分类： politics

As Japan gathered in Hiroshima on Thursday to mark 81 years since the 1945 U.S. atomic bombing, the somber commemoration was overshadowed by growing public and global pushback against controversial pro-nuclear remarks from senior Japanese government officials.

Held at Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park, the annual memorial brought renewed attention to a dramatic shift in Japan’s long-standing post-war security posture, which has been anchored since 1971 by the Three Non-Nuclear Principles — a framework that bans Japan from possessing, manufacturing, or allowing the entry of nuclear weapons into its territory. In recent months, top ruling officials have broken decades of taboo to openly call for unrestricted debate over revising these principles, triggering widespread alarm.

Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, who attended the ceremony, struck a familiar public note, stating that as the only nation to have suffered wartime nuclear attacks, Japan bears a unique mission to work toward global nuclear disarmament. But when pressed by reporters on whether the Three Non-Nuclear Principles would be revised during this year’s update of the country’s three core national security documents, Takaichi refused to give a clear denial, telling *The Asahi Shimbun* that it would be inappropriate to prejudge the final wording of the documents. Neither Takaichi nor Hiroshima Mayor Kazumi Matsui — who used his address to highlight the catastrophic human cost of nuclear weapons and called for multilateral nonproliferation efforts — acknowledged the full historical context of the 1945 bombings that ended World War II.

Political analysts say the incremental string of provocative nuclear-related statements from Japanese officials is a deliberate strategy to test public opinion and lay groundwork for abandoning the country’s post-war pacifist security commitments. “The government is gradually reshaping Japan’s deep-rooted domestic anti-nuclear sentiment through these small, repeated shifts in rhetoric,” explained Hiroshi Shiratori, a political science professor at Tokyo’s Hosei University. Last month, Japanese Defense Minister Shinjiro Koizumi went as far as stating that Japan should debate all aspects of nuclear policy “without taboos,” including a rewrite of the decades-old Non-Nuclear Principles. Late last year, a senior security and defense advisor to the Prime Minister’s Office publicly stated Japan should acquire its own nuclear weapons.

Since taking office in October last year, the Takaichi administration has already advanced revisions to Japan’s core national security documents and repeatedly raised the prospect of rolling back the Three Non-Nuclear Principles’ “no introduction” rule. Proponents of the change argue it would strengthen the credibility of the U.S. nuclear “extended deterrence” arrangement, under which Washington commits to defending Japan using its full military arsenal, including nuclear weapons. But critics warn the shift puts Japan at greater, not reduced, risk. “Japan-U.S. consultations on nuclear deterrence do not lower Japan’s risk of nuclear attack,” said Ukeru Magosaki, a former Japanese foreign ministry official and current director of the Tokyo-based East Asian Community Institute. “Instead, these talks expand Washington’s nuclear strike options against other nuclear-armed states, which makes Japan far more likely to become a target itself.”

The Takaichi administration’s increasingly assertive pro-nuclear security agenda stands in stark opposition to the strong anti-nuclear and anti-war sentiment held by the majority of the Japanese public. *The Tokyo Shimbun* reported that since Takaichi took office, at least 128 local assemblies across 36 of Japan’s prefectures have submitted formal written petitions to the national parliament urging the government to preserve the Three Non-Nuclear Principles — a record high for such advocacy. Magosaki added that upholding the principles is not just a symbolic commitment: it is the foundation of Japan’s own security, because a non-nuclear Japan poses no threat to neighboring countries, strengthening regional stability.

The shift has also drawn sharp criticism from China, which condemned Japanese right-wing forces for exploiting the country’s status as a nuclear attack victim to gain international sympathy while advancing plans to acquire nuclear capabilities. “Japanese right-wing forces have long distorted historical fact and deliberately downplayed Japan’s wartime invasion, which killed and wounded tens of millions of people in neighboring Asian countries, all to escape accountability for their war crimes,” said Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian in an online statement Thursday. Lin added that the Japanese government has recently accelerated large-scale military buildup, sought enhanced nuclear protection from the U.S., and actively worked to break free from the constraints of the Three Non-Nuclear Principles. China urged Tokyo to honor its binding nuclear nonproliferation obligations under international law and abandon its moves to erode post-war security commitments.

