标签： Asia

In a sudden announcement that has reshaped the trajectory of escalating tensions across the Persian Gulf, former US President Donald Trump revealed on Monday that Washington has scrapped plans to launch a full, large-scale military offensive against Iran, set to begin Tuesday. The decision came following a formal request from the top leaders of three key Gulf Arab allies to delay the attack amid ongoing diplomatic negotiations.

Trump made the announcement via his TruthSocial platform, stating that the Emir of Qatar Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud, and United Arab Emirates President Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan all urged the US to hold off on its planned military strike. The leaders argued that serious diplomatic talks were already underway, and their assessment as close US allies was that a mutually acceptable negotiated agreement could be reached, according to Trump’s post.

The outgoing president added that any prospective final deal would be very favorable to US interests, with one critical non-negotiable provision: Iran will permanently be barred from developing nuclear weapons. Trump emphasized that his deep respect for the three Gulf leaders guided his choice to accommodate their request, but made clear that the pause on military action is not permanent. He warned that US military forces remain fully postured to launch the full-scale large-scale assault against Iran at a moment’s notice if a viable, acceptable agreement fails to materialize through negotiations.

This latest development comes on the heels of nearly two months of open conflict across the region, triggered by a joint US-Israeli strike on Iran on February 28. Iran retaliated immediately, launching thousands of missiles and drones targeting Gulf Arab states, with the UAE bearing the brunt of the attack after normalizing relations with Israel in 2020 under the Abraham Accords. Almost 3,000 Iranian projectiles struck UAE territory, according to regional reports.

In mid-April, Pakistan brokered a fragile ceasefire that has paused large-scale open fighting, though low-level tensions and limited military action have continued. On Friday, Bloomberg reported that the UAE had recently attempted to rally Saudi Arabia and Qatar to back a coordinated joint military offensive against Iran in response to Tehran’s attacks, but the bid ultimately failed.

Shortly after the February 28 US-Israeli strike, Mohamed bin Zayed held a series of urgent calls with fellow Gulf leaders to push for the coordinated military response. But Saudi Arabia’s crown prince and other Gulf leaders rejected the proposal, sources confirmed. Despite the rebuff of the joint offensive plan, both Saudi Arabia and the UAE have launched independent retaliatory strikes against Iranian targets, recent reporting confirms.

The Wall Street Journal reported that the UAE targeted key Iranian energy infrastructure, carrying out a strike on Iran’s Lavan Island, a major Persian Gulf oil export hub, in early April around the time the ceasefire was announced. Saudi Arabia, by contrast, carried out limited, measured retaliatory strikes before quickly shifting its focus to supporting Pakistan’s mediation efforts, regional analysts note.

Last week, the Financial Times reported that Saudi Arabia has also circulated a proposal for a region-wide non-aggression pact between Iran and other Middle Eastern states, modeled on the 1970s Helsinki Accords that de-escalated Cold War tensions in Europe. The Saudi initiative has already earned backing from major European capitals and EU institutions, though it remains unclear whether the US and Israel will support the proposed framework.

Parallel to shifting regional diplomatic efforts, the conflict has drawn Israel and the UAE even closer strategically. Middle East Eye reported on Monday that the two countries have launched a joint defense acquisition fund to jointly purchase and develop next-generation weapons systems, deepening their security cooperation amid rising regional tensions.

Weeks after his high-profile meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing, former and current U.S. President Donald Trump has delivered an unprecedented public warning to Taiwan against moving toward formal independence, triggering immediate reactions from Taipei and sparking widespread debate over the future of U.S. policy in the Indo-Pacific.

In an interview with Fox News that aired Friday, Trump made his stance clear: “I’m not looking to have somebody go independent. And, you know, we’re supposed to travel 9,500 miles to fight a war. I’m not looking for that. I want them to cool down. I want China to cool down.” These remarks mark the most direct public pressure a sitting U.S. president has ever placed on Taiwan regarding its sovereignty status, leading to a quick response from Taipei.

Taiwanese officials reiterated their long-held position that the island sees no need for a formal declaration of independence, a stance that aligns with mainstream public sentiment on the self-governing island. To understand the stakes of this exchange, it is necessary to contextualize the decades-long historical and geopolitical backdrop of the Taiwan issue.

