标签： Asia

In the months following the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s Syrian government, bilateral relations between Lebanon and neighboring Syria have hovered in a tense limbo, caught between shared strategic necessity and decades of accumulated mutual mistrust. Tied together by shared geography, intertwined history, overlapping security interests, and a sprawling backlog of unresolved bilateral disputes, neither nation has managed to shake off the heavy legacy of their fraught past.

Lebanon has remained deeply wary of any return to the era of Syrian political dominance over its domestic affairs, while Syria’s new leadership under President Ahmed al-Sharaa is keenly alert to the risk that unilateral policy moves by Beirut could spill across their shared border and undermine Damascus at a critical transitional moment for the war-torn state. That underlying tension has now flared anew around one of the region’s most sensitive diplomatic topics: direct bilateral negotiations with Israel.

According to a senior Lebanese official with direct knowledge of recent diplomatic exchanges between Beirut and Damascus, Syria has raised clear concerns that Lebanon’s rapidly advancing negotiation track with Israel is proceeding without sufficient coordination with the Syrian government, even as Damascus’s own talks with Tel Aviv remain stalled. The Syrian position was laid out explicitly during Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam’s recent official visit to Damascus, where he held talks with al-Sharaa.

“The Syrian leader spoke in a diplomatic, non-confrontational tone, but made clear that coordination between the two countries on issues of vital national interest was essential to strengthening the negotiating hand of both sides,” the Lebanese official shared.

Damascus’s unease extends beyond the simple breach of diplomatic protocol: Syrian leaders worry that Beirut’s separate negotiation path could set a precedent that international powers will later pressure Syria to follow. For months, United States officials have cited ongoing Syrian-Israeli diplomatic contacts to push Lebanon to launch its own direct talks with Israel. But with the Syrian negotiation track now largely deadlocked – in large part because Damascus judges Israel unwilling to make meaningful territorial or security concessions – the regional diplomatic dynamic has shifted dramatically. What began as a tool to pressure Lebanon to align with Syria’s approach could now become a mechanism to force Syria to adopt Lebanon’s framework.

Lebanon’s negotiation process carries additional sensitivity given the conditions under which it has unfolded. Lebanese President Joseph Aoun previously pledged that Beirut would not enter talks until a permanent ceasefire with Israel was implemented. Yet diplomatic contacts have continued even as Israeli military strikes on Lebanese territory persist, despite a nominal ceasefire agreement reached in mid-April.

For Damascus, this creates a core strategic threat: if Lebanon advances negotiations amid ongoing violence and makes early concessions to Israel, Syria could face mounting pressure from Washington and other global actors to accept an identical unfavorable framework. The dispute over negotiations has added a new layer of friction to an already deeply fragile bilateral relationship.

The two neighbors are still working through a host of long-simmering unresolved issues: the status of Syrian detainees held in Lebanese prisons, unresolved land and maritime border demarcation, the future of Hezbollah’s role in regional security, the presence of former Assad regime officials in Lebanese territory, and the fundamental question of how to restructure their security relationship after decades of domination, open hostility, and mutual suspicion. Syrian unease over Beirut’s unilateral moves has already emerged across multiple of these files.

Back in December, Damascus raised formal objections to Assad-linked military officers residing in Lebanon, with Syrian security officials sharing name lists with their Lebanese counterparts and warning that some of these figures could use Lebanese territory as a base to plot against Syria’s new government. Damascus has also framed the resolution of the Syrian detainee issue as a non-negotiable prerequisite for any meaningful improvement in bilateral ties.

The Israel negotiation file is now the latest addition to this complex web of competing interests. For Syria, the dispute is not merely a matter of diplomatic etiquette – it is a question of strategic leverage. Damascus argues that despite their bitter shared history, Lebanon and Syria face overlapping regional vulnerabilities, meaning any concession Lebanon makes to Israel – particularly on security arrangements, border demarcation, or post-war security guarantees – will indirectly erode Syria’s own future negotiating position.

“This is why Sharaa stressed that coordination on vital issues was not an optional courtesy, but a strategic necessity,” the Lebanese official said. “If Syria takes one step in favour of Lebanon, Lebanon should understand that its own vital interests require it to take many steps in favour of Syria.”

That comment underscores the core asymmetry in how the two sides view their relationship: while Lebanon fears a return to Syrian dominance, Syria believes that Lebanese policy decisions can still expose it to severe strategic risk.

