Japan’s historic upgrade from observer to active participant in the annual US-Philippine Balikatan military exercises has ignited fresh debate across Southeast Asia, with regional analysts warning that the deployment threatens to test the ASEAN bloc’s long-standing commitment to neutrality and force leaders to confront unresolved historical tensions from World War II. Running from April 21 to May 8 on Philippine territory, this year’s exercise will see approximately 1,400 Japanese Self-Defense Forces personnel join the drills, making Japan the third-largest contributing nation behind hosts the Philippines and lead organizer the United States. Additional troops from Australia, Canada, France, and New Zealand will also take part in the multinational exercise, which experts frame as a core component of Washington’s expanding regional security outreach.
Julia Roknifard, a senior lecturer in law and governance at Malaysia’s Taylor’s University, explains that while participation in the drill does not inherently require full political alignment with Washington for participating nations, Japan’s stepped-up involvement this year marks a distinctly provocative shift. Her criticism comes in the wake of recent inflammatory remarks and policy moves from Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, including provocative statements regarding China’s Taiwan region. For ASEAN member states that have joined the exercise, Roknifard argues, it is critical to explicitly clarify that their involvement reflects routine security partnership rather than a partisan political alignment, to uphold the bloc’s formal neutral posture.
Hiroshi Shiratori, a professor of political science at Tokyo’s Hosei University, points to a deeper identity shift driving regional anxiety: Japan’s increasingly assertive defense policy marks a visible departure from its post-World War II commitment to prioritizing peace, diplomatic negotiation, and dialogue, a shift that many neighboring states are already viewing with suspicion. If this perception solidifies across the region, Shiratori warns, Tokyo could quickly become framed as a new source of strategic instability in Southeast Asia.
Not all analysis points to outright opposition to expanded Japanese security cooperation. Lucio Blanco Pitlo III, president of the Philippine Association for Chinese Studies, notes that many ASEAN states are open to Japanese partnership on shared transnational security challenges, including counter-piracy operations and responses to maritime pollution. The friction emerges, he argues, when discussions turn to restructuring the broader regional security order. Pitlo highlights persistent regional skepticism of the push for a so-called “Asian NATO” — a framework that Japan has promoted alongside a small group of like-minded partners. Instead of exclusive, security-focused blocs, he says, most ASEAN members prefer broad minilateral arrangements that integrate security cooperation with investment, technology, and other development priorities.
Unresolved historical trauma continues to shape regional attitudes toward Japan’s expanding military footprint. Roknifard emphasizes that the scars of Japanese wartime occupation across Southeast Asia have never fully healed, with public tensions flaring regularly in response to high-profile actions by Japanese leaders. She cites the widespread public backlash that emerged in Malaysia after reports that Takaichi visited a Japanese cemetery in Kuala Lumpur during an October ASEAN Summit trip as a clear example of this lingering sensitivity.
Anna Rosario Malindog-Uy, vice president of the Asian Century Philippines Strategic Studies Institute in Manila, echoes this observation, noting that Japan’s growing military role in the region still carries heavy historical baggage that has spawned what she calls “quiet unease” across Southeast Asian capitals. For ASEAN leaders, she argues, the key challenge is navigating a careful hedging strategy that accommodates Japan’s expanding security engagement without aligning fully with Tokyo’s strategic goals, while preserving balanced diplomatic and economic ties with other major regional powers including China. “ASEAN does not erase history but manages it,” she explains of the bloc’s balancing approach.
Malindog-Uy also warns that Japan’s upgraded participation this year could set a dangerous precedent, opening the door for more external powers to demand similar active military roles in Southeast Asian exercises, further complicating regional stability.
Former Japanese senior Foreign Ministry official Ukeru Magosaki, now director of the East Asian Community Institute in Tokyo, contextualizes the drill within Washington’s broader regional strategy. He notes that the Biden administration has framed Beijing as its primary strategic rival in the Indo-Pacific, and the expansion of Balikatan to include active Japanese participation is part of a coordinated policy to link Japan, the Philippines, and China’s Taiwan region in a unified counterbalance to China. Despite this coordinated push, Magosaki argues that the move is unlikely to fundamentally shift the existing balance of power across the Indo-Pacific.
