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A groundbreaking new investigation from Human Rights Watch (HRW) has uncovered damning evidence linking the United Arab Emirates to the deployment of hundreds of Colombian mercenaries in Sudan, where the foreign fighters have supported the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) — a paramilitary group accused of large-scale war crimes and genocide in the country’s ongoing civil conflict.

According to the 38-page report, Abu Dhabi-based private security firm Global Security Services Group (GSSG) has actively recruited hundreds of Colombian special operations contractors since the start of 2024, deploying them directly to Sudan to fight alongside the RSF against the official Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). HRW investigators confirmed that the contractors passed through UAE-operated military bases on Sudanese territory before joining frontline RSF units, a trail of evidence that the human rights organization says proves direct UAE complicity in widespread violence committed by the paramilitary.

The RSF has faced mounting international accusations of genocide, systematic mass sexual violence, ethnic cleansing, and multiple other violations of international humanitarian law since Sudan’s civil conflict reignited in April 2023. HRW’s findings add new weight to global calls for punitive action against the UAE, which has long faced allegations of covertly backing the RSF despite consistent official denials.

“The recruitment of Colombian private military contractors adds to a growing body of evidence that the UAE provides military support to the Rapid Support Forces, which have repeatedly carried out heinous atrocities in Sudan,” said Mausi Segun, executive director of HRW’s Africa Division. “Governments should publicly demand that the UAE stop supplying weapons, equipment, personnel, and other military support to the Rapid Support Forces.”

HRW’s findings align with earlier independent investigations into RSF atrocities. In March 2024, Yale University’s Humanitarian Research Lab (HRL) corroborated United Nations claims of genocide in Sudan’s Darfur region, documenting that RSF forces had waged a deliberate campaign of starvation against the strategic city of el-Fasher. The lab’s report confirmed that RSF fighters razed dozens of rural farming villages, destroyed critical crop infrastructure, and systematically targeted civilian populations after seizing control of the city. Extensive on-the-ground interviews conducted by independent outlet Middle East Eye (MEE), alongside subsequent UN and HRL investigations, have documented widespread extrajudicial executions, mass rape, and extortion of el-Fasher’s civilian population by RSF fighters.

The presence of Colombian mercenaries in Sudan first entered public view in November 2024, when a SAF-aligned armed group released social media videos showing an intercepted convoy of Colombian fighters that had crossed into Sudan from neighboring Libya. While the UAE has repeatedly rejected all accusations of supporting the RSF, MEE has published years of investigative work backed by satellite imagery, flight tracking logs, weapons serial numbers, and multiple anonymous insider sources confirming the UAE’s ongoing military backing for the paramilitary.

Joey Shea, a lead HRW researcher on the investigation, told MEE that Colombian contractors transited through sensitive UAE military and government facilities prior to their deployment to RSF frontlines. She added that investigators have directly linked the foreign contractors to grave human rights abuses on the ground.

“One contractor who I spoke to told me that he helped to support the training of child soldiers, boys as young as 13-14 years old,” Shea explained.

The investigation also revealed that the military relationship between the UAE and Colombian private military contractors stretches back more than a decade. As early as 2011, The New York Times reported that UAE leader Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan was building a foreign legion of up to 800 Colombian contractors to serve officially within the UAE armed forces. One retired Colombian contractor interviewed by HRW confirmed he took part in that 2011 recruitment drive, noting that the operation was entirely public, with all participants receiving formal work contracts for their service in the UAE.

This report is based on independent reporting from Middle East Eye, a media outlet specializing in original, unfiltered coverage of the Middle East, North Africa, and global affairs.

A growing diplomatic rift has emerged across the Middle East and broader Muslim world over a controversial plan by the self-declared independent region of Somaliland to open an embassy in occupied East Jerusalem, with two Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members notably declining to join a widespread collective condemnation of the move.

The proposal comes on the heels of a historic step last year: Israel became the first country in the world to formally recognize Somaliland as a sovereign state, a breakaway territory that declared independence from Somalia in 1991 but has not secured widespread international recognition. In comments delivered Tuesday, Mohamed Hagi, Somaliland’s ambassador to Israel, confirmed the reciprocal diplomatic arrangement, noting that Israel will also open its own embassy in Hargeisa, Somaliland’s administrative capital. Hagi framed the exchange of diplomatic missions as a reflection of deepening friendship, mutual respect, and expanding strategic cooperation between the two entities.

