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Turkey’s fractured main opposition bloc entered a new phase of upheaval this week, when former Republican People’s Party (CHP) chairman Ozgur Ozel announced plans to formally launch a new political force — named Yeni Parti, or New Party — on Monday, capping months of escalating internal and judicial conflict that has gutted the decades-old CHP.

The schism traces back to the CHP’s historic victory in the 2024 Turkish local elections, where the party swept most of the country’s major urban centers and claimed the largest share of the national vote, positioning it as the most credible threat to President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s long-running rule ahead of the 2028 presidential and parliamentary polls. Within months, a wave of judicial investigations targeted CHP leadership and elected officials, leading to the arrest of 26 CHP mayors on corruption charges — including Ekrem Imamoglu, the widely popular mayor of Istanbul.

A separate legal case accused Ozel of securing the CHP chairmanship through bribery and improper lobbying. In May, a Turkish court annulled the party congress that elected Ozel, removed him from office, and reinstated former CHP leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu as interim pending the outcome of Ozel’s appeal. Since his return, Kilicdaroglu has rejected repeated calls from party members to hold an extraordinary congress to resolve the leadership dispute, instead purging senior party officials aligned with Ozel and Imamoglu. Many Ankara-based political analysts suspect Kilicdaroglu’s reinstatement was quietly supported by Erdogan’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) as part of a deliberate strategy to split the opposition. To date, the judicial pressure and internal chaos have already pushed several sitting CHP mayors to defect to the AKP.

As the party’s power struggle intensified, Ozel opted to break away entirely, building a new movement that is expected to draw the vast majority of the CHP’s sitting lawmakers and provincial leadership. Reports indicate that 94 of the CHP’s 135 members of parliament and 74 of its 81 provincial chairs will join Ozel’s new party. A small group of Ozel-aligned officials will remain in the original CHP, however, to block Kilicdaroglu from consolidating full control over the remaining rump party.

The split has created a complex new political calculus for Erdogan, carrying both clear short-term advantages and long-term risks for his bid to retain power in 2028. In the immediate term, the divided opposition plays directly into the AKP’s strategic goals. The opposition already lost significant momentum after months of legal pressure on the CHP, and a split into rival factions leaves no unified challenger to Erdogan. If the fractured opposition fields multiple presidential candidates, political strategists widely expect that split to enable Erdogan to win outright in the first round of voting.

This advantage has been compounded by Erdogan’s ongoing 2024 peace process with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which has pulled the pro-Kurdish Dem Party away from the broader opposition alliance, giving the government unobstructed political space to advance its corruption cases against CHP leaders. Polling also suggests that Kilicdaroglu retains very little support among the CHP’s original voter base: only 5 to 10 percent of CHP voters say they will remain with the party under his leadership. Multiple surveys indicate Ozel’s new party could capture more than 30 percent of the national vote, surpassing the AKP’s current support share — the CHP won 37 percent of the vote in the 2024 local elections.

Still, even with this strong initial showing, the split could benefit Erdogan in parliamentary elections, where tightly contested constituencies often swing to the candidate or party with even a narrow lead. A pollster affiliated with the AKP told Middle East Eye that the new party’s initial momentum is likely to fade over time, and the AKP’s internal leadership sees Ozel as a preferable opponent to other potential challengers. Despite Ozel’s growing popularity, AKP strategists believe he would struggle to win a nationwide head-to-head contest against Erdogan. With Kilicdaroglu also expected to field his own presidential candidate, the opposition vote will be further fragmented, easing Erdogan’s path to victory.

One major wild card in the current political equation is Mansur Yavas, the popular incumbent mayor of Ankara. Multiple independent polls consistently show Yavas leading Erdogan by 15 to 20 percentage points, making him the opposition’s strongest potential presidential candidate. Yavas has thus far signaled he intends to remain in the CHP, but Ozel-aligned officials privately warn that Yavas could face his own corruption investigations if he solidifies his position as the leading opposition challenger. Erdogan’s current approval rating sits between 35 and 40 percent, but polling analysts note he could push that figure close to 50 percent through a well-executed populist campaign ahead of 2028.

