ongoing coercion to enforce tolls.

    Over the past three months of conflict, Iran has already used military tactics including attacks on commercial vessels to deter transits, killing innocent seafarers and disrupting global energy and commodity markets. However, continuing these aggressive tactics after the conflict ends would draw severe international backlash, including harsh new sanctions, widespread diplomatic condemnation, and pushback even from Iran’s key trading partners such as China. Without sustained coercion, Iran lacks the means to enforce a permanent tolling regime.

    As regional security expert Jennifer Parker, an adjunct professor at the University of Western Australia and UNSW Sydney, notes, Iran is currently leveraging its ability to disrupt shipping through the strait to gain bargaining power in ongoing peace negotiations. But leverage gained through temporary disruption does not translate to permanent, enforceable control. While Iran can disrupt commercial traffic in the short term, it is extremely unlikely to be able to impose and maintain permanent tolls on the Strait of Hormuz.