Iraq emerging as an accidental Iran war winner

In the rapidly shifting landscape of 21st-century Middle Eastern geopolitics, Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi has embarked on an ambitious, high-stakes diplomatic tour that underscores his country’s growing role as a critical bridge between competing global and regional powers. Fresh off a successful weeklong visit to the United States that concluded on July 19, 2026, where he held high-profile talks with President Donald Trump, al-Zaidi is set to travel next to Tehran to engage Iran’s new leadership, with additional stops planned for Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Syria in the weeks ahead.

This U.S. trip marked the first and most strategically significant stop on al-Zaidi’s broader regional diplomatic push, which aims to shore up domestic legitimacy for his new administration, attract much-needed foreign direct investment, and elevate Iraq’s standing as a key independent actor in the Middle East. A core goal of Baghdad’s current diplomatic strategy is to nurture closer ties with Washington while preserving its long-standing cooperative relationship with Tehran, even as tensions between the two powers reignite and disruptions to shipping in the Strait of Hormuz send economic shockwaves across the region. Al-Zaidi’s government is positioning Iraq as a neutral diplomatic intermediary, and a potential future host for formal Iran-U.S. negotiations, to cement this delicate, influential role.

The U.S. visit, which included a major high-level business summit and meetings with top American energy industry executives in Houston, was carefully structured to align with a new U.S. regional strategy that prioritizes expanded trade and investment across the Middle East, with Iraq at its center. As a close scholar of Middle Eastern geopolitics, this coordinated diplomatic push points to a profound transformation: Iraq is steadily emerging as a central strategic connector in a region increasingly defined by cross-border energy trade, infrastructure networks, and interconnected investment flows.

Iraq’s growing stature as a nexus for diplomacy and commerce stems from a combination of critical domestic changes and sweeping regional power shifts. The near-defeat of the Islamic State group across Iraq and the broader Middle East, paired with notable improvements in domestic security and Baghdad’s more assertive independent diplomacy, have dramatically expanded Iraq’s room for diplomatic maneuver. At the same time, the collapse of the Tehran-aligned Assad regime in Syria, the weakening of Iran’s regional proxy networks, and ongoing open confrontation between the U.S. and Iran have all amplified the strategic value of Iraq’s geographic position, state institutions, and existing cross-regional relationships. Today, as the regional balance of power is redrawn and Iran’s traditional network of influence is disrupted, Iraq has become an increasingly critical platform for military coordination, regional diplomacy, and cross-border economic connectivity.

Against this backdrop, al-Zaida’s choice to make the U.S. his first foreign trip as prime minister underscores a broader trend: nearly every major regional and global power is currently reassessing Iraq’s strategic importance. Iran, Arab Gulf states, and China have all deepened their diplomatic and economic engagement with Baghdad in recent years, each pursuing distinct policy goals but unified in their recognition of Iraq’s unique geostrategic position.

For Washington, this reassessment marks a clear break from the post-Iraq War framework that framed relations with Baghdad almost exclusively through the lenses of counterterrorism and military stabilization. Today, U.S. and Iraqi officials are building a far broader bilateral partnership, with new economic agreements focused on strengthening Iraq’s energy sector, modernizing its crumbling national infrastructure, and expanding private-sector investment. While security cooperation remains a core pillar of the relationship, it now serves a broader strategic goal: building a more resilient Iraqi state capable of managing competing external pressures and governing effectively across its territory.

For Tehran, Iraq has grown even more central to its regional strategy at a time when its geopolitical position across the Middle East has weakened. Iraq provides Iran with a critical strategic buffer, deep commercial ties, and an essential land corridor connecting Iran to its remaining partners across the Levant. As Iran’s other key regional allies, including Hezbollah and Yemen’s Houthi movement, face growing military and political pressure, maintaining Iran’s influence in Iraq has become a top strategic priority.

Arab Gulf states have also recalibrated their approach to Baghdad in recent years. While security concerns, particularly over Iraq’s close relationship with Iran, continue to shape their policy, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and other Gulf monarchies see Iraq’s post-Islamic State trajectory as a major opportunity for expanded engagement through investment, infrastructure development, and regional economic integration. A more stable, connected Iraq can link Gulf capital, markets, and infrastructure projects to global trade networks, while reducing the risk of regional instability spilling over from Iran.