Despite these short-term gains for the ruling party, the emergence of Ozel’s new party carries significant long-term risks for Erdogan and the AKP. For decades, Erdogan built successful election campaigns by framing the CHP as an elitist, bureaucratic, statist movement disconnected from ordinary Turkish voters, tying it to unpopular historical policies such as the university headscarf ban. That messaging has resonated deeply with conservative and Islamist constituencies for decades. Ozel’s new party carries none of the CHP’s historical baggage, leaving it free to build a cross-spectrum coalition.

If Ozel succeeds in building a broad center-left movement that unites voters across Turkey’s political divide, while rolling out a credible policy platform focused on restoring independent institutions and repairing Turkey’s struggling economy, the new party could emerge as a formidable long-term challenger to AKP rule. A recent joint poll conducted by the IstanPol think tank and Rawest Research, which surveyed 1,985 respondents across 20 Turkish cities between July 3 and 10, found that 55.9 percent of all respondents believe the new party can succeed. Support for the project is particularly high among opposition voters: 81 percent of CHP supporters, 72 percent of Dem Party voters, and 61 percent of nationalist IYI Party voters expressed confidence in the new party. Notably, even 67 percent of voters from the AKP’s coalition partner, the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), and 45 percent of AKP voters said they believe the new party can achieve full or partial success.

Political analysts argue the new movement has an opportunity to avoid the organizational weaknesses that have long hampered the CHP, including an overcentralized structure that relies on tightly controlled local branches with little engagement with broader civil society. Kemal Buyukyuksel, an analyst at George Mason University, wrote for independent outlet Progresif that the new party should not model itself on traditional, centralized political organizations. Instead, he argued, it can function as a broad political space that incorporates elements of civil society and grassroots social movements. “Instead of being a machine that plans everything from the central office, the party can become a platform that opens up space for social initiatives emerging in different places, connects them, and gives them a common political direction,” Buyukyuksel explained.

A closed-door Sudan-focused gathering organized by the UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office at the Wilton Park conference facility has sparked sharp international criticism after independent outlet Middle East Eye exposed that a senior leader from the political wing of Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF) will attend the event – while the country’s internationally recognized army-backed transitional government has been excluded from the agenda.

Multiple verified British and Sudanese sources confirm that Nasredeen Abdulbari, a top figure in the RSF-aligned Tasis political coalition, will participate in the three-day conference, which kicked off Wednesday, alongside an official delegation from the United Arab Emirates. Sources familiar with the event’s planning describe the gathering as intentionally kept “discreet,” with no public listing on Wilton Park’s official event schedule, a departure from the facility’s standard transparency practices for most of its dialogues.

The controversial invitation to the RSF representative and UAE delegates follows damning recent testimony to a UK parliamentary committee from Nathaniel Raymond, executive director of Yale University’s Humanitarian Research Lab. Raymond publicly accused the UK government of prioritizing its close strategic and economic ties with the UAE over taking meaningful action to halt widespread atrocities in Sudan’s ongoing civil conflict.

Sudan has been locked in a brutal civil war since April 2023, pitting the RSF paramilitary group against the country’s formal Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). The RSF, which the United Nations, United States and multiple independent human rights bodies have formally accused of perpetrating genocide in Sudan’s Darfur region, has long been documented receiving military and political backing from the UAE – a claim the UAE has repeatedly denied despite growing open source evidence. The SAF, by contrast, receives external support from Egypt and Turkey.

