分类： politics

A complex geopolitical entanglement has emerged as the British government maintains co-ownership of a strategic Somaliland port controlled by the United Arab Emirates, raising serious questions about conflict of interest regarding the ongoing conflict in Sudan. Through its foreign investment arm, British International Investment (BII), the UK holds a minority stake in Berbera port alongside Emirati logistics giant DP World and the Somaliland government.

The port forms part of a network of UAE-controlled infrastructure across the Horn of Africa that multiple sources indicate is being utilized to arm the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in Sudan. This connection creates a diplomatic dilemma for the UK, which has sanctioned RSF commanders for atrocities including mass killings and sexual violence in Darfur.

Somaliland itself represents a diplomatic flashpoint, being a breakaway region of Somalia that only Israel has recognized as independent—a move that has drawn widespread international condemnation. The territory has recently hosted high-level Israeli delegations discussing potential military bases, while simultaneously serving as a hub for regional power plays involving Yemeni separatists.

The UK government maintains that its investment through BII represents purely commercial interests focused on regional development. A recently published impact assessment commissioned by the Foreign Office described Berbera as “a strategic gateway to Somaliland and a potential alternative trade corridor for Ethiopia,” highlighting the creation of 2,500 jobs and $45 million in economic value.

However, policy experts argue that the UK cannot simultaneously condemn atrocities in Sudan while potentially benefiting from infrastructure that supports the conflict. Flight tracking data, cargo inventories, and multiple official sources indicate that Berbera’s facilities, including one of Africa’s longest runways capable of handling military aircraft, form part of the supply chain sustaining the RSF’s operations.

The situation illustrates the challenging balance between commercial investment and diplomatic principles, with British-made military equipment having been discovered in Sudan and the UK’s extensive commercial ties to the UAE facing increasing scrutiny amid the humanitarian crisis.

A complex pattern of protest participation is emerging across Iran’s Kurdish regions as nationwide demonstrations triggered by a severe economic crisis continue to unfold. While western provinces with Shia Kurdish majorities have witnessed the most violent clashes, the northern Kurdish towns that ignited the historic 2022 uprising have remained notably quiet—a phenomenon experts attribute to the lingering trauma of previous state repression.

According to documentation by the Kurdish-Iranian rights organization Hengaw, the most intense recent protests and government crackdowns have occurred in western provinces including Ilam and Kermanshah. This stands in stark contrast to northern Rojhelat Kurdish cities such as Saqqez—the hometown of Mahsa Amini, whose 2022 death in police custody sparked the ‘Woman, Life, Freedom’ movement—and Sanandaj, the provincial capital of Kurdistan, where significant street protests have been conspicuously absent.

Kurdish journalist Kaveh Ghoreishi confirms this geographical divergence, noting that activists attribute the hesitation in northern Kurdish areas to the devastating consequences they suffered during the 2022 demonstrations. The previous crackdown resulted in hundreds killed and wounded, thousands detained, and dozens facing capital charges, creating what Zhila Mostajer of Hengaw describes as ‘little capacity to endure further sacrifice.’

The current protest movement began in Tehran on December 28th, initially focusing on economic grievances including spiraling prices and currency devaluation before evolving into broader anti-government sentiment. Demonstrations have since spread across 111 cities in 31 provinces, though demands vary significantly by region according to Mostajer, who notes that while economic hardship affects all areas, Kurdish protests have maintained explicitly political objectives calling for regime change.

Kurdish political organizations have pursued a strategy of solidarity strikes rather than mass gatherings. On January 5th, seven Kurdish parties from the Dialogue Centre for Inter-Party Cooperation called for a general strike, which was observed in over 57 towns across Iranian Kurdistan according to Arash Saleh of the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan. While injecting momentum into the national movement, most towns refrained from subsequent physical protests, possibly due to concerns about supporting Reza Pahlavi, the exiled son of Iran’s last shah, who has been promoted as a leader by some Persian-language media.

Hussein Yazdanpana, leader of the Kurdistan Freedom Party (PAK), emphasizes that different Kurdish regions have varying capacities for mobilization, with western areas now bearing the brunt of protest activity while northern regions recover from the 2022 crackdown. The conflict has already turned deadly, with four PAK fighters reportedly killed in clashes with security forces in Malekshahi on January 7th.