Following the 1949 conclusion of China’s civil war, the defeated Kuomintang government relocated to Taiwan, while the Chinese Communist Party established control over the mainland. Beijing has claimed the island as an inalienable part of its territory ever since, and Taiwan independence has stood as the most sensitive red line for Chinese leadership. Since President Xi Jinping took office, Beijing has ramped up its efforts to suppress perceived separatist activity, framing unification with Taiwan as an “unstoppable” historical priority. In recent years, this pressure has translated into regular military drills near the island, diplomatic campaigns to cut Taiwan’s global recognition, and persistent greyzone incursions into Taiwan’s airspace and territorial waters.

During his recent summit with Trump, Xi emphasized that the Taiwan question is the single most critical issue shaping U.S.-China relations, warning that mishandling the topic could lead to direct conflict. For decades, global observers have warned that any Chinese military move against Taiwan would likely draw in the U.S., which is legally bound by the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act to provide the island with defensive military capabilities. Under China’s 2005 Anti-Secession Law, Beijing retains the right to use “non-peaceful means” to assert its territorial claims if Taiwan formally declares independence or all options for peaceful unification are exhausted, making any move toward formal independence a potential trigger for regional war.

Today, most Taiwan residents, who live under a thriving democratic system distinct from mainland China’s increasingly authoritarian rule, support maintaining the status quo—neither formal independence nor unification with Beijing. This position is reflected in the official policy of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which has governed Taiwan since 2016. Current President Lai Ching-te, like his predecessor Tsai Ing-wen, has argued that Taiwan already functions as an independent sovereign state, so no formal declaration is necessary—a carefully calibrated approach designed to assert Taiwanese autonomy without crossing Beijing’s explicit red line. A formal declaration of independence would also require constitutional amendment approved by Taiwan’s legislature and a majority public vote in a referendum, making it logistically difficult for any administration to pursue even if it wanted to. Even so, Beijing remains deeply suspicious of the DPP, which historically advocated for formal sovereignty, and has repeatedly labeled Lai a dangerous separatist, accusing his administration of hijacking public opinion to push an independence agenda and building up military capabilities for confrontation. Lai has pushed back on these claims, noting that military strengthening is only a defensive measure in response to growing Chinese pressure.

Trump’s recent comments have upended long-standing expectations around U.S. policy on Taiwan. No U.S. administration has ever explicitly supported Taiwanese independence, and for decades Washington has maintained a carefully calibrated “strategic ambiguity” policy, neither confirming nor denying whether it would intervene militarily to defend the island. This policy emerged after 1979, when the U.S. severed formal diplomatic ties with Taiwan to establish relations with Beijing, acknowledging the one-China principle, while passing the Taiwan Relations Act to enshrine U.S. commitments to Taiwan’s defense. The act authorizes ongoing arms sales to Taiwan to support its self-defense capabilities.

Trump’s remarks have left analysts divided. During his summit, Trump noted that Xi “doesn’t want a movement for independence” in Taiwan, adding that he “heard him out” but did not offer a formal response. While Trump later stressed that “nothing’s changed” in U.S. policy and expressed openness to speaking directly with Lai— a move that would almost certainly draw fierce condemnation from Beijing, as it did when Trump spoke with a Taiwanese president early in his first term—many observers see his warning to Taiwan as an unusual break from past U.S. framing. Ryan Hass, a senior analyst at the Brookings Institution, argues that Trump’s “visible sympathy for Xi’s framing on Taiwan will embolden Beijing to increase pressure on Taipei, and elevated the risk of confrontation.”

All eyes are now turning to a pending $14 billion U.S. arms package for Taiwan, which follows an $11 billion weapons sale approved in December. After the Beijing summit, Trump declined to commit to finalizing the new package, telling Fox News the decision “depends on China” and that the proposal “is a very good negotiating chip for us frankly.” He later added that he would make a decision “over the next fairly short period.” This is not the first time a U.S. president has shaken up long-standing Taiwan policy rhetoric: former President Joe Biden twice publicly stated the U.S. would defend Taiwan if attacked, appearing to move away from strategic ambiguity, only for his administration to walk back the comments and clarify that official policy had not changed. For decades, U.S. policy on Taiwan has remained fundamentally consistent despite shifts in rhetoric. Now, regional and global powers are closely watching Trump’s next moves to see if the long-standing U.S. balancing act on the Taiwan issue is finally shifting.