Shiratori added that the Takaichi administration’s broader policy shifts — including easing restrictions on arms exports under Japan’s Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology — make clear that the current government no longer prioritizes Japan’s long-standing pacifist principles, signaling a historic break from the post-war order that has shaped East Asia for nearly 80 years.

For almost 30 years, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has anchored his political power on a foundational alliance with ultra-Orthodox Jewish political parties, a partnership that has kept him in office through multiple terms. But as he prepares for one of the most competitive elections of his decades-long career, that long-standing governing coalition faces unprecedented strain, with the decades-long dispute over mandatory military conscription for ultra-Orthodox men pushing the partnership to a breaking point. The escalating conflict has laid bare deep fissures within Netanyahu’s right-wing bloc, leaving political observers questioning whether his two most reliable allies—United Torah Judaism (UTJ) and Shas, partners since his first term as prime minister in 1996—could abandon his bloc to align with a rival government. “There is deep disappointment and anger across the ultra-Orthodox public about their current standing,” Pnina Pfeuffer, director general of the Ultra-Orthodox Public Organisation, a civil society group focused on the community, told Middle East Eye. Pfeuffer notes that the future political alignment of ultra-Orthodox parties is now so uncertain that a break from Netanyahu is no longer a far-fetched scenario—including a potential shift to a government led by Gadi Eisenkot, Netanyahu’s most formidable challenger in years. “Eisenkot is not viewed as anti-ultra-Orthodox by the community,” she explained, referencing the former Israel Defense Forces chief’s reputation among religious voters. Avi-ram Tzoreff, an Israeli historian and human rights activist specializing in Jewish cultural, political and religious history, says the growing rift between Netanyahu and his ultra-Orthodox allies has opened unexpected new pathways for Israel’s opposition. “There is clearly a rupture between the ultra-Orthodox community and the right-wing bloc,” Tzoreff told MEE. Echoing a common slogan chanted at anti-conscription protests, Tzoreff added: “The ultra-Orthodox as a political force have made their position clear: they would rather die than be drafted. The alliance between ultra-Orthodox parties and the right is no longer a foregone conclusion.” Tzoreff argues that an Eisenkot-led opposition bloc could leverage these internal divisions to break apart what he calls the Israeli right’s “unnatural political alliance” with the ultra-Orthodox. For opposition parties aiming to oust Netanyahu, he says, a full rethink of traditional coalition-building strategies is necessary. “Once political alliances are structured around the question of ultra-Orthodox military conscription, it becomes far harder to build broad, inclusive coalitions,” he explained. “If the centre-left wants to take power, it needs to redefine how it draws the boundaries of its political camp.” The long-running exemption of ultra-Orthodox men from compulsory military service has existed for decades, allowing the group to focus on full-time religious study at yeshivas. But the issue exploded into Israel’s most divisive political flashpoint after the launch of Israel’s war on Gaza, which has seen hundreds of thousands of reservists mobilized for active duty. The unprecedented demand for military manpower has massively intensified public pressure to end the long-standing exemption. Netanyahu’s governing coalition has repeatedly failed to pass new legislation to regulate ultra-Orthodox conscription, triggering mass protests organized and backed by UTJ and Shas, and leading to the detention of dozens of ultra-Orthodox men charged with draft evasion. Last year, lawmakers from both ultra-Orthodox parties resigned from their cabinet posts to protest the coalition’s failure to advance a draft law that met their demands, though they continued to cooperate with the government on core legislative priorities. The dispute has also split Netanyahu’s own Likud party, where multiple sitting lawmakers have characterized attempts to pass a new conscription law that preserves most exemptions for ultra-Orthodox communities as an unacceptable concession to the alliance partners. Dan Illouz, a Knesset member who left Likud last month over the issue, told Israeli outlet Ynet that the right-wing bloc “has become idolatry” that “undermines our ability to advance right-wing economic and security policy,” including guaranteeing the Israeli military has sufficient personnel to meet its operational needs. For their part, ultra-Orthodox leaders have openly questioned their decades-long partnership with Netanyahu in recent months. In May, Rabbi Dov Lando, the influential spiritual leader of Degel HaTorah—one of the two factions that make up UTJ—publicly declared that “we no longer have trust in Netanyahu,” adding that the party was no longer politically “committed to him.” Last month, a senior Degel HaTorah official told Israeli newspaper Ma’ariv that “there is no such thing as a right-wing bloc anymore,” noting the party would open coalition negotiations with any political bloc that agrees to meet its core demands on conscription. Beyond