In a striking contradiction of the UK’s public posture on the Sudan conflict, British officials joined a joint statement with other European nations in June 2024 that openly condemned RSF atrocities, specifically referencing the group’s October 2023 seizure of el-Fasher, the capital of North Darfur. The statement noted that UN assessments found the violence carried out during that assault carried “the hallmarks of genocide,” with witness accounts collected by Middle East Eye confirming systemic rape, summary executions, and extortion of civilian populations by RSF fighters.

Beyond Abdulbari and the UAE delegation, Wilton Park officials have confirmed that representatives from several other Gulf states will also take part in the closed conference. Founded in the aftermath of World War II to foster open democratic dialogue between global stakeholders, Wilton Park brands itself as the UK’s “foremost multilateral facilitator” and acts as an official expert body for the UK government to convene sensitive international policy discussions.

When reached by Middle East Eye for clarification on attendee lists and the purpose of the confidential gathering, the UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office declined to issue any comment. A senior foreign office source, speaking on condition of anonymity, only confirmed that the event was proceeding as planned, and a Wilton Park staff member also verified that the conference was scheduled and underway at the facility’s Wiston House estate in West Sussex.

The exclusion of Sudan’s official Transitional Sovereignty Council has drawn fierce condemnation from the Sudanese government. Amgad Fareid Eltayeb, a senior adviser to the council, slammed the UK’s decision as inconsistent with its public rhetoric around human rights and accountability in Sudan.

“We saw a lot of statements from the US and UK governments showing concern about what the RSF would do if they took el-Fasher. It’s the same rhetoric we still hear, the same talk… But while the British government is echoing concern about possible crimes committed by the RSF, a possible genocide committed by the RSF, they have invited RSF affiliates to England to discuss the future of Sudan,” Eltayeb told Middle East Eye.

“Anything that needs to be discreet is hiding something that makes it necessary for it to be discreet. The UAE’s support for the RSF has been documented even by their own parliament, and so we have very little confidence or trust in what the British government is trying to do discreetly,” he added.

Critics have also pointed to deep economic ties between the UK and UAE that may inform the UK’s approach to the Sudan conflict. Official trade data shows the UK has exported £422 million ($565 million) worth of arms to the UAE over the past three years, and independent open source investigations have already confirmed British-made military equipment originating from the UAE has been recovered from RSF fighters on Sudan battlefields.

For Eltayeb, this creates an unmistakable pattern of contradictory behavior: “We can see a pattern of complicity here. They issue statements of concern about the RSF possibly committing genocide, then invite their leadership to discuss the future of Sudan.”

A veteran British policy expert with decades of experience working on Sudanese peace negotiations, who spoke on condition of anonymity to avoid professional repercussions, called the exclusion of key Sudanese stakeholders from the conference “fairly outrageous.” The expert noted that many longstanding Sudanese peace advocates and experienced negotiators were not only uninvited but completely unaware the conference was being organized.

The controversial gathering comes just 48 hours after former Labour Party leader Ed Miliband was appointed as the UK’s new foreign secretary in Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s new cabinet. Notably, Miliband did not mention Sudan or its ongoing civil war in his opening public address after taking office, as the new UK government has prioritized other pressing foreign policy issues including the war in Ukraine, rising tensions with Iran, and the ongoing conflict in Gaza. Miliband’s brother, David Miliband, currently serves as CEO of the International Rescue Committee, a major humanitarian organization operating in Sudan.

Diplomatic sources, however, tell Middle East Eye that some Sudanese and international stakeholders hold tentative hope that Miliband will take a harder stance against the UAE’s role in fueling the Sudan conflict, which the UN has classified as the world’s worst current humanitarian crisis. More than a year into the war, official estimates place the death toll at hundreds of thousands, and over 14 million Sudanese have been displaced from their homes.

Escalating tensions in the Middle East have taken a sharp turn as former U.S. President Donald Trump has publicly threatened a forthcoming military strike on Pickaxe Mountain, a heavily fortified underground nuclear facility that lies at the heart of fresh Israeli claims about Iran’s contested nuclear program. Speaking on Tuesday, amid ongoing U.S. military operations targeting Iranian assets, Trump stated bluntly: “We’ll be hitting that area very probably pretty soon. And there’s not a thing they can do about it.”