Amid ongoing regional volatility sparked by the U.S.-Israeli campaign against Iran, the United Arab Emirates and Israel have established a joint investment fund dedicated to the co-acquisition and development of advanced defense systems, multiple current and former U.S. officials confirmed to Middle East Eye in exclusive reporting. This new initiative marks the deepest level of defense cooperation between Israel and an Arab nation to date, cemented during a visit to Abu Dhabi by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu amid active hostilities against Iran.

The current U.S. official, who spoke on condition of anonymity due to the sensitivity of the arrangements, outlined that the partnership will center on joint weapons procurement, with the UAE poised to inject capital into the advancement of Israeli air defense technologies. Specific areas of focus include Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems (C-UAS) and other integrated air defense platforms, and the former U.S. official added that a substantial sum of capital has already been committed to the fund, with future purchases expected to expand beyond air defense into other defense sectors.

Notably, Netanyahu’s office publicly confirmed the visit, but Abu Dhabi issued a rare denial of the trip, and as of publication, neither the UAE nor Israeli embassies in Washington had responded to requests for comment from Middle East Eye.

The new fund builds on already unprecedented security coordination between the two countries that unfolded after Iran launched a massive wave of drone and missile strikes across the Gulf in response to the February U.S.-Israeli attack on Iranian targets. The UAE bore the brunt of this retaliation, with nearly 3,000 Iranian projectiles targeting its territory, and U.S. Ambassador to Israel Mike Huckabee confirmed in May that Israel deployed Iron Dome air defense batteries and operating personnel to the UAE during the conflict to bolster its defensive capabilities.

Regional security analysts describe the joint defense fund as a natural next step in the deepening bilateral relationship, which was normalized under the 2020 Abraham Accords — a deal whose supporters long cited expanded defense cooperation as a core strategic benefit. “Israel will need UAE money. We have the technology, but we lack the resources. The UAE has the resources, but lacks the technology,” explained Yoel Guzansky, a senior Gulf-focused fellow at Tel Aviv’s Institute for National Security Studies.

Unlike multi-national defense procurement projects in Europe that have faced significant bureaucratic and political headwinds in efforts to coordinate spending against Russian threats, funding is far more straightforward for the UAE, an absolute monarchy that does not publicly disclose its full defense budget. Independent estimates place the UAE’s 2026 defense spending at approximately $27 billion, equal to 5% of its total gross domestic product, and diplomats and defense industry sources expect all Gulf Cooperation Council states to ramp up defense outlays in the wake of Iran’s large-scale strikes. Abu Dhabi, the UAE’s wealthiest and most powerful emirate, alone controls nearly $2 trillion in assets through its sovereign wealth funds and holds the majority of the country’s oil reserves, giving it vast capital to deploy for defense investment.

The joint initiative also follows a string of already growing defense-industry ties between the two nations: in June 2025, UAE defense conglomerate Edge Group acquired a 30% stake in Israel’s Thirdeye Systems, an AI-powered drone technology firm. Princeton University Near Eastern studies professor Bernard Haykel called the new fund a logical continuation of existing defense cooperation, noting that it addresses shifting strategic financial realities for Israel. For decades, Israel has relied heavily on U.S. military financing, receiving roughly $3 billion in annual foreign military aid plus an additional $21 billion in defense funding through September 2025, according to Brown University’s Costs of War Project. But support for unrestricted U.S. military aid to Israel has plummeted among American voters, particularly younger generations across the political spectrum, and Netanyahu himself has publicly acknowledged Israel may need to phase out U.S. aid over time.

“The UAE has money. This is a time when US money is being threatened, so why not switch to the UAE? [Israel] needs to diversify,” Haykel told Middle East Eye.