the immediate tensions within Netanyahu’s coalition, the conscription dispute has laid bare deep ideological rifts among Israel’s ultra-Orthodox leadership over the country’s military campaigns and the role of the secular state. While most opposition parties across the political spectrum agree that ultra-Orthodox men should be required to serve, analysts say the debate also reflects starkly diverging views on Israel’s war in Gaza and broader regional military engagement. Those differences were thrown into sharp relief last month, when 96-year-old Rabbi Lando delivered an unusually harsh rebuke of the Religious Zionist movement, whose supporters have played a high-profile role in both the Gaza war and the expansion of Israeli settlements in the occupied West Bank. “They wage wars not for the sake of rescue, only for the sake of the state’s honour,” Lando said, accusing Religious Zionists of being “evil” and murderers. His comments drew widespread condemnation from across Israel’s political landscape, including from Netanyahu, who called the remarks “awful” and rejected them outright. But Lando’s statements are consistent with his long-held ideological positions. Last year, he claimed Religious Zionists had “brought physical disasters, not only spiritual ones, upon the Jewish people,” arguing that Zionist actions had left Arabs hating Jews “like never before.” Pfeuffer argues that Lando’s remarks should not be read as a direct political challenge to Netanyahu’s coalition. “Rabbi Lando is expressing an ethics-based position on the situation, not a political one, and as evidence, he never demanded leaving the government over the war,” she told MEE. Instead, she says the comments reflect a long-standing ultra-Orthodox worldview that distances the community from the Israeli state’s core military ethos. “The ultra-Orthodox don’t perceive the war as their own,” Pfeuffer said, noting that over the course of the nearly 10-month conflict, “life continued fairly normally” in ultra-Orthodox communities across Israel and the occupied West Bank. Even without immediate political fallout, Pfeuffer says Lando’s intervention is significant because it offers a clear alternative to the dominant Israeli narrative surrounding the war. “It represents moderation and restraint, which stems from a perception that our place in this land is not guaranteed and that we need to live alongside our enemies,” she explained. Tzoreff echoes that analysis, noting that Lando’s comments stem from a deeply held theological position rather than a tactical political move. “If you send someone to kill in the name of the honour of the state, you’re actually elevating the theological status of the state at the expense of Torah study,” he said. “This isn’t just a random statement. It was released to the media, and even if it doesn’t currently have broad public traction, its purpose was to build support for this position over time.” Even so, Lando’s anti-war, anti-conscription position sits uneasily with a broader shift toward the right among parts of Israel’s ultra-Orthodox electorate. According to Pfeuffer, far-right National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir has made significant inroads among traditional Shas and UTJ voters, complicating the political calculations of ultra-Orthodox party leaders. “Part of Shas’s constituency aren’t classic Shas voters—they could vote for Ben Gvir or Likud, because they don’t live strictly ultra-Orthodox lives. Therefore, Shas needs to show that it is part of the right-wing bloc and aligned with Netanyahu,” she explained. While Pfeuffer notes that Shas remains far more committed to Netanyahu’s coalition than UTJ, Tzoreff says the party has steadily drifted toward the far right since the 2013 death of its founding spiritual leader, Rabbi Ovadia Yosef. Shas, he says, has “undergone a process of Ben Gvirization,” as hardline religious figures such as the late Rabbi Meir Mazuz have gained increasing influence over the party’s policy and ideological direction. “Rabbi Ovadia was a bulwark against moving rightward,” Tzoreff explained. “Since the revered spiritual leader’s death, Shas has been struggling to set clear red lines. The party’s leadership, similar to other parties, doesn’t act to lead public opinion, but acts to please it.” Tzoreff says this rightward shift extends beyond Shas, pointing to increasingly close ties between ultra-Orthodox communities and Israel’s settler movement, as well as the growing adoption of nationalist rhetoric within many ultra-Orthodox communities. He also notes the strengthening of links between settlers and ultra-Orthodox communities in the occupied West Bank, alongside the growing acceptance of the idea that Torah study itself contributes to Israel’s national security. “But on the other hand, there’s a strong movement against military conscription,” he added. For Israel’s opposition parties, Tzoreff argues, this internal contradiction within the ultra-Orthodox community creates a unique political opening. “The role of the centre-left is to divide and conquer within the right-wing bloc,” he said. Rather than automatically ruling out cooperation with ultra-Orthodox parties, he says Netanyahu’s opponents should pursue pragmatic engagement with the group. “They need to consider partnership with the UTJ and Shas not out of idealization of the ultra-Orthodox, but because there is a political opening that can be exploited,” he added.