China’s growing engagement with Iraq highlights another dimension of the country’s rising strategic importance. As Baghdad becomes an increasingly contested arena for geopolitical and commercial competition, Chinese firms face growing pressure to compete aggressively for infrastructure and energy contracts, while Beijing has stronger incentives than ever to deepen its ties to Baghdad to protect its existing regional influence. Yet China’s interests extend beyond securing market access and outcompeting other powers: a stable, economically viable Iraq serves Beijing as a reliable energy supplier and a potential hub for broader Eurasian regional connectivity. In this respect, outside of great-power competition, U.S. and Chinese interests in Iraq are broadly aligned.

Notably, these overlapping engagements with Iraq do not fit the traditional model of zero-sum competition between rival powers or blocs. Instead, they coexist, reflecting a deliberate strategy from Baghdad to diversify its external partnerships while avoiding dangerous over-reliance on any single global power.

What sets Iraq apart from other Middle Eastern states is not just its central geographic location, but the unique overlap of productive relationships it maintains with competing powers that few other countries in the region can match. Baghdad can engage Washington on security and energy cooperation, maintain deep political and commercial ties with Tehran, partner with Beijing on infrastructure development and trade, and collaborate with Gulf states on investment and regional connectivity. This unique position has allowed Iraq to take on the role of what analyst John Calabrese terms an “intermediary state” – a country whose influence stems from its ability to maintain connections to competing political, economic, and security networks, while shaping how those networks interact with one another.

Iraq’s emerging role offers a clear window into the broader transformation of Middle Eastern geopolitics. While military power and traditional alliances remain central to regional influence, power increasingly flows through the cross-border systems that connect economies and societies: energy infrastructure, electricity grids, logistics corridors, financial systems, and cross-border investment relationships. Going forward, states that can shape and lead these interconnected networks will hold the greatest influence over the region’s future.

Despite this unprecedented opportunity, Iraq faces significant structural and geopolitical challenges that threaten to derail its bid to convert strategic connectivity into lasting national advantage. The same overlapping relationships that boost Baghdad’s value also create powerful incentives for external powers to compete for influence within Iraq’s domestic political system. While strategic connectivity offers major new sources of leverage for Baghdad, without stronger, more unified national institutions, it can also deepen dependence on foreign powers and erode Iraqi sovereignty.

The most immediate challenge facing al-Zaidi’s government is consolidating full state authority across Iraqi territory. The prime minister’s push to bring non-state armed groups under formal government control will be a critical test of whether powerful Iran-aligned militias will be willing to give up the autonomy, political influence, and economic interests they have built up over two decades of conflict. Progress on disarmament and integration is likely to be uneven, particularly if rising regional tensions increase the value of these militias to Tehran.

Iraq’s fractured domestic political economy presents an equally formidable obstacle. Decades of patronage networks, systemic corruption, and fragmented governance continue to limit Baghdad’s ability to implement nationwide economic reforms, attract sustained long-term foreign investment, and translate external partnerships into broad-based, inclusive economic development for Iraqi citizens. Converting Iraq’s strategic importance into lasting national strength ultimately depends as much on building domestic institutional capacity as it does on maintaining productive foreign relationships.

External geopolitical dynamics will also continue to shape Iraq’s trajectory. Persistent deep distrust between Washington and Tehran ensures that Iraq will remain under pressure from competing powers seeking to pull Baghdad into their orbits. If the current escalation of U.S.-Iran hostilities spirals into a protracted, wider regional war, both Iraq’s ability to realize its strategic potential and the survival of the al-Zaidi government would be put at severe risk.

Looking ahead, China is unlikely to retreat from Iraq, where it has already become a leading trading partner and major infrastructure investor. Arab Gulf states will continue to pursue closer ties to a more stable, economically integrated Iraq, while Washington will remain invested in a sovereign Iraqi partner capable of resisting destabilizing pressure and balancing Chinese influence in the region. The core challenge for Baghdad will be managing these overlapping relationships effectively, ensuring that foreign partnerships strengthen Iraqi sovereignty rather than constrain it.