Under longstanding international law, East Jerusalem is universally classified as occupied Palestinian territory. Israel seized control of the area from Jordan during the 1967 Six-Day War, and despite Israel’s annexation of the territory, the overwhelming majority of the global community has declined to recognize Jerusalem as Israel’s sovereign capital.

The planned embassy opening has drawn sharp condemnation from a broad coalition of regional and international states. Foreign ministers from four of the six GCC member states—Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia—joined more than a dozen other nations including Egypt, Jordan, Turkey, Pakistan, Indonesia, Djibouti, Somalia, Palestine, Sudan, Yemen, Lebanon, Mauritania, Algeria, Bangladesh, and Morocco to denounce what they called the “illegal and unacceptable step taken by the so-called Somaliland region in opening its purported embassy in occupied Jerusalem.” Even GCC Secretary-General Jasem Mohamed Albudaiwi joined the rebuke, stating that the diplomatic move violates international law and United Nations resolutions.

Notably absent from the collective condemnation were the UAE and Bahrain, the two GCC states that have already normalized formal diplomatic relations with Israel as part of the 2020 Abraham Accords. Requests for comment from Middle East Eye to clarify the two countries’ positions on the Somaliland embassy plan went unanswered as of the publication of the original reporting.

Beyond the diplomatic controversy over Jerusalem, the recognition of Somaliland by Israel has opened the door to discussions of deeper security cooperation. Multiple sources have confirmed that Somaliland officials have held talks with Israeli counterparts about constructing a permanent Israeli military base in the territory, a proposal that reverses earlier denials of such plans by Hargeisa’s foreign ministry. For Israel, a military foothold in Somaliland would place its forces within short striking distance of Yemen’s Houthi movement, which has launched repeated attacks on commercial shipping in the Red Sea since late 2023, actions the group says are in retaliation for Israel’s military campaign in Gaza.

The status of Somaliland itself remains a contentious global issue. While the region has operated as a de facto independent state since 1991, the United Nations, African Union, and nearly all sovereign governments still recognize it as an integral part of Somalia. The UAE has maintained close diplomatic and security ties with Somaliland since 2017, when Hargeisa granted Abu Dhabi permission to establish its own military base in the region, a partnership Somaliland has leveraged to build international support for its independence bid.

This close alliance has already sparked regional friction in recent months. In January, Saudi Arabia publicly accused the UAE of secretly evacuating Yemeni separatist leader Aidarous al-Zubaidi—who faced treason charges in Yemen—from Yemen to Somaliland, before he traveled onward to Abu Dhabi. Somalia reacted furiously to the incident, canceling all of the UAE’s commercial and military agreements related to Somaliland, even though Mogadishu holds little effective control over the territory. Unlike Saudi Arabia, which centers its diplomatic engagement on Somalia’s recognized central government in Mogadishu, the UAE’s approach to the Horn of Africa has long been structured around its separate ties to both Somaliland and the semi-autonomous Somali region of Puntland.

The recent surge of large-scale armed attacks in northern Mali that has significantly weakened the ruling junta has reignited a long-standing debate across the Sahel: will Algeria, once the preeminent diplomatic mediator for the region, be able to reclaim its influential role – a possibility that many actors in Bamako openly question today.

On April 25, a coordinated alliance of two powerful groups launched a surprise offensive against Malian military and government installations. The coalition brings together the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA), a Tuareg separatist movement fighting for independence for Mali’s northern Azawad region, and Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), an al-Qaeda-affiliated militant coalition. By the end of the assault, the alliance had seized strategic population centers including the key northern town of Kidal, captured multiple major army bases, imposed a de facto blockade on national capital Bamako, and killed Malian Defense Minister Sadio Camara. The attack marks the most severe threat to the junta that seized power in a 2020 coup since it took control of the country.

Across the border in neighboring Algeria, the rapid upheaval in Mali has sparked a mix of urgent concern and cautious strategic expectation. For years, Algeria’s diplomatic clout in Mali has steadily eroded, but the new crisis has opened a window for Algiers to reassert its long-held role as a regional crisis manager.