The dispute over maritime energy rights adds further complexity to the dynamic. Turkey has already raised sharp objections to Lebanon’s 2025 exclusive economic zone agreement with Cyprus, arguing that the deal was reached without sufficient consideration of Syrian and Turkish economic and security interests in the Eastern Mediterranean. The incident has reinforced a widespread regional perception that Beirut often pushes ahead on sensitive cross-border issues without adequate consultation with neighboring stakeholders.

Against this backdrop, Damascus does not view Lebanon’s separate talks with Israel as an isolated domestic decision by Beirut. Instead, it frames the move as part of a broader pattern of unilateral action by Lebanon on issues that carry implications far beyond its own borders.

A senior Syrian official noted that Damascus has repeatedly emphasized to Arab regional states the need for coordinated diplomatic strategy and the risk of separate negotiation tracks that weaken the broader Arab position in talks with Israel. “There is a positive atmosphere, but there are realities on the ground that cannot be ignored,” the official said. “Cooperation with Lebanon is growing, but it has not yet reached the required level. The issue is less about disagreement and more about poor coordination.”

The official added that Syria has a clear stake in a stable, prosperous neighbor: “The Syrian state wants Lebanon to be strong and capable of standing on its own feet,” he said, noting that al-Sharaa has stressed in meetings that Lebanon is navigating an unusually sensitive period and requires more innovative solutions than the outdated frameworks it has relied on in the past. Damascus believes Lebanon needs “precise tools” to navigate this transitional phase, and that Syria’s role is to support Beirut rather than add to existing pressure, the official added.

For Lebanon, the core risk is that what appears to be an effort to expand diplomatic room for maneuver could end up narrowing its long-term options. A unilateral negotiation track with Israel could deepen Syrian mistrust, alienate Turkey, complicate Beirut’s own domestic political relationship with Hezbollah, and leave Lebanon exposed to pressure from international actors pushing for a quick, superficial deal rather than a durable, sustainable peace settlement.

For Syria, the risk follows a different logic. Having inherited a fractured state, a weakened regional position, and already difficult talks with Israel, Damascus fears that Lebanon’s acceptance of a US- and Israeli-backed negotiation framework could create a regional precedent that Western powers will later use to pressure Syria into accepting identical terms.

That said, the current tension does not signal an imminent slide into open confrontation between the two neighbors. On the whole, diplomatic exchanges between the two sides remain cautious and pragmatic. Both states still depend on one another: Syria needs Lebanon to prevent its territory from becoming a staging ground for anti-Damascus opposition activity, while Lebanon relies on Syria for border management, progress on the detainee file, refugee repatriation, anti-smuggling oversight, security coordination, and any credible regional peace settlement.

For Lebanon, the central question now is whether it can advance negotiations with Israel while maintaining a coherent, aligned regional posture. For Syria, the key challenge is whether it can prevent Lebanese policy decisions from becoming a precedent that undermines its own negotiating position.

The latest developments make clear that the post-Assad bilateral relationship has not yet evolved into an institutionalized, trust-based strategic partnership. It remains largely transactional, reactive, and still shaped by the lingering suspicions of the past. Caught between the legacy of the old order and the demands of a new regional landscape, the two neighbors face a familiar dilemma: they are no longer bound by the old hegemonic relationship, but neither can afford to ignore one another’s core strategic interests.

A prominent Egyptian-Palestinian activist and academic has secured a landmark provisional legal victory over the French government, after an administrative commission ruled that his planned deportation over pro-Palestine advocacy violates fundamental European rights to privacy and free expression.

Ramy Shaath, a veteran organizer of the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings in Egypt, had been targeted for expulsion by French authorities, who labeled him a “serious threat to public order” stemming from his participation in pro-Palestine demonstrations and leadership in Palestinian solidarity groups. But the Hauts-de-Seine departmental deportation commission determined Thursday that removing Shaath would run counter to France’s commitments to protecting fundamental civil liberties.

Shaath’s case carries unique layers of complexity that the commission weighed heavily in its ruling. The activist spent 900 days in Egyptian state detention between 2019 and 2022, and he has since been stripped of his Egyptian citizenship. Compounding this, he cannot be transferred to his ancestral home in Gaza, where Israel’s ongoing military campaign has created an uninhabitable, war-ravaged environment. The commission also found that deporting Shaath to an alternate third country would amount to an unacceptable, disproportionate violation of his right to private and family life; Shaath resides in France with a French spouse and child.