The closer defense alignment between Abu Dhabi and Jerusalem comes amid divergent post-conflict strategies among Gulf nations, even as all three major Gulf states — the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar — initially opposed the U.S. war on Iran. After hostilities began, Saudi Arabia and the UAE both granted expanded basing and overflight access to U.S. forces and joined in limited strikes against Iran, per Reuters reporting. But Saudi Arabia has since pivoted to backing Pakistani-led mediation efforts to end the conflict, while the UAE has actively worked to derail peace talks and lobbied heavily for the U.S. to continue its military campaign against Iran.

Firas Maksad, Middle East and North Africa managing director at Eurasia Group, explained that Abu Dhabi fears any nuclear-focused peace deal struck by the Trump administration with Tehran will leave Gulf states facing an emboldened Iran without addressing the core threats the UAE prioritizes: Iran’s regional proxy networks, ballistic missile program, and long-range drone capabilities. “The Gulf states believe they are going to be left holding the bag on any deal the Trump administration strikes with Iran, which is focused on the nuclear file and Strait of Hormuz. The Gulf states need to address Iran’s proxies, ballistic missiles and drones,” Maksad said.

Unlike Saudi Arabia, which has responded to growing uncertainty over the long-term reliability of the U.S. security umbrella by deepening security ties with Pakistan, Turkey, and Egypt — a move that included Pakistan deploying 8,000 troops, a fighter jet squadron, and a Chinese-built air defense system to the kingdom in recent weeks — the UAE has taken a vastly different approach.

“The Emiratis will not be part of that construct,” Maksad said. “Their means of leverage with the Iranians is their relationship with Israel. The more adversarial the relationship is with Iran, the closer the UAE will draw to Israel and develop those security ties.”