In response to the threat, Tehran has issued a stern warning that any attack on its sovereign nuclear facilities will trigger a broadening of the ongoing regional conflict, raising fears of a wider war that could engulf the entire Middle East. The core of the current dispute centers on Israeli allegations that Iran relocated enriched uranium stocks and advanced centrifuges to the Pickaxe Mountain facility after earlier joint U.S.-Israeli strikes damaged other key Iranian nuclear sites. Notably, Israel has yet to release any verifiable evidence to support these claims, and Trump himself has openly acknowledged that U.S. intelligence agencies cannot confirm Jerusalem’s assertion.

Located just 1.6 kilometers south of the Natanz uranium enrichment complex in central Iran – a site that was heavily bombed by U.S. and Israeli forces in June 2025 – Pickaxe Mountain is purpose-built to withstand military attack. Carved at least 100 meters beneath the surface of Kuh-e Kolang Gaz La, a mountain named for the Persian word for “pickaxe”, the facility is nearly impervious to conventional air strikes and would pose enormous challenges to any ground incursion. Construction of the site first began in 2020, following a damaging explosion at a centrifuge assembly workshop within the original Natanz complex. Iran formally notified the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that the facility was intended to manufacture centrifuges for uranium enrichment operations.

Analysis of satellite imagery conducted by the Institute for Science and International Security reveals an extensive network of tunnels, a broad heavily guarded security perimeter, and blast-resistant concrete-reinforced entrances designed to survive heavy air bombardment. As of current reporting, construction work remains ongoing, and no public evidence has emerged to confirm that the complex has begun full operations. Satellite imagery captured by Vantor on June 21, 2026, shows visible vehicle activity at the western entrance of the tunnel complex, confirming that work at the site has accelerated dramatically in the year following the June 2025 U.S.-Israeli attacks on Natanz and other Iranian nuclear sites.

The Center for Strategic and International Studies has outlined two leading explanations for the increased activity at Pickaxe Mountain: Iran may be accelerating completion of the declared centrifuge assembly plant it initially announced, or it has simply moved critical nuclear operations to the secured underground site after other facilities were damaged in the earlier bombings.

A key unresolved question hangs over the fact that the U.S. and Israel chose not to target Pickaxe Mountain during their 12-day offensive against Iranian nuclear infrastructure in 2025, raising doubts about the site’s purported strategic importance to Iran’s program at that time. During that earlier campaign, Israel first struck Iran’s core nuclear sites at Natanz, Isfahan and Fordow, killing multiple civilian Iranian nuclear scientists, before the U.S. joined the conflict, launching heavier bombing raids on the same three targets. Trump initially claimed the attacks had completely “obliterated” Iran’s nuclear capabilities, but subsequent assessments from U.S. and United Nations experts found that while the strikes caused extensive damage, significant portions of Iran’s nuclear program survived.

Since the 2025 offensive, Washington and Jerusalem have focused intense pressure on Iran over its existing stockpile of nearly 450 kilograms of highly enriched uranium, demanding that Tehran either surrender the material or permanently dispose of it. When pressed by reporters on whether Iran had indeed moved advanced centrifuges to Pickaxe Mountain, Trump contradicted Israel’s unsubstantiated claims, admitting: “We don’t have it on record.”

Iran has repeatedly denied conducting any undeclared nuclear activities at the Pickaxe Mountain site. The Iranian government maintains that its entire nuclear program is oriented toward peaceful civilian energy goals, and says it plans to expand its nuclear power fleet to meet growing domestic electricity demand, freeing up more of its oil reserves for export to global markets. The latest threat of a new strike has sent shockwaves through the international community, with experts warning that further escalation could have catastrophic consequences for global energy security and regional stability.