While the commission’s ruling is only advisory, and the French government retains the authority to move forward with a final deportation order regardless of the decision, Shaath framed the outcome as a significant embarrassment to state authorities and a turning point for pro-Palestinian advocacy in France.

“It’s a very important win – the ruling was absolutely decisive, saying that Ramy is not a danger to public order or to France in any way,” Shaath told Middle East Eye in an interview Friday. “Nevertheless, based on the French oppressive system, their decision is advisory, so the ministry can tomorrow, or the day after, issue a final deportation order for me.”

Shaath comes from a leading Palestinian political family: he is the son of Nabil Shaath, a veteran Palestinian chief negotiator and former Palestinian Authority prime minister, and previously advised late PLO leader Yasser Arafat as part of the PA’s peace negotiation team. Beyond his Palestinian political work, Shaath rose to prominence in Egypt as a leading organizer during the 2011 Arab Spring protests that ousted longtime autocratic leader Hosni Mobarak, and later served as coordinator of the Egyptian chapter of the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement pushing for accountability for Israeli occupation.

After his release from Egyptian prison in 2022, following a high-profile international pressure campaign that included intervention from French President Emmanuel Macron, Shaath settled in France on a one-year residence visa. His conflict with French authorities escalated in late 2023, when he co-founded the Urgence Palestine collective. Then-Interior Minister Bruno Retailleau moved to dissolve the group, accusing it of “glorifying a terrorist organisation such as Hamas, calling for an Intifada on national territory, and inciting hatred, violence or discrimination against Jews.” The dissolution attempt drew international pushback, with a group of United Nations experts warning that the move would represent an unnecessary and disproportionate restriction on fundamental civil freedoms.

Shaath applied to renew his French residence visa in September 2023, but never received a formal response from authorities. He filed 10 separate urgent appeals for renewal without success, despite his legal family ties to the country. On 30 April, he received formal notice at his Paris-area home that deportation proceedings had been opened against him.

A formal document from the Nanterre prefecture outlining the deportation order cited Shaath’s public speeches, lectures, and activist appearances as core justifications. It specifically called out his connections to leading pro-Palestine organizers in France, his public descriptions of Israel’s military campaign in Gaza as a criminal occupation, his public anti-Zionist stance, and his support for a one-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Shaath has denounced what he calls a deliberate, extrajudicial administrative campaign against him. “We are facing an administrative maze that is beyond the law and every time they try to go to court they lost – but they’re still increasing those tactical games just like Third World fascist regimes and systems,” he told Middle East Eye.

Even as the case remains unresolved, Shaath emphasized that the commission’s ruling marks a critical victory for free speech for pro-Palestinian organizers in France, who have faced growing criminalization of their advocacy since the outbreak of the latest Israel-Gaza war in October 2023.

“It asserts that the language of Palestine and the language of calling for an end to Zionism, the right of the Palestinian people to resist even with arms…all are today cleared under the rule of freedom of expression,” he said. “We will win – they are losing the fight and that is why they are panicking.”

In a move that underscores deep diplomatic pressure on the Palestinian mission at the United Nations, Palestinian UN Ambassador Riyad Mansour has formally pulled his name from contention for the vice presidency of the UN General Assembly, following explicit threats from the United States to revoke the entire Palestinian delegation’s entry visas if he refused to abandon the race, National Public Radio has reported.

Citing an anonymous source with direct knowledge of the internal developments, the outlet confirmed that Lebanon’s ambassador will now take Mansour’s place on the ballot. The Palestinian UN delegation communicated through a third Arab nation that Mansour would not seek the vice presidential position for the 2024-2026 term, according to the report. La Neice Collins, spokesperson for the sitting UN General Assembly president, later issued a public statement confirming the withdrawal, cementing the outcome of the behind-the-scenes pressure campaign.

Documents show that internal communications from the US State Department, dated Tuesday, had explicitly instructed American diplomatic staff based in Jerusalem to ramp up pressure on Palestinian leadership to force Mansour out of the race. The cable argued that Mansour’s candidacy ran counter to former US President Donald Trump’s ongoing policy proposals for the post-conflict future of the Gaza Strip. The department’s message was uncompromising: “We will hold the Palestinian Authority responsible if the Palestinian delegation does not withdraw its VPGA candidacy.”