As Israel prepares for its pivotal national election on October 27, a striking political shift is reshaping the country’s opposition landscape, with almost all anti-Netanyahu leaders moving to rule out power-sharing coalitions with Palestinian Arab parties – a reversal of the historic 2021 power-sharing arrangement that ended Benjamin Netanyahu’s 12-year tenure in office.

Gadi Eisenkot, a retired Israeli general and leader of the Yashar party who has emerged as a key contender for prime minister, was the latest opposition figure to formalize this stance during a recent security conference hosted by Israeli outlet Yedioth Ahronoth and the Institute for National Security Studies. He announced his goal of forming a self-described “Zionist majority” government holding 63 to 64 parliamentary seats. If he cannot secure this threshold, he said he would pressure ultra-Orthodox parties to join his bloc, and would call for fresh elections rather than turn to Palestinian Arab parties for support.

Eisenkot’s position reflects a broader trend across the anti-Netanyahu camp. Former prime minister Yair Lapid and former alternate prime minister Naftali Bennett, who jointly partnered with the United Arab List (Ra’am) – a Palestinian Arab party – to oust Netanyahu in 2021 and defended that partnership as a necessary political experiment at the time, now echo Eisenkot’s refusal to collaborate with Palestinian Arab factions. This shift comes despite repeated public statements from Ra’am leader Mansour Abbas affirming his willingness to negotiate with any Jewish-majority bloc seeking to replace Netanyahu.

Political analysts trace this sharp reversal directly to the post-7 October 2023 security and political context that has transformed Israeli public opinion. Following the Hamas-led attacks, cooperation with Palestinian Arab parties has been framed by right-wing factions as a compromise on both national security and the Jewish identity of the Israeli state. This framing has made any outreach politically toxic for opposition parties, even centrist blocs that previously supported inclusion. Data from the December 2025 Israel Democracy Institute Democracy Index underscores this shift: 71.5% of Jewish Israelis now oppose including Palestinian Arab parties in any governing coalition, and a separate 2025 Institute for National Security Studies survey found 57% of all Israelis reject the creation of a Palestinian state under any circumstances, reflecting a broad hardening of public sentiment.

Palestinian political analyst Ehab Jabareen argues that Netanyahu and his right-wing bloc spent years weaponizing the question of collaboration with Palestinian Arab parties, successfully framing any cooperation as politically illegitimate. “Today, the political cost of being seen as close to Palestinian Arab parties has become very high,” Jabareen explained to Middle East Eye. While he notes that some opposition blocs may still quietly leave open the option of partnering with Palestinian Arab parties if parliamentary math leaves no other path to power, few are willing to state this publicly during the campaign: “They keep the back door open, but the front door is locked.”