A candid off-script conversation caught on a hot microphone last September has offered a rare, unfiltered glimpse into the close personal and diplomatic bond between Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin, as the two leaders walked through Beijing’s iconic Tiananmen Square. In the casual exchange, Putin was heard musing on the possibility of extending human lifespan dramatically through sequential organ transplants, even joking about achieving immortality, to which Xi responded by noting expert projections that humans could reach a 150-year lifespan within the current century. For two long-ruling leaders who have publicly called each other their closest friend and have held power for a combined 39 years with no plans to step down, the lighthearted, off-the-record chat offered one of the few public insights into a partnership that has long been misunderstood and shrouded in secrecy. This week, that partnership is stepping back into the global spotlight, as Putin prepares to return to Beijing to mark the 25th anniversary of the landmark Treaty of Good-Neighbourliness and Friendly Cooperation between the two nations. The visit comes on the heels of U.S. President Donald Trump’s high-profile, extravagantly staged trip to meet Xi last week, which featured opulent banquets with gold tableware and a private tour of an ancient cultural site. In stark contrast, Putin’s visit has been deliberately low-key, with almost no advance details released to the public. The Kremlin has confirmed that one key goal of the trip is to hear a first-hand account of the discussions between Trump and Xi during the U.S. leader’s visit. It has also been reported that during Trump’s walk through Zhongnanhai — Beijing’s closed leadership compound, rarely accessed by foreign visitors — Xi casually referenced his long-time friend Putin, joking that the Russian leader had previously toured the restricted political space. While some in Washington have held out hope that Trump could persuade Beijing to distance itself from Moscow, analysts broadly agree that those hopes are little more than unfounded wishful thinking. In recent years, the two countries have formally described their bilateral connection as a “friendship with no limits”, but the reality of the partnership is far more nuanced than the slogan suggests. The dynamic between the two nations is deeply asymmetric, with any bilateral agreements overwhelmingly favoring Chinese terms, according to Alexander Gabuev, director of the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center. “Russia is fully in China’s pocket, and China can dictate the terms,” Gabuev explains. This power imbalance is most visible in the economic sphere: China holds the position of Russia’s largest single trading partner, while Russia accounts for just 4% of China’s total global trade. China’s overall economy is many times larger than Russia’s, and it dominates exports to the Russian market. Years of sweeping Western sanctions imposed on Russia following its 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine have gradually pushed Moscow deeper into economic and diplomatic alignment with Beijing, creating new opportunities for Chinese firms to fill gaps left by departing Western companies. A prime example is Chinese tech giant Huawei, which has been targeted by U.S. sanctions and forced out of the United Kingdom’s 5G network. The company has capitalized on the exit of Western competitors to become a central foundational player in Russia’s telecommunications industry. As Russia’s economic and technological links to the West have fractured, China has become the primary source of expertise for Russia across technology, science, and industrial sectors. Most critically for Moscow’s foreign policy goals, Russia has grown increasingly dependent on Chinese components to sustain its war machine in Ukraine. A recent analysis from Bloomberg found that more than 90% of the technology restricted by Western sanctions that Russia imports now comes from China, representing a 10% increase from the previous year. Russian leadership is acutely aware of the risks that come with this lopsided dependence. In a recent commentary titled “We bow to no one”, Dmitry Trenin, president of the Moscow-based Russian International Affairs Council think tank, emphasized that Russia has no desire to become a vassal state of Beijing. “It’s absolutely essential for us to maintain an equal footing in our relations and to remember that Russia is a great power which cannot be a junior partner,” Trenin wrote. Yet for Moscow, there are few viable alternative partners to replace Beijing. China offers a scale of market demand for Russia’s core exports that no other country can match, a role that has become integral to Russia’s economic stability amid its break with the West. If China were to reduce its trade volumes with Russia, it would severely undermine Moscow’s ability to pursue its core foreign policy and military objectives. Despite the imbalance, Russia retains key buffers that prevent Beijing from exerting unchecked dominance over the relationship, analysts note. Marcin Kaczmarski, a security studies lecturer at the University of Glasgow, explains that Chinese policy makers are fully aware of the severity of the power asymmetry, and have deliberately adopted a policy of self-restraint to avoid a backlash among Russian political elites. “I would say that a summary of Chinese policy towards Russia is one of self-restraint. China is not pushing Russia around,” Kaczmarski says. This cautious approach stems in large part from recognition that while Russia is the junior partner, it remains a proud major power that is unlikely to acquiesce to external pressure. Gabuev points to a notable example from 2023, when Xi Jinping visited Moscow and was widely reported to have urged Putin to refrain from using nuclear weapons in Ukraine. Just days after the meeting, Russia announced it would station tactical nuclear weapons in neighboring Belarus, a move widely interpreted as a deliberate show of resistance to external pressure and a reminder of Russia’s independent strategic posture. While Russia’s protracted war in Ukraine creates certain liabilities for China, it also brings tangible strategic benefits for Beijing as it navigates its own regional tensions, particularly surrounding Taiwan. “Russia brings a lot to the table in terms of some military technologies such as niche equipment that it can still sell, and testing some Chinese equipment or components,” Gabuev says. Beyond military technology, Russia’s vast reserves of oil and natural gas hold huge strategic importance for China, which has been seeking to diversify its energy supplies to reduce geopolitical risk. In a May press conference, Putin noted that the two sides were close to achieving a “highly significant step forward in oil and gas cooperation”, a comment widely interpreted as referring to the long-stalled Power of Siberia 2 pipeline project. After