The cable also carried a veiled reference to past punitive visa actions, reminding recipients that Washington had already denied entry visas to Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas and 80 other senior Palestinian officials ahead of last year’s UN General Assembly gathering in New York. It noted that “it would be unfortunate to have to revisit any available options” — a clear signal that the US was prepared to enact new restrictions if its demands were not met.

As of press time, the Palestinian UN mission has not issued an immediate response to requests for comment from Middle East Eye, the independent outlet that first expanded on the reporting of the incident.

This latest withdrawal marks the second time in 2024 that a senior Palestinian candidate has stepped back from a top UN leadership post amid foreign pressure. Back in February, Mansour withdrew his candidacy for the presidency of the UN General Assembly after coordinated lobbying campaigns from both the United States and Israel. At that time, the Palestinian mission framed the decision as a response to “the prevailing conditions in Palestine.”

The election for UN General Assembly president and the 21 vice presidential seats from regional groups across the world is scheduled to take place on June 2. The current controversy comes on the heels of a landmark May 2024 vote in the General Assembly that delivered expanded participation rights for the Palestinian Authority. In an unprecedented outcome, delegates overwhelmingly approved a measure granting Palestine enhanced standing beyond its current status as a non-member observer state, including the right to speak on all General Assembly agenda items, co-sponsor resolutions, and propose amendments to draft UN texts. The assembly also voted by a wide margin to back Palestine’s bid for full UN membership, marking a major diplomatic breakthrough for Palestinian statehood efforts that has drawn sharp pushback from the US and Israel.

GOTEMBA, Japan — In a dramatic display of military capability against the quiet backdrop of training grounds tucked into the foothills of Japan’s iconic Mount Fuji, the first rocket launched by U.S. Marines from a mobile launcher tore across the clear blue sky. A burst of flame preceded a thunderous roar that shattered the area’s pastoral calm, the engine’s bright orange glow leaving a sharp, visible trail in its wake. Five additional rockets followed in rapid sequence, before a second High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) truck emerged from its concealed position in a grove of evergreen trees, launched its own six-rocket salvo, and immediately withdrew back into cover.

This week’s brief live-fire drill at the U.S. military’s Camp Fuji East Maneuver Area, which lasted only a matter of minutes, carries outsize strategic weight. As Washington works to deter potential Chinese military action against Taiwan — the self-governing democracy that Beijing claims as its own territory and has not ruled out seizing by force — the exercise serves as a clear signal of American military credibility to regional allies.

The drill also lays bare a deliberate shift in U.S. military tactics across the Indo-Pacific, a change driven by the rapid modernization and expansion of China’s military capabilities over the past decade.

“The United States’ core goal is preventing a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, but it is no longer banking on the traditional large-scale carrier-based attack air wings that defined past conflicts,” explained Euan Graham, senior defense analyst at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute. “During U.S. tensions with Iran, more than 40 American manned and unmanned aircraft were destroyed or damaged by a far less capable adversary. Against China, that vulnerability would be exponentially greater. That is why the U.S. is now prioritizing smaller, dispersed, mobile units.”

According to the Pentagon’s most recent annual report to Congress, the new strategic framework aims to “deny any nation in the Indo-Pacific the ability to dominate the region or overpower our allies,” with a core focus on strengthening deterrence “through strength, not confrontation.”

The core value of the HIMARS system is written into its name. Mounted on a standard military truck, the rocket pod can be easily hidden from drone or satellite surveillance, driven to a firing position to launch its precision GPS-guided missiles, then relocate to a new hidden position almost immediately — a tactic military officials call “shoot-and-scoot.”

“Depending on the crew, we can be in and out in as little as two to four minutes,” said Sergeant Kevin Alvarez, section chief for one of the two HIMARS units from Fox Battery, 3rd Battalion, 12th Marines, 3rd Marine Division that took part in the Camp Fuji exercise.

First introduced roughly 20 years ago, HIMARS saw combat service in Iraq and Afghanistan, but it rose to global public prominence only after Ukrainian forces deployed it to devastating effect against Russian invasion forces. Recent conflicts, marked by the widespread proliferation of surveillance drones that can quickly spot and target static artillery positions, have only underscored the critical advantage of mobile systems like HIMARS.

“Compared to traditional cannon artillery, HIMARS is far quicker, far more maneuverable, and much easier to conceal,” noted Lieutenant Colonel Ryan Anness, commander of the 3rd Battalion. “Combine that with precision strike capability, and it’s easy to see why this system is a priority for so many nations, and for the U.S. military in the Pacific.”