Algeria’s diplomatic legacy in Mali stretches back decades, with its most landmark achievement being the brokering of the 2015 Algiers Peace Agreement, a deal designed to address the long-simmering political and social grievances that fuel conflict in northern Mali. However, bilateral relations between Algiers and Bamako collapsed dramatically after the August 2020 military coup that ousted Mali’s democratically elected civilian government led by President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita. In 2024, Mali’s junta formally withdrew from the 2015 peace accord, and has repeatedly levied accusations that Algeria maintains improper clandestine ties with northern separatist and militant rebel groups.

Algeria has consistently rejected these claims, arguing that its open contacts with a full range of Malian stakeholders are intended solely to keep diplomatic communication channels open and prevent further violent escalation of the conflict. For Algiers, reclaiming influence in Mali is not just a matter of regional diplomatic prestige – it is a critical national security priority. The two countries share a 1,370-kilometer undefended border, and Algiers views sustained stability in Mali as central to protecting its own territory from cross-border threats including militant insurgency, arms trafficking, and irregular migration. Algerian policymakers have long warned that any further collapse of control in northern Mali could spill over to destabilize Algeria’s own restive southern regions.

Toufik Gouider, an Algerian international relations researcher and writer, explained to Middle East Eye that Algeria’s policy is rooted in a core strategic premise: “Mali’s security and stability are part of Algeria’s own security and stability.” Gouider added that Algeria considers preserving Mali’s territorial integrity to be a non-negotiable strategic interest, as fragmentation in the north would almost certainly create instability that spreads across the border.

The April 2025 offensive has laid bare the persistent fragility of Mali’s security situation, even after more than a decade of sustained military operations against separatist and militant groups. Mali’s ongoing crisis first erupted in 2012, when a Tuareg separatist rebellion in the north was rapidly co-opted by al-Qaeda and Islamic State-linked militant groups to expand their influence, spiraling into a persistent civil war that has ebbed and flowed for 13 years.

Since taking power in 2020, Mali’s junta has prioritized a purely military strategy to reassert full state control over the entire country. The recent successful rebel offensive has demonstrated that the core threat to state authority remains far from eliminated. “The latest events have reinforced the belief that military solutions alone are insufficient, and that lasting stability cannot be achieved without an inclusive political dialogue that takes into account local specificities and social balances in the region,” Algerian political analyst Sadek Amin told Middle East Eye.

Amin added that abandoning the 2015 Algiers Agreement marked a retreat from the only existing political framework that, for all its flaws and implementation delays, offered a realistic path to preserving Mali’s territorial unity and stabilizing the broader Sahel region. The 2015 accord, signed in Algiers under United Nations oversight, remains Algeria’s most consequential diplomatic achievement in the Sahel. It established a framework for greater political decentralization in northern Mali, and the integration of former rebel fighters into national state institutions, in exchange for armed groups laying down their weapons. While full implementation of the deal stalled for years due to political disagreements on both sides, most diplomats and regional analysts continued to view it as the most comprehensive framework for addressing the root causes of Mali’s conflict.

“The Algiers Agreement was the only framework that brought the Malian parties to the same table,” Malian journalist Omar al-Ansari told MEE, noting that Mali’s current junta deliberately undermined the accord by prioritizing a military-only approach to ending the conflict. Mali’s military authorities formally exited the agreement in January 2024, justifying the move by claiming the accord no longer aligned with the country’s modern sovereignty and security priorities.

Bilateral tensions between the two neighbors escalated even further in early 2025, when Algerian air defense forces shot down a Malian military drone near the shared border. Algiers stated the drone had violated Algerian airspace, while Bamako called the incident a deliberate and serious act of escalation. In the wake of the incident, anti-Algeria protests erupted outside the Algerian embassy in Bamako, with demonstrators holding signs accusing Algeria of supporting terrorism.

Following the April 2025 rebel offensive, Algerian Foreign Minister Ahmed Attaf reaffirmed his country’s long-held position, stating that Algeria remains “committed to the territorial integrity of Mali, the unity of its people and its institutions”, while restating Algiers’s “categorical rejection of all forms and manifestations of terrorism”. Despite this official public stance, Malian government officials and independent commentators continue to accuse Algeria of practicing a double standard: publicly endorsing Mali’s territorial unity while maintaining close ties to separatist and armed political actors in the north, including leaders of groups that have previously waged armed rebellion against the Bamako central government.