years of slow negotiations, Russian energy giant Gazprom and China National Petroleum Corporation have reportedly signed a preliminary agreement for the pipeline, which will deliver 50 billion cubic meters of Russian natural gas to China each year via Mongolia. If completed, the project will be a transformative development for China’s energy security, particularly as tensions escalate in the strategic Strait of Hormuz. For Beijing, the shift toward increased reliance on Russian energy is not just a matter of pricing; it is a critical investment in long-term energy security amid growing global geopolitical instability. Unlike formal military alliances that require rigid coordination and shared commitments, the China-Russia partnership is defined by its deliberate strategic flexibility, a feature that analysts say gives it surprising resilience. “It is not an alliance, but a flexible strategic partnership,” explains Bobo Lo, former deputy head of mission at the Australian Embassy in Moscow, a partnership that has defied repeated Western predictions of imminent collapse. Western analysts have typically framed the Sino-Russian relationship in one of two extreme narratives: either as a unified “axis of authoritarianism” bound together by a shared goal of undermining the U.S.-led global order, or as a brittle, untrustworthy brotherhood on the brink of collapse. Neither narrative captures the nuanced reality of a deeply integrated partnership that two neighboring countries have built around shared core interests, despite their significant power asymmetry and occasional divergent priorities. Lo notes that even if both countries were to improve their relations with the West, they would still retain strong incentives to maintain close cooperation. The foundational shared interests are clear: first, they share a 4,300-kilometer border that was once a source of constant tension and insecurity, but is now a peaceful frontier that supports cross-border trade and cooperation. Second, their economies are deeply complementary: Russia is a leading exporter of energy and raw materials, while China’s massive industrial economy provides a ready, large-scale market for those exports. Third, both countries share a core opposition to the existing U.S.-led international order. A further unifying feature is the mutual non-interference stance the two countries adopt toward each other’s internal affairs. Unlike Western nations, which often condition engagement on shared values and human rights standards, Moscow and Beijing do not publicly criticize each other for controversial domestic policies. Western nations have raised repeated concerns over alleged large-scale human rights abuses in China’s Xinjiang region, which China denies, and over the death of Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny, but neither Russia nor China has commented on these issues in the other’s case. “They don’t criticise each other over Xinjiang, the poisoning of Russian Navalny and so on. And they look eye-to-eye on a lot of issues of local governments in the UN… that creates an organic symbiotic relationship,” Gabuev says. This pragmatic approach to bilateral relations has deep historical roots that stretch back through the final years of the Soviet Union and into the post-Soviet era, he adds. On the question of whether the partnership will remain durable over the long term, one anonymous Chinese analyst acknowledged that the public framing of the relationship as an inseparable “boundless friendship” is partially performative, designed to project an image of unity and stability to the world. In practice, the public display of unity acts as a useful political tool to smooth over occasional differences in national priorities. While both countries oppose what they frame as “Western hegemony”, their strategic approaches to challenging that order differ significantly. The analyst noted that Russia favors building a new global order that completely bypasses the United States, while China adopts a far more cautious and pragmatic stance, prioritizing gradual, long-term gains over open confrontation and avoiding rash, high-stakes decisions. A clear example of this divergence came in China’s measured response to U.S. actions in Iran in the lead-up to Trump’s visit: Beijing refused to abandon its planned summit preparations, a choice that “clearly shows Beijing’s willingness not to provoke and not to close doors,” the analyst said. China has prioritized keeping communication channels open with Washington and avoiding unnecessary provocation, a markedly different approach from Russia’s more confrontational stance. Beyond high geopolitics, the depth of the Sino-Russian partnership is also being shaped by growing people-to-people ties, a factor that is often overlooked in mainstream analysis. From the top down, Xi and Putin have worked to cultivate an image of close personal friendship that sets the tone for broader bilateral connections. This visit will mark Putin’s 25th trip to China, and Russian bureaucratic officials interact with their Chinese counterparts more frequently than with officials from any other country. Not all analysts are convinced that popular cultural affinity between the two publics runs deep. Charles Parton, a former British diplomat to China, argues that ordinary citizens of both countries still prioritize the West when it comes to travel, study, and investment. “Do Chinese want to study in Moscow and settle in Moscow and buy flats in Moscow? No,” Parton says, noting that when given the choice, Russians prefer to invest and settle in Western cities like Paris, London, and Cyprus rather than Beijing. But Gabuev pushes back on that claim, arguing that people-to-people connections have grown rapidly in recent years, driven largely by Western sanctions and tighter European visa policies that have pushed ordinary Russians to turn toward China. A mutual visa-free travel regime between the two countries means Russians can easily travel to major Chinese cities, with multiple daily direct flights from Moscow. Russians are also increasingly adopting Chinese consumer technology and automobiles, a trend that has accelerated following Western sanctions that cut off access to many European and American brands. “So the interconnectedness, visa-free travel and ease of payment and navigation makes China much closer than it used to be. And then all of the exchange programmes, scholarships, joint research programmes bring the two societies closer,” Gabuev says. While the growing power imbalance between Moscow and Beijing remains a long-term structural weakness for the partnership, most analysts agree that predictions of an imminent collapse are unfounded, at least in the near term. Despite their differences and divergent priorities, Lo says, “The Sino-Russian partnership remains resilient. Both sides recognise that it is too important to fail, especially given there are no viable alternatives to continuing cooperation.”