HIMARS is compatible with a range of missile types. Initially, the U.S. only supplied Ukraine with shorter-range munitions, but it later approved the delivery of Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS), which can strike targets roughly 180 miles away. More recently, the U.S. has deployed the even longer-range Precision Strike Missile (PrSM), built by manufacturer Lockheed Martin, which can hit targets more than 310 miles away. According to Air Force General Dan Caine, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, PrSM saw its first combat use in February during operations against Iran, where HIMARS sank multiple Iranian surface ships and a submarine while docked in port.

Graham explained that when paired with the Army’s Typhon system — another truck-based launcher that fires longer-range Tomahawk missiles, though it is less maneuverable than HIMARS — the two systems can fully cover the Taiwan Strait and the strategically critical Luzon Strait between the Philippines and Taiwan if deployed on Taiwan and nearby Japanese and Philippine islands. Both waterways are central to any potential Chinese invasion or blockade of Taiwan.

“Ahead of any conflict over Taiwan, most large U.S. military assets would likely move outside the range of China’s coastal missile capabilities,” Graham said. “What would remain are highly survivable submarines, and small, dispersed units built around rugged, mobile systems like HIMARS.”

The Wednesday drill at Camp Fuji incorporated strict safety protocols: Japanese military observers oversaw the exercise, and a local road was closed as a precaution against stray projectiles, with some launches using inert, concrete-filled dummy rockets to meet safety requirements. Though the precautions slowed the drill compared to real combat operations, Anness emphasized that the exercise delivered tangible value both for troop readiness and for strengthening alliances in the region.

“Fielding long-range precision strike weapons directly bolsters deterrence here in the Pacific,” Anness said. “Training alongside our Japanese partners as often as we can ensures we are ready to respond if needed.”

In a significant announcement during a Senate hearing Thursday, acting U.S. Secretary of the Navy Hung Cao confirmed that the Biden administration has put a planned $14 billion arms sales package to Taiwan on hold, a move driven by the need to ensure sufficient ammunition stockpiles for ongoing U.S. military operations tied to the conflict with Iran. Cao, who has held the acting Navy post since April, explained that the pause is intended to align U.S. foreign military sales priorities with the demands of Epic Fury, the codename for joint U.S.-Israel military operations targeting Iran. He emphasized that the U.S. maintains adequate stockpiles for current operational needs, and that the arms sale to Taiwan will proceed once the administration determines it is appropriate to move forward.

The confirmation comes just days after former President and current U.S. President Donald Trump signaled uncertainty over his final approval of the package, framing the proposed sale as a “very good negotiating chip” in dealings with China and stating he planned to hold direct talks with Taiwan’s President Lai Ching-te on the issue. A potential direct conversation between the U.S. and Taiwanese heads of state would mark a sharp break with decades of diplomatic protocol: no formal direct dialogue between the two leaders has occurred in decades, though Trump did speak with Lai’s predecessor, Tsai Ing-wen, during his 2016 presidential transition period.

As of Friday, Taiwan’s presidential office has stated that it has received no formal notification from Washington about any adjustments to the planned arms sale, leaving Taipei in a holding pattern as the situation unfolds. For its part, Beijing has long viewed U.S. arms sales to Taiwan as a blatant violation of Chinese territorial claims. China insists Taiwan is an inalienable part of its territory, has repeatedly condemned American military support for the self-governing island, and has never ruled out the use of force to bring Taiwan under Beijing’s control.

The pause in the sale follows high-stakes talks between Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping during a recent presidential summit in Beijing, where Xi identified the Taiwan issue as the most sensitive and important matter framing bilateral relations between the two world powers. Trump later acknowledged that he discussed U.S. arms sales to Taiwan with Xi in great detail, a choice that breaks a 1982 U.S. commitment to Taiwan that Washington would not consult Beijing on arms sales to the island.

This latest development builds on already heightened tensions across the Taiwan Strait. In December of last year, Washington approved an $11 billion arms package for Taiwan, one of the largest such sales in history, prompting fierce pushback from Beijing. At the time, China’s foreign ministry warned that the sale would “accelerate the push towards a dangerous and violent situation across the Taiwan Strait.” In response to growing Chinese military pressure, Lai’s administration has significantly increased Taiwan’s defense budget in recent months, with Lai framing consistent U.S. arms support as a critical pillar of maintaining cross-strait peace and regional stability.