Bamako argues that these covert contacts allow Algeria to gain unfair leverage over Malian domestic affairs, directly undermining any claim Algeria might have to being a neutral, trusted mediator. A senior Malian official, who spoke to MEE on condition of anonymity, said Algeria has “largely lost its credibility” with Mali’s current ruling authorities. The source added that Bamako views Algeria’s continued contacts with rebel groups and opposition figures as an attempt to preserve its own regional influence, rather than a good-faith neutral mediation effort, and acknowledged that Algiers’s policy is also driven by its own goal of securing its southern border.

Malian journalist Ibrahim Toure confirmed that widespread anti-Algeria sentiment has taken hold among both officials and the public in Bamako, noting that the junta also believes several individuals wanted by Malian authorities on terrorism charges are residing openly in Algeria. “Algeria currently enjoys no credibility as a mediator, neither with the government nor with a large segment of Malian public opinion,” Toure told MEE.

Algerian analysts have uniformly rejected allegations that Algiers is covertly aiding armed groups against the Malian junta. “These ties are not evidence of double standards, but rather a natural extension of cross-border social, cultural and historical links,” Amin explained, pointing in particular to the transnational Tuareg community, whose traditional lands span multiple countries across the Sahara. He added that maintaining open contacts with all local actors is “a necessity linked to protecting border stability and preventing the spread of chaos and extremist groups”. Gouider echoed this position, emphasizing that Algeria “supports Mali’s unity wholeheartedly”, and that its advocacy for greater representation of northern communities is aimed at securing their full political and institutional inclusion in the Malian state.

Since the 2020 coup, Mali has completely overhauled its international security partnerships, ending long-standing military cooperation with former colonial ruler France and United Nations peacekeeping forces, while rapidly deepening security ties with Russia, which has become the junta’s primary external military backer. Russia’s presence in Mali is led by the Africa Corps, a state-run paramilitary organization that replaced the Wagner Group after the death of its leader Yevgeny Prigozhin.

Agence France-Presse reported last month that Algeria may already have played a quiet, off-the-record mediating role during the recent fighting around Kidal, helping to negotiate a safe corridor that allowed Russian forces to withdraw from the embattled town. According to Gouider, Mali’s deepening strategic partnership with Moscow has narrowed Algeria’s room for diplomatic maneuver, but it has not erased the country’s long-standing traditional role as a regional crisis manager, thanks to Algiers’s decades of on-the-ground experience addressing conflict in the Sahel.

Gouider added that Algeria has taken active diplomatic steps in recent months to counter regional alignments that Algiers views as attempts to marginalize its influence in the Sahel. Most notably, he pointed to the Alliance of Sahel States, a bloc formed in September 2023 by Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso to coordinate political and security policy outside of traditional West African regional frameworks. Gouider said Algeria has launched diplomatic outreach to reopen communication channels with multiple regional capitals, to prevent this new bloc from evolving into a political axis hostile to Algeria’s interests or one that would exclude Algeria from its historic role managing Sahel crises. These efforts, Gouider argued, have allowed Algeria to preserve its status as a key regional actor despite ongoing high tensions with Bamako.

Even amid widespread distrust in Mali, many regional observers acknowledge that Algiers still retains significant diplomatic and historical capital in the Malian conflict, thanks to its long-standing ties with all armed and political stakeholders across the Sahel. Ansari, the Malian journalist, argued that Algeria “remains the regional actor best placed to play a mediating role in Mali”, citing Algiers’s unmatched depth of understanding of local political and social dynamics.

At its core, however, the question facing Algeria and the Sahel today is no longer whether Algeria can retain influence in Mali – it is whether the ruling junta in Bamako is willing to accept Algerian influence and mediation once again. The anonymous senior Malian official told MEE that for Algeria to resume any meaningful mediating role, Algiers must first adapt to the new political reality in Bamako and work to rebuild shattered bilateral trust. “Any meaningful mediating role will depend on Algiers’s ability to adapt to the new realities in Bamako and rebuild trust,” the official said.

Across Southeast Asia, a quiet but transformative shift is underway: nations across the region are reembracing nuclear power as a core component of their long-term development strategies, and China has positioned itself at the center of this emerging energy landscape, turning its growing nuclear industrial capacity into a pivotal tool of geopolitical influence.

A decade ago, large-scale nuclear development across Southeast Asia was widely seen as politically unfeasible. Today, however, the urgent pressures of climate action, rapid industrial growth, expanding artificial intelligence infrastructure, and soaring domestic electricity demand have pushed governments to prioritize low-carbon baseload power, moving nuclear energy from a marginal option to a central policy priority. The regional shift is already visible in concrete planning: Vietnam signed a construction agreement with Russia for the Ninh Thuan 1 nuclear power plant in March 2026; the Philippines and Indonesia have set targets to operationalize their first commercial reactors by the early 2030s; and Malaysia, Thailand, and Singapore are actively evaluating small modular reactor technologies for future energy development.

While established nuclear exporters including France, Russia, South Korea, and the United States remain active in the region, Beijing has emerged as the most consequential long-term partner for Southeast Asian nations, backed by unmatched advantages in financing, industrial scale, and state-backed delivery capacity that few competitors can replicate. Unlike traditional infrastructure projects, nuclear partnerships are not short-term commercial transactions: they are strategic commitments that span more than 50 years, shaping everything from a nation’s long-term fuel dependency and industrial regulatory standards to its broader geopolitical alignment.

China’s rise as a global nuclear export leader is the product of decades of deliberate industrial investment and technological accumulation. As of 2026, China operates 61 commercial nuclear reactors with an additional 36 under construction, giving it the world’s third-largest operating reactor fleet while leading global nuclear construction activity. Unlike many Western nuclear industries that stagnated in the post-Cold War era, China sustained consistent investment across reactor engineering, domestic manufacturing, and workforce development, allowing it to localize approximately 90% of all reactor component production within its borders.

This deep domestic localization has cut supply chain risks, reduced manufacturing costs, and enabled Chinese nuclear firms to offer fully integrated turnkey packages that cover every stage of a project: engineering, procurement, construction, financing, workforce training, and long-term fuel supply. Rather than exporting standalone reactors, China effectively exports complete, self-sustaining nuclear ecosystems. The flagship of this export strategy is the Hualong One (HPR1000), a third-generation pressurized-water reactor co-developed by China’s two top nuclear operators, China National Nuclear Corporation and China General Nuclear Power Group. With more than 40 units already operational or under construction globally, the Hualong One has become one of the world’s most widely deployed modern reactor designs, featuring advanced safety systems and a 1,100 megawatt generation capacity per unit, enough to power roughly one million households. For developing economies grappling with persistent electricity deficits and rapid industrial expansion, this combination of cost, capacity, and fully integrated service is uniquely compelling.

Beyond comprehensive offerings, China’s appeal to Southeast Asian nations stems from its ability to deliver projects quickly and affordably. Western nuclear projects are frequently plagued by costly overruns and multi-year delays, while Russia faces growing international geopolitical constraints that limit its export reach, and South Korea lacks the large-scale financing capacity China can offer through its state-led development model. Beijing has already set an ambitious target of exporting 30 reactors to Belt and Road Initiative partner countries by 2030, an initiative valued at an estimated 1 trillion yuan (US$145 billion). Chinese nuclear cooperation already spans multiple continents, with active projects and agreements in Pakistan, Argentina, Kenya, Kazakhstan, and Saudi Arabia, demonstrating the global scale of its export push. For Southeast Asian governments working against tight development timelines to meet growing energy demand, this reliable, fast-tracked model is a major advantage.

Yet the opportunities presented by Chinese nuclear technology come with unavoidable strategic risks that regional governments cannot dismiss. Nuclear infrastructure creates unusually deep, long-term dependencies for recipient nations: reactor lifespans regularly exceed 40 years, and fuel supply, technical upgrades, and spent fuel management remain tied to the original vendor for decades. This structural dependency is amplified by the limited number of countries that possess industrial-scale uranium enrichment capacity. While Russia currently dominates global low-enriched uranium supplies, China is rapidly expanding its own domestic fuel cycle infrastructure to support its growing export business, meaning future recipient nations could become dependent on Beijing not just for construction, but for long-term fuel access and consistent operational capacity.