This new political landscape has forced Palestinian Arab parties – which represent the roughly 2 million Palestinian citizens of Israel, who make up 21% of the country’s total population – to rethink their electoral strategies. The community are descendants of Palestinians who remained on their land after the 1948 Nakba, when Zionist militias displaced an estimated 750,000 Palestinians to establish the state of Israel. After decades of systemic discrimination, Palestinian citizens formed political parties to advocate for civil equality, an end to the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories, and recognition of Palestinian national rights. For decades, these parties remained on the margins of Israeli politics, as collaboration with governing coalitions was viewed as toxic by both most Jewish voters and many Palestinian citizens. That taboo was only broken in 2021, when Ra’am’s four seats provided the critical margin for Bennett and Lapid to form their narrow majority.

Now that the taboo has reasserted itself, Ra’am’s Abbas has adopted a bold new approach to expand the party’s influence: Israeli media has confirmed that the party has reached a preliminary agreement to add former Yesh Atid lawmaker Yoav Segalovich, a Jewish politician, to its electoral list. A recent Channel 13 poll projects this move could boost Ra’am’s seat count from the currently projected five to an unprecedented seven seats.

Jabareen argues that Abbas’ strategy is targeted at three distinct audiences. For Palestinian Arab voters, he positions himself as the only leader pursuing pragmatic, achievable political progress. For the fragmented anti-Netanyahu camp, he leaves open a pathway to secure his party’s support if they cannot form a majority without it. And for the Israeli political establishment, he signals that Ra’am remains a reliable, institutional negotiating partner. But the strategy carries clear risks: “He is signalling a willingness to negotiate with a side that publicly says it has no interest in negotiating with him,” Jabareen notes. “That creates an image of weakness because the balance of power is not in his favour.”

Other Palestinian party leaders reject the framing that Palestinian Arab factions should prioritize joining governing coalitions. Aida Touma-Sliman, a Knesset member from the Palestinian-led party Hadash, argues that the refusal of Jewish opposition parties to collaborate with Palestinian factions is not just about electoral calculations – it reflects deep-rooted ideological bias. “The leaders of these parties know the Israeli public does not want any partnership with Palestinian Arab parties after years of incitement,” she said. “They lack the courage to present a genuine alternative to the current government’s policies. In reality, they also hold Zionist and discriminatory positions.”

Touma-Sliman emphasized that Palestinian Arab representation in the Knesset has never been solely focused on joining ruling coalitions. Instead, it serves as a platform for political struggle: to represent Palestinian citizens, expose discriminatory government policies, and defend the community’s collective rights. Even as parliament becomes an increasingly hostile space, she argues that abandoning it would only erase Palestinian political influence at a critical moment: “our political weight is needed to confront fascism, even if that only means preventing the formation of another far-right government.”

For Jabareen, the core challenge facing Palestinian Arab parties extends far beyond the current election cycle or coalition negotiations. After years of centering campaigns around the question of which bloc they might support to form a government, he argues it is time for a fundamental reset, amid a dramatically shifted Israeli political landscape. “The important question is no longer who will invite us into a coalition,” he said. “The real question is how we rebuild Palestinian political power inside Israel over the next decade in a way that makes ignoring us politically costly.”

Current polling puts the Eisenkot-led anti-Netanyahu bloc and Netanyahu’s right-wing bloc in a dead heat. Some surveys suggest Eisenkot could secure a majority without support from Palestinian Arab parties, while others indicate neither bloc will be able to reach the required threshold without backing from Palestinian factions, leaving the final outcome of the October 27 election still deeply uncertain.

A high-stakes upcoming hearing in the UK legal system will determine whether five Palestine Action activists, already convicted of felony criminal damage, will be subjected to exceptional terrorist sentencing, a move that has sparked fierce criticism over judicial process and overreach.