International dimensions have emerged as Yazdanpana calls for the implementation of statements by U.S. President Donald Trump, who initially vowed intervention if protesters were killed but later suggested some deaths resulted from stampedes—a claim disputed by Kurdish leaders. With documented protester deaths ranging from 25 to 42, including minors, and thousands detained, the situation remains volatile with significant potential for further expansion according to Kurdish political representatives.

A significant diplomatic rift has emerged between the United Arab Emirates and the United Kingdom, culminating in Abu Dhabi restricting state scholarships for its citizens to study at British universities. This policy shift, reported by the Financial Times, excludes UK institutions from the list of approved foreign universities while maintaining funding for programs in Israel, France, and the United States.

The core of the dispute centers on the UK’s refusal to designate the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization, a long-standing demand from Emirati officials. The tension is reflected in visa statistics, showing a stark 55% decline in UAE students granted UK study visas between September 2022 and September 2025, dropping from 475 to just 213.

Emirati authorities, quoted by the FT, expressed concerns about potential radicalization on British campuses. In response, UK officials reiterated their commitment to academic freedom. The disagreement has escalated through unusual diplomatic channels, including the UAE’s funding of a December trip to Abu Dhabi for Nigel Farage, leader of the right-wing Reform UK party, to discuss shared opposition to the group.

Founded in Cairo in 1928, the Muslim Brotherhood is one of the world’s most prominent political Islamist groups. It maintains a self-proclaimed peaceful and democratic mission, yet it is banned as a major threat by several Middle Eastern autocracies, including Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the UAE itself. The group’s affiliates have demonstrated significant electoral success in the rare free elections held in the region.

The UK’s stance has been more nuanced. A 2017 parliamentary inquiry, reportedly initiated after lobbying by the UAE, concluded that engaging with political Islamists acts as a ‘firewall’ against violent extremism. The current Labour government states it keeps the issue of proscription under ‘close review.’

This is not the UAE’s first attempt to influence UK policy on this matter. In January 2025, it designated eight British organizations as terror groups due to alleged Brotherhood links, though none have breached UK law. Furthermore, a 2023 revelation showed the UAE paid a Geneva-based intelligence firm to smear the UK’s largest Muslim charity, Islamic Relief Worldwide, by attempting to link it to extremism.

The political pressure within the UK is growing. Reform UK, now leading national opinion polls, has vowed to ban the Brotherhood if elected, with Farage criticizing both Conservative and Labour parties for being ‘gutless’ on the issue. The situation presents a complex clash between international diplomacy, domestic security policy, and academic exchange.

Iran’s clerical establishment faces a profound crisis of legitimacy as anti-government demonstrations that originated in Tehran last month have now expanded across all 31 provinces, creating the most significant challenge to the Islamic Republic in recent years.

The current unrest, while not yet reaching the scale of the 2022-2023 protests triggered by Mahsa Amini’s death, represents a broader coalition of dissent. Initially sparked by economic grievances among Tehran’s Grand Bazaar merchants angered by the rial’s sharp depreciation, the movement has evolved to include predominantly young men—a demographic shift from the previous female-led protests.

According to the U.S.-based Human Rights Activists News Agency (HRANA), the turmoil has resulted in at least 34 protester fatalities, four security personnel deaths, and approximately 2,200 arrests. Analysts interpret these developments as evidence of deepening disillusionment with the Shi’ite establishment.

Alex Vatanka, director of the Iran Program at the Middle East Institute in Washington, D.C., observed: ‘The collapse is not just of the rial but of trust.’

Authorities have adopted a dual strategy, acknowledging the legitimacy of economic protests while employing tear gas and forceful measures during street confrontations. This approach highlights the regime’s struggle to reconcile its revolutionary priorities with the aspirations of a youthful population.

Mina, a 25-year-old unemployed university graduate from Kuhdasht in Lorestan province, expressed a common sentiment: ‘I just want to live a peaceful, normal life… Instead, they insist on a nuclear programme, supporting armed groups in the region, and maintaining hostility toward the United States. Those policies may have made sense in 1979, but not today.’