Technology lock-in may prove even more impactful than fuel dependency over time. Unlike traditional infrastructure such as ports or industrial parks, integrated nuclear ecosystems are extremely difficult to restructure or replace once technological and institutional dependency becomes embedded over decades. Maintenance systems, engineering standards, and regulatory frameworks remain aligned with the original supplier, gradually shaping a nation’s long-term industrial priorities and geopolitical orientation. In effect, China exports far more than power generation infrastructure: it exports sustained, long-term strategic influence.

This does not inherently imply malicious intent; all major nuclear exporters create similar structural dependencies through their supply relationships. But what makes China’s position unique is its combination of reactor exports, Belt and Road infrastructure financing, cross-border industrial integration, and broader geopolitical outreach, making the long-term strategic implications far more significant for regional states. For Southeast Asian nations seeking to maintain strategic autonomy amid intensifying US-China great power competition, this dynamic creates a difficult balancing act. Washington already views competition over critical infrastructure in maritime Southeast Asia through a strategic lens, as Chinese-backed energy, port, and digital projects expand across the region. Chinese nuclear diplomacy could therefore become a new front in broader Indo-Pacific competition over influence, technological standards, and long-term regional alignment.

In response, most ASEAN governments are expected to pursue a hedging strategy rather than aligning exclusively with any single nuclear supplier. Maritime Southeast Asian nations such as Indonesia and the Philippines are likely to pursue diversified technology partnerships with multiple exporters, while mainland Southeast Asian economies may become more deeply integrated into Chinese nuclear industrial and financing ecosystems. This divergence could eventually lead to competing nuclear technological ecosystems across the region, where infrastructure standards and fuel supply arrangements reflect broader geopolitical blocs, adding a new layer of fragmentation to ongoing Indo-Pacific great power competition.

China is also investing heavily in next-generation nuclear technology, most notably thorium molten-salt reactors. In June 2024, China’s Wuwei Thorium Molten Salt Reactor reached full operational capacity, marking a key milestone in the commercial development of this advanced reactor technology. While thorium is promoted as a safer and more sustainable alternative to conventional uranium-based nuclear power, its long-term geopolitical impact may be far more significant than its technical benefits. If China becomes the first major exporter of commercially viable thorium reactors, it could secure substantial influence over global nuclear technology standards across much of the developing world.

It is important to note that framing Southeast Asian nations as passive recipients of Chinese influence oversimplifies the complex regional dynamic. Many regional governments are pursuing nuclear partnerships with China specifically to accelerate domestic technological learning and build domestic industrial capacity. Thailand offers a clear example of this approach: in 2015, Thai utility Ratchaburi Electricity Generating Holding acquired a 10% stake in two Hualong One reactors at China’s Fangchenggang nuclear site in Guangxi province, while Chinese institutions trained a new generation of Thai nuclear engineering professionals. This early cooperation laid the groundwork for a 2025 bilateral memorandum on peaceful nuclear energy cooperation between Beijing and Bangkok. Notably, China itself followed a similar developmental path: its modern nuclear industry was built through technological absorption from Canadian, French, Russian, and American designs before it eventually developed fully indigenous reactor technology with domestic intellectual property rights. Many Southeast Asian states now hope to replicate this model, leveraging initial foreign partnerships to gradually build their own domestic expertise, regulatory capacity, and industrial capability.

The core challenge for regional governments will be maintaining strategic diversification. If nations become overly dependent on any single supplier—whether China, Russia, or Western vendors—their long-term strategic flexibility could be significantly eroded over time. Today, Southeast Asia’s nuclear revival is no longer solely a story about decarbonization and meeting rising electricity demand. It is increasingly tied to regional industrial competitiveness, technological sovereignty, expanding AI infrastructure, and geopolitical positioning. For China, successful expansion of nuclear exports strengthens its global industrial reach, extends its geopolitical influence, and reinforces its image as a leading provider of advanced technological solutions for developing economies. For Southeast Asian governments, Chinese nuclear cooperation delivers access to financing, rapid project deployment, and industrial learning opportunities that few other exporters can currently match. Ultimately, the actors that come to dominate Southeast Asia’s future nuclear infrastructure will likely shape the balance of technological and geopolitical influence across the Indo-Pacific for the rest of the 21st century.