The five defendants – Brendon O’Hagan, 28, Amanda Kelly, 31, Hmeera Atiqnisar, 31, Mohammed Malik, 28, and 70-year-old Alma Yaniv – were found guilty by a jury in June 2026 of causing more than £212,000 (equivalent to $283,000) in intentional damage to a Barclays bank location in Burnley back in August 2024. Notably, their direct action protest at the branch took place months before the UK government officially proscribed Palestine Action as a terrorist organization, and this specific incident is not included among the three group-related events the government has formally designated as terrorist activity – all of which are alleged to have caused more than £1 million in damage each.

What has made this case unprecedented in legal procedure is that the question of terrorist sentencing was never raised to the jury during the entire trial process. After the guilty verdict was returned, the trial’s presiding judge, Phillip Parry, notified defense counsel that he would consider attaching a formal “terrorist connection” to the conviction, a designation that carries far harsher legal penalties. He then referred the sentencing decision to senior judge Robert Altham, who will hold a dedicated hearing on August 21 to rule on the terror designation, two weeks ahead of the formal sentencing scheduled for September 4.

Judge Altham’s involvement in the case has already drawn significant scrutiny from activist and legal circles. A 2018 review by the UK Court of Appeal found that Altham had handed down “manifestly excessive” prison sentences to a group of anti-fracking activists convicted of public nuisance during a protest near Blackpool. The appellate court ruled the sentences were wholly inappropriate and ordered the immediate release of all activists. One of those activists, Simon Roscoe Blevins, who received a 16-month custodial sentence from Altham in 2018, has publicly criticized Altham’s role in the current case.

“It is surely another gross overreach to add a terror connection to sentencing after failing to mention the possibility at any point before or during trial,” Blevins said. “And given his history, Judge Altham in particular cannot be trusted to make a fair ruling on this.”

Criticism has also come directly from Palestine Action leadership. Huda Ammori, co-founder of the group, called Altham’s appointment to decide the terror designation “shocking.” Ammori noted that in both the current Barclays case and a separate high-profile Palestine Action case tried recently near Bristol, juries were given no indication that a criminal damage conviction could open the door to terrorist sentencing.

“In both the Filton and the Barclays cases, the jury operated under the clear impression they were only deciding whether criminal damage occurred,” Ammori explained. “They had no idea that a conviction for this straightforward offense would effectively amount to convicting the defendants of terrorism.”

The move to pursue terrorist designation follows a precedent set in the recent Filton case, where four activists convicted of criminal damage at an Elbit Systems facility were sentenced as terrorists despite only being convicted of non-terrorism criminal charges. Judge Parry circulated that ruling by Justice Johnson, the presiding judge in that case, to legal teams in the current Barclays trial after the conclusion of proceedings. The Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) has since formally backed applying the terror sentencing, even though it never raised the possibility during the trial itself.

On the 81st anniversary of the 1945 atomic bombing of Hiroshima, a senior Chinese foreign ministry spokesman has underscored two critical global lessons that must never be forgotten. Speaking in Beijing on Thursday, spokesman Lin Jian made the position clear in a formal response to a media query surrounding the annual commemoration of the Hiroshima attack.

First, Lin emphasized that the widespread death and destruction inflicted by nuclear weapons must never be allowed to be repeated in any conflict around the world. Beyond the horror of the Hiroshima bombing, he added, the catastrophic legacy of Japanese militarism’s decades of aggression and expansion across Asia must remain a permanent warning to the international community, to prevent the world from repeating the mistakes of violent expansionism.

Lin also issued a clear call for Japanese authorities: Japan must openly acknowledge the security and international concerns surrounding its current nuclear policy and related actions, and strictly uphold its commitments to nuclear non-proliferation obligations as required by international law. The statement comes amid growing regional and global attention to Japan’s nuclear posture and historical memory of World War II aggression in East Asia.

The commemoration of the Hiroshima bombing, which killed more than 140,000 people when the United States dropped the first atomic weapon used in warfare, annually sparks global reflections on the dangers of nuclear proliferation and the importance of upholding historical truth about World War II. This year’s remarks from the 81st anniversary has drawn particular significance as international tensions around nuclear policy continue to rise in multiple regions.