Verified videos from Mashhad show protesters tearing down the Iranian flag, while clashes occurred in Tehran’s Grand Bazaar. Additional footage from Gonabad depicted young men abandoning a seminary mosque to join cheering crowds in what appeared to be a symbolic revolt against the clergy.

Vatanka suggests the clerical system’s survival strategy—combining repression with tactical concessions—may be reaching its limits. ‘Change now looks inevitable; regime collapse is possible but not guaranteed,’ he noted.

The geopolitical dimension intensified when U.S. President Donald Trump hinted at potential intervention, stating on January 2: ‘We are locked and loaded and ready to go.’ This followed a 12-day military conflict seven months prior involving Israeli and U.S. bombing of Iranian nuclear sites.

Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, facing one of the most precarious moments of his decades-long rule, vowed Iran ‘will not yield to the enemy.’ However, analysts note the 86-year-old leader’s policies—including proxy network development, sanction evasion, and nuclear advancement—appear to be unraveling.

Within Iran, opinions remain divided regarding foreign intervention. A 31-year-old Isfahan resident captured the ambivalence: ‘Enough is enough. For 50 years this regime has been ruling my country. Look at the result. We are poor, isolated and frustrated.’ When asked about foreign military support, he responded: ‘No. I don’t want my country to suffer military strikes again. Our people have endured enough.’

Exiled opposition groups, though deeply fragmented, sense an opportunity to overthrow the establishment but face uncertainty regarding their domestic support base.

In his first public address addressing nationwide unrest, Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei delivered a scathing condemnation of former U.S. President Donald Trump while confronting escalating domestic protests. Speaking on January 9, 2026, Khamenei characterized Trump as “arrogant” and predicted his political downfall, drawing parallels to Iran’s pre-revolution monarchy.

The supreme leader’s remarks came amid sustained demonstrations triggered by economic grievances and rising living costs. Khamenei accused “vandals” and “saboteurs” of damaging public property to curry favor with American leadership, asserting Iran’s resilience against such actions. Despite government-imposed communication restrictions aimed at quelling dissent, protests continued with reported incidents of government buildings being set ablaze.

Simultaneously, Reza Pahlavi—son of Iran’s deposed shah and now U.S.-based opposition figure—called for reinforced demonstrations following what he described as successful protests on January 8. Pahlavi claimed visible retreats by security forces and urged expanded Friday rallies to further weaken governmental control.

Khamenei’s dual-front address combined familiar anti-American rhetoric with direct confrontation of domestic discontent, highlighting the regime’s challenge in balancing ideological opposition to Western powers with addressing internal economic dissatisfaction.

In a significant defiance of Syrian government authority, Kurdish-led forces have rejected ceasefire terms requiring their withdrawal from Aleppo. The political councils governing the Ashrafieh and Sheikh Maqsoud districts declared the evacuation demand equivalent to “a call to surrender,” instead pledging to defend their neighborhoods against what they described as intensive government shelling.

The initially proposed truce, announced by Syria’s defense ministry, established a six-hour window for the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to exit the Kurdish-majority districts with only personal light weapons. The arrangement aimed to prevent further civilian casualties in Syria’s second city, where recent fighting has claimed at least 22 lives and displaced over 140,000 residents.

Despite the expired ceasefire window, relative calm prevailed as Syrian security forces advanced into sections of Ashrafieh, securing key thoroughfares and structures. State media reported the seizure of weapons and ammunition while broadcasting footage showing military positioning and the arrival of transport buses intended to relocate fighters to eastern Kurdish-held territories.

The humanitarian situation remains critical with Aleppo’s hospitals operating beyond capacity and entire neighborhoods evacuated virtually overnight. Syrian authorities have cautioned displaced families against returning due to unexploded ordnance and ongoing security operations.

International dimensions complicate the conflict: Damascus accuses SDF forces of shelling a university housing complex, while Turkey—viewing the SDF as linked to the outlawed PKK—has threatened military action if integration agreements aren’t honored. The United States, through envoy Tom Barrack, welcomed the temporary ceasefire and advocated for its extension.

Concurrently, in Damascus, President Ahmed al-Sharaa met with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen—the highest-ranking EU official to visit since Sharaa’s 2024 inauguration—who pledged Europe’s support for Syria’s recovery despite the